No peace no war: the role of
Russian in the Caucasian
conflicts
IREn5019 No War, No Peace: Frozen Conflicts in the Caucasus
Mgr. Zinaida Bechná, Ph.D.
22 November 2023
Structure
Russian strategic interests: Russian grand strategy
Russian security interests
Russian policy instruments and tools
Russian policy towards the N-K, Georgian and
Chechen conflicts
The new Putin’s doctrine
Post imperium
Russian strategic interests
• Identify Russia’s strategic interests in the
region the crucial factors that shape Russian
policies.
• Russian policies are not designed to achieve
long-term stability in the Caucasus: controlled
instability seems to suit the Kremlin.
Debate on Russia’s Grand Strategy
After the collapse of the USSR there was
apparent identity crisis and ideological vacuum.
What happens after the demise of the Empire?
Russia‘s Grand Strategy I
• Westernisers - pessimistic about Russia’s use
of soft power in the post-Soviet region.
• The role of the Russia, as Western nation, has
to be the spread of western values and setting
standards of liberal democracy.
• To only effective way how to address its
regional problems is through multilateral
institutions and cooperation with the West.
Russia’s Grand Strategy II
• Stabilizers - soft power is significant for
achieving grand strategic goals of Russia. Key
objective is greater security and stability in
Russia’s periphery, which can be achieved
through economic modernization.
• The best way how to achieve grand strategic
goals are transforming Russia into a “nation-
civilization”.
Russia’s Grand Strategy III
• Imperialist - military forces are key element,
particularly in such conflict area as Caucasus is.
• The most effective way to achieve this objective is
through supplying arms to secessionist
territories, granting them status of independent
states, giving Russian passport to those who is
pro-Russian oriented and is willing of
reunification with Russia and applying economic
sanctions on politically “disloyal” states
Russia’s security interests – a sphere of
influence
• Russia’s threat assessment is different from other
powers.
• Threat is coming from all directions:
- the Caucasus, Central Asia, a dispute with Japan over
Kuril Islands, a war of words with Canada over drilling
right in the Arctic, deployments of US BMD systems in
Poland and Romania, US warships in Black and North
Seas and NATO further enlargement. Opinion that
Russia’s aggressive reaction in August 7-8 of 2008 was
caused by Georgia’s integration in NATO - is the wellknown
argument.
Russia’s security interests I
• The foreign policy guidelines in 1992 established that the
most important foreign policy tasks, requiring ‘the
coordinated and constant efforts of all state structures’,
included:
• regulating armed conflicts around Russia,
• preventing their spread into Russian territory,
• guaranteeing the observance of the Russians’ and Russianspeaking
populations’ rights.
• Accordingly, the conflicts in the Caucasus were viewed as a
security threat to Russia with a high level of spillover.
Russia’s security interests II
• The foreign policy guidelines issued by the Security Council in March 1993
reflected Russia’s position regarding its ‘near abroad’ even more clearly and
argued for an external CIS border over which the international community should
recognize Russia’s key role and rights.
• The rhetoric used by the Russian president and foreign and defense ministries
echoed the desire to view the post-Soviet space as a Russian sphere of influence
and called for a possible reintegration of the independent republics into a
structure where Russia would play its ‘historical role’.
• A post-imperialist strategy was designed, which implied the restoration of
Russian imperial power over the Baltic, Caucasus and Central Asia,
monopolization of the Caspian Sea, and allowing the new states a limited
sovereignty.
Russia’s security interests – a sphere of
influence I
• The ultimate result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union
for Russia was an identity crisis in political circles, and the
resulting inconsistency was manifest in the country’s foreign
policy.
• An unclear preference formation in Moscow’s foreign policy
more or less had two dimensions:
1. the Euro-Atlantic trend, which saw Russia’s future in Europe as
a member of Euro-Atlantic civilized nations,
2. the Eurasian trend, which was unwilling to recognize the
independence of former Soviet republics and expressed
antagonism towards the West, aspiring to restore Russian
post-imperial rule.
