Review
Psychological benefits of believing conspiracy
theories
Jan-Willem van Prooijen1,2,3
Abstract
Many people believe conspiracy theories, even though such
beliefs are harmful to themselves and their social environment.
What is the appeal of conspiracy theories? In this contribution,
I propose that conspiracy theories have psychological benefits
by imbuing perceiver’s worldview with meaning and purpose in
a rewarding manner. Conspiracy theories enable an alternative
reality in which perceivers (a) can defend a fragile ego by
perceiving themselves and their groups as important, (b) can
rationalize any of their beliefs and actions as legitimate, and (c)
are entertained through the opportunity to uncover a mystery in
an exciting tale. These are short-term benefits, however,
suggesting that conspiracy theories provide people with a form
of instant gratification.
Addresses
1
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands
2
The Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement
(NSCR), Netherlands
3
Maastricht University, Netherlands
Corresponding author: Prooijen, Jan-Willem van (j.w.van.prooijen@
vu.nl)
Current Opinion in Psychology 2022, 47:101352
This review comes from a themed issue on Conspiracy Theories
(2023)
Edited by Jan-Willem van Prooijen and Roland Imhoff
For complete overview about the section, refer Conspiracy Theories
(2023)
Available online 5 May 2022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101352
2352-250X/© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an
open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Keywords
Conspiracy theories, Psychological benefits, Alternative reality,
Instant gratification.
Although conspiracy theories are omnipresent, empirical
research has mainly emphasized their negative effects.
Believing conspiracy theories is associated with poor
health choices [1e5], decreased well-being [6,7], and
deteriorated social relationships [8]. Conspiracy beliefs
also harm society by decreasing public support for policy
aimed at addressing genuine problems such as climate
change [9; but see 10] and the Covid-19 pandemic
[11,12]. Moreover, they are associated with support for
populist and politically extreme movements [13e15],
and violent activism [16e19]. These findings suggest a
paradox: If conspiracy theories are largely harmful for
perceivers and their environment, then why do so many
people endorse them? The present contribution will
examine how perceivers benefit psychologically from
conspiracy beliefs.
While current theoretical models may imply that conspiracy
theories satisfy basic psychological needs or help
alleviate threats, empirical evidence does not support
that people actually benefit from conspiracy beliefs in
this manner. For instance, an evolutionary perspective
suggests that susceptibility to conspiracy theories has
been adaptive to ancient hunteregatherers, to cope with
the realistic threat of hostile coalitions. This reasoning,
however, only emphasizes how conspiracy theories
helped ancestors survive in a Pleistocene environment,
and does not hold implications for possible psychological
benefits in present-day society [20]. If anything, the
evolutionary perspective implies macro-level societal
benefits, by explaining why people possess mental systems
that make them sensitive to signals suggesting
possible collusion. Consistent with this perspective,
citizens display stronger conspiracy beliefs in highcorruption
than low-corruption countries [21,22].
Motivational perspectives also fall short of clarifying the
psychological benefits of conspiracy beliefs. Extensive
research has revealed that conspiracy beliefs increase
following deprivation of existential, epistemic, and
social needs [23]. These findings do not show, however,
that conspiracy beliefs subsequently are successful in
satisfying these needs. While conspiracy theories may
help people understand their social environment when
faced with existential threats, the epistemic assumption
that hostile conspiracies operate in the shadows is unlikely
to make them feel safe or certain. Conspiracy
beliefs indeed do not reduce, and sometimes even increase,
anxiety, uncertainty aversion, and existential
threat [24]. Furthermore, although experiences of social
exclusion increase conspiracy beliefs [25], believing
conspiracy theories does not restore belongingness
needs. Instead, conspiracy beliefs make people vulnerable
to stigmatization [26], and predict job loss and
social rejection [7]. One can even question how
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comforting “denialist” conspiracy theories are: These
theories may reduce feelings of existential threat in one
domain (e.g., by denying the reality of climate change)
yet reinforce other existential threats (e.g., the belief
that authorities are deceptive).
These issues raise the question what the psychological
payoff of conspiracy theories is for believers. The core of
my argument is that although conspiracy beliefs may not
reduce anxiety or help them maintain social relationships,
they do stimulate a sense of meaning and purpose
in a specific way that is psychologically rewarding.
Through conspiracy theories perceivers can construct an
alternative reality in which they are important and
legitimate actors, participating in a spectacular narrative.
In what follows I more specifically propose that
conspiracy theories (1) have ego-defensive benefits by
making people feel important, (2) help people rationalize
their behavior and therefore make them feel
legitimate, and (3) have entertainment value by stimulating
feelings of excitement.
