

THE DUALITY OF CLAIMS AND EVENTS: THE GREEK CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE TROIKA'S MEMORANDA AND AUSTERITY, 2010-2012*

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Protest campaigns consist of connected public events to which participants assign shared meanings. Data from thirty-one large protest events that occurred in Greece between January 2010 and December 2012—protests challenging neoliberal austerity policies and the “Troika’s” bailout package—enable us to illustrate a network-analytic approach to identify those connections. We treat claims as the linkages that assign a common meaning to different episodes of collective action, weaving them into a coherent national campaign. We also examine the ways that events provide a connection between different claims, merging them in distinctive political agendas. Agendas evolve over time, and while some thematic continuity is essential to the existence of a campaign, this does not imply total stability in protestors’ agendas. Data from Greek and transnational newspapers, electronic websites, and other media sources reveal both the continuity and shifts over the three main phases of the antiausterity campaign.

Since the start of the global crisis in 2008, several Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), structural adjustment measures imposed by international lenders and the “Troika”—European Commission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF)—have placed a heavy toll on the ordinary people of many (mostly Southern) European countries. They have also attracted considerable opposition from the street, similar to the response to previous crises in non-Western countries (Almeida 2010; Arce and Kim 2011; Auyero and Moran 2007; Lagi, Bertrand, and Bar-Yam 2011). Among European countries, Greece stands out for both the severity of the impact of the adjustment measures on people’s lives (Kousis 2014; Kousis and Kanellopoulos 2014; Monastiriotis 2013) and for the extent of its antiausterity mobilizations: the Greek police recorded over 20,210 protest events in the country between May 8, 2010 and March 28, 2014, of which about 6,266 occurred in Athens.¹

Apart from documenting one of the most dramatic episodes of contention in recent European politics, this article draws upon the Greek case to illustrate a network-analytic approach to collective action campaigns. Campaigns are viewed as sets of interconnected events sharing similar claims. At the same time, sets of claims that are advanced repeatedly and jointly in the same events come to constitute specific agendas. Looking at the networks connecting the largest events (more than 5,000 participants) that took place in Athens between February 2010 and November 2012 highlights the centrality of political grievances and threats to democracy over strictly economic claims in the unfolding of collective action in the country (see also Lefkofridi 2014).

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PROTEST CAMPAIGNS AS NETWORK STRUCTURES

Social movement analysts usually define a *campaign* as “a thematically, socially, and temporally interconnected series of interactions . . . geared to a specific goal” (della Porta and Rucht 2002: 3; see also Keck and Sikkink 1998: 6; Staggenborg and Lecomte 2009: 164). Campaigns cannot be equated with social movements, as their more focused aims and scope imply a different model of collective action: “Campaigns concentrate movement energies on specific goals. . . . [T]hey have important impacts on movement networks and subsequent campaigns. While movement campaigns are displays of unity aimed at demonstrating to authorities that the claims of activists are important to large numbers of people, social movements are typically neither unified nor unitary” (Staggenborg and Lecomte 2009: 164). Still, campaigns represent a higher level of contention than isolated protest events, and may be seen as a bridge between these and larger scale social movements. According to Tilly (2004: 4), “Unlike a one-time petition, declaration, or mass meeting, a campaign extends beyond any single event—although social movements often include petitions, declarations, and mass meetings.”

If social movements, conceived as sustained interactions between power holders and challengers (Tilly 1978), consist of nested campaigns, each campaign may be seen as a set of nested events. Relational approaches have long explored the connections between the constitutive elements of contentious processes, whether individuals, organizations, events, or cultural representations (Tilly 1978, 2005; Melucci 1996; Diani and McAdam 2003). Conducting such explorations, however, has proved to be problematic. Methodological constraints have often encouraged analysts to adopt an “aggregative” view of contentious episodes, according to which the structure of a process can be inferred from the distribution of the properties of its elements (Diani 2015: ch. 1). For example, protest event analysis has largely adopted an aggregative view of social movements, despite offering important insights on protest dynamics (e.g., Kriesi et al. 1995). The “dynamics of contention” approach has actually attempted to address the difficulties of the political process perspective on this particular ground, spurring a relational focus on collective action fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Analysts from other perspectives (e.g., Armstrong 2005) have done the same. Attention to the relational dimension of collective action and to the complex connections between its elements has been particularly strong among advocates of network-analytic approaches to the study of fields (Ansell 2003; Diani 1995). However, they have struggled to account for variation over time, due to lack of proper longitudinal data.

Here we propose an approach to collective action campaigns that combines insights from analyses of protest events and networks to map their evolution over time. Our theoretical goal is not to formulate testable hypotheses, but to refine our conceptualization of campaigns in such a way that enables the systematic analysis of the multiple relational layers within them.² A campaign can be seen as a particular type of network, connecting different sets of elements (at the very least, events, the organizations involved in them, and the claims advanced with each event). We cannot speak of a campaign when we have simply a set of events, promoted by different disconnected organizations and advancing different specific claims, even in the presence of a broad common issue. For example, the presence of protests against neoliberal austerity policies in Greece does not automatically suggest a unified campaign. Established and radical political organizations might, for instance, have promoted totally disconnected events, or each event might reflect the specific concerns of different sections of the Greek population. It is therefore important to explore the mechanisms that connect different public (protest) events into a specific campaign.