Russia’s security interests – a sphere of
influence II
• The Realpolitik of Russian leadership is rooted
in the belief, that the world is composed by
great powers – USA, China and Russia – and
their “spheres of influence.”
• characteristic feature of global politics is to
compete over these spaces.
Russia’s security interests – a sphere of
influence III
• “Civilization unity”
• Russian speaking world (Russkij Mir)
• Russian Federation was proclaimed “as the locus
of Russian national identity”
• Protection of “near abroad” and opposing the
NATO expansion
Russian interests in the I
• Russia’s doctrine is base o “controlling the
civilization role of the Russian nation in
Eurasia”, because “Russia is traditionally linked
with the former Soviet republics, and now
newly independent states, by history, the
Russian language and great culture, cannot
stay away from the common striving for
freedom”.
Russian interests in the Caucasus II
• The Caucasus represents a buffer zone between the
Russian North Caucasus and the Islamic world.
• Area in which Russia feels threated and there is a risk
of rise of other regional powers, such as Turkey.
• Gateway for Russian influence in the Middle East and
Central Asia
• Pipelines and energy resources.
Russian interests in the Caucasus III
• Russia’s post-imperial objectives:
• every republic of the former Soviet Union
should be in the CIS,
• military presence in these states should be
secured,
• the CIS external border with Iran and Turkey in
the south should be guarded by Russian
soldiers.
Russian strategy towards armed conflict in the
Caucasus
• All statements and official policy guidelines in the 90s stressed the threat of
possible conflicts in Russia’s vicinity and the need to regulate them.
• The Kremlin viewed the Caucasus as a single geopolitical region and also as a
security complex, that is a region of security interdependency.
• The spillover potential of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts, which were
occurring in Georgia and subsequently affecting the North Caucasus, and the
possibility of a Turkish engagement in the Mountainous Karabakh conflict raised
concern over Moscow’s great power status.
- creation of the of satellite states, to control the extraction and transportation of
energy resources, penetration economic influence, moderation of armed conflict
and keeping the region out of Western influence.
- keep Caspian pipelines under its control and overcome the diversification of
energy resources to Europe.
Russian policy instruments I
• Inconsistent during the first years of the Yeltsin period, so that one could not observe a single
Russia or Russian elite, but a number of/sometimes parallel, sometimes intersecting
entities.
• The Russian position was represented independently by the president (the state position),
the parliament and the military, each acting autonomously.
• There were a number of situations where it is not clear whether certain actions committed
on behalf of the Russian state were a part of the Russian state policy or purely private
actions.
• Example: the Russian state, represented by President Yeltsin and the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, from the onset of the conflict conveyed unilateral support to Georgia’s territorial
integrity and developed an interest in preventing the disintegration of Georgia as a state.
• This was conditioned by the concerns of the Yeltsin executive that Abkhazia’s and South
Ossetia’s secession from Georgia, and the success of separatism in the post-Soviet space,
would create a precedent and encourage separatism in Russian North Caucasus.
• The instability in South Ossetia and later in Abkhazia had a high level of spillover into
Adygeyya, Chechnya and North Ossetia, partly because of kinship between the ethnic
groups.
Russian policy instruments II
• A contrary policy to that of the Yeltsin executive was that of the Russian Duma, the
media and the Russian military bases stationed in Abkhazia, and the volunteers
from the North Caucasus.
• At least half of the fighters in South Ossetia and Abkhazia against Georgian forces
were volunteers from the North Caucasus.
• The volunteers were stimulated by a feeling of solidarity and compassion for
their ethnic kin in the South.
• The scale of Russian military assistance in the conflict within a short period of time
after the start of the conflict, the Abkhazian side managed to access 100,000
landmines and some heavy weapons, neither of which had existed in Abkhazia
before the outbreak of the conflict.
