Index of TABLES 1 The US DoD budget request by appropriation title, USDm.............24 2 US DoD FY2023 budget request vs House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees'proposed defence budgets, USDbn...............................................................................................25 3 The US DoD total budget request by military service, USDm..........26 4 US National Defense Budget Function and other selected budgets, 2000, 2010-2023...........................................................................27 5 United States: Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV)..................30 6 United States: fixed-wing combat aircraft exports, 2010-22...........31 7 Poland: Rosomak wheeled armoured vehicle family..........................70 8 Spain: selected aerospace procurement since 2010...........................71 9 Russia: defence expenditure, 2015-22 (trillion roubles, current prices).................................................................................................162 Index of FIGURES North America 1 US defence budget as % of GDP.................................................................25 Europe 2 The FREMM frigate: selected national variants.....................................57 3 Europe: selected countries, inflation (%) 2017-27...............................60 4 Europe: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average).............62 5 Europe: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2022.........63 6 Europe defence budget announcements, 2022...................................64 Russia and Eurasia 7 Recapitalising Russia's bomber inventory.............................................158 8 Russia: defence expenditure as % of GDP.............................................161 9 Ukraine: selected Ukrainian main battle tank (MBT) upgrades.....166 Asia 10 Asia: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2022.............216 11 Asia: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average).................217 12 Asia: sub-regional real-terms defence-spending growth, 2021 -22 (USDbn, constant 2015).............................................................219 13 China: defence budget compared with the rest of Asia (total), 2008-22, USDbn, constant 2015..............................................................225 Index of MAPS 1 Europe: regional defence spending (USDbn, %ch yoy).....................61 2 Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine: February-March 2022.......154 3 Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine: April-October 2022...........155 4 Russia and Eurasia: regional defence spending (USDbn, %ch yoy)..161 5 China and Russia: selected military cooperation activities, 2019-22.........................................................................................211 6 Asia: regional defence spending (USDbn, %ch yoy).........................218 10 Russia: Volume of military-technical cooperation and arms exports (USD billion, current)....................................................................164 11 Selected equipment donations to Ukraine, February-September 2022.............................................................................................170 12 Philippines: selected aerospace procurement since 2010..............227 13 Pakistan: selected naval procurement since 2000.............................228 14 Qatar: selected procurement since 2010...............................................313 15 Peru: selected procurement since 2010.................................................374 16 Kenya: defence procurement since 2000..............................................432 17 List of abbreviations for data sections....................................................498 18 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel..........................................................................................500 19 Index of country/territory abbreviations...............................................506 20 Index of countries and territories.............................................................507 Middle East and North Africa 14 Middle East and North Africa: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2022....................................................................................310 15 Middle East and North Africa: defence spending as%of GDP (average)..................................................................................................310 Latin America and the Caribbean 16 Latin America and the Caribbean: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2022...................................................................371 17 Latin America and the Caribbean: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average)..............................................................371 18 Latin America: selected countries, inflation (%), 2017-27..............372 Sub-Saharan Africa 19 Sub-Saharan Africa: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2022............................................................................................428 20 Sub-Saharan Africa: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average)..................................................................................................428 21 Sub-Saharan Africa: total defence spending by sub-region, 2008-22.............................................................................................................429 7 Middle East and North Africa: regional defence spending (USDbn, %ch yoy).......................................................................309 8 Egypt: defence industry...............................................................................314 9 Latin America and the Caribbean: regional defence spending (USDbn, %ch yoy)...........................................................................................370 10 Sub-Saharan Africa: regional defence spending (USDbn, %ch yoy)...........................................................................................427 Editor's Introduction Change in military affairs is often incremental and slow. In many nations there is a formal process in which national-security priorities are assessed, defence policies are produced or updated and restructuring efforts reshape military organisations. Meanwhile, procurement plans lead to the arrival of new or upgraded equipment, changing the size and composition of inventories, which in turn can lead to equipment being retired, stored or destroyed, or sold or transferred to others. War, or other national emergencies, can change the trajectory and pace of change. In 2022, Russia's ill-fated decision to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine illustrates how defence transformation can be accelerated or even prompted, especially in Europe. The Military Balance captures important changes that are under way in military organisations and inventories. Russia's armed forces, of course, have suffered considerable losses in personnel and equipment in the invasion, though Moscow's decision to mobilise means that personnel numbers have increased relative to previous years' figures. The assessment of personnel strength in Ukraine has also changed this year, as that country has looked to boost numbers and improve combat capability after Russia's invasion. Elsewhere, war in East Africa has also led to notable changes in this year" s estimate for the personnel numbers of the armed forces of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Equipment inventories are changing too. Russia failed to gain air superiority over Ukraine and relied mainly on standoff attacks using its land-attack cruise missiles, depleting its inventory. As a consequence, Moscow has turned to importing Iranian direct-attack munitions. In turn, this is driving closer defence-industrial cooperation between Moscow and Tehran. Russia's tank and artillery fleets have suffered significant attrition. Around 50% of its pre-war fleet of modern T-72B3S and T-72B3MS is assessed to have been lost. Moreover, the composition of Russia's inventory has changed. As modern vehicles have been destroyed, Russia has looked to maintain its fleet by bringing older vehicles out of store. The war is finally driving out of many East European inventories the Soviet-era equipment that many states have retained since the end of the Cold War. The flow of Western artillery to Ukraine is modernising Kyiv's inventory and delivering improved capability. Meanwhile, Russia's 2022 invasion sharpened Poland's threat perceptions. Warsaw is accelerating its plans to build up its armoured vehicles and artillery, on top of its existing goals of boosting its air and naval power. Indeed, the strategic centre of gravity in Europe has moved further north and east: Germany announced a special EUR100 billion (USDio6bn) fund for defence and, like Poland and Finland, joined the group of European nations ordering from the United States the fifth-generation F-35 combat aircraft. Meanwhile, in 2023 Finland will almost certainly formally join NATO, alongside Sweden, a decision that they only took after Russia's 2022 invasion. Change is under way elsewhere too. In some cases, however, procurement and modernisation plans are being delayed by economic realities. Higher rates of inflation in 2022 eroded the value of many defence investments. Indeed, despite announced increases to defence budgets, in 2022 global defence spending fell for the second year in real terms because of soaring inflation rates. European and Asian defence spending still grew in real terms, and with spending uplifts set to continue into the mid-202os, these will be more effective as inflation abates. The application of special funds or off-budget expenditure to supplement defence spending has become more prevalent in 2022 as countries seek to rapidly increase investment. Such measures can reduce transparency and accountability while also creating issues for defence economists seeking to accurately track and compare like-for-like international defence budgets. In China, the 7% nominal increase in the 2022 budget, over 2021 figures, represents a CNYg^bn (USDi6bn) boost in funding for the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the largest-ever annual increase in absolute terms, even though growth has in recent years stalled in real terms. These funds are enabling the PL A's continued modernisation. The launch of a new aircraft carrier drew headlines, but China also continues to launch more, and more complex, frigates and destroyers. According to the US Department of Defense (DoD), Beijing has also improved its strategic capabilities by introducing new and longer-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles like the JL-3 (CH-SS-N-20). The PLA Navy (PLAN), according to the DoD, likely began 'near-continuous at-sea deterrence patrols', with the JL-3 possibly allowing the PLAN to target the US from longer ranges than before, giving it options to enhance the survivability of its deterrent. And then there is the change to China's land silo-based nuclear deterrent, first publicly observed in the West by open-source analysts. China's air-force inventory is also changing: there are more Y-20 transport aircraft and now YY-20A tankers, and yet more J-20A combat aircraft. Moreover, new J-20AS and new Y-20S are now considered to be fitted with locally manufactured engines, respectively the Shenyang WS-10C afterburning turbofan and the Shenyang WS-20, replacing the Russian Saturn AL-31F and Soloviev D-30KP engines. For years, China's inability to domestically manufacture military-specification turbofans had been held as one of the factors limiting the development of its military capability. This is important as numerical changes to the inventories in The Military Balance reflect only one aspect of military capability. The process of generating numerical estimates is made somewhat easier where countries exhibit a degree of transparency in defence affairs, particularly open societies and nations that ascribe to defence-reporting systems - such as to NATO for defence-planning purposes, or to the OSCE and UN for arms-control and confidence-building purposes. 6 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 And there is an increasing volume of online reporting and imagery through, for instance, social media, and information from commercial providers of satellite imagery. Data gathered through these sources has to then be assessed alongside other information including from routine open-source monitoring and consultations with other defence specialists. An active conflict sharpens the challenge yet further. And the war in Ukraine illustrates the importance of information warfare, and the risks of this for analysts, as governments actively exploit the information space in order to shape narratives. However, the increasing number of open-source citizen analysts and independent research organisations scrutinising conflict and defence affairs has in recent years provided an increasingly rich source of information, for instance in contributing to assessments of Russian and Ukrainian equipment losses during the current war. The growth in publicly-available courses in analytical techniques, as well as technical tools, has helped this process. The expanding activity of groups like these, and the profusion of open-source data more generally, are leading government agencies to establish units focused on open source. In the case of the war in Ukraine, this volume of information, and the pace at which it has been generated, has meant that analysts have to consider carefully a profusion of often very diverse data, and in many cases repriori-tise analytical capacity; this inevitably creates risk for other areas of study. That said, though conflict makes it problematic to judge numbers with precision, assessments can nonetheless be made, including judgements that a particular category of equipment may be in service, but the numerical breakdown between types is unclear. An additional complication is that combat attrition to both formations as well as equipment makes it yet more difficult to generate accurate estimates based on long-established methods, such as on tables of organisation and equipment. However, more information often becomes available over time, enabling more precise judgements. More broadly, headline numbers remain useful as an indicator, but they have to be scrutinised. For instance, despite significant combat losses, Russia's personnel numbers remained relatively high, but attrition and mobilisation meant that, by the end of the year, the ground forces contained large numbers of relatively inexperienced personnel. And while the numbers of China's fleet of destroyers and frigates, or of heavy transport aircraft, may be relatively uniform, these fleets generally comprise more modern platforms than before. If anything, these factors highlight the importance of looking beyond numbers to qualitative evaluations of military capability. Equipment holdings may look good on paper, but can they be effectively used? Assessments like these include judgements of industrial sustainability, logistics, maintenance, strategies and plans and training, areas in which Russia's armed forces have in 2022 demonstrated significant deficiencies. Such evaluations may also include difficult-to-gauge factors such as the effect of corruption on industry or the armed forces, military morale or even 'will' among populations. Additionally, they must consider the broader defence-funding burden for states, and where appropriate include assessments of purchasing power parity. Assessments like these require considered methodological approaches. These qualitative factors do not readily lend themselves to comparable assessments between states - a key function of IISS defence data in The Military Balance. For this reason, the IISS Defence and Military Analysis Programme has expanded its work in these areas and is looking to devise ways of assessing the broader factors influencing capability, in ways that are comparable between states. We are integrating our judgements into the MilitaryBalance+ database, and this volume illustrates in graphic form one aspect: our approach to identifying important factors that we think influence equipment capability. We are continuing similar work on military-cyber issues and on defence expenditure while exploring other means to deliver in our work further qualitative as well as numerical assessments of global defence data. MILITARY BALANCE + THE ONLINE DATABASE GSA Contract Holder Contract # 47QTCA22D000H www.iiss.org/militarybalanceplus CONTACT For an online demonstration, trial and subscription information: Robert Hopgood Sales Manager for Military Balance+ Direct: +44 (0)20 7395 9911 Mobile: +44 (0)7548 217 063 Email: robert.hopgood@iiss.org Chapter One: Defence and military analysis The shadow of war Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is reshaping the security environment in Europe and has ramifications elsewhere. The scale of Moscow's miscalculation is apparent nearly a year on, but at the outset it was not clear that Russia would face such difficulty. One of the preliminary lessons offered by the war - beyond those for the belligerents - is that defence and intelligence specialists need to sharpen focus on methodologies important to the assessment of military capabilities, and in this case revise how they evaluate Russia's armed forces. Other early take-aways include those related to the importance of aspects of military capability such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), longer range artillery and better targeting, and the importance of training and morale. Yet more concern resilience, both civil and military. Meanwhile, although the United States has led international military support for Ukraine, and Washington perceives Russia as the immediate threat, its longer-term focus remains what it views as the challenge from China. Beijing continues to modernise its armed forces at pace. Russia's war also offers lessons for the US armed forces and its defence industry, both for its involvement in Europe, but also in possible contingencies elsewhere, including in Asia. Military miscalculation Russia's initial military campaign was launched on a range of assumptions that proved to be ill-judged and over-optimistic: Ukraine's leaders did not flee, and the Ukrainian armed forces did not collapse. Moreover, Russia's strategy was based on a poor understanding of its own armed forces. Russia's recent military operations, and forces with important elements postured for fast and decisive missions, gave its leaders a false sense of confidence. Recent operations took place within relatively permissive operating environments, while training and exercises did not adequately prepare Russian forces for offensive actions against a determined and well-armed opponent. Russian forces displayed lower standards of tactical competence, command, leadership and logistics than their Ukrainian counterparts. The significant investment in Russia's military power that took place after the latest modernisation phase (the 'New Look') began in 2008 has not brought the desired outcome. While important vulnerabilities in Russian capabilities have been demonstrated, once Russia resorted to artillery-heavy assaults the gap between expectation and performance was - in relation to Russia's weapons -perhaps reduced a little. But in other aspects - such as command and control, maintenance, logistics, planning, reconnaissance and soldier training - significant deficiencies soon became apparent. In the first real test of Russian combat power against a peer adversary for decades, the armed forces have so far come up short. Military setbacks and the only incrementally-growing resources that Russia is committing to the war have meant that there is a growing gap between military realities and Russia's aims. As of late 2022, though state media control remained tight, and public support ostensibly remained high, some in the Russian security community likely recognised this gap. A crucial issue was whether this was recognised also by President Putin and the military leadership and, if it was, whether they would sustain their intentions or revise goals in line with miltary realities on the ground. If a key objective of the war was to reassert Russian primacy over its 'near abroad', it has had the opposite effect. The war has reinforced Ukrainian statehood and galvanised its population and armed forces. The effect of the war on Russia's periphery has been varied. Belarus has been drawn closer to Moscow and has been complicit in Russia's actions by offering logistical and material - if not directly physical - support. But in Central Asia, Russia's grip appeared weaker at the end than at the start of 2022, while its ability to be an effective broker elsewhere, such as between Armenia and Azerbaijan, is in doubt. The effect in Europe has been profound. Russia's European strategy, as winter deepened, appeared to focus on weakening Western public resolve by cutting gas supplies. This has caused European states to sharpen their attention on resilience and energy security. It has made more important continued Ukrainian military progress in winter 2022-23 - even if this is at a reduced tempo compared to its mid-September Defence and military analysis: The shadow of war 9 to early November 2022 high point. This is important not only to maintain pressure on a Russian force that is trying to reconstitute, but also to bolster arguments in Western Europe that holding firm during an energy crisis and, indeed, providing continued military