Conspiracy theories are ego-defensive
Many conspiracy theories provide alternative explanations
for impactful crisis events in the world, such as
pandemics, wars, or natural disasters [27]. Believing
conspiracy theories therefore can install a sense of
meaning and purpose by raising the impression that one
is discovering something truly important. This reasoning
is compatible with theoretical insights into closely
related phenomena: For instance, radicalization theories
stress that extreme ideological beliefs satisfy a need for
significance, by making people feel important and special.
People therefore are more likely to radicalize
following experiences of significance loss (e.g., injustice;
humiliation [28]). Likewise, conspiracy beliefs are associated
with feeling unique and special, and can hence
reflect positively on people’s self-perception [29,30].
It should be specified, however, that these self-related
benefits of conspiracy theories do not necessarily
pertain to maintenance of a positive self-concept;
instead, conspiracy theories help people defend relatively
fragile forms of self-perception [31]. For example,
conspiracy beliefs predict instability of self-esteem (i.e.,
the extent to which self-esteem fluctuates over time)
more strongly than level of self-esteem [32]. Moreover,
conspiracy beliefs are positively associated only with an
inflated sense of self, as conspiracy beliefs predict lower
self-esteem but also higher narcissism [6].
A similar process can be observed in the way people
derive self-worth from their group memberships, as
conspiracy beliefs predict collective narcissism (i.e., an
inflated perception of one’s ingroup [33,34]). Through
conspiracy theories people can establish the superiority
of their ingroup as compared with competing outgroups.
In sum, conspiracy beliefs can make people feel
important and superior, and thus are beneficial by
helping them defend a fragile sense of self-worth.
Conspiracy theories as rationalization tool
An additional way in which conspiracy theories
contribute to meaning and purpose is by legitimizing
people’s role in the world. Recall that conspiracy beliefs
are associated with counter-normative behaviors
including rejection of vaccines, reduced containmentrelated
behavior during the Covid-19 pandemic, and
antisocial behavior [3,4,18]. It is important to keep in
mind that much of the evidence supporting this link is
correlational. Even research showing causal effects of
conspiracy theories on counter-normative behavior
[11,35] does not exclude the possibility of bidirectionality:
Counter-normative behavior may causally increase
conspiracy beliefs. Here, I propose that the link between
counter-normative behavior and conspiracy beliefs
partially reflects a psychological benefit for
perceivers: Conspiracy theories may be used as rationalization
tool because they are flexible narratives that
people can endorse, sometimes even with limited or no
evidence [36]. Conspiracy theories therefore facilitate a
motivated reasoning process that helps people justify
(to themselves and others) their beliefs and behaviors
[37].
The notion that people seek to rationalize their
behavior, and therefore easily embrace conspiracy beliefs,
is consistent with classic theories of cognitive
dissonance [38]. The flexible nature of conspiracy theories
implies that people can conveniently form them
about any societal institution or group, and as such,
conspiracy theories help perceivers mentally reconstrue
unhealthy behaviors as healthy (e.g., justifying vaccine
refusal by believing that pharmaceutical companies are
dishonest), and anti-government violence as legitimate
(e.g., justifying violent protests as legitimate resistance
against oppressors). While these actions themselves are
not beneficialdto neither believers nor societydconspiracy
beliefs can imbue people’s worldview,
and their actions associated with it, with a sense
of legitimacy.
Various findings support the notion that people use
conspiracy theories as a rationalization tool. During the
Covid-19 pandemic, conspiracy beliefs not only predict
decreased Covid-19 preventive behavior over time, but
also, decreased preventive behavior predicts increased
conspiracy belief over time [39]. Also, at the start of the
pandemic the link between conspiracy beliefs and
detrimental health behaviors was mediated by a belief to
have experienced a Covid-19 infection, without evidence
of a positive medical test. Apparently, conspiracy
beliefs predict a motivated tendency to interpret one’s
own physical discomfort as evidence of a Covid-19
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infection, presumably to rationalize a worldview that
downplays the dangers of the coronavirus [12].
Conspiracy beliefs also help to rationalize people’s perceptions
of society. In politics, people endorse conspiracy
theories as a form of motivated reasoning to support
their ideological beliefs and degrade competing ideologies
[40,41]. Moreover, conspiracy theories help people
justify the societal system that they live indthus raising
their satisfaction with itdby blaming its problems on
outgroup conspiracies instead of inherent flaws in the
system [42,43]. Relatedly, outgroup conspiracy theories
are associated with collectivist cultural values [44e46].