• What is not clear, though, is whether these Russian foreign policy in the South
Caucasus weapons were delivered unilaterally by the Russian military base in
Gudauta (in Abkhazia), or whether there was any commanded assistance from
Moscow.
Russian policy instruments III
• Furthermore, Gamsakhurdia’s anti-Russian stance and nationalistic rhetoric had already
reduced the Russian president’s willingness to pursue a pro- Georgian policy in the Abkhazia
conflict.
• The Abkhazian leader, Ardzinba, enjoyed good relations with Yeltsin’s opponents, namely the
Duma speaker Khasbulatov and a number of key government officials.
• That fact coupled with Abkhazia and South Ossetia receiving sympathy from North Caucasian
elites.
• Russian assistance to Georgia against South Ossetia would create a dilemma for the Kremlin,
as during the previous 200 years the Ossets had predominantly acted in support of the Russian
Empire in the North Caucasus.
• The conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia had become levers for the Kremlin to use to
coerce Georgia into entry to the CIS in 1993.
Russian policy instruments IV
• Tbilisi received support including limited military assistance
from Moscow in order to prevent the disintegration of the state
• Russian support sought a legal framework through the Treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation between Tbilisi and
Moscow, signed by the Russian president in Georgia in 1994.
• Although the treaty was not ratified by the Duma, it implied a
broad framework for Russian military, economic and political
support to Tbilisi, which would strengthen Georgia in relation
to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Russian tools
• Russia today is not the USSR of the cold war. It has no broad-based
military posture and no explicit aggressive strategic doctrine. But it
has nevertheless maintained a military presence in every
neighbourhood state since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991.
• Russian troops are often placed in areas blighted by secessionist
conflicts – allowing them to be branded as “peacekeepers”. The
presence of Russian troops limits the sovereignty of neighbourhood
states, both directly – by denying states full control over their
territory – and indirectly, by limiting their foreign policy options:
states with Russian military bases can hardly envisage joining NATO,
for example.
Russian Troops
Russian tools II
• Russia claims that it has a responsibility to ensure the
security of Russian citizens, ethnic Russians and even mere
Russian-speakers in its “near abroad”.
• But the war in Georgia led to allegations that Russia
deliberately handed out passports to foreign nationals in
order to create or bolster minorities it could then claim the
right to protect: there are estimated to be around 179,000
Russian passport holders in Georgia.
• There are almost 160,000 in Azerbaijan, and 114,500 in
Armenia. The existence of these “Russian minorities” in
neighbourhood states gives Russia a potential excuse for
involvement in conflict in any of these countries.
Russian tools III
• Trade embargoes as political tools. It has banned wine from
Georgia (since 2005) and Moldova (2005-07) when relations
have soured, as well as Moldovan, Ukrainian and Georgian
vegetables, meat and dairy products.
• The most comprehensive economic pressures were applied to
Georgia after Tbilisi arrested four Russian spies in September
2006. Russia introduced a transport and postal blockade,
closed Verkhnii Lars, the only land border crossing between
the two countries, and expelled several hundred Georgian
workers.
Russian tools IV
• This last act raised concerns across the neighbourhood over Moscow’s
willingness to use the millions of migrant workers in Russia as leverage.
• Neighbourhood states fear that if they antagonise the Kremlin, Russia
could introduce visa requirements, suspend money transfers or deport
large numbers of workers, placing already fragile economic and political
systems under huge strain.
• All the neighbourhood states are exposed to this risk. For example, in
Azerbaijan no less than 70% of the income of the country’s rural
population comes from remittances. There are nearly 2 million Azeri
migrants in Russia, compared to a total Azeri population of 8.4 million; if
Russia forced even a small proportion of these migrants to return home,
the social and political consequences for Azerbaijan could be devastating.
