Psychological Science
24(5) 622­–633
© The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/0956797612457686
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Research Article
More than 90% of climate scientists agree that the global
climate is changing, largely because of carbon dioxide
emissions resulting from human activity (Anderegg, Prall,
Harold, & Schneider, 2010; Doran & Zimmerman, 2009).1
There are indications that the 2007 assessment of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was
conservative rather than “alarmist” (Allison et al., 2009;
Freudenburg & Muselli, 2010); however, the scientific
indicators of increasing actual risks are accompanied by
an apparent decrease in the public’s perception of those
risks in some countries (Brulle, Carmichael, & Jenkins,
2012; Hanson, 2009; Scruggs & Benegal, 2012).
The reasons for this declining public concern are manifold.
Researchers in history and sociology frequently cite
the “manufacture of doubt” by vested interests and political
groups as a factor (Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman,
2008; McCright & Dunlap, 2003, 2010; Mooney, 2007;
Oreskes & Conway, 2010; Stocking & Holstein, 2009). For
example, more than 90% of books endorsing skepticism
toward environmentalism that have been published since
1972 have been sponsored by conservative think tanks
(Jacques et al., 2008). Oreskes and Conway (2010) analyzed
the shared ideological underpinnings of organized
attempts over the past few decades to discredit wellestablished
scientific findings, such as the link between
smoking and lung cancer, the causal role of chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) in eroding the ozone layer, and, most
recently, the findings of climate change. Oreskes and
Conway documented that a small number of organizations
and individuals have been instrumental in those
457686PSSXXX10.1177/0956797612457686Lewandowsky et al.Motivated Climate Denial
research-article2013
Corresponding Author:
Stephan Lewandowsky, School of Psychology, University of Western
Australia, 35 Stirling Highway, Crawley, Western Australia 6009,
Australia
E-mail: stephan.lewandowsky@uwa.edu.au
NASA Faked the Moon Landing—Therefore,
(Climate) Science Is a Hoax: An Anatomy
of the Motivated Rejection of Science
Stephan Lewandowsky1
, Klaus Oberauer1,2
, and
Gilles E. Gignac1
1
University of Western Australia and 2
University of Zurich
Abstract
Although nearly all domain experts agree that carbon dioxide emissions are altering the world’s climate, segments of
the public remain unconvinced by the scientific evidence. Internet blogs have become a platform for denial of climate
change, and bloggers have taken a prominent role in questioning climate science. We report a survey of climateblog
visitors to identify the variables underlying acceptance and rejection of climate science. Our findings parallel
those of previous work and show that endorsement of free-market economics predicted rejection of climate science.
Endorsement of free markets also predicted the rejection of other established scientific findings, such as the facts that
HIV causes AIDS and that smoking causes lung cancer. We additionally show that, above and beyond endorsement of
free markets, endorsement of a cluster of conspiracy theories (e.g., that the Federal Bureau of Investigation killed Martin
Luther King, Jr.) predicted rejection of climate science as well as other scientific findings. Our results provide empirical
support for previous suggestions that conspiratorial thinking contributes to the rejection of science. Acceptance of
science, by contrast, was strongly associated with the perception of a consensus among scientists.
Keywords
scientific communication, policymaking, climate science
Received 5/22/12; Revision accepted 7/7/12
Motivated Climate Denial	623
contrarian activities, arguably motivated by a laissez-faire
free-market ideology that views as threatening any scientific
finding with potential regulatory impact, such as
interference with the marketing of tobacco products,
bans on CFCs, or a price on carbon emissions (cf. Dunlap
& McCright, 2011).
These historical analyses complement empirical results
showing that people’s rejection of climate science is associated
with an embrace of laissez-faire free-market economics
(Heath & Gifford, 2006; Kahan, 2010). There is
little doubt that people’s personal ideology—also often
referred to as worldview or cultural cognition—is a major
predictor of the rejection of climate science (Dunlap &
McCright, 2008; Feygina, Jost, & Goldsmith, 2010;
Hamilton, 2011; Heath & Gifford, 2006; Kahan, 2010;
Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011; McCright &
Dunlap, 2011a, 2011b).
