Camp David Accords
Lions become Lambs
Decision type
• Rational choice theory
• Rational choice theory then assumes that an
individual has preferences among the
available choice alternatives allowing an
option preferred.
• Rational choice approach allows preferences
to be represented as real-“valued” beneficial
Case
• Peace between Egypt and
Israel
• Security and economic
considerations
• US mediator
• Personality verses principle
Case for Egypt
• Egyptian leader Sadat offers peace to Israel
• Leaves economic and political sphere of Soviet
Union
• Alliance with Syria finished
• Secure Sinai as buffer zone
Case for Israel
• Secure southern border
• Divide Arab unity (Jordan-Syria-Egypt)
• Fulfill domestic expectations and international
anticipation
• Reciprocal visits between capitals
Crisis
• Never been accomplished.
• UN resolution 242
• Domestic support and opposition
• Assassination and mistrust
• Cabinet split (tenuous control)
Negotiations
• Legal
• Rhetoric
Israel
• The May 1977 elections would prove to be a defining moment in
Israeli history. For the first time since Israel’s independence in 1948
the government would not be in the hands of the Labor party—the
party of the founding father of Israel David Ben Gurion and military
hero Moshe Dayan. (Gilbert, Israel: a History, 477)
• After 30 years under the Labor party’s guidance, the Israeli
government had accomplished many goals set out in its early
days. It survived many large waves of immigration from the Arab
world, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union, four wars with its
Arab neighbors, and constant attack in wars of attrition since 1956;
but financial scandals and mismanagement during an hour of peril
in 1973 forced Labor out and allowed the Likud party and its
leader Menachem Begin to seize power and create a ruling
coalition. (Gilbert, Israel: a History, 478)
Egypt
• November, Sadat’s intentions were to become publicly known. In an
address to the Egyptian Parliament on November 6th, Sadat announced
his wish to speak to the Israeli Knesset, “I am willing to go to the ends of
the earth for peace. Israel will be astonished to hear me say now, before
you, that I am prepared to go to their own house, to the Knesset itself, to
talk to them.” (Gilbert, Israel: a History, 482-83)
• Sadat’s speech was met with utter disbelief in Israel. Many government
leaders believed Sadat’s words were merely false piety, that he was
using rhetoric to score political points with Washington and that he did
not truly stand behind his words. In response, Menachem Begin
announced that if Sadat truly desired a visit to the Knesset he would be
welcomed. An official invitation was relayed via United States diplomatic
cables to Sadat, who officially accepted the invitation and planned a
visit for the 19th of November. (Gilbert, Israel: a History, 487; Sachar, A
History of Israel, 46)
USA
• In the months between the Egyptian President’s visit and
the Camp David Accords, several attempts were made
to take advantage of the groundbreaking initiative
offered by Sadat; but each effort subsequently failed.
• In order to save the peace process and to bring Egypt
out of the Soviet sphere of influence during the Cold
War, US President Jimmy Carter called upon the leaders
of Egypt and Israel to join him at a Summit Conference
in the US in order to design a framework for a
comprehensive peace plan for the Middle East.
Secrecy
• No members of the press were invited to the
Accords process. Carter wanted the leaders of
Israel and Egypt to feel comfortable expressing
their true positions to one another without feeling
obligated to stick to talking points for their
audiences at home.
• (Gilbert, Israel: a History, 489)
Background
• Contrasting styles of Sadat and Begin.
• While Sadat was emotional, a dreamer and an idealist,
Begin was
• Colder and more analytical, grinding down proposals inch
by inch “into the fine dry powder of details, legal clauses,
and quotes from international law.” (Wright, 2014)
• Despite mistrust, mistakes and miscalculations, they signed a
peace treaty that has endured
Background
• By end of the summer of 1978, almost a year after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s
historic trip to Israel, negotiations between the two countries had stalled.
• In March, Palestinian terrorists killed 38 Israelis, the Israelis invaded Lebanon,
inflaming the Arab world.
• Prime Minister Menachem Begin made clear that he was unwilling to stop Israeli
settlements in or withdraw from the Sinai or the West Bank or grant Palestinians any
real authority.
• Despite these developments and against advice that he not invest political capital in
an initiative that was doomed before it started President Jimmy Carter invited Sadat
and Begin to come to Camp David.
• “Close to nature, peaceful and isolated from the world,” the two leaders, he [Carter]
wrote, with a characteristic combination of idealism, hubris and naiveté, might
conclude the “First Egyptian-Jewish peace since the time of Jeremiah.”
• Lawrence Wright, Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp
David, 49-50
Background
• The agreement was due to the character,
temperament, ideology and tactical and strategic
calculations of both Sadat and Begin, the isolation of
the participants and the dogged determination of
Carter.
• After the initial weekend, it became clear that neither
Begin nor Sadat could leave without paying a terrible
political price. Isolation became a stronger incentive,
since both men couldn’t stand each other, or the
idea of remaining in Camp David.
Process
• Carter started the negotiations with a meeting between himself,
Secretary of State Vance, President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin.
Each party was allowed time to lay out their positions on a host of issues
uninterrupted by the others. Carter wanted to ensure that each leader
had the opportunity to make their positions perfectly clear from the
outset. Begin began the discussions. (Wright, Thirteen Days in
September: Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David, 49-50)
• In no minced words, Begin assured the group that his positions had
changed little since Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem the year prior. While Israel
was ready and willing to return the Sinai Peninsula in return for an
agreement of peace with the Egyptians the other territories captured in
the Six Day War were to remain off limits in the negotiations at Camp
David. The historic lands of Judea and Samaria, to Begin and his party,
were historically integral to the Land of Israel.
