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Jordan

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ANALYSTS OFTEN DESCRIBE THE historical relationship between Jordan's Hashemite monarchy and the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood as "symbiotic" and, compared to elsewhere in the Arab world, relatively non-confrontational.[1] The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has never been driven underground; its leaders were never systematically jailed. Its organizations survived the banning of political parties under martial law in 1957, after which the movement operated openly as a registered charitable society and, in 1992, formed a political party. The Brotherhood was allowed, even encouraged, to expand throughout the kingdom when it offered an alternative to pan-Arab and leftist movements that the monarchy considered a greater threat than political Islam. In return, the Brotherhood never challenged the legitimacy of the Hashemite regime, including during the 1970–1971 Jordanian Civil War and after the controversial Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty of 1994. The consistency of this relationship distinguishes the Jordanian Brotherhood from its sister movements elsewhere, where periods of regime persecution and suppression impacted Islamists' organization, leadership, strategy, and "habits of thought and behavior."[2] The "twin shocks" of the fall of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt and the rise of the Islamic State in neighboring Iraq and Syria have not fundamentally changed this relationship.

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has a broad conception of reform and seeks to gradually "reestablish the Islamic way of life" in the kingdom.[3] It enthusiastically participated in elections when parliamentary life in Jordan resumed in 1989. Since the 1993 elections, the relationship between the regime and the Brotherhood can be characterized by a repeated strategic interaction. In the months leading up to each election, (1) the Brotherhood publicly calls for specific changes to the electoral system, such as the number of votes each voter can cast, apportionment, and redistricting, and (2) the regime then announces incremental changes to the system, after which (3) the Brotherhood decides if it should participate in or boycott the imminent election. The interaction is guided by the Brotherhood and the government's belief that a boycott delegitimizes, to some extent, the election and resulting parliament in the eyes of the Jordanian public or the international community or both.

Before the start of the Arab Spring, this strategic interaction had been repeated four times: prior to the 1997, 2003, 2007, and 2010 parliamentary elections.[4] Despite the election of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt in June 2012 and his overthrow in July 2013, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the regime continued this pattern of interaction prior to Jordan's parliamentary elections in January 2013 and September 2016. In other words, the Arab uprisings, including the coming to power and fall of Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt and the rise of the Islamic State, did not alter the *nature* of the strategic dynamic between the Hashemite monarchy and the Jordanian Brotherhood. Regional events only affected the parameters of the interaction, such as the specific electoral reforms the Brotherhood demanded and perhaps shifting its "reservation point"—the minimum set of reforms under which the group would participate. But the fates of sister movements and the emergence of the Islamic State did not fundamentally alter the gradualist goals of the Brotherhood in Jordan or upend its relationship with the regime. The Muslim Brotherhood demanded electoral reforms, the palace announced incremental reforms, and the Muslim Brotherhood then decided whether or not to boycott.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts. Part one elaborates on the argument made previously, focusing on what the Jordanian Brotherhood did and did not do to advance its agenda when Islamists' fortunes rose elsewhere—during the Arab Spring. Part two briefly discusses cleavages among Jordanian Islamists, including the relationship between Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood and what I argue is the more important but often overlooked cleavage: the ongoing and growing divide between Jordanian Islamists of Palestinian origin and Transjordanian Islamists. The split in the movement caused by the Zamzam Initiative (discussed later) and the rise of an alternative Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood group is merely the latest in a series of defections by Transjordanian Islamists. The regime's "deregistration" of the Muslim Brotherhood can be understood as an attempt to pressure the organization to commit to participate in parliamentary elections in 2016 (which it did). Part three concludes with a royal comment on the relationship between the Jordanian Brotherhood and the Hashemite regime.