support to Ukraine were worthwhile. Europe refocuses on Russia The security environment in Europe is shifting sharply against Russia due to further NATO enlargement, decisions by European states to boost their military capability and additional US commitments. In 2019, NATO was described as experiencing 'brain death' by French President Emmanuel Macron, at a time when the then US president, Donald Trump, was at best ambivalent about the value of the Alliance, following decades of various US presidents exhorting Europeans to increase their defence spending. Russia's 2022 invasion has given NATO a renewed raison d'etre and impelled Finland and Sweden to formally apply to join the Alliance. It has caused many states to reassess their defence priorities and has in effect shifted further north and east the strategic centre of gravity in Europe. For Germany, Russia's invasion marked a new era in European security, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a EUR100 billion (USDio6bn) fund for defence. And as of the end of 2022, Helsinki and Stockholm were well on the path to NATO membership in 2023. At its Madrid Summit in 2022, NATO agreed a new force model to boost force size and readiness and to replace the NATO Response Force, but as before, a key challenge will be in transforming members' commitments into effective capability. At the same time, European defence expenditure is being increased. This spending trajectory is readily apparent in Russia's immediate European neighbours and at its most obvious in Poland, where the defence minister said the defence budget should increase from 2% to 3% of GDP in 2023. The February 2022 invasion reinforced Warsaw's security concerns and spurred a rapid programme to modernise its land forces with new equipment, including South Korean and US armour. For at least the next decade, Russia will be central to European security concerns, and will be important in driving defence policy developments and acquisition plans. But these concerns are not universally held. The United States led the Western response to Russia's actions, and while the Biden administration's National Security Strategy did say that Russia was indeed an acute threat, China was still the main challenge for Washington. Moreover, while there is concern across the world about the conflict, many responses were circumspect. China and India remained 'neutral', while several Middle Eastern and African states also hedged. President Xi Jinping of China has claimed that the growth in NATO membership resulted in the Ukrainian crisis - a narrative that was first articulated by Moscow. And in other states there are more hard-headed calculations of how the conflict may directly affect them, for instance in relation to the supply of hydrocarbons or military materiel. Although the leaders of China and Russia in early February 2022 announced a 'no limits' bilateral friendship, the rhetoric may exaggerate the depth and potential of contemporary Sino-Russian relations, and a formal Sino-Russian military alliance or direct Chinese military support for Russia's war in Ukraine both seem unlikely prospects. Nevertheless, the bilateral partnership is now closer and includes an increasingly strong military dimension that goes beyond defence-industrial cooperation. East Asia In Asia, the war in Ukraine added complications to an already-deteriorating security environment. Concerns were expressed in some states about the potential problems arising from a dependence on Russia for defence sales and support; Soviet- and Russian-origin equipment comprises a significant portion of the inventories of nations such as India and Vietnam. Meanwhile, China has grown more assertive regarding reunification with Taiwan, while relations between China and the US have become more abrasive. Beijing was harsh in its criticism of the visit to Taipei, in August 2022 by Nancy Pelosi, then-speaker of the US House of Representatives; the visit was accompanied by large-scale Chinese military exercises near Taiwan. Meanwhile, China's military modernisation continued to prompt concern in Washington, which views it as the Department of Defense's 'pacing challenge'. China appears to have expanded its nuclear capabilities, and at the end of the year the Pentagon's annual report on China's military capability noted other important developments including in submarine capability and the integration onto modern Chinese combat aircraft and transport aircraft of domestically produced military-grade jet engines. Tensions also rose on the Korean Peninsula. By late October 2022, North Korea had launched more ballistic missiles than in any previous year. These 10 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 activities included, for the first time since 2017, intercontinental ballistic missile-related launches and the launch, in October, of a claimed new intermediate-range ballistic missile; this reportedly overflew Japan. Speculation continued that North Korea was preparing for its seventh nuclear test. Meanwhile, the new South Korean administration has stressed the development of independent national military capabilities and strengthened military cooperation with the US. Large-scale bilateral exercises have resumed, after some years in which these were scaled back to support diplomatic discussions with North Korea. And in July, the government emphasised the importance of South Korea's 'Kill Chain' system and the other two associated systems (Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation and Korean Air and Missile Defense) which had been renamed amid the short-lived thaw in inter-Korean relations after 2018. Meanwhile, the lifting of US-imposed 'missile guidelines' in 2021 has allowed Seoul to accelerate its development of ballistic missiles with two-ton warheads which could help to provide a powerful precision-strike capability. In Japan, the war in Ukraine and Taiwan-related developments influenced the defence policy considerations of the Kishida administration. As anticipated, the government released revised versions of the National Security Strategy, National Defense Program Guidelines and Medium-Term Defense Program at the end of 2022, recasting the latter two as the National Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup Program. The annual defence White Paper noted an 'increasingly severe' security environment and that Japan needed to strengthen its defence capabilities 'dramatically'. Alongside a raft of important defence procurements, including the plan to modify the two Izwmo-class helicopter carriers to allow shipborne F-35B operations, in December it was announced that Japan would join Italy and the United Kingdom in a programme to develop a new sixth-generation combat aircraft. Governments in Asia and elsewhere are continuing to monitor the war in Ukraine for early lessons relating to military capability and also broader national-security issues. The Ukraine war: some early lessons In late 2021 and early 2022, US national-security officials engaged in a series of briefings to Ukrainian and European leaders, relating intelligence assessments about Russia's intent to mount a full-scale invasion. Intelligence assessments were declassified with the judgement that Russia was planning an attack and that Moscow was plotting to stage a 'false flag' attack as a pretext for this. Although for many governments these did not appear to dramatically 'move the needle' in the weeks leading up to 24 February, there is a case to be made that such 'intelligence diplomacy' strategies may in future gain more traction, not least because of what Russia's invasion implied about US intelligence penetration of Russian decision-making circles and the accuracy of its assessment in this case. That said, gaining such information may be more difficult elsewhere. It is unclear whether governments have integrated this rapid declassification process such that it will automatically be employed in the next crisis, or even that they see a requirement for this. Processes have been established that would make it easier to share intelligence assessments and it is becoming easier to share information with trusted partners. Nonetheless, briefings like these, including the declassification of intelligence information and making this available to the public, have value in keeping populations informed and helping to shape narratives. They are particularly valuable when civilians are being asked to endure degrees of hardship because of wars elsewhere, as in the energy crisis in Europe in the winter of 2022. And they are important when civilians receive information from so many sources, some of varied analytical provenance, that can often provide information faster than governments have traditionally been able to, often because they are restricted by classification constraints. Moreover, there has been a wealth of open-source information on the war in Ukraine produced by citizen analysts and private firms, making use of commercially available satellite systems to deliver imagery-based assessments that were until recently the preserve of governments. Questions of analysis The war raises other questions relating to military capability assessments, in that Russia's military power was in many quarters misjudged. A caveat is needed: some elements of the armed forces have been used only sparingly, such as the submarine service, while the strategic-bomber force has for the most part been able to launch its stand-off munitions - even if some of these have appeared to be sub-optimal. However, Russia's military exercises, for instance, were more scripted than they appeared. This was widely understood to be the case for large-scale strategic exercises like Zapad, but not so much for Russia's snap exer- Defence and military analysis: The shadow of war 11 cises - designed to test combat readiness - that had become a feature since Sergei Shoigu became defence minister in 2012. The same goes for Ukraine, where there was generally an underestimation of the capability of its still-nascent non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps and, more broadly, of the fighting potential and 'will' of its armed forces and society. This calls for stricter application of structured analytical techniques to avoid cognitive biases like mirror-imaging. But this is challenging when it is difficult to gain access to armed forces and harder still when these forces are themselves deceived by their own reporting. It calls for techniques, possibly including environmental scanning, that could lead to thorough study of societies as well as their armed forces, and for more regular and more qualitative assessments of military capability. For instance, while Russia has sunk considerable sums into its post-2008 military-modernisation process, it may be that the effectiveness of these investments has been reduced by the impact of Russia's political culture and of corruption. Alongside poor military and political leadership, further revelations of entrenched corruption in Russia's armed forces will not help to improve mutual trust. In advanced Western armed forces this is seen as an important factor in helping to enable effective military leadership at all levels. Indeed, the war has highlighted the importance of the human factor in war and reinforced the value of investing in personnel, including the competence of commanders at all levels and adequate individual and collective training, without which investments in equipment can be wasted. After 2014, Ukraine's armed forces embarked on a programme to train and professionalise its troops, including the development of a professional NCO cadre. With the support of NATO and individual member states, through vehicles such as NATO's Ukraine Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP), four areas were addressed for bilateral support from allies: basic training; train-the-trainer courses; the development of a professional NCO career system; and the creation of professional military education systems for NCOs. Reports on the progress of Ukraine's military reform were in many cases mixed, though the demonstration under fire of Ukraine's military adaptability and resilience indicates not only that more structured analysis would have been helpful here, but also that such reforms can bring results in traditionally hierarchical post-Soviet armed forces. However, it is important to also consider that the impressive performance of Ukraine's forces has been against a Russian adversary that has proven surprisingly poor, so caution should be taken in judging whether all of Ukraine's forces have improved to the same degree, or that they have overcome all of the challenges associated with their post-Soviet heritage. However, in Russia, achieving effective change in this regard will require political will, as well as improvements in education and training. But devolving and encouraging independent decisionmaking seems to conflict with the type of control and governance that has characterised President Putin's rule. This may be a risk in other authoritarian states too, perhaps including China, though circumstances are different there (for instance, China has had prominent anti-corruption initiatives), and again, much depends on the quality of the enemy these forces would face. Nonetheless, this is a problem for the Russian armed forces moving forward. The ground forces now need to rebuild while engaged in a high-intensity fight. Many of its most experienced troops were lost in the early months of the war, and it is unclear not only how Russia will address the issue of adequately training and then integrating new troops into existing units, but also whether its military culture can change enough in future so that its troops can become militarily effective against a peer adversary. Military matters The war in Ukraine has shown how important it is for armed forces to be able to adapt. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces adapted during combat, though with varying degrees of success. After failing in its initial attempt to seize the country with a dispersed set of multiple axes of advance and an optimistic 'thunder run' approach, Russia reshaped its offensives towards the east. Russia's failure to gain control of the air meant it had to resort to greater use of stand-off weaponry and, towards the end of 2022, to augment these with uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) and direct-attack munitions sourced from Iran. Ukraine, for its part, has also rapidly sourced and used direct-attack munitions and has developed a capacity to fuse information from small UAVs to improve the capability of its artillery forces. It also dispersed its air force and maintained combat effectiveness and has also developed a capability to attack Russian targets at-reach using UAVs and missiles. These include the attacks on the Russian Black Sea 12 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Fleet flagship Moskva and some of Russia's strategic-bomber bases, and at closer ranges using direct-attack munitions. Attacks like these have highlighted risks to static locations including supply bases and headquarters and also troop concentrations; it appears to be increasingly difficult to hide on the battlefield. The war has also been a stark reminder of the importance of magazine depth, evidenced by high usage rates for guided weapons and artillery ammunition and the severe attrition of armour. It indicates that any future military capability that relies exclusively on precision weapons will not only likely be costly, but will also need careful replenishment planning. This may require some production lines to remain open that would otherwise close, and government and industry to work together on suitable procurement mechanisms. It may also require striking a balance between mass and capability. There is greater concern over supply-chain issues because of the war - concerns which had already been expressed during the coronavirus pandemic. There are now additional concerns relating to sourcing and traceability in the lower levels of the supply chain. Along with interest in supply chain assurance, this is also leading to a reconsideration in some countries over what supply chains and components may need to be onshored. At the same time, industrial capacity issues highlight potential near-term difficulties in increasing production to replace Western materiel supplied to Ukraine. Moreover, concerns over supply-chain vulnerabilities form only one aspect of resilience. There is also now greater focus than for decades on the resilience of critical national infrastructure and of societies to state-based threats, including from physical attack as well as from cyber and broader disinformation threats. However, effectively tackling these challenges requires long-term government attention, including in the education sphere, and a joined-up approach within government and between government, the private-sector business community and broader society. The war has illustrated the continuing importance of the combined-arms approach to warfare -including the integration of UAV and counter-UAV capabilities into land units, and also how increasingly pervasive surveillance can pose risk for manoeuvre forces. Furthermore, it has highlighted the importance of long-range precision artillery and also the armour versus anti-armour fight. Fitting active-protection systems to armoured vehicles can reduce the threat from anti-armour systems, but not eliminate it. Urban operations have highlighted the continued importance of capabilities, and training, suitable for this terrain. Meanwhile, the war suggests that both unguided and smart ammunition have complementary roles. Large amounts of both conventional unguided ammunition and precision weapons have been expended. Anti-armour weapons illustrate the benefits but also the costs of precision, with concerns expressed not only over whether Ukraine may run out of stocks of Western supplied anti-armour systems, but also about national stocks and defence-industrial capacity in countries that have supplied such systems to Ukraine. Neither combatant in Ukraine has secured overall air superiority. Ground-based air defence has proved effective in limiting freedom of action and losses have been inflicted, while Russia's comparative lack of modern short- and medium-range air-launched precision-guided munitions has been exposed. The importance of ISR has also been highlighted, alongside the ability to rapidly distribute information from the sensor to the shooter. And the vulnerability of helicopters to air defences has been apparent on both sides. But while air forces have looked to the war for lessons in 2022, some key developments in aerospace technology have more direct relevance elsewhere. The unveiling in December of the new US strategic bomber, the B-21, was clearly focused on Asia-Pacific contingencies; it was anticipated that China's next-generation bomber would also be shown. In areas such as combat-aircraft design and manufacture, a problem for Washington's allies and partners is that its requirements mean its designs will be at a price point that few of them will be willing or able to accept. In turn, this may lead groups of nations to team up in order to deliver advanced capabilities. However, the more diverse their requirements, the harder it will be to produce systems on time that are affordable and able to meet all their needs. In the maritime domain, Russia's navy has been embarrassed by Ukrainian tactics, but it was not really configured to face an opponent with very limited naval capability but adept at using naval guerrilla tactics. Rather, it was designed to hold at bay an opponent with significant naval dependence. For all the setbacks, Russia was at the end of 2022 still essentially enforcing a distant blockade of Ukraine's trade. This underscores global energy and resource interdependence, and the importance of maritime trade flows and sea lanes of communi- Defence and military analysis: The shadow of war 13 cation, as well as the potential of blockades. More broadly, for navies as for land and air forces, Ukraine has brought home the need to consider attrition, magazine depth and sustainment ability. It has also brought home the threat of unconventional tactics and emerging technologies, and critical undersea infrastructure vulnerabilities. Money counts In the wake of the disruption caused by the corona-virus pandemic, the global economic climate is again fraught. Surging inflation, commodity-price spikes, supply-chain crises and heightened economic uncertainty resulting from Russia's invasion of Ukraine have derailed an economic recovery that, in some countries, was far from complete. Inflation rates increased globally in 2021 as a result of higher energy costs, a recovery in demand and ongoing pandemic-related supply-chain disruptions. The war had led some countries in Europe to increase their defence spending, and others elsewhere to take the opportunity to revise defence strategies. In 2022, around 20 countries in Europe pledged to increase defence spending, with varying degrees of size and immediacy. Nonetheless, the difficult global economic environment that will persist in the short term will impose constraints on public expenditure, not least the higher cost of debt financing in light of increased interest rates designed to curb inflation. Global defence expenditure grew in nominal terms in 2021 and 2022 but higher rates of inflation meant expenditure fell in real terms in both years. In recent years, high inflation eroded defence spending in real terms in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa and Russia and Eurasia, but this trend is now more widespread. Europe and Asia were the only regions globally to continue to exhibit defence-spending growth in real terms in 2021 with Russia and Eurasia joining them in 2022 as war fuelled above-inflation increases in the region. For some governments, such as those in Europe and Asia, security challenges continue to sharpen even as the value of their defence investments is being undercut. This makes it more important not only to spend wisely and ensure that procurements deliver on time and on budget, but also to see that full use is made of the possibilities deriving from collaborative equipment development and from defence and military partnerships. ChapterTwo: Defence budgets and expenditure 1. United States' Top 15 defence budgets in 2022 (USDbn) 2. China 3. Russia" 11. South Korea 43.0 12. Australia 33.8 31.1 45.6 14. Canada 24.6 4. United Kingdom0 70.0 7. Germany 53.4 10. Iran 44.0 United Other Rest 15. Brazil States top 15 of the countries world 23.0 a0MB adjusted figure. "Total defence expenditure including military R&D funding, military pensions, paramilitary forces' budgets, and other MoD-related expenses such as housing. 