Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War
Author(s): John J. Mearsheimer
Source: International Security , Summer, 1990, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer, 1990), pp. 5-56
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538981
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
International Security
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future John J. Mearsheimer
Instability in Europe
After the Cold War
The profound changes now underway in Europe have been widely viewed
as harbingers of a new age of peace. With the Cold War over, it is said, the
threat of war that has hung over Europe for more than four decades is lifting.
Swords can now be beaten into ploughshares; harmony can reign among the
states and peoples of Europe. Central Europe, which long groaned under
the massive forces of the two military blocs, can convert its military bases
into industrial parks, playgrounds, and condominiums. Scholars of security
affairs can stop their dreary quarrels over military doctrine and balance
assessments, and turn their attention to finding ways to prevent global
warming and preserve the ozone layer. European leaders can contemplate
how to spend peace dividends. So goes the common view.
This article assesses this optimistic view by exploring in detail the consequences
for Europe of an end to the Cold War. Specifically, I examine the
effects of a scenario under which the Cold War comes to a complete end.
The Soviet Union withdraws all of its forces from Eastern Europe, leaving
the states in that region fully independent. Voices are thereupon raised in
the United States, Britain, and Germany, arguing that American and British
military forces in Germany have lost their principal raison d'etre, and these
forces are withdrawn from the Continent. NATO and the Warsaw Pact then
dissolve; they may persist on paper, but each ceases to function as an alliance.1
As a result, the bipolar structure that has characterized Europe since
This article emerged from a paper written for a February 1990 conference at Ditchley Park,
England, on the future of Europe, organized by James Callaghan, Gerald Ford, Valery Giscard
d'Estaing, and Helmut Schmidt. An abridged version of this article appears in the Atlantic,
August 1990. I am grateful to Robert Art, Stacy Bergstrom, Richard Betts, Anne-Marie Burley,
Dale Copeland, Michael Desch, Markus Fischer, Henk Goemans, Joseph Grieco, Ted Hopf,
Craig Koerner, Andrew Kydd, Alicia Levine, James Nolt, Roger Petersen, Barry Posen, Denny
Roy, Jack Snyder, Ashley Tellis, Marc Trachtenberg, Stephen Van Evera, Andrew Wallace, and
Stephen Walt for their most helpful comments.
John Mearsheimer is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science, University of Chicago.
1. There is considerable support within NATO's higher circles, including the Bush administration,
for maintaining NATO beyond the Cold War. NATO leaders have not clearly articulated
the concrete goals that NATO would serve in a post-Cold War Europe, but they appear to
conceive the future NATO as a means for ensuring German security, thereby removing possible
German motives for aggressive policies; and as a means to protect other NATO states against
International Security, Summer 1990 (Vol. 15, No. 1)
C 1990 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
5
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 6
the end of World War II is replaced by a multipolar structure. In essence,
the Cold War we have known for almost half a century is over, and the
postwar order in Europe is ended.2
How would such a fundamental change affect the prospects for peace in
Europe?3 Would it raise or lower the risk of war?
I argue that the prospects for major crises and war in Europe are likely to
increase markedly if the Cold War ends and this scenario unfolds. The next
decades in a Europe without the superpowers would probably not be as
violent as the first 45 years of this century, but would probably be substantially
more prone to violence than the past 45 years.
This pessimistic conclusion rests on the argument that the distribution and
character of military power are the root causes of war and peace. Specifically,
the absence of war in Europe since 1945 has been a consequence of three
factors: the bipolar distribution of military power on the Continent; the rough
military equality between the two states comprising the two poles in Europe,
German aggression. However, the Germans, who now provide the largest portion of the Alliance's
standing forces, are likely to resist such a role for NATO. A security structure of this sort
assumes that Germany cannot be trusted and that NATO must be maintained to keep it in line.
A united Germany is not likely to accept for very long a structure that rests on this premise.
Germans accepted NATO throughout the Cold War because it secured Germany against the
Soviet threat that developed in the wake of World War II. Without that specific threat, which
now appears to be diminishing rapidly, Germany is likely to reject the continued maintenance
of NATO as we know it.
2. I am not arguing that a complete end to the Cold War is inevitable; also quite likely is an
intermediate outcome, under which the status quo is substantially modified, but the main
outlines of the current order remain in place. Specifically, the Soviet Union may withdraw much
of its force from Eastern Europe, but leave significant forces behind. If so, NATO force levels
would probably shrink markedly, but NATO may continue to maintain significant forces in
Germany. Britain and the United States would withdraw some but not all of their troops from
the Continent. If this outcome develops, the basic bipolar military competition that has defined
the map of Europe throughout the Cold War will continue. I leave this scenario unexamined,
and instead explore what follows from a complete end to the Cold War in Europe because this
latter scenario is the less examined of the two, and because the consequences, and therefore
the desirability, of completely ending the Cold War would still remain an issue if the intermediate
outcome occurred.
3. The impact of such a change on human rights in Eastern Europe will not be considered
directly in this article. Eastern Europeans have suffered great hardship as a result of the Soviet
occupation. The Soviets have imposed oppressive political regimes on the region, denying
Eastern Europeans basic freedoms. Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe will probably change
that situation for the better, although the change is likely to be more of a mixed blessing than
most realize. First, it is not clear that communism will be promptly replaced in all Eastern
European countries with political systems that place a high premium on protecting minority
rights and civil liberties. Second, the longstanding blood feuds among the nationalities in Eastern
Europe are likely to re-emerge in a niultipolar Europe, regardless of the existing political order.
If wars break out in Eastern Europe, human rights are sure to suffer.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 7
the United States and the Soviet Union; and the fact that each superpower
was armed with a large nuclear arsenal.4 Domestic factors also affect the
likelihood of war, and have helped cause the postwar peace. Most importantly,
hyper-nationalism helped cause the two world wars, and the decline
of nationalism in Europe since 1945 has contributed to the peacefulness of
the postwar world. However, factors of military power have been most
important in shaping past events, and will remain central in the future.
The departure of the superpowers from Central Europe would transform
Europe from a bipolar to a multipolar system.5 Germany, France, Britain,
and perhaps Italy would assume major power status; the Soviet Union would
decline from superpower status but would remain a major European power,
giving rise to a system of five major powers and a number of lesser powers.
The resulting system would suffer the problems common to multipolar systems,
and would therefore be more prone to instability.6 Power inequities
could also appear; if so, stability would be undermined further.
The departure of the superpowers would also remove the large nuclear
arsenals they now maintain in Central Europe. This would remove the pacifying
effect that these weapons have had on European politics. Four principal
scenarios are possible. Under the first scenario, Europe would become
nuclear-free, thus eliminating a central pillar of order in the Cold War era.
Under the second scenario, the European states do not expand their arsenals
to compensate for the departure of the superpowers' weapons. In a third
scenario, nuclear proliferation takes place, but is mismanaged; no steps are
4. It is commonplace to characterize the polarity-bipolar or multipolar-of the international
system at large, not a specific region. The focus in this article, however, is not on the global
distribution of power, but on the distribution of power in Europe. Polarity arguments can be
used to assess the prospects for stability in a particular region, provided the global and regional
balances are distinguished from one another and the analysis is focused on the structure of
power in the relevant region.
5. To qualify as a pole in a global or regional system, a state must have a reasonable prospect
of defending itself against the leading state in the system by its own efforts. The United States
and the Soviet Union have enjoyed clear military superiority over other European states, and
all non-European states, throughout the Cold War; hence they have formed the two poles of
both the global and European systems. What is happening to change this is that both the Soviet
Union and the United States are moving forces out of Central Europe, which makes it more
difficult for them to project power on the Continent and thus weakens their influence there;
and reducing the size of those forces, leaving them less military power to project. Because of
its proximity to Europe, the Soviet Union will remain a pole in the European system as long as
it retains substantial military forces op its own territory. The United States can remain a pole in
Europe only if it retains the capacity to project significant military power into Central Europe.
6. Stability is simply defined as the absence of wars and major crises.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 8
taken to dampen the many dangers inherent in the proliferation process. All
three of these scenarios would raise serious risks of war.
In the fourth and least dangerous scenario, nuclear weapons proliferate in
Europe, but the process is well-managed by the current nuclear powers.
They take steps to deter preventive strikes on emerging nuclear powers, to
set boundaries on the proliferation process by extending security umbrellas
over the neighbors of emerging nuclear powers, to help emerging nuclear
powers build secure deterrent forces, and to discourage them from deploying
counterforce systems that threaten their neighbors' deterrents. This outcome
probably provides the best hope for maintaining peace in Europe. However,
it would still be more dangerous than the world of 1945-90. Moreover, it is
not likely that proliferation would be well-managed.
Three counter-arguments might be advanced against this pessimistic set
of predictions of Europe's future. The first argument holds that the peace
will be preserved by the effects of the liberal international economic order
that has evolved since World War II. The second rests on the observation
that liberal democracies very seldom fight wars against each other, and holds
that the past spread of democracy in Europe has bolstered peace, and that
the ongoing democratization of Eastern Europe makes war still less likely.
The third argument maintains that Europeans have learned from their disastrous
experiences in this century that war, whether conventional or nuclear,
is so costly that it is no longer a sensible option for states.
But the theories behind these arguments are flawed, as I explain; hence
their prediction of peace in a multipolar Europe is flawed as well.
Three principal policy prescriptions follow from this analysis. First, the
United States should encourage a process of limited nuclear proliferation in
Europe. Specifically, Europe will be more stable if Germany acquires a secure
nuclear deterrent, but proliferation does not go beyond that point. Second,
the United States should not withdraw fully from Europe, even if the Soviet
Union pulls its forces out of Eastern Europe. Third, the United States should
take steps to forestall the re-emergence of hyper-nationalism in Europe.
METHODOLOGY: HOW SHOULD WE THINK ABOUT EUROPE S FUTURE?
Predictions on the future risk of war and prescriptions about how best to
maintain peace should rest on general theories about the causes of war and
peace. This point is true for both academics and policymakers. The latter are
seldom self-conscious in their uses of theory. Nevertheless, policymakers'
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future I 9
views on the future of Europe are shaped by their implicit preference for one
theory of international relations over another. Our task, then, is to decide
which theories best explain the past, and will most directly apply to the
future; and then to employ these theories to explore the consequences of
probable scenarios.
Specifically, we should first survey the inventory of international relations
theories that bear on the problem. What theories best explain the period of
violence before the Cold War? What theories best explain the peace of the
past 45 years? Are there other theories that explain little about pre-Cold War
Europe, or Cold War Europe, but are well-suited for explaining what is likely
to occur in a Europe without a Soviet and American military presence?
Next, we should ask what these theories predict about the nature of
international politics in a post-Cold War multipolar Europe. Will the causes
of the postwar peace persist, will the causes of the two world wars return,
or will other causes arise?
We can then assess whether we should expect the next decades to be more
peaceful, or at least as peaceful, as the past 45 years, or whether the future
is more likely to resemble the first 45 years of the century. We can also ask
what policy prescriptions these theories suggest.
The study of international relations, like the other social sciences, does not
yet resemble the hard sciences. Our stock of theories is spotty and often
poorly tested. The conditions required for the operation of established theories
are often poorly understood. Moreover, political phenomena are highly
complex; hence precise political predictions are impossible without very powerful
theoretical tools, superior to those we now possess. As a result, all
political forecasting is bound to include some error. Those who venture to
predict, as I do here, should therefore proceed with humility, take care not
to claim unwarranted confidence, and admit that later hindsight will undoubtedly
reveal surprises and mistakes.
Nevertheless, social science should offer predictions on the occurrence of
momentous and fluid events like those now unfolding in Europe. Predictions
can inform policy discourse. They help even those who disagree to frame
their ideas, by clarifying points of disagreement. Moreover, predictions of
events soon to unfold provide the best tests of social science theories, by
making clear what it was that given theories have predicted about those
events. In short, the world can be used as a laboratory to decide which
theories best explain international politics. In this article I employ the body
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 10
of theories that I find most persuasive to peer into the future. Time will
reveal whether these theories in fact have much power to explain international
politics.
The next section offers an explanation for the peacefulness of the postWorld
War II order. The section that follows argues that the end of the Cold
War is likely to lead to a less stable Europe. Next comes an examination of
the theories underlying claims that a multipolar Europe is likely to be as
peaceful, if not more peaceful, than Cold War Europe. The concluding section
suggests policy implications that follow from my analysis.
Explaining the "Long Peace"
The past 45 years represent the longest period of peace in European history.7
During these years Europe saw no major war, and only two minor conflicts
(the 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary and the 1974 Greco-Turkish war in
Cyprus). Neither conflict threatened to widen to other countries. The early
years of the Cold War (1945-63) were marked by a handful of major crises,
although none brought Europe to the brink of war. Since 1963, however,
there have been no East-West crises in Europe. It has been difficult-if not
impossible-for the last two decades to find serious national security analysts
who have seen a real chance that the Soviet Union would attack Western
Europe.
The Cold War peace contrasts sharply with European politics during the
first 45 years of this century, which saw two world wars, a handful of minor
wars, and a number of crises that almost resulted in war. Some 50 million
Europeans were killed in the two world wars; in contrast, probably no more
than 15,000 died in the two post-1945 European conflicts.8 Cold War Europe
is far more peaceful than early twentieth-century Europe.
Both Europeans and Americans increasingly assume that peace and calm
are the natural order of things in Europe and that the first 45 years of this
century, not the most recent, were the aberration. This is understandable,
7. The term "long peace" was coined by John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of
Stability in the Postwar International System," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986),
pp. 99-142.
