Definitions and trends of different types of internal
armed conflict
IREn5019 No War, No Peace: Unresolved Conflicts in the Caucasus
Mgr. Zinaida Bechna, Ph.D.
27. September 2023
Structure
□ Introduction
□ A taxonomy of conflict
□ Who fights?
□ Why do they fight?
□ Where do they fight?
□ Is the world getting more or less peaceful?
Introduction
International violence is becoming less problematic than it was during the last century — more intrastate conflicts, than interstate struggles.
From 1989 to 1996 there were 69 armed conflicts, of which only five have been between states.
Conflict trends
Conflict trends
140,000 120,000 w 100,000 1 80,000
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Minor conflict (25+) War (1,000+)
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Figure I: Number of battle deaths and conflicts, 1989-2020. Source: UCDP database (ucdp.uu.se)
Is the war declining?
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Trends in conflict
60
| Intrastate Conflicts
| Internationalized Intrastate Conflicts
Interstate Conflicts
Extrastate Conflicts
Figure 3.1 State-Based Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946-2006
Year
After more than a decade of unever decline, the number of state-basec conflicts being fought around the world has levelled off.
Data Sources: UCDP/PW; UCDP Human Security Report Project Dataset
Human Security Brief 2
Trends in conflict II
Trends in conflict
60
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■Colonial Wars     International conflicts   "Civil wars
Trends in conflict III
Is war declining?
• War is declining!
O The central role of the state
• Monopoly of violence
• Internal peace
• Reduced exposure to interstate war
O World Wars 1 and 2 sharply diverge from the trend
o Normann Angell (1911) The Great Illusion
Q Key reason
• Peace has become more profitable
• War has not become more lethal
IN HUMAN CIVILIZATI
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THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE
WHY VIOLENCf HAS DECLINED
Our better angels
• Identifies the same trend. O Explanations
• The Leviathan (again!)
• Trade and commerce (the profitability of peace again)
• Feminization: increases respect for interests and values of women
• Cosmopolitanism: makes it easier to identify with 'others'
• Rise of reason and rationality
O Fewer people are growing up in violent societies where they are taught that violence is acceptable, a way of life
A taxonomy of conflict
□
□
□
□
Who fights?
□ Governments Organizations
□ Individuals Why do they fight?
□ Politics? Economics? Insanity?
Where do they fight
□ Home or away? Consequences of conflict
How many were killed? What is the time frame?
The concept of conflict
This word is derived from the Latin "con-fligo" which means strife.
"Conflict is a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals".
Conflict is "a social situation in which minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at same moment in time an available set of scarce resources."
Conflict is a situation in which "actors use conflict behavior against each other to attain incompatible goals and/or express their hostility".
In general, conflict is understood in terms of aspirations of conflicting parties to achieve incompatible goals simultaneously.
The concept of conflict
What is "conflict behavior"?
• The definition suggests that conflict behavior is any behavior that helps the party to achieve its goal that is incompatible with that of the opponent or that expresses its hostility towards him.
• Rational action is based on careful deliberation, judgment and valuing a set of all relevant alternatives, assessing their outcomes correcdy, evaluation in accordance with own values and then choosing the action that was the best. Contrary to that, non-rational actions are quick, impulsive and driven by emotions.
The concept of conflict
□ Conflict action - conflict behavior.
□ If the actions of conflict party are guided by rational considerations, then we speak about conflict action. When we assume that they may be rational or non-rational, we use the term conflict "behavior."
The concept of conflict
"coercive" - "non-coercive" action/behavior:
• Coercive action forces the opponent side to what they do not wish to do, by threatening to inflict injury or by actually inflicting it.
• Distinguish between physical violence and symbolic injury
• Severe physical violence, can be violent, in sense of hurting or killing the opponents, or destroy their property. It could also have non-violent character, such as depriving opponents of resources they need. Symbolic injury, in the other hand, weakens the opponent by inducing fear, shame, or guilt.