'Includes Armed Forces Pension Scheme and military aid to Ukraine, excludes security expenditure. Note: Unless otherwise indicated, US dollar totals are calculated using average market exchange rates for 2022, derived using IMF data. The relative position of countries will vary not only as a result of actual adjustments in defence spending levels, but also due to exchange-rate fluctuations between domestic currencies and the US dollar. The use of average exchange rates reduces these fluctuations, but the effects of such movements can be significant in a number of cases. Dashed line reflects an estimate for the value of the Chinese and Russian defence budget in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms to take into account the lower input costs in these countries. These PPP figures are not used in any regional or global totals in this publication and should not be used in comparison with other international data. ©HSS 2022 Top 15 defence budgets as a % of GDP* Oman Kuwait Algeria Jordan Saudi Mali Morocco Israel Armenia Russia UAE Qatar Azerbaijan Greece Cambodia Arabia • • • 5.9% 5.0% 4.8% 4.8% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.3% 4.2% 4.1% 4.0% 3.8% 3.8% 3.5% 3.5% ©IISS Planned global defence spending by region 2022T* Latin America and the Caribbean, 2.6% Asia, 25.7% Middle East and North Africa 9.6% Europe 16.7% Russia and Eurasia, 4.9% Planned defence spending by country 2022* Other Eurasia, 0.5% Russia, 4.4% Other Middle East and North Africa, 7.3% Saudi-- Arabia, 2.3% Other Asia /~~[ 5.8% South ^ Korea, 2.1% Japan, 2.4% India, 3.3% China, 12.1% - Sub-Saharan Africa, 1.0% - Latin America, 2.6% United Kingdom 3.5% Non-NATO--— I * France, 2.7% Europe, 1.3% Other NATO, 7.8% Germany, 2.7% t At current prices and exchange rates * Analysis only includes countries for which sufficient comparable data is available. Notable exceptions include Cuba, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea and Syria. Defence and military analysis: Defence budgets and expenditure 15 Real global defence spending changes by region 2020-22* ■ 2020 nnni 1 1 1 ■ ZUZ 1 ■ 2022 ■ 1 . 1 1 1 ■1. 1 1 J _ ■ 1 II 1 ■II II 1 II II II 1 1 1 1 6 4 2 % 0 -2 -4 -6 North America Europe Russia and Eurasia * Excludes states for which insufficient data is available Asia Middle East and Latin America Sub-Saharan North Africa and the Africa Caribbean Global Impact of inflation on global defence expenditure 2015-22 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Composition of real defence spending increases 2021-22t Other Sub-Saharan Africa, 3.7% Other Russia and Eurasia, 0.6% Other Europe, 12.5% Other Middle East, 1.5% Other Asia, 2.5% Iraq, 3.0% Ethiopia, 3.6% United Kingdom, 4.7% Germany, 4.9% Latin America and the Caribbean, 1.5% China, 15.6% Iran, 8.3% Composition of real defence spending reductions 2021-22t Netherlands, 6.7% Other Sub-Saharan Africa, 0.8% Other Asia, 4.7% Other Latin America and the Caribbean, 0.8% Other Europe, 2.3%, Other Middle East and North Africa, 1.0% Pakistan, 1.2% Israel, 1.6% Mexico, 1.9% Myanmar, 2.1% Brazil, 2.2% Kuwait, 2.7% .Russia and /Eurasia, 1.2% Other North America, 0.3% Saudi Arabia, 8.7% Turkey, 6.9% t At constant 2015 prices and exchange rates ChapterThree North America According to the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), released in unclassified form in October, Russia is an'acute'threat but China is the pacing challenge for the Department of Defense. The modernisation of China's armed forces remains the principal driver of US policy attention and capability development. The US has led the international response to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. US officials have played key roles in coordinating defence assistance to Ukraine, and the US has delivered significant stocks, including anti-armour weapons, various air and missile defence systems, and HARM anti-radiation missiles and artillery (particularly HIMARS rocket artillery). The US Army is focused on regenerating its capability for large-scale combat operations under its Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept. Integrating lessons drawn from Ukraine delayed the official publication of MDO as army doctrine, though the updated document - FM 3-0, Operations - was eventually published in October. The US Navy'Navigation Plan'outlined goals, including 12 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, 66 tactical submarines, 96 large and 56 small surface combatants, as part of a force design for 373 crewed vessels, plus approximately 150 uninhabited surface and subsurface platforms, to be achieved by 2045. The US Air Force unveiled the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider bomber in December 2022, but a timeline for the public display of a prototype crewed element of the Next-Generation Air Dominance project remains unclear. The FY2023 DoD budget request prioritises the Pentagon's plan to build advantage by investing in innovation and modernisation as well as industrial capability.The Pentagon is also looking to improve recruitment and retention, and the FY2023 budget includes a 4.6% pay raise for both military and civilian personnel. Canada and the US agreed to upgrade infrastructure and systems associated with the North American Aerospace Defense Command. US cruisers, destroyers and frigates, 2014-22 Active military personnel (25,000 per unit) I Cruisers ■ Destroyers ■ Frigates 120 100 80 60 40 20 nmmmmmm mmmmm Global total 20,773,950 m us 1,359,600 Canada 66,500 2014 2016 2018 2020 2021 2022 I Regional 6.9% total I 1,426,100 Regional defence policy and economics Arms procurements and deliveries Armed forces data section 18 ► 29 ► 32 ► US F-35 numbers, 2014-22 350 300 250 200 150 100 I Air Force (F-35A) ■ Naval Aviation (F-35C) I Marine Corps Aviation (F-35B) ■ Air National Guard (F-35A) I Marine Corps Aviation (F-35C) ion (F-35C) _I_ Guard (F-35A) M B~ ■ || I I. 2014 2016 2018 2020 2021 2022 United States: selected tactical combat aircraft, 2014-22 Advanced I Modern I Ageing I Obsolescent 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Including only Ftr, FGA and Atk aircraft (not incl AC-130J) 2022 US real-terms defence budget trend, 2012-22 Canada real-terms defence budget trend, 2012-22 S 600 ° 400 CO 200 2 60 CO 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 ■■■■■■II 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 18 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 North America Canada and the United States took strides to deepen cooperation over continental defence in 2022. It is increasingly acknowledged that both have important defence and security interests in the Arctic, the Atlantic and the Pacific. The year also saw the release of major strategic documents by the US. The unclassified versions released in the public domain are shorter than the classified versions for government but still contain important insights into US priorities. Washington also released an Arctic strategy. For its part, Canada stepped up its maritime deployments to the Indo-Pacific and Europe and made progress on some key defence acquisitions, such as the future fighter programme. Both nations delivered defence assistance to Ukraine in the wake of Russia's full-scale invasion, with the US leading contributions from NATO Allies and partner states in terms of both political coordination and material assistance. Washington also increased its deployments to Europe, with forces increasing by over 20,000 in 2022. At the same time debates in the US over prioritisation continue, notwithstanding Russia's actions in Ukraine, because of China's military modernisation and deepening concern over its activities in the Indo-Pacific more generally, but particularly in relation to Taiwan. China is Washington's 'pacing challenge' and its principal security concern. Shared continental security concerns led both states to re-establish in 2022 the Cross Border Crime Forum, which includes counter-terrorist and cyber-security collaboration as well as law enforcement cooperation over borders, travel and transportation. Both states, but especially the US, also remain concerned by security challenges from transnational organised criminal groups, including drug cartels active in Latin America. Importantly, Ottawa and Washington in 2022 took steps to upgrade the capabilities of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) following a Joint Statement on NORAD Modernisation in 2021. THE UNITED STATES The Biden administration has led the international response to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, both politically and materially. Well before Moscow's troops crossed their start line, administration officials were briefing Ukraine's leaders with Washington's assessment of President Vladimir Putin's intent, with similar disclosures to other European leaders. And a public campaign saw the rapid declassification of intelligence pointing to indicators of Russian activity, alongside the significant amount of information derived from commercially available sources that was made available by civilian analysts. US officials have played key roles in coordinating defence assistance to Ukraine, and the US has delivered significant stocks including anti-armour weapons, various air- and missile-defence systems, and HARM anti-radiation missiles and artillery - particularly HIMARS rocket artillery. Nonetheless, the president has maintained a solid 'red line' against the commitment of any US forces. Military trainers were withdrawn from Ukraine in advance of 24 February. Meanwhile, the administration has been firm about the US commitment to NATO, deploying additional troops to Romania, Poland and the Baltic states, as well as bolstering the air and naval presence in Europe and being central to the movement to bring Finland and Sweden into the Alliance, following their application to join. According to the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), released in unclassified form in October, Russia is an 'acute' threat, but China is the pacing challenge for the Department of Defense (DoD). Indeed, the report continued, the 'most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security is the PRC's coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences'. The US is concerned by China's policy and military posture in relation to Taiwan, which it sees as part of this broader pattern of destabilising and coercive behaviour. In late October, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Beijing had decided that the status quo over Taiwan was 'no longer acceptable, that they wanted to speed up the process by which they would pursue reunification', with the possibility that if pressure on Taiwan did not speed reunification Beijing could use force to meet North America 19 its goals. Yet this view is not uniformly espoused in the administration, and there remains considerable debate internally over the likelihood of Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the most plausible time period and the form that any such attack might take. While the administration has sent select equipment to Ukraine, but not personnel, the president has leaned in a more assertive direction in East Asia. Without formally abandoning US 'strategic ambiguity' over Taiwan, President Joe Biden had, by October, stated on more than one occasion that he would likely send US combat forces to help Taiwan defend itself in the event of a Chinese attack. The modernisation of China's armed forces remains the principal driver of US policy attention and capability development. Washington believes Beijing 'has modernized and expanded nearly every aspect' of the People's Liberation Army (PL A) and that China is focused on offsetting US military advantage. The NDS says that the PLA is 'rapidly advancing and integrating its space, counterspace, cyber, electronic, and informational warfare capabilities to support its holistic approach to joint warfare', and that it is also speeding and expanding nuclear modernisation. To deliver a force able to 'strengthen and sustain deterrence, and to prevail in conflict if necessary', the DoD says in the NDS that it will prioritise a force that possesses capabilities that can 'penetrate adversary defenses at range', that 'securely and effectively provides logistics and sustainment to continue operations in a contested and degraded environment', that maintains information and decision advantage and is able to rapidly mobilise force and generate combat power. Integrated with the NDS were unclassified versions of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and Missile Defense Review. DoD did not release an unclassified space strategy. The NPR reflects international tensions in its language and also seems to balance the revived move to retire older systems such as the B83 gravity bomb, as well as the cancellation of the development agreed by the Trump administration of the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, with maintenance of other developments agreed during the Trump-era. These include the low-yield warhead for Trident II (the W76-2), the life extension to the B61 gravity bomb (the B61-12) and the developmental Long-Range Standoff weapon. Also prominent were commitments to upgrade all legs of the nuclear triad, make nuclear command and control more resilient, and expand the capability of the National Nuclear Safety Agency to produce 'plutonium pits' for nuclear weapons. For its part, the Missile Defense Review reflected a growing diversity and sophistication of threats, indicating the need for sensors and command-and-control systems to be able to operate more seamlessly and rapidly across the threat landscape, though with minimal detail overall in the unclassified version on plans for meeting these challenges. Meeting ambition A key challenge for the DoD will lie in delivering on the ambitions contained in its strategy documents, not simply in terms of military capability development and maintaining the funding needed to support these but also in relation to the broader capabilities required to support its ambitions - for instance in national defence industry, the supply chain and innovation. Moreover, the DoD and the national security establishment and industry need to meet these requirements at the right timescale - not only during what the Biden administration's 2022 National Security Strategy called the 'decisive decade' of the next ten years, but beyond that. At the same time, it must cope with the prioritisation problem highlighted by actual and potential threats to security in Europe as well as in the Indo-Pacific. But these are not new problems. And much of the rhetoric in the Biden administration's strategic documents will be familiar to readers of recent versions, even if there was more on the importance of allies and partners than before. Indeed, in early November 2022, Under Secretary of Defense Colin Kahl described the 2022 NDS as in some ways just the next iteration of the 2018 version, issued under the leadership of president Donald Trump and secretary of defense Jim Mattis. But after nearly two years in office, perhaps the most striking aspect of the Biden administration's defence and military policy, under Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, is its broad continuity - from the Trump administration as well as the last major military initiatives of the Obama years and the bipartisan agreement on how to size, structure, modernise and fund the US defence establishment. In practical terms, these conceptual and rhetorical initiatives help justify the significant emphasis on research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E). The RDT&E budget is now greater than USD130 billion annually, an historic high that considerably exceeds the full investment budget of the rest of NATO combined. These investments 20 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 have reached such a scale largely because systems that have been at the conceptual or laboratory level for years are now reaching advanced prototyping and field-testing phases, with low-level production to follow. Investments have also led to the creation of a Pacific Deterrence Initiative to complement the European Deterrence Initiative developed after Russia's aggressions against Ukraine from 2014. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative's funding stands at about USD6bn compared with USD4bn for Europe in the president's 2023 budget request. The plan helps with infrastructure modernisation, enhanced training initiatives - including in the Indo-Pacific with the other 'Quadrilateral Security Dialogue' nations of India, Japan and Australia - and greater targeted experimentation and research (including with Australia and the United Kingdom under the AUKUS arrangement of 2021). To date, however, it has not led to significant changes to US posture, at least in the broader Indo-Pacific. Modest alterations continue, such as deployment changes of a few thousand troops at most in Guam and in Australia. Moreover, according to analysts, it remains unclear if the Pentagon is moving quickly enough to address acute gaps and vulnerabilities, such as shortages of sensors and munitions that would be useful in helping Taiwan fend off possible Chinese attack and vulnerabilities in military and national infrastructural command and control, or alternatives to forward-located airfields and aircraft carriers that could survive possible Chinese pre-emption in any war. Meanwhile, the documents also note the challenge from what the NDS termed 'persistent threats' from North Korea, Iran and violent extremist organisations. Their persistence perhaps helps explain why the shift towards great-power competition has been constrained in scope, pace, and overall strategic effect within the DoD. Under the updated force-planning construct, the joint force is intended to 'simultaneously defend the homeland, maintain strategic deterrence and deter and, if necessary, prevail in conflict'. However, the precise force-sizing construct remains unclear from the public document. Risk-mitigation efforts 'rooted in integrated deterrence' are seen as key to deterring 'opportunistic aggression' if the US is involved in an 'all domain conflict'. Cooperation with allies is seen as key, as is the US nuclear deterrent and other capabilities such as space and cyber. But the force is also meant to have the ability to 'respond to small-scale, short-duration crises without substantially impairing high-end warfighting readiness'. Washington is looking to build strength in key areas, including surveillance and decision systems, 'particularly in the space domain', hardening its command-and-control networks and developing systems that can 'mitigate adversary anti-access/area-denial capability'. It was noteworthy that the NDS also highlighted the need to improve logistics and sustainment, reinforcing the US ability to 'quickly mobilise and deploy' forces in the face of denial operations. But the sustainment reference points to other concerns, including not only those highlighted by growing strategic competition with China but also those deriving from the war in Ukraine, and related to security of supply and weapons stocks. It is significant that in 2022 defence officials have paid numerous visits to US defence plants at varying positions in the supply chain. Measures being considered include mitigating vulnerabilities in the current supply chain and improving innovation and planning for procurement mechanisms that can help industry develop or maintain the capability to boost production. But although investments may be growing, and US strategic logic increasingly shifts to a paramount focus on China, there remains much continuity in force structure and in strategy. While the defence debate suggests a desire for greater change, actual adjustments have so far occurred more slowly. This may change with the influx of greater resources into the Pentagon. Since the mid-20ios, there has been a notable defence-budget build-up in the US. The process began under former secretary of defense Mattis, whose 2018 NDS called for 'additional resources in a sustained effort to solidify our competitive advantage'. That objective has been largely attained over the ensuing half decade even if, during the Biden years, it has been sustained more by Congress than by the administration. Vast spending on COVID-19 relief made it hard even for fiscal hawks and defence doves to turn off the tap, while inflation pressures have