8. There were approximately 10,000 battle deaths in the Russo-Hungarian War of OctoberNovember
1956, and some 1500-5000 battle deaths in the July-August 1974 war in Cyprus. See
Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1989 (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities,
1989), p. 22; and Melvin Small a'nd J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil
Wars, 1816-1980 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982), pp. 93-94.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future I 11
since Europe has been free of war for so long that an ever-growing proportion
of the Western public, born after World War II, has no direct experience with
great-power war. However, this optimistic view is incorrect.
The European state system has been plagued with war since its inception.
During much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries war was underway
somewhere on the European Continent.9 The nineteenth century held longer
periods of peace, but also several major wars and crises. The first half of that
century witnessed the protracted and bloody Napoleonic Wars; later came
the Crimean War, and the Italian and German wars of unification.10 The wars
of 1914-45 continued this long historical pattern. They represented a break
from the events of previous centuries only in the enormous increase in their
scale of destruction.
This era of warfare came to an abrupt end with the conclusion of World
War II. A wholly new and remarkably peaceful order then developed on the
Continent.
THE CAUSES OF THE LONG PEACE: MILITARY POWER AND STABILITY
What caused the era of violence before 1945? Why has the postwar era been
so much more peaceful? The wars before 1945 each had their particular and
unique causes, but the distribution of power in Europe-its multipolarity
and the imbalances of power that often occurred among the major states in
that multipolar system-was the crucial permissive condition that allowed
these particular causes to operate. The peacefulness of the postwar era arose
for three principal reasons: the bipolarity of the distribution of power on the
Continent, the rough equality in military power between those two polar
states, and the appearance of nuclear weapons, which vastly expanded the
violence of war, making deterrence far more robust.11
9. For inventories of past wars, see Jack S. Levy, War In the Modern Great Power System, 1495-
1975 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983); and Small and Singer, Resort to Arms.
10. Europe saw no major war from 1815-1853 and from 1871-1914, two periods almost as long
as the 45 years of the Cold War. There is a crucial distinction, however, between the Cold War
and these earlier periods. Relations among the great powers deteriorated markedly in the closing
years of the two earlier periods, leading in each case to a major war. On the other hand, the
Cold War order has become increasingly stable with the passage of time and there is now no
serious threat of war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Europe would surely remain at
peace for the foreseeable future if the Cold War were to continue, a point that highlights the
exceptional stability of the present European order.
11. The relative importance of these'three factors cannot be stated precisely, but all three had
substantial importance.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 12
These factors are aspects of the European state system-of the character
of military power and its distribution among states-and not of the states
themselves. Thus the keys to war and peace lie more in the structure of the
international system than in the nature of the individual states. Domestic
factors-most notably hyper-nationalism-also helped cause the wars of the
pre-1945 era, and the domestic structures of post-1945 European states have
been more conducive to peace, but these domestic factors were less important
than the character and distribution of military power between states. Moreover,
hyper-nationalism was caused in large part by security competition
among the European states, which compelled European elites to mobilize
publics to support national defense efforts; hence even this important domestic
factor was a more remote consequence of the international system.
Conflict is common among states because the international system creates
powerful incentives for aggression.12 The root cause of the problem is the
anarchic nature of the international system. In anarchy there is no higher
body or sovereign that protects states from one another. Hence each state
living under anarchy faces the ever-present possibility that another state will
use force to harm or conquer it. Offensive military action is always a threat
to all states in the system.
Anarchy has two principal consequences. First, there is little room for trust
among states because a state may be unable to recover if its trust is betrayed.
Second, each state must guarantee its own survival since no other actor will
provide its security. All other states are potential threats, and no international
institution is capable of enforcing order or punishing powerful aggressors.
States seek to survive under anarchy by maximizing their power relative
to other states, in order to maintain the means for self-defense. Relative
power, not absolute levels of power, matters most to states. Thus, states seek
opportunities to weaken potential adversaries and improve their relative
power position. They sometimes see aggression as the best way to accumulate
more power at the expense of rivals.
This competitive world is peaceful when it is obvious that the costs and
risks of going to war are high, and the benefits of going to war are low. Two
aspects of military power are at the heart of this incentive structure: the
distribution of power between states, and the nature of the military power
12. The two classic works on this su1ject are Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The
Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973); and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of
International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 13
available to them. The distribution of power between states tells us how
well-positioned states are to commit aggression, and whether other states
are able to check their aggression. This distribution is a function of the
number of poles in the system, and their relative power. The nature of
military power directly affects the costs, risks, and benefits of going to war.
If the military weaponry available guarantees that warfare will be very destructive,
states are more likely to be deterred by the cost of war. 13 If available
weaponry favors the defense over the offense, aggressors are more likely to
be deterred by the futility of aggression, and all states feel less need to
commit aggression, since they enjoy greater security to begin with, and
therefore feel less need to enhance their security by expansion.14 If available
weaponry tends to equalize the relative power of states, aggressors are
discouraged from going to war. If military weaponry makes it easier to
estimate the relative power of states, unwarranted optimism is discouraged
and wars of miscalculation are less likely.
One can establish that peace in Europe during the Cold War has resulted
from bipolarity, the approximate military balance between the superpowers,
and the presence of large numbers of nuclear weapons on both sides in three
ways: first, by showing that the general theories on which it rests are valid;
second, by demonstrating that these theories can explain the conflicts of the
pre-1945 era and the peace of the post-1945 era; and third, by showing that
competing theories cannot account for the postwar peace.
THE VIRTUES OF BIPOLARITY OVER MULTIPOLARITY. The two principal arrangements
of power possible among states are bipolarity and multipolarity.15
13. The prospects for deterrence can also be affected by crisis stability calculations. See John J.
Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," International
Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 6-8.
14. See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No.
2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Stephen Van Evera, "Causes of War" (unpub. PhD dissertation,
University of California at Berkeley, 1984), chap. 3. As noted below, I believe that the
distinction between offensive and defensive weapons and, more generally, the concept of an
offense-defense balance, is relevant at the nuclear level. However, I do not believe those ideas
are relevant at the conventional level. See John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 25-27.
15. Hegemony represents a third possible distribution. Under a hegemony there is only one
major power in the system. The rest are minor powers that cannot challenge the major power,
but must act in accordance with the dictates of the major power. Every state would like to gain
hegemony, because hegemony confers abundant security: no challenger poses a serious threat.
Hegemony is rarely achieved, however, because power tends to be somewhat evenly distributed
among states, because threatened states have strong incentives to join together to thwart an
aspiring hegemon, and because 'the costs of expansion usually outrun the benefits before
domination is achieved, causing extension to become overextension. Hegemony has never
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 14
A bipolar system is more peaceful for three main reasons. First, the number
of conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war. Second, deterrence
is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily
averted. Third, the prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations
of relative power and of opponents' resolve are fewer and less likely.16
In a bipolar system two major powers dominate. The minor powers find
it difficult to remain unattached to one of the major powers, because the
major powers generally demand allegiance from lesser states. (This is especially
true in core geographical areas, less so in peripheral areas.) Furthermore,
lesser states have little opportunity to play the major powers off against
each other, because when great powers are fewer in number, the system is
more rigid. As a result, lesser states are hard-pressed to preserve their
autonomy.
In a multipolar system, by contrast, three or more major powers dominate.
Minor powers in such a system have considerable flexibility regarding alliance
partners and can opt to be free floaters. The exact form of a multipolar system
can vary markedly, depending on the number of major and minor powers
in the system, and their geographical arrangement.
A bipolar system has only one dyad across which war might break out:
only two major powers contend with one another, and the minor powers
are not likely to be in a position to attack each other. A multipolar system
has many potential conflict situations. Major power dyads are more numerous,
each posing the potential for conflict. Conflict could also erupt across
dyads involving major and minor powers. Dyads between minor powers
could also lead to war. Therefore, ceteris paribus, war is more likely in a
multipolar system than a bipolar one.
Wars in a multipolar world involving just minor powers or only one major
power are not likely to be as devastating as a conflict between two major
characterized the European state system at any point since it arose in the seventeenth century,
and there is no prospect for hegemony in the foreseeable future; hence hegemony is not relevant
to assessing the prospects for peace in Europe.
16. The key works on bipolarity and multipolarity include Thomas J. Christensen and Jack
Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International
Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; Karl W. Deutsch and J. David
Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," World Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3
(April 1964), pp. 390-406; Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 1966), pp. 314-327; Kenneth N. Waltz,
"The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881-909; and
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chap. 8. My conclusions about bipolarity are similar to
Waltz's, although there are important differences in our explanations, as will be seen below.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future 1 15
powers. However, local wars tend to widen and escalate. Hence there is
always a chance that a small war will trigger a general conflict.
Deterrence is more difficult in a multipolar world because power imbalances
are commonplace, and when power is unbalanced, the strong become
hard to deter. 17 Power imbalances can lead to conflict in two ways. First, two
states can gang up to attack a third state. Second, a major power might
simply bully a weaker power in a one-on-one encounter, using its superior
strength to coerce or defeat the minor state.18
Balance of power dynamics can counter such power imbalances, but only
if they operate efficiently. 19 No state can dominate another, either by ganging
up or by bullying, if the others coalesce firmly against it, but problems of
geography or coordination often hinder the formation of such coalitions.204
These hindrances may disappear in wartime, but are prevalent in peacetime,
and can cause deterrence failure, even where an efficient coalition will eventually
form to defeat the aggressor on the battlefield.
First, geography sometimes prevents balancing states from putting meaningful
pressure on a potential aggressor. For example, a major power may
not be able to put effective military pressure on a state threatening to cause
trouble, because buffer states lie in between.
In addition, balancing in a multipolar world must also surmount difficult
coordination problems. Four phenomena make coordination difficult. First,
alliances provide collective goods, hence allies face the formidable dilemmas
of collective action. Specifically, each state may try to shift alliance burdens
onto the shoulders of its putative allies. Such "buck-passing" is a common
feature of alliance politics.21 It is most common when the number of states
17. Although a balance of power is more likely to produce deterrence than an imbalance of
power, a balance of power between states does not guarantee that deterrence will obtain. States
sometimes find innovative military strategies that allow them to win on the battlefield, even
without marked advantage in the balance of raw military capabilities. Furthermore, the broader
political forces that move a state towards war sometimes force leaders to pursue very risky
military strategies, impelling states to challenge opponents of equal or even superior strength.
See Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, especially chap. 2.
18. This discussion of polarity assumes that the military strength of the major powers is roughly
equal. The consequences of power asymmetries among great powers is discussed below.
19. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 123-128.
20. One exception bears mention: ganging up is still possible under multipolarity in the restricted
case where there are only three powers in the system, and thus no allies available for the victim
state.
21. See Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1966), pp. 266-279; and Barry R. Posen, The
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 1 16
required to form an effective blocking coalition is large. Second, a state faced
with two potential adversaries might conclude that a protracted war between
those adversaries would weaken both, even if one side triumphed; hence it
may stay on the sidelines, hoping thereby to improve its power position
relative to each of the combatants. (This strategy can fail, however, if one of
the warring states quickly conquers the other and ends up more powerful,
not less powerful, than before the war.) Third, some states may opt out of
the balancing process because they believe that they will not be targeted by
the aggressor, failing to recognize that they face danger until after the aggressor
has won some initial victories. Fourth, diplomacy is an uncertain
process, and thus it can take time to build a defensive coalition. A potential
aggressor may conclude that it can succeed at aggression before the coalition
is completed, and further may be prompted to exploit the window of opportunity
that this situation presents before it closes.22
If these problems of geography and coordination are severe, states can lose
faith in the balancing process. If so, they become more likely to bandwagon
with the aggressor, since solitary resistance is futile.23 Thus factors that
weaken the balancing process can generate snowball effects that weaken the
process still further.
The third major problem with multipolarity lies in its tendency to foster
miscalculation of the resolve of opposing individual states, and of the
strength of opposing coalitions.
War is more likely when a state underestimates the willingness of an
opposing state to stand firm on issues of difference. It then may push the
other state too far, expecting the other to concede, when in fact the opponent
will choose to fight. Such miscalculation is more likely under multipolarity
because the shape of the international order tends to remain fluid, due to
the tendency of coalitions to shift. As a result, the international "rules of the
road"-norms of state behavior, and agreed divisions of territorial rights and
other privileges-tend to change constantly. No sooner are the rules of a
given adversarial relationship worked out, than that relationship may become
a friendship, a new adversarial relationship may emerge with a previous
Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1984).
22. Domestic political considerations can also sometimes impede balancing behavior. For example,
Britain and France were reluctant to ally with the Soviet Union in the 1930s because of
their deep-seated antipathy to communism.
23. See Walt, Origins of Alliances, pp. 28-32, 173-178.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 17
friend or neutral, and new rules must be established. Under these circumstances,
one state may unwittingly push another too far, because ambiguities
as to national rights and obligations leave a wider range of issues on which
a state may miscalculate another's resolve. Norms of state behavior can come
to be broadly understood and accepted by all states, even in multipolarity,
just as basic norms of diplomatic conduct became generally accepted by the
European powers during the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, a well-defined
division of rights is generally more difficult when the number of states
is large, and relations among them are in flux, as is the case with multipo-
larity.
War is also more likely when states underestimate the relative power of
an opposing coalition, either because they underestimate the number of
states who will oppose them, or because they exaggerate the number of allies
who will fight on their own side.24 Such errors are more likely in a system
of many states, since states then must accurately predict the behavior of
many states, not just one, in order to calculate the balance of power between
coalitions.
A bipolar system is superior to a multipolar system on all of these dimensions.
Bullying and ganging up are unknown, since only two actors compete.
Hence the power asymmetries produced by bullying and ganging up are also
unknown. When balancing is required, it is achieved efficiently. States can
balance by either internal means-military buildup-or external meansdiplomacy
and alliances. Under multipolarity states tend to balance by external
means; under bipolarity they are compelled to use internal means.