THE JORDANIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, FROM SPRING TO WINTER

After protests spread to Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and beyond, many analysts, both in the region and elsewhere, thought that Jordan was the most vulnerable regime still standing. This belief was reinforced by the rise of nascent protest movements among tribal, youth, and locally based *hirak* groups in Transjordanian-majority areas, such as Dhiban and Karak, which are often characterized as part of the heartland of support for the Hashemite monarchy. But when the Muslim Brotherhood joined protests in Amman and urban centers, its demands did not escalate to call for the overthrow of the regime, and coordination with new protest groups remained limited.[5]

The most that can be said about changes to the Jordanian Brotherhood's demands after the start of the Arab uprisings is that it became more overt in demanding constitutional changes to constrain the monarchy's institutional prerogatives. For example, the Brotherhood called for removing the powers of the king to dissolve parliament, select the prime minister without input from parliament, and appoint the Upper House.[6] At the time, Brotherhood leaders claimed that this emphasis on constitutional reform marked a real shift.

The Brotherhood's shift to emphasizing constitutional reforms alongside electoral ones, however, is overstated for three reasons. First, the Brotherhood had long talked about such reforms. Its reform initiative of 2005 lists as its number one priority "to carry out urgently-needed political and structural reform to activate the section of the constitution that proclaims that the ruling system is a constitutional monarchy with a representative government, and to ensure that parliament assumes a position in keeping with this."[7] Its post–Arab Spring statements largely elaborate this established point. Second, the Brotherhood's most vocal statements about constitutional reform came after the king established a Royal Committee for Constitutional Review in April 2011[8] and as he issued a series of four "discussion" papers on reform issues.[9] The phrase *malakiyya dusturiyya* (constitutional monarchy) was already in the air before Muslim Brotherhood leaders started using it; the "red" line had faded to pink. Finally, the Jordanian Brotherhood basically was asking for the same reforms that the Moroccan king had already proposed for himself. In the range of demands that it could have made, the Jordanian Brotherhood selected a set that would not overly antagonize the monarchy and, perhaps, still save face for the group within the wider circle of Muslim Brotherhood organizations. It did not call for the regime to be overthrown, and it did not challenge the basic legitimacy of the Hashemites.

Some observers noted that the Muslim Brotherhood organized almost weekly protests in downtown Amman and reported this as evidence of the Arab uprisings spreading to Jordan. These protests had been recurring, though, since the early to mid-2000s in the exact same place and manner. After Friday prayers at the Grand Husseini Mosque in downtown Amman, the Brotherhood would organize, often with smaller leftist allies, a procession to a square at Ras al-Ein. A single Brotherhood truck distributes flags and banners at the beginning of these marches and collects them at the end, serving as an amplification system and stage during the event. All such protests are highly choreographed, controlled by the Brotherhood, and approved by the security forces. Jillian Schwedler has written about the nontransgressive nature of these protests, both before and during the Arab uprisings.[10] The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was not protesting in ways it had not done before. Its tactics did not shift. It did not permit members to test the boundaries of what the security services would tolerate.

All participants understood what game they were playing, and neither side tried to change the game. The Brotherhood demanded "real" constitutional reforms to the electoral system to make it more representative of the demographics and will of the Jordanian people. The 41 amendments proposed by the Royal Committee were approved, including additional protections to personal rights and the creation of a constitutional court to monitor legislation. The regime also tinkered, once again, with the electoral system. In April 2012, the regime unveiled a new draft electoral law that met some longstanding demands of the Islamic movement (e.g., abandoning the controversial single nontransferable vote [SNTV] "one-person, one-vote system") but also introduced a mixed system where seats would be allocated to both districts and a national list proportional representation system.[11] Almost immediately after the election of Morsi in Egypt, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood announced it would boycott the upcoming Jordanian elections if the draft electoral law was not further amended. In particular, the Brotherhood demanded that a greater percentage of seats be allocated for party candidates, and, although the increase it demanded was greater than what it had asked for in the past, the range (30 to 50 percent) remained in line with their gradualist approach.

Morsi's rise to power in Egypt appears to have influenced the Jordanian Brotherhood to demand greater reforms, but not maximalist ones. It did not lead them to demand changes that would open a path to win a majority of seats in parliament. The regime largely ignored the movement's most important demands and implemented other reforms, such as the establishment of an independent election commission that would blunt international observers' criticisms.[12] The election was held in January 2013, but without the participation of the Jordanian Brotherhood after the group decided to boycott.