further strengthened the argument in the course of 2022 for large defence outlays. And Congress has added tens of billions of dollars to the requested defence budget in each of the first two years of the Biden presidency. Nonetheless, these sums need to be focused correctly, provide quality and quantity, and deliver on the range of technologies and systems for this and the next generation of US armed forces. North America 21 US Army The US Army is focused on regenerating its capability for large-scale combat operations under its Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept. These plans pre-date Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but that conflict has influenced thinking in key areas. These include the importance of being able to conduct effective combined-arms warfare at scale, precision long-range firepower and mobile air- and missile-defence capabilities. Integrating lessons drawn from Ukraine delayed the official publication of MDO as army doctrine, though the updated document - FM 3-0, Operations - was eventually published in October. Moving into 2022, the army had already identified a number of 'critical gaps' in the design of its current divisional structures, and new divisional structures proposed under its Waypoint 2028-2029 initiative are intended to help overcome these shortcomings. Under these proposals, the 1st Cavalry Division (and likely the 1st Armored Division) will restructure as 'Penetration Divisions', each retaining three Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), but with the addition of an organic engineering brigade, a dedicated division-level armoured cavalry squadron and an extra artillery battalion to be equipped with the forthcoming 155mm M1299 Extended Range Cannon Artillery system. These changes are intended to make the revised formations better able to conduct breakthrough operations against peer opponents in defensive positions. The Army National Guard is also expected to form its own Penetration Division, with the realignment of existing brigades under the 34th Infantry Division's headquarters. The remaining nine active force ABCTs and medium-weight Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) based in the continental US (CONUS) seem set to be redistributed into three 'heavy divisions' comprising two ABCTs and one SBCT each. These divisions will lack the dedicated division-level assets available to the two Penetration Divisions and serve instead as general-purpose heavy armoured and mechanised formations. With the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle programme still in the prototyping stage, and not expected to begin being issued to units until 2029, the army is now taking delivery of upgraded M2A4 Bradley variants, and the first unit set was issued in early 2022. Development efforts in the Robotic Combat Vehicle uninhabited ground vehicle programme have been refocused, with work on medium-weight fire-support platforms deferred in favour of lighter, reconnaissance-oriented systems. Under Waypoint 2028-2029, the 10th Mountain and 25th Infantry Divisions will likely become 'Light Divisions' and the 82nd Airborne and 101st Air Assault Divisions 'Joint Forcible Entry Divisions'. All of these divisions will receive a new light tank battalion operating the General Dynamics Griffin II design selected to fulfil the Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) programme requirement in June 2022. Original plans to assign an MPF company to each Brigade Combat Team have been dropped following concerns about overloading brigade headquarters staff. The 82nd and 101st will also receive a dedicated cavalry squadron for divisional reconnaissance, but the Light Divisions will not. The newly formed 11th Airborne Division, created from US Army Alaska in mid-2022, may retain a tailored structure due to its role as the army's dedicated Arctic and extreme cold-weather operations formation. All of the new divisional designs will also receive a new combat support brigade with engineer, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear, military police battalions and a short-range air-defence battalion operating the new M-SHORAD system to counter helicopters and UAVs. M-SHORAD was first fielded in Germany in 2021, and the first CONUS-based M-SHORAD battalions began activating in 2022. The army plans to take delivery of its first platoon of M-SHORAD Increment 2 (Directed Energy) systems by the end of 2022 to go alongside the already-issued production models of the M-SHORAD Increment 1 (Kinetic Effect) system. There has been a significant short-term expansion of the army's presence in Europe following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. By May 2022, this had grown to 45,000 personnel, with a full corps headquarters, two division headquarters, two further ABCTs and one airborne brigade combat team deployed in addition to regular forward-based and rotational forces. Balancing these deployments, the army has also continued to adjust its long-term posture elsewhere. Having previously ended its ABCT rotations to the Middle East, the transfer of the Korea Rotational Force deployment from an ABCT to an SBCT in late 2022 means that the vast majority of the army's heavy armour is now concentrated in Europe and CONUS. In the Pacific, the army has instead focused on lighter forces, and longer-range missile capabilities, with the establishment of an additional brigade-level Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) included 22 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 in the president's FY2023 budget. This third MDTF was officially established in Hawaii at the end of September 2022. The army's new theatre-missile capabilities, including the short-range Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), will not start to be fielded until 2023, although deliveries of the first modernised M270A2 multiple-launch rocket system, one of the intended launch platforms for PrSM, began in mid-2022. The Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft programme, intended to replace the retired OH-58D Kiowa helicopter, appears to be behind schedule, with the competitive demonstration phase now delayed until at least late 2023. On 5 December 2022, the army announced it had selected the Bell-Textron V-280 Valor as their chosen option to replace the ubiquitous UH-60 Black Hawk under the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft programme. US Navy The US Navy is still struggling to deal with the growing challenge from China and multiple other demands. Several proposals to address the navy's future fleet size and structure have been forthcoming. These involve varying combinations of large and small surface combatants and uninhabited vehicles of various descriptions. Perhaps the most notable is the new Navigation Plan from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday. Released in July 2022, the goals outlined included 12 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, 66 tactical submarines, 96 large and 56 small surface combatants (as part of a force design for 373 crewed vessels, to be achieved by 2045), and approximately 150 uninhabited surface and subsurface platforms. Gilday also argued that industrial capacity needs to increase, as it is the greatest obstacle to growing the fleet. However, the US Navy is also facing friction with Congress over its shipbuilding plans and its efforts to decommission older vessels in order to focus on newer capabilities and future programmes. Five of the US Navy's Ticonderoga-dass cruisers were among the ships decommissioned in FY2022, and nearly 40 more vessels are slated by the navy for decommissioning in FY2023, although Congress was seeking to prevent a significant number of these planned retirements. All the Ticonderogas are scheduled to leave the fleet by 2027, a significant loss of vertical launch system firepower that will not be replaced straight away by the arrival of new Flight III Arleigh Burke-dass destroyers, despite various proposals to try to accelerate destroyer construction. In 2022, one new destroyer commissioned up to November, while two Flight IV Virginia-dass nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines joined the fleet, plus the 12th San Antonio-class landing platform dock, to a slightly improved design. A keel-laying ceremony took place in June 2022 for the first of the new Columbia-dass nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines, although concerns are mounting as to whether these vessels - the navy's top procurement priority - will remain on schedule. The ceremonial keel laying for the third Gerald R. Ford-class carrier, the new USS Enterprise, took place in August. The same month, construction began on the first of the Constellation-dass frigates. Efforts to maintain and refurbish the existing fleet continue to be challenged by high operational demands as well as maintenance backlogs. The Ukraine war saw the extended deployment to the Mediterranean of an aircraft carrier (initially the USS Harry S. Truman, replaced by the USS George H. W. Bush), while in early 2022 the navy surged four additional destroyers into the European theatre. Separately, in June, the Biden administration announced that two additional destroyers would be forward deployed to Europe, bringing the total forward-deployed presence to six. In the Indo-Parific, deployments remained at a high tempo, including a number of freedom-of-navigation transits of the Taiwan Strait during 2022. The latest Rim of the Pacific exercise included significantly greater integration of uninhabited platforms. The LHA USS Tripoli also carried out a further test of the 'Lightning carrier' with a record 20 Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II aircraft aboard, potentially adding options to US Navy aviation operations at sea. The latest update to the US Marine Corps' Force Design 2030 plan to make the force more agile included an increased emphasis on reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance to both strike and hide. The first Marine Littoral Regiment was formed in March with the re-designation of the 3rd Marine Regiment. The plan intends to make the marines more expeditionary, more focused on long-range missile strikes, less dependent on centralised command, control, communications and intelligence support, and generally more focused on China. The USMC is looking to diversify its footprint in the Asia-Pacific region in particular, and the goals of USMC Commandant General David Berger include North America 23 helping joint-force commanders better monitor China and deter it from committing various 'gray zone' micro-aggressions as well as possible larger attacks in places such as Taiwan. The plan received considerable criticism from a number of senior retired USMC officers. Differences between the navy and the marines also appeared to be holding up plans for a new light amphibious ship for dispersed operations, particularly in the Pacific. For the US Coast Guard, top procurement priorities are a new class of medium-sized Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs) and new icebreakers. After delays, the first of up to 25 OPCs was due for completion in late 2022. A detailed design and construction contract for a second new heavy icebreaker, or Polar Security Cutter, was awarded at the end of 2021, with the first ship scheduled for delivery in the spring of 2025. US Air Force The US Air Force turned 75 in 2022, while the average age of a key fleet component - the Boeing KC-135 tanker - is 59. Although the KC-135 is a comparative outlier, the air force continues to grapple with the challenges of recapitalising a swathe of ageing types in its combat and support fleets at the same time as attempting to build combat capacity. There remains also a 1,650 shortfall in pilots and the wider demands of recruitment and retention. The USAF continues to view China as the pacing challenge, but it is also confronted by the 'acute threat' of Russia. While the latter is more immediate, the former is more sustained and technologically demanding. Russia's war on Ukraine has reinforced concerns over Moscow's willingness to use military force, but the performance of its Aerospace Forces (VKS) in the conflict has so far been lacklustre at best. The USAF is trying to employ a strategy centred on combat aircraft fleets to address the immediate challenge of Russia and the longer-term and more demanding issue of the build-up of Chinese airpower. It is far from a simple task, with the confluence of several long-term issues compounding the difficulty. The combat aircraft fleet continues to decline in number and, along with the overall cut, the service will also see the number of types fielded reduced to four, the latter by design. Combat aircraft types will be reduced to the Boeing F-15EX Eagle II, Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon, Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II, and Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft. The F-15C/D Eagle, F-15E Strike Eagle and Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor will be retired over the course of the next decade or so. The air force's plan to cut the size of the F-22A fleet, removing 33 Block 20 aircraft during FY2023 to free up additional funding for NGAD, met with political opposition. The fall in total fleet numbers is due to ongoing and historical issues with the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II. The aircraft's entry into service was delayed by years and it is now being bought at lower production rates than first envisaged. The F-35A, however, will provide a central element of the mass of the air force's future combat capability. Before then, however, several technical and financial concerns will need to be addressed. The air force is looking to the Block 4 development of the aircraft, combined with Technical Refresh 3 to allow the F-35 to operate against the advanced threats now envisaged. The air force has cautioned that these aircraft need to be affordable and delivered in time. While there has been no indication yet of when a prototype, or prototypes, of the crewed element of NGAD will be made public, roll-out of the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider bomber took place in December 2022. As of September 2022, six test aircraft were on the production line. The B-21 will operate alongside the KC-135 which, irrespective of its age, will remain in the inventory beyond 2040. The McDonnell Douglas KC-10 Extender, operated in far smaller numbers, will be retired during FY2024. The KC-46A has now been cleared to refuel both the F-22A and F-35 (currently up to 97% of US aircraft) and was deployed on operations to Europe and the Middle East in 2022. However, the revised refuelling vision system required for initial operating capability (IOC) has been delayed again, this time to October 2025. Despite this, the USAF is reportedly considering dropping the KC-Y tanker programme contest altogether and bringing forward the planned KC-Z programme instead. The first of 351 T-7A Red Hawk training aircraft, intended to replace the T-38C Talon, was delivered in April 2022. Boeing also delivered the first test MH-139A helicopters in August 2022 following a lengthy Federal Aviation Administration certification process. The MH-139 will replace the USAF ICBM force's venerable UH-iN models. The HH-60W Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) programme of record was cut by one-third in the president's FY2023 budget (from 113 to 75 helicopters) as the USAF reportedly re-examines its future CSAR requirements. This, in turn, has significantly increased the HH-6oW's unit cost. 24 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 The USAF expects to divest an initial batch of A-io attack aircraft in 2023, although retiring the whole fleet remains politically contentious. Nearly the entire C-130H fleet remained grounded well into October due to engine issues. The AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile has not yet officially achieved its projected 2022 IOC, although it is reportedly in live-fire testing. The hypersonic AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) achieved its first successful live firings from a B-52 bomber in summer 2022, but the USAF has delayed any production decision on the system to 2023. In late 2022 the USAF selected a Raytheon and Northrop Grumman team to develop prototypes of its planned scramjet Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile design. Supply-chain issues delayed the planned launch of 28 Tranche o small satellites as part of the USSF proliferated low Earth orbit constellation test and demonstration phase from September 2022 to perhaps March 2023. Earlier in 2022, the USSF awarded contracts for the follow-on Tranche 1 satellites for the communications Transport Layer and missile-warning Tracking Layer constellations. DEFENCE ECONOMICS On 28 March 2022, the DoD submitted its Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 budget request to Congress with a top line DoD budget of USD773bn. Biden called the request 'one of the largest investments in our national security in history'. The proposed discretionary budget request included USD2cj.8bn for Department of Energy atomic-energy defence activities and USDio.6bn for 'defense-related activities' carried out by the FBI and other government agencies. Defence-related discretionary spending amounts to USD8i3bn, with total DoD funding reaching USD827bn when mandatory spending is included. Inflation, growth and purchasing power According to the DoD announcement, the USD773bn top line request constitutes a 4.1% increase over the enacted 2022 defence budget of USD742bn, which itself included USD25.6bn in additional funding over President Biden's FY2022 request. However, some have questioned the accuracy of the announced 4.1% increase due to two developments that complicate year-on-year comparisons. Firstly, Washington authorised USDi4.3bn in supplemental defence spending during FY2022, which was tied to the US armed forces' withdrawal from Afghanistan (USD6.5bn), support for Ukraine (USD6.5bn) and other priorities. This additional spending increased the FY2022 DoD budget from USD742bn to USD757bn. Against this number, the Biden administration's FY2023 DoD budget only constitutes a 2.2% increase over FY2022. However, it is possible that additional DoD funds will be used to support Ukraine in FY2023, as the war has become a strategic priority for the Biden administration. In May, Congress passed a USD4obn Ukraine aid package that provided a framework for continuing military, economic and humanitarian support. In September, the administration requested an additional USDn.7bn for Ukraine as part of an emergency funding package to hedge against the likelihood of a 'continuing resolution', or temporary funding measure, starting in FY2023. Even more important to the discussion of year-on-year growth is the impact of inflation on budget growth and purchasing power. Inflation estimates for the FY2023 budget request are tied to the GDP Price Index and an assumed average inflation rate of 2.2% during 2023. The defence budget's buying power will be eroded if inflation exceeds 2.2% on average over the course of 2023, as other indices and forecasts suggest. Table 1 The US DoD budget request by appropriation title, USDm Requests/ 2022 DoD 2022 2023 DoD Change Enacted budget Requested Base Base between by Appropriation Enacted Requested FY2022 Title (USDm) Enacted and FY23 Requested Military Personnel 163,699 166,714 173,883 +7,169 Operations and Maintenance 292,299 294,550 309,343 +14,793 Procurement 143,256 145,212 145,939 +727 Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation 107,456 118,787 130,097 +11,310 Military Construction 7,143 13,375 10,198 -3,177 Family Housing 1,401 1,525 1,956 +431 Revolving Management and Trust Funds 1,394 2,112 1,583 -529 Totals 716,648 742,275 773,000 +30,725 Source: Defense Comptroller, FY23 Defense Budget Overview Book, Appendix A, April 2022 North America 25 3.37 3.54 3.49 3.71 3.30 3.06 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 [1] Figures refer to the National Defense (050) Budget Function (Budget Authority) as a % of GDP A Figure 1 US defence budget as % of GDP1 As the FY2023 budget passed through Congress, various uplifts were proposed for the defence budget amid concerns over the effects of inflation on the DoD's purchasing power and on its ability to meet the challenges of an increasingly tense security environment. During summer 2022, three of the four congressional committees charged with marking up the administration's FY2023 budget recommended funding increases ranging from USD37bn to USD44bn. The House and Senate armed services committees agreed on the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on 6 December with a final figure of USD878bn for defence, USD45bn above the presidential request. However, Congress failed to pass the FY2023 spending bill by 30 September 2022, the end of the US fiscal year. Instead, it enacted a continuing resolution that would maintain funding levels for all government departments until 16 December 2022. The resolution also prevents the DoD from using the level funding for new or accelerated production or certain multi-year procurements. Pacing, acute and persistent challenges The FY2023 budget is linked to the threat perceptions and objectives articulated in the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and the NDS. A classified version of the NDS was sent to Congress on the same day as the FY2023 budget was released in March 2022, with the unclassified version released in October. According to the budget-release document and March 2022 NDS fact sheet, the USD773bn proposed budget is principally designed to provide the capabilities to deter and compete with China -identified as the United States' 'most consequential strategic competitor' and pacing challenge. The budget must also balance the Pentagon's focus on China with the need to meet other kinetic and non-kinetic threats to the US homeland as well as US allies, interests and personnel. For its part, Russia constitutes an immediate and acute threat, while the NDS summary and budget document commit the US to working with NATO allies and Kyiv to repel Russia's invasion of Ukraine. 