A bimodal approach to networks enables us to map the connections between different components of a campaign, while recognizing their duality. Connections are created not only by direct links between elements of a similar nature (e.g., organizations sharing resources, or individuals befriending each other), but also by the fact that elements of the same network are

involved in some activities or share some properties that can create opportunities of interaction. This was famously illustrated by Simmel's analysis of the effect of the intersection of social circles, namely, individual memberships in different types of social groups (Simmel 1955; Breiger 1974). One important implication of the approach has to do with the dual effect that intersecting circles have on social structure. On the one hand, individuals are linked through their membership in the same groups; on the other, social groups are connected by the fact of having many individuals in common (Breiger 1974).

This fundamental social mechanism easily translates to the analysis of campaigns. While connections are established between events because organizations promote several events, the joint involvement of some organizations in the same events indicates connections between those organizations (see e.g., Diani 2015). Likewise, activists' participation in multiple public events creates connections both among the activists attending the same events, and among the events attended by the same individuals (Carroll and Ratner 1996; Diani 2009).

However, campaigns also consist of connections between elements with no agentic capacity (e.g., between contentious events and the claims addressed in them). The recurrence of the same claims across events tells us to what extent such events reflect similar goals and world-views among their participants. In other words, we may treat claims as the connectors that assign a common meaning to different episodes of collective action: the greater the number of claims two events share, the closer their connection, and the sounder the assumption that they are part of the same campaign. This approach corroborates and strengthens insights from the more standard view, illustrated above, of individual and organizational agents operating as links between events. On the other hand, while each single protest event may give voice to several—even highly heterogeneous—claims, if the same claims tend to appear together in multiple events over a stretch of time, they are more likely to be part of a distinct political agenda involving specific populations (Tilly 2004: 4). At the same time, this approach enables us to explore the extent to which agendas evolve over time. While some thematic continuity is essential to the existence of a campaign, this does not necessarily imply total stability. Despite recent exceptions (Cinalli and O'Flynn 2014; Wada 2004), this perspective is still rarely adopted. This article contributes to such endeavor through a focus on the nonagentic elements in the recent Greek antiausterity campaigns.³

THE STUDY: LARGE PROTEST EVENTS IN GREECE IN 2010-2012

The study of large contentious events is especially useful for periods of "thickened history" when "the pace of challenging events quickens to the point that it becomes practically impossible to comprehend them and they come to constitute an increasingly significant part of their own causal structure" (Beissinger 2002: 27). This certainly applies to the actions that the Greeks (Kousis 2014; Kousis forthcoming) and other Southern European protesters took to confront the devastating impact of austerity policies and Troika Memoranda, which were imposed by a delegitimized Greek state and powerful economic and political transnational agencies during the turbulent period of 2010-12 (Kousis 2013).

Given our interest in assessing the connectedness of events in a national campaign, we concentrate on the first systematic set of large protest events (LPEs). Located within a "thickened" period, featuring more than 20,000 contentious episodes,⁴ LPEs (31 in total; see table 1) mostly consist of national demonstrations/marches and national strikes, but also include the "movement of the squares."⁵ They occur between January 2010 and December 2012 and share the following features:

1. high numbers of participants (minimum 5,000 - maximum 500,000);⁶
2. high numbers of parallel and synchronized actions in cities and towns across the country with the same claims (as shown in figure 1);

3. focus on national-level claims challenging the Troika's MoU and the government's austerity policies;
4. broad, cross-class coalitions involving a large number of groups and the general public;
5. based in Athens' Constitution Square, addressing the Parliament.

LPEs are widely covered by national and transnational media that depict the discursive content of claims making, the repertoire of related actions, the embeddedness of movement groups in multi-organizational fields, and the relations between opportunities and mobilization (Koopmans 2007). As in previous periods of "thickened history," a "blanketing strategy" (Beissinger 1998: 290-300), utilizing multiple available sources in order to enrich the dataset, seems to be the best option for protest event analysis. Primary and secondary sources were selected based on their continuous, reliable, and satisfactory coverage of the LPEs. The former include the high-quality, center-left, independent, daily *Eleftherotypia*;⁷ the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Greece, *Rizospastis*, founded in 1916; the leftist newspaper *Avgi*, operating since 1952 and recently expressing SYRIZA's party views; the electronic websites, *Athens Indymedia*. and *realdemocracy.gr*.⁸ These sources were supplemented with other Greek national news sources that met the criteria above, including *To Vima*, a high-quality centrist newspaper, published since 1922; *Ta Nea*, *Kathimerini* and *Naftemporiki*, high-circulation pro-government newspapers; the news site *in.gr*; leftist newspaper *Epohi*; center-left news site *tvxs*; high-quality international news sources like *The Guardian*, *Reuters*, *BBC*, and *CNN*, and blogs such as left-oriented *iskra.gr*; and the official sites of the two large unions of the public and private sectors. These supplemental sources offered valuable information during the three-year period, but especially since the closure of *Eleftherotypia* in December 2011.