Internal means are more fully under state control, hence are more efficient,
and are more certain to produce real balance.25 The problems that attend
efforts to balance by diplomatic methods-geographic complications and
coordination difficulties-are bypassed. Finally, miscalculation is less likely
than in a multipolar world. States are less likely to miscalculate others'
resolve, because the rules of the road with the main opponent become settled
over time, leading both parties to recognize the limits beyond which they
cannot push the other. States also cannot miscalculate the membership of
the opposing coalition, since each side faces only one main enemy. Simplicity
breeds certainty; certainty bolsters peace.
24. This point is the central theme of Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World." Also see Geoffrey
Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973), chap. 3.
25. Noting the greater efficiency of internal over external balancing is Waltz, Theory of International
Politics, pp. 163, 168.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 18
There are no empirical studies that provide conclusive evidence of the
effects of bipolarity and multipolarity on the likelihood of war. This undoubtedly
reflects the difficulty of the task: from its beginning until 1945, the
European state system was multipolar, leaving this history barren of comparisons
that would reveal the differing effects of multipolarity and bipolarity.
Earlier history does afford some apparent examples of bipolar systems, including
some that were warlike-Athens and Sparta, Rome and Carthagebut
this history is inconclusive, because it is sketchy and incomplete and
therefore does not offer enough detail to validate the comparisons. Lacking
a comprehensive survey of history, we cannot progress beyond offering
examples pro and con, without knowing which set of examples best represents
the universe of cases. As a result the case made here stops short of
empirical demonstration, and rests chiefly on deduction. However, I believe
that this deductive case provides a sound basis for accepting the argument
that bipolarity is more peaceful than multipolarity; the deductive logic seems
compelling, and there is no obvious historical evidence that cuts against it.
I show below that the ideas developed here apply to events in twentieth
century Europe, both before and after 1945.
THE VIRTUES OF EQUALITY OF POWER OVER INEQUALITY. Power can be more
or less equally distributed among the major powers of both bipolar and
multipolar systems. Both systems are more peaceful when equality is greatest
among the poles. Power inequalities invite war by increasing the potential
for successful aggression; hence war is minimized when inequalities are
least.26
How should the degree of equality in the distribution of power in a system
be assessed? Under bipolarity, the overall equality of the system is simply a
function of the balance of power between the two poles-an equal balance
creates an equal system, a skewed balance produces an unequal system.
Under multipolarity the focus is on the power balance between the two
leading states in the system, but the power ratios across other potential
conflict dyads also matter. The net system equality is an aggregate of the
degree of equality among all of the poles. However, most general wars under
multipolarity have arisen from wars of hegemony that have pitted the leading
state-an aspiring hegemon-against the other major powers in the system.
Such wars are most probable when a leading state emerges, and can hope
26. This discussion does not encompass the situation where power asymmetries are so great
that one state emerges as a hegemon. See note 15.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future 19
to defeat each of the others if it can isolate them. This pattern characterized
the wars that grew from the attempts at hegemony by Charles V, Philip II,
Louis XIV, Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and
Nazi Germany.27 Hence the ratio between the leader and its nearest competitor-in
bipolarity or multipolarity-has more effect on the stability of the
system than do other ratios, and is therefore the key ratio that describes the
equality of the system. Close equality in this ratio lowers the risk of war.
The polarity of an international system and the degree of power equality
of the system are related: bipolar systems tend more toward equality, because,
as noted above, states are then compelled to balance by internal
methods, and internal balancing is more efficient than external balancing.
Specifically, the number-two state in a bipolar system can only hope to
balance against the leader by mobilizing its own resources to reduce the gap
between the two, since it has no potential major alliance partners. On the
other hand, the second-strongest state in a multipolar system can seek security
through alliances with others, and may be tempted to pass the buck
to them, instead of building up its own strength. External balancing of this
sort is especially attractive because it is cheap and fast. However, such
behavior leaves intact the power gap between the two leading states, and
thus leaves in place the dangers that such a power gap creates. Hence another
source of stability under bipolarity lies in the greater tendency for its poles
to be equal.
THE VIRTUES OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. Deterrence is most likely to hold
when the costs and risks of going to war are obviously great. The more
horrible the prospect of war, the less likely it is to occur. Deterrence is also
most robust when conquest is most difficult. Aggressors then are more likely
to be deterred by the futility of expansion, and all states feel less compelled
to expand to increase their security, making them easier to deter because
they are less compelled to commit aggression.
27. This point is the central theme of Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the
European Power Struggle, trans. Charles Fullman (New York: Knopf, 1962). Also see Randolph
M. Siverson and Michael R. Tennefoss, "Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of International
Conflict, 1815-1965," American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 1057-
1069. The two lengthy periods of peace in the nineteenth century (see note 10 above) were
mainly caused by the equal distribution of power among the major European states. Specifically,
there was no aspiring hegemon in Europe for most of these two periods. France, the most
powerful state in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century, soon declined to a position
of rough equality with its chief competitors, while Germany only emerged as a potential
hegemon in the early twentieth century.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 20
Nuclear weapons favor peace on both counts. They are weapons of mass
destruction, and would produce horrendous devastation if used in any numbers.
Moreover, if both sides' nuclear arsenals are secure from attack, creating
a mutually assured retaliation capability (mutual assured destruction or
MAD), nuclear weapons make conquest more difficult; international conflicts
revert from tests of capability and will to purer tests of will, won by the side
willing to run greater risks and pay greater costs. This gives defenders the
advantage, because defenders usually value their freedom more than aggressors
value new conquests. Thus nuclear weapons are a superb deterrent:
they guarantee high costs, and are more useful for self-defense than for
aggression.28
In addition, nuclear weapons affect the degree of equality in the system.
Specifically, the situation created by MAD bolsters peace by moving power
relations among states toward equality. States that possess nuclear deterrents
can stand up to one another, even if their nuclear arsenals vary greatly in
size, as long as both sides' nuclear arsenals are secure from attack. This
situation of closer equality has the stabilizing effects noted above.
Finally, MAD also bolsters peace by clarifying the relative power of states
and coalitions.29 States can still miscalculate each other's will, but miscalculations
of relative capability are less likely, since nuclear capabilities are not
elastic to the specific size and characteristics of forces; once an assured
destruction capability is achieved, further increments of nuclear power have
little strategic importance. Hence errors in assessing these specific characteristics
have little effect. Errors in predicting membership in war coalitions also
have less effect, since unforeseen additions or subtractions from such coalitions
will not influence war outcomes unless they produce a huge change
in the nuclear balance enough to give one side meaningful nuclear superi-
ority.
THE DANGERS OF HYPER-NATIONALISM. Nationalism is best defined as a set
of political beliefs which holds that a nation-a body of individuals with
characteristics that purportedly distinguish them from other individuals-
28. Works developing the argument that nuclear weapons are essentially defensive in nature
are Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1982), pp. 45-49; Stephen Van Evera, 'Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World
Doesn't: American Grand Strategy after the Cold War," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No.
2 (June 1990, forthcoming); and Vaq Evera, "Causes of War," chap. 13.
29. See Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, pp. 50-52; and Van Evera, "Causes of War," pp. 697-
699.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 21
should have its own state.30 Although nationalists often believe that their
nation is unique or special, this conclusion does not necessarily mean that
they think they are superior to other peoples, merely that they take pride in
their own nation.
However, this benevolent nationalism frequently turns into ugly hypernationalism-the
belief that other nations or nation-states are both inferior
and threatening and must therefore be dealt with harshly. In the past, hypernationalism
among European states has arisen largely because most European
states are nation-states-states comprised of one principal nation-and
these nation-states exist in an anarchic world, under constant threat from
other states. In such a situation people who love their own nation and state
can develop an attitude of contempt and loathing toward the nations who
inhabit opposing states. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that political
elites often feel compelled to portray adversary nations in the most negative
way so as to mobilize public support for national security policies.
Malevolent nationalism is most likely to develop under military systems
that require reliance on mass armies; the state may exploit nationalist appeals
to mobilize its citizenry for the sacrifices required to sustain large standing
armies. On the other hand, hyper-nationalism is least likely when states can
rely on small professional armies, or on complex high-technology military
organizations that do not require vast manpower. For this reason nuclear
weapons work to dampen nationalism, since they shift the basis of military
power away from pure reliance on mass armies, and toward greater reliance
on smaller high-technology organizations.
In sum, hyper-nationalism is the most important domestic cause of war,
although it is still a second-order force in world politics. Furthermore, its
causes lie largely in the international system.
THE CAUSES OF THE LONG PEACE: EVIDENCE
The historical record shows a perfect correlation between bipolarity, equality
of military power, and nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and the long
peace, on the other hand. When an equal bipolarity arose and nuclear weapons
appeared, peace broke out. This correlation suggests that the bipolarity
30. This definition is drawn from Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1983), which is an excellent study of the origins of nationalism. Nevertheless,
Gellner pays little attention to how nationalism turns into a malevolent force that contributes to
instability in the international system.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 22
theory, the equality theory, and the nuclear theory of the long peace are all
valid. However, correlation alone does not prove causation. Other factors
still may account for the long peace. One way to rule out this possibility is
to enumerate what the three theories predict about both the pre-war and
postwar eras, and then to ask if these predictions came true in detail during
those different periods.
BEFORE THE COLD WAR. The dangers of multipolarity are highlighted by
events before both world wars. The existence of many dyads of potential
conflict provided many possible ways to light the fuse to war in Europe.
Diplomacy before World War I involved intense interactions among five
major powers (Britain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany), and
two minor powers (Serbia, and Belgium). At least six significant adversarial
relationships emerged: Germany versus Britain, France, Russia, and Belgium;
and Austria-Hungary versus Serbia and Russia. Before World War II five
major powers (Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Germany, and Italy) and
seven minor powers (Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary,
Romania, and Finland) interacted. These relations produced some thirteen
important conflicts: Germany versus Britain, France, the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Austria; Italy versus Britain and France; the
Soviet Union versus Finland and Poland; Czechoslovakia versus Poland and
Hungary; and Romania versus Hungary. This multiplicity of conflicts made
the outbreak of war inherently more likely. Moreover, many of the state
interests at issue in each of these conflicts were interconnected, raising the
risk that any single conflict that turned violent would trigger a general war,
as happened in both 1914 and 1939.
Before World War II Germany was able to gang up with others against
some minor states, and to bully others into joining with it. In 1939 Germany
bolstered its power by ganging up with Poland and Hungary to partition
Czechoslovakia, and then ganged up with the Soviet Union against Poland.
In 1938 Germany bullied the Czechs into surrendering the Sudetenland, and
also bullied the Austrians into complete surrender.31 By these successes
Germany expanded its power, leaving it far stronger than its immediate
neighbors, and thereby making deterrence much harder.
German power could have been countered before both world wars had
the other European powers balanced efficiently against Germany. If so, Ger-
31. Austria is not a pure case of bullying; there was also considerable pro-German support in
Austria during the late 1930s.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 23
many might have been deterred, and war prevented on both occasions.
However, the other powers twice failed to do so. Before 1914 the scope of
this failure was less pronounced; France and Russia balanced forcefully
against Germany, while only Britain failed to commit firmly against Germany
before war began.32
Before 1939, failure to balance was far more widespread.33 The Soviet Union
failed to aid Czechoslovakia against Germany in 1938, partly for geographic
reasons: they shared no common border, leaving the Soviets with no direct
access to Czech territory. France failed to give effective aid to the Czechs and
Poles, partly because French military doctrine was defensively oriented, but
also because France had no direct access to Czech or Polish territory, and
therefore could not easily deploy forces to bolster Czech and Polish defenses.
Britain and France each passed the buck by transferring the cost of deterring
Germany onto the other, thereby weakening their combined effort. The
Soviet Union, with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, sought to turn the German
armies westward, hoping that they would become bogged down in a war of
attrition similar to World War I on the Western Front. Some of the minor
European powers, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the
Scandinavian states, passed the buck to the major powers by standing on
the sidelines during the crises of 1938 and 1939.
Britain and the United States failed to recognize that they were threatened
by Germany until late in the game-1939 for Britain, 1940 for the United
States-and they therefore failed to take an early stand. When they finally
recognized the danger posed by Germany and resolved to respond, they
lacked appropriate military forces. Britain could not pose a significant military
threat to Germany until after it built up its own military forces and coordinated
its plans and doctrine with its French and Polish allies. In the meantime
32. Britain's failure to commit itself explicitly to a Continental war before the July Crisis was
probably a mistake of great proportions. There is evidence that the German chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg,
tried to stop the slide towards war once it became apparent that Britain would
fight with France and Russia against Germany, turning a Continental war into a world war. See
Imanuel Geiss, ed., July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War (New York: Norton, 1967),
chap. 7. Had the Germans clearly understood British intentions before the crisis, they might
have displayed much greater caution in the early stages of the crisis, when it was still possible
to avoid war.
33. See Williamson Murray, The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The Path to
Ruin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine; and Arnold
Wolfers, Britain and France between Two WYars: Conflicting Strategies of Peace from Versailles to World
War II (New York: Norton, 1968); and Barry R. Posen, "Competing Images of the Soviet Union,"
World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 4 (July 1987), pp. 579-597.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 24
deterrence failed. The United States did not launch a significant military
buildup until after the war broke out.
Multipolarity also created conditions that permitted serious miscalculation
before both world wars, which encouraged German aggression on both
occasions. Before 1914, Germany was not certain of British opposition if it
reached for continental hegemony, and Germany completely failed to foresee
that the United States would eventually move to contain it. In 1939, Germany
hoped that France and Britain would stand aside as it conquered Poland,
and again failed to foresee eventual American entry into the war. As a result
Germany exaggerated its prospects for success. This undermined deterrence
by encouraging German adventurism.