'Persistent threats' from Iran, North Korea and violent extremist groups are also of concern as are pandemics and other 'transboundary challenges'. The budget '[devotes] more than USD3bn to address the effects of climate change' by improving installation resilience and adaptation to climate challenges. Integrated deterrence, campaigning and building advantage The FY2023 budget request stresses three activities and investment areas central to realising the NDS. Integrated deterrence - a point of emphasis for the DoD throughout the Biden administration - revolves around integrating and coordinating activities across all domains and all instruments of national power. In the FY2023 defence budget, integrated deterrence is supported through emphasis on the modernisation, development and procurement of capabilities in several areas. Most notably, the FY2023 budget allocates USD344bn to modernise all three legs of the US nuclear triad - up from USD27.7bn in the FY2022 request. It also includes USD24.7bn in funding for capabilities to defend against and defeat missile threats, up from USD20.4bn in the FY2022 DoD request. Meanwhile, key FY2023 investments in campaigning (which the NDS describes as 'the conduct and sequencing of logically linked military activities to achieve strategy-aligned objectives over time') include the USD6.ibn Pacific Deterrence Table 2 US DoD FY2023 budget request vs House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees' proposed defence budgets, USDbn Committee / Organisation Recommended DoD Budget House Appropriations Committee 762 billion Department of Defense Request 773 billion House Armed Services Committee 839 billion Senate Armed Services Committee 847 billion Senate Appropriations Committee 850 billion Source: "Senate appropriators seek S850 billion for defense, largest total of 4 key committees", Breaking Defense, 28 July 2022 26 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Initiative and the USD4.2bn European Deterrence Initiative, both of which intersect with the broader integrated deterrence approach. The FY2023 DoD budget request also prioritises DoD's plan to build advantage by investing in innovation and modernisation as well as industrial capability. The DoD's RDT&E requests have been important in funding modernisation projects in recent years. The FY2023 RDT&E request, at USDi3obn, was USDnbn higher than the USDncjbn enacted in FY22, itself a record amount. Priorities within this broad category of spending include investment in science and technology, artificial intelligence, microelectronics, 5G, and an Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) programme to strengthen the US defence-related supply chain. The FY2023 budget's IBAS programme will focus on building capacity in chemical production, bio-manufacturing and rare-earth element supply chains. A people-friendly budget The Pentagon is also looking to improve recruitment and retention, and the FY2023 budget includes a 4.6% pay rise for military and civilian personnel - the largest in 20 years for military personnel - among several other programmes to 'cultivate [the US] military and civilian workforce, grow [DoD] talent, build resilience and force readiness'. The pay rise and funding of a USDi5/hour minimum wage for the federal workforce also serves as a measure to offset the effects of what could be a prolonged period of inflation volatility. Personnel investments also include several measures to 'ensure accountable leadership' and build a more diverse and equitable workforce. These include USD479 million to implement the recommendations of the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Table 3 The US DoD total budget request by military service, USDm Requested/ Enacted budget by service (USDm) FY22 Enacted FY2023 Requested Budget (USDm) Difference between FY2022 and FY2023 % of Total Base Topline Request for FY2023 Army 174,854 177,315 +2,461 22.9 Navy 221,302 230,848 +9,546 28.9 Air Force 222,279 234,116 +11,837 30.3 Defense Wide 138,125 130,721 -7,404 16.9 Total 756,560 773,000 +16,640 100 Source: Defense Comptroller, FY23 Defense Budget Overview Book, Appendix A, April 2022 Military; USD34m to help the DoD deter, detect and address 'extremism in the ranks'; and development and implementation of talent-management initiatives that improve racial and gender diversity at key points in the military-career lifecycle. Military departments and armed services The F Y2023 request reveals uplifts to the budgets of the DoD's military departments, though the Department of the Air Force (including the US Space Force (USSF)) and the Department of the Navy (including the US Marine Corps (USMC)) receive significantly larger increases than the Department of the Army. The Department of the Air Force technically has the highest budget and received the biggest increase in funding, at USDn.8bn. Modernisation efforts across both the US Air Force (USAF) and the USSF are crucial to supporting the air force's seven 'operational imperatives': 1) establishing space resiliency; 2) achieving an operationally optimised Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), the air force's contribution to the DoD's Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2); 3) advancing development of the sixth-generation Next Generation Air Dominance family of systems; 4) achieving more target engagements at scale; 5) defining optimised, resilient basing, sustainment and communications; 6) defining the family of systems supporting the B-21 long-range strike capability; and 7) transitioning to a wartime posture against a peer competitor. Nonetheless, funding issues threaten to slow air force and space force modernisation precisely as there is increasing demand for USAF capabilities to help maintain deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. It should also be noted that the overall Department of the Air Force FY2023 budget is distorted by USD40.2bn in pass-through funding (USD4i.4bn in FY22), which is allocated to, but not controlled by, the USAF and which usually funds classified or non-disclosed programmes. Moreover, of the remaining USDi94bn, USDiyobn goes to the air force (22% of the total FY2023 budget request) while USD24.5bn (3% of the total budget request) goes to the space force. This means the overall USAF budget is less than that of the US Army. As a result, the USAF is increasingly looking to divest legacy systems to free up funds to reinvest in more modern capabilities. The FY2023 budget calls for the retirement of 150 aircraft, the transfer of 100 MQ-9 Reaper uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) to another government agency, as well as the divestment of 1,463 aircraft during the Future Years North America 27 Defense Program (FYDP). The same FYDP calls for the procurement of just 467 aircraft, just under 90 of which are to be procured in FY2023, including 15 F-35A and F-15EX combat aircraft. The FY2023 budget increases the Department of the Navy's budget by USD9.5bn over the enacted FY2022 budget with more funding across military personnel, maintenance and operations, procurement, and RDT&E. Procurement funding is set at USD27.9bn for nine battle-force ships, including two Block V Virginia-class attack submarines, two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, one Constellation-class frigate, incremental funding for the Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarine, and four support and logistics ships. Another USDi6.8bn is dedicated to the procurement of 96 fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and uncrewed aircraft with plans to buy 15 F-35BS and 13 F-35CS. The budget also includes USD4.7bn for weapons procurement. As with the USAF, the US Navy (USN) and the USMC budgets include platform retirements to free up funds for modernisation. For the USN, the budget envisions the retirement of 12 ships in FY2023 and 24 over the course of the FYDP, including 16 before the end of their service life. The USMC budget stresses the need to continue the retirement of 'legacy capabilities and excess capacity' while the force 'reallocates savings for initiatives that support readiness' and the USMC's Force Design 2030. The Department of the Army budget has the least overall growth, at USD2.5bn. This reflects the continuing transition from 20 years of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations to preparing for high-intensity large-scale operations. Interestingly, even though the RDT&E budget is the highest it has ever been, both army RDT&E and procurement funding have decreased in the FY2023 budget request. Funding for military personnel sees the biggest increase, at USD2.9bn, reflecting the strong emphasis placed in the budget request on 'the army's most enduring advantage': its 'highly qualified and capable people'. The army budget request also Table 4 US National Defense Budget Function and other selected budgets, 2000,2010-23 USD in billions, current-year dollars National Defense Budget Function Atomic Energy Defense Activities Other Defense Activities Total National Defense Department of Homeland Security Department of Veterans' Affairs Total Federal Government Outlays Total Federal Budget Surplus/ Deficit FY BA Outlay BA BA BA Discretionary BA Outlay BA BA 2000 290.3 281.0 12.4 1.3 304.0 300.8 294.4 13.8 45.5 1,789.0 236.2 2010 695.6 666.7 18.2 7.3 721.2 714.1 693.5 45.4 124.3 3,457.1 -1,294.4 2011 691.5 678.1 18.5 7.0 717.0 710.1 705.6 41.6 122.8 3,603.1 -1,299.6 2012 655.4 650.9 18.3 7.7 681.4 669.6 677.9 45.9 124.0 3,526.6 -1,076.6 2013 585.2 607.8 17.5 7.4 610.2 600.4 633.4 61.9 136.0 3,454.9 -679.8 2014 595.7 577.9 18.4 8.2 622.3 606.2 603.5 44.1 165.7 3,506.3 -484.8 2015 570.8 562.5 19.0 8.5 598.4 585.9 589.7 45.3 160.5 3,691.9 -442.0 2016 595.7 565.4 20.1 8.3 624.1 606.8 593.4 46.0 163.3 3,852.6 -584.7 2017 626.2 568.9 21.4 8.7 656.3 634.1 598.7 62.3 178.8 3,981.6 -665.4 2018 694.5 600.7 23.3 9.0 726.8 700.9 631.2 103.0 191.8 4,109.0 -779.1 2019 712.6 654.0 24.0 9.1 745.7 718.8 686.0 61.4 194.2 4,447.0 -983.6 2020 738.8 690.4 26.0 9.7 774.5 756.6 724.6 114.2 233.3 6,553.6 -3,132.4 2021 719.5 717.6 29.4 10.8 759.6 741.7 753.9 123.2 255.4 6,822.4 -2,775.3 2022* 727.0 741.0 29.5 10.1 766.6 753.7 779.7 71.4 257.9 5,851.6 -1,415.0 2023* 784.0 767.6 31.8 11.1 827.0 813.4 808.6 76.5 296.7 5,792.0 -1,153.9 Notes FY = Fiscal Year (1 October-30 September) * (request) 'The National Defense Budget Function subsumes funding for the DoD, the Department of Energy Atomic Energy Defense Activities and some smaller support agencies (including Federal Emergency Management and Selective Service System). It does not include funding for International Security Assistance (under International Affairs), the Veterans Administration, the US Coast Guard (Department of Homeland Security), nor for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Funding for civil projects administered by the DoD is excluded from the figures cited here. 2 Early in each calendar year, the US government presents its defence budget to Congress for the next fiscal year, which begins on 1 October. The government also presents its Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), which covers the next fiscal year plus the following five. Until approved by Congress, the budget is called the Budget Request; after approval, it becomes the Budget Authority (BA). 28 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 mentions the service's leadership in publishing a climate strategy in 2022, its continued focus on the electrification of its vehicle fleet, and efforts to develop and test tactics for Arctic operations. CANADA Canada's defence minister, Anita Anand, said at the June 2022 IBS Shangri-La Dialogue that Canada is 'an Atlantic, Arctic and Pacific nation'. The challenges that this presents for the country were underscored during the year, with perceived security concerns emerging on all three fronts. Following the invasion of Ukraine, the government unveiled in April an uplift of CAD8bn (USD6.3bn) in defence spending over five years. Accompanying the budget move was the announcement of a new defence policy review - billed as an update of the 2017 review proposition entitled 'Strong, Secure, Engaged' -because of the requirement 'to reassess Canada's role, priorities and needs in the face of a changing world'. In Europe, Canada sought to adjust and bolster, to a degree, its contributions. Its training mission in Ukraine, Operation Unifier, was paused weeks before the start of hostilities with the intention to relocate it outside Ukraine. It was announced in August that up to 225 personnel would resume the training effort based in the United Kingdom, initially for four months. Canadian military aid to Ukraine has included M777 howitzers, replacement barrels and funding for 20,000 rounds of 155mm ammunition. It also redeployed its military air transport detachment in the Middle East of two C-130J Hercules transport aircraft to the UK to help with the Ukraine military aid effort. Under its Operation Reassurance mission to support NATO, Canadian personnel deployed to Poland for several months to support the reception of Ukrainian refugees there. Other modest enhancements included the addition of a battery of four M777 howitzers and personnel to join the 540 Canadian personnel leading the NATO Enhanced Presence Battlegroup in Latvia. Canada also deployed two Halifax-class frigates on NATO operations during 2022 as well as two Kingston-class mine-countermeasures vessels. Ottawa also assigned a CP-140M Aurora (P-3 Orion) Maritime Patrol aircraft to NATO from February to July and deployed from August to December 2022 a new rotation of six CF-18 (F/A-18) Hornet combat aircraft to the enhanced NATO Air Policing Mission in Romania. More broadly for Canada, Russia's 2022 invasion increased security concerns over the Arctic and may have helped to stimulate a renewed focus in Ottawa on the defence and security aspects of Canada's interests there. The significant modernisation and upgrading that Canada announced in June to its NORAD capabilities was partly a reflection of this. The government said it would invest in an Arctic over-the-horizon radar system, a polar over-the-horizon radar system, and a new network of sensors called Crossbow distributed across northern Canada. These plans also reignited debates in Canada over missile defence more broadly. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau attended Canada's signature Arctic exercise Operation Nanook in August. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg undertook his first official visit to Canada's Arctic at the same time. Meanwhile, Canada hosted the first meeting since 2014 of chiefs of defence of Arctic nations (without Russia). The Canadian Navy has enhanced its presence in the region, including extended deployments by the first two of its new Harry DeWolf-class Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships; the third of the class was delivered to the navy in September. Meanwhile, Canada sought to enhance its presence in the Indo-Pacific, including a two-frigate deployment during 2022. One of the ships, HMCS Vancouver, joined a US Navy destroyer on a transit of the Taiwan Strait in September. The same vessel undertook operations to support implementation of UN sanctions against North Korea, maintaining a task also performed by Canadian vessels in previous years. At the end of March, Ottawa finally chose the Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II as its preferred bidder for its future combat aircraft programme. But the delivery targets are challenging, with a requirement for the first nine aircraft to be in service by December 2027 and all 88 of the planned aircraft to be in service by 2031. Concerns remain over costs and the timetable for the navy's new Canadian Surface Combatant, for which Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor with a heavily modified version of the UK Type-26 Global Combat Ship design. Likewise, the new Protector-class Joint Support Ships appeared to be further delayed, with deliveries of the two vessels now expected in 2025 and 2027 respectively. As a result, Canada has extended the lease on its interim converted auxiliary Asterix. North America 29 Arms procurements and deliveries - North America Significant events in 2022 I FEBRUARY LOCKHEED'S AEROJET ACQUISITION FALLS THROUGH 1 Objections by the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) halted Lockheed Martin's (LM) planned USD4.4bn acquisition, through its wholly-owned subsidiary Mizar Sub, of Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings (Aerojet). A month before, the FTC had expressed concern that the buyout might harm competition, saying that Aerojet was the 'last independent supplier of key missile propulsion inputs' including solid propellant rocket motors (SRM). Northrop Grumman is the only other company competing against LM and Raytheon Technologies for missile programme contracts. Industrial consolidation means that Aerojet and Northrop Grumman currently hold over 90% of the SRM market in the US; two decades ago there were six SRM manufacturers. A February 2022 Pentagon report expressed concern regarding a lack of competition in several sectors, including SRM. MARCH CANADA FUTURE FIGHTER DECISION Canada selected the Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II as the preferred bid to replace its ageing fleet of CF-18 Hornets. A contract for 88 aircraft is due to be awarded by the end of 2022. A shortlisting process in December 2021 eliminated Boeing's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, with the final competitors being the F-35 and Saab's Gripen E.The project is valued at CADI 5-19bn (USD11.74-14.87bn) and first deliveries are expected as early as 2025. However, this is not the first time Canada has selected the F-35. It joined the concept phase of the US Joint Strike Fighter programme in 1998 and, while in 2006 it postponed an acquisition decision, Ottawa agreed in July 2010 to buy the aircraft, with deliveries planned from 2016. The deal was cancelled in 2012, reportedly on cost grounds, and since then Canada has acquired 18 F/A-18A/B Hornets from Australia. JAVELIN PRODUCTION RAMPS UP In an interview, the CEO of Lockheed Martin discussed a plan to increase Javelin missile production from 2,100 to nearly 4,000 systems annually. The same month, it was announced that the Javelin Joint Venture (JJV), a partnership between Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Technologies, had been awarded two production contracts, worth USD309m, for Javelin missiles and support functions. After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the US - along with other states - increased the number of Javelin systems that it shipped to Ukraine. In September, another contract, worth USD311m, was awarded for 1,800 Javelins to replenish US Army stocks. Meanwhile, there is focus also on the supplier base, so that firms can not only expand production but also mitigate dependencies on components from overseas. In November 2022, the US government announced that it had so far sent more than 8,500 Javelins to Ukraine. Production increases are also planned elsewhere: for example, the Pentagon is seeking to increase HIMARS production from 60 to 96 units a year. AUGUST F-35 ENGINE DECISION HEATS UP GE Aviation announced that its prototype engine for the Adaptive Engine Transition Program (AETP), the XA100, passed the final tests as part of a USD1.01 bn R&D contract awarded in 2016. The AETP seeks to improve the F-35's power generation, fuel efficiency and operational capability. The XA100 is designed to fit in the F-35A and F-35C without any structural modification, but it is not compatible with the F-35B. GE's competitor Pratt & Whitney supplies the F-l 35, the current F-35 engine, and is developing a modernisation package for it and a new engine prototype, dubbed XA101. Both prototypes are intended to provide 25% more fuel efficiency and 10% more thrust as well as greater power for future software blocks, which will be needed in future F-35 developments. An appraisal of whether the new engine or the upgrade should be pursued is due to be completed by February 2023. Table 5 =■ United States: Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) In 2014, the US cancelled the Ground Combat Vehicle programme, which had been designed to produce a series of replacement armoured vehicles for its Armored and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, including forthe 1980s-era M2 Brad/eyinfantry fighting vehicle. Two years later, the army proposed the NGCV as the replacement programme. Indeed, the NGCV is now envisaged as one of the army's 'big six' modernisation priorities, but it encompasses five programmes at different stages of development. The Bradley replacement effort is now called the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV). This is in the concept-design phase and contracts were awarded to five industry teams in 2021. The army intends to give the next-stage contracts to three teams in 2023 with the aim to award a low-rate initial production (LRIP) contract in 2027. The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) and the Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) programmes are both now in low-rate production. The former will replace support versions of the Ml 13 family of tracked vehicles with five variants and is potentially worth over USD15 billion. The AMPV has an improved version of the Bradley hull and, with approximately 5,000 M113s in US service, the programme has potential for expansion. OMFV and AMPV are direct replacements for systems already in service, but the MPF project is intended to give Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) a direct precision-fire capability that they have not had before. Following a four-and-a-half-year 'middle-tier acquisition-rapid prototyping phase', the army selected General Dynamics' Griffin, which is based on the Austrian-Spanish ASCOD chassis. Vehicles will undergo further tests before unit deliveries begin in 2025. The army has been experimenting with uninhabited ground systems for many years and in 2018 announced that it would pursue a Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV) programme in three weight categories. In 2020, contracts were awarded to two industry teams for experimental prototype trials vehicles in the Light and Medium categories. These trials also featured modified Ml 13 and Sf/y/cervehicles acting as surrogates for Heavy RCVs. In mid-2022, the army announced that it would prioritise the Light variant and use it to inform development of the other two. The least developed, yet potentially most expensive, of these programmes is the Decisive Lethality Platform (DLP), which is intended to replace the Ml Abrams main battle tank. The Abrams'\s currently undergoing SEPv3 upgrades; a further SEPv4 variant is planned later in the decade, and the army is exploring either a further iteration of Abrams or a brand-new design. > 33 -< CD > > z n Programme Classification Replacing Status Quantity to be acquired DoD-estimated total acquisition cost (USD billions) Potential contractors First unit equipped Notes Decisive Lethality Platform (DLP) Main battle tank Ml Abrams Technical-analysis phase tbd tbd Extent of programme likely dependent on RCV-H success Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) Infantry fighting vehicle M2 Bradley Concept-design phase tbd 2029 LRIP decision expected 2027 Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) Armoured personnel carrier (tracked) M113 LRIP 2,897 15.33 BAE Systems Land & Armaments 2023 First LRIP contract awarded February 2019 Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) Light tank New capability LRIP 504 6.65 General Dynamics Land Systems 2025 First LRIP contract awarded June 2022 n: .