In the study reported here, we investigated predictors
of the rejection of climate science and investigated
whether they generalize across content domains. We
define the rejection of science as the dismissal of wellestablished
scientific results for reasons that are not scientifically
grounded (Diethelm & McKee, 2009; Jacques,
2012; McKee & Diethelm, 2010).2
Those reasons may
comprise the psychological factors that are of interest
here, but they may also include indecision arising from
inaccurate or misleading media coverage—for example,
the scientific consensus on climate change is often misrepresented
in the media (e.g., Boykoff, 2007). Rejection
of science must be distinguished from true skepticism,
which may prompt the revision of a scientific claim on
the basis of evidence and reasoned theorizing. Skepticism
not only is at the core of scientific reasoning, but also has
been shown to improve people’s discrimination between
true and false information (e.g., Lewandowsky, Stritzke,
Oberauer, & Morales, 2005, 2009).
In addition to a worldview that endorses free-market
economics, another variable that has been associated
with the rejection of science is conspiratorial thinking, or
conspiracist ideation, defined here as the attempt to
explain a significant political or social event as a secret
plot by powerful individuals or organizations (Sunstein &
Vermeule, 2009). The presumed conspirators are typically
perceived as virtually omnipotent (Bale, 2007). Thus,
internal documents of the tobacco industry referred to
scientists doing medical research on the health effects of
smoking as a “vertically integrated, highly concentrated,
oligopolistic cartel” that—in combination with “public
monopolies”—“manufactures alleged evidence, suggestive
inferences linking smoking to various diseases, and
publicity and dissemination and advertising of these socalled
findings” (Abt, 1983, p. 126). Likewise, rejection of
the link between HIV and AIDS has been associated with
the conspiratorial belief that HIV was created by the U.S.
government to eradicate Black people (e.g., Bogart &
Thorburn, 2005; Kalichman, Eaton, & Cherry, 2010).
Rejection of climate science has also long been infused
with notions of a conspiracy among scientists. As early as
1996, accusations of corruption in the IPCC were aired in
the Wall Street Journal (Lahsen, 1999; Oreskes & Conway,
2010). More recently, a book by a U.S. senator is called
The Greatest Hoax: How the Global Warming Conspiracy
Threatens Your Future (Inhofe, 2012).
The prominence of conspiracist ideation in people
who espouse science denial is not entirely surprising
because if an overwhelming scientific consensus cannot
be accepted as the result of researchers independently
converging on the same evidence-based view, then the
very existence of the consensus calls for an alternative
explanation. The ideation of a complex and secretive
conspiracy among researchers can provide that explanation
(Diethelm & McKee, 2009; McKee & Diethelm, 2010).
However, there is no empirical evidence about how
widespread such ideations are among people who reject
scientific evidence, in particular as it relates to climate
change. Moreover, to date, analyses of conspiracist ideation
in the rejection of science have exclusively focused
on conspiracy theories pertaining to the scientific issue
under consideration: Thus, denial of HIV’s connection
with AIDS has been linked to the belief that the U.S. government
created HIV (Kalichman, 2009), members of the
tobacco industry viewed lung-cancer researchers as an
“oligopolistic cartel” (Abt, 1983, p. 127), and climate
deniers believe that communists, socialists, and a “global
elite” have manufactured global warming as the “biggest
scam in history” (Sussman, 2010, p. 215). In all these
cases, the conspiracy theory serves to explain away overwhelming
scientific evidence. Thus, the conspiracist ideation
may be an accoutrement of the denial of an
inconvenient scientific fact, rather than an independent
and potentially stable psychological variable that is associated
with the rejection of science more generally.
It is known that people’s propensity for conspiracist
ideation is not limited to one theory in isolation. Instead,
the belief that AIDS was created by the government is
likely accompanied by the conviction that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) killed Martin Luther King,
Jr., or that the Air Force is hiding evidence of extraterrestrial
visitors (Goertzel, 1994; Swami, ChamorroPremuzic,
& Furnham, 2009). Douglas and Sutton (2011),
in a study supporting the notion of a general disposition
toward conspiracist ideation, showed that people’s
endorsement of conspiracy theories was associated with
their willingness to engage in a conspiracy themselves
when they deemed it necessary. It is therefore possible
that this disposition predicts the rejection of science independently
of the scientific domain in question: If conspiracist
ideation reflects a stable personality or cognitive
624	 Lewandowsky et al.
characteristic, then people who believe that NASA faked
the moon landing may be likely to reject a range of other
scientific propositions, from medical facts on HIV-AIDS
to consensus on climate change.