Figure 1. Total Number of Synchronized LPEs in Greek Cities and Towns, 2010-12.⁹




Table 1. The Greek Campaign against MoU and Austerity Measures, 2010-12

PE #	Highest # Participants (Athens only)	Date of LPE	Major Form I	Major Form II
<i>Phase One: February 2010 – February 2011 (7LPEs)</i>				
1	50,000	2/24/2010	1st, 24hr General Strike GSEE-ADEDY	March and Demonstration
2	200,000	3/11/2010	2nd, 24hr General Strike GSEE-ADEDY	March and Demonstration
3	250,000	5/5/2010	3rd, 24hr General Strike GSEE-ADEDY	March and Demonstration
4	60,000	11/17/2010	Commemoration of the anti-junta Student Uprising	March and Demonstration
5	30,000	12/6/2010	Commemoration of Grigoropoulos and Youth Uprising	March and Demonstration
6	200,000	12/15/2010	4th, 24hr General Strike GSEE-ADEDY	March and Demonstration
7	250,000	2/23/2011	5th, 24hr General Strike GSEE-ADEDY	March and Demonstration
<i>Phase Two: March 2011 – February 2012 (18 LPEs)</i>				
8	50,000	5/25/2011	Movement of the squares (MoS)	MoS and Demonstration
9	100,000	5/29/2011	European Revolution 29 May—the Greek <i>Indignados</i>	MoS and Demonstration
10	30,000	5/31/2011	Movement of the squares	MoS and Demonstration
11	25,000	6/2/2011	Movement of the squares	MoS and Demonstration
12	400,000	6/5/2011	Movement of the squares	MoS and Demonstration
13	250,000	5/15/2011	6th, 24hr Gen. Strike GSEE-ADEDY and MoS	MoS and Demonstration
14	200,000	6/28/2011	7th, 48hr Gen. Strike GSEE-ADEDY and MoS	MoS and Demonstration
15	300,000	6/29/2011	7th, 48hr Gen. Strike GSEE-ADEDY and MoS cont.	MoS and Demonstration
16	50,000	10/5/2011	8th, 24hr General Strike GSEE-ADEDY	March and Demonstration
17	6,000	10/15/2011	Global Occupy Day	Demonstrations and Festivals
18	500,000	10/19/2011	9th, 48hr General Strike GSEE-ADEDY	March and Demonstration
19	300,000	10/20/2011	9th, 48hr General Strike GSEE-ADEDY	March and Demonstration
20	10,000	10/28/2011	Cancellation of Parade	March and Demonstration
21	20,000	11/17/2011	Commemoration of the anti-junta Student Uprising	March and Demonstration
22	10,000	12/6/2011	Commemoration of Grigoropoulos and Youth Uprising	March and Demonstration
23	250,000	2/10/2012-2/11/2013	10th, 48hr General Strike GSEE-ADEDY	March and Demonstration
24	500,000	2/12/2012	10th, 48hr General Strike GSEE-ADEDY	March and Demonstration
25	5,000	2/18/2012	Transnational Solidarity for Greeks Day	March and Demonstration
<i>Phase Three: March 2012 – December 2012 (6 LPEs)</i>				
26	200,000	9/26/2012	11th, 24hr General Strike GSEE-ADEDY	March and Demonstration
27	80,000	10/9/2012	Work Stoppage GSEE-ADEDY	Worker Demonstration
28	50,000	10/18/2012	12th, 24hr General Strike GSEE-ADEDY	March and Demonstration
29	100,000	11/6/2012-11/7/2012	13th, 48hr General Strike GSEE-ADEDY	March and Demonstration
30	6,000	11/14/2012	Work Stoppage GSEE-ADEDY	ETUC 1 st antiausterity strike
31	20,000	11/17/2012	Commemoration of 1973 Student	March and Demonstration

Based on the information drawn from 440 articles, 24 of the 31 events attracted more than 25,000 participants, reaching half a million demonstrators in one case. The others had fewer participants (between 5,000 and 24,000) but still played a significant political role. Five of these “smaller yet crucial” events were organized on dates commemorating (1) the refusal of Greece to allow Axis forces to enter Greece on October 28, 1940, which started the country’s participation in World War II; (2) the National Technical University (Polytechnio) student uprising against the military dictatorship on November 17, 1973; and (3) the unprovoked fatal shooting of sixteen-year-old Alexis Grigoropoulos by a policeman in the center of Athens on December 6, 2008.¹⁰ Three of these events adopted new, transnational forms of action, while sharing crisis-related claims with the other events: one took place on October 15, 2011, the day of the global Occupy mobilization; another launched a new solidarity campaign for the Greek people, i.e., “We Are All Greeks”/ “Je suis Grecque,” on February 18, 2012; and the third was part of the first antiausterity strike promoted by all European unions across member states on November 14, 2012 (Kousis 2014).

The range of contentious claims has been broad. To capture this diversity, a wider coding scheme was developed drawing from protest event analyses as well as political claims analyses (Koopmans and Statham 1999; Kousis 2014). Coding categories were created based on: (1) occurrences in media reports, (2) pilot coding, and (3) features of the policy area (following Koopmans 2002) and of the Southern European crisis (Lapavitsas et al. 2010: 323-27). As illustrated in table 2, eight basic types of claims are used for the purposes of this article. The *crisis packages* claims refer to distinct measures imposed by the Troika and the Greek state, which protesters pinpoint as the cause of contention. These measures include the second state financial package (March 25, 2010), the first Troika MoU bailout and austerity package (May 2, 2010), the second bailout package and soft restructuring of debt (June 21, 2011), the third bailout package and hard restructuring of debt (October 27, 2011), the Troika MoU loan package and PSI (February 9 and 13, 2012), and the post June-2012 election Troika measures. The *Eurozone* claim concerns protesters’ position on whether or not the country should leave or stay in the Eurozone. A number of claims focus on unprecedented *austerity laws and measures* such as wage decreases, tax increases or the introduction of new taxes, neoliberal structural reforms, cuts to jobs, cuts to pensions, privatization of public firms, or privatization of education. The next four sets of claims refer to the impact of such measures