In sum, the events leading up to the world wars amply illustrate the risks
that arise in a multipolar world. Deterrence was undermined in both cases
by phenomena that are more common under a multipolar rather than a
bipolar distribution of power.34
Deterrence was also difficult before both wars because power was distributed
asymmetrically among the major European powers. Specifically, Germany
was markedly stronger than any of its immediate neighbors. In 1914
Germany clearly held military superiority over all of its European rivals; only
together were they able to defeat it, and then only with American help. 1939
is a more ambiguous case. The results of the war reveal that the Soviet Union
had the capacity to stand up to Germany, but this was not apparent at the
beginning of the war. Hitler was confident that Germany would defeat the
Soviet Union, and this confidence was key to his decision to attack in 1941.
Finally, the events leading up to both world wars also illustrate the risks
that arise in a world of pure conventional deterrence in which weapons of
mass destruction are absent. World War I broke out partly because all of the
important states believed that the costs of war would be small, and that
successful offense was feasible.35 Before World War II these beliefs were less
widespread, but had the same effect.36 The lesser powers thought war would
34. The problems associated with multipolarity were also common in Europe before 1900.
Consider, for example, that inefficient balancing resulted in the collapse of the first four coalitions
arrayed against Napoleonic France. See Steven T. Ross, European Diplomatic History, 1789-1815:
France Against Europe (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969).
35. Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,"
International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. Also see Jack Snyder, The Ideology
of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1984).
36. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, chaps. 3-4.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 25
be costly and conquest difficult, but the leaders of the strongest stateGermany-saw
the prospect of cheap victory, and this belief was enough to
destroy deterrence and produce war. Had nuclear weapons existed, these
beliefs would have been undercut, removing a key condition that permitted
both wars.
What was the role of internal German politics in causing the world wars?
So far I have focused on aspects of the international system surrounding
Germany. This focus reflects my view that systemic factors were more important.
But German domestic political and social developments also played
a significant role, contributing to the aggressive character of German foreign
policy. Specifically, German society was infected with a virulent nationalism
between 1870 and 1945 that laid the basis for expansionist foreign policies.37
However, two points should be borne in mind. First, German hypernationalism
was in part fueled by Germany's pronounced sense of insecurity,
which reflected Germany's vulnerable location at the center of Europe, with
relatively open borders on both sides. These geographic facts made German
security problems especially acute; this situation gave German elites a
uniquely strong motive to mobilize their public for war, which they did
largely by fanning nationalism. Thus even German hyper-nationalism can be
ascribed in part to the nature of the pre-1945 international system.
Second, the horror of Germany's murderous conduct during World War II
should be distinguished from the scope of the aggressiveness of German
foreign policy.38 Germany was indeed aggressive, but not unprecedentedly
so. Other states have aspired to hegemony in Europe, and sparked wars by
their efforts; Germany was merely the latest to attempt to convert dominant
into hegemonic power. What was unique about Germany's conduct was its
policy of mass murder toward many of the peoples of Europe. The causes
of this murderous policy should not be conflated with the causes of the two
37. See Ludwig Dehio, Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century, trans. Dieter Pevsner
(New York: Norton, 1967); Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914, trans.
Marian Jackson (New York: Norton, 1975); Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German
Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980), chap. 18; Hans Kohn, The Mind of
Germany: The Education of a Nation (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1965), chaps. 7-12; and Louis
L. Snyder, German Nationalism: The Tragedy of a People (Harrisburg, Pa.: Telegraph Press, 1952).
38. There is a voluminous literature on the German killing machine in World War II. Among
the best overviews of the subject are Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives
of Interpretation, 2nd ed. (London: Arnold, 1989), chaps. 5, 8, 9; Henry L. Mason, "Imponderables
of the Holocaust," World Politics, Vol. 34, No. 1 (October 1981), pp. 90-113; and Mason, "Implementing
the Final Solution: The Ordinary Regulating of the Extraordinary," World Politics,
Vol. 40, No. 4 (July 1988), pp. 542-569.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 26
world wars. The policy of murder arose chiefly from domestic sources; the
wars arose mainly from aspects of the distribution and character of power in
Europe.
THE COLD WAR RECORD. The European state system abruptly shifted from
multipolar to bipolar after 1945. Three factors were responsible: the nearcomplete
destruction of German power, the growth of Soviet power, and the
permanent American commitment to the European Continent. The weakening
of the German Reich was accomplished by allied occupation and dismemberment.
Silesia, Pomerania, East Prussia, and parts of West Prussia
and Brandenburg were given to other countries, the Sudetenland was returned
to Czechoslovakia, and Austria was restored to independence. The
rest of the German Reich was divided into two countries, East and West
Germany, which became enemies. This reduction of German power, coupled
with the physical presence of American and Soviet military might in the heart
of Europe, eliminated the threat of German aggression.39
Meanwhile the Soviet Union extended its power westward, becoming the
dominant power on the Continent and one of the two strongest powers in
the world. There is no reason to think that the Soviets would not have
reached for continental hegemony, as the Spanish, French, and Germans did
earlier, had they believed they could win a hegemonic war. But the Soviets,
unlike their predecessors, made no attempt to gain hegemony by force,
leaving Europe in peace.
Bipolarity supplies part of the reason. Bipolarity made Europe a simpler
place in which only one point of friction-the East-West conflict-had to be
managed to avoid war. The two blocs encompassed most of Europe, leaving
few unprotected weak states for the Soviets to conquer. As a result the Soviets
have had few targets to bully. They have also been unable to gang up on the
few states that are unprotected, because their West-bloc adversary has been
their only potential ganging-up partner.
Bipolarity also left less room for miscalculation of both resolve and capability.
During the first fifteen years of the Cold War, the rules of the road for
the conflict were not yet established, giving rise to several serious crises.
However, over time each side gained a clear sense of how far it could push
the other, and what the other would not tolerate. A set of rules came to be
agreed upon: an understanding on the division of rights in Austria, Berlin,
39. See Anton W. DePorte, Europe betiveen the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance, 2nd ed. (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 27
and elsewhere in Europe; a proscription on secret unilateral re-deployment
of large nuclear forces to areas contiguous to the opponent; mutual toleration
of reconnaissance satellites; agreement on rules of peacetime engagement
between naval forces; and so forth. The absence of serious crises during
1963-90 was due in part to the growth of such agreements on the rights of
both sides, and the rules of conduct. These could develop in large part
because the system was bipolar in character. Bipolarity meant that the same
two states remained adversaries for a long period, giving them time to learn
how to manage their conflict without war. By contrast, a multipolar world
of shifting coalitions would repeatedly have forced adversaries to re-learn
how their opponents defined interests, reach new accords on the division of
rights, and establish new rules of competitive conduct.
Bipolarity also left less room to miscalculate the relative strength of the
opposing coalitions. The composition of possible war coalitions has been
clear because only two blocs have existed, each led by an overwhelmingly
dominant power that could discipline its members. Either side could have
miscalculated its relative military strength, but bipolarity removed ambiguity
about relative strength of adversarial coalitions arising from diplomatic un-
certainties.
The East-West military balance in Europe has been roughly equal throughout
the Cold War, which has further bolstered stability. This approximate
parity strengthened deterrence by ensuring that no state was tempted to use
force to exploit a power advantage. Parity resulted partly from bipolarity:
because the two blocs already encompassed all the states of Europe, both
sides have balanced mainly by internal rather than external means. These
more efficient means have produced a more nearly equal balance.
Nuclear weapons also played a key role in preventing war in post-World
War II Europe.
Western elites on both sides of the Atlantic quickly recognized that nuclear
weapons were vastly destructive and that their widespread use in Europe
would cause unprecedented devastation. The famous Carte Blanche exercises
conducted in Germany in 1955 made it manifestly clear that a nuclear war in
Europe would involve far greater costs than another World War II.40 Accordingly,
Western policymakers rarely suggested that nuclear war could be
"won," and instead emphasized the horrors that would attend nuclear war.
40. See Hans Speier, German Rearmament and Atomic War: The Views of German Military and Political
Leaders (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957), chap. 10.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 28
Moreover, they have understood that conventional war could well escalate
to the nuclear level, and have in fact based NATO strategy on that reality.
Soviet leaders also recognized the horrendous results that a nuclear war
would produce.41 Some Soviet military officers have asserted that victory is
possible in nuclear war, but even they have acknowledged that such a victory
would be Pyrrhic. Soviet civilians have generally argued that victory is impossible.
Furthermore, the Soviets long maintained that it was not possible
to fight a purely conventional war in Europe, and that conventional victory
would only prompt the loser to engage in nuclear escalation.42 The Soviets
later granted more possibility that a conventional war might be controlled,
but still recognized that escalation is likely.43 Under Gorbachev, Soviet military
thinking has placed even greater emphasis on the need to avoid nuclear
war and devoted more attention to the dangers of inadvertent nuclear war.44
Official rhetoric aside, policymakers on both sides have also behaved very
cautiously in the presence of nuclear weapons. There is not a single case of
a leader brandishing nuclear weapons during a crisis, or behaving as if
nuclear war might be a viable option for solving important political problems.
On the contrary, policymakers have never gone beyond nuclear threats of a
very subtle sort, and have shown great caution when the possibility of
nuclear confrontation has emerged.45 This cautious conduct has lowered the
risk of war.
Nuclear weapons also imposed an equality and clarity on the power relations
between the superpowers. This equality and clarity represented a
41. See Robert L. Arnett, "Soviet Attitudes Towards Nuclear War: Do They Really Think They
Can Win?" Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (September 1979), pp. 172-191; and David
Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
42. Thus Nikita Khrushchev explained, "Now that the big countries have thermonuclear weapons
at their disposal, they are sure to resort to those weapons if they begin to lose a war fought
with conventional means. If it ever comes down to a question of whether or not to face defeat,
there is sure to be someone who will be in favor of pushing the button, and the missiles will
begin to fly." Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans. and ed. by
Strobe Talbott (New York: Bantam, 1976), pp. 603-604.
43. See James M. McConnell, "Shifts in Soviet Views on the Proper Focus of Military Development,"
World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 3 (April 1985), pp. 317-343.
44. See Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking
on Security," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), pp. 134-138.
45. See Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-taking and Crisis Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1982); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings, 1987); and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb
in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988). Also see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear
Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Reg'imes," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer
1987), pp. 371-402.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 29
marked change from the earlier non-nuclear world, in which sharp power
inequalities and miscalculations of relative power were common.46
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union have exhibited
markedly less hyper-nationalism than did the European powers before
1945. After World War II, nationalism declined sharply within Europe, partly
because the occupation forces took active steps to dampen it,47 and also
because the European states, no longer providing their own security, now
lacked the incentive to purvey hyper-nationalism in order to bolster public
support for national defense. More importantly, however, the locus of European
politics shifted to the United States and the Soviet Union-two states
that, each for its own reasons, had not exhibited nationalism of the virulent
type found earlier in Europe. Nor has nationalism become virulent in either
superpower during the Cold War. In part this reflects the greater stability of
the postwar order, arising from bipolarity, military equality, and nuclear
weapons; with less expectation of war, neither superpower has faced the
need to mobilize its population for war. It also reflects a second effect of
nuclear weapons: they have reduced the importance of mass armies for
preserving sovereignty, thus diminishing the importance of maintaining a
hyper-nationalized pool of manpower.
THE CAUSES OF THE LONG PEACE: COMPETING EXPLANATIONS
The claim that bipolarity, equality, and nuclear weapons have been largely
responsible for the stability of the past 45 years is further strengthened by
the absence of persuasive competing explanations. Two of the most popular
theories of peace-economic liberalism and peace-loving democracies-are not
relevaint to the issue at hand.
Economic liberalism, which posits that a liberal economic order bolsters
peace (discussed in more detail below), cannot explain the stability of postwar
Europe, because there has been little economic exchange between the Soviet
Union and the West over the past 45 years. Although economic flows be-
46. Some experts acknowledge that nuclear weapons had deterrent value in the early decades
of the Cold War, but maintain that they had lost their deterrent value by, the mid-1960s when
the Soviets finally acquired the capability to retaliate massively against the American homeland.
I reject this argument and have outlined my views in John J. Mearsheimer, "Nuclear Weapons
and Deterrence in Europe," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1984/85), pp. 19-46.
47. See Paul M. Kennedy, "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900-1970," Journal
of Contemporary History, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1973), pp. 77-100; and E.H. Dance, History the
Betrayer (London: Hutchinson, 1960).
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 130
tween Eastern and Western Europe have been somewhat greater, in no sense
has all of Europe been encompassed by a liberal economic order.
The peace-loving democracies theory (also discussed below) holds that
democracies do not go to war against other democracies, but concedes that
democracies are not especially pacific when facing authoritarian states. This
theory cannot account for post-World War II stability because the Soviet
Union and its allies in Eastern Europe have not been democratic over the
past 45 years.
A third theory of peace, obsolescence of war, proposes that modern conventional
war had become so deadly by the twentieth century that it was no
longer possible to think of war as a sensible means to achieve national goals.48
It took the two world wars to drive this point home, but by 1945 it was clear
that large-scale conventional war had become irrational and morally unacceptable,
like institutions such as slavery and dueling. Thus, even without
nuclear weapons, statesmen in the Cold War would not seriously have
countenanced war, which had become an anachronism. This theory, it should
be emphasized, does not ascribe the absence of war to nuclear weapons, but
instead points to the horrors of modern conventional war.