Another attribute common to people who reject science
is reliance on the Internet (Diethelm & McKee,
2009; McKee & Diethelm, 2010). By definition, the peerreviewed
literature does not promote denial; for example,
questioning the link between HIV and AIDS lost
intellectual respectability decades ago (Nattrass, 2010,
2011), and there are few peer-reviewed contrarian climate
publications (Anderegg et al., 2010). The Internet,
by contrast, provides the opportunity for individuals who
reject a scientific consensus to feed “each other’s feelings
of persecution by a corrupt elite” (McKee & Diethelm,
2010, pp. 1310–1311). Accordingly, climate-“skeptic” blogs
have become a major staging post for denial, although
blogs are also used by supporters of climate science to
disseminate scientific evidence. The influence of blogs
should not be underestimated: For example, one skeptic
blogger (Steven McIntyre of the “Climate Audit” blog, at
climateaudit.org) has triggered several congressional
investigations, and one anonymous proscience blogger
(“Deep Climate”) uncovered a plagiarism scandal involving
a report skeptical of climate change for Congress,
which ultimately led to the retraction of a peer-reviewed
article. Popular climate blogs can register upward of
700,000 monthly visitors, a self-selected audience that is
by definition highly engaged in the increasingly polarized
climate debate.
Climate-blog denizens therefore present a highly relevant
population for the study of variables underlying
endorsement or rejection of the scientific consensus on
climate. We surveyed blog denizens on (a) their views
on climate science and a range of other scientific propositions;
(b) two constructs that we hypothesized to be
associated with rejection of science (endorsement of freemarket
ideology and agreement with a range of conspiracy
theories); (c) a construct targeting sensitivity to
environmental problems (e.g., whether previous concerns
about acid rain have been addressed); and (d) the perceived
consensus among scientists, which has been
repeatedly linked to acceptance of science (Ding, Maibach,
Zhao, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2011; Dunlap &
McCright, 2008; Kahan et al., 2011; Lewandowsky, Gignac,
& Vaughan, 2012).
Method
Participants
Visitors to climate blogs voluntarily completed an online
questionnaire between August and October 2010 (N =
1,377). Links were posted on eight blogs that have a proscience
stance but a diverse audience (see the
Supplemental Material for more on audience composition);
an additional five “skeptic” (or “skeptic”-leaning)
blogs were approached, but none posted the link.
Questionnaire
Table 1 lists items retained for analysis together with their
abbreviated variable names.3
The free-market items were
taken from Heath and Gifford (2006). Most of the conspiracy
items were adapted from previous research (e.g.,
Swami et al., 2009). The conspiracies covered the political
spectrum, with fears of a “world government” being
most pronounced on the political right and a theory that
September 11 was an “inside job” being prevalent on the
left (Nyhan, 2010). The remaining items were designed
for this study. The table shows the ordering of items into
groups for one version of the questionnaire; in another
version, the conspiracist items were positioned between
the items querying free-market ideology and those focusing
on acceptance of climate science. The two versions
were arbitrarily assigned to blogs.
Results
Following standard recommendations (Gosling, Vazire,
Srivastava, & John, 2004), whenever more than one
response was submitted from the same Internet Protocol
address, we eliminated all those responses (n = 71). An
additional 161 responses were eliminated because the
respondent’s age was implausible (< 10 or > 95 years
old), values for the consensus items were outside the
range of the rating scale, or responses were incomplete.
This left 1,145 complete records for analysis. Items were
reverse-scored when necessary, such that larger scores
pointed to greater endorsement of the underlying construct.
Raw correlation matrices and summary statistics
are reported in the Supplemental Material available
online (Tables S3 and S4).
Analyses focused on the relations among the constructs
of greatest interest: free-market ideology, acceptance
of climate science and of other sciences, perceived
consensus among scientists, conspiracist ideation, and
the belief that earlier environmental problems have been
resolved. The overarching analysis used a structural
equation model (SEM), with the data preprocessed as
follows.
Separate exploratory factor analyses were conducted
for the free-market, climate-change, and conspiracistideation
items. For free-market items, a single factor comprising
five items accounted for 56.5% of the variance;
the remaining item (FMNotEnvQual) loaded on a second
factor (17.7% of the variance) by itself and was therefore
eliminated. The four climate-change items (excluding
CauseCO2) loaded on a common factor that explained
87% of the variance; all were retained. For conspiracist
Motivated Climate Denial	625
ideation, two factors were identified; the 2 items involving
space aliens (CYArea51 and CYRoswell) loaded on
the second factor, which accounted for 9.6% of the variance,
and the remaining 10 loaded on the first one, which
accounted for 42.0% of the variance (CYAIDS and
CYClimChange were not considered for the reasons
stated in Table 1). Responses to items loading on each
conspiracist-ideation factor were summed, so that two
composite manifest variables were created. The two composites
thus estimated a conspiracist-ideation construct
without any conceptual relation to the scientific issues
under investigation.