Not all conflict actions involve coercion.
The concept of conflict
□ "Conflict behavior"
- an umbrella term that covers many diverse types of behavior. It can involve rational or non-rational conflict actions and expressions of hostilities and a range of behavior that is highly coercive as well as to behavior that is fully cooperative.
Low High
coer-_^ coer-
civeness civeness
"Pure" Promising Trying to Threat of Nonviolent Violent
coop- a reward persuade coercion coercion coercion eration
► 4
Noncoercive action Coercive action
Figure 2.1. Coerciveness of Conflict Action
The concept of Conflict
□ Goals are incompatible when the action of one party threatens the interests of another party.
□ The complexity of conflict depends whether tangible issues (like recognition, security, territory, money) are more significant than intangible aspects like symbolic meanings that shape values and ideologies, legitimizing a certain conflict behavior.
The concept of conflict
□ Donald Horowitz: "conflict is a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals" (Horowitz 1985: 95).
□ The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research defines conflict as "the clashing interests (political differences) on national values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organization) that are determined to pursue their interests and win their cases."
Towards conceptual clarity
□ Peter Wallensteen:
□ In order to understand and provide conflict analysis, we have to focus on three major components of the phenomenon:
□ l) actors,
□ 2) process (action), and
□ 3) incompatibility (issues at stake).
The concept of conflict
□ By combining these aspects, we arrive at a most comprehensive analysis of all possible kinds of conflict, which is a "social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources" (Wallensteen 2009: 15).
Typology according to actors
□
□
□
□
(1) Extrasystemic armed conflict, which takes place between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory. In the Correlates of War (COW) project, this category is further divided into colonial wars and imperial wars;
(2) interstate armed conflict, which occurs between two or more states;
(3) internal armed conflict, in which the government of a state is in conflict with internal opposition groups without intervention from another state; and
(4) internationalized internal armed conflict, when conflict occurs between the government of a state and internal groups in opposition to and with intervention from an outside state (Havard, Wilhelmsen, Gleditsch 2004: 11).
Typology according to actors
□ Civil war—affected states are states in which "it is almost the case that significant elements of actual or potential military power exist outside the control of the central state apparatus" (Giddens 1987).
□ Violence is a central feature of such a conflict and the only way to establish the authority of one or the other conflicting party. Under this condition a state uses its military power to suppress rebellions challenging its authority and legitimacy. As a result civil conflict is brutish and nasty, accompanied by killing, which is "to a great extent a matter of national pride" (Misra 2008: 45).
Typology according to actors
□ Emergence of new non-state actors
□ Trends that have increased a range of worldwide arms trades expanded the power of multinational corporations and the growth of trans-border exchange of weapons, drugs, and people, which in turn has contributed to the formation of coalitions that have acquired the capacity to form armies.
Typology according to actors
□ first, between states;
□ second, between a state and non-state actors outside of the state;
□ third, between a state and non-state actors within a state; and
□ fourth, between non-state actors taking place outside of the state.
A taxonomy of conflict
Interstate war
Figure: Interstate war
Goverment -^> Goverment
insurgents Insurgents Criminal organizations Criminal organizations
Non-violent Organization Non-violent Organization
Unorganized individuals Unorganized individuals
A taxonomy of conflict
Intrastate war
Figure: Intrastate war
Goverment Insurgents
Goverment Insurgents
Criminal organizations Criminal organizations
Non-violent Organization Non-violent Organization
Unorganized individuals Unorganized individuals
A taxonomy of conflict
One-sided violence war
Figure: One-sided violence
Goverment
Insurgents
Criminal organizations
Non-violent Organization
Unorganized individuals
Goverment
Insurgents
Criminal organizations
Non-violent Organization
Unorganized individuals
A taxonomy of conflict
Non-state conflict
Figure: Non-state conflict
Goverment Goverment
Insurgents -Insurgents
Criminal organizations Criminal organizations
Non-violent Organization Non-violent Organization
Unorganized individuals Unorganized individuals
A taxonomy of conflict
Criminal violence
Figure: Criminal violence
Goverment
Insurgents
Criminal organizations
Non-violent Organization
Unorganized individuals
Goverment
Insurgents
^> / Criminal organizations
Non-violent Organization
Unorganized individuals
V
Conflict typology by Process—Violence Intensity
□ The COSIMO (Conflict Simulation Model) conflict categorization belongs among the most prominent classifications; it has been developed by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), aiming to grasp armed conflict from nonviolent, latent conflict to violent war phases.
