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16

Terrorism

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→ Chapter Contents

- Introduction
- Concepts and definitions
- Types and causes of terrorism
- Security measures
- Conclusion

✓ Reader's Guide

This chapter analyses the threat that **terrorism** poses for countries and the world. Efforts to deal with terrorism can be considered within the framework of terrorism as warfare, terrorism as crime, and terrorism as disease. Which of these views is adopted determines what kinds of countermeasures countries will use in their effort to deal with terrorism. Terrorism is a technique of action available to all groups; security measures that work with one group may not be effective with others. Dealing with terrorism in today's world can be a very complex process indeed.

Introduction

Terrorism has become an important phenomenon, as well as a major security issue for many countries. The attacks on 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon near Washington DC highlighted the great damage that such attacks could cause. Since that time, large-scale attacks on tourist facilities on Bali in 2002 and again in 2005, on commuter trains in Madrid in 2004, on a Russian middle school in Beslan in 2004, and the suicide bombings in London in 2005 all demonstrate the continuing threat that terrorism can pose. Further, the continuing terrorist campaigns that persist over time have claimed many victims; it is not only the spectacular attacks that constitute a threat. The cumulative effects of such campaigns are important. Multiple attacks by a variety of dissident groups in Turkey between 1975 and 1980 left more than 5,000 dead and 15,000 injured (Bal and Laciner 2001: 106), a toll heavier than the casualties inflicted on 9/11. Casualty lists have demonstrated the continuing vulnerability of people everywhere to terrorism, and more recently concern has grown that terrorists might use weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, or nuclear).

While terrorism is a technique that has been around for millennia and used by different groups, the more pressing concern for governments today is the groups currently operating. Groups have adapted to changing circumstances. During the Cold War, terrorist groups often gained the support of the Soviet Union or the United States or their respective allies. Today, there are no competing superpowers, and overt support for terrorist groups can generate a massive military response as the **Taliban** regime in Afghanistan discovered. In response, terrorist organizations have developed networks that provide mutual assistance. Groups like **al-Qaeda** in some respects now have structures that resemble multinational criminal networks (see Case Study 16.1). Terrorist groups have also

developed linkages with criminal organizations, especially those involved in drug trafficking. Both the terrorists and the drug cartels benefit from weak governments that find it difficult to interfere with their activities. These loosely connected international networks can be more difficult to attack and defeat.

While terrorism and terrorists have been analysed from a variety of theoretical perspectives, one of the most useful has been proposed by Peter Sederberg (2003), who suggests that terrorism can be viewed from three perspectives. The first perspective is to think of terrorism in the context of an enemy to be defeated in war. The war analogy presumes that the use of military methods can be successful and that it is possible to achieve victory. A second perspective for dealing with terrorists is to rely on normal police techniques. The criminal analogy has two quite important implications. First, it suggests that terrorism, like crime, will not disappear; it can only be contained. Second, this approach is a reactive one—criminals are normally caught after they commit their crimes. The third perspective is to consider terrorism as a disease, emphasizing both symptoms and underlying causes. It assumes that there is a need for long-term strategies even if there can be successes along the way in treating symptoms. The three perspectives, of course, are not mutually exclusive, but they can represent dominant ways in which terrorism is viewed. They are important for analysing the phenomenon and for government officials who make choices in terms of how to deal with terrorist activity. Which perspective is adopted will suggest mechanisms for dealing with terrorism. Before 11 September 2001, authorities in the United States largely dealt with acts of terrorism from the criminal perspective. Terrorists were caught (eventually in some cases) and brought to trial (although not always convicted). Normal police techniques, including the use of informers and the infiltration

of agents into potentially dangerous groups (like the **Ku Klux Klan** in the 1960s) drew upon conventional practices. After 9/11, however, the war analogy

became dominant for the administration of President Bush, and references to the global war on terrorism appeared regularly.



CASE STUDY 16.1

Al-Qaeda and decentralized structures

Al-Qaeda (the Base) provides the most prominent example of a network form of terrorist organization that has always maintained links with distinct groups operating in different countries, especially groups favouring the creation of more Islamic government. It has provided assistance and cooperated with groups in Algeria, Egypt, the Philippines, and Indonesia among other countries. There is a fear that there are many ' sleeper cells ' of al-Qaeda activists or those in agreement with its goals scattered around the world ready to strike when mobilized. The organization itself is relatively small, and provides technical and financial leadership and support to these groups. The coordination permits individuals to use existing local contacts for their operations, and provides channels for obtaining

arms and for laundering money. Al-Qaeda was willing to fund projects presented to it by terrorist groups if the leaders were convinced that the project held promise of success (Nedoroscik 2002). The flexibility and willingness of the organization to use these local groups effectively extended the reach of the group. The loose, decentralized structure provided protection from infiltration or disruption by security forces. This structure and contacts with local Muslim extremist groups helps to explain how the organization was able to direct and support the attacks on commuter trains in Madrid in 2004 and the transit system in London in 2005 while its leaders and many of its other personnel were being actively sought by security forces around the world. (Also, see Table 16.7)

KEY POINTS

- Terrorism was a problem long before the 11 September attacks.
- Terrorism can be viewed as a problem to be resolved by military means (war on terrorism), by normal police techniques (terrorism as crime), or as a medical problem with underlying causes and symptoms (terrorism as disease).
- How terrorism is viewed will help to determine which policies governments will adopt to deal with terrorism.

Concepts and definitions

There are a number of key concepts that are essential to any discussion of terrorism. The first is selecting a workable definition. A second concern involves targets and techniques, including the increasing concern about the danger that weapons

of mass destruction present. A third key issue involves the prevalence of terrorism and the distinction between domestic and international terrorism, a distinction becoming more blurred with the passage of time. Finally, it is useful to distinguish

among some basic types of terrorist groups, including ethnic, religious, and ideological.

Definition of terrorism

There has been a multitude of definitions used for terrorism, partially because of disagreements among commentators or analysts and partially because some definers seek to exclude groups that they support or to include groups that they wish to denounce. Courts and police agencies require definitions that permit prosecution and incarceration; political leaders may have different needs and agendas. A working definition that is relatively neutral recognizes the basic fact that terrorism is a tactic used by many different kinds of groups. It includes six major elements. Terrorism involves (1) the use of violence or threat of violence (2) by an organized group (3) to achieve political objectives. The violence (4) is directed against a target audience that extends beyond the immediate victims, who are often innocent civilians. Further, (5) while a government can either be the perpetrator of violence or the target, it is only considered an act of terrorism if the other actor is not a government. Finally, (6) terrorism is a weapon of the weak (Lutz and Lutz 2005: 7).