— -a > Heavy (RCV-H) Heavy uninhabited ground vehicle New capability Tests conducted with surrogate systems tbd tbd To weigh 18.1-27.2 tonnes E " o cc Si Medium (RCV-M) Medium uninhabited ground vehicle New capability Experimental prototype testing tbd tbd To weigh 9.1-18.1 tonnes; EMD decision in FY2024 1> Light (RCV-L) Light uninhabited ground vehicle New capability Experimental prototype testing tbd 2028 To weigh no more than 9.1 tonnes; EMD decision in FY2023 DoD = Department of Defense (US); EMD = engineering, manufacturing and development; tbd = to be decided North America 31 Table 6 1 United States: fixed-wing combat aircraft exports, 2010-22 Country Equipment 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022f Australia F-35A 2 8 8 14 12 12 Denmark S3 F-35A 4 2 Egypt m F-16C/D 7 20 Iraq F-16C/D 4 10 7 6 11 Israel m F-351 2 7 5 6 4 6 3 Italy i F-35A 6* 2* 2* 1* 2* 1* 3* F-35B 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* Japan F-35A 2 3&1* 4* 6* 6* 6* 4* Korea, Republic of • F-15K 2 2 3 F-35A 6 7 11 12 4 Kuwait F/A-18E/F 12 16 Morocco ■ F-16C/D 3 13 6 Netherlands = F-35A 1 1 6&2* 5* 7* 8* Norway F-35A 2 2 6 6 6 6 6 3 Pakistan F-16C/D 14 14 1 Qatar ■ F-15QA 4 4 14 Saudi Arabia B F-15SA 4 29 19 21 11 Singapore H F-15SG 4 2 8 Turkey ia F-16C/D 3 11 F-35A 2 2 United Arab Emirates i_ F-16E/F 3 3 1 United Kingdom SIS F-35B 2 1 5 6 3 1 3 3 3 Total = 579 26 35 34 22 2 6 39 61 62 78 79 78 57 *Final assembly outside the US 'January-October 32 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Canada CAN Canadian Dollar CAD 2021 2022 GDP CAD 2.49tr 2.8 Itr USD 1.99tr 2.20tr per capita USD 52,015 56,794 Growth % 4.5 3.3 Inflation % 3.4 6.9 Def exp [a] CAD 32.8bn 35.5bn USD 26.2bn 27.7bn Def bdgt [b] CAD 29.1 bn 31.5bn USD 23.2bn 24.6bn USD1=CAD 1.25 1.28 [a] NATO figure [b] Department of National Defence and Veterans Affairs Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- 2022 Population 38,232,593 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.1% 2.7% 2.8% 3.4% 23.4% 9.2% Female 7.7% 2.6% 2.7% 3.1% 23.6% 10.8% Capabilities_ Canada's armed forces are focused principally on territorial defence, as well as contributing important capabilities to international missions, chiefly through NATO. The 2017 defence review reaffirmed commitments not only to NATO, but also to modernising capabilities, including cyber power. The review promised to increase regular and reserve forces, with particular enhancements in the areas of cyber and intelligence. In April 2022 the government announced a boost in defence spending over five years as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and a new policy review to update thinking in light of the changed global environment. Canada's deployments, although relatively small in scale, underscore a determination to maintain both international engagement and power-projection capability. Canada's leadership of a NATO bat-tlegroup in Latvia highlights a continuing capability to deploy medium-sized land formations. It has also contributed to NATO's air-policing mission and enhanced its European deployment in April 2022. Meanwhile, the deployments of frigates to the NATO theatre and the Pacific demonstrate continuing blue-water naval capabilities. In March 2022 it extended for a further year its coalition contribution to military capacity-building in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, with most personnel based in Kuwait. In June additional funding was announced including for NORAD modernisation. The 2017 review pledged to finally deliver on a range of delayed procurements. It raised the target for a future fighter capability to 88 aircraft and in March 2022 it was announced that the F-35A Lightning II had been selected. In the interim, Canada has been supplementing its existing fighter force with second-hand Australian F/A-18 Hornets. Despite continuing cost concerns, design work has progressed on the future Canadian Surface Combatant programme, based on the UK Type-26 frigate design, while the navy has received three of its six new Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships intended to enhance its Arctic operating capability. There is renewed focus on recruitment and retention, amid reports of personnel shortages and readiness problems; the Chief of Defence said in October that the force was reconstituting. Canada maintains a well-developed range of mainly small and medium-sized defence firms. The strongest sector is in combat vehicles and components, though the government is using its latest naval procurements to establish a long-term national shipbuilding strategy. ACTIVE 66,500 (Army 22,500 Navy 12,600 Air Force 12,100 Other 19,300) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,500 RESERVE 34,400 (Army 26,800 Navy 4,100 Air 2,000 Other 1,500) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • SPACE SURVEILLANCE 1 Sapphire Army 22,500_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (1st) mech bde gp (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 It inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log bn) 2 (2nd & 5th) mech bde gp (1 armd recce regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 It inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr regt 3 MP pi AIR DEFENCE 1 AD regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 82:42 Leopard 2A4 (trg role); 20 Leopard 2A4M (upgraded); 20 Leopard 2A6M (52 Leopard 1C2 in store) RECCE £120 LAV-25 Coyote IFV 550 LAV 6.0 APC 443 APC (T) 268: 235 M113; 33 M577 (CP) APC (W) 175 LAV Bison (incl 10 EW, 32 amb, 32 repair, 64 recovery) AUV 507: 7 Cougar; 500 TAPV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 23: 5 Buffalo; 18 Wisent 2 ARV 12 BPz-3 Büffel ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS TOW-2 RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 287 TOWED 163 105mm 126: 98 C3 (M101); 28 LG1 Mkll; 155mm 37 M777 MOR 124: 81mm 100; SP 81mm 24 LAV Bison UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light 5 RQ-21A Blackjack Reserve Organisations 26,800_ Canadian Rangers 5,300 Reservists Provide a limited military presence in Canada's northern, coastal and isolated areas. Sovereignty, public-safety and surveillance roles FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 5 (patrol) ranger gp (209 patrols) Army Reserves 21,500 Reservists Most units have only coy-sized establishments FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 10 bde gp HQ MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 18 recce regt (sqn) Light 51inf regt(coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 16 fd arty regt (bfy) 3 indep fd arty bfy 10 cbt engr regt (coy) 1 EW regt (sqn) 4 int coy 10 sigs regt (coy) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 10 log bn (coy) 3 MP coy Royal Canadian Navy 12,600_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 4 SSK 4 Victoria (ex-UK Upholder) (of which 1 in long-term refit) with 6 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 12 FFGHM 12 Halifax with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 2 8-cell Mk 48 mod 0 VLS with RIM-162C ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 CH-148 Cyclone ASW hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 2 PSOH 2 Harry DeWolf (capacity 1 CH-148 Cyclone ASW hel) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 12 MCO 12 Kingston (also used in patrol role) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10 AORH 1 Asterix (Resolve) (capacity 2 CH-148 Cyclone ASW hel) AX 9: AXL 8 Orca; AXS 1 Oriole Reserves 4,100 reservists_ 24 units tasked with crewing 10 of the 12 MCOs, harbour defence & naval control of shipping North America 33 Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) 12,100 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with F/A-18A/B Hornet (CF-18AM/BM) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 2 sqn with CH-148 Cyclone MARITIME PATROL 2 sqn with P-3 Orion (CP-140M Aurora) SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT 3 sqn with AW101 Merlin (CH-149 Cormorant); C-130H/H-30 (CC-130) Hercules 1 sqn with C295W (CC-295) TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with A310/A310 MRTT (CC-150/CC-150T) 1 sqn with KC-130H TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-17A (CC-177) Globemaster 1 sqn with CL-600 (CC-144B) 1 sqn with C-130J-30 (CC-130) Hercules 1 (utl) sqn with DHC-6 (CC-138) Twin Otter TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with F/A-18A/B Hornet (CF-18AM/BM) 1 OCU sqn with C-130H/H-30/J (CC-130) Hercules 1 OCU sqn with CH-148 Cyclone 1 OCU sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) 1 sqn with P-3 Orion (CP-140M Aurora) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 5 sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) 3 (cbt spt) sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) 1 (Spec Ops) sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon -OPCON Canadian Special Operations Command) 1 sqn with CH-47F (CH-147F) Chinook EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 110 combat capable EGA 96: 71 F/A-18A (CF-18AM) Hornet; 25 F/A-18B (CF- 18BM) Hornet ASW 14 P-3 Orion (CP-140M Aurora) SAR 7 C295W (CC-295) TKR/TPT 5: 2 A310 MRTT (CC-150T); 3 KC-130H TPT 42: Heavy 5 C-17A (CC-177) Globemaster III; Medium 26: 7 C-130H (CC-130) Hercules; 2 C-130H-30 (CC-130) Hercules; 17 C-130J-30 (CC-130) Hercules; Light 4 DHC-6 (CC-138) Twin Otter; PAX 7: 3 A310 (CC-150 Polaris); 4 CL-600 (CC-144B/C) TRG 4 DHC-8 (CT-142) HELICOPTERS ASW 22 CH-148 Cyclone MRH 68 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) SAR 14 AW101 Merlin (CH-149 Cormorant) TPT • Heavy 15 CH-47F (CH-147F) Chinook 34 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 RADAR 53 AD RADAR • NORTH WARNING SYSTEM 47:11 AN/FPS-117 (range 200nm); 36 AN/FPS-124 (range 80nm) STRATEGIC 6: 4 Coastal; 2 Transportable AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM BOMBS Laser-guided: GBU-10/-12/-16 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway III Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II INS/GPS-guided: GBU-31 ID AM; GBU-38 ID AM NATO Flight Training Canada_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TRG 45: 26 T-6A Texan II (CT-156 Harvard II); 19 Hawk 115 (CT-155) (advanced wpns/tactics trg) Contracted Flying Services - Southport EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 7 Beech C90B King Air TRG 11 G-120A HELICOPTERS MRH 9 Bell 412 (CH-146) TPT • Light 7 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (CH-139) Canadian Special Operations Forces Command 1,500_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt (Canadian Special Operations Regiment) 1 SF unit (ITF 2) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 CBRN unit (Canadian loint Incident Response Unit -QIRU) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 (spec ops) sqn, with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon - from the RCAF) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE NBC VEHICLES 4 LAV Bison NBC HELICOPTERS • MRH 10 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) Canadian Forces Joint Operational Support Group_ FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr spt coy 1 (close protection) MP coy 1 (joint) sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (spt) log unit 1 (movement) log unit Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,500_ Canadian Coast Guard 4,500_ Ind Department of Fisheries and Oceans; all platforms are designated as non-combatant EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 72 PSOH 1 Leonard J Cowley PSO 1 Sir Wilfred Grenfell (with hel landing platform) PCO 13: 2 Cape Roger; 1 Gordon Reid; 9 Hero; 1 Tanu PBF 1 Response Boat-Medium (RB-M) PB 56: 9 Baie de Plaisance; 9 Type-300A; 36 Type-300B; 1 S. Dudka; 1 Vakta AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 4 UCAC 4 Type-400 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 32 ABU 6 AG 4 AGB 18 AGOS4 HELICOPTERS • MRH 7 Bell 412EP • TPT 19: Medium 1 S-61; Light 18: 3 Bell 206L Long Ranger; 15 Bell 429 DEPLOYMENT_ CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP (Operation Snowgoose) 1 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO (Operation Crocodile) 7 EGYPT: MFO (Operation Calumet) 55; 1 MP team IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 16 KUWAIT: Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact) 200 LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence (Operation Reassurance) 540; 1 mech inf bn HQ; 1 mech inf coy(+); 1 cbt spt coy; LAV 6.0; M777 MALI: UN • MINUSMA (Operation Presence) 5 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO (Operation Jade) 4 POLAND: Operation Unifier 40 (UKR trg) ROMANIA: NATO • Enhanced Air Policing 170; 6 F/A-18A Hornet (CF-18AM) SERBIA: NATO • KFOR • Joint Enterprise (Operation Kobold) 5 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS (Operation Soprano) 8 UNITED KINGDOM: Air Task Force Prestwick (ATF-P) 55; 3 C-130I-30 Hercules (CC-130I); Operation Unifier 170 (UKR trg) FOREIGN FORCES_ United Kingdom BATUS 400; 1 trg unit; 1 hel fit with SA341 Gazelle AH1 United States 150 North America 35 United States US United States Dollar USD 2021 2022 GDP USD 23.0tr 25.0tr per capita USD 69,227 75,180 Growth % 57 1.6 Inflation % 47 8.1 Def exp [a] USD 794bn 822bn Def bdgt [b] USD 760bn 767bn 2023 827bn [a] NATO figure [b] National Defense Budget Function (50) Budget Authority. Includes DoD funding, as well as funds for nuclear weapons-related activities undertaken by the Department of Energy. Excludes some military retirement and healthcare costs Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) _«_ 785 598 2008 2015- -2022 Population 337,341,954 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 9.3% 3.2% 3.3% 3.5% 22.0% 7.9% Female 8.9% 3.1% 3.2% 3.3% 22.4% 9.8% Capabilities The United States remains the world's most capable military power, with a unique ability to project power on a global basis. In October 2022, the Biden administration issued a new National Security Strategy clearly prioritising China as the 'most consequential geopolitical challenge' facing the US, with Russia an immediate but mainly regional threat. These priorities were echoed in a new National Defense Strategy (NDS) that was accompanied by a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and a new Missile Defense Review (MDR). The NDS emphasised homeland defence, integrated deterrence and 'campaigning' to tackle sub-conflict competition that is already under way. It reflected the fact that the force structure is under strain, requires recapitalising with an emphasis on new technology, and needs improved resilience, including of the industrial base. Russia's further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led the US to bolster its presence in Europe and also supply large amounts of military and other aid to Ukraine.The NPR reaffirmed broad nuclear modernisation plans but cancelled the proposed nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile capability. It also stated that the US would consider using nuclear weapons only 'in extreme circumstances' but did not institute a 'no first use' policy. The MDR reinforced increasing US concern about growing air and missile threats. The US maintains an all-volunteer force, including significant reserves, with high levels of training throughout all commands and services. The Pentagon is trying to improve readiness. Modernisation priorities include a renewal of strategic nuclear capabilities, including a new class of ballistic-missile submarine and a new long-range bomber, as well as improved naval capabilities likely to include both crewed and uninhabited platforms. The US Army is focused on regenerating its capability for large-scale combat operations under its Multi-Domain Operations concept, and the updated doctrine document 'FM 3-0, Operations'was published in October. The US continues to actively develop its defensive and offensive cyber capabilities. The country has the world's most capable defence industry, active in all sectors and with a dominant position in the international defence market, and in the wake of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine there has been focus on issues relating to defence-industrial capacity and security of supply. ACTIVE 1,359,600 (Army 464,900 Navy 346,300 Air Force 325,100 Space Force 8,400 US Marine Corps 174,550 US Coast Guard 40,350) RESERVE 817,450 (Army 506,600 Navy 98,250 Air Force 173,400 Marine Corps Reserve 33,050 US Coast Guard 6,150) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE_ US Strategic Command_ HQatOffuttAFB (NE) US Navy_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 14 Ohio with up to 20 UGM-133A Trident D-5/D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT US Air Force • Global Strike Command_ FORCES BY ROLE MISSILE 9 sqn with LGM-30G Minuteman III BOMBER 5 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress 2 sqn with B-2A Spirit (+1 ANG sqn personnel only) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS ICBM • Nuclear 400 LGM-30G Minuteman III (1 Mkl2A or Mk21 re-entry veh per missile) AIRCRAFT BBR 66: 20 B-2A Spirit; 46 B-52H Stratofortress AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ALCM • Nuclear AGM-86B Strategic Defenses - Early Warning_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE RADAR NORTH WARNING SYSTEM 50:14 AN/FPS-117; 36 AN/FPS-124 SOLID STATE PHASED ARRAY RADAR SYSTEM (SSPARS) 5 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar located at Beale AFB (CA), Cape Cod SFS (MA), Clear SFS (AK), Thüle AB (GL) and RAF Fylingdales (UK) SPACETRACK SYSTEM 7: 1 AN/FPS-85 Spacetrack Radar at Eglin AFB (FL); 6 contributing radars at Cavalier SFS (ND), Clear SFS (AK), Thüle AB (GL), RAF Fylingdales (UK), Beale AFB (CA) and Cape Cod SFS (MA); 3 Spacetrack Optical Trackers located at Socorro (NM), Maui (HI), Diego Garcia (BIOT) PERIMETER ACQUISITION RADAR ATTACK CHARACTERISATION SYSTEM (PARCS) 1 AN/ FPQ-16 at Cavalier SFS (ND) DETECTION AND TRACKING RADARS 5 located at Kwajalein Atoll, Ascension Island, Australia, Kaena 36 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Point (HI), MIT Lincoln Laboratory (MA) GROUND BASED ELECTRO OPTICAL DEEP SPACE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (GEODSS) Socorro (NM), Maui (HI), Diego Garcia (BIOT) STRATEGIC DEFENCES - MISSILE DEFENCES SEA-BASED: Aegis engagement cruisers and destroyers LAND-BASED: 40 ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely (AK); 4 ground-based interceptors at Vandenburg SFB (CA) Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 144 COMMUNICATIONS 47: 6 AEHF; 6 DSCS-III; 2 Milstar-l; 3 Milstar-II; 5 MUOS; 5 SDS-III; 2 SDS-IV; 1 TacSat-4; 1 TacSat-6; 6 UFO; 10 WGS SV2 POSITIONING, NAVIGATION & TIMING 30:12 NAVSTAR Block IIF; 7 NAVSTAR Block IIR; 7 NAVSTAR Block IIRM; 4 NAVSTAR Block