This argument probably provides the most persuasive alternative explanation
for the stability of the Cold War, but it is not convincing on close
inspection. The fact that World War II occurred casts serious doubt on this
theory; if any war could have convinced Europeans to forswear conventional
war, it should have been World War I, with its vast casualties. There is no
doubt that conventional war among modern states could devastate the participants.
Nevertheless, this explanation misses one crucial difference between
nuclear and conventional war, a difference that explains why war is
still a viable option for states. Proponents of this theory assume that all
conventional wars are protracted and bloody wars of attrition, like World
War I on the Western front. However, it is possible to score a quick and
decisive victory in a conventional war and avoid the devastation that usually
attends a protracted conventional war.49 Conventional war can be won; nuclear
war cannot be, since neither side can escape devastation by the other,
regardless of the outcome on the battlefield. Thus, the incentives to avoid
48. This theory is most clearly articulated by John E. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence
of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989). See also Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete? A
Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 42-64.
49. See Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, chaps. 1-2.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 31
war are far greater in a nuclear than a conventional world, making nuclear
deterrence much more robust than conventional deterrence.50
Predicting the Future: The Balkanization of Europe?
What new order will emerge in Europe if the Soviets and Americans withdraw
to their homelands and the Cold War order dissolves? What characteristics
will it have? How dangerous will it be?
It is certain that bipolarity will disappear, and multipolarity will emerge in
the new European order. The other two dimensions of the new order-the
distribution of power among the major states, and the distribution of nuclear
weapons among them-are not pre-determined, and several possible arrangements
could develop. The probable stability of these arrangements
would vary markedly. This section examines the scope of the dangers that
each arrangement would present, and the likelihood that each will emerge.
The distribution and deployment patterns of nuclear weapons in the new
Europe is the least certain, and probably the most important, element of the
new order. Accordingly, this section proceeds by exploring the character of
the four principal nuclear worlds that might develop: a denuclearized Europe,
continuation of the current patterns of nuclear ownership, and nuclear proliferation
either well- or ill-managed.
The best new order would incorporate the limited, managed proliferation
of nuclear weapons. This would be more dangerous than the current order,
but considerably safer than 1900-45. The worst order would be a non-nuclear
Europe in which power inequities emerge between the principal poles of
power. This order would be more dangerous than the current world, perhaps
almost as dangerous as the world before 1945. Continuation of the current
50. German decision-making in the early years of World War II underscores this point. See
Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, chap. 4. The Germans were well aware from their experience
in World War I that conventional war among major powers could have devastating
consequences. Nevertheless, they decided three times to launch major land offensives: Poland
(1939); France (1940); and the Soviet Union (1941). In each case, the Germans believed that they
could win a quick and decisive victory and avoid a costly protracted war like World War I. Their
calculations proved correct against Poland and France. They were wrong about the Soviets,
who thwarted their blitzkrieg and eventually played the central role in bringing down the Third
Reich. The Germans surely would have been deterred from attacking the Soviet Union if they
had foreseen the consequences. However, the key point is that they saw some possibility of
winning an easy and relatively cheap victory against the Red Army. That option is not available
in a nuclear war.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 132
pattern, or mismanaged proliferation, would be worse than the world of
today, but safer than the pre-1945 world.
EUROPE WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Some Europeans and Americans seek to eliminate nuclear weapons from
Europe, and would replace the Cold War order with a wholly non-nuclear
order. Constructing this nuclear-free Europe would require Britain, France
and the Soviet Union to rid themselves of nuclear weapons. Proponents
believe that a Europe without nuclear weapons would be the most peaceful
possible arrangement; in fact, however, a nuclear-free Europe would be the
most dangerous among possible post-Cold War orders. The pacifying effects
of nuclear weapons-the security they provide, the caution they generate,
the rough equality they impose, and the clarity of relative power they createwould
be lost. Peace would then depend on the other dimensions of the
new order-the number of poles, and the distribution of power among them.
However, the new order will certainly be multipolar, and may be unequal;
hence the system may be very prone to violence. The structure of power in
Europe would look much like it did between the world wars, and it could
well produce similar results.
The two most powerful states in post-Cold War Europe would probably
be Germany and the Soviet Union. They would be physically separated by
a band of small, independent states in Eastern Europe. Not much would
change in Western Europe, although the states in that area would have to
be concerned about a possible German threat on their eastern flank.
The potential for conflict in this system would be considerable. There
would be many possible dyads across which war might break out. Power
imbalances would be commonplace as a result of the opportunities this
system would present for bullying and ganging up. There would be considerable
opportunity for miscalculation. The problem of containing German
power would emerge once again, but the configuration of power in Europe
would make it difficult to form an effective counterbalancing coalition, for
much the same reason that an effective counterbalancing coalition failed to
form in the 1930s. Eventually the problem of containing the Soviet Union
could also re-emerge. Finally, conflicts may erupt in Eastern Europe, providing
the vortex that could pull others into a wider confrontation.
A reunified Germany would be surrounded by weaker states that would
find it difficult to balance against German aggression. Without forces stationed
in states adjacent to Germany, neither the Soviets nor the Americans
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 33
would be in a good position to help them contain German power. Furthermore,
those small states lying between Germany and the Soviet Union might
fear the Soviets as much as the Germans, and hence may not be disposed to
cooperate with the Soviets to deter German aggression. This problem in fact
arose in the 1930s, and 45 years of Soviet occupation in the interim have
done nothing to ease East European fears of a Soviet military presence. Thus,
scenarios in which Germany uses military force against Poland, Czechoslovakia,
or even Austria become possible.
The Soviet Union also might eventually threaten the new status quo. Soviet
withdrawal from Eastern Europe does not mean that the Soviets will never
feel compelled to return to Eastern Europe. The historical record provides
abundant instances of Russian or Soviet involvement in Eastern Europe.
Indeed, the Russian presence in Eastern Europe has surged and ebbed repeatedly
over the past few centuries.51 Thus, Soviet withdrawal now hardly
guarantees a permanent exit.
Conflict between Eastern European states is also likely to produce instability
in a multipolar Europe. There has been no war among the states in
that region during the Cold War because the Soviets have tightly controlled
them. This point is illustrated by the serious tensions that now exist between
Hungary and Romania over Romanian treatment of the Hungarian minority
in Transylvania, a region that previously belonged to Hungary and still has
roughly 2 million Hungarians living within its borders. Were it not for the
Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, this conflict could have brought Romania
and Hungary to war by now, and it may bring them to war in the future.52
This will not be the only danger spot within Eastern Europe if the Soviet
empire crumbles.5
Warfare in Eastern Europe would cause great suffering to Eastern Europeans.
It also might widen to include the major powers, because they would
51. See, inter alia: Ivo J. Lederer, ed., Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Andrei Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1825-1878
(Ann Arbor, Mich.: George Wahr Publishing, 1954); and Marc Raeff, Imperial Russia, 1682-1825:
The Coming of Age of Modern Russia (New York: Knopf, 1971), chap. 2.
52. To get a sense of the antipathy between Hungary and Romania over this issue, see Witnesses
to Cultural Genocide: First-Hand Reports on Romania's Minority Policies Today (New York: American
Transylvanian Federation and the Committee for Human Rights in Romania, 1979). The March
1990 clashes between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians in Tfrgu Mures (Romanian Transylvania)
indicate the potential for savage violence that is inherent in these ethnic conflicts.
53. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-Communist Nationalism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 5
(Winter -1989/1990), pp. 1-13; and Mark Kramer, "Beyond the Brezhnev Doctrine: A New Era in
Soviet-East European Relations?" International Security, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter 1989/90), pp. 51-
54.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 134
be drawn to compete for influence in that region, especially if disorder created
fluid politics that offered opportunities for wider influence, or threatened
defeat for friendly states. During the Cold War, both superpowers were
drawn into Third World conflicts across the globe, often in distant areas of
little strategic importance. Eastern Europe is directly adjacent to both the
Soviet Union and Germany, and has considerable economic and strategic
importance; thus trouble in Eastern Europe could offer even greater temptations
to these powers than past conflicts in the Third World offered the
superpowers. Furthermore, because the results of local conflicts will be
largely determined by the relative success of each party in finding external
allies, Eastern European states will have strong incentives to drag the major
powers into their local conflicts.54 Thus both push and pull considerations
would operate to enmesh outside powers in local Eastern European w%ars.
Miscalculation is also likely to be a problem in a multipolar Europe. For
example, the new order might well witness shifting patterns of conflict,
leaving insufficient time for adversaries to develop agreed divisions of rights
and agreed rules of interaction, or constantly forcing them to re-establish
new agreements and rules as old antagonisms fade and new ones arise. It is
not likely that circumstances would allow the development of a robust set of
agreements of the sort that have stabilized the Cold War since 1963. Instead,
Europe would resemble the pattern of the early Cold War, in which the
absence of rules led to repeated crises. In addition, the multipolar character
of the system is likely to give rise to miscalculation regarding the strength of
the opposing coalitions.
It is difficult to predict the precise balance of conventional military power
that would emerge between the two largest powers in post-Cold War Europe,
especially since the future of Soviet power is now hard to forecast. The Soviet
Union might recover its strength soon after withdrawing from Central Europe;
if so, Soviet power would overmatch German power. Or centrifugal
national forces may pull the Soviet Union apart, leaving no remnant state
that is the equal of a united Germany.55 What seems most likely is that
54. The new prime minister of Hungary, Jozsef Antall, has already spoken of the need for a
"European solution" to the problem of Romania's treatment of Hungarians in Transylvania.
Celestine Bohlen, "Victor in Hungary Sees '45 as the Best of Times," New York Times, April 10,
1990, p. A8.
55. This article focuses on how changes in the strength of Soviet power and retraction of the
Soviet empire would affect the prospects for stability in Europe. However, the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, a scenario not explored here in any detail, would raise dangers that would
be different from and in addition to those discussed here.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 35
Germany and the Soviet Union might emerge as powers of roughly equal
strength. The first two scenarios, with their marked inequality between the
two leading powers, would be especially worrisome, although there is cause
for concern even if Soviet and German power are balanced.
Resurgent hyper-nationalism will probably pose less danger than the problems
described above, but some nationalism is likely to resurface in the
absence of the Cold War and may provide additional incentives for war. A
non-nuclear Europe is likely to be especially troubled by nationalism, since
security in such an order will largely be provided by mass armies, which
often cannot be maintained without infusing societies with hyper-nationalism.
The problem is likely to be most acute in Eastern Europe, but there is
also potential for trouble in Germany. The Germans have generally done an
admirable job combatting nationalism over the past 45 years, and in remembering
the dark side of their past. Nevertheless, worrisome portents are now
visible; of greatest concern, some prominent Germans have lately advised a
return to greater nationalism in historical education.56 Moreover, nationalism
will be exacerbated by the unresolved border disputes that will be uncovered
by the retreat of American and Soviet power. Especially prominent is that of
the border between Germany and Poland, which some Germans would
change in Germany's favor.
However, it seems very unlikely that Europe will actually be denuclearized,
despite the present strength of anti-nuclear feeling in Europe. For example,
it is unlikely that the French, in the absence of America's protective cover
and faced with a newly unified Germany, would get rid of their nuclear
weapons. Also, the Soviets surely would remain concerned about balancing
the American nuclear deterrent, and will therefore retain a deterrent of their
own.
THE CURRENT OWNERSHIP PATTERN CONTINUES
A more plausible order for post-Cold War Europe is one in which Britain,
France and the Soviet Union keep their nuclear weapons, but no new nuclear
powers emerge in Europe. This scenario sees a nuclear-free zone in Central
Europe, but leaves nuclear weapons on the European flanks.
56. Aspects of this story are recounted in Richard J. Evans, In Hitler's Shadow: West German
Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past (New York: Pantheon, 1989). A study of
past German efforts to mischaracterize history is Holger H. Herwig, "Clio Deceived: Patriotic
Self-Censorship in Germany After the Great War," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Fall
1987), pp. 5-44.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 36
This scenario, too, also seems unlikely, since the non-nuclear states will
have substantial incentives to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Germany
would probably not need nuclear weapons to deter a conventional attack by
its neighbors, since neither the French nor any of the Eastern European states
would be capable of defeating a reunified Germany in a conventional war.
The Soviet Union would be Germany's only legitimate conventional threat,
but as long as the states of Eastern Europe remained independent, Soviet
ground forces would be blocked from a direct attack. The Germans, however,
might not be willing to rely on the Poles or the Czechs to provide a barrier
and might instead see nuclear weapons as the best way to deter a Soviet
conventional attack into Central Europe. The Germans might choose to go
nuclear to protect themselves from blackmail by other nuclear powers. Finally,
given that Germany would have greater economic strength than Britain
or France, it might therefore seek nuclear weapons to raise its military status
to a level commensurate with its economic status.
The minor powers of Eastern Europe would have strong incentives to
acquire nuclear weapons. Without nuclear weapons, these Eastern European
states would be open to nuclear blackmail from the Soviet Union and, if it
acquired nuclear weapons, from Germany. No Eastern European state could
match the conventional strength of Germany or the Soviet Union, which
gives these minor powers a powerful incentive to acquire a nuclear deterrent,
even if the major powers had none. In short, a continuation of the current
pattern of ownership without proliferation seems unlikely.
How stable would this order be? The continued presence of nuclear weapons
in Europe would have some pacifying effects. Nuclear weapons would
induce greater caution in their owners, give the nuclear powers greater
security, tend to equalize the relative power of states that possess them, and
reduce the risk of miscalculation. However, these benefits would be limited
if nuclear weapons did not proliferate beyond their current owners, for four
main reasons.