Table 2. LPE Claims Related to Troika MoU and Austerity Policies in Greece, 2010-12

Types of claims	Avg. No. of LPEs in which claims are addressed	LPE Claim Frequency (no. of claims) per Phase		
		Feb 2010-Feb 2011	Mar 2011-Feb 2012	Mar 2012-Dec 2012
Opposing Crisis Packages	9.3	4.5 (7)	4.3 (19)	5.0 (6)
Greece in Eurozone	2.4	4.4 (7)	2.1 (9)	(0)
Unprecedented Austerity Laws and Measures	19.2	25.0 (39)	17.9 (79)	25.8 (31)
Impacts on Society	16.3	8.3 (13)	15.6 (69)	17.5 (21)
Impacts on the Economy	11.6	9.0 (14)	8.8 (39)	9.2 (11)
Impacts on Sovereignty	16.3	7.7 (12)	9.0 (40)	11.7 (14)
Impacts on Democracy	16.7	9.0 (14)	10.2 (45)	12.5 (15)
Accountability	20.2	32.1 (50)	32.1 (142)	18.3 (22)
		100.0 (156)	100.0 (442)	100.0 (120)

at four levels. *Societal* claims address dramatic consequences in terms of unemployment, poverty, inequality, social divisions, children’s future, crime rates, and suicides. *Economic* claims include concerns for deepening recession and for lack of growth; the difficulty to meet public borrowing targets, to invest in new technologies, and to increase productivity; and the sell out of natural resources to foreign interests. Claims in the *sovereignty* set range from broad concerns about Greece’s reduced independence to worries about the increasing power of the EU or the IMF over the Greek state, or about the extensive alienation of Greek territory (e.g., islands, public lands). Claims in the *democracy* category focus on the growing disregard for the Greek constitution, the indifference to labor and social welfare laws, and the threats to the right to peaceful protest. Finally, *accountability* claims attribute responsibility for the crisis and its consequences to a broad variety of actors, including the two major parties, the Greek state and government, bureaucrats and managers, political parties in general, the EU, banks, investors, capitalism, rich people, and “the 1 percent” (see table 2; more detailed distributions available from the authors).

The coding system has been designed to avoid overlaps between types of claims. Coding of action forms, actors, and claims has been done in an “open” manner, extending the codes when necessary. The coding scheme’s different drafts have been tested with different samples of protest events and accompanying claims. Overall, more than eight trials of the different versions of the coding instrument were carried out before coding began, resulting eventually in a total of fifteen revisions. In order to retain as much of the information available as possible, all categories of claims were coded as dichotomous yes/no variables (Kousis 1999). As in political claims analysis (Koopmans and Statham 1999), all claims were identified primarily on the basis of the information contained in the relevant media reports. If this information was limited or not available, claims were also identified in the organizers’ own press releases or websites.¹¹

NETWORKS OF EVENTS

In presenting our network-analytic reconstruction of Greek contention, we break down the protest wave into three distinct phases. The first phase runs from February 2010 to February 2011 and reveals an escalation of strikes and intense resistance to the Greek government’s “stability measures” and, more importantly, to Troika’s first memorandum and accompanying measures. The second period, from March 2011 to February 2012, is characterized by the protests spurred by the government’s Mid-Term Fiscal Strategy (2012-15) and the second memorandum. The third phase, from March until the end of 2012, is first dominated by the two consecutive national elections (on May 6 and June 17), then by large-scale contention in the fall.

Looking at the connections between LPEs—determined by the number of claims shared between them—generates three matrices, one for each phase:

1. 7x7 matrix with 7 events in phase one;
2. 18x18 matrix with 18 events in phase two;
3. 6x6 matrix with 6 events in phase three.


Table 3 reports data on the average density of the links between events across the three phases. This is an elementary measure of network cohesion (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson 2013: 151) that, in this particular case, reflects the extent to which different events address similar agendas. Over the entire wave of contention, pairs of events share, on average, almost 21 claims. The incremental, though steady, growth in this figure (from about 20 in the first phase to over 23 in the third) does not suggest significant changes in this pattern.¹² Rather, data point to the substantial continuity in the breadth of agendas through different episodes of contention. Apart from one exception (the commemoration of Alexis Grigoropoulos’s killing, held in December 2011), all LPEs are connected by at least one shared claim. It is therefore advisable to

Table 3. Density of Networks of Events over Different Phases

	Density	s.d.	Cut off
Phase One (February 2010- February 2011)	19.86	8.03	28
Phase Two (March 2011- February 2012)	21.77	14.65	36
Phase Three (March 2012- December 2012)	23.33	8.5	35
Total	20.9	12.5	33

focus on the strongest links—those that reflect the strongest similarity in agendas. In the graphs that follow, we look at connections that are one standard deviation above the average (cut-off points are reported in table 3). This strategy reveals a more dynamic picture than table 3 suggests, combining elements of continuity and discontinuity over time.