This definition excludes kidnappings for financial gain and excludes acts by individuals, even those with political objectives. Organization is essential for a successful campaign to bring about the political goals that are being sought. While the exact political objectives vary, they can include changes in government policies or practices, changes in government leaders or structures, demands for regional autonomy or independence, or a mix of such political issues. While organization is necessary for any chance of a successful campaign, individuals may operate in loose affiliation with a group. The individual dissidents may receive suggestions from leaders who maintain their distance from the operatives in the field in an organizational form that has come to be known as **leaderless resistance**. The individuals providing 'guidance' in this context are careful to avoid giving direct orders or encouraging violence against specific individuals to avoid any

criminal or civil charges (Jenkins 2001). This type of activity has been used by **animal rights groups** to coordinate actions in defence of animals (Monaghan 2000). More recently al-Qaeda has drawn upon some of the same methods. **Terrorist violence is a form of psychological warfare that undermines opposition to their goals** (Chalk 1996: 13). **They generate fear in a target audience by attacking individuals who are representative of the larger group.** This group can be members of the elite, supporters of the governments, members of a particular ethnic or religious community, or the general public. Civilians are often chosen as targets because they are more vulnerable than members of the security forces; furthermore, their deaths or injuries heighten the level of insecurity in the larger audience. It is often suggested that terrorist targets are chosen at random, but in fact terrorists usually pick their targets very carefully in order to influence an audience. **The media often becomes important for this aspect of terrorism since media coverage is very important for spreading fear,** or at least in reaching the target audience more quickly, although target populations will usually become aware of attacks even when media attention is limited. Finally, terrorism is also a weapon utilized by the weak. Groups that can win elections or seize control of the government will do so; groups that cannot hope to win their objectives in other ways, however, may resort to terrorism.

While terrorism can involve governments as targets or perpetrators, it does not include cases during cold and hot wars where governments use terror tactics against each other. These government to government attacks are a different security issue and are not included in definitions of terrorism even if they involve massacres, atrocities, or war crimes. Governments, however, are often the targets of dissident terrorists. While governments usually oppose terrorist attacking their citizens, at times political leaders may tolerate terrorist attacks by private groups against enemies, potential dissidents, or unpopular minorities (ethnic, religious, cultural, or ideological). The government may fail to investigate or prosecute the perpetrators of the violence. In

other cases governments may provide active support and in extreme cases even form death squads to attack its enemies while maintaining at least an illusion of deniability. While this governmental involvement in terrorism is quite important, it will not be the focus of the present chapter since the violence does not begin as a security concern (although violent groups that are tolerated may later challenge the government, as occurred with the **Fascists** in Italy). The use of private groups or death squads does correspond with the idea that terrorism is a weapon of the weak. Governments that are strong enough to deal with dissidents or to protect dissidents from private violence do not need to tolerate or use such forms of control.

Techniques and targets

The range of techniques available to terrorists is varied, but most activities are variations of standard practices—bombings, kidnappings, assaults including assassinations, and takeovers of buildings or planes or ships, invariably with hostages. Bombs can be used to just damage property or in efforts to inflict casualties, sometimes in large numbers. Car bombs have increasingly become a favourite device for terrorist groups because of the damage that they can do. Kidnapping frequently provides a publicity bonanza for terrorist groups. In some cases ransoms from kidnappings have provided an important source of funding for terrorist groups, and in other cases terrorists have been able to gain some concessions from governments in turn for the release of the victims. Assaults are usually directed at individuals who represent a particular group (politicians, police, military personnel, journalists, etc.). Sometimes the intent is to wound while in other cases the goal is the assassination of the individual or individuals. No one assassination is likely to bring about the changes the terrorists desire, but a campaign of such assassinations generates greater fear. Hostage situations in airline hijackings or the capture of buildings (the Japanese embassy in Peru in December 1996) demonstrate the vulnerability of society and generate publicity for the terrorist

cause. Even when governments refuse to make major concessions, they often will publicize a list of demands by the terrorists or publish other kinds of communiqués.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have become a special security concern for governments. There is a great fear that some terrorist groups will use biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological (dirty) weapons to cause more casualties. **To some extent terrorist groups have already gained a psychological edge simply because of the fear of use.** There have only been few such attacks to date. **Aum Shinriyko**, the Japanese cult, attempted to use nerve gas in the Tokyo subway system to cause mass casualties but failed. This attempt did demonstrate what might happen. The anthrax attacks in the United States after 11 September generated great fear, but there were only a few deaths. A single bomb might have killed more, but **the form of the anthrax attacks made them more terrifying.** Such weapons have not been used very often because they require major resources to develop and trained personnel. Further, most terrorist groups still prefer to stick to the tried-and-true techniques, at least until the utility of a new technique, such as car bombs, has been demonstrated.

One deadly technique that has been used by terrorists involves suicide attacks. Such attacks with bombs can be more deadly since the detonation can occur at the last minute or when casualties will be maximized. Suicide attacks are not an especially new technique. The **Assassins** active from the eleventh through the thirteenth centuries expected to die, as did the anarchists who undertook assassinations in the late nineteenth century. Recent attacks have been more devastating, as with the airliners on 9/11 and bombers in Israel. The single most important source of suicide attacks in terms of numbers has been neither Middle Eastern nor Islamic. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, more commonly known as the **Tamil Tigers**, were responsible for more suicide attacks than all other groups put together between 1980 and 2000 (Radu 2002). Many of these attacks have inflicted large numbers of casualties while

others were directed against important political figures. Perhaps the greatest danger in the future is that a suicide attack might be combined with the use of biological, chemical, or radiological weapons. If the persons involved in the use of these weapons are willing to die in the effort, many of the problems involved in using WMD will have been reduced.

Terrorists have great flexibility in choosing their targets, and if one target is too carefully protected, they can simply shift to another. Some other individual, building, or large gathering of people will serve to send the message that everyone in the target audience is vulnerable. The ability to find vulnerable targets may be greater in democratic states since government security is likely to be weaker than in equivalent authoritarian societies. There are limitations on how much a democratic state can monitor its citizens and visitors. Democracies also

provide greater publicity for the cause since the media face few, if any, restraints. Further, even if the terrorists are caught, they will be tried in some type of impartial judicial setting where proof of guilt must be established. Of course, it is not only democratic countries that are vulnerable. Security forces may be weak in a variety of non-democratic political systems providing terrorist groups with similar opportunities to operate relatively freely.