Conflict typology by Process—Violence Intensity
□ Dennis Sandole (1998):
□ Non-violent conflict is a manifestation of conflict processes during which one party seeks to undermine the goal-seeking capabilities of another conflicting party by non-violent means, as i.e. economic sanctions, exclusion of some groups from access to power, and so on.
Conflict typology by Process—Violence Intensity
According to The Uppsala Conflict Data Program:
Minor armed conflicts - conflicts with more than 25 deaths but fewer than 1000 for the year and for the duration of the conflict.
• Intermediate armed conflicts - conflicts with more than 25 deaths and fewer than 1000 for a year, but more than 1000 for the duration of the conflict.
• Wars - conflicts with more than 1000 battie-related deaths in one year.
Conflict typology by Process—Violence Intensity
□
□
□
Hedley Bull's definition, which has guided research within the field of IR, defines war as "organized violence carried on by political units against each other" (Bull 1977: 184).
Significant assumptions made by this definition elucidate the following aspects of war: first, it is fought by political organizations (not by any other collective actors, as for example economic corporations); second, war is organized violence with its own rules and norms; and third, war is collective, not individual (Vasquez 1993: 35).
As the most well-known definition by famous military theorist Carl von Clausewitz claims "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means" (Clausewitz 2008).
Conflict typology by Process—Violence Intensity
□ The concept of war has been based on two primary criteria: (1) a certain magnitude of battle related fatalities (initially including only soldiers and military staff) and (2) the status of the conflicting actors. According to these scholars, the threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths caused by sustainable organized armed forces differentiate war from other types of conflict (Singer, Small 1972: 8).
Conflict dynamics
□ Latent conflict,
□ Manifestation of the conflict,
□ Escalation,
□ Dead-point,
□ De-escalation,
□ Resolution and
□ Post conflict arrangement of relations (peace building).
Conflict dynamics
□ During the phase of latent conflict divergence of
interests are perceived, but the actors are unwilling or unable to clearly articulate the existence of conflict.
□ During the manifestation of the conflict at least one of the actors articulates its incompatible interests and intention to protect them at the expense of other party.
□ During the escalation of the conflict both conflict parties try to achieve their goals. This phase has four sub-phases: 1. Discussion, 2. Polarization, 3. Isolation and 4. Destruction.
Conflict dynamics
□ Dead-point is a situation when neither conflict party is able to end conflict in his favor.
□ De-escalation —decreasing the destructive power of conflict, a greater willingness to search compromise solutions.
□ Resolution and post conflict arrangement, peace building restore relation between the parties, the objective is to restore cooperation and peace.
ases of violent conflict
Phases of violent conflict
Sustained violent conflict
Outbreak of violence _ ,
Stalemate/
M mk de-escaiatiorvceasefire
Unstable peace/ M latent conflict m
ft   Return to unstable Stable peace peacalatent conflict
Durable peace
Settlement/resolution
DURATION OF CONFLICT
rozen conflict
Frozen conflict
□ Michal Smentana and Jan Ludvik: "a protracted, post-war conflict process, characterized by the absence of stable peace between the opposing sides".
□ Four criteria: "it must be (a) international and (b) protracted post-war, it must have (c) core unresolved issues, and it (d) lacks stable peace.