In the first phase of the conflict, between February 2010 and February 2011, LPEs consisted predominantly of general strikes (indicated by white circles in figure 2 below), called in reaction to the austerity and structural adjustment measures approved by Parliament and imposed by the Troika as the required conditions for Greece to receive rescue funds to avoid bankruptcy. These were promoted by the General Confederation of Private Sector Greek Workers (GSEE) and the Greek Confederation of Public Servants (ADEDY), and involved very broad coalitions and simultaneous rallies in Athens and other cities across the country. While five national strikes were called in this period (in February, March, May, and December 2010, and in February 2011), the most strongly connected events, in terms of shared agendas, are the ones that mark the start of the anti-Troika protests (LPEs 3, 6, and 7 in figure 2). In contrast, the strikes opposing the Greek government's austerity measures before the Troika stepped in (LPEs 1 and 2) seem to show more distinctive and narrower agendas (as illustrated by the smaller size of the circles in figure 2). Events with high symbolic content, like the commemorations of the November 1973 Polytechnic University student uprising against the military regime and the fatal shooting of teenager Alexis Grigoropoulos by a policeman in December 2008, provide further opportunities to voice strong claims against the first Memorandum and its accompanying measures. However, only the former (LPE 4 in figure 2) shows strong claim overlap with other events. This phase sees increasing radicalization of action repertoires and police responses, culminating in the death of three bank employees in a fire started by Molotov cocktails on the day of the May general strike.


Figure 2. Network of Events, Phase One

Notes: Circles: union-promoted general strikes. Squares: national demonstrations. Cut off = 28. Node size proportional to size of demonstration.

The escalation of the conflict in the second phase (March 2011 to February 2012) is reflected not only in the greater number of events and in the higher numbers of participants (table 1), but also in the greater heterogeneity of agendas as well as of actors playing key roles in the mobilization process. While in the first phase it was mainly unions and students/youth groups who acted as promoters of the protests, other actors played a more substantial role as the conflict evolved. These include citizens' action committees, anarchists and antiauthoritarian groups, professional groups from any layer of Greek society, and political parties from the left. The most noticeable phenomenon in the spring of 2011 was the emergence of the so-called "movement of the squares," strongly inspired by the Spanish *Indignados* (see Giovanopoulos and Mitropoulos 2011; Korizi and Vradis 2012; Leontidou 2012). Blaming political parties for the country's critical condition, the movement of the squares promoted a number of independent, peaceful events that attracted strong participation between May and June (LPEs 8-12, see table 1). An estimated two million people of all classes, ages, and political beliefs visited the protest camp of Syntagma square in Athens (Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos 2013: 448), while similar protest camps were simultaneously set up across most, if not all, Greek cities (Kousis 2014). Altogether, over one-third of Greek citizens seem to have taken part in protests across the country during the peak period of the movement of the squares in May and June of 2011 (Public Issue 2011; see also Rüdig and Karyotis 2013 for similar figures from the earlier phase of the conflict).

While movement of the squares activists rejected political party affiliations, they were nonetheless involved in general strikes promoted in the same period (LPEs 13-15, table 1). The combination of convergence on some major events and distance from established actors is also visible in the structure of the events network. In terms of shared claims, the national strikes initiated by the unions still provided the ground on which different agendas could most easily converge. Admittedly, the most-attended movement of the squares event in early June (LPE 12) and two demonstrations initiated by radical groups in the fall (LPEs 20 and 21) also showed strong convergence in agendas with national strikes (figure 3 below). Altogether, however, movement of the squares events, as well as cognate events with a transnational

Figure 3. Network of Events, Phase Two



Notes: Circles: union-promoted general strikes. Squares: national demonstrations. Triangles: "movement of the squares" protests. Diamonds: transnational events. Cut off = 36. Node size proportional to size of demonstration.


focus such as *Global Occupy Day* (LPE 17) or the *Transnational Solidarity for Greeks Day* (LPE 25), seem to carry more distinct claims, as illustrated by their peripheral position (where “peripheral” means distinctiveness in agendas, not marginality) in figure 3.

While police were more tolerant and street violence was reduced in the spring, repression was high again on the occasion of the June 21 national strike. High levels of repression continued in the fall when more national strikes were called on October 5 and 19-20 to challenge the Troika’s third Greek bailout package of “hard restructuring” (October 27, 2011) and the accompanying measures. These included greater wage flexibility and public sector downsizing, further pension reductions, insurance fund mergers, liberalization of “closed professions,” health-related reductions, minimum wage reductions and recapitalization of banks after debt restructuring (Monastiriotis 2013). These measures were met by fewer major protest events, which were, nonetheless, very intense and well-attended, including the tenth national 48-hours strike on February 10-12, 2012.

In the third phase (March to December 2012: see figure 4), contention decreased to more “normal” levels, both in number of events and participants (averaging 76,000 participants per event, versus 149,000 in the first phase and 167,000 in the second: see table 1). In such a context, and similar to what happened in the first phase, only national strikes seem to be strongly connected by a shared agenda while other demonstrations and transnational events seem more distinctive. The key event, on which the claims raised in other strikes converge, seems to be the 48-hours national strike (LPE 29) called on November 6-7, 2012. On that occasion, about 100,000 participants demonstrated against a new package of austerity measures that were passed by Parliament, under the threat of bankruptcy, in order to receive Troika’s 31.5 billion dollar rescue fund. The two LPEs addressing a narrower set of claims were a transnational event, the first antiausterity strike by European Trade Union Confederation-ETUC (LPE 30), as well as, once again, the commemoration of the anti-junta student uprising of 1973 (LPE 31).