Table 1.  Questionnaire Items, Variable Names, and Factor Loadings
Variable name Item Loadinga
Free-market ideology
FMUnresBest An economic system based on free markets unrestrained
by government interference automatically works best
to meet human needs.
.802
FMNotEnvQual I support the free-market system but not at the expense
of environmental quality. (R)
(omitted from analysis)
FMLimitSocial The free-market system may be efficient for resource
allocation, but it is limited in its capacity to promote
social justice. (R)
.624
FMMoreImp The preservation of the free-market system is more
important than localized environmental concerns.
.827
FMThreatEnv Free and unregulated markets pose important threats to
sustainable development. (R)
.887
FMUnsustain The free-market system is likely to promote
unsustainable consumption. (R)
.892
Acceptance of climate science
CO2TempUp I believe that burning fossil fuels increases atmospheric
temperature to some measurable degree.
.941
CO2AtmosUp I believe that the burning of fossil fuels on the scale
observed over the last 50 years has increased
atmospheric temperature to an appreciable degree.
.969
CO2WillNegChange I believe that the burning of fossil fuels on the scale
observed over the last 50 years will cause serious
negative changes to the planet’s climate unless there
is a substantial switch to non-CO2-emitting energy
sources.
.982
CO2HasNegChange I believe that the burning of fossil fuels on the scale
observed over the last 50 years has caused serious
negative changes to the planet’s climate.
.921
Perception that problems have been resolved
CFCNowOK The problem of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) is no longer
a serious threat to the ozone layer.
.801
AcidRainNowOK The problem of acid rain is no longer a serious threat to
the global ecosystem.
.927
Conspiracist ideationb
CYNewWorldOrder A powerful and secretive group known as the New
World Order is planning to eventually rule the world
through an autonomous world government that
would replace sovereign governments.
.742
CYSARS SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) was
produced under laboratory conditions as a biological
weapon.
.742
CYPearlHarbor The U.S. government had foreknowledge about the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor but allowed the
attack to take place so as to be able to enter the
Second World War.
.742
(Continued)
626	 Lewandowsky et al.
Variable name Item Loadinga
CYMLK The assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. was the
result of an organized conspiracy by U.S. government
agencies such as the FBI and CIA.
.742
CYMoon The Apollo moon landings never happened and were
staged in a Hollywood film studio.
.742
CYJFK The assassination of John F. Kennedy was not
committed by the lone gunman Lee Harvey Oswald
but was rather a detailed organized conspiracy to kill
the president.
.742
CY911 The U.S. government allowed the 9/11 attacks to take
place so that it would have an excuse to achieve
foreign (e.g., wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) and
domestic (e.g., attacks on civil liberties) goals that
had been determined prior to the attacks.
.742
CYDiana Princess Diana’s death was not an accident but rather
an organized assassination by members of the British
royal family who disliked her.
.742
CYOkla The Oklahoma City bombers Timothy McVeigh and
Terry Nichols did not act alone but rather received
assistance from neo-Nazi groups.
.742
CYCoke The Coca-Cola company intentionally changed to an
inferior formula with the intent of driving up demand
for their classic product, later reintroducing it for their
financial gain.
.742
CYRoswell In July 1947, the U.S. military recovered the wreckage
of an alien spacecraft from Roswell, NM, and covered
up the fact.
.891
CYArea51 Area 51 in Nevada is a secretive military base that
contains hidden alien spacecraft and/or alien bodies.
.891
CYClimChangec
The claim that the climate is changing due to emissions
from fossil fuels is a hoax perpetrated by corrupt
scientists who want to spend more taxpayer money
on climate research.
 
CYAIDSc
U.S. agencies intentionally created the AIDS epidemic
and administered it to Black and gay men in the
1970s.
 
Acceptance of other sciences
CauseHIV The HIV virus causes AIDS. .894
CauseSmoke Smoking causes lung cancer. .845
CauseCO2 Human CO2 emissions cause climate change —
Consensus items
ConsensHIV Out of 100 medical scientists, how many do you think
believe that the HIV virus causes AIDS?