Prevalence of terrorism

Although terrorism has occurred widely in the world, it is only recently that we have anything approaching decent statistics on its extent. Table 16.1 contains totals for international terrorist incidents from 1991 to 2003. Tables 16.2 and 16.3 indicate the extent of international terrorist incidents

Table 16.1 Casualties in International terrorist incidents 1991–2002

Year	Incidents	Dead	Injured	Total	Dead/ Incident	Injured/ Incident	Total/ Incident
1991	565	—	—	317	—	—	0.56
1992	363	—	—	729	—	—	2.01
1993	431	—	—	1,510	—	—	3.50
1994	322	314	674	988	0.98	2.09	3.07
1995	440	165	6,291	6,454	0.38	14.30	14.68
1996	296	311	2,654	2,965	1.05	8.97	10.02
1997	304	221	693	914	0.73	2.28	3.01
1998	273	741	6,313	7,054	2.71	23.12	25.84
1999	392	233	706	939	0.59	1.80	2.40
2000	423	405	791	1,196	0.96	1.87	2.82
2001	355	2,689	1,776	4,465	7.57	5.00	12.57
2002	199	725	2,013	2,738	3.64	10.12	13.76
2003	208	—	—	4,886	—	—	23.49

Source: US Department of State, *Patterns of Terrorism*, various years, online at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt>

Table 16.2 Number of international terrorist incidents by region

YEAR	REGION							Total
	Africa	Asia	Eurasia*	Latin America	Europe	Middle East	North America	
1991	3	48	6	199	229	78	2	565
1992	10	13	3	113	143	79	2	363
1993	6	37	5	185	97	100	1	431
1994	25	24	11	88	58	116	0	322
1995	10	16	5	272	92	45	0	440
1996	11	11	24	121	84	45	0	296
1997	11	21	42	128	52	37	13	304
1998	21	49	14	110	48	31	0	273
1999	52	72	35	121	85	25	2	392
2000	55	98	31	193	30	16	0	423
2001	33	68	3	201	17	29	4	355
2002	5	99	7	50	9	29	0	199

*Former Communist countries of Eastern Europe and successor states of the Soviet Union.

Source: US Department of State (various years) *Patterns of Terrorism*, online at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt>.

by region and the casualties (dead and injured). International terrorist incidents are considered to be actions where indigenous terrorists attack a foreign target (kidnapping foreign tourists), where terrorists launch an attack against a target in another country (the 11 September attacks), or when a foreign country is used because it is convenient (IRA attacks against British soldiers in Germany). The compilation of statistics for these kinds of incidents is usually more complete than records for domestic attacks since such incidents attract more attention. The tables indicate that international actions have been widespread. North America has been the scene of very few attacks, but the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center resulted in many injuries, while the 2001 attacks resulted in many deaths (and undercounts on the number of injuries). Latin America

typically has had large numbers of incidents. Heavy casualties have occurred in different regions for different years, reflecting singularly deadly attacks such as the East Africa embassy attacks in 1998, the World Trade Center disaster in 2001, and the heavy toll in Bali in 2002.

The distinction between domestic and international attacks has become increasingly blurred, especially when international terrorist networks are included. British citizens apparently undertook the attacks in London in 2005, but this fact did not make them domestic attacks given the international nature of the probable goals of the suicide attackers. Assassination of a domestic leader on foreign soil qualifies as international terrorism but the choice of the foreign country could simply be one of convenience. Domestic terrorism does not generate the

Table 16.3 Number of casualties due to international terrorist incidents by region

YEAR	REGION							Total
	Africa	Asia	Eurasia*	Latin America	Europe	Middle East	North America	
1991	3	150	7	68	56	33	0	317
1992	28	25	0	374	65	236	1	729
1993	7	135	1	66	117	178	1,006	1,510
1994	55	71	151	329	126	256	0	988
1995	8	5,639	29	46	287	445	0	6,454
1996	80	1,507	20	18	503	837	0	2,965
1997	28	344	27	11	17	480	7	914
1998	5,379	635	12	195	405	68	0	7,054
1999	185	690	8	9	16	31	0	939
2000	102	898	103	20	4	69	0	1,196
2001	150	651	0	6	20	513	4,091	5,341
2002	12	1,281	615	52	6	772	0	2,718
2003	14	1,427	615	79	928	1,823	0	4,886

*Former Communist countries of Eastern Europe and successor states of the Soviet Union.

Source: US Department of State (various years) *Patterns of Terrorism*, online at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt>.

media attention that international incidents have, but it is by far the most prevalent form of terrorism. There is more complete data for terrorist acts between 1998 and 2004, with data on incidents, injuries, and fatalities for international and domestic terrorism. Tables 16.4, 16.5, and 16.6 contain statistics by region for these years. Domestic incidents are more prevalent than international incidents. There are probably missing incidents that did not cause casualties, but the numbers would indicate that domestic incidents can be ten times as high with correspondingly higher figures for injuries and deaths. North America experienced very few attacks (although some were major of course); West Europe was more likely to be the scene of terrorist violence.

For the seven years in question, it was South Asia that had the largest number of recorded fatalities overall, reflecting relatively high death tolls every year. The relative importance of domestic incidents is most obvious in the fact that the number of incidents in 2002, 2003, and 2004 was higher than in 2001 and that the totals for injuries and deaths in 2004 were higher than the totals for 2001, which included the attacks on New York and Washington DC. Terrorist violence has obviously been increasing in the twenty-first century and is becoming more dangerous as well. Whether terrorism is addressed within the context of war, crime, or disease, it is not likely to be eliminated as a security concern in the immediate future.

Table 16.4 Incidents of domestic and international terrorism by region: 1998–2004

Region	Year						
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
North America	6	8	9	39	16	18	6
West Europe	284	433	372	550	342	372	271
East Europe	313	86	27	104	215	125	167
East and Central Asia	20	—	—	23	12	13	15
South Asia	126	88	96	197	836	613	626
Southeast Asia and Oceania	27	28	72	122	96	30	49
Middle East	205	350	309	508	627	496	1,291
Africa	107	53	28	27	29	29	36
Latin America	186	113	225	163	477	199	167
Totals	1,274	1,159	1,138	1,833	2,650	1,895	2,461

No information reported for East and Central Asia in 1999 and 2000. Information is either lacking or the numbers are included in other regions.

Source: National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, www.tkb.org/Home.jsp

Table 16.5 Injuries of domestic and international terrorism by region: 1998–2004

Region	Year						
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
North America	2	14	0	11	3	0	0
West Europe	145	34	153	213	1,914	114	653
East Europe	260	775	234	259	1,236	689	1,232
East and Central Asia	20	—	—	23	3	1	43
South Asia	1,193	675	1,043	1,171	2,158	1,326	2,929
Southeast Asia and Oceania	94	104	601	494	975	394	406
Middle East	413	334	190	1,267	1,914	3,205	4,921
Africa	5,858	372	139	239	183	51	402
Latin America	120	25	176	306	757	473	1,232
Totals	8,166	2,333	2,397	3,983	7,333	6,253	10,586

No information reported for East and Central Asia in 1999 and 2000. Information is either lacking or the numbers are included in other regions. Figures for North America for 2001 obviously do not include the uncertain number of injuries on 11 September.