First, the caution and the security that nuclear weapons impose would be
missing from the vast center of Europe. The entire region between France
and the Soviet Union, extending from the Arctic in the north to the Mediterranean
in the south, and comprising some eighteen significant states,
would become a large zone thereby made "safe" for conventional war. Second,
asymmetrical power relations would be bound to develop, between
nuclear and non-nuclear states and among non-nuclear states, raising the
dangers that attend such asymmetries. Third, the risk of miscalculation
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 37
would rise, reflecting the multipolar character of this system and the absence
of nuclear weapons from a large portion of it. A durable agreed political
order would be hard to build because political coalitions would tend to shift
over time, causing miscalculations of resolve between adversaries. The relative
strength of potential war coalitions would be hard to calculate because
coalition strength would depend heavily on the vagaries of diplomacy. Such
uncertainties about relative capabilities would be mitigated in conflicts that
arose among nuclear powers: nuclear weapons tend to equalize power even
among states or coalitions of widely disparate resources, and thus to diminish
the importance of additions or defections from each coalition. However,
uncertainty would still be acute among the many states that would remain
non-nuclear. Fourth, the conventionally-armed states of Central Europe
would depend for their security on mass armies, giving them an incentive
to infuse their societies with dangerous nationalism in order to maintain
public support for national defense efforts.
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, WELL-MANAGED OR OTHERWISE
The most likely scenario in the wake of the Cold War is further nuclear
proliferation in Europe. This outcome is laden with dangers, but also might
provide the best hope for maintaining stability on the Continent. Its effects
depend greatly on how it is managed. Mismanaged proliferation could produce
disaster, while well-managed proliferation could produce an order
nearly as stable as the current order. Unfortunately, however, any proliferation
is likely to be mismanaged.
Four principal dangers could arise if proliferation is not properly managed.
First, the proliferation process itself could give the existing nuclear powers
strong incentives to use force to prevent their non-nuclear neighbors from
gaining nuclear weapons, much as Israel used force to preempt Iraq from
acquiring a nuclear capability.
Second, even after proliferation was completed, a stable nuclear competition
might not emerge between the new nuclear states. The lesser European
powers might lack the resources needed to make their nuclear forces survivable;
if the emerging nuclear forces were vulnerable, this could create firststrike
incentives and attendant crisis instability. Because their economies are
far smaller, they would not be able to develop arsenals as large as those of
the major powers; arsenals of small absolute size might thus be vulnerable.
Furthermore, their lack of territorial expanse deprives them of possible basing
modes, such as mobile missile basing, that would secure their deterrents.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 38
Several are landlocked, so they could not base nuclear weapons at sea, the
most secure basing mode used by the superpowers. Moreover, their close
proximity to one another deprives them of warning time, and thus of basing
schemes that exploit warning to achieve invulnerability, such as by the quick
launch of alert bombers. Finally, the emerging nuclear powers might also
lack the resources required to develop secure command and control and
adequate safety procedures for weapons management, thus raising the risk
of accidental launch, or of terrorist seizure and use of nuclear weapons.
Third, the elites and publics of the emerging nuclear European states might
not quickly develop doctrines and attitudes that reflect a grasp of the devastating
consequences and basic unwinnability of nuclear war. There will
probably be voices in post-Cold War Europe arguing that limited nuclear
war is feasible, and that nuclear wars can be fought and won. These claims
might be taken seriously in states that have not had much direct experience
with the nuclear revolution.
Fourth, widespread proliferation would increase the number of fingers on
the nuclear trigger, which in turn would increase the likelihood that nuclear
weapons could be fired due to accident, unauthorized use, terrorist seizure,
or irrational decision-making.
If these problems are not resolved, proliferation would present grave dangers.
However, the existing nuclear powers can take steps to reduce these
dangers. They can help deter preventive attack on emerging nuclear states
by extending security guarantees. They can provide technical assistance to
help newly nuclear-armed powers to secure their deterrents. And they can
help socialize emerging nuclear societies to understand the nature of the
forces they are acquiring. Proliferation managed in this manner can help
bolster peace.
How broadly should nuclear weapons be permitted to spread? It would
be best if proliferation were extended to Germany but not beyond.57 Germany
has a large economic base, and can therefore sustain a secure nuclear force.
Moreover, Germany will feel insecure without nuclear weapons; and Germany's
great conventional strength gives it significant capacity to disturb
Europe if it feels insecure. Other states-especially in Eastern Europe-may
also want nuclear weapons, but it would be best to prevent further proliferation.
The reasons are, as noted above, that these states may be unable to
57. See David Garnham, "Extending Deterrence with German Nuclear Weapons," International
Security, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer 1985), pp. 96-110.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 39
secure their nuclear deterrents, and the unlimited spread of nuclear weapons
raises the risk of terrorist seizure or possession by states led by irrational
elites. However, if the broader spread of nuclear weapons proves impossible
to prevent without taking extreme steps, the existing nuclear powers should
let the process happen, while doing their best to channel it in safe directions.
However, even if proliferation were well-managed, significant dangers
would remain. If all the major powers in Europe possessed nuclear weapons,
history suggests that they would still compete for influence among the lesser
powers and be drawn into lesser-power conflicts. The superpowers, despite
the security that their huge nuclear arsenals provide, have competed intensely
for influence in remote, strategically unimportant areas such as South
Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central America. The European powers are likely
to exhibit the same competitive conduct, especially in Eastern Europe, even
if they possess secure nuclear deterrents.
The possibility of ganging up would remain: several nuclear states could
join against a solitary nuclear state, perhaps aggregating enough strength to
overwhelm its deterrent. Nuclear states also might bully their non-nuclear
neighbors. This problem is mitigated if unbounded proliferation takes place,
leaving few non-nuclear states subject to bullying by the nuclear states, but
such widespread proliferation raises risks of its own, as noted above.
Well-managed proliferation would reduce the danger that states might
miscalculate the relative strength of coalitions, since nuclear weapons clarify
the relative power of all states, and diminish the importance of unforeseen
additions and defections from alliances. However, the risk remains that
resolve will be miscalculated, because patterns of conflict are likely to be
somewhat fluid in a multipolar Europe, thus precluding the establishment
of well-defined spheres of rights and rules of conduct.
Unbounded proliferation, even if it is well-managed, will raise the risks
that appear when there are many fingers on the nuclear trigger-accident,
unauthorized or irrational use, or terrorist seizure.
In any case, it is not likely that proliferation will be well-managed. The
nuclear powers cannot easily work to manage proliferation while at the same
time resisting it; there is a natural tension between the two goals. But they
have several motives to resist. The established nuclear powers will be reluctant
to give the new nuclear powers technical help in building secure deterrents,
because it runs against the grain of state behavior to transfer military
power to others, and because of the fear that sensitive military technology
could be turned against the donor state if that technology were further
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 40
transferred to its adversaries. The nuclear powers will also be reluctant to
undermine the legitimacy of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by
allowing any signatories to acquire nuclear weapons, since this could open
the floodgates to the wider proliferation that they seek to avoid, even if they
would otherwise favor very limited proliferation. For these reasons the nuclear
powers are more likely to spend their energy trying to thwart the
process of proliferation, rather than managing it.
Proliferation can be more easily managed if it occurs during a period of
relative international calm. Proliferation that occurred during a time of crisis
would be especially dangerous, since states in conflict with the emerging
nuclear powers would then have a strong incentive to interrupt the process
by force. However, proliferation is likely not to begin until the outbreak of
crisis, because there will be significant domestic opposition to proliferation
within the potential nuclear powers, as well as significant external resistance
from the established nuclear powers. Hence it may require a crisis to motivate
the potential nuclear powers to pay the domestic and international costs of
moving to build a nuclear force. Thus, proliferation is more likely to happen
under disadvantageous international conditions than in a period of calm.
Finally, there are limits to the ability of the established nuclear powers to
assist small emerging nuclear powers to build secure deterrents. For example,
small landlocked powers cannot be given access to sea-based deterrents or
land-mobile missile systems requiring vast expanses of land; these are geographic
problems that technology cannot erase. Therefore even if the existing
nuclear powers move to manage the proliferation process early and wisely,
that process still may raise dangers that they cannot control.
Alternative Theories that Predict Peace
Many students of European politics will reject my pessimistic analysis of
post-Cold War Europe and instead argue that a multipolar Europe is likely
to be at least as peaceful as the present order. Three specific scenarios for a
peaceful future have been advanced. Each rests on a well-known theory of
international relations. However, each of these theories is flawed and thus
cannot serve as the basis for reliable predictions of a peaceful order in a
multipolar Europe; hence the hopeful scenarios they support lack plausibility.
Under the first optimistic scenario, even a non-nuclear Europe would
remain peaceful because Europeans recognize that even a conventional war
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 41
would be horrific. Sobered by history, national leaders will take great care to
avoid war. This scenario rests on the "obsolescence of war" theory.
Although modern conventional war can certainly be very costly, there are
several flaws in this argument. There is no systematic evidence demonstrating
that Europeans believe war is obsolete. However, even if it were widely
believed in Europe that war is no longer thinkable, attitudes could change.
Public opinion on national security issues is notoriously fickle and responsive
to elite manipulation and world events. Moreover, only one country need
decide war is thinkable to make war possible again. Finally, it is possible that
a conventional war could be fought and won without suffering grave losses,
and elites who saw this possibility could believe war is a viable option.
Under the second optimistic scenario, the existing European Community
(EC) grows stronger with time, a development heralded by the Single European
Act, designed to create a unified Western European market by 1992.
A strong EC then ensures that this economic order remains open and prosperous,
and the open and prosperous character of the European economy
keeps the states of Western Europe cooperating with each other. In this view,
the present EC structure grows stronger, but not larger. Therefore, while
conflict might emerge in Eastern Europe, the threat of an aggressive Germany
would be removed by enmeshing the newly unified German state deeply in
the EC. The theory underpinning this scenario is "economic liberalism."
A variant of this second scenario posits that the EC will spread to include
Eastern Europe and possibly the Soviet Union, bringing prosperity and peace
to these regions as well.58 Some also maintain that the EC is likely to be so
successful in the decade ahead that it will develop into a state apparatus: a
unified Western European super-state would emerge and Germany would
be subsumed in it. At some future point, the remainder of Europe would be
incorporated into that super-state. Either way, suggest the proponents of
this second scenario and its variants, peace will be bolstered.
Under the third scenario, war is avoided because many European states
have become democratic since the early twentieth century, and liberal democracies
simply do not fight against each other. At a minimum, the presence
of liberal democracies in Western Europe renders that half of Europe free
from armed conflict. At a maximum, as democracy spreads to Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union, it bolsters peace among these states, and between
58. Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4
(Spring 1990), pp. 5-41.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 42
these states and Western Europe. This scenario is based on the theory that
can be called "peace-loving democracies."
ECONOMIC LIBERALISM
THE LOGIC OF THE THEORY. Economic liberalism rejects the notion that the
prospects for peace are tightly linked to calculations about military power,
and posits instead that stability is mainly a function of international economic
considerations. It assumes that modern states are primarily motivated by the
desire to achieve prosperity, and that national leaders place the material
welfare of their publics above all other considerations, including security.
This is especially true of liberal democracies, where policymakers are under
special pressure to ensure the economic well-being of their populations.59
Thus, the key to achieving peace is establishment of an international economic
system that fosters prosperity for all states.
The taproot of stability, according to this theory, is the creation and maintenance
of a liberal economic order that allows free economic exchange
between states. Such an order works to dampen conflict and enhance political
cooperation in three ways.60
First, it makes states more prosperous; this bolsters peace because prosperous
states are more economically satisfied, and satisfied states are more
59. This point about liberal democracies highlights the fact that economic liberalism and the
theory of peace-loving democracies are often linked in the writings of international relations
scholars. The basis of the linkage is what each theory has to say about peoples' motives. The
claim that individuals mainly desire material prosperity, central to economic liberalism, meshes
nicely with the belief that the citizenry are a powerful force against war, which, as discussed
below, is central to the theory of peace-loving democracies.
60. The three explanations discussed here rest on three of the most prominent theories advanced
in the international political economy (IPE) literature. These three are usually treated as distinct
theories and are given various labels. However, they share important common elements. Hence,
for purposes of parsimony, I treat them as three strands of one general theory: economic
liberalism. A caveat is in order. The IPE literature often fails to state its theories in a clear
fashion, making them difficult to evaluate. Thus, I have construed these theories from sometimes
opaque writings that might be open to contrary interpretations. My description of economic
liberalism is drawn from the following works, which are among the best of the IPE genre:
Richard N. Cooper, "Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policies in the Seventies," World
Politics, Vol. 24, No. 2 (January 1972), pp. 158-181; Ernst B. Haas, "Technology, Pluralism, and
the New Europe," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ed., International Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown,
1968), pp. 149-176; Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence: World
Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation
and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); David
Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1966); Edward L. Morse, "The
Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence, and Externalization,"
World Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (April 1970), pp. 371-392; and Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of
the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 43
peaceful. Many wars are waged to gain or preserve wealth, but states have
less motive for such wars if they are already wealthy. Wealthy societies also
stand to lose more if their societies are laid waste by war. For both reasons
they avoid war.
Moreover, the prosperity spawned by economic liberalism feeds itself, by
promoting international institutions that foster greater liberalism, which in
turn promotes still greater prosperity. To function smoothly, a liberal economic
order requires international regimes or institutions, such as the EC,
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). These institutions perform two limited but important
functions. First, they help states to verify that partners keep their cooperative
commitments. Second, they provide resources to governments experiencing
short-term problems arising from their exposure to international markets,
and by doing so they allow states to eschew beggar-thy-neighbor policies
that might otherwise undermine the existing economic order. Once in place,
these institutions and regimes bolster economic cooperation, hence bolster
prosperity. They also bolster themselves: once in existence they cause the
expansion of their own size and influence, by proving their worth and selling
themselves to states and publics. And as their power grows they become
better able to promote cooperation, which promotes greater prosperity, which
further bolsters their prestige and influence. In essence, a benevolent spirallike
relationship sets in between cooperation-promoting regimes and prosperity,
in which each feeds the other.