—
ConsensSmoke Out of 100 medical scientists, how many do you think
believe that smoking causes lung cancer?
—
ConsensCO2 Out of 100 climate scientists, how many do you think
believe that CO2 emissions resulting from human
activities cause climate change?
—
Note: All items used a 4-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4), with the exception of the consensus items,
which used a scale from 0 to 100. R = reverse-scored. The section headings inside the table correspond to the latent variable names in
Figure 2.
a
Standardized loadings of manifest variables on their corresponding latent variables are as shown in Figure 2. All loadings are significant.
b
There were two composite manifest variables for conspiracist ideation. The same loading is shown for all items that entered into a given
composite variable. c
These items were not entered as manifest variables to estimate the conspiracist-ideation latent variable because they
referred to conspiracies relevant to the scientific proposition being queried. People might therefore have endorsed these items because they
represented a convenient way to justify a rejection of science actually motivated by other variables.
Table 1. (Continued)
Motivated Climate Denial	627
Acceptance of science and consensus
Pairs of acceptance-of-science and consensus items (e.g.,
CauseHIV-ConsensHIV) were entered into an SEM with
two correlated latent variables, one capturing the common
variance of all acceptance questions and the other
representing all consensus questions (see Fig. 1). Pairwise
correlations between the residuals for each belief-consensus
pair represented content-specific covariance. All
SEMs in this article were performed with Mplus (http://
www.statmodel.com) using ordinal coding of the manifest
variables, with the consensus responses binned into
nine categories with approximately equal numbers.
The model fit reasonably well, χ2
(5) = 53.71, p < .0001,
confirmatory fit index (CFI) = .989, root-mean-square
error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.092, 90% confidence
interval (CI) = [0.071, 0.115]. People’s content-general
inclination to accept science was associated with their
content-general perception of scientific consensus, r =
.43, Z = 12.76, p < .0001, over and above the contentspecific
links represented by the pairwise correlations.
The fact that acceptance of climate science (CauseCO2)
and perceived consensus among climate scientists
(ConsensCO2) loaded onto their respective latent variables
together with items concerning other very different
scientific propositions suggests that respondents did not
gauge consensus among climate scientists and evaluate
climate science independently of their views of other,
unrelated domains of scientific inquiry. Rather, their perception
of consensus and their endorsement of scientific
findings about the climate reflected in part a contentindependent
disposition to perceive scientific consensus
and a correlated disposition to accept scientifically wellestablished
propositions. This finding replicated the factor
structure reported in Lewandowsky, Gignac, and
Vaughan (2012).
Ideology, conspiratorial thinking, and
acceptance of science
We next examined the interplay among the five constructs
of greatest interest: acceptance of climate science,
acceptance of other scientific propositions, free-market
ideology, the belief that previous environmental problems
have been resolved, and conspiracist ideation. For
this analysis, climate science was considered separately
from the other scientific propositions. Constructs were
measured using the manifest variables identified in
the earlier factor analyses, and acceptance of other
scientific propositions was measured by CauseHIV and
CauseSmoke. For the climate-science factor, pairwise correlations
were estimated between CO2TempUp and
CO2AtmosUp, and between CO2WillNegChange and
CO2HasNegChange, as this improved model fit considerably.
An exploratory model that estimated correlations
among all five latent variables fit well, χ2
(78) = 261.0, p <
.0001, CFI = .997, RMSEA = 0.045, 90% CI = [0.039, 0.051];
the pairwise correlations between the latent variables are
given in Table 2.
ConsensHIV
ConsensSmoke
ConsensCO2
CauseCO2
CauseSmoke
CauseHIV
e1
e2
e3
e4
e5
e6
Consensus
Science
0.84
0.79
0.55
0.72
0.89
0.86
0.43
0.67 0.62 0.88
Fig. 1.  Latent variable model for the relationship between perceived consensus among scientists
and acceptance of scientific propositions, as related to three scientific issues. All correlations (double-headed
arrows) and factor loadings (single-headed arrows) are significant and standardized.
See Table 1 for an explanation of the names of the manifest variables. e = residuals.
628	 Lewandowsky et al.
We next sought to predict acceptance of climate science
and other sciences from the remaining three latent
variables while simultaneously simplifying the model by
removing nonsignificant correlations and regression
weights. This final model fit very well, χ2
(82) = 182.1, p <
.0001, CFI = .999, RMSEA = 0.033, 90% CI = [0.026, 0.039],
and its fit did not differ from that of the unconstrained
model that included all correlations, Δχ2
(4) = 3.525,
p > .10. Figure 2 shows the model at the level of latent
variables, displaying only weights and correlations that
were statistically significant, p < .05.