Source: National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, www.tkb.org/Home.jsp

Table 16.6 Fatalities from domestic and international terrorism by region: 1998–2004

Region	Year						
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
North America	1	3	0	2,987	3	0	0
West Europe	52	6	33	31	15	6	194
East Europe	133	350	65	70	375	266	543
East and Central Asia	71	—	—	13	3	21	26
South Asia	585	201	297	440	1,017	803	883
Southeast Asia and Oceania	9	16	87	161	351	72	202
Middle East	168	113	60	257	564	907	2,598
Africa	1,078	93	37	289	129	109	388
Latin America	142	67	198	307	297	185	543
Totals	2,239	849	777	4,555	2,754	2,369	4,834

No information reported for East and Central Asia in 1999 and 2000. Information is either lacking or the numbers are included in other regions.

Source: National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, www.tkb.org/Home.jsp

KEY POINTS

- Statistics indicate that terrorism is actually increasing.
- Domestic terrorism is often not as newsworthy as international actions, but it accounts for a large majority of terrorist attacks.
- Terrorist groups can be very flexible in their choice of targets.
- Terrorist groups often find that democratic states or weaker authoritarian political systems are more inviting targets.
- Some groups may be willing to use weapons of mass destruction, but most terrorist organizations continue to rely on conventional weapons for their attacks.

Types and causes of terrorism

Terrorism has been widespread, and there is no single cause that explains outbreaks of this kind of violence. It is a complex phenomenon with many facets. Linked with the causes of terrorism are the motivations of the various organizations involved in the violence, motivations that provide clues as to the underlying causes. These motivations can be used to categorize groups in terms of their objectives. The basic types are religious, ethnic or nationalist, and ideological. Additionally, there are a few groups that are more difficult to place into any particular category given the complexity of their motivations.

Categories

Religious groups obviously come to mind in the twenty-first century given their prevalence in recent years. Al-Qaeda is the most prominent example

today with the global nature of its attacks (see Table 16.7), but it is not the only such group in operation. There are other Islamic groups, some with linkages to al-Qaeda, that have been active in Indonesia, India, Egypt, Israel and the Occupied Territories,

Table 16.7 Major al-Qaeda attacks

Date	Place	Target	Method	Fatalities
25 June 1996	Dhahran, Saudi Arabia	Khobar Towers housing US military	Truck bomb	19
7 August 1998	Nairobi, Kenya	US Embassy	Truck bomb	247
7 August 1998	Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania	US Embassy	Truck bomb	10
11 September 2001	New York Washington DC	World Trade Center Pentagon	Aircraft flown into buildings	2,973
12 October 2001	Aden, Yemen	USS Cole, US destroyer	Explosives on boat	17
22 December 2001	Paris–Miami flight	Airliner	Attempted suicide attack with shoe bomb	0
11 April 2002	Djerba, Tunisia	Synagogue and tourists	Truck bomb	19
14 June 2002	Karachi, Pakistan	US consulate	Suicide car bomb	19
6 October 2002	Mina al-Dabah, Yemen	French tanker	Boat bomb	1
12 October 2002	Bali, Indonesia	Nightclub area and Western tourists	Car bomb	202
28 November 2002	Mombasa, Kenya	Israeli-owned hotel	Suicide car bomb	16
12 May 2003	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	Three compounds for Westerners	Car bombs	25
16 May 2003	Casablanca, Morocco	Five sites	Suicide bombs	42
5 August 2003	Jakarta, Indonesia	Marriott Hotel	Car bomb	10
11 March 2004	Madrid, Spain	Commuter trains	Bombs	191
7 July 2005	London, England	Underground trains and bus	Suicide bombs	56

Source: *Washington Post* database.

Algeria, the Philippines, and other countries. Religious terrorism, however, has not been limited to Islamic organizations; extremist groups in other religious traditions have also used the technique. The violent anti-abortion activities in the United States are based in Christian viewpoints. Christian beliefs were used to justify ethnic cleansing activities against Muslims in Bosnia. There was a guerrilla struggle in the Indian **Punjab** in the 1980s and 1990s that pitted **Sikhs** against Hindus. The Sikh uprising was in part a reaction to extremist Hindu groups in India that sought to reclaim the subcontinent for their religion. Jewish extremists justifying their actions by their religious beliefs have used terrorist tactics against Palestinians. Aum Shinrikyo was willing to attack Japanese society given the cult's belief in the future and the need for a cleansing of the impure. Many religious groups are too weak to impose their views in other fashions, and terrorism becomes the weapon of choice.

Groups defined by their ethnic or linguistic identifications are another broad category (see Case Study 16.2). The Basque **Euzkadi ta Askatasuna** (ETA—Basque for Homeland and

Freedom) has been seeking independence for the Basque region of Spain for more than 25 years. The Tamil Tigers continue to seek independence (or at least autonomy) for those areas of Sri Lanka where Tamils are a majority. Turkey has faced significant terrorist attacks from **Kurdish** separatist groups. The **Aceh Sumatra Liberation Front** has used both guerrilla warfare and terrorism in its efforts to gain independence from Indonesia. A large number of anti-colonial groups in the past were ethnically based and used terrorism as one tactic in their efforts to gain independence. Algerians mounted a major urban terrorism campaign against the French in the late 1950s to supplement guerrilla activities. Greek Cypriots also used urban terrorism and guerrilla attacks against the British in the same period. In Palestine, Jewish settler groups (who qualify as nationalist in this context since most of the settlers were quite secular) relied only on terrorism in their successful efforts to force the British to leave the territory.

Other terrorist groups have drawn their ideas from **ideologies**. There was a wave of terrorist violence in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s rooted

in various **leftist and Marxist ideologies**. The **Red Brigades** in Italy, the **Red Army Faction** in Germany, and other groups in Europe were joined by Japanese groups, the **Weathermen** in the United States, and organizations in Latin America. This leftist wave was on the wane by the last part of the 1980s when the collapse of communism in East Europe and the Soviet Union weakened the surviving groups even further. Terrorist groups based in right-wing ideologies have also been present. Such groups were relatively weak in the years after the Second World War, but a great number of them appeared in the 1990s in Western Europe. These groups have often been opposed to foreign influences, a large state, or leftist ideas. They have often targeted migrants and foreign workers, especially those from the Middle East, South Asia, or sub-Saharan Africa where cultural, ethnic, and religious differences often reinforced each other. These groups have their counterparts in the United States with *xenophobic* and anti-black groups. The Ku Klux Klan was once one of the largest of such groups (see Case Study 16.3). It was severely weakened in the 1960s and 1970s, but its place has been taken by a larger number of smaller groups espousing some

of the same racist and anti-foreign ideas. When groups from the left and right have battled each other, more conservative governments tolerated the violent right-wing groups that targeted members of the left. At times governments have used death squads against leftist dissidents.

Some groups are more difficult to categorize. A number of right-wing groups in the United States incorporate Christianity into their ideologies (sometimes in unusual ways). The IRA in Northern Ireland has mobilized support on the basis of Irish versus British nationalities, but the role of religion in the struggles in the province cannot be denied. Ideology has also appeared in this struggle since the **Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)** shared the ethnic Irish basis of the IRA but also included a Marxist-Leninist ideological component. In Colombia there were some straightforward Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups that operated in the country, but others such as the **Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)** joined forces with the drug cartels. In Peru in the 1980s and 1990s dissident organizations using terror combined leftist ideology with an ethnic appeal to the Indian communities that have been ignored by the Europeanized elite of the country. These Peruvian

CASE STUDY 16.2

Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

The struggle between the Israelis and the Palestinians is often seen as a religious conflict, but most of the initial Jewish settlers were largely secular and the original Palestinian resistance movements were overwhelmingly secular as well. Only in the early 1990s did the Palestinian opposition take on overtly religious objectives such as the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state in all of the Occupied Territories and Israel. The PLO always focused on Palestinian nationalism and stressed secular themes so that it could appeal to both Muslim and Christian Palestinians. It was an umbrella organization that included many different Palestinian nationalist groups, but it never included avowedly Islamic groups. **Fatah**, the organization led by Yasser Arafat, was one of the most important but others like the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine**

(**PFLP**) and its later splinters combined leftist ideology with Palestinian nationalism. For them the Palestinians were an oppressed Third World people battling against the evils of global capitalism and its Israeli representatives in the Middle East. The PLO initially used guerrilla raids against Israel, but after the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 war, it shifted to terrorism as the remaining hope for creating a Palestinian homeland. At various times groups, such as the PFLP and others, left the PLO because of disputes with Arafat over the course of action to be followed—for example, when the PLO limited terrorist attacks. Departures occurred after the peace initiatives that eventually led to the creation of the Palestinian Authority. In these and other cases, some organizations were later permitted to rejoin the PLO.

CASE STUDY 16.3

The Ku Klux Klan (KKK)

The KKK is the classic American terrorist group that propounded racist and right-wing views in the 1950s and 1960s. It tried to terrorize Black Americans and their white supporters during the civil rights struggle of those years. Lynchings, murders, and bombs were used in the failed attempt to dissuade people from agitating for equal rights. This period, violent though it was, resulted in hundreds of deaths. The most active period for the KKK was in the 1920s. In this period the KKK combined its racist orientation with opposition to the presence of Catholics, Jews, and Orientals. It also was opposed to the arrival of new immigrants (many of whom were Catholic or Jewish). In these years the KKK had noticeable

strength outside the Southern states; in fact, Indiana at one time had the largest membership of any state branches. The overall level of violence by the KKK was much greater in this period with lynchings and murders totalling in the thousands (Sinclair 2003: 231). Many of the dead were Black Americans, but members of other groups were also victims. Whites were at times the main targets because they were considered more dangerous than the Black Americans since they were often contaminated by foreign ideas (Tucker 1991: 5). The KKK eventually declined, partially as a consequence of a major scandal that involved the leader of the Indiana chapter (Bennett 1988: 199–237).

groups also developed links with the weaker drug cartels in that country.

Causes

The causes of terrorism in many ways are similar to the causes of most other forms of political violence (such as riots, rebellions, coups, and civil wars). Individuals in a society become so discontented or frustrated with their inability to bring about what they see as necessary changes that they resort to violence. The dissidents have a perception that society and the political system discriminate or are unfair. What is ultimately important are the perceptions of the dissidents, although greater levels of exploitation may drive larger numbers to attempt violent change.

There are some specific factors, however, that can contribute to outbreaks of terrorism. Democracies with their limitations on the security forces provide opportunities for terrorists. Limited political participation and repression by government forces can also breed the necessary popular discontent for violence, but states with strong security forces and firm control of their societies usually can prevent terrorists from operating. Dissidents and potential dissidents can be jailed, suspects can be tortured, families can be held hostage, and convictions can be guaranteed in the courts (if trials occur). When the Soviet Union was a strong centralized system, terrorism was virtually unknown. The successor states are weaker, and some like Russia have faced significant terrorist problems. It is the inability of the government of Colombia to function effectively in many parts of the country that has provided significant opportunities for guerrillas and terrorists, as well as the drug cartels, to survive and prosper. Similarly, the weak state structure present in Lebanon for the last part of the twentieth century permitted terrorist groups to form and operate. Lebanon not only saw terrorism used in the struggles to control the country, but Lebanon became a base for terrorist groups operating elsewhere.

The processes involved with globalization have also contributed to outbreaks of terrorism. With faster communications and transportation outside forces—usually Western—intrude into local societies. Economies are disrupted, and even if winners outnumber losers, there are still losers. Further, local cultures including religious components are threatened by globalization, especially when it has been accompanied by secularization. Terrorism in many cases can be seen as a reaction to globalization. Leftist groups around the world have opposed the spread of capitalism and all its evils. Secular globalization also leads to religious and ethnic fragmentation (Ramakrishna and Tan 2003: 3–4). Many religious groups (Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu) are opposed to the secularism that comes with modernity (Pillar 2001: 65). Right wing, ethnocentric groups have opposed the dilution of their cultures by the outside ideas that accompany migrants, guest workers, and refugees. It is perhaps ironic that Muslims in the Middle East feel threatened by the intrusion of European or Western values at the same time that groups in Europe feel threatened by individuals from Middle Eastern cultures and with Islamic ideas. Terrorism rooted in ethnic differences can also reflect the intrusion of outside forces as groups like the Irish and the Basques fear the submergence of their language and culture into a larger ethnic identity (Dingley and Kirk-Smith 2002). There is another potential connection between democracy and nationalism that has come with globalization or been a response to it. Walter Laqueur (2001: 11) has suggested that the overlap between democracy and nationalism provides more opportunities for terrorism. Nationalism provides a spark that can exacerbate ethnic differences, and democracy allows for the expression of opposing nationalist views. If Laqueur's analysis is correct, the wave of democratization that occurred at the end of the twentieth century may have increased the chances of new outbreaks of terrorism, although increasing democratization in stable countries may eventually remove many of the conditions that contribute to terrorism.