□ Under influence of internal and external factors, a frozen conflict undergoes a periodical "thawing" : toward diplomatic negotiations - "peaceful thawing" or re-escalation toward use of armed force - "violent thawing".
Frozen conflict
Conflict Transformation => Stable Peace
Thawing Peak
Conflict Thawing (Peaceful / Violent)
Competing goals: typology of issues at stake in armed conflicts
□ Academic research focuses on such aspects as religion, ideology, language, ethnicity, resources and markets, dominance, equality, and territory.
□ (1) ethnic conflict, (2) conflict over political arrangements, (3) ideological, (4) economic, and (5) territorial cross-border conflict.
Competing goals: typology of issues at stake in armed conflicts
□ Each conflict differs on a range of dimension and may include ethnicity, religion, political, economic, and territorial aspirations.
□ The question is how these dimensions interrelate in the whole process of conflict dynamics and how far each contributes to armed conflict?
A typology of Internal Armed Conflict
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Underlying and Proximate Causes
►   Main question: Do ethnic cleavages matter for a conflict, and how?
► Main point: Ethnic cleavages matter in combination with relative inequality between groups. Underlying causes
■ Necessary but not sufficient conditions for conflict.
■ Four types of factor:
structural; political;
economic and social; cultural and perceptual.
Can contribute to mobilisation of ethnic groups and impact on development of the conflict.
Underlying and Proximate Causes (2)
Proximate causes
Factors increasing likelihood of conflict where there are underlying conditions.
Internal and external factors at mass and elite level.
■ Internal elite-level: 'bad leaders'.
■ External elite-level: 'bad neighbours'.
■ Internal mass-level: 'serious domestic problems.'
■ External mass-level: 'bad neighbourhoods'.
■ Many situations of ethnic tension share similar underlying causes but not all lead to civil war because not all share significant proximate causes (Wolff 2006, chpt. 3).
Context
A very popular claim that ethnic cleavages generate internal armed conict Very popular in the 1990s (Bosnia, Rwanda etc.)
Robert D. Kaplan's vThe Coming Anarchy article, 1993 ► Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations'
Still extremely widespread (e.g right-wing immigration sceptics)
Main ideas:
a) Many conflicts are driven by "ancient hatreds' between groups !
b) ethnic cleavages generate inter-group antagonisms !
c) ethnic heterogeneity will lead to conflict! This lecture will show that these claims must either be:
Rejected, or (more likely)...
qualied: Ethnic cleavages matter in combination with political and
context
Concepts: Ethnic group
► What is ethnicity?
► What is an ethnic group?
► First, an ethnic group needs a common marker
Religion (i.e Alawites in Syria)
Language (i.e French-Quebequouis in Canada)
Common origin or nationality (i.e Indians in South Africa)
► Second, a group needs a common identity
The members of the group must actively identify themselves as members
Shared sense of belonging to that group
Often also common narratives relating to history etc.
Ethnic groups are \imagined communities" (e.g Benedict Anderson) (BUT, not epistemically subjective! Ethnic groups exist)
External attribution is often also mentioned (others must also identify the group as a group)
Concepts: Ethnic group
► What constitutes ethnic conflict?
► The definition most of the studies stick to:
► Internal conflict between a government and an organized interna challenger (Uppsala definition!) in which the challenger is defined (and defines itself) along ethnic lines.1
► Another common definition (from the MAR project)
► "Episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status'
Why ethnic conflict: ancient hatred and the security
► Why do groups fight? ("onset' of conflict)
► 1     Ancient hatreds (Kaplan)
Historical rivalries, Retribution and revenge Almost tautological!
► 2      Security dilemmas (Posen)
Since groups (where the state is weak or predatory) cannot be sure that other groups are benign, and vice versa. This leads to a security dilemma where groups attack each other pre-emptively (offense is the best defense)
Ancient hatreds
► Ethnic appeals may lead to violent escalation only if a group fears that its existence threatened: myths justifying ethnic hostility.
► What matters is the ability to evoke vertical escalation "our group is in danger" — ethnic fear.