Several aspects of the model are noteworthy: First,
endorsement of free markets was highly predictive of
rejection of climate science, β = −0.77. Second, freemarket
ideology also predicted the rejection of other
scientific propositions, although the magnitude of that
Table 2.  Pairwise Correlations Between the Five Latent Variables in the Unconstrained Model
Variable
Acceptance of
climate science
Acceptance of
other sciences
Perception that problems
have been resolved Free-market ideology
Acceptance of climate
science
—  
Acceptance of other
sciences
.563 —  
Perception that problems
have been resolved
−.586 −.263 —  
Free-market ideology −.866 −.464 .498 —
Conspiracist ideation −.197 −.538 .032 .021
0.680.41
Acceptance
of Climate
Science
Acceptance
of Other
Sciences
Free-Market
Ideology
Conspiracist
Ideation
Problems
Resolved
D1 D2
r2
= .83 r2
= .54
–0.49
–0.55
–0.20
–0.77
.50
–0.21
Fig. 2.  Latent variable model predicting acceptance of climate science and acceptance
of other scientific propositions on the basis of free-market ideology, the perception
that earlier environmental problems have been resolved, and conspiracist ideation.
All regression weights (single-headed arrows) and the correlation (double-headed
arrow) are significant and standardized. Weights and correlations that are not shown
were set to zero (e.g., the correlation between the residuals of acceptance of climate science
and acceptance of other sciences). Manifest variables for each latent variable and
their loadings are provided in Table 1. See the text for further explanation.
Motivated Climate Denial	629
link was smaller, β = −0.49. Third, conspiracist ideation
was negatively associated with acceptance of climate science
and other scientific propositions, β = −0.21 and β =
−0.55, respectively. Finally, the perception that previous
environmental problems have been resolved was negatively
associated with acceptance of climate science, β =
−0.20, but was unrelated to acceptance of other sciences
(β set to 0).
The three latent predictors accounted for much of the
variance in acceptance of climate science and for about
half the variance in acceptance of other sciences. Notably,
the three predictors explained the entire association
between the two latent criterion variables (initially r =
.563; see Table 2) because there was no remaining unexplained
correlation (r between the residuals of acceptance
of climate science and acceptance of other sciences
was set to 0 without loss of fit). Conspiracist ideation did
not correlate with the other two predictors.
Discussion
Rejection of climate science was strongly associated with
endorsement of a laissez-faire view of unregulated free
markets. This finding replicates previous work (e.g.,
Heath & Gifford, 2006), although the strength of association
found here (r ; .80) exceeds that reported in any
extant study. At least in part, this may reflect the use of
structural equation modeling, which enables measurement
of the associations between constructs in a way that
is free of measurement error (Fan, 2003).
Another variable that was associated with rejection of
climate science and other scientific propositions was
conspiracist ideation. This relationship emerged even
though conspiracies related to the queried scientific
propositions (HIV-AIDS, climate change) did not contribute
to the conspiracist construct. By implication, the role
of conspiracist ideation in the rejection of science did not
simply reflect “convenience” theories that provided specific
alternative “explanations” for a scientific consensus.
Instead, this finding suggests that a general propensity to
endorse any of a number of conspiracy theories predisposes
people to reject entirely unrelated scientific facts.
The relative importance of free-market ideology and
conspiracist ideation differed between climate science
and the other scientific propositions. We suggest that
free-market ideology had a larger effect on rejection of
climate science than did conspiratorial thinking (β =
−0.77 vs. β = −0.21) for two reasons: First, climate science
has arguably become more politicized than other sciences
(Hamilton, 2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a), and
second, given the fundamental importance of fossil fuels
(and hence carbon dioxide emissions) to contemporary
economies, climate science presents a far greater threat
to laissez-faire economics than do the medical facts that
HIV causes AIDS and that smoking causes lung cancer.
For the same reasons but in reverse, conspiracist ideation
had a larger effect on denial of facts about AIDS and lung
cancer (β = −0.55), compared with the effect of freemarket
ideology on denial of these facts (β = −0.49).
