

Cuban Missile Crisis

Housekeeping

- Tomorrow: 16:00. U43
- Reflections: Thank you
 - Reflections on Reflections

The Decision to Confront

Decisionmaking

Structures

Bureaucracies

Politics

The Soviet Decision

The US Decision

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DECISION MAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY:

Rational Actor

1. Cost-Benefit Analysis

1. State as unitary

3. Good information

How do you explain interests/actions:

Deduce from international position

The Benefits: Good starting point

The Drawbacks: It is usually wrong

DECISION MAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY:

Identities and Interests

Realism: Rational Actor Emphasizes Power, Wealth

Constructivists: Identity

Constructivism says international system a social construction,

Created as a result of actions and expectations

”National Interests,” State interests not result of structure, but
result of national identity, story that people tell about themselves
about country

Germany and Japan after World War II

DECISION MAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY:

Cognitive Issues

Crisis situations usually done by individuals

Individuals: Cognitive Schemas

1. Frameworks about how the world works: what's important, what things are and who people are, how things interact, what causes what, etc.

The opposition is aggressive; understands only strength

2. Fit new information into old ideas: only when doesn't work is there a problem

Ideology: Cognitive Schemas embedded in society, institutions

Society excludes alternatives

Aversion to Loss: Both domestic and foreign, but probably domestic is more important

DECISION-MAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY:

Structural Issues: States are not unitary actors

Domestic Politics:

- Two-Level Game

- Domestic Groups have different interests

Organizational Issues

- Problems of coordination—Status quo, routines

- Different organizations in government have different tasks

 - Different problems, different expertise, different procedures

 - Look at same problem differently

 - Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce

Power of Bureaucracies: Information, Implementation, Networks

How does state identity get embedded in institutions?

- State as an organization
 - Identity as domestic legitimation
- Organizations created to perform particular tasks
 - These organizations, tasks, must be justified in terms of identity and interests
 - These institutions have staying power
 - Individual actors invested in the tasks of these institutions
 - New recruits, those who are promoted should accept tasks of those institutions
 - Those who populate institutions will defend ideas that justify them
 - But may define identity in different ways:
 - Educators may define US identity different from military

Soviet Union: Nikita Khrushchev's Domestic Situation

- Nikita Khrushchev: First Secretary of the CPSU, Premier
- Key Decision Making Body: The Presidium (Politburo) of the CPSU
 - Elected by Central Committee of CPSU
 - Decisions based on consensus, maybe majority
- On rare occasions, when Presidium can't decide,
Central Committee decides between factions
Military also has influence
- Khrushchev has strong position in Presidium in 1962
All dependent on Khrushchev except Mikoyan, and he is loyal
But continued authority depends on ability to provide goods as defined by
Soviet system

Khrushchev's Policy Strategy

KHRUSHCHEV'S CORE BELIEFS

The superiority of the Soviet system—his own rise

The importance of economic development

The horrors of war

Self-confidence, laced with sense of inferiority

DOMESTIC POLICY

Rapid economic growth: Overtake US in 1970

Construct Communism by 1980

How? Chemical Industries, Agricultural innovations

Save Money on defense

IDEOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS: Leading Role of Party Requires

Notion of surrounded by enemies

Guarantee of defeating enemies and creating

future communist system

The Nuclear Dilemma

Khrushchev's Strategy

The Problem of Nuclear Weapons

Khrushchev: Enemies would like to attack, but not crazy

Growing power of Soviet Union forces, esp. nuclear weapons, deter all but most crazy

Once war made unlikely, competition goes to other arenas where progressives can win

Economy

People's Revolutions, primarily in the decolonized countries

Objectives: Strong nuclear force

Strong economy

Recognition of USSR as equal: recognition of sphere of influence in Europe

Success of National liberation movements: Argument in 1959 to Castro that US would refrain in order to improve relations

Strategy: Build up nuclear weapons, conventional weapons less important

Pretend the Soviets have more weapons than they have

Force crises on Berlin

Shift money from conventional weapons to economy

National liberation: Once war excluded, people can win by selves

Khrushchev's Situation in 1962

Soviet Economy: Not doing very well, partly because of Khrushchev's actions; so wants to save face

Recognition of Soviet status in Soviet bloc: Essentially unchanged

Nuclear weapons: Khrushchev's Blustering gets Kennedy to build, so the Soviet Union is very far behind

Also, NATO missiles in Turkey, Italy

Military angry because of unilateral cuts

Threat to Cuba becomes greater, war games in Spring, 1962

The Decision

Kh. Knows there are risks to placing missiles in Cuba

Kh. Faces serious issues at home and abroad around foreign, domestic policy

Negotiations with the United States would require concessions, and that would be impossible for domestic reasons

Grasps at Cuban missiles to solve them all

The United States Decision:

Why does Kennedy react so strongly?

The US International Situation

Military Balance

US has great strategic superiority, but could be hit by a few nuclear weapons

US has great conventional superiority in Caribbean

US conventional inferiority in Berlin

Increased national liberation movements, particularly in Vietnam

Kennedy's Domestic Situation

Great deal of institutional power in foreign policy

Less power in domestic politics: Needs Congressional Support

Bureaucracy, too, has to persuade

Military particularly important

Ideological Constraints:

US is a city on a hill

Cannot appease totalitarian governments

Truman Doctrine against "losing" countries to communism

Domino Theory

The particular importance of Cuba

Kennedy: Lots of questions about authority

Barely wins election

Bay of Pigs

Vienna Summit

Congressional Election in November, 1962

Why does Kennedy react so strongly?

Constrained by ideology

Kennedy's traditional focus on virility and strength

Fear of impact on domestic influence

Particularly he has made a speech saying he would not accept "offensive" weapons

He was angry: Soviets had used backchannel, had been promised nothing was there, and nothing would happen, and he had reduced surveillance as a result

The Question

- To what extent do you think Khrushchev or Kennedy's decisions leading to the crisis were a product of domestic politics, and to what extent do you think they were a response to international pressures?
- RESPONSE:
 - Answer the question
 - Tell me why you think that way

Elements of Argument

- Statement of question
- Background on significance of question
- Discussion of existing conversation around this question (*)
- Statement of argument
- Discussion of definitions of key concepts and key assumptions that inform your argument
- Statement of how these concepts interact
- Evidence
- Why your argument better than others(*)
- Conclusion

(*). Not necessary for the paper in this class.

Creating an argument:

- While some conflict between the USSR and the USA after WWII was probably inevitable, the conflict was made much worse by the ideological differences between the two.