► The next condition, is political opportunity. This consist of two elements,
\ first, there must be sufficient political space (weakening or state breakdown, or support from external power)
\ second, a territorial base (for successful mobilization, ethnic groups are either territorially concentrated in some region or they have a territorial base in neighboring country).
Ancient hatreds
► Ethnic conflict involves three dynamics: - mass hostility,
chauvinist political mobilization \a security dilemma.
The combination and interaction of those aspects creates the spiral of escalation, if the preconditions mentioned above are present.
Ancient hatreds
► Causal chain of ethnic conflict is following: Three preconditions are necessary
1. Ethnic group's interpretation of its history justifies hostility towards others and emphasizes the need to gain special status.
2. Fear of group extinction is strong at the time violence breaks out.
3. Ethnic group has a territorial base and the opportunity to mobilize.
Ancient hatreds
Mechanisms:
► Extreme hostility has a popular mass support. The probability of conflict increases with the ethnic group's relative demographic size.
► The ethnic group glorifies its history through a one sided interpretation of its own victories and blames losses on traitors or weak leaders. Nourishing calls for revenge contributed to creating organi2ational structures and culture of violence.
► Elites uses ethnic appeals, promoting fear and mass hostility and mobili2ation for conflict.
► A security dilemma arises, in which the hostile ax by the leadership on one side leads to the radicali2ation of the leadership on the other.
Ancient hatreds
► Ethnic symbolism — combines ancient hatreds, manipulative elites and rivalry.
► Without perceived conflicts of interest, people have no reason to mobilize.
► Without emotional commitment based on hostile feelings, they lack sufficient imputes to do so.
► Without leadership, they typically lack the organization to act.
Ethnic Security Dilemma
Security dilemmas as result of 'fear-producing environments5:
l. ii.
m.
iv.
v.
vi.
government breakdown;
geographical isolation or vulnerability of a minority within a larger group;
shifts in political power balance between groups;
changes in access to or control over economic resources;
forced or voluntary demobilisation of partisan armies;
changes in external patronage or balance of power between rival patrons.
Ethnic Security Dilemma (2)
Increased security of one group seen as coming at expense of insecurity of another; incentive for group to use force preemptively
How elites and masses respond to the ethnic security dilemma determines the outcome.
Physical security, political security, economic and social security, cultural security, and environmental security.
For leaders to mobilise followers to violence there must be 'credible evidence' of other groups' hostile intentions.
► State institutions
The Lijphart-Horowitz debate
Lijphart: Majoritarian "winner-take-all' institutions lead to ethnic conflict
Horowitz: Lijphartian power sharing institutions "reify' and harden ethnic cleavages, leading to more conflict
Note: Przeworski's argument about the fundamental un-democratic nature of power sharing Relative deprivation (Gurr)
► "Why Men Rebel'
Frustrations relating to relative deprivation generate conflict
Relative deprivation: a discrepancy between vthe goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled' and the "goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them'.
► This is the most developed theoretical framework
Opportunity theory
Opposing framework: Opportunity
theory ("ethnic-grievance skepticism')
Tilly (and Skocpol): Grievances are ubiquitous : what is needed is a minimum level of resources and organization
► Ethnic (and other) antagonisms are endemic, opportunities for conflict are not
► Ethnic grievances not important
► Focus on economic opportunities for conflict (eg Collier and Hoeer 2004) or feasibility (e.g Fearon and Laitin 2003)
The Economic Debate: Greed vs. Grievance
Recent body of work developed argument about ethnic and other civil conflicts being the result of economic 'greed'.
Largely developed by economists working for bodies like the World Bank.
Most well known are Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1998 and 2000), arguing that ethnic conflict happens if the incentive for rebellion is sufficiently large relative to its costs and that contemporary civil wars are largely motivated by economic greed rather than by political grievances.