Second, a liberal economic order fosters economic interdependence among
states. Interdependence is defined as a situation in which two states are
mutually vulnerable; each is a hostage of the other in the economic realm.61
When interdependence is high, this theory holds, there is less temptation to
cheat or behave aggressively towards other states because all states could
retaliate. Interdependence allows states to compel each other to cooperate
on economic matters, much as mutual assured destruction allows nuclear
powers to compel each other to respect their security. All states are forced
by the others to act as partners in the provision of material comfort for their
home publics.
Third, some theorists argue that with ever-increasing political cooperation,
international regimes will become so powerful that they will assume an
61. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence," in Charles P. Kindelberger,
ed., The International Corporation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 205-223.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 44
independent life of their own, eventually growing into a super-state. This is
a minority view; most economic liberals do not argue that regimes can become
so powerful that they can coerce states to act against their own narrow
interests. Instead most maintain that regimes essentially reflect the interests
of the states that created and maintain them, and remain subordinate to
other interests of these states. However, the "growth to super-statehood"
view does represent an important strand of thought among economic liberals.
The main flaw in this theory is that the principal assumption underpinning
it-that states are primarily motivated by the desire to achieve prosperityis
wrong. States are surely concerned about prosperity, and thus economic
calculations are hardly trivial for them. However, states operate in both an
international political environment and an international economic environment,
and the former dominates the latter in cases where the two systems
come into conflict. The reason is straightforward: the international political
system is anarchic, which means that each state must always be concerned
to ensure its own survival. Since a state can have no higher goal than survival,
when push comes to shove, international political considerations will be
paramount in the minds of decision-makers.
Proponents of economic liberalism largely ignore the effects of anarchy on
state behavior and concentrate instead on economic considerations. When
this omission is corrected, however, their arguments collapse, for two rea-
sons.
First, competition for security makes it very difficult for states to cooperate.
When security is scarce, states become more concerned about relative gains
than absolute gains.62 They ask of an exchange not, "will both of us gain?"
but instead, "who will gain more?"63 When security is scarce, they reject
even cooperation that would yield an absolute economic gain, if the other
state would gain more of the yield, from fear that the other might convert
its gain to military strength, and then use this strength to win by coercion
in later rounds.M4 Cooperation is much easier to achieve if states worry only
about absolute gains, as they are more likely to do when security is not so
62. See Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988),
pp. 485-507; and Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to
Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
63. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 105.
64. It is important to emphasize that because military power is in good part a function of
economic might, the consequences of economic dealings among states sometimes have important
security implications.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 45
scarce. The goal then is simply to insure that the overall economic pie is
expanding and each state is getting at least some part of the resulting benefits.
However, anarchy guarantees that security will often be scarce; this heightens
states' concerns about relative gains, which makes cooperation difficult unless
gains can be finely sliced to reflect, and thus not disturb, the current
balance of power.
In contrast to this view, economic liberals generally assume that states
worry little about relative gains when designing cooperative agreements, but
instead are concerned mainly about absolute gains. This assumption underlies
their optimism over the prospects for international cooperation. However,
it is not well-based: anarchy forces states to reject agreements that
result in asymmetrical payoffs that shift the balance of power against them.
Second, interdependence is as likely to lead to conflict as cooperation,
because states will struggle to escape the vulnerability that interdependence
creates, in order to bolster their national security. States that depend on
others for critical economic supplies will fear cutoff or blackmail in time of
crisis or war; they may try to extend political control to the source of supply,
giving rise to conflict with the source or with its other customers. Interdependence,
in other words, might very well lead to greater competition, not
to cooperation.65
Several other considerations, independent of the consequences of anarchy,
also raise doubts about the claims of economic liberals.
First, economic interactions between states often cause serious frictions,
even if the overall consequences are positive. There will invariably be winners
and losers within each state, and losers rarely accept defeat gracefully. In
modern states, where leaders have to pay careful attention to their constit-
65. There are numerous examples in the historical record of vulnerable states pursuing aggressive
military policies for the purpose of achieving autarky. For example, this pattern of behavior
was reflected in both Japan's and Germany's actions during the interwar period. On Japan, see
Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and James B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). On Germany, see William Carr, Arms, Autarky and
Aggression: A Study in German Foreign Policy, 1933-39 (New York: Norton, 1973). It is also worth
noting that during the Arab oil embargo of the early 1970s, when it became apparent that the
United States was vulnerable to OPEC pressure, there was much talk in America about using
military force to seize Arab oil fields. See, for example, Robert W. Tucker, "Oil: The Issue of
American Intervention," Commentary, January 1975, pp. 21-31; Miles Ignotus [said to be a
pseudonym for Edward Luttwak], "Seizing Arab Oil," Harpers, March 1975, pp. 45-62; and U.S.
Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Report on Oil Fields as Military Objecti
A Feasibility Study, prepared by John M. Collins and Clyde R. Mark, 94th Cong., 1st sess.
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], August 21, 1975).
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 46
uents, losers can cause considerable trouble. Even in cases where only winners
are involved, there are sometimes squabbles over how the spoils are
divided. In a sense, then, expanding the network of contacts among states
increases the scope for international disagreements among them. They now
have more to squabble about.
Second, there will be opportunities for blackmail and for brinkmanship in
a highly dynamic economic system where states are dependent on each other.
For example, although mutual vulnerabilities may arise among states, it is
likely that the actual levels of dependence will not be equal. The less vulnerable
states would probably have greater bargaining power over the more
dependent states and might attempt to coerce them into making extravagant
concessions. Furthermore, different political systems, not to mention individual
leaders, have different capacities for engaging in tough bargaining
situations.
THE HISTORICAL RECORD. During two periods in the twentieth century,
Europe witnessed a liberal economic order with high levels of interdependence.
Stability should have obtained during those periods, according to economic
liberalism.
The first case clearly contradicts the theory. The years between 1890 and
1914 were probably the time of greatest economic interdependence in Europe's
history. Yet World War I broke out following this period.66
The second case covers the Cold War years. During this period there has
been much interdependence among the EC states, while relations among
these states have been very peaceful. This case, not surprisingly, is the
centerpiece of the economic liberals' argument.
The correlation in this second case does not mean, however, that interdependence
has caused cooperation among the Western democracies. It is
more likely that the prime cause was the Cold War, and that this was the
main reason that intra-EC relations have flourished.67 The Cold War caused
these results in two different but mutually reinforcing ways.
First, old-fashioned balance of power logic mandated cooperation among
the Western democracies. A powerful and potentially dangerous Soviet
66. See Richard N. Rosecrance, et al., "Whither Interdependence?" International Organization,
Vol. 31, No. 3 (Summer 1977), pp. 432-434.
67. This theme is reflected in Barry Buzan, "Economic Structure and International Security: The
Limits of the Liberal Case," International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Autumn 1984), pp. 597-
624; Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign
Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975); and Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the
Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 47
Union forced the Western democracies to band together to meet the common
threat. Britain, Germany, and France no longer worried about each other,
because all faced a greater menace from the Soviets. This Soviet threat muted
concerns about relative gains arising from economic cooperation among the
EC states by giving each Western democracy a vested interest in seeing its
alliance partners grow powerful, since each additional increment of power
helped deter the Soviets. The Soviet threat also muted relative-gains fears
among Western European states by giving them all a powerful incentive to
avoid conflict with each other while the Soviet Union loomed to the east,
ready to harvest the gains of Western quarrels. This gave each Western state
greater confidence that its Western partners would not turn their gains
against it, as long as these partners behaved rationally.
Second, America's hegemonic position in NATO, the military counterpart
to the EC, mitigated the effects of anarchy on the Western democracies and
facilitated cooperation among them.68 As emphasized, states do not trust
each other in anarchy and they have incentives to commit aggression against
each other. America, however, not only provided protection against the
Soviet threat, but also guaranteed that no EC state would aggress against
another. For example, France did not have to fear Germany as it rearmed,
because the American presence in Germany meant that the Germans were
not free to attack anyone. With the United States serving as night watchman,
relative-gains concerns among the Western European states were mitigated
and, moreover, those states were willing to allow their economies to become
tightly interdependent.
In effect, relations among EC states were spared the effects of anarchyfears
about relative gains and an obsession with autonomy-because the
United States served as the ultimate arbiter within the Alliance.
If the present Soviet threat to Western Europe is removed, and American
forces depart for home, relations among the EC states will be fundamentally
altered. Without a common Soviet threat and without the American night
watchman, Western European states will begin viewing each other with
greater fear and suspicion, as they did for centuries before the onset of the
Cold War. Consequently, they will worry about the imbalances in gains as
well as the loss of autonomy that results from cooperation.69 Cooperation in
68. See Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," Foreign Policy, No. 54 (Spring 1984), pp. 64-
82.
69. Consider, for example, a situation where the European Community is successfully extended
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 48
this new order will be more difficult than it has been in the Cold War. Conflict
will be more likely.
In sum, there are good reasons for looking with skepticism upon the claim
that peace can be maintained in a multipolar Europe on the basis of a more
powerful EC.
PEACE-LOVING DEMOCRACIES
The peace-loving democracies theory holds that domestic political factors,
not calculations about military power or the international economic system,
are the principal determinant of peace. Specifically, the argument is that the
presence of liberal democracies in the international system will help to produce
a stable order.70 The claim is not that democracies go to war less often
than authoritarian states. In fact, the historical record shows clearly that such
is not the case.71 Instead, the argument is that democracies do not go to war
against other democracies. Thus, democracy must spread to Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union to insure peace in post-Cold War Europe.
It is not certain that democracy will take root among the states of Eastern
Europe or in the Soviet Union. They lack a strong tradition of democracy;
institutions that can accommodate the growth of democracy will have to be
built from scratch. That task will probably prove to be difficult, especially in
an unstable Europe. But whether democracy takes root in the East matters
to include Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and that over time all states achieve greater
prosperity. The Germans, however, do significantly better than all other states. Hence their
relative power position, which is already quite strong, begins to improve markedly. It is likely
that the French and the Soviets, just to name two states, would be deeply concerned by this
situation.
70. This theory has been recently articulated by Michael Doyle in three articles: "Liberalism and
World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169;
"Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3
(Summer 1983), pp. 205-235; and "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2," Philosophy
and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1983), pp. 323-353. Doyle draws heavily on Immanuel
Kant's classic writings on the subject. This theory also provides the central argument in Francis
Fukuyama's widely publicized essay on "The End of History?" in The National Interest, No. 16
(Summer 1989), pp. 3-18. For an excellent critique of the theory, see Samuel P. Huntington,
"No Exit: The Errors of Endism," The National Interest, No. 17 (Fall 1989), pp. 3-11.
71. There is a good empirical literature on the relationship between democracy and war. See,
for example, Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . .. Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 617-648; Erich Weede, "Democracy
and War Involvement," in ibid., pp. 649-664; Bruce M. Russett and R. Joseph Monsen,
"Bureaucracy and Polyarchy As Predictors of Performance," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 8,
No. 1 (April 1975), pp. 5-31; and Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War-Proneness of
Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 4
(Summer 1976), pp. 50-69.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 49
little for stability in Europe, since the theory of peace-loving democracies is
unsound.
THE LOGIC OF THE THEORY. Two explanations are offered in support of the
claim that democracies do not go to war against one another.
First, some claim that authoritarian leaders are more prone to go to war
than leaders of democracies, because authoritarian leaders are not accountable
to their publics, which carry the main burdens of war. In a democracy,
by contrast, the citizenry that pays the price of war has greater say in the
decision-making process. The people, so the argument goes, are more hesitant
to start trouble because it is they who pay the blood price; hence the
greater their power, the fewer wars.
The second argument rests on the claim that the citizens of liberal democracies
respect popular democratic rights-those of their fellow countrymen,
and those of individuals in other states. As a result they are reluctant to
wage war against other democracies, because they view democratic governments
as more legitimate than others, and are loath to impose a foreign
regime on a democratic state by force. This would violate their own democratic
principles and values. Thus an inhibition on war is introduced when
two democracies face each other that is missing in other international rela-
tionships.
The first of these arguments is flawed because it is not possible to sustain
the claim that the people in a democracy are especially sensitive to the costs
of war and therefore less willing than authoritarian leaders to fight wars. In
fact, the historical record shows that democracies are every bit as likely to
fight wars as are authoritarian states.
Furthermore, mass publics, whether democratic or not, can become deeply
imbued with nationalistic or religious fervor, making them prone to support
aggression, regardless of costs. The widespread public support in post-revolutionary
France for Napoleon's wars of aggression is just one example of
this phenomenon. On the other hand, authoritarian leaders are just as likely
as democratic publics to fear going to war, because war tends to unleash
democratic forces that can undermine the regime.72 War can impose high
costs on authoritarian leaders as well as on their citizenries.
The second argument, which emphasizes the transnational respect for
democratic rights among democracies, rests on a weaker factor that is usually
72. See, for example, Stanislav Andreski, "On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships,"
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (December 1980), pp. 3-10.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 50
overridden by other factors such as nationalism and religious fundamentalism.
There is also another problem with the argument. The possibility always
exists that a democracy will revert to an authoritarian state. This threat of
backsliding means that one democratic state can never be sure that another
democratic state will not change its stripes and turn on it sometime in the
future. Liberal democracies must therefore worry about relative power among
themselves, which is tantamount to saying that each has an incentive to
consider aggression against the other to forestall future trouble. Lamentably,
it is not possible for even liberal democracies to transcend anarchy.
