No peace no war: the Western
role in the Caucasian conflicts
Mgr. Zinaida Bechna, Ph.D.
IREn5019 No War, No Peace: Unresolved Conflicts
in the Caucasus
27.11.2024
The Caucasus
• All states are small,
• located in the same geopolitical space
• in all countries are unresolved regional conflicts,
• All were part of the Soviet Union during the same
period,
• are currently countries in transformation.
• -significant differences in the development of these
countries' attitudes towards the transatlantic
Alliance.
The Caucasus
• The Caucasus forms the hub of an evolving
geostrategic and geo-economic system
• projecting Western power and values along with
security into Central Asia and the Greater Middle
East.
• security assistance, state-consolidation efforts, and
promotion of energy projects.
• new-type security threats associated with
international terrorism, mass-destruction-weapons
proliferation, arms and drugs trafficking.
NATO and the Caucasus: History of
Mutual relations
• North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).
• Partnership for Peace
• first dividing line in the region:
• Tashkent agreement
• Organization of the Collective Security Treaty
2002.
Armenia
• 1994 - PfP
• 2002 - PARP
• In 2003 - the military exercise "Cooperative Best Effort".
• 2008 on the territory of Armenia was held exercises "Cooperative
Longbow" and the command staff exercises "Cooperative Lancer.
• Individual Partnership Plan (IPP) - exercises, peacekeeping missions,
various educational programs, logistical support, budget planning,
operational capabilities and increase public awareness.
• Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) was between NATO and Armenia
signed on 16 December 2005.
Azerbaijan
• Azerbaijan acceded to the Individual Partnership
Action Plan in May 2004.
• IPAP become a major tool for strengthening political
dialogue with NATO and implementing reforms
throughout the defense and security sector of
Azerbaijan.
• Since 2010 Third IPAP.
Azerbaijan
Georgia
• Between 1999-2003 the Georgian territory held
various educational programs, including Medceur-00,
Coop, Partner-01, Best Effort-02-02 Eternity,
Medceur/Rescuer-03, Medceur/Recuer-05 and
Eternity-05 .
• Involved in the fight against terrorism by the
Partnership Action Plan on Combating Terrorism
(PAP-T) and the Partnership Action Plan for Defence
Institution Building (PAP-DIP).
Georgia
Georgia
• Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) for
Georgia was adopted at the NATO summit in
Prague on the 21st November 2002.
• New York - 21st September 2006 - ID
• Summit in Bucharest - 2008.
NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC)
• First deepen political dialogue and cooperation
between NATO and Georgia,
• Second control the process, which was initiated at
the Summit in Bucharest
• 3rd coordinate assistance for the rehabilitation of the
Alliance of Georgia after the August events and
• 4th strengthen political and economic reforms in the
aspect of Euro-Atlantic integration
Russia-Georgian Armed Conflict
• After Georgia lost a bruising war with Russia
in 2008—shortly after its NATO membership
application was put on hold earlier that year—
Moscow carved out protectorates in legal
Georgian territory, rendering it technically
under occupation.
• “smart defense” doctrine
EU’s role in the South Caucasus
• In 90, the South Caucasus was a “distant neighbour for the EU.
• Mutual cooperation at this time was based on regional funding programs
within the Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent
States (TACIS), the EU Food Security Program and the European
Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), European Initiative for
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), as well as Transport Corridor
Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) and Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to
Europe (INOGATE). Despite all of these programs, EU considers the South
Caucasus the “region of the frozen conflicts.”
• 2003 – year when EU thinking towards the region began to change:
- appointment of Special Representative to the region
- inception of the Wider Europe Initiative
- prospect and process of EU enlargement towards the Central and Eastern
Europe.
EU – more powerful security actor – direct role in the regional conflict.
EU’s role in the South Caucasus
• EU – “silent disciplining” power
• To provide security – employing the
“stabilization/cooperation/partnership” formula.
• EU-as-a-framework – export models of
governance, law and policies to its periphery
or
EU-as-an-actor – exert its influence through
negotiation and creating incentives for the
peaceful resolutions of conflict.
EU’s role in the South Caucasus
2004/2007 enlargements – domino-effect on EU
policies towards the South Caucasus.
By 2003 – civilian and military crisis management
operations – Rapid Reaction Force, Civilian and
Military Headline Goals 2008 and 2010.
South Caucasus – test-case where the EU could prove
its credentials in civilian and military crisis
management.
EU’s role in the South Caucasus
• Long-term stability projection through intensified financial
assistance and the European Neighbourhood Policy (Action
Place), the Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership (March
2009).
• The ENP, BSS and EaP:
1. More enhanced relationship and contribute to the
transformation to EU models of governance.
2. Platforms of bilateral dialogue between the conflict parties
and the south region.
Eastern Partnership
• The first Eastern Partnership (EaP) summit in Prague on 7 May
2009
• leaders from the EU Member States, EU institutions and
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova
and Ukraine to launch this new framework of reinforced
bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
• deepening of political and economic relations,
• more energy security,
• increased mobility and
• pro-democratic and market oriented reforms in partner
countries.
Eastern Partnership
• The Eastern Partnership was proposed by the European Commission in December 2008.
• - Association Agreements (for those partners that have made sufficient progress towards democracy, the rule of law, respect
for human rights and principles of market economy, sustainable development and good governance);
• - better economic integration with the EU (with the objective of establishing deep and comprehensive Free Trade Areas), as
well as free trade among the partners themselves, with a longer term goal to develop a Neighbourhood Economic
Community;
• - increased mobility through visa facilitation and readmission agreements (with gradual steps towards full visa
liberalisation)
• - strengthened energy security cooperation, including through support to investment in infrastructure, better regulation,
energy efficiency and more efficient early warning systems to prevent disruption of supply;
• - improved administrative capacity of partner countries through jointly decided Comprehensive Institution-Building
Programmes, financed by the EU;
• - specific programmes addressing economic and social development in the partner countries, aimed at reducing disparities
of wealth between regions which can undermine stability; - additional financial support of € 350 million for the period till
2013, plus the redeployment of €250 million bringing the total for the implementation of the policy to €600 million.
EU’s role in the South Caucasus
After 2008: EU established a monitoring mission to Georgia and
launched an international fact-finding mission to investigate
the origins and the course of the conflict.
After the Russian-Georgian armed conflict, EU acquired a role of
a security actor by enhancing the Russian-Georgian six point
peace agreement, supporting territorial integrity of Georgia
and established the European Union Monitoring Mission
(EUMM), which remains the only international mission in
Georgia.
The EU is also engaged in the “Geneva discussions.”
Together with UN and OSCE, the EU is also hosting the peace
talks between Russia and Georgia in Geneva.
Vilnius summit 28-29 November
2013
• A signed Association
Agreement offers
Georgia the possibility
of closer economic
integration provided
Tbilisi adjusts its legal,
judicial, and economic
systems to fit certain EU
norms.
Vilnius summit 28-29 November
2013
• Azerbaijan continues to negotiate for its
own Association Agreement with the
bloc.
• The European Union and Azerbaijan
signed an agreement to facilitate the
procedures for issuing short-stay visas.
• “This will allow citizens from Azerbaijan
to travel more easily to the Schengen
area, as well as for EU citizens to travel
to Azerbaijan,” said Cecilia Malmström,
the European commissioner for Home
Affairs.
• “This is a very tangible result of the
Eastern Partnership and will further
promote interaction between citizens
of the EU and Azerbaijan.”
The EU’s Role and Strategic Shift
Deployed an unarmed civilian mission in Armenia in 2022 to
monitor the volatile border with Azerbaijan.
Enhanced dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan under the
leadership of European Council President Charles Michel​.
Growing focus on Azerbaijan due to energy resource
diversification, particularly gas supplies through the Southern
Gas Corridor (SGC).
EU aims to reduce reliance on Russian energy and strengthen
regional connectivity​.
13. 1. 2021
Challenges and Contradictions
• Contradictory Positions: The EU’s dual emphasis on Armenia’s right to
self-determination and Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity creates tensions in
its policy approach.
• Limitations in Mediation: Armenia has been cautious about EU
involvement, wary of alienating Russia, while Azerbaijan questions EU
neutrality.
• Lack of coordinated pressure on conflicting parties limits EU’s influence.
• Humanitarian and Regional Stability: The Lachin Corridor blockade
highlights ongoing issues with freedom of movement and access for
conflict-affected populations.
• Despite EU-backed judicial measures, practical resolutions remain elusive​.
13. 1. 2021
?
• What will happen to South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
since they are totally dependent on Russia for their
political, military, and economic survival?
• How can Tbilisi overcome the disadvantage of being
a small country with a small military with 20 percent
of its de jure territory garrisoned by its giant
neighbor to the north, Russia?
South Caucasus – “broken region”
• The contradictions between
Turkey and Armenia,
between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, and between
Georgia and Russia – entail
differing foreign-policy
orientation and different
systems of security.