Three „ waves" of research
1. The skeptics:
Seminal studies (on armed conflict) are Collier and Hoeer (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) Country-level studies, looking at civil conflict
Using Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) as a measure of country-level ethnic heterogeneity General finding: Ethnic heterogeneity does not increase risk of civil war.
2. The horizontal-inequality wave:
Ostby (2008), and Cederman and colleagues
Finds that substantive inequalities (political and economic) between groups lead to more conflict Most research here is at the group level, using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset.
3. Micro-research
► For example the contributions of Lyall
► Less interested in whether ethnic grievances matter, and more in how they matter
A prominent representative of grievance-skepticism": Professor Paul Collier
Empirical Research: The skeptics
► The skeptics
► Use the ELF (ethnolinguistic fractionali2ation), which measures the: "probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country are from different ethnolinguistic groups' (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, p.78)
► FL and CH find no statistically signicant effects of ELF on civil war
► But, CH find an effect of "Ethnic dominance' (i.e one group being in a majority)
► Some studies using alternative fractionali2ation measures are less skeptical (e.g Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005)
► The "take home point' in the wake of FL and CH is that ethnic cleavages matter less than what is commonly believed
New York Times coverage of Fearon and Lai tin
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The commonplace assumption that a more homogeneous society is a more peaceful society certainly sounds reasonable. Surely monoethnic Japan should have an easier time maintaining domestic order than Indonesia; or Slovenia than Macedonia. After all, in a country with numerous ethnic or religious groups, politicians are easily tempted to organize factions along group lines — which can lead to rising tensions and even civil war or the collapse of the state. In 1938, Benito Mussolini warned. "If Czechoslovakia finds herself today in what might be called a 'delicate situation.' it is because she was not just Czechoslovakia, but Czech-Germano-Polono-Magyaro-Rutheno-Rumano-Slovakia.'
Today, as Iraq spirals toward outright warfare between Sunnis and Shiites, it risks joining a lengthening list of countries that have seemingly inevitably been ripped apart by bitter sectarian hatreds: Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sudan and not least Lebanon, which experienced civil wars in i860 and 1958 and from 1975 to 1990 and may face yet another one.
But what if this whole premise is wrong? Odd as it may seem, there is a growing body of work that suggests that multiethnic countries are actually no more prone to civil war than other countries. In a sweeping 2003 study, the Stanford civil war experts James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin came to a startling finding: L;it appears not to be true that a greater degree of ethnic or religious diversity- — or indeed any particular cultural demography — by itself makes a country more prone to civil war."
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Empirical research: The horizontal inequality wave
Inequality, Grievances,
and Civil War    Lars-Erik Cederman
Kristian Skrede Gleditsch Halvard Buhaug
► The horizontal inequality wave
► Argues against looking at ELF at the country-level
► Not enough to count number of ethnic groups!
► We should look at substantive (economic and political) inequalities between groups
► Note: two crucial recent papers:
► Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010: vWhy Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?'
► Cederman, Weidmann, Gleditsch 2011: "Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-Nationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison'
Empirical research: The horizontal inequality wave
Why do Ethnic Groups Rebel?
Core question: Does political exclusion/inclusion increase the risk of ethnic conflict
Introduces the EPR (Ethnic Power Relations dataset) Codes all "politically relevant' ethnic groups in the world, 1946-2005. Rely on theories of relative deprivation The "polity model':
A government versus several contenders Excluded versus included groups
Empirical research: Why do Ethnic groups Rebel?
State
Polity
Included Group 1
Excluded Group 1
Government
Excluded Group 2
Included Group 3
Included Group 2
Excluded Group 4
Excluded Group 3
Figure 1
The Polity Model with Included and Excluded Ethnic Groups
Why do ethnic groups rebel
► Independent variables:
► Political exclusion (not being included in government or regional autonomy)
► Political "downgrading'
► Dependent variable:
► Ethnic Armed Conflict onset: UCDP internal conflicts, where challenger \pursued ethnonationalist aim"
Why do ethnic group rebel
► Cederman and colleagues show that politically excluded groups are more prone to conflict
► And that groups who lose power are also more likely to rebel
► Discussion:
► The "politically relevant ethnic group' criterion
► The dependent "ethnic conflict' variable
► Coding "power status'
► The endogeneity of inclusion/exclusion (this is affected by nocflict-potential!)