KEY POINTS

- There is no one cause of terrorism.
- Terrorism is not unique to Islam or to the Middle East.
- Terrorism is a technique that is available to different kinds of groups pursuing different types of objectives.

Security measures

Leaders and governments facing terrorist attacks have to defend against the danger of these attacks. Since there is no one overwhelming cause or source of terrorism, partially because it is a technique that can be used by different groups for different causes, countermeasures become more difficult. Sederberg's threefold typology is relevant as a point of reference because some security or counterterrorism measures are more in keeping with viewing terrorism as war, others fit terrorism as crime, and yet others are more relevant for the disease analogy. Counterterrorism measures can also be considered within the scope of prevention, response to attacks, international collaboration, and the effects of security measures on civil liberties.

Prevention

Prevention is normally associated with the concept of terrorism as war or crime. All governments will practise prevention—repression from the terrorist perspective—by seeking to arrest or eliminate those actively involved in the violence. Security forces attack the terrorists before they strike (war) or they are arrested after the attack (crime). Clearly, which concept of battling terrorism is chosen helps to determine security policy. The war conceptualization, for example, permits a stronger pre-emptive response. In actual fact, however, the military and police functions do not have a precise dividing line.

Police forces dealing with dangerous criminals (terrorist or otherwise) may shoot first and ask questions later. In both the warfare and criminal models, there may be a desire to capture terrorists to elicit further intelligence, sometimes by offering shorter sentences to captured terrorists in exchange for information. Informers, whether members who have turned or agents, inside the terrorist groups can be key assets for the security forces for gathering intelligence. Such intelligence gathering is hard for small groups; they are usually too cohesive for effective infiltration. Larger organizations are easier to penetrate and gain information, but it is unlikely that all the operations of larger groups can be stopped except with the passage of time. Similarly, loose network groups like al-Qaeda and right-wing extremist groups in the United States and Europe are unlikely to be dismantled due to any single intelligence coup, although actions based on successful intelligence gathering can weaken them.

Greater physical security measures are another preventive option that has merit whether one views terrorism as war, crime, or disease. Not every possible target can be protected, but key installations, including potential sources of materials for weapons of mass destruction, however, need to be secured. In other cases security can be enhanced for many potential targets even if all attacks cannot be prevented. Some terrorist activities might be foiled, and in other cases some members of the dissident

THINK POINT 16.1

Security and the law of unintended consequences

Sometimes improved security can have unintended, and negative, consequences. In the 1960s and 1970s the United States and other countries suffered through a wave of airline hijackings. Individuals from a variety of groups (and loners with no cause but a desire for publicity) skyjacked airliners, issuing communiqués justifying their actions. Many of the aircraft were flown to Cuba or Algeria where the hijackers received asylum in return for releasing the planes and passengers. In response to the hijackings airport security was improved so that hijackings virtually ceased. Groups could no longer use this tactic to publicize their cause; therefore, some organizations shifted to planting bombs on the airliners to raise

public consciousness of their objectives. The terrorists even developed sophisticated bombs that would only begin a countdown to detonation when a certain altitude was reached. Eventually, baggage security at airports improved so that only an occasional bomb could be successfully placed on planes, but not before a number of airliners had been destroyed in mid-flight. In some ways the use of airliners as bombs on 11 September was a response to the difficulties of placing bombs on aircraft. These examples demonstrate that while defensive security precautions can be important, committed terrorists can find new techniques that can also be more deadly than the ones that they replace.

groups may be captured or killed as a consequence of improved security. These preventive measures will not stop determined terrorists who will seek other, more vulnerable targets (see Think Point 16.1). Increased security, of course, will mean increased costs, and the money spent on physical security and target hardening is not available elsewhere in the economy.

Responses

Responses to terrorist attacks vary, either explicitly or implicitly, if terrorism is seen as warfare, crime, or disease. If the war analogy holds, retaliation and punishment become the norms. Pre-emptive strikes against training facilities, at headquarters, or even assassinations of key individuals in the terrorist organizations are potential responses. The United States and its allies have attempted to follow this strategy against al-Qaeda. In their confrontations before the **Oslo Accords**, Israel and the **PLO** basically viewed their struggle in terms of covert warfare. Even though Israel regarded the PLO and other Palestinian groups as terrorists—and definitely not as soldiers, the context of the struggle was one of warfare. Today, Israel has adopted the

same approach to dealing with **Hamas** and **Islamic Jihad**.

Arrest, capture, trial (fair or otherwise), and incarceration reflect the crime perspective. The ultimate goal of police forces is to deter action by demonstrating that criminals will be caught and punished. The same goal is present with terrorists; capture and punishment are inevitable. While the warfare analogy also presumes deterrence at times, deterrence is more central to a justice system. Pre-emptive strikes and assassinations are not normally part of the arsenal of crime fighting unless a government unleashes death squads as a form of state violence or permits groups allied with the government to attack in this fashion. In these circumstances governments have shifted from the crime perspective to one closer to the warfare analogy. The extent of pre-emption available in a normal criminal context is detention of suspects, sometimes for lengthy periods (but not indefinite ones), and perhaps judicial harassment. Hostage situations are one area where terrorism as crime is most frequently the response. It is normally police forces that are better equipped and trained to deal with these kinds of situations. Even rescue attempts are not foreign to typical police practice. The war response might

consider the hostages as potential casualties of the conflict rather than considering their safety as the prime objective of dealing with terrorists.

If terrorism is viewed as a disease, the range of responses will change. Since diseases have both symptoms and causes, this perspective requires that some of the responses related to the war and crime views be applied. Terrorist violence, as a symptom, will need to be dealt with by arrest or prevention. The disease perspective also leads to efforts to deal with the underlying causes. Reform packages may become part of the government response in an effort to reduce the appeal of the terrorist groups within the population. If ethnic or religious discrimination is present, laws forbidding discrimination may be passed. If poverty is perceived to be fuelling support for the terrorists, then governmental programmes to reduce poverty in a region or group may be instituted (at least if the funds are available). If the terrorists are operating in a colonial situation, then the ultimate reform that is possible is for the colonial power to grant independence. Of course, it has been argued that reforms will simply encourage the terrorists to continue the violence because they are being rewarded. As one leader of a terrorist group argued, more was won by a few months of violence than by years of peaceful politics (Ash 2003: 63). Under these circumstances reforms may become concessions that fuel the violence rather than a mechanism for ending it.

It is clear for other reasons that reforms will not always eliminate the presence of terrorism. Demands by the terrorist dissidents for the establishment of a religious state, a leftist government, the repression of a minority, or removal of all foreigners or foreign elements may not be acceptable to the majority. The leftists in the 1970s and 1980s in Europe wanted to do away with the international capitalist system, yet most Europeans wanted to continue to receive the benefits of capitalism. Most of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico do not want independence, but groups with this objective have used terror attacks against the United States. The United States cannot prevent the spread of globalization or the intrusion of outside

values and new cultures into the Middle East. In other cases, extremist groups in the same country may have mutually incompatible goals. Extreme Jewish settler groups in Israel want complete control of the West Bank and all Palestinians to leave; Hamas wants to create an Islamic state in the whole of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. No Israeli government can meet the demands of both groups. In the 1970s dissident terrorists from the left and the right attacked the Turkish government. There was no programme available that could meet the demands of both groups. Given situations such as the ones noted above, even a government or political leaders inclined to reforms will frequently have to rely on other options.

International measures

International cooperation among countries is another important counter-terrorist technique. Intelligence agencies operate best on their own soil or in their own region; national intelligence is not equally effective everywhere. Collaboration among intelligence agencies, therefore, will contribute to the prevention of terrorism. International cooperation can also provide the necessary support for reforms that reduce the severity of terrorism. Sanctions against countries aiding terrorists will be more effective if there is international support. The cumulative effect of economic sanctions (and declining oil prices) led Libya to reduce its support for foreign terrorist groups (Crenshaw 2003: 165). Extreme military sanctions (an invasion) ended the support that the Taliban regime was providing to al-Qaeda, and this military action had widespread international support (unlike the later military action against Iraq). While cooperative international sanctions do not always work, it is important to note that they do not always fail.

A great deal of international diplomacy has involved attempts to define terrorism so that all countries could then take steps to eliminate terrorist groups. These efforts have faltered because countries often support or sympathize with dissidents

who use violence against repressive governments. Governments in the developing world have wanted to avoid situations where anti-colonial struggles are labelled as terrorism. Most countries have sought to avoid too strict a definition since they want the flexibility to avoid extradition or punishment of some political dissidents. It is hard to envision the United States accepting a terrorist label in 2003 for anti-Saddam Hussein dissidents who attacked members of his regime. There have been some successes in the international sphere. Certain types of actions, such as air piracy, have been outlawed and most members of the United Nations have signed these treaties and conventions (Pillar 2001: 77–79). These partial agreements are a positive step in the process of containing terrorism by defining certain terrorist acts as crime. When global agreements are not possible, diplomacy can achieve agreements among smaller groups of countries, providing for greater cooperation and bilateral arrangements to automatically avoid asylum for individuals associated with certain groups. The United States and the United Kingdom, for example, eventually signed a bilateral agreement making the extradition of suspected IRA members from the United States easier.

Civil liberties in peril

A final concern that has appeared with counterterrorism efforts in many countries is the potential threat that such measures can have for civil liberties. While authoritarian states do not worry about this issue, there are limits on intelligence gathering and pre-emptive actions in democracies. Increased security measures can lead to infringements on the rights of citizens or of foreign residents. In the United States, the Patriot Act has permitted more intrusive searches and wiretaps, while persons captured overseas have been placed in indefinite detention at the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba. There has also been consideration of establishing special tribunals to try suspected terrorists that would be expected to operate in ways to convict suspects. In Northern Ireland IRA intimidation of jurors led to the use of courts without juries, and preventative detention was also introduced. Special terrorism laws were passed in the United Kingdom in the wake of IRA attacks. The danger of wrongful convictions is possible even without special legislation; judges and juries may be quick to assume the guilt of suspected terrorists. Germany, France, and Australia—like the United Kingdom and the United States—passed

CASE STUDY 16.4

Miscarriages of justice with Irish defendants

In 1974 IRA attack teams set off bombs in Woolwich in London and Guildford in Surrey that killed off duty service personnel (and others). A month later two pubs in Birmingham were bombed. These bombings led to the passage of the **Prevention of Terrorism Acts** (Temporary Provisions)—since periodically renewed—which provided for longer detention of IRA suspects for questioning and other changes that facilitated intelligence gathering. Four suspects (the Guildford Four) were arrested, convicted, and imprisoned on shaky evidence and coerced confessions. Their arrests also led to the arrest and conviction on weak forensic evidence of seven more suspects (the Maguire Seven). The bombings in Birmingham resulted in the conviction of six individuals (the

Birmingham Six) with weak evidence and coerced confessions. Sixteen of the seventeen individuals were Irish and the seventeenth was the English girlfriend of one of the suspects. The special interrogation procedures available to the authorities permitted overzealous police to coerce confessions and manipulate evidence to convict those that the police thought were guilty. Juries were clearly inclined to believe the police and doubtful of the Irish suspects. While there is no evidence that the police, the courts, or the government had a concerted policy to manufacture convictions, the climate of fear and the desire to convict someone for the crimes contributed to these miscarriages of justice (Lutz, Lutz, and Ulmschneider 2002).

new legislation after the events of 11 September giving government security forces greater powers to detain and interrogate those suspected of terrorism (Haubrick 2003; Hocking 2003). In such circumstances there is always the danger of convicting innocent people (see Case Study 16.4). Civil liberties are in the least danger if terrorism is viewed as a disease where the root causes need to be treated. The crime model provides for some threat to civil liberties, but defenders of civil liberties are used to deal-

ing with the police and criminal justice system. The greatest danger comes when governments regard the battle against terrorism as warfare because most democratic countries permit greater restrictions on the rights of individuals during wartime. As a consequence, viewing the struggle with terrorism as war tends to bring with it the idea that temporary personal sacrifices of liberties may be necessary in the interest of victory.

KEY POINTS

- Detection and prevention of terrorist attacks will not always be possible.
- Dealing with terrorism within the context of warfare is more likely to result in pre-emptive actions.
- Considering terrorism within the disease perspective places greater emphasis on reforms than either the crime or war perspective.
- International cooperation for dealing with terrorism would appear to have natural limits, and any global agreements on a meaningful definition of terrorism are unlikely.
- The greatest threat to civil liberties in democracies comes in those contexts where the battle against terrorism is seen as being equivalent to war.

Conclusion

It is clear that terrorism will remain a major security threat for years to come. The ethnic, religious, and ideological disputes that have fuelled terrorism have not disappeared. While ideological terrorism has declined since the end of communism, it has not disappeared, and ethnic and religiously inspired terrorism remains very important. Groups that cannot attain their goals through the electoral process or government takeovers will often adopt terrorism as a technique. Globalization will continue to disrupt economic, political, social, religious, and cultural systems. Weak states will be inviting targets for attacks or provide terrorists with convenient bases. Government repression will generate opposition. Connections between terrorists and drug operations could increase the relative threat even more.