Russian objectives in the Southern flank
• 1) to join CSTO
• 2) to join the EEU (Eurasian Economic Union)
• 3) to establish Russian military bases
• 4) to protect Russian minorities and promote Russian
language and culture
• At minimum, prevent any country to join NATO, develop
trade relations and military cooperation.
Russian policies under the Putin
government
• Firstly, during the early years of his presidency, Putin managed
to centralize the power and decision-making mechanism of
the Kremlin, and limited the free will of the regional elites,
including those in the North Caucasus.
• Putin pressed hard to establish the strong hand of the Kremlin
over all structures of the state, filling civilian positions with
security staff (siloviki).
• Secondly, when Putin came to power, the Kremlin had no
option but to pursue a consistent policy for the South
Caucasus, as from 1994 the West, driven by its economic
interests (the USA and the EU), had started to penetrate the
region and compete for influence in that area.
Russian policy towards the Mountainous
Karabakh conflict I
• The conflict has become an important lever in Russian foreign policy towards the
region and it enables Russia to influence a large number of issues: military
presence, Turkey’s potential military and political intrusion, and the Caspian
energy development and pipeline routes.
• Russian policy at the start of the Karabakh conflict was inconsistent and had no
clear strategy:
• caused the departure of the Kremlin-loyal political elite in Azerbaijan, led by
Mutallibov, following Azerbaijani accusations of Russian military assistance during
the Khojaly massacre.
• The massacre of Azerbaijanis by Armenian forces in Khojaly was noted for its
particularly brutal treatment of civilians and caused an outrage in Baku, which led
to Mutallibov’s resignation and the instalment of an anti-Russian, pro-Turkish, proWestern
government under President Elcibey.
Russian policy towards the Mountainous
Karabakh conflict II
• Russian assistance to the Armenian side at the start of the conflict was as
much based on identity as on strategic interests: based upon religious
fraternity.
• After 1992 : instrumentalising the conflict.
• Assisting Armenia and the Karabakh Armenians in the conflict, Russia used
the conflict as a lever against Baku to impose conditions, which included
Azerbaijan’s entry to the CIS, deployment of military bases, guarding the
country’s borders with Turkey and Iran, and jointly using the resources of
the Caspian Sea.
Georgian-Russian relations I
• “Rose revolution” – Russian fear to loose its control over the
region.
• After 2008 Russian built trenches, fences and minefields
• Intergration of Abkhazia and South Ossetian into Russian
economic, political and security system.
• November 2014 “alliance and integration”, transfer of
responsibility for South Ossetia’s security to the RF. South
Ossetian armed forces – Russian army and security services
(FSB) as well as customs regime through EEU. Russian
regulation on education and health insurances. In sum,
Russian legislation in the SO.
Georgian-Russian relations II
• SO : no foreign policy or military doctrine.
• Leonid Tibilov for referendum joining Russia: not only for
security guarantees but hopes to subsidize the region.
• Russia needs SO as a method of destabilizing Georgia, but not
as a territory of the RF.
• Moscow promise to allocate 111$ million to Abkhazia in
2015 was not fulfilled – deterioration of relations.
• Abkhazia refused to ratify the strategic treaty singed in
November 2014.
• 50% of Georgian oil, natural gas and electricity sector owned
by Russian Inter RAO
Russian Chechen relations
a) the repeated attempt of Russia's military and political elite to solve the ethno-political conflict by force
justified by the fight with international terrorism was doomed to failure;
b) the war enables the resolution of strictly political goals of certain Russian power groups but fails to address
Chechnya's political status;
c) in reaching its aims, Russian authorities are ready to sacrifice not only the lives of Chechen people but also
the lives of their own citizens, not to mention the direct battle casualties;
d) the war does not facilitate the establishment of democratic institutes of power and the formation of a civil
community in Russia;
e) the conflict has devastating effects on the Chechen community because an entire generation has been
growing up under war circumstances. The radicalization of opinions is perceptible not only among
Chechens, but also among the insurgents. The process of fostering puppet groups that agree to anything
to secure their personal interests is closely associated with the formation of factions that do not believe in
peaceful settlement of the war and support only the use of power;
f) the war provokes and Russian authorities stimulate the escalation of nationalist and chauvinist tendencies.