Why do ethnic group rebel
► Core question: Does economic inequality between groups lead to conflict?
► They look at horizontal inequality (overlapping cleavages in Rokkan's terminology)
► Test a "grievance' argument: Relative inequality between groups lead to conflict
How do they measure group-level wealth? Use GIS
Combine information about where groups reside, with geographical estimates of local economic activity
Dependent variable: Ethnic Armed conflict between a group and the state
Independent variables:
The ration between the GDPpc of the given group from the average GDPpc in the country
One variable measuring this ratio when it is lower than the average
Another capturing this variable when it is higher
► Cederman and colleagues find that groups that are poorer or richer than country average are more prone to rebel
► Discussion:
► This shows strong support for "grievance explanations'
► Potential measurement problems? Causal mechanisms
Empirical research: Micro-studies
► In addition to country- or group-level studies, there has also been a surge of micro-studies
► These look at mechanisms, and ask how ethnicity matters, not just whether it matters at the macro level
► Research questions in micro-literature:
► Where does ethnic violence occur?
Mobilization/coordination within ethnic groups Ethnic collaboration/defection
► Two examples:
Lyall 2010, Are Coethnics More Eective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War.'
See also: Weidmann 2011, vViolence vfrom above' or vfrom below'? The Role of Ethnicity in Bosnia's Civil War.'
Empirical research: Micro-studies, Lyall 2010
► Lyall, 2010
Core question: Are ethnic insurgents more
actively fought by members of the same ethnic group
► Case: The Russian war in Checnya, 2000-2005
► Points:
► Finds that Pro-Russian Chechens are better at conducting "sweep' operations in insurgent villages in Chechnya (2000-5).
► Argues that members of same ethnic groups have information advantage when it comes to identifying insurgents.
Empirical research: Micro-studies, Lyall 2010
Why should co-ethnics be more effective counterinsurgents? Lyall suggests a number of mechanisms:
1 Because Chechens are more likely to cooperate with co-ethnics?
Unlikely, since these are seen as traitors
2 Chechen tactics more effective?
Chechen units for example use kidnapping more often But, problematic since these tactics have no effect in the data
3 Being of the same ethnicity as the insurgents reduces uncertainty
Co-ethnics can access existing social networks more easily, to obtain information Co-ethnics can identify who they are looking for more easily
4 vTo catch a thief mechanism: Prior rebel experience
Pro-Russian Chechens more likely to have previously been insurgents They know the insurgents better
A comparison of defector versus non-defector units speaks against this mechanism
Summary: Where are we now?
Summary: What do we know about ethnic cleavages and conflict?
Ethnic heterogeneity might not matter much in itself
Ethnic cleavages matter in combination with horizontal inequalities
Groups that are somehow aggrieved are more likely to rebel
This supports the ^grievance explanation" for conflict
Denny and Walter present arguments for why cleavages that are ethnic are so potent
►        The emerging micro-literature can tell us more about mechanisms
Ethnic Conflict & the End of the Cold War (2)
□ Presumption that ethnic conflicts sprang up after the Cold War because the 'lid' on 'ancient rivalries' was taken off (Brown 1993).
□ 'Pressure-cooker' theory of ethnic conflict has primordialist underpinnings.
□ Many reject this explanation (see Brown 1993; Harff and Gurr 2004; Bowen 1996).
Ethnic Conflict & the End of the Cold War (2)
D    End of the Cold War and collapse of communism were significant but this is simplistic as a complete explanation. Three objections:
ignores numerous violent ethnic conflicts that went on during the Cold War (see Eriksson, Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2003);
ii. doesn't explain why conflicts broke out in some places but not in others;
iii. doesn't explain why intensity of violence is stronger in some ethnic conflicts than in others.