Although the Arab uprisings did not alter the *nature* of the interaction, they appear to have increased the minimum set of concessions that the Brotherhood expected in order to participate. However, the precise mechanism of impact is unclear; most accounts simply say that the Jordanian Brotherhood was "inspired" or "encouraged" by events elsewhere. Maybe they expected future diplomatic, organizational, or financial support from an empowered Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which would decrease the "cost" of rejecting the king's proposals. Maybe Islamist victories elsewhere led them to believe that they had more support among the Jordanian public than they had previously, or maybe they were trying to use the illusion of widespread latent support to get a better deal.

Two final and interesting conjectures have to do with inter–Muslim Brotherhood "competition." Perhaps the Jordanian Brotherhood feared participating and not getting as much electoral support as Islamist parties had received in Tunisia and Egypt. Moreover, the Jordanian interaction described previously paralleled but (perhaps not unintentionally) trailed by a few months a somewhat similar process in Morocco. In March 2011, the Moroccan king announced a plan for comprehensive constitutional reform, pledged to reduce his powers, and appointed an ad hoc constitutional committee. The Jordanian king appointed his committee in April 2011. The Moroccan king announced the details of the new draft constitution in June, and voters overwhelmingly approved it in a referendum on July 1 (98.5 percent approved with 73 percent turnout). Henceforth, Moroccan kings would be obligated to appoint the prime minister from the party that won the most seats in parliament and the prime minister would be the head of government with the (theoretical) power to dissolve parliament. The Jordanian committee issued its much less far-reaching reform plan in August: the king would retain the ability to appoint the prime minister, although would do so in consultation with parliament. Morocco's Justice and Development Party (PJD), the country's largest Islamist party, participated in the parliamentary election on November 25 and won a plurality with 107 of 395 seats; their leader was appointed prime minister four days later, as called for by the new constitution.

In contrast, the Jordanian Brotherhood immediately rejected its country's amendments as not going far enough. One possible explanation is that it felt less constrained. Unlike the Jordanian Brotherhood, the PJD, as discussed in Avi Spiegel's chapter, faces a strong domestic competitor in Al Adl Wal Ihsan, which basks in nonparticipation and illegality. The Brotherhood in Jordan does not have a serious Islamist rival with which it must contend. Yet, why would the Jordanian government put the Brotherhood in such a situation if it knew that the group would reject its proposed reforms?

INTRA-ISLAMIST CLEAVAGES

This section is divided into two parts. The first briefly discusses relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis in Jordan; the second discusses cleavages within the Muslim Brotherhood. A large body of literature argues that authoritarian governments often seek to divide opposition, often along ideological lines.[13] I suggest that communal differences better capture divisions among Jordanian Islamists than ideological ones.

Salafis

The vast majority of "Salafis" in Jordan are political quietists, and many have effectively been co-opted by the regime.[14] Many prominent Jordanian Salafis, such as Ali bin Hasan al-Halabi and Salim al-Hilali, studied under the prominent Salafi scholar Mohamed Nasir al-Din al-Albani, and Albani's anti-jihadist and relatively pro-monarchical orientation remains influential.[15] Many non-jihadist Salafis have been incorporated into state institutions (especially the Ministry of Religious Endowments) or are allowed to preach independently and conduct outreach. There have been few significant moves by Salafis in Jordan to organize to participate in elections, although some scholars who run as independents are Salafis and some members of the Muslim Brotherhood have clear Salafi leanings, such as Mohamed Abu Faris.[16] Several prominent Salafi scholars have published books criticizing the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, but their impact on the Brotherhood has not received serious attention by scholars. Jordanian Salafis spend much of their intellectual energy defending Albani's ideas from criticism by other Salafi scholars.