In addition to a general fatigue—an expected outcome for long waves of intense mobilization—the fading of the movement of the squares contributed to the diminished levels of protest. However, in the third phase of the conflict left-wing political parties combined persistent mobilizing capacity in the streets with a substantially increased role in parliamentary politics. Despite the movement of the squares’s distrust for partisan politics, political organization like the Greek Communist Party (KKE), the Front of the Greek Anticapitalist Left (ANTARSYA), the Democratic Left (DIMAR), and of course the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) had been actively involved in protests in the earlier phases (see

Figure 4. Network of Events, Phase Three



Notes: Circles: union-promoted general strikes. Squares: national demonstrations. Diamonds: transnational events. Cut off = 35. Node size proportional to size of demonstration.

also Rüdig and Karyotis 2013). Their participation continued in the third phase,¹³ with two important differences: the withdrawal of DIMAR, who had become part of the new coalition government with ND and PASOK, from the antiausterity campaign; and the consolidated position of SYRIZA in conventional politics, as the Coalition of the Radical Left emerged from the double round of national elections in the Spring of 2012 as the second strongest party, with 27 percent of the votes.

NETWORKS OF CLAIMS

Having repeatedly referred to events being “linked” by shared sets of claims, it is now time to reverse the perspective, looking at how similar claims are raised across several events and, in the process, providing more details on the agendas pursued in the demonstrations. This approach generates three 66 by 66 matrices, one for each phase, in which nodes are claims and ties consist of the number of events in which two claims have been simultaneously raised. As in the case of events, the overall cohesion of the networks of claims seems fairly stable over time. On average, pairs of claims are raised in 1.4 events during the first phase, 5 events in the second, and again 1.4 in the third (see table 4). While the difference between phase two and the others may seem huge, this depends largely on the fact that the number of events is about three times larger in phase two than in the others. After controlling for the number of events that might possibly link two claims, the differences turn out to be insignificant. In other words, the exceptionally harsh austerity measures that preceded the spring 2012 national elections may have fueled a greater number of major protest events but do not seem to have altered the overall levels of connection between different claims. This does not mean, of course, that the overall pattern of connections between specific (sets of) claims had not changed, even substantially.

Table 4. Density of Networks of Claims over Different Phases

	Average (ctrl by N of events)	s.d.	Cut off	N of events
<i>Phase One</i>	1.39 (0.19)	1.94	3	7
<i>Phase Two</i>	4.98 (0.28)	5.26	10	18
<i>Phase Three</i>	1.42 (0.24)	2.38	4	6
<i>Total</i>	7.81 (0.25)	8.46	16	31


Similar to our analysis of ties between events, we explore structures of claims by focusing on connections that exceed by one standard deviation the average tie strength in a certain phase (details on cut-off points are reported in table 4). For the sake of simplicity, we focus on flows of connections between the eight types of claims we identified in table 2. Figure 5 shows a set of strongly interconnected themes, including concerns about the difficulties brought about by the crisis (“austerity measures” and “social impact”), worries about the state of democracy and Greek sovereignty, and aspirations to hold power holders accountable for the crisis (“accountability”). Claims most directly connected to the crisis packages and to specific actions by foreign actors, to the role of Greece in the Eurozone, or to the impact of the crisis on the competitiveness and efficiency of the Greek economy are, by comparison, less connected to a broader agenda.

Claims concerning the austerity measures imposed by Troika and enacted by Parliament, and their social impacts, are densely interconnected with claims attributing the responsibility for the country’s crisis to major transnational and national power holders. These include the Greek government, the Troika, political parties, the rich, banks, and capitalist agencies, as

reflected in the protesters' slogan: "The haves [rich], the thieves, the crooks, the power holders, should pay for the crisis."


The same pattern is found in phase two (figure 6), with claims focusing on issues of accountability, on the austerity measures and their impact, and on the assault on Greek democracy still dominating the scene. If anything, the overall integration of the core set of claims is even greater, with claims about the social consequences of the austerity measures

Figure 5. Connections between Types of Claims, Phase One



Note: Cut off = 2.0

Figure 6. Connections between Types of Claims, Phase Two



Note: Cut off = 7.2

being more connected to the others and, in particular, to arguments about the actors responsible for Greek people's suffering, and about the limitations imposed on Greek sovereignty. The impression of continuity between the first two phases of the mobilization is confirmed by a QAP regression¹⁴ of the full matrix of 66 claims in phase two on the corresponding matrix in phase one. As table 5 shows, the strength of ties between pairs of claims at the start of the campaign accounts for two thirds ($R^2 = .67$) of the links at the peak of the conflict.

As in the first phase, claims on attribution of responsibility are central to the agenda. So are concerns for the social consequences of the crisis and the degradation of living conditions for the working and middle classes. Of course, there are substantial differences regarding the ways through which the fight for democracy is to be conducted, with the loudest calls for direct action and grassroots democracy coming from activists in the movement of the squares.