The Chechen community is gradually being alienated from other communities. In the current Russia, this
alienation has become an everyday fact.
The New Putin Doctrine
The New Putin Doctrine II
• 1. Russia no longer views the West as
a credible partner. He believes that the West
dismissed his legitimate complaints against
U.S. unilateralism and double standards that
he articulated in his 2007 Munich speech.
Despite claims that the Cold War has ended,
the West continues to pursue a Cold War-like
containment policy against Russia, Putin says.
The New Putin Doctrine III
• 2. Russia no longer considers itself part
of European — much less Euro-Atlantic —
civilization. Russia is a democracy, but of a special
type. The country has rejected communist
and "pseudo-democratic" dogmas. If more than 90
percent of Russians support the annexation
of Crimea, it means the move had a strong backing
and legitimacy based on the fundamental democratic
principal of vox populi.
The New Putin Doctrine IV
• 3. International law is no longer a system of rules or
set of reference points. Putin argues
that international law has been reduced to a menu
of options from which every powerful state is free
to choose whatever suits its interests. To put down
the uprising in Chechnya, for example, Moscow cited
the international principle of upholding territorial
integrity. But in annexing Crimea, it cited
the fundamental right to self-determination.
The New Putin Doctrine V
• 4. The new Putin Doctrine applies to the entire
territory of the former Soviet Union. Putin justifies
the right to oversee this expanse by relying on a
vague notion of "Russia's historical heritage" and the
need to ensure the country's security in its rightful
sphere of influence. As it turns out, from now on the
sovereignty of the former Soviet republics will
depend on how the Kremlin views its strategic
interests. The only exceptions are the three former
Baltic republics, which are NATO members.
The New Putin Doctrine VI
• 5. The main Westphalian principle upholding state sovereignty
and territorial integrity now applies only to the strongest
countries that protect their borders with their own armies or
the armies of military blocs such as NATO or the Collective
Security Treaty Organization. The sovereignty and integrity
of weak and especially failed states becomes open game
for powerful states and their blocs. States now fall into two
categories: the big leagues, with security and other
guarantees for its members, and the little leagues, with far
fewer guarantees.
Post-imperium I
• Post-Soviet or post-imperial Russia did not experience a
rebirth as a nation-state, like for example democratic
Germany after the World War II or Kemalist Turkey. It did
not shrink into a small fragment, as a memento of past
imperial glory, like for example Deutsch-Oesterreich after
1918, which became the Republic of Austria.
• It created the Commonwealth of Independent States,
which has however nothing to do with commonwealth
except for the term itself. It has promoted a Russophobie in
light of Russkiy Mir, but it has not been supported by
attractive soft power components. Contrary to that,
Russia’s strategy was to use military power to protect its
natural sphere of influence.
Post-imperium II
• From Russian perspective the downfall of empire
is recognized, but Russia has to remain a great
power.
• The imperial élan has gone, however Russian
establishment defines their country as a “great
power”.
• Russia’s interests in former Soviet region are real,
but we can claim that privileged zone in that area
is a chimera.
Post-imperium III
• Adopting a new role after 500 years as an
empire, seventy years as an ideological warrior
and over forty year during the Cold War period
as a military superpower is not easy for Russia.
• Russian Federation today is in a position of postempire
rather than neo-empire.
• “No great power walks alone” and close allies,
satellite nations are significant part of a great
power’s armory.
?
• How effective is a support of ethnic conflict in
advancing Russian grand strategic interests?
• How effective is ethnic conflict as a tool for
Russia’s grand strategic interests in the
Caucasus region?
• Is destabilizing of the region the good way to
keep these states from NATO membership?