Meanwhile, there are several currents of Salafi-jihadism in Jordan. One Salafi-jihadist current looks to influential ideologue Abu Mohamed al-Maqdisi, who is critical of any Muslims who take jobs in the Jordanian government. A number of small Salafi-jihadist organizations exist or have existed in Jordan, but many were discredited or dismantled by security services after the 2005 terrorist attack on hotels in Amman.[17]

So far, the rise of the Islamic State appears to have had little effect on the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. Analysts' estimates vary widely, but several thousand Jordanians have gone to fight in Syria since the beginning of the uprising there, many to fight with al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (now known as Jabhat Fath al-Sham after publicly distancing itself from al-Qaeda).[18] Information is limited, but these jihadists seem to be disproportionately Transjordanians (as opposed to Palestinian Jordanians) and more likely to be from Salafi circles than those of the Brotherhood. An unknown number of Jordanians—estimates vary from a few hundred up to 3000—have joined the Islamic State as either fighters or to work in their court system and bureaucracy, but the group appears to have made few inroads into Jordanian territory. In May 2014, a group in Ma'an offered an oath of loyalty to the Islamic State in a YouTube video as the "Ma'an Martyrs' Brigade," but nothing has been heard from them since. The February 2015 release of the video showing the gruesome killing of Jordanian Air Force pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh quieted criticisms of the Jordanian role in the anti-ISIS coalition and, at least temporarily, turned public opinion dramatically against the Islamic State.

Intra-Brotherhood Divisions

Journalists and academics studying the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood generally focus on ideological coalitions within the movement and track the successes and failures in internal elections of purported "hawks," "doves," "centrists," and "Hamasists."[19] Shura Council and executive positions are often analyzed to assess which of these "currents" or coalitions within the movement is ascendant at any moment.

In contrast, my research suggests that electoral contestation transformed Islamic politics in Jordan into a form of ethnic politics.[20] Over time, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood came to rely more and more on the votes of Palestinian-Jordanian Islamists and lost the support of Transjordanian Islamists. In the 1989 elections, the Brotherhood had found electoral support among both native Transjordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin. Sixteen of their 22 deputies (73 percent) elected in 1989 were from districts with a Transjordanian majority. In subsequent elections, however, the movement's candidates won fewer seats in Transjordanian majority districts but continued to win at the same rate in Palestinian-Jordanian majority districts. Consequently, the Brotherhood's political arm, the Islamic Action Front, increasingly came to represent one "ethnic" group—Palestinian Jordanians. In the 2003 elections, only five of its 17 parliamentarians (29 percent) came from Transjordanian majority districts. Brotherhood support has vanished from the southern Transjordanian heartland, where the movement won only a single seat in the 2003 and 2007 elections.

Why did this occur? I argue that the ethnic transformation of the Jordanian Brotherhood was an unintended by-product of electoral rule changes in 1993 and gerrymandering in 2001. Changes in voting rules had different effects in different districts; they interacted with differences across communal groups to dramatically reduce the electoral prospects of Brotherhood candidates in Transjordanian districts but not in Palestinian-Jordanian majority districts. Redistricting in 2001 deepened Islamists' disadvantages in Transjordanian areas by effectively creating two electoral systems in Jordan: mostly single-member districts in Transjordanian majority areas (equivalent to a first-past-the-post system) and multimember districts in Palestinian-Jordanian majority areas (equivalent to an SNTV system). Since Transjordanians rely more on government jobs and services than Palestinian Jordanians do, survey data show that they are more likely to want an elected representative who has *wasta*, or connections. The Brotherhood's willingness to boycott elections and its confrontational interactions with the regime make its parliamentarians poor interlocutors with government bureaucracies.

The difference between so-called "hawks" and "doves" has more to do with disagreements on how accommodationist the Islamic movement should be towards the Jordanian government than it does with ideological differences. Jordan's peace treaty with Israel and controversy over individual Brotherhood members' connections with Hamas contribute to ethnic tensions within the movement. But electoral boycotts and poor relations with the regime affect members from Transjordanian-majority areas more than those from Palestinian-majority areas because of differential demand for state services and jobs across those two communities. This relates to *hizb-haraka* (party-movement) relations to the extent that the Muslim Brotherhood's relationship with the regime affects the group's political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF).