In sum, conspiracy theories make perceivers feel like
legitimate actors by helping them rationalize their beliefs
and behaviors.
Conspiracy theories as entertainment
A third way in which conspiracy theories contributes to
meaning and purpose is by creating an alternative reality
that is exciting, attention-grabbing, and spectacular.
Conspiracy theories typically portray an archetypical
struggle between good and evil, and introduce mystery
about the potentially dubious role of powerful and
important societal actors (e.g., politicians; celebrities).
It is therefore not surprising that the plotlines of many
works of fictiondincluding novels, theater plays, and
moviesdcenter around conspiracies [47]. Believing
conspiracy theories turns perceivers into active players
in such spectacular narratives, and gives them the
opportunitydmuch like lay detectivesdto uncover a
mystery. Believing conspiracy theories hence offers
people entertainment.
At first blush, this psychological benefit might seem
discrepant with the notion that conspiracy theories can
increase negative emotions such as anxiety [24]. Note,
however, that many popular sources of entertainment
are likely to increase anxiety (e.g., scary movies; detective
novels; gambling; bungee jumping). People often do
not avoid such negative emotions; instead, people are
drawn to events that provide intense emotional experiences,
which may include emotions that are negative,
positive, or both [48]. Such intense emotional experiences
are exciting, and make people feel alive.
Research supports the notion that people experience
conspiracy beliefs as entertaining. Conspiracy beliefs are
associated with dispositional aversion to boredom [49],
and with the more general trait sensation-seeking,
reflecting people’s desire for intense sensations and
experiences [50]. Sensation-seeking also predicts a
range of phenomena closely related with conspiracy
beliefs, including radicalization and participation in violent
extremist groups [51,52], and supernatural beliefs
[53,54]. Moreover, conspiracy beliefs are associated with
not only negative but also positive emotions [55].
Experimental studies underscore the entertainment
value of conspiracy theories. Participants rated a
conspiratorial text (about the Notre Dame fire or the
death of Jeffrey Epstein) as more entertaining than a
text describing the official account of these events.
These entertainment appraisals subsequently predicted
increased belief in these conspiracy theories. An additional
study showed that people more strongly believed
that an election event was rigged if it was described in
an entertaining rather than a boring manner [50]. These
findings illuminate that people find conspiracy theories
entertaining, which motivates increased belief in them.
Conclusions
Why are so many people drawn to conspiracy theories?
The present contribution has highlighted three complementary
ways in which believing conspiracy theories
may bring psychological benefits. Conspiracy
theories help people defend a fragile ego by exaggerating
the importance of themselves and their groups;
conspiracy theories make people feel like legitimate
actors by rationalizing their beliefs and behaviors; and,
believing conspiracy theories entertains people by
making them active participants of an exciting tale.
The general process underlying these psychological
benefits is the potential of conspiracy theories to
imbue perceivers’ worldview with meaning and purpose
in a rewarding manner.
Two qualifications of these propositions are in order.
First, the described processes are likely to be psychologically
beneficial only in the short run. While
constructing an alternative reality may be appealing as
described here, a risk is that reality catches up with
perceivers eventually. Many of the harmful effects of
conspiracy theories emerge by promoting choices that
may have negative real-life consequences for themselves
and others [3,7,11]. Second, the current propositions
only focus on the question how perceivers
themselves benefit from conspiracy theories. How
perceivers’ social environment, or society at large,
might benefit from conspiracy theories is a different
issue. Although conspiracy theories also may have
certain benefits for societydin that they can increase
transparency among decision-makers, and can keep the
public attentive to the possibility of actual corruption
[56]dmost social consequences are likely to be negative
[1e5,7e12,16e20].
These considerations suggest that conspiracy theories
provide a form of instant gratification to people. Somewhat
analogous to smoking or gambling, conspiracy beliefs
may be psychologically rewarding in the short run;
but perceivers and society pay a price for them in the
long run. It therefore should be emphasized that the
main goal of the present contribution was to understand
what makes conspiracy theories appealing despite all of
Benefits of conspiracy theories Prooijen 3
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their negative effects. Recognizing that there are psychological
benefits to believing conspiracy theories does
not imply a recommendation to endorse them, nor is it
an argument against interventions to reduce conspiracy
beliefs (e.g., debunking and prebunking; [57]). The
appeal of conspiracy theories notwithstanding, in the
end perceivers and society benefit most from reason
and truth.
Conflict of interest statement
Nothing declared.
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