The third predictor, the perception that previous environmental
problems have been resolved, predicted rejection
of climate science but not of the other sciences. We
suggest that this construct reflects a predisposition to dismiss
environmental concerns (or consider them resolved)
that is prevalent in particular among adherents of the free
market (as evidenced by the correlation relating perception
that problems have been resolved with free-market
ideology, r = .50).
Finally, we replicated the finding that perceived scientific
consensus is associated with acceptance of science
(Ding et al., 2011; Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Kahan et al.,
2011; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2012). Although
the direction of causality cannot be ascertained from
these data, it has been shown that providing consensus
information can significantly enhance people’s acceptance
of climate science (Lewandowsky, Gignac, &
Vaughan, 2012).
Potential objections
Our respondents were self-selected denizens of climate
blogs. Therefore, one potential objection to our results
might be the selected nature of our sample. We acknowledge
that our sample is self-selected and that the results
may therefore not generalize to the population at large.
However, this fact has no bearing on the importance of
our results: We designed the study to investigate what
motivates the rejection of science in individuals who
choose to get involved in the ongoing debate about one
scientific topic, climate change. As noted earlier, this
group of people has a demonstrable impact on society,
and understanding their motivations and reasoning is
therefore of importance.
Another objection that might be raised is the possibility
that our respondents willfully accentuated their replies
to subvert our presumed intentions. As in most behavioral
research, this possibility cannot be ruled out.
However, unless a substantial subset of the more than
1,000 respondents conspired to coordinate their
responses, any individual accentuation or provocation
would only have injected more noise into our data. This
seems unlikely because subsets of our items have been
used in previous laboratory research, and for those subsets,
our data did not differ in a meaningful way from
published precedent. For example, responses to the
Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, &
Griffin, 1985) replicated previous research involving the
population at large (see Table S2 in the Supplemental
630	 Lewandowsky et al.
Material), and the model in Figure 1 exactly replicated
the factor structure reported by Lewandowsky, Gignac,
and Vaughan (2012) using a sample of pedestrians in a
large city. The Supplemental Material also shows that the
results are robust to the removal of potential outliers.
A final concern might be that respondents who
rejected science did so on the basis of a general critical
stance or predisposition to reject any proposition put
before them for potential endorsement. We find this
highly unlikely because respondents who rejected scientific
propositions were quite likely to endorse other items,
such as various conspiracy theories or the idea that “an
economic system based on free markets unrestrained by
government interference automatically works best to
meet human needs” (FMUnresBest in Table 1).
Theoretical implications
The pivotal role of personal ideology in the rejection of
climate science has been repeatedly demonstrated
(Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Feygina et al., 2010; Hamilton,
2011; Heath & Gifford, 2006; Kahan, 2010; Kahan et al.,
2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a, 2011b). We highlighted
the magnitude of this effect among climate-science blog
denizens, who have a strong interest in the issue, and we
additionally showed that endorsement of the free market
also predicted the rejection of two other well-established
scientific facts. This novel result is particularly intriguing
because only one of those facts, the link between tobacco
smoke and lung cancer, has regulatory implications and
has a history of organized ideologically motivated denial
(e.g., Michaels & Monforton, 2005; Oreskes & Conway,
2010). The fact that HIV causes AIDS, by contrast, seems
of little relevance to one’s views on the free market at
first glance. However, the association between ideology
and rejection of the link between HIV and AIDS is in
good agreement with our finding that perceived consensus
and acceptance of science were associated via general
factors that transcended pairwise correlations (Fig.
1). If acceptance of science is a coherent construct, then
it is not altogether surprising that rejection of established
facts is also consistently associated with free-market ideology
and conspiracist ideation.
Our results identify conspiracist ideation as a personality
factor or cognitive style, as numerous conspiracy theories
are captured by a single latent construct (cf. Goertzel,
1994; Swami et al., 2009; Swami et al., 2011). The negative
association between conspiracist ideation and acceptance
of well-established science confirms previous conceptual
analyses (Diethelm & McKee, 2009; Goertzel, 2010; McKee
& Diethelm, 2010). However, to our knowledge, our
results are the first to provide empirical evidence for the
correlation between a general construct of conspiracist
ideation and a general tendency to reject well-founded
science. This association is particularly notable because it
persisted after “convenience theories” were removed,
thus reliably linking broad-based rejection of science to
ideations that appear quite unrelated at first glance, such
as the notion that the U.S. government had advance
knowledge about the September 11th attacks or that the
FBI assassinated Martin Luther King, Jr.