In short, what is usually described as an ideological divide is better understood as an "ethnic" or communal one. Islamism is not declining among Transjordanians; they are simply not looking toward the Muslim Brotherhood to represent them any longer. Defectors from the Brotherhood leadership since 1989 have disproportionally been Transjordanians. Of the 33 Muslim Brotherhood deputies from 1989 or 1993 or both, I identified 10 who subsequently resigned or were expelled from the Brotherhood for going against nomination decisions, boycotts, or the bloc's position on votes of confidence. Eight of these 10 are Transjordanian, and most represented Transjordanian majority areas such as Karak, Tafileh, and Madaba. At least 5 were prominent leaders within the Brotherhood and held executive positions in internal organs. Similarly, members of the Shura Councils and executive bureaus of the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF who have left since 1989 are disproportionately Transjordanians. Transjordanian defectors from the Brotherhood formed the Islamic Center Party (ICP) in July 2001 with other aspiring politicians from outside the Islamic movement. The core of the ICP is overwhelmingly Transjordanian, and its leaders are mostly from Salt; several are from the same family.

Developments in the past few years have exacerbated this ethnic cleavage within the movement. The decision to boycott the 2013 parliamentary elections—the second boycott in a row—triggered what some observers have described as the most important challenge the Jordanian Brotherhood has ever faced. As during previous boycotts, several members left the organization and ran as independents. But a larger split took shape when a group of mostly Transjordanian "doves" met in Amman's Zamzam Hotel in October 2013. With government officials in attendance, they called for a greater focus on domestic (i.e., "Jordanian") issues and for developing a reform program based on the broad principles of Islamic civilization.[21] This is not a new "post–Arab Spring" divide; rumors of such a split have surfaced regularly since the doves lost internal elections in 2008. In February 2014, the Shura Council of the Muslim Brotherhood expelled 10 members associated with this Zamzam Initiative, including a former general-overseer of the organization, ostensibly for violating the organization's bylaws. These members are mostly Transjordanian,[22] and Zamzam leaders say that only 15 percent of the 600 politicians involved in the group are Brotherhood members.[23] In its origins and composition, the Zamzam Initiative resembles, in many ways, the earlier ICP "split."

In March 2015, the Jordanian government approved an application from defectors from the Brotherhood, including some of those affiliated with the Zamzam Initiative, to form a licensed Jordanian charity under the banner of the "Muslim Brotherhood Society." The original Muslim Brotherhood was licensed in Jordan in 1945–1946 as a "charity" and as an "Islamic society" in 1953, but specifically as a branch of the mother Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It remains unclear if the Jordanian government sees the bureaucratic decision in March 2015 as the licensing of a new charity or the adjustment of the status of the old organization, but the regime exploited this opportunity to pressure the Muslim Brotherhood. In effect, there currently are two Muslim Brotherhoods in Jordan: the older, established, and larger faction, which remains nominally connected to movements elsewhere, and the new "Jordanian" Muslim Brotherhood, which appears committed to greater collaboration with regime initiatives. On several occasions, the government has stated that the old Muslim Brotherhood is illegal or unregistered or both. In March 2016, the government banned the organization from holding internal elections, and the following month police closed the main Muslim Brotherhood office in Abdali in Amman, as well as offices in several other cities.

A number of analysts describe these actions as a "major crackdown" on the Jordanian Brotherhood; some equate it to an existential crisis for the organization. This analysis presented in this chapter suggests a different interpretation. Following the Brotherhood's boycott of two consecutive parliamentary elections, the regime used bureaucratic and regulatory tools to essentially coerce the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in the subsequent elections which took place in September 2016. Brotherhood activists were not rounded up and detained. Although their headquarters was closed, police merely sealed the doors with tape. The organizational network of the Brotherhood was not dismantled. The king wanted the Brotherhood to participate in (and therefore help legitimize) elections and not boycott a third consecutive vote. Internal divisions within the Jordanian Brotherhood and the fall of Islamist allies elsewhere provided an opportunity for the regime to weaken the relative bargaining power of the Brotherhood heading into yet another iteration of the pre-election strategic game described earlier in the chapter. The regime's gambit succeeded. In June 2016, the IAF announced that it would participate in elections slated for September. A day later, the unrecognized Muslim Brotherhood, denied the ability to hold internal elections for a new leadership, appointed an "interim committee" to replace its executive committee and lead the organization during this period.[24] A relative moderate, Abdul Hamid Thuneibat, was selected to lead this committee. The unrecognized Muslim Brotherhood and its allies participated in the 2016 election as the "National Coalition for Reform" and won 15 seats, including 10 held by IAF members. None were in the south. The recognized and Transjordanian-dominated "Muslim Brotherhood Society" and the Zamzam group won 5 seats.