Providing security against terrorism will not be easy. There are too many targets for total protection, and terrorists have the advantage of being able to choose the targets that are not defended. No one countermeasure will defeat terrorism. It has multifaceted causes, especially since terrorism is a technique that is available to many different groups. Counterterrorist successes against one group will not automatically guarantee victory against groups elsewhere. Groups come from different backgrounds, have different kinds of support, and seek different objectives. Under these circumstances it would be amazing if there was one countermeasure that would always work. In some cases, normal police methods will be successful. Treating terrorism as crime, for example, is quite appropriate

when terrorists have linked up with drug cartels. Curtailing drug operations will help to deprive the terrorist organizations of an important source of funding. Considering terrorism as war is relevant in cases where the dissident groups combine terrorism with guerrilla activities, as has been the case with the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. In other circumstances, and even in Sri Lanka, there may be some value in the government considering reforms as one means of weakening support for the dissidents or as a compromise to end the violence. Looking at terrorism from the perspective of war, crime, or

disease is useful for analysis and for pinpointing problems that can occur when one or the other of these particular views is taken, but many terrorist groups and situations do not fit neatly into one or the other of these three situations. The necessary response will often be a mixture of elements involved with all three, and determining the appropriate mix of security programmes and responses to terrorism will never be easy. Security measures for dealing with terrorist threats is likely to require flexibility and government security forces will have to change techniques as circumstances change.

? QUESTIONS

Which type of terrorism is currently the most prevalent in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and the United States and why?

Which areas of the world are most vulnerable to terrorism and why?

What other categories might be added to religious, ideological, and ethnic terrorism?

What role does the media play in international terrorism and domestic terrorism?

Is terrorism more widespread in the twenty-first century than it was in the last half of the twentieth century?

What techniques might be most effective in dealing with different kinds of terrorism? Why?

Is terrorism best dealt with as war, crime, or disease in your own country?

What counter-terrorism measures would be most effective in dealing with terrorism in your country?

What changes (if any) will occur in the next decade in how terrorist groups operate? How will ways of providing security against terrorism change?

Are efforts to defeat or contain terrorism a great threat to civil liberties?

WAVE FURTHER READING

■ **Bjorgo, Tore (ed.) (1995), *Terror from the Extreme Right*, London: Frank Cass.** This compilation provides examples of right wing terrorist groups that are operating in a variety of countries, indicating the extent of such activities.

■ **Campbell, Bruce D. and Brenner, Arthur D. (eds.) (2000), *Death Squads in a Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability*, New York: St. Martin's.** This book is a compilation of case studies of the

use of death squads in all parts of the world and an excellent introduction for this form of government-supported terrorism.

■ **Crenshaw, Martha and Pimlot, John (eds.) (1997), *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.** This three-volume work provides brief but comprehensive coverage of terrorist groups around the world and deals with basic types of terrorism and government responses.

■ **Hoffman, Bruce (1998), *Inside Terrorism*, New York: Columbia University Press.** This volume is an excellent work outlining some of the classic types of terrorism and movements.

■ **Juergensmeyer, Mark (2000), *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, Berkeley: University of California Press.** Juergensmeyer provides a needed global perspective on the rise of religious groups willing to use terrorist violence.

■ **Kegley, Charles W. Jr. (ed.) (2003), *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.** This collection is undoubtedly the best recent compilation of short works in the field, covering basic issues from a variety of perspectives.

■ **Laqueur, Walter (2001), *A History of Terrorism*, Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.** This book is in part an update of earlier works. It contains a broad overview of terrorism over time and details the difficulties of viewing terrorism from one or a limited number of perspectives.

■ **Lutz, James M. and Lutz, Brenda J. (2004), *Global Terrorism*, London: Routledge.** This textbook uses case studies to provide historical and geographical depth to the discussion of terrorism. While it covers both Islamic terrorism and the Middle Eastern events, it clearly avoids concentrating on either one to the exclusion of other groups.

■ **Tucker, Jonathan B. (ed.) (2000), *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.** This volume documents various attempts to use chemical and biological weapons by terrorist or potential terrorist groups. It indicates that most of the attempted uses have ended in failure, although the efforts of Aum Shinrikyo in Japan are an obvious exception.

■ **Wilkinson, Paul (2000), *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, London: Frank Cass.** Wilkinson provides an extensive overview of terrorism and terrorist groups and discusses the effects that terrorism has had on Western democracies.

GLOBE IMPORTANT WEBSITES

● **www.tkb.org/Home.jsp** National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). This website contains invaluable statistics on terrorists actions by country or group. The material can also be organized by year. The data begin in 1968, and only include international terrorist incidents from 1968 to 1997. From 1998 onward they include both international and domestic attacks.

● **www.comw.org/rma/fulltest/terrorism.html** Project on Defense Alternatives, Revolution on Military Affairs (RMA)—maintained by Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, MA. This website provides access to papers and other works dealing with terrorism, including some papers (from conferences or as working papers) that are not readily available elsewhere.

● **www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgfrpt** United State Department of State, *Patterns of Terrorism* series on line. This series is a compilation on international terrorist incidents around the world. The series

began in 1991. The data are not restricted to attacks involving the United States and against US interests or American citizens abroad. The data from 1991 to 2003 are comprehensive and considered reliable. Questions were raised about the 2004 data, which were then withdrawn for possible correction and later release.



Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for lots of interesting additional material: www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/collins/

17

The Defence Trade

JOANNA SPEAR AND NEIL COOPER



Chapter Contents

- Introduction
- Explaining the arms dynamic
- Trends in defence expenditure
- The content of the contemporary defence trade
- Conclusion



Reader's Guide

This chapter aims to provide the reader with an understanding of key aspects of the contemporary defence trade. It begins by examining the main theoretical approaches that have been developed to explain why states acquire defence equipment. This section includes an analysis of the action-reaction, domestic factor and technological imperative models as well as a brief discussion of the military-industrial complex thesis. The first section concludes by considering the various ways in which the symbolic meaning attached to military technology may influence decisions on both the acquisition and sale of defence equipment.

The chapter then examines trends in both defence expenditure and defence exports. With respect to the former, it highlights, in particular, the way in which the US war on terror has legitimized a return to Cold War levels of defence expenditure and how the vast amounts expended on defence by the US is creating a growing technology gap between it and other producers. With respect to the latter, the chapter draws on the notion of 'tiers' in the defence market to analyse trends in the defence export trade, focusing on the policies of specific states that can be viewed as exemplars of each tier. This section also includes a brief discussion of the role played by non-state actors in the supply of defence material as well as an examination of demand factors in the market. The final section of the chapter outlines the changes in the content of the contemporary defence trade, in particular the shift away from the supply of complete major weapons systems to the provision of upgrades, dual-use technologies, communications equipment, spare parts and training.

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