The pattern changes dramatically in phase three (figure 7): the decentralized pattern in which several types of core claims appeared fairly integrated to each other is replaced by a star-shaped structure in which one set of claims operates as the connection between the others. This is not due to a significant reduction in the number of claims addressed by each protest, as the average figure modestly falls from 32 in the previous phase to 29 (it was 28 at the start of the protest wave). Rather, it suggests a tendency of specific types of claims to concentrate in specific events rather than spreading more evenly across events. The claims in the third phase

Table 5. Regression of Links between Claims in Phase One over Links in Phase Two

	Unstandardized coefficient	Standardized coefficient
Strength of ties between pairs of claims in phase one	2.233***	0.823***
Intercept	1.887***	0.000***
Adj R2		0.677***

Note: *** p<.001

Figure 7. Connections between types of claims, phase 3



Note: Cut off = 2.7

of the conflict still address the persisting decay of living conditions in Greece by combining, once again, critique of the austerity measures with anger for their consequences for ordinary Greeks. But in this phase, there is more emphasis on the specific impacts of the different crisis packages imposed by the Troika and the EU.

In contrast to the previous phases, there is just one set of claims in the third phase that seems to recur in differently focused agendas, which provides some integration to otherwise more differentiated claims. These claims relate to the state of Greek democracy, in particular, the disregard of the Greek constitution. This connects claims about the wreckage of the social

fabric in Greece, which we just highlighted, with claims about the threats to national sovereignty brought about by the crisis. References to the threatened constitution occur among both traditional and new political and social actors.

The impression of a non-negligible shift in the overall structure of claims between phase two and phase three is confirmed if we look at the overall distribution of ties between the 66 claims in the two phases. While similar data had suggested strong continuity between phase one and phase two (table 5), the picture here is rather different (table 6). The structure of claims in phase two still significantly affects the corresponding structure in phase three, yet the amount of explained variance is much lower (it drops from .67 to .29). In addition, data also suggest the agenda in phase three was partially shaped by the distribution of claims in phase two, but not significantly by the structure in phase one (table 6). In other words, the overall structure of agendas seems to evolve dynamically over time, with each phase affecting the next one. The stronger continuity between phases one and two may be at least partially attributed to the shock of Troika Memorandum-austerity policies and to the attribution of responsibility claims. As for the shift in agenda structures between phase two and phase three, one should note that the peak of the protests in phase two occurred during a pre-election period, in which power was in the hands of a nonelected government. Also during this period, the highly attended movement of the squares arose and later dissolved. On the other hand, during phase three, which followed the elections, there were more conventional protests with lower participation rates, sometimes on the occasion of events with an international focus. As might be expected during a phase of relative demobilization, claims tended to differentiate more across events, as promoters of each event tried to give it a particular spin and found it more difficult to promote broader, encompassing agendas.

Table 6. Regression of Links between Claims in Phase One and Two over Links in Phase Three

	Unstandardized coefficient	Standardized coefficient
Strength of ties between pairs of claims in phase one	0.129	0.105
Strength of ties between pairs of claims in phase two	0.203***	0.449***
Intercept	0.253***	0.000***
Adj R2		0.290***

Note: *** p<0.001

CONCLUSIONS

In this article we have proposed a novel approach to mapping collective action campaigns using basic network-analytic tools and exploring what we have called “the duality of claims and events.” In the process, we have also tried to contribute to the analysis of a major wave of protest in a country very badly stricken by neoliberal policies. Our analysis focused on 31 LPEs (large protest events) in Athens, i.e., the most conspicuous episodes of contention alongside hundreds of satellite protests across the country on similar claims. The number of connections among events—based on the sharing of broad sets of claims—and among claims—based on their recurrence in several events—leaves little doubt about the existence of an integrated campaign extending “beyond any single event” (Tilly 2004: 4). The campaign followed a fairly classic path: It started strongly in the wake of the first massive cuts to public spending, featuring highly attended demonstrations promoted primarily by the unions. It peaked in the second phase with a further rise in attendance, expansion of activities, inclusion of new actors—most notably, the Greek movement of the squares and radical left parties—and consolidation of a distinct, integrated agenda. Its third phase saw (relative) demobilization, as established unions again took a major role and as and claims became less connected

and more likely to break down into more distinct agendas. Even a cursory look at the events of 2013, which we were unable to cover in our study, confirms this pattern. In the course of that year, the focus of mobilizations shifted from broad national issues to more specific ones, yielding lower levels of participation but a diverse set of claims. These claims included Greek farmers' economic concerns (January and February), multicultural networks' rejection of fascism (January), gold mining (April), the shutdown of the historic public broadcasting service (ERT) and the firing of its 2,700 employees (June), and redundancies among municipal workers and teachers (in the Fall).