Challenges of the Eastern
Partnership (EaP)
Dual Challenge Facing the EaP:
1. Unrealized Transformation: The envisioned reforms have largely failed,
while unintended conflict with Russia has intensified, deepening divisions in
the region.
2. Geopolitical Overshadowing: The EU's developmental agenda is
increasingly dominated by competition with Russia, for which the EaP was
not designed.
EU’s Strategic Shortcomings:
• Lack of tools to protect partners from Russian reprisals.
• Strength lies in transformation, but lacks coherent strategy and flexibility.
• Reactivity in times of crisis limits proactive engagement and strategic
foresight.
EU's EaP vs. Russia's Realist Power Politics
Russia's Perspective:
• Views the conflict as a zero-sum
game driven by power and
influence.
• Demands respect for its interests
in the post-Soviet space.
• Likely misinterpreted the EU's
communication on the EaP as a
sign of limited EU involvement in
the region.
EU's Perspective:
• The EaP prioritizes development
and liberal values over
geopolitical competition.
• Rejects traditional power
hierarchies and spheres of
influence, focusing on
cooperation for mutual benefits.
• Denies the legitimacy of Russian
interference or objections to the
EaP.
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Russia's Tactics and Asymmetrical
Conflict with the EU
Russia’s Tools for Influence:
• Short-Term Incentives: Reduced energy prices and loans for cooperative states.
• Short-Term Disincentives: Trade sanctions, restricted access for migrant workers,
domestic opposition sponsorship, and support for separatist regions and armed
insurgents.
• Soft Power Efforts: Effective propaganda campaigns targeting EU weaknesses.
EU vs. Russia: A Clash of Narratives
• Russia’s Stance: Dismisses EU values as a guise for geopolitical ambitions.
• EU’s Response: Rejects Russia’s objections as illegitimate interference.
Asymmetrical Conflict:
• Russia’s Strategy: Combines hard power (military, economic coercion) and soft
power (propaganda) to exploit EU vulnerabilities.
• EU’s Challenges: Distracted by internal crises (eurozone issues, refugee influx,
Brexit), limiting its response capacity.
Key Insight:
• Russia’s actions appear more reactive than strategic, leveraging immediate
opportunities rather than pursuing a cohesive long-term plan.
he Clash of Diffusions in Eastern
Partnership Countries
• Countries in the "in-between zones" of EU and Russian
influence are battlegrounds for the diffusion of political
norms.
• Unstable "competitive authoritarianism" in EaP nations
amplifies this clash.
• Domestic agency matters: Political actors use foreign
support to complement—not substitute—their agendas.
Examples of Diffusion Dynamics:
• Ukraine (2013): Yanukovych’s rejection of EU ties
spurred democratization via the Revolution of Dignity.
• Georgia (2023): Rapid EU candidate status approval
coincided with authoritarian backsliding, driven by local
elites.
The Fragmentation of the Liberal International Order (LIO)
• The Russian invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the
fragmentation of the LIO.
• Fragmentation includes challenges to universal norms, crises
in global governance, and the return of spheres of influence.
• EU security policies face shifts from crisis management to
territorial defense, exposing gaps in preparedness.
• Energy dependency on Russia underscores the EU’s limited
authority in energy security policy, further complicating the
foreign policy agenda.
13. 1. 2021
Mapping EU Responses to Fragmentation
• Actorness Challenges:Fragmentation has reduced preference cohesion
among EU member states, authority to act, and capabilities to respond.
• Shifts in defense priorities (from external crisis management to internal
territorial defense) expose limitations in strategic planning.
Worldviews Shaping Responses:
• Nationalists: Embrace fragmentation, advocating for sovereign decisionmaking
over EU alignment.
• Atlanticists: Mixed views depending on U.S. leadership, leaning toward
strengthened transatlantic ties or hedging strategies.
• Europeanists: Support strategic autonomy, envisioning the EU as an
independent global power.
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Mapping EU Responses to Fragmentation
• Strategic Autonomy Dimensions:
• Political: Decision-making independence.
• Operational: Capability to act.
• Industrial: Building defense systems within the EU.
Implications:
• Divergent worldviews lead to varied strategies within the EU,
complicating cohesive action.
• Strategic autonomy projects (e.g., joint defense initiatives)
remain unevenly developed.
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Conclusion
• The security deficit and fragile peace arraignment in the South
Caucasus underlines the need for internationalization of
conflict resolution efforts.
• Unfortunately, the role of the OSCE, NATO and UN has
considerably declined.
• The EU has a new momentum and can contribute to revival of
multilateral security engagements in this region: creation of
multidimensional and coherent approach may keep the
conflicts from escalating to “hot” wars.