III METEOROLOGY/OCEANOGRAPHY 4 DMSP-5 ISR 14: 5 FIA Radar; 5 Evolved Enhanced/Improved Crystal (visible and infrared imagery); 2 NRO L-71; 2 NRO L-76 ELINT/SIGINT 31: 6 Mentor (advanced Orion); 2 Mercury; 2 Nemesis; 1 Sharp (NRO L-67); 3 Trumpet; 4 Improved Trumpet; 12 Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS); 1 NRO L-85 SPACE SURVEILLANCE 8: 6 GSSAP; 1 SBSS (Space Based Surveillance System); 1 ORS-5 EARLY WARNING 10:4 DSP; 6 SBIRS Geo REUSABLE SPACECRAFT 1 X-37B OTV COUNTERSPACE • EW Counter Communications System (CCS) US Army 464,900_ FORCES BY ROLE Sqn are generally bn sized and tp are generally coy sized COMMAND 4 (I, III, V & XVIII AB) corps HQ 1 (2nd) inf div HQ 1 (56th) arty comd SPECIAL FORCES (see USSOCOM) MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 (1st Armd & 1st Cav) armd div (3 (lst-3rd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 SP arty bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (hy cbt avn) hel bde) 1 (1st) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 SP arty bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde) 1 (3rd) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 It inf bn; 1 SP arty bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde) Mechanised 1 (4th) inf div (1 (3rd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 2 (1st & 2nd SBCT) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 SP arty bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (hy cbt avn) hel bde) 1 (7th) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd SBCT, 2nd ID) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, lCSSbn)) 2 (2nd & 3rd CR) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech sqn, 1 arty sqn, 1 cbt engr sqn, 1 CSS sqn) Light 1 (10th Mtn) inf div (3 (lst-3rd IBCT) It inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 log bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde) 1 (25th) inf div (2 (2 & 3rd IBCT) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 log bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde) 5 (Sy Force Assist) inf bde(-) Air Manoeuvre 1 (11th) AB div (1 (1st IBCT) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (2nd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, lCSSbn)) 1 (82nd) AB div (1 (1st AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 1 mech coy; 3 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 2 (2nd & 3rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 3 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 log bde) 1 (101st) air aslt div (3 (lst-3rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 3 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 log bde) 1 (173rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) Other 1 (11th ACR) trg armd cav regt (OPFOR) (2 armd cav sqn, 1 CSS bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 3 MRL bde (2 MRL bn) 1 MRL bde (1 MRL bn; 1 SSM bn (forming)) 1 MRL bde (5 MRL bn) 4 engr bde 2 EOD gp (2 EOD bn) 10 int bde 2 int gp 4 MP bde 1 NBC bde 3 (strat) sigs bde 4 (tac) sigs bde 1 (1st MDTF) cbt spt bde (1 (I2CEWS) cbt spt bn) 2 (2nd & 3rd MDTF) cbt spt bde(-) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2 log bde 3 med bde 1 tpt bde ISR 1 ISR avn bde HELICOPTER 2 (cbt avn) hel bde 1 (cbt avn) hel bde HQ AIR DEFENCE 6 SAM bde North America 37 Reserve Organisations_ Army National Guard 329,750 reservists Normally dual-funded by DoD and states. Civil-emergency responses can be mobilised by state governors. Federal government can mobilise ARNG for major domestic emergencies and for overseas operations FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 8 div HQ SPECIAL FORCES (see USSOCOM) MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd recce sqn Armoured 5 (ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) Mechanised 2 (SBCT) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) Light 14 (IBCT) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) 6 (IBCT) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) 1 (Sy Force Assist) inf bde(-) 4 inf bn Air Manoeuvre 1 ABbn COMBAT SUPPORT 8 arty bde 1 SP arty bn 8 engr bde 1 EOD regt 3 int bde 3 MP bde 1 NBC bde 2 (tac) sigs bde 17 (Mnv Enh) cbt spt bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 10 log bde 17 (regional) log spt gp HELICOPTER 8 (cbt avn) hel bde 5 (theatre avn) hel bde AIR DEFENCE 3 SAM bde Army Reserve 176,850 reservists Reserve under full command of US Army. Does not have state-emergency liability of Army National Guard FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES (see USSOCOM) COMBAT SUPPORT 4 engr bde 4 MP bde 2 NBC bde 2 sigs bde 3 (Mnv Enh) cbt spt bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 9 log bde 11 med bde HELICOPTER 2 (exp cbt avn) hel bde Army Stand-by Reserve 700 reservists Trained individuals for mobilisation EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 2,645: £540 M1A1 SA Abrams; 1,605 M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; £500 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams; (£2,000 more M1A1/ A2 Abrams in store) ASLT £100 M1128 Stryker MGS (being divested 2022) RECCE 1,745: £ 1,200 M3A2/A3 Bradley; 545 M1127 Stryker RV (£800 more M3 Bradley in store) IFV 2,959: £14 LAV-25; £2,500 M2A2/A3 Bradley; 21 M2A4 Bradley; 334 M7A3/SA BFIST (OP); 83 M1296 Stryker Dragoon (£2,000 more M2 Bradley in store); 7 Stryker MCWS (in test) APC 10,477 APC (T) 4,930:130 AMPV (in test); £4,800 M113A2/A3 (£8,000 more in store) APC (W) 2,613: 1,348 M1126 Stryker ICV; 280 M1130 Stryker CV (CP); 167 M1131 Stryker FSV (OP); 258 M1133 Stryker MEV (Amb); 21 M1251A1 Stryker FSV (OP); 46 M1254A1 Stryker MEV (Amb); 68 M1255A1 Stryker CV (CP); 425 M1256A1 Stryker ICV PPV 2,934: 2,633 MaxxPro Dash; 301 MaxxPro LWB (Amb) AUV 21,516: £12,500 JLTV; 2,900 M1117 ASV; 465 M1200 Armored Knight (OP); 5,651 M-ATV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 567: 149 M1150 ABV; 250 M9 ACE; 152 M1132 Stryker ESV; 16 M1257A1 Stryker ESV ARV 1,274+: 360 M88A1; £914 M88A2 (s: 1,000 more M88A1 in store); some M578 VLB 383: £230 M60 AVLB; 93 M1074 Joint Assault Bridge; 20 REBS; 40 Wolverine HAB MW 3+: Aardvark JSFU Mk4; some Husky 2G; 3+ Hydrema 910 MCV-2; M58/M59 MICLIC; M139; Rhino NBC VEHICLES 234 Ml 135 Stryker NBCRV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 1,133: 120 Ml 134 Stryker ATGM; 13 M1253A1 Stryker ATGM; £ 1,000 M1167 HMMWV TOW MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 5,096 SP 155mm 689: 486 M109A6; 203 M109A7 (£850 more M109A6 in store) TOWED 1,267:105mm 821M119A2/3; 155mm 446 M777A2 MRL 227mm 594: 368 M142 HIMARS; 226+ M270A1/A2 MLRS MOR 2,507: 81mm 990 M252; 120mm 1,076 M120/ M1064A3; SP 120mm 441; 363 M1129 Stryker MC; 78 M1252A1 Stryker MC SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A/B ATACMS; MGM-168 ATACMS (All launched from M270A1 MLRS or M142 HIMARS MRLs) 38 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 7 LSL 7 Frank Besson (capacity 24 Abrams MBT) LANDING CRAFT 70 LCT 34 LCU 2000 (capacity 5 Ml Abrams MBT) LCM 36 LCM 8 (capacity either 1 Ml Abrams MBT or 200 troops) AIRCRAFT ISR 46: 8 EMARSS-G; 4 EMARSS-V; 7 EMARSS-M; 19 RC-12X Guardrail (5 trg); 8 RO-6A ARL-E SIGINT 2 CL-600 Artemis ELINT 9: 4 EMARSS-S; 4 EO-5C ARL-M (COMINT/ ELINT); 1 TO-5C (trg) TPT 156: Light 152: 113 Beech A200 King Air (C-12 Huron); 28 Cessna 560 Citation (UC-35A/B); 11 SA-227 Metro (C-26E); PAX 4: 1 Gulfstream IV (C-20F); 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 1 Gulfstream G550 (C-37B) TRG 4 T-6D Texan II HELICOPTERS ATK 740: e250 AH-64D Apache; e490 AH-64E Apache SAR 356: 19 HH-60L Black Hawk; 337 HH-60M Black Hawk (medevac) TPT 2,768: Heavy 450 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 1,857: £20 UH-60A Black Hawk; e900 UH-60L Black Hawk; 931 UH-60M Black Hawk; 6 UH-60V Black Hawk; Light 524: 457 UH-72A Lakota; 2 UH-72B Lakota; 65 UH-1H/V Iroquois UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 416 CISR • Heavy £180 MQ-1C Gray Eagle ISR • Medium 236 RQ-7B Shadow AIR DEFENCE SAM 1,187+ Long-range 480 M902/M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE Short-range Iron Dome; NASAMS Point-defence 471+: FIM-92 Stinger; 18 M-SHORAD; 453 Ml097 Avenger GUNS • Towed • 20mm Phalanx (LPWS) MISSILE DEFENCE • Long-range 42 THAAD AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114K/L/M/N/R Hellfire II; AGM-179A JAGM; AGR-20A APKWS US Navy 346,300_ Comprises 2 Fleet Areas, Atlantic and Pacific. 6 Fleets: 2nd - Atlantic; 3rd - Pacific; 4th - Caribbean, Central and South America; 5th - Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, Red Sea; 6th -Mediterranean; 7th - Indian Ocean, East Asia, W. Pacific; plus Military Sealift Command (MSC); Naval Reserve Force (NRF). For Naval Special Warfare Command, see US Special Operations Command EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 67 STRATEGIC • SSBN 14 Ohio (opcon US STRATCOM) with up to 20 UGM-133A Trident D-5/D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT TACTICAL 53 SSGN 51: 4 Ohio (mod) with 22 7-cell MAC VLS with UGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT 4 Los Angeles Flight II with 112-cell VLS with UGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT 22 Los Angeles Flight III with 1 12-cell VLS with UGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT 10 Virginia Flight I/II with 1 12-cell VLS with UGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT 8 Virginia Flight III with 2 6-cell VPT VLS with UGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT 3 Virginia Flight IV with 2 6-cell VPT VLS with UGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT SSN 2 Seawolf (one other damaged in collision in 2021, repair to begin in 2023) with 8 single 660mm TT with UGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM/Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 122 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVN 11: 1 Gerald R. Ford with 2 octuple Mk 29 mod 5 GMLS with RIM-162D ESSM SAM, 2 Mk 49 mod 3 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 3 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS (typical capacity 75+ F/A-18E/F Super Hornet FGA ac; F-35C Lightning II FGA ac; E-2D Hawkeye AEW&C ac; EA-18G Growler EW ac; MH-60R Seahawk ASW hei; MH-60S Knight Hawk MRH hel) 10 Nimitz with 2 8-cell Mk29 GMLS with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 2 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM Block 2 SAM, 3 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS (typical capacity 55 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet FGA ac; F-35C Lightning II FGA ac; 4 EA-18G Growler EW ac; 4 E-2C/D Hawkeye AEW ac; 6 MH-60R/S Seahawk/ Knight Hawk hel) CRUISERS • CGHM 19: 17 Ticonderoga with Aegis Baseline 5/6/8/9 C2, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84D Harpoon Block 1C AShM, 16 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (of which 2 only 5-cell and fitted with reload crane) with RGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM/SM-2 Block III/IIIA/IIIB/IV SAM/SM-3 Block IA/B SAM/SM-6 Block I SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 2 127mm guns (capacity 2 MH-60R Seahawk/MH-60S Knight Hawk hels) 2 Zumwalt with 20 4-cell Mk 57 VLS with RGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM/RIM-162 ESSM SAM/ SM-2 Block IIIA SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 155mm guns (capacity 2 MH-60R Seahawk ASW hel or 1 MH-60R Seahawk ASW hel and 3 Fire Scout UAV) DESTROYERS 70: DDGHM 42: 5 Arleigh Burke Flight IIA with Aegis Baseline 5/9 C2, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM/SM-2 Block III/IIIA/IIIB/IV SAM/ SM-3 Block IA/B SAM/SM-6 Block I SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R Seahawk/MH-60S Knight Hawk hels) North America 39 37 Arleigh Burke Flight IIA with Aegis Baseline 6/7/9 C2,12 8-cell Mk 41VLS with RGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACIvI/SIvI-2 Block III/IIIA/IIIB/IV SAM/ SM-3 Block IA/B SAM/SM-6 Block I SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R Seahawk/MH-60S Knight Hawk hels) (of which 1 vessel also with 1 Mk 15 SeaRAM with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 and 3 vessels also with 1 Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN) LWS) DDGM 28 Arleigh Burke Flight I/II with Aegis Baseline 5/9 C2, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84D Harpoon Block 1C AShM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (of which 2 only 5-cell and fitted with reload crane) with RGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM/SM-2 Block III/IIIA/IIIB/IV SAM/SM-3 Block IA/B SAM/SM-6 Block I SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS (of which 5 vessels with 1 Mk 15 SeaRAM with RIM-116C RAM Block 2, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB instead of 2 Phalanx), 1 127mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FRIGATES 22: FFGHM 6 Independence with 2 quad lnchr with NSM (RGM-184A) AShM, 111-cell SeaRAM lnchr with RIM-116C Block 2 SAM, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R/S SeahawklKnight Hawk hel and 3 MQ-8 Fire Scout UAV) FFHM 16: 10 Freedom with 121-cell Mk 49 lnchr with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R/S Seahawkl Knight Hawk hel or 1 MH-60 with 3 MQ-8 Fire Scout UAV) 6 Independence with 1 11-cell SeaRAM lnchr with RIM-116C Block 2 SAM, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R/S Seahawkl Knight Hawk hel and 3 MQ-8 Fire Scout UAV) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 89 PCFG 5 Cyclone with 1 quad Mk 208 lnchr with BGM-176B Griffin B SSM PBF 84: 32 Combatant Craft Assault; 2 Combatant Craft Heavy; 30 Combatant Craft Medium Mk 1; 20 Defiant 40 (40PB) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8 MCO 8 Avenger COMMAND SHIPS LCC 2 Blue Ridge with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS (capacity 3 LCPL; 2 LCVP; 700 troops; 1 med hel) (of which 1 vessel partially crewed by Military Sealift Command personnel) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 31: LHA 2 America with 2 8-cell Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-162D ESSM SAM, 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS (capacity up to 29 ac/hel inch 6-13 F-35B Lightning II FGA ac (possible 20 as full 'Lightning carrier'); 4 AH-1Z Viper atk hel; up to 12 MV-22B Osprey tpt ac; 2 MH-60S Knight Hawk MRH; 4 CH-53E Sea Stallion tpt hel; 2 UH-1Y Iroquois tpt hel; up to 1,800 troops) LHD 7 Wasp with 2 8-cell Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS (capacity up to 23 ac/hel ind: 6 AV-8B Harrier II FGA or F-35B Lightning II FGA ac (possible 20 F-35B as full 'Lightning carrier'); 4 AH-1Z Viper atk hel; 4 CH-53E Sea Stallion hel; up to 6 MV-22B Osprey tpt ac; 3 UH-1Y Iroquois tpt hel; 3 LCAC(L); 60 tanks; 1,687 troops) LPD 12 San Antonio with 2 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM (1 vessel also fitted with 1 Solid-State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM) LWS) (capacity 2 CH-53E Sea Stallion hel or 2 MV-22 Osprey; 2 LCAC(L); 14 AAV; 720 troops) LSD 10: 4 Harpers Ferry with 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS (capacity 2 CH-53E Sea Stallion hel; 2 LCAC(L); 40 tanks; 500 troops) 6 Whidbey Island with 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS (capacity 2 CH-53E Sea StaZZwn hel; 4 LCAC(L); 40 tanks; 500 troops) LANDING CRAFT 145: LCU 32 LCU 1610 (capacity either 1 Ml Abrams MBT or 350 troops) LCM 8 LCM 8 LCP 33 Maritime Positioning Force Utility Boat (MPF-UB) LCAC 72: 68 LCAC(L) (MLU ongoing) (capacity either 1 MBT or 60 troops); 4 Ship to Shore Connector (SSC (capacity 1 MBT or 145 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13 AFDL 1 Dynamic AGOR 6 (all leased out): 2 Ocean; 3 Thomas G. Thompson; 1 Kilo Moana ARD 2 AX 1 Prevail ESB 3 Lewis B. Puller (capacity 4 MH-53/MH-60 hel) UUV (1 Cutthroat for testing) MISSILE DEFENCE • Long-range 3 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-3 Naval Reserve Forces 98,250_ Selected Reserve 55,500 Individual Ready Reserve 42,750 Naval Inactive Fleet_ Notice for reactivation: 60-90 days minimum (still on naval-vessel register) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS FRIGATES • FFH 1 Freedom with 1 57mm gun AMPHIBIOUS 4 LHA 2 Tarawa LSD 2 Whidbey Island LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4 AOE 2 Supply ARS 2 Safeguard 40 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Military Sealift Command (MSC)_ Fleet Oiler (PM1) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 16 AOR 16:1 John Lewis with 1 hel landing platform; 15 Henry J. Kaiser with 1 hel landing platform Special Mission (PM2) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 21 AGM 2:1 Howard O. Lorenzen; 1 Sea-based X-band radar AGOR 6 Pathfinder AGOS 5:1 Impeccable (commercial operator); 4 Victorious AGS 1 Waters ARC 1 Zeus AS 4 Arrowhead (long-term chartered) ATF 2:1 HOS Red Rock (leased); 1 MV Hercules Prepositioning (PM3) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14 AG 2:1 VAdm K.R. Wheeler; 1 Fast Tempo AKR 5: 2 Bob Hope; 1 Stockham; 2 Watson AKRH 5 2nd Lt John P. Bobo ESD 2 Montford Point Service Support (PM4) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12 AH 2 Mercy with 1 hel landing platform ARS 2 Safeguard AS 4:1 Dominator; 2 Emory S. Land; 1 Malama (long-term chartered) ATF 4:1 Gary Chouest; 1 MV Ocean Valour; 2 Powhatan Sealift (PM5) (At a minimum of 4 days' readiness) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18 AOT 1 Maersk Peary (long-term chartered) AK 4: 2 LTC /o/m U.D. Page; 1 Ma/'. Bernard F. Fisher; 1 CPT David I. Lyon AKR 13: 5 Bob Hope; 2 Gordon; 6 Watson Fleet Ordnance and Dry Cargo (PM6) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 16 AOE 2 Supply AKEH 14 Lewis and Clark Expeditionary Fast Transport (PM8) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14 AP 2 Guam EPF 12 Spearhead Dry Cargo and Tankers EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 6 AK 2:1 Sea Eagle; 1SLNC Corsica (long-term chartered) AOT 4: 2 Empire State; 1 SLNC Pax; 1 SLNC Goodwill (long-term chartered) US Maritime Administration (MARAD)_ National Defense Reserve Fleet EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 20 ACS 2:1 Flickertail State; 1 Keystone State AGOS 2 General Rudder AGM 2:1 Pacific Collector; 1 Pacific Tracker AK 8: 2 Cape Ann (breakbulk); 1 Cape Chalmers (breakbulk); 1 Cape Jacob; 2 Cape May; 1 Del Monte (breakbulk); 1 Savannah AP 4: 1 Empire State VI; 1 Golden Bear; 1 Kennedy; 1 State of Maine AX 2:1 Freedom Star; 1 Kings Pointer Ready Reserve Force Ships at readiness up to a maximum of 30 days EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 40 ACS 4:1 Flickertail State; 1 Gopher State; 2 Keystone State AK 2 Wrig/jf (breakbulk) AKR 34: lAdm WM. CallaghanA Algol; 1 Cape Arundel; 4 Cape Capella; 1 Cape Decision; 4 Cape Ducato; 1 Cape Edmont; 1 Cape Henry; 2 Cape Hudson; 2 Cape Knox; 4 Cape Island; 1 Cape Orlando; 1 Cape Race; 1 Cape Trinity; 2 Cape Trinity; 2 Cape Victory; 2 Cape Washington Naval Aviation 98,600_ 10 air wg. Average air wing comprises 8 sqns: 4 with F/A-18; 1 with MH-60R; 1 with EA-18G; 1 with E-2C/D; 1 with MH-60S FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 22 sqn with F/A-18E Super Hornet 10 sqn with F/A-18F Super Hornet 1 sqn with F-35C Lightning II 1 sqn (forming) with F-35C Lightning II ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 12 sqn with P-8A Poseidon 1 (special projects) sqn with P-8A Poseidon 12 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk 3 ASW/ISR sqn with MH-60R Seahawk; MQ-8B Fire Scout ELINT 1 sqn with EP-3E Aries II ELINT/ELECTRONIC WARFARE 13 sqn with EA-18G Growler AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 3 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye 6 sqn with E-2D Hawkeye COMMAND & CONTROL 2 sqn with E-6B Mercury MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2 sqn with MH-53E Sea Dragon TRANSPORT 2 sqn with CMV-22B Osprey (forming) 2 sqn with C-2A Greyhound North America 41 TRAINING 1 (FRS) sqn with EA-18G Growler 1 (FRS) sqn with C-2A Greyhound; E-2C/D Hawkeye; TE-2C Hawkeye 1 sqn with E-6B Mercury 2 (FRS) sqn with F/A-18E/F Super Hornet 1 (FRS) sqn with F-35C Lightning II 1 (FRS) sqn with MH-53 Sea Dragon 2 (FRS) sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk; HH-60H Seahawk 2 (FRS) sqn with MH-60R Seahawk 1 (FRS) sqn with P-3C Orion; P-8A Poseidon 6 sqn with T-6A/B Texan II 2 sqn with T-44C Pegasus 5 sqn with T-45C Goshawk 2 hel sqn with TH-57B/C Sea Ranger 1 hel sqn with TH-73A 1 (FRS) UAV sqn with MQ-8B Fire Scout; MQ-8C Fire Scout TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 13 sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk 2 tpt hel/ISR sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk; MQ-8B Fire Scout; MQ-8C Fire Scout ISR UAV 1 sqn with MQ-4C Triton EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 988 combat capable EGA 704: 10 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16B Fighting Falcon; 52 F-35C Lightning II; 5 F/A-18B Hornet; 16 F/A-18C Hornet; 4 F/A-18D Hornet; 327 F/A-18E Super Hornet; 286 F/A-18F Super Hornet ASW126:14 P-3C Orion; 112 P-8A Poseidon EW158 EA-18G Growler* ELINT 9 EP-3E Aries II AEW&C 74: 20 E-2C Hawkeye; 54 E-2D Hawkeye C2 16 E-6B Mercury TKR/TPT 3:1 KC-130R Hercules; 1 KC-130T Hercules; 1 KC-130J Heroines TPT • Light 54: 4 Beech A200 King Air (C-12C Huron); 6 Beech A200 King Air (UC-12F Huron); 8 Beech A200 King Air (UC-12M Huron); 27 C-2A Greyhound; 2 DHC- 2 Bower (U-6A); 7 SA-227-BC Metro III (C-26D) TRG 576: 44 T-6A Texan II; 231 T-6B Texan II; 7 T-38C Talon; 55 T-44C Pegasus; 237 T-45C Goshawk; 2 TE-2C Hawkeye TILTROTOR • TPT 27 CMV-22B Osprey HELICOPTERS