Our approach, however, generates insights that go beyond the confirmation of the (fairly obvious) fact that antiausterity protests were largely part of an integrated campaign. It enables us to identify at least two important features of recent Greek contention. First, it highlights the complex interplay of economic and political dimensions in the campaign (see also Kousis and Tilly 2005). On the one hand, there is no doubt that the roots of the campaign lay in the massive and sudden depletion of economic and social rights and well being that Greek working and middle class citizens have suffered as a consequence of "readjustment" policies, and that economic factors have mattered. On the other hand, the dominant agenda, reflected in the network of claims across different phases, was mainly articulated in political terms. The only set of claims that one finds consistently linked by strong ties across the three phases of the protest consisted of claims focusing on "democracy," which acted as bridges between claims on "sovereignty" and claims on "austerity measures." It is similarly revealing that claims about the suffering of Greek people because of the Troika measures were not strongly linked to other claims about the policy or economic dimensions of the crisis, but were instead mediated since phase two by claims concerning sovereignty and democracy. What is interesting is not so much that political claims are central in the Greek events (demonstrations are inherently political), but their specific articulation. The strongest links were not to claims for interventions by the national government or claims on the role of Greece in the Eurozone; rather, they were to claims voicing deep worries about the current state of Greek democracy and about threats to national sovereignty (a theme that, incidentally, resonates well across traditional left-right divides). Democracy, rather than the economy, was clearly at the center of popular reactions to the Greek crisis (see also Kotronaki 2013; Lefkofridi 2013; Seferiades 2013).

Secondly, we should note the persistent role of union-related events (in particular, general strikes) in weaving together different phases of contention, and in providing an occasional bridge to the actions promoted by the movement of the squares, despite the latter's principled hostility to established political actors. Our evidence reveals the unfolding of very broad cross-class coalitions, which facilitated and enhanced the mobilization potential of Greek society (Goldstone 2011; Rüdig and Karyotis 2013), reflecting characteristics of both "contained" as well as "warring" movements (Tarrow 2011). The breadth of the coalitions and the massive involvement of unions make the Greek campaign similar to earlier instances of mass contention, such as those that occurred in Italy between the late 1960s and the early 1970s (Pizzorno et al. 1978; Tarrow 1989).

Our exploration of the duality of claims and events in the Greek context yields considerable comparative potential. It is easy to imagine how our approach might contribute to mapping the variety of forms of popular reactions, and their interdependence, in the countries that have proved most vulnerable to the global financial crisis of 2008. Greek protests peaked at the same time as the flourishing of phenomena like the Occupy movement, the Arab and North African protests, the Eastern European protests, and the *Indignados*. Approaching those waves from the perspective of the duality of events and claims would not just enable us to reconstruct their internal structure; it would also offer an opportunity to trace the connections between those events through the sets of claims they might share.

NOTES

¹ Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection, Office of Parliamentary Control (April 4, 2014) “Reply to Inquiry 6964/14-03-14” (“The four-year chemical war against protesters” by SYRIZA Members of Parliament).

² See Stinchcombe (1968: chap. 2) on concept definition as a specific form of theorization.

³ In principle, one should devote a parallel analysis to the interplay of organizations and events (Diani 2003; Heaney and Rojas 2008). Here, however, we feel exempted from doing so because (a) there was a strong match between each event and a specific organization that played a major role in its promotion, which means that when talking about events we will also be talking about their main promoters; and (b) at the same time, organizations participated widely across events, which makes a specific analysis of the 2-mode network of organizations and events largely redundant.

⁴ See endnote 2, as well as <http://www.apergia.gr/> for a day-to-day calendar of protests in Greece, and a chronology of strikes assembled by the GSEE Press secretariat in 2013.

⁵ This term will be used throughout the article. It is the term used by activists of the spring-summer 2011 movement, who adopted actions carried out in the squares of urban areas, similar to the Spanish *Indignados* and North African activists. Other terms have also been used to describe this “movement,” such as the “piazza movement” (Leontidou 2012), the “Greek *Indignados*” (*aganaktismenoi*), and “the Determined” (*apofasismenoi*); these will not be used here, in order to maintain consistency.

⁶ We refer to “large” protest events to emphasize their political salience to the overall campaign, not their mere number of participants. As we explain below, the (few) small, yet crucial, events that account for the big range in size were organized on commemoration days or transnational events.

⁷ Since 1975, *Eleftherotypia*, a multithematic newspaper with high circulation rates, has offered continuous and detailed coverage on contentious issues and social mobilizations (Kousis 1999, 2014). It closed down from December 2011 to mid-January 2012 due to economic problems.

⁸ Created in May 2011, the site was a product of the movement of the squares. Last accessed on February 13, 2013.

⁹ This figure was created with the data set of LPEs through ArcGIS (version 10) by Dr. Apostolos Sarris at the Laboratory of Geophysical-Satellite Remote Sensing and Archaeo-environment, Foundation for Research and Technology, Hellas (F.O.R.T.H.), Institute for Mediterranean Studies (I.M.S.), Rethymno, Greece. Dr. Sarris’s generous support is gratefully acknowledged.

¹⁰ See Iakovidou, Kanellopoulos, and Kotronaki (2008).

¹¹ Following the same guidelines, Kostas Kanellopoulos coded the first 21 events while Maria Kousis checked this first set and coded all the subsequent events totaling to 31.

¹² A bootstrap comparison between the densities of the different networks, with density of the network in phase three set as the theoretical parameter, found no significant differences between phases (Hanneman and Riddle 2005: 291-92).

¹³ Even a right-wing anti-Memorandum party, “Independent Greeks,” participated in LPEs during the fall of 2012 (Kousis and Kanellopoulos 2014).

¹⁴ A QAP (quadratic assignment procedure) regression is not subject to the assumptions of standard estimation methods on the independence of cases, as it relies on innumerable permutations of the matrice(s) taken as independent variables (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson 2013: 128-33).

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