If the organizations do not reconcile, it is too early to say what long-term impact this "split" in the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood will have, but it is important to note that it is not a new divide. The Muslim Brotherhood survived the breaking away of the Islamic Center Party a decade earlier and the occasional defection of leaders; it likely will similarly survive this most recent loss of several dozen activists and prominent members. The regime might use the court system and bureaucratic licensing to aid the breakaway faction, but it is unclear if the mostly Transjordanian Islamists leaving or being expelled from the Muslim Brotherhood will be able to take any of the organization's networks and charities with them. In July 2015, the Department of Land and Survey reportedly transferred ownership of several properties to the new and licensed Muslim Brotherhood,[25] but there are no indications that the networks, charitable societies, and institutions of the movement have shifted their allegiance or would cooperate with such a change. The parallel Islamic sector will most likely remain loyal to the older Muslim Brotherhood organization. But, if permanent, this split further divides Jordanian Islamists along "ethnic" lines; it makes the Muslim Brotherhood ever more dependent on Jordanians of Palestinian origin and could make them even more likely to boycott elections in the future. In the short-term, however, the regime succeeded in inducing the Brotherhood to participate in elections and not boycott a third, perhaps decisive, consecutive time.

CONCLUSION

King Abdullah was remarkably candid during conversations in early 2013 with Jeffrey Goldberg of *The Atlantic* and expressed his dislike and mistrust of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, whom he referred to as a "Masonic cult" and "wolves in sheep's clothing."[26] Leaders of the Brotherhood met with the king two months after the Arab uprisings began, but the two sides present vastly different accounts of what transpired during the meeting. Brotherhood officials claim that they were invited to join the government and implicitly offered their choice of ministries. The king's account is worth quoting at length:

> They were the first people I saw in the Arab Spring. They were the loudest voice, so I brought them in, and they said, "Our loyalty is to the Hashemites, and we stood with you in the '40s and '50s and '70s," and I said, "That is the biggest load of crap I have ever heard." And they were like, "Aaaargh"—they were shocked.... "My father told me that you guys watched the way things were going, and when you saw that my father was winning, you went with him." I said, "This is complete and utter bullshit, and if we're going to sit here and bullshit each other, then we might as well have a cup of tea and then say goodbye.... If you want to have a serious conversation here's where we start."

The king proceeded to outline areas of common interest and then said, "I think you're part of the Jordanian system, and I think you should be part of the process.... I think we all leave this meeting feeling really good, but—I'll be honest with you—there's 10 percent distrust from me, and 10 percent distrust from you, I'm sure. But we have good vibes here."

King Abdullah continued by saying that, after the meeting, Brotherhood leaders went to Cairo to meet with the Egyptian Brotherhood's General Guide and, after seeing what the Brotherhood had achieved there, decided not to participate in the national dialogue committee.[27]

My analysis suggests that both the king and the (old) Muslim Brotherhood understand precisely the game they are playing, and that both sides prefer continuing to play it rather than interact in a different, presumably more confrontational, way. The regime has resisted pressure from its allies—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates—to crack down significantly on the Brotherhood.[28] The one thing everyone in Jordan seems to agree on is that no one knows what will happen in the absence of the Hashemites, and with instability in Syria and the Muslim Brotherhood on the run in Egypt, both the king and the Brotherhood share an interest in keeping their established game going. The regime's bureaucratic support for the Zamzam Initiative and recognition of the new Muslim Brotherhood Society will be limited; it was a tactic to coerce the 70-year-old organization to rejoin the electoral process. As much as the king and regime would prefer a more conciliatory and participatory Muslim Brotherhood, they recognize that further dividing the Islamic movement between mostly Palestinian-Jordanian "hawks" and mostly Transjordanian "doves" risks politicizing the country's most salient cleavage and could give rise to new social movements and political actors claiming an Islamic identity, including radical ones.