THE HISTORICAL RECORD. Problems with the deductive logic aside, the historical
record seems to offer strong support for the theory of peace-loving
democracies. There appears to have been no case where liberal democracies
fought against each other. Although this evidence looks impressive at first
glance, closer examination shows it to be indecisive. In fact, history provides
no clear test of the theory. Four evidentiary problems leave the issue in
doubt.
First, democracies have been few in number over the past two centuries,
and thus there have not been many cases where two democracies were in a
position to fight with each other. Only three prominent cases are usually
cited: Britain and the United States (1832-present); Britain and France (1832-
49, 1871-1940); and the Western democracies since 1945.
Second, there are other persuasive explanations for why war did not occur
in those three cases, and these competing explanations must be ruled out
before the peace-loving democracies theory can be accepted. While relations
between the British and the Americans during the nineteenth century were
hardly free of conflict,73 their relations in the twentieth century were quite
harmonious, and thus fit closely with how the theory would expect two
democracies to behave towards each other. That harmony, however, can
easily be explained by the presence of a common threat that forced Britain
and the United States to work closely together. 74 Both faced a serious German
threat in the first part of the century, and a Soviet threat later. The same
basic argument applies to France and Britain. While Franco-British relations
73. For a discussion of the hostile relations that existed between the United States and Britain
during the nineteenth century, see H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of
Anglo-American Relations, 1783-1952 (London: Odhams, 1954).
74. For a discussion of this rapprochement, see Stephen R. Rock, Why Peace Breaks Out: Great
Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1989), chap. 2.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 51
were not the best throughout most of the nineteenth century,75 they improved
significantly around the turn of the century with the rise of a common
threat: Germany.76 Finally, as noted above, the Soviet threat can explain the
absence of war among the Western democracies since 1945.
Third, it bears mention that several democracies have come close to fighting
one another, which suggests that the absence of war may be due simply to
chance. France and Britain approached war during the Fashoda crisis of 1898.
France and Weimar Germany might have come to blows over the Rhineland
during the 1920s, had Germany possessed the military strength to challenge
France. The United States has clashed with a number of elected governments
in the Third World during the Cold War, including the Allende regime in
Chile and the Arbenz regime in Guatemala.
Lastly, some would classify Wilhelmine Germany as a democracy, or at
least a quasi-democracy; if so, World War I becomes a war among democra-
cies.77
Conclusion
This article argues that bipolarity, an equal military balance, and nuclear
weapons have fostered peace in Europe over the past 45 years. The Cold
War confrontation produced these phenomena; thus the Cold War was principally
responsible for transforming a historically violent region into a very
peaceful place.
There is no doubt that the costs of the Cold War have been substantial. It
inflicted oppressive political regimes on the peoples of Eastern Europe, who
were denied basic human rights by their forced membership in the Soviet
75. For a good discussion of Franco-British relations during the nineteenth century, see P.J.V.
Rolo, Entente Cordiale: The Origins and Negotiation of the Anglo-French Agreements of 8 April 1904
(New York: St. Martins, 1969), pp. 16-109.
76. Stephen Rock, who has examined the rapprochement between Britain and France, argues
that the principal motivating force behind their improved relations derived from geopolitical
considerations, not shared political beliefs. See Rock, Why Peace Breaks Out, chap. 4.
77. Doyle recognizes this problem and thus has a lengthy footnote that attempts to deal with
it. See "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs [Part One]," pp. 216-217, n. 8. He argues
that "Germany was a liberal state under republican law for domestic issues," but that the
"emperor's active role in foreign affairs . .. made imperial Germany a state divorced from the
control of its citizenry in foreign affairs." However, an examination of the decision-making
process leading to World War I reveals that the emperor (Wilhelm II) was not a prime mover in
foreign affairs and that he was no more bellicose than other members of the German elite,
including the leading civilian official, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 52
empire. It consumed national wealth, by giving rise to large and costly
defense establishments in both East and West. It spawned bloody conflicts
in the Third World; these produced modest casualties for the superpowers,
but large casualties for the Third World nations. Nevertheless, the net human
and economic cost of the Cold War order has been far less than the cost of
the European order of 1900-45, with its vast violence and suffering.
A Cold War order without confrontation would have been preferable to
the order that actually developed; then the peace that the Cold War order
produced could have been enjoyed without its attendant costs. However, it
was East-West enmity that gave rise to the Cold War order; there would have
been no bipolarity, no equality, and no large Soviet and American nuclear
forces in Europe without it. The costs of the Cold War arose from the same
cause-East-West confrontation-as did its benefits. The good could not be
had without the bad.
This article further argues that the demise of the Cold War order is likely
to increase the chances that war and major crises will occur in Europe. Many
observers now suggest that a new age of peace is dawning; in fact the
opposite is true.
The implications of my analysis are straightforward, if paradoxical. The
West has an interest in maintaining peace in Europe. It therefore has an
interest in maintaining the Cold War order, and hence has an interest in the
continuation of the Cold War confrontation; developments that threaten to
end it are dangerous. The Cold War antagonism could be continued at lower
levels of East-West tension than have prevailed in the past; hence the West
is not injured by relaxing East-West tension, but a complete end to the Cold
War would create more problems than it would solve.
The fate of the Cold War, however, is mainly in the hands of the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union is the only superpower that can seriously threaten
to overrun Europe; it is the Soviet threat that provides the glue that holds
NATO together. Take away that offensive threat and the United States is
likely to abandon the Continent, whereupon the defensive alliance it has
headed for forty years may disintegrate. This would bring to an end the
bipolar order that has characterized Europe for the past 45 years.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the West paradoxically has an interest
in the continued existence -of a powerful Soviet Union with substantial military
forces in Eastern Europe. Western interests are wholly reversed from
those that Western leaders saw in the late 1940s: instead of seeking the
retraction of Soviet power, as the West did then, the West now should hope
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 53
that the Soviet Union retains at least some military forces in the Eastern
European region.
There is little the Americans or the Western Europeans can or are likely to
do to perpetuate the Cold War, for three reasons.
First, domestic political considerations preclude such an approach. Western
leaders obviously cannot base national security policy on the need to maintain
forces in Central Europe for the purpose simply of keeping the Soviets there.
The idea of deploying large forces in order to bait the Soviets into an orderkeeping
competition would be dismissed as bizarre, and contrary to the
general belief that ending the Cold War and removing the Soviet yoke from
Eastern Europe would make the world safer and better.78
Second, the idea of propping up a declining rival runs counter to the basic
behavior of states. States are principally concerned about their relative power
position in the system; hence, they look for opportunities to take advantage
of each other. If anything, they prefer to see adversaries decline, and thus
will do whatever they can to speed up the process and maximize the distance
of the fall. In other words, states do not ask which distribution of power
best facilitates stability and then do everything possible to build or maintain
such an order. Instead, they each tend to pursue the more narrow aim of
maximizing their power advantage over potential adversaries. The particular
international order that results is simply a byproduct of that competition, as
illustrated by the origins of the Cold War order in Europe. No state intended
to create it. In fact, both the United States and the Soviet Union worked hard
in the early years of the Cold War to undermine each other's position in
Europe, which would have ended the bipolar order on the Continent. The
remarkably stable system that emerged in Europe in the late 1940s was the
unintended consequence of an intense competition between the superpow-
ers.
Third, even if the Americans and the Western Europeans wanted to help
the Soviets maintain their status as a superpower, it is not apparent that they
could do so. The Soviet Union is leaving Eastern Europe and cutting its
78. This point is illustrated by the 1976 controversy over the so-called "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine."
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, an adviser to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, was reported to have
said in late 1975 that the United States should support Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. It
was clear from the ensuing debate that whether or not Sonnenfeldt in fact made such a claim,
no administration could publicly adopt that position. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on
International Relations, Hearings on United States National Security Policy Vis-a-Vis Eastern Europe
(The "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine"), 94th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, April 12, 1976).
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 54
military forces largely because its economy is foundering. It is not clear that
the Soviets themselves know how to fix their economy, and there is little
that Western governments can do to help them solve their economic problems.
The West can and should avoid doing malicious mischief to the Soviet
economy, but at this juncture it is difficult to see how the West can have
significant positive influence.79
The fact that the West cannot sustain the Cold War does not mean that
the United States should abandon all attempts to preserve the current order.
The United States should do what it can to direct events toward averting a
complete mutual superpower withdrawal from Europe. For instance, the
American negotiating position at the conventional arms control talks should
aim toward large mutual force reductions, but should not contemplate complete
mutual withdrawal. The Soviets may opt to withdraw all their forces
unilaterally anyway; there is little the United States could do to prevent this.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
If complete Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe proves unavoidable, the
West faces the question of how to maintain peace in a multipolar Europe.
Three policy prescriptions are in order.
First, the United States should encourage the limited and carefully managed
proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe. The best hope for avoiding
war in post-Cold War Europe is nuclear deterrence; hence some nuclear
proliferation is necessary to compensate for the withdrawal of the Soviet and
American nuclear arsenals from Central Europe. Ideally, as I have argued,
nuclear weapons would spread to Germany, but to no other state.
Second, Britain and the United States, as well as the Continental states,
will have to balance actively and efficiently against any emerging aggressor
to offset the ganging up and bullying problems that are sure to arise in postCold
War Europe. Balancing in a multipolar system, however, is usually a
problem-ridden enterprise, either because of geography or because of significant
coordination problems. Nevertheless, two steps can be taken to maximize
the prospects of efficient balancing.
The initial measure concerns Britain and the United States, the two prospective
balancing states that, physically separated from the Continent, may
79. For an optimistic assessment of h,ow the West can enhance Gorbachev's prospects of succeeding,
see Jack Snyder, "International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change," World Politics,
Vol. 42, No. 1 (October 1989), pp. 1-30.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Back to the Future | 55
thus conclude that they have little interest in what happens there. They
would then be abandoning their responsibilities and, more importantly, their
interests as off-shore balancers. Both states' failure to balance against Germany
before the two world wars made war more likely in each case. It is
essential for peace in Europe that they not repeat their past mistakes, but
instead remain actively involved in maintaining the balance of power in
Europe.
Specifically, both states must maintain military forces that can be deployed
to the Continent to balance against states that threaten to start a war. To do
this they must also socialize their publics to support a policy of continued
Continental commitment. Support for such a commitment will be more difficult
to mobilize than in the past, because its principal purpose would be to
preserve peace, rather than to prevent an imminent hegemony, and the latter
is a simpler goal to explain publicly. Moreover, it is the basic nature of states
to focus on maximizing relative power, not on bolstering stability, so this
prescription asks them to take on an unaccustomed task. Nevertheless, the
British and American stake in peace is real, especially since there is a sure
risk that a European war might involve large-scale use of nuclear weapons.
It should therefore be possible for both countries to lead their publics to
recognize this interest and support policies that protect it.80
The other measure concerns American attitudes and actions toward the
Soviet Union. The Soviets may eventually return to their past expansionism
and threaten to upset the status quo. If so, we are back to the Cold War; the
West should respond as quickly and efficiently as it did the first time. However,
if the Soviets adhere to status quo policies, Soviet power could play a
key role in balancing against Germany and in maintaining order in Eastern
Europe. It is important that, in those cases where the Soviets are acting in a
balancing capacity, the United States recognize this, cooperate with its former
adversary, and not let residual distrust from the Cold War interfere with the
balancing process.
Third, a concerted effort should be made to keep hyper-nationalism at bay,
especially in Eastern Europe. This powerful force has deep roots in Europe
and has contributed to the outbreak of past European conflicts. Nationalism
has been contained during the Cold War, but it is likely to reemerge once
80. Advancing this argument is Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World
Doesn't."
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
International Security 15:1 | 56
Soviet and American forces leave the heart of Europe.81 It will be a force for
trouble unless it is curbed. The teaching of honest national history is especially
important, since the teaching of false chauvinist history is the main
vehicle for spreading virulent nationalism. States that teach a dishonestly
self-exculpating or self-glorifying history should be publicly criticized and
sanctioned.82
On this count it is especially important that relations between Germany
and its neighbors be handled carefully. Many Germans rightly feel that
Germany has behaved very responsibly for 45 years, and has made an honest
effort to remember and make amends for an ugly period of its past. Therefore,
Germans quickly tire of lectures from foreigners demanding that they apologize
once again for crimes committed before most of the current German
population was born. On the other hand, peoples who have suffered at the
hands of the Germans cannot forget their enormous suffering, and inevitably
ask for repeated assurance that the past will not be repeated. This dialogue
has the potential to spiral into mutual recriminations that could spark a
renewed sense of persecution among Germans, and with it, a rebirth of
German-nationalism. It is therefore incumbent on all parties in this discourse
to proceed with understanding and respect for one another's feelings and
experience. Specifically, others should not ask today's Germans to apologize
for crimes they did not commit, but Germans must understand that others'
ceaseless demands for reassurance have a legitimate basis in history, and
should view these demands with patience and understanding.
None of these tasks will be easy to accomplish. In fact, I expect that the
bulk of my prescriptions will not be followed; most run contrary to powerful
strains of domestic American and European opinion, and to the basic nature
of state behavior. Moreover, even if they are followed, this will not guarantee
the peace in Europe. If the Cold War is truly behind us, the stability of the
past 45 years is not likely to be seen again in the coming decades.
81. On the evolution of nationalistic history-teaching in Europe see Kennedy, "The Decline of
Nationalistic History," and Dance, History the Betrayer.
82. My thinking on this matter has been influenced by conversations with Stephen Van Evera.
This content downloaded from
134.117.10.200 on Sun, 20 Sep 2020 03:35:14 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms