Cuban Missile Crisis Housekeeping •Tomorrow: 16:00. U43 •Reflections: Thank you •Reflections on Reflections • • The Decision to Confront • Decisionmaking • Structures • Bureaucracies • Politics • The Soviet Decision • The US Decision •\ DECISION MAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: Rational Actor • 1. Cost-Benefit Analysis • 1. State as unitary • 3. Good information •How do you explain interests/actions: • Deduce from international position •The Benefits: Good starting point •The Drawbacks: It is usually wrong • • • DECISION MAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: Identities and Interests •Realism: Rational Actor Emphasizes Power, Wealth •Constructivists: Identity • Constructivism says international system a social construction, • Created as a result of actions and expectations •”National Interests,” State interests not result of structure, but •result of national identity, story that people tell about themselves about country • Germany and Japan after World War II • • DECISION MAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: Cognitive Issues •Crisis situations usually done by individuals • Individuals: Cognitive Schemas • 1. Frameworks about how the world works: what’s important, what things • are and who people are, how things interact, what causes what, etc. •The opposition is aggressive; understands only strength • 2. Fit new information into old ideas: only when doesn’t work is there a problem • Ideology: Cognitive Schemas embedded in society, institutions • Society excludes alternatives • • Aversion to Loss: Both domestic and foreign, but probably • domestic is more important • DECISION-MAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: Structural Issues: States are not unitary actors •Domestic Politics: • Two-Level Game • Domestic Groups have different interests •Organizational Issues • Problems of coordination—Status quo, routines • Different organizations in government have different tasks • Different problems, different expertise, different procedures • Look at same problem differently • Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce •Power of Bureaucracies: Information, Implementation, Networks • • How does state identity get embedded in institutions? •State as an organization •Identity as domestic legitimation •Organizations created to perform particular tasks •These organizations, tasks, must be justified in terms of identity and interests •These institutions have staying power •Individual actors invested in the tasks of these institutions •New recruits, those who are promoted should accept tasks of those institutions •Those who populate institutions will defend ideas that justify them •But may define identity in different ways: •Educators may define US identity different from military • • • • Soviet Union: Nikita Khrushchev’s Domestic Situation •Nikita Khrushchev: First Secretary of the CPSU, Premier •Key Decision Making Body: The Presidium (Politburo) of the CPSU •Elected by Central Committee of CPSU •Decisions based on consensus, maybe majority •On rare occasions, when Presidium can’t decide, •Central Committee decides between factions •Military also has influence •Khrushchev has strong position in Presidium in 1962 •All dependent on Khrushchev except Mikoyan, and he is loyal •But continued authority depends on ability to provide goods as defined by Soviet system • • Khrushchev’s Policy Strategy •KHRUSHCHEV’S CORE BELIEFS • The superiority of the Soviet system—his own rise • The importance of economic development • The horrors of war • Self-confidence, laced with sense of inferiority •DOMESTIC POLICY • Rapid economic growth: Overtake US in 1970 • Construct Communism by 1980 •How? Chemical Industries, Agricultural innovations • Save Money on defense •IDEOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS: Leading Role of Party Requires • Notion of surrounded by enemies • Guarantee of defeating enemies and creating • future communist system • The Nuclear Dilemma Khrushchev’s Strategy The Problem of Nuclear Weapons Khrushchev: Enemies would like to attack, but not crazy Growing power of Soviet Union forces, esp. nuclear weapons, deter all but most crazy Once war made unlikely, competition goes to other arenas where progressives can win Economy People’s Revolutions, primarily in the decolonized countries Objectives: Strong nuclear force Strong economy Recognition of USSR as equal: recognition of sphere of influence in Europe Success of National liberation movements: Argument in 1959 to Castro that US would refrain in order to improve relations Strategy: Build up nuclear weapons, conventional weapons less important Pretend the Soviets have more weapons than they have Force crises on Berlin Shift money from conventional weapons to economy National liberation: Once war excluded, people can win by selves Khrushchev’s Situation in 1962 •Soviet Economy: Not doing very well, partly because of Khrushchev’s • actions; so wants to save face •Recognition of Soviet status in Soviet bloc: Essentially unchanged •Nuclear weapons: Khrushchev’s Blustering gets Kennedy to build, so the Soviet Union is very far behind • Also, NATO missiles in Turkey, Italy •Military angry because of unilateral cuts •Threat to Cuba becomes greater, war games in Spring, 1962 The Decision •Kh. Knows there are risks to placing missiles in Cuba •Kh. Faces serious issues at home and abroad around foreign, domestic policy •Negotiations with the United States would require concessions, and • that would be impossible for domestic reasons •Grasps at Cuban missiles to solve them all • • The United States Decision: •Why does Kennedy react so strongly? The US International Situation •Military Balance • US has great strategic superiority, but could be hit by a few nuclear weapons • US has great conventional superiority in Caribbean • US conventional inferiority in Berlin • Increased national liberation movements, particularly in Vietnam Kennedy’s Domestic Situation •Great deal of institutional power in foreign policy •Less power in domestic politics: Needs Congressional Support • Bureaucracy, too, has to persuade • Military particularly important •Ideological Constraints: • US is a city on a hill • Cannot appease totalitarian governments • Truman Doctrine against “losing” countries to communism • Domino Theory • The particular importance of Cuba •Kennedy: Lots of questions about authority • Barely wins election • Bay of Pigs • Vienna Summit •Congressional Election in November, 1962 • • Why does Kennedy react so strongly? •Constrained by ideology •Kennedy’s traditional focus on virility and strength •Fear of impact on domestic influence • Particularly he has made a speech saying he would not accept “offensive” weapons • • He was angry: Soviets had used backchannel, had been promised nothing was there, and nothing would happen, and he had reduced surveillance as a result • • The Question •To what extent do you think Khrushchev or Kennedy's decisions leading to the crisis were a product of domestic politics, and to what extent do you think they were a response to international pressures? • •RESPONSE: •Answer the question •Tell my why you think that way Elements of Argument •Statement of question •Background on significance of question •Discussion of existing conversation around this question (*) •Statement of argument •Discussion of definitions of key concepts and key assumptions that inform your argument •Statement of how these concepts interact •Evidence •Why your argument better than others(*) •Conclusion • (*). Not necessary for the paper in this class. Creating an argument: •While some conflict between the USSR and the USA after WWII was probably inevitable, the conflict was made much worse by the ideological differences between the two.