Process
• Like the issues in the West Bank, the Palestinian problem was to
remain unaddressed at the Camp David summit. In Begin’s eyes,
the accords process was an opportunity to build a bilateral peace
agreement with Egypt, as facilitated by the US and President
Carter; but not to settle disputes with the other Arab countries not
represented at the summit.
• Beyond these restrictions everything else was up for discussion:
permanent non-aggression, the determination of final borders
between Israel and Egypt, the status of Jerusalem which had been
reunited in 1967, the passage of Israeli ships and cargo through
the Suez Canal and Red Sea without problems.
• Gilbert, Israel: a History, 493.
Process
• President Sadat was of the same vein of reasoning as Begin. His negotiating positions
had changed little since his visit to the Knesset in the previous November.
• Sadat insisted upon the full military and civilian withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula
and the Gaza Strip, both of which had been under Egypt’s control from 1948 to 1967,
as well as all other Arab territories including the Golan Heights and the West Bank. As
Sadat had made perfectly clear, his intention at the accords was to both make peace
with Israel bilaterally, but also to begin negotiating a final peace deal between Israel
and her other neighbors—mainly with the Palestinians. Sadat’s main motivation
behind peace with the Palestinian population was his view of himself as the leader of
the Arab world. (Sachar, A History of Israel, pg. 61)
• Though he was shunned by many of his Arab counterparts, and was kicked out of the
Arab League, Sadat recognized the power and size of Egypt as a significant and
influential force that could help bring about peace, with or without the help of the
other Arab countries. Regardless, Sadat came to the peace conference in the
mindset that he was representing each and every Arab state in the region. (Wright,
Thirteen Days in September, pg. 57)
Problems
• The President had invited Sadat and Begin to Camp David
under the stipulation that both parties would arrive without
preconditions for negotiations, ready to seriously discuss
concessions both sides would be willing to take.
• On one hand, Sadat presented his proposal replete with
stipulations that were sure to be rejected by the Israeli
delegation;
• On the other hand, Begin offered areas in which he would
be able to compromise—but laid out demands the
Egyptians were to fulfill before the Israelis could agree to a
settlement.
Resolution
• By day eight, Carter had finally devised a strategy he hoped would save
the talks and push the delegations towards real progress. Instead of
creating one comprehensive peace deal to appease all parties in the ArabIsraeli
conflict, Carter suggested two separate, but linked agreements.
• (Boyne, The Two O’clock War, 13-14; Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: a
Personal Account of the Egypt-Israeli Negotiations, pg. 49)
• One agreement, “A Framework for Peace in Sinai,” would exclusively deal
with Israel and Egypt’s disputes in the Sinai Peninsula. The other
agreement, “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East,” would create a
framework to finalize a comprehensive agreement between Israel and all of
her Arab neighbors while establishing rights and autonomy for the
Palestinians.
• (Wright, Thirteen Days in September, pg. 190-92)
Result
• The treaty was the result of months of grueling, often frustrating negotiations that
finally were concluded early this morning when a final compromise was reached
on the last remaining issue - a timetable for Israel to give up Sinai oil-fields.
• Under the treaty, Israel will withdraw its military forces and civilians from the Sinai
Peninsula in stages over three years.
• Two-thirds of the area will be returned within nine months, after formal
ratification documents are exchanged.
• The ratification process began in two weeks.
• In return for Israel's withdrawal, Egypt agreed to end the state of war and to
establish peace. After the initial nine-month withdrawal was completed, Egypt and
Israel will establish "normal and friendly relations" in many fields, including
diplomatic, cultural and economic relations.
Rational Actors
• Begin: Technical (legal) with strategy
• Sadat: Too trusting? (lack of strategy)
• Carter: facilitator; moral obligation
• Rational Actor Theory
• third party monitoring and enforcement
Final Negotiations
• The peace treaty negotiations went through a series of ups
and downs and surprises.
• They began in October in Washington with expectations of
an early conclusion.
• Although the basic treaty text was approved by both Egypt
and Israel by early December, three months more were
needed to obtain agreement on differing interpretations of
the treaty -- the subject of a separate document of "agreed
minutes" - and over issues such as when ambassadors
would be exchanged and target dates for beginning and
concluding the Palestinian self-rule negotiations.
Final Negotiations
• President Carter resolved most of the questions during a week-long trip to the Middle
East in September 1979.
• Even though both Governments approved the treaty, it was not completed until late
the previous night when Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat agreed that the Sinai oilfield would
be returned to Egypt seven months after the treaty was ratified, instead of the nine
months Israel had preferred and the six months Egypt had earlier asked.
• In addition, Mr. Begin agreed to turn over the El Arish area within two months instead
of the three months originally proposed by Israel.
• An arrangement was also made to insure Israel a right to buy oil from the fields
without interruption.
• Even the morning, in the final drafting, differences arose over whether to call a body
of water the Gulf of Aqaba or the Gulf of Eilat. The Arabic and English texts refer to it
as "Aqaba," the name of the Jordanian port by that name. The Hebrew version calls it
Eilat, after the Israeli port adjacent to Aqaba.
Further reading
• Lawrence Wright, Thirteen Days in September:
Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014)
• William B. Quandt, Camp David: Israel and the
Peacemaking Process (Washington DC:
Brookings Institute Press, 1981)
Further Reading
• Shlomo Avineri, "Beyond Camp David," Foreign
Policy, no. 46 (1982)
• Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel, Volume II:
from the Aftermath of the Yom Kippur War (New
York: Oxford UP, 1987)