ASW 271 MH-60R Seahawk MRH 258 MH-60S Knight Hawk (Multi Mission Support) MCM 28 MH-53E Sea Dragon ISR 3 OH-58C Kiowa TPT 13: Heavy 2 CH-53E Sea Stallion; Medium 3 UH-60L Black Hawk; Light 8: 5 UH-72A Lakota; 2 UH-1N Iroquois; 1 UH-1Y Venom TRG 116: £10 TH-57B Sea Ranger; 76 TH-57C Sea Ranger; 30 TH-73A UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 114 Heavy 64: 5 MQ-4C Triton; 19 MQ-8B Fire Scout; 36 MQ-8C Fire Scout; 4 RQ-4A Global Hawk (evaluation and trials); Medium 35 RQ-2B Pioneer; Light 15 RQ-21A Blackjack AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES A AM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow (being withdrawn); ARH AIM-120C-5/C-7/D AMRAAM ASM AGM-65F Maverick; AGM-114B/K/M Hellfire; APKWS AShM AGM-84D Harpoon; AGM-119A Penguin 3; AGM-158C LRASM ARM AGM-88B/C/E HARM/AARGM ALCM • Conventional AGM-84E/H/K SLAM/ SLAM-ER BOMBS Laser-guided: GBU-10/-12/-16 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway III; GBU-51 LCDB Laser & INS/GPS-guided: EGBU-12 Paveway II; EGBU-24 Paveway III; GBU-52 LCDB; GBU-54 Laser ID AM INS/GPS-guided: GBU-31/-32/-38 JDAM; AGM-154A/C/C-1 JSOW Naval Aviation Reserve_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F/A-18E/F Super Hornet ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with P-3C Orion 1 sqn with P-8A Poseidon (forming) 1 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with EA-18G Growler TRANSPORT 6 log spt sqn with B-737-700 (C-40A Clipper) 1 log spt sqn with Gulfstream V/G550 (C-37A/B) 5 sqn with C-130T/KC-130T Hercules TRAINING 2 (aggressor) sqn with F-5F/N Tiger II 1 (aggressor) sqn with F-16C Fighting Falcon TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 64 combat capable FTR 31: 2 F-5F Tiger II; 29 F-5N Tiger II EGA 24:12 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 10 F/A-18E Super Hornet; 2 F/A-18F Super Hornet ASW 4: 2 P-3C Orion; 2 P-8A Poseidon EW 5 EA-18G Growler* TKR/TPT 11 KC-130T Hercules TPT 40: Medium 19 C-130T Hercules; PAX 21:17 B-737-700 (C-40A Clipper); 1 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 3 Gulfstream G550 (C-37B) HELICOPTERS ASW 5 MH-60R Seahawk MRH 12 MH-60S Knight Hawk MCM 6 MH-53E Sea Dragon US Marine Corps 174,550_ 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), 3 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB), 7 Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) drawn from 3 div. An MEU usually consists of a battalion landing team (1 SF coy, 1 It armd recce coy, 42 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 1 recce pi, 1 armd pi, 1 amph aslt pi, 1 inf bn, 1 arty bty, 1 cbt engr pi), an aviation combat element (1 medium-lift sqn with attached atk hel, FGA ac and AD assets) and a composite log bn, with a combined total of about 2,200 personnel. Composition varies with mission requirements FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES (see USSOCOM) MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 3 (MEF) recce coy Amphibious 1 (1st) mne div (2 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 3 mne regt (4 mne bn), 1 amph aslt bn, 1 arty regt (3 arty bn, 1 MRL bn), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) 1 (2nd) mne div (1 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 3 mne regt (3 mne bn), 1 amph aslt bn, 1 arty regt (2 arty bn), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) 1 (3rd) mne div (1 recce bn, 1 mne regt (2 mne bn, 1 AD bn, 1 log bn), 1 arty regt (2 arty bn), 1 cbt spt bn (1 armd recce coy, 1 amph aslt coy, 1 cbt engr coy), 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 log gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 488 LAV-25 APC • APC (W) 207 LAV variants (66 CP; 127 log; 14 EW) AAV 1,360:1,200 AAV-7A1 (all roles); e160 ACV (in test) AUV 6,929:1,725 Cougar, e4,500 JLTV; 704 M-ATV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 42 Ml ABV ARV 105: 60 AAVRA1; 45 LAV-R MW 38 Buffalo; some Husky 2G VLB £30 M60 AVLB ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 106 LAV-AT MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; FGM-172B SRAW-MPV; TOW ARTILLERY 1,459 TOWED 812:105mm: 331 M101 Al; 155mm 481 M777A2 MRL 227mm 47 M142 HIMARS MOR 600: 81mm 535 M252; SP 81mm 65 LAV-M; 120mm (49 EFSS in store for trg) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Light 100 BQM-147 Exdrone AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger Marine Corps Aviation 34,700_ 3 active Marine Aircraft Wings (MAW) and 1MCR MAW FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II 1 sqn with F/A-18C Hornet 5 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet 5 sqn with F-35B Lightning II 1 sqn with F-35C Lightning II COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Beech A200/B200 King Air (UC-12F/M Huron); Beech 350 King Air (UC-12W Huron); Cessna 560 Citation Ultra/Encore (UC-35C/D); Gulfstream IV (C-20G) TANKER 3 sqn with KC-130I Hercules TRANSPORT 16 sqn with MV-22B Osprey TRAINING 1 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet 2 sqn with F-35B Lightning II 1 sqn with MV-22B Osprey 1 hel sqn with AH-1Z Viper; UH-1Y Venom 1 hel sqn with CH-53E Sea Stallion ATTACK HELICOPTER 6 sqn with AH-1Z Viper; UH-1Y Venom TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 6 sqn with CH-53E Sea Stallion 1 sqn with CH-53K King Stallion (forming) 1 (VIP) sqn with MV-22B Osprey; VH-3D Sea King; VH-60N White Hawk CISR UAV 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper ISR UAV 2 sqn with RQ-21A Blackjack AIR DEFENCE 2 bn with M1097 Avenger; FIM-92 Stinger EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 417 combat capable FGA 417: 135 F-35B Lightning II; 10 F-35C Lightning II; 134 F/A-18C Hornet; 79 F/A-18D Hornet; 53 AV-8B Harrier II; 6 TAV-8B Harrier TKR/TPT 46 KC-130J Hercules TPT 20: Light 18:2 Beech B200 King Air (UC-12F Huron); 2 Beech B200 King Air (UC-12M Huron); 7 Beech 350 King Air (C-12W Huron); 7 Cessna 560 Citation Encore (UC-35D); PAX 2 Gulfstream IV (C-20G) TRG 3 T-34C Turbo Mentor TILTROTOR • TPT 273 MV-22B Osprey HELICOPTERS ATK 134 AH-1Z Viper TPT 288: Heavy 135: 129 CH-53E Sea Stallion; 6 CH- 53K King Stallion (in test); Medium 25: 11 VH-3D Sea King (VIP tpt); 8 VH-60N White Hawk (VIP tpt); 6 VH- 92A (in test); Light 128 UH-1Y Venom UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 2 MQ-9A Reaper ISR • Light 40 RQ-21 A Blackjack AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; Ml097 Avenger AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; HR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7P Sparrow; ARH AIM- 120C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65E/F IR Maverick; AGM-114 Hellfire; AGM- 176 Griffin; AGM-179A TAGM; AGR-20A APKWS AShM AGM-84D Harpoon ARM AGM-88 HARM L ACM AGM-84E/H/K SLAM/SLAM-ER North America 43 BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10/-12/-16 Paveway II Laser & INS/GPS-guided: EGBU-12 Paveway II; GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II; GBU-54 Laser JDAM INS/GPS guided GBU-31/-32/-38 JDAM; AGM-154A/ C/C-l JSOW Reserve Organisations_ Marine Corps Reserve 33,050 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 2 MEF recce coy Amphibious 1 (4th) mne div (1 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 2 mne regt (3 mne bn), 1 amph aslt bn, 1 arty regt (2 arty bn, 1 MRL bn), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log gp Marine Corps Aviation Reserve 12,000 reservists FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F/A-18C/C+ Hornet TANKER 2 sqn with KC-130J Hercules TRANSPORT 2 sqn with MV-22B Osprey TRAINING 1 sqn with F-5F/N Tiger II ATTACK HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AH-1Z Viper; UH-1Y Venom TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with CH-53E Sea Stallion EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 24 combat capable FTR 12; 1 F-5F Tiger II; 11 F-5N Tiger II EGA 12; 5 F/A-18C Hornet; 7 F/A-18C+ Hornet TKR/TPT 17 KC-130J Hercules TPT • Light 7; 2 Beech A200 King Air (UC-12F); 2 Beech 350 King Air (UC-12W Huron); 3 Cessna 560 Citation Encore (UC-35D) TILTROTOR • TPT 24 MV-22B Osprey HELICOPTERS ATK 26 AH-1Z Viper TPT 30; Heavy 8 CH-53E Sea Stallion; Light 22 UH-1Y Venom Marine Stand-by Reserve 700 reservists Trained individuals available for mobilisation US Coast Guard 40,350_ 9 districts (4 Pacific, 5 Atlantic) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 334 PSOH 23; 1 Alex Haley; 13 Famous; 9 Legend with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH-65 hel) PCO 62; 14 Reliance (with 1 hel landing platform); 48 Sentinel (Damen 4708) PCC 12 Island PBF 174 Response Boat-Medium (RB-M) FBI 63 Marine Protector LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 65 ABU 52; 16 ]uniper; 4 WLI; 14 Keeper; 18 WLR AGB 12; 9 Bay; 1 Mackinaw; 1 Healy; 1 Polar (1 Polar in reserve) AXS 1 Eagle US Coast Guard Aviation_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT SAR 44; 11 HC-130H Hercules; 15 HC-130J Hercules; 5 HC-144A; 13 HC-144B TPT 16; Medium 14 C-27J Spartan; PAX 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A) HELICOPTERS SAR 142; 44 MH-60T Jayhawk; 49 AS366G1 (MH-65D) Dauphin II; 49 AS366G1 (MH-65E) Dauphin II; US Air Force (USAF) 325,100_ Almost the entire USAF (plus active-force ANG and AFR) is divided into 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF), each on call for 120 days every 20 months. At least 2 of the 10 AEFs are on call at any one time, each with 10,000-15,000 personnel, 90 multi-role ftr and bbr ac, 31 intra-theatre refuelling aircraft and 13 aircraft for ISR and EW missions Global Strike Command (GSC)_ 2 active air forces (8th & 20th); 8 wg FORCES BY ROLE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 9 ICBM sqn with LGM-30G Minuteman III BOMBER 4 sqn with B-1B Lancer 2 sqn with B-2A Spirit 5 sqn (incl 1 trg) with B-52H Stratofortress COMMAND & CONTROL 1 sqn with E-4B TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 3 sqn with UH-1N Iroquois Air Combat Command (ACC)_ 2 active air forces (9th & 12th); 12 wg. ACC numbered air forces provide the air component to CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 3 sqn with F-22A Raptor FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle 3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (+6 sqn personnel only) 3 sqn with F-35A Lightning II GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II (+1 sqn personnel only) ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with EA-18G Growler (personnel only -USN aircraft) 2 sqn with EC-130H Compass Call 44 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 ISR 2 sqn with E-8C J-STARS (personnel only) 5 sqn with OC-135/RC-135/WC-135 2 sqn with U-2S AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 5 sqn with E-3 Sentry COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 2 sqn with HC-130J Combat King II 1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk 2 sqn with HH-60W Jolly Green II (forming) TRAINING 1 (aggressor) sqn with F-16C Fighting Falcon 1 (aggressor) sqn with F-35A Lightning II 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II 1 sqn with E-3 Sentry 2 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle 1 sqn with F-22A Raptor 1 sqn with RQ-4A Global Hawk; TU-2S 1 UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper COMBAT/ISR UAV 9 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper ISR UAV 2 sqn with RQ-4B Global Hawk 2 sqn with RQ-170 Sentinel 1 sqn with RQ-180 Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)_ Provides the air component of PACOM, and commands air units based in Alaska, Hawaii, Japan and South Korea. 3 active air forces (5th, 7th, & 11th); 8 wg FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle 2 sqn with F-22A Raptor (+1 sqn personnel only) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 5 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 2 sqn with F-35A Lightning II GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 2 sqn with E-3 Sentry COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk TANKER 1 sqn with KC-135R (+1 sqn personnel only) TRANSPORT 1 sqn with B-737-200 (C-40B); Gulfstream V (C-37A) 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster (+1 sqn personnel only) 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules 1 sqn with Beech 1900C (C-12J); UH-1N Huey TRAINING 1 (aggressor) sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon United States Air Forces in Europe - Air Forces Africa (USAFE-AFAFRICA)_ Provides the air component to both EUCOM and AFRICOM. 1 active air force (3rd); 5 wg FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle 3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 2 sqn with F-35A Lightning II (forming) COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk TANKER 1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules 2 sqn with Gulfstream V (C-37A); Learjet 35A (C-21A); B-737-700 (C-40B) Air Mobility Command (AMC)_ Provides strategic and tactical airlift, air-to-air refuelling and aeromedical evacuation. 1 active air force (18th); 12 wg and 1 gp FORCES BY ROLE TANKER 3 sqn with KC-10A Extender 1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus 1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus (forming) 8 sqn with KC-135R/T Stratotanker (+2 sqn with personnel only) TRANSPORT 1 VIP sqn with B-737-200 (C-40B); B-757-200 (C-32A) 1 VIP sqn with Gulfstream V (C-37A); Gulfstream 550 (C-37B) 1 VIP sqn with VC-25 Air Force One 2 sqn with C-5M Super Galaxy 8 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III (+1 sqn personnel only) 5 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules (+1 sqn personnel only) 1 sqn with Learjet 35A (C-21A) Air Education and Training Command_ 1 active air force (2nd), 10 active air wg and 1 gp FORCES BY ROLE TRAINING 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules 4 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 5 sqn with F-35A Lightning II 1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus 1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker 5 (flying trg) sqn with T-1A Jayhawk 10 (flying trg) sqn with T-6A Texan II 10 (flying trg) sqn with T-38C Talon 5 UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS ICBM • Nuclear 400 LGM-30G Minuteman III (1 Mkl2A or Mk21 re-entry veh per missile) AIRCRAFT 1,574 combat capable BBR 123: 45 B-1B Lancer; 20 B-2A Spirit; 58 B-52H Stratofortress (46 nuclear capable) FTR 214:45 F-15C Eagle; 4 F-15D Eagle; 165 F-22A Raptor EGA 1,063: 218 F-15E Strike Eagle; 2 F-15EX Eagle II; 410 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 91F-16D Fighting Falcon; 342 F-35A Lightning II North America 45 ATK 135 A-10C Thunderbolt II CSAR 16 HC-130J Combat King II EW 7 EC-130H Compass Call ISR 38: 2 E-9A; 4 E-11A; 26 U-2S; 4 TU-2S; 1 WC-135R Constant Phoenix ELINT 22: 8 RC-135V Rroet Joint; 9 RC-135W Rivet Joint; 3 RC-135S Cobra Ball; 2 RC-135U Combat Sent AEW&C 31: 7 E-3B Sentry; 1 E-3C Sentry; 23 E-3G Sentry C2 4 E-4B TKR 156:126 KC-135R Stratotanker; 30 KC-135T Stratotanker TKR/TPT 70: 36 KC-10A Extender; 34 KC-46A Pegasus TPT 336: Heavy 182: 36 C-5M Super Galaxy; 146 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 105: 10 C-130J Hercules; 95 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 23: 4 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 19 Learjet 35A (C-21A); PAX 26: 4 B-737-700 (C-40B); 4 B-757-200 (C-32A); 9 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 7 Gulfstream 550 (C-37B); 2 VC-25A Air Force One TRG 1,126:178 T-1A Jayhawk; 443 T-6A Texan II; 505 T-38A/C Talon HELICOPTERS MRH 4 MH-139A Grey Wo//(in test) CSAR 62:52 HH-60G Pave Hawk; 10 HH-60W Jolly Green II TPT • Light 62 UH-1N Huey UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 261 CISR • Heavy 210 MQ-9A Reaper ISR • Heavy 27:10 RQ-4B Global Hawk; elO RQ-170 Sentinel; e7 RQ-180 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7M Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C/D AMRAAM ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick; AGM-114K/M/N/R Hellfire II; AGM-130A; AGM-176 Griffin; AGR-20A APKWS AShM AGM-158C LRASM ALCM Nuclear AGM-86B (ALCM) Conventional AGM-158A JASSM; AGM-158B JASSM-ER ARM AGM-88B/C HARM EW MALD/MALD-J BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10/-12/-16 Paveway II, GBU-24 Paveway III; GBU-28 Laser & INS/GPS-guided EGBU-24 Paveway III; EGBU-28; GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II; GBU-54 Laser ID AM INS/GPS-guided GBU-15 (with BLU-109 penetrating warhead or Mk84); GBU-31/-32/-38 JDAM; GBU-39B Small Diameter Bomb (2501b); GBU-43B MOAB; GBU-57A/B MOP Multi-mode guided GBU-53/B Stormbreaker Reserve Organisations_ Air National Guard 105,100 reservists FORCES BY ROLE BOMBER 1 sqn with B-2A Spirit (personnel only) FIGHTER 5 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle 1 sqn with F-22A Raptor (+1 sqn personnel only) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 10 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II ISR 1 sqn with E-8C J-STARS COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 3 sqn with HC-130J Combat King II 3 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk TANKER 1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus 16 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker (+1 sqn personnel only) 3 sqn with KC-135T Stratotanker TRANSPORT 1 sqn with B-737-700 (C-40C) 6 sqn with C-17A Globemaster (+2 sqn personnel only) 10 sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 sqn with C-130H/LC-130H Hercules 4 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules TRAINING 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle 4 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper COMBAT/ISR UAV 10 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 596 combat capable FTR157:123 F-15C Eagle; 14 F-15D Eagle; 20 F-22A Raptor FGA 354: 288 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 46 F-16D Fighting Falcon; 20 F-35A Lightning II ATK 85 A-10C Thunderbolt II CSAR 12 HC-130J Combat King II ISR 13 E-8C J-STARS ELINT 11 RC-26B Metroliner TKR 162:138 KC-135R Stratotanker; 24 KC-135T Stratotanker TKR/TPT 12 KC-46A Pegasus TPT 197: Heavy 50 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 144: 99 C-130H Hercules; 35 C-130J-30 Hercules; 10 LC- 130H Hercules; PAX 3 B-737-700 (C-40C) HELICOPTERS • CSAR 18 HH-60G Pave Hawk UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR • Heavy 24 MQ-9A Reaper Air Force Reserve Command 68,300 reservists FORCES BY ROLE BOMBER 1 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress (personnel only) FIGHTER 2 sqn with F-22A Raptor (personnel only) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (+1 sqn personnel only) 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II (personnel only) GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II (+2 sqn personnel only) 46 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 ISR 1 (Weather Recce) sqn with WC-130J Hercules AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with E-3 Sentry (personnel only) COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with HC-130J Combat King II 2 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk TANKER 4 sqn with KC-10A Extender (personnel only) 1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus 1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus (personnel only) 6 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker (+2 sqn personnel only) TRANSPORT 1 (VIP) sqn with B-737-700 (C-40C) 2 sqn with C-5M Super Galaxy (+2 sqn personnel only) 3 sqn with C-17A Globemaster (+9 sqn personnel only) 6 sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules 1 (Aerial Spray) sqn with C-130H Hercules TRAINING 1 (aggressor) sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II; F-15C/E Eagle; F-16 Fighting Falcon; F-22A Raptor (personnel only) 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II 1 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress 1 sqn with C-5M Super Galaxy 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 5 (flying training) sqn with T-1A Jayhawk; T-6A Texan II; T-38C Talon (personnel only) COMBAT/ISR UAV 2 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper (personnel only) ISR UAV 1 sqn with RQ-4B Global Hawk (personnel only) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 133 combat capable BBR 18 B-52H Stratofortress FGA 54:52 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 2 F-16D Fighting Falcon ATK 61 A-10C Thunderbolt II CSAR 4 HC-130J Combat King II ISR 10 WC-130J Hercules (Weather Recce) TKR 62 KC-135R Stratotanker TKR/TPT 9 KC-46A Pegasus TPT 98: Heavy 42:16 C-5M Super Galaxy; 26 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 52:42 C-130H Hercules; 10 C-130J-30 Hercules; PAX 4 B-737-700 (C-40C) HELICOPTERS • CSAR 16 HH-60G Pave Hawk Civil Reserve Air Fleet Commercial ac numbers fluctuate AIRCRAFT • TPT 517 international (391 long-range and 126 short-range); 36 national Air Force Stand-by Reserve 16,850 reservists Trained individuals for mobilisation US Space Force 6,400_ New service established December 2019, currently in the process of being stood up. Tasked with organising, training and equipping forces to protect US and allied space interests and to provide space capabilities to the joint Combatant Commands EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES see Space COUNTERSPACE see Space RADAR see Strategic Defenses - Early Warning US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 65,800_ Commands all active, reserve and National Guard Special Operations Forces (SOF) of all services based in CONUS Joint Special Operations Command_ Reported to comprise elite US SOF, including Special Forces Operations Detachment