We suggest that the study and analysis of conspiracist
ideation is of increasing importance: First, the spread of
conspiracy theories about the alleged risks from vaccinations
has been linked to reduced vaccination rates, with
consequent adverse public-health impacts (Goertzel,
2010). In the climate arena, the conspiracist ideation that
all of the world’s scientific academies have conspired
together to create a hoax known as global warming has
found traction in American mainstream politics (Inhofe,
2012). Second, there is evidence that conspiracy theories
are capable of influencing people even when they explicitly
attempt to discount them. Douglas and Sutton (2008)
showed that after exposure to conspiracy theories about
the death of Princess Diana, participants were demonstrably
affected by those theories even when they tried to
dismiss their influence. Third, belief in conspiracy theories
appears to be inducible. Swami et al. (2011) were
able to induce belief in an entirely fictitious conspiracy
theory involving a popular soft drink (e.g., that the drink
“raises dopamine levels”), especially among participants
who already held other conspiratorial views. That study
is arguably a laboratory equivalent of the real-life “experiment”
conducted by vested interests and political groups
with respect to climate science (cf. Oreskes & Conway,
2010).
In closing, we consider briefly what countermeasures
might be available to reduce the influence and spread of
conspiracy theories. Conspiracist ideation is, by definition,
difficult to correct because any evidence contrary to
the conspiracy is itself considered evidence of its existence
(Bale, 2007; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). Thus,
increasing global temperatures are reinterpreted as being
the result of government agencies selectively removing
thermometers that show a cooling trend and retaining
only those that show the “desired” warming trend.
Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) discussed several potential
countermeasures that are at the disposal of government
officials, several of which agree well with our
finding. For example, Sunstein and Vermeule suggested
that instead of rebutting single conspiracy theories, scientists
and policymakers should try to rebut many at the
same time. This conforms with our finding that conspiracist
ideation tends to be quite broad. Multiple rebuttals
also raise the complexity of possible conspiracist
responses (not only must there be a conspiracy to remove
thermometers, but there must also be a conspiracy to
launch a false “decoy” theory about the absence of a
Motivated Climate Denial	631
plane hitting the Pentagon on September 11 in order to
detract from the real conspiracy, which was to destroy
the Twin Towers, and so on). Sunstein and Vermeule
noted the possibility of addressing the “demand” rather
than the “supply” of conspiracy theories; that is, rather
than being directed at changing the minds of actual
believers, communication should be directed at inoculating
potential consumers of conspiracy theories against
accepting them.
Similarly, Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, and
Cook (2012) offered a broad review of “debiasing” techniques
that are directly applicable to the rebuttal of conspiracy
theories and include suggestions about how to
avoid various backfire effects that can arise when people’s
worldviews are challenged by corrective information.
Some of those suggestions, such as reaffirmation of
a subset of beliefs among consumers of conspiracy theories,
were echoed by Sunstein and Vermeule (2009).
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with
respect to their authorship or the publication of this article.
Funding
Preparation of this article was facilitated by a Discovery Grant
from the Australian Research Council and an Australian
Professorial Fellowship to S. L.
Supplemental Material
Additional supporting information may be found at http://pss
.sagepub.com/content/by/supplemental-data
Notes
1. The existence of a scientific consensus about core principles
of climate change does not imply the absence of uncertainty
or the absence of legitimate scientific debate surrounding asyet
unresolved issues. The core aspects of climate science for
which the consensus is beyond doubt are that the climate is
changing, that greenhouse gases are responsible, and that the
world is beginning to witness predicted changes in climate
patterns (Somerville, 2011). See the Supplemental Material
for further evidence about the pervasive scientific consensus
regarding climate science.
2. We prefer “rejection of science” to the term “denial,” which
in current scholarly usage typically pertains to an active public
denial of scientific facts by various means, such as the use
of rhetoric to create the appearance of debate where there
is none (Diethelm & McKee, 2009; Jacques, 2012; McKee &
Diethelm, 2010). Thus, whereas investigations of denial focus
on the techniques by which organizations or individuals seek
to undermine scientific findings in the public’s eye, our research
on the rejection of science focuses on the factors that predispose
people to be susceptible to organized denial. We thus use
“denial” to refer to public activities connected to the rejection
of science and use “rejection” when discussing individuals’ attitudes
toward science.
3. The survey included several additional items (e.g., perceived
income rank, well-being) that were not relevant to the constructs
of interest. The data are available at www.cogsciwa.com.
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