What next?
► We know more about correlations, less about causality
► Huge endogeneity problems, almost never dealt with
► Ethnic groups are treated as "black boxes'
► Ethnicity treated as "static'
► More work needed to establish mechanisms
► We know little about what drives horizontal inequality
Conflict over political arrangements
□ The long-term political relationship becomes increasingly conflictive and hostile when
□ (1) political change is used as a tool to mobilize masses,
□ (2) there are conflicting visions about the political arrangement of a state, and
□ (3) incompatibility of goals rests upon a change of political regime.
Ideological confrontation
□ Religion can tur into armed confrontation if
□ (1) the religious make-up of a state involves different religious groups,
□ (2) there are conflict-prone religious structures, and
□ (3) religion is a politicized issue and serves as a tool in the hands of political leaders.
Economic conflict
□ Economic aspects of conflict are operationalized as follows: (1) economic decline and inequality in the economic development of different regions,
□ (2) the shadow economy (smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal trade activities), and
□ (3) interest to control key economic resources.
Territorial conflict
□  If redentism is not a state-based process; it is a movement that seeks to attain the external support and territory of the group across the existing border. The goal of this group is to add territory and population into an existing state by reason of common affinities, such as ethnic, cultural, historical, or linguistic ties (Wolff 2007).
□  Secession, which is a process at the end of which a population group
inhabiting a defined territory within an existing state has succeeded in splittin itself and its territory off from a titular state. As a result it has established an independent state of its own (Wolff 2004). Secession is a process of political divorce and the formation of at least one new sovereign unit through a formal declaration of independence.
Challenges in conflict research
□ It is critically significant to think about the dialog between the conceptual and operational level of our analysis.
□ The problem remains how to assess the causal impact of one factor in relation to others. One of the possible ways for establishing the relation between operationalization and measurement lies in the case-oriented view
□ The challenge for further research is to explore not only the combination of issues at stake in armed conflict, but also the correlation and causal relationships among these aspects.
Conflict research
□ Study of each conflict requires the research of:
□ 1. Background of the conflict (history of mutual relations),
□ 2. Type of actors,
□ 3. Character and nature of involved parties,
□ 4. Reasons of conflict and
□ 5. Context (the role of external actor).
Useful Sources in Conflict Research
News databases
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (www.monitor .bbc.co.uk) □Factiva (www, factiva.com) □Open Source Center (www, opens our c e. g ov)
Keesing's Record of World Event (www.keesings.com) □LexisNexis (academic.lexisnexis.com) Reports issues by specialized NGOs and IGOs □Global Witness (www.globalwitness.org) □Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org) □International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org) □Integrated Regional Information Network (www.irinnews.org) □
Useful Sources in Conflict Research
Surveys
Afrobarometer (www, afrobarometer. org)
Households in Conflict Network — HiCV (www.hinc.org) □World Values Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org) General country information
□World Development Indicators (data.worldbank.org) UN Data (data.un.org)
The Quality of Government Institute, Goteborg University (www.qog.pol.gu.se) □Gapminder (www.gapminder. org) Conflict data programs
□Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland (www.cidcm.umd.edu)
□Correlated of War (www, c or relate s o fwar. org) □Uppsala Conflict Data Program (www.ucdp.uu.se)
Literature:
□ Bartoš, O. J., Wehr, P. (2002): Using Conflict Theory, Cambridge University Press.
□ Tesar, F. (2007): Etnické konflikty, Praha, Portal.
V V
□ Waisová, Šárka (2005): Řešení konfliktů v mezinárodních vztazích. Praha: Portál.
□ Wallensteen, P. (2007): Understanding Conflict Resolution, War, Peace and Global System, SAGE, London.
□ Wolff, S. (2006): Ethnic Conflict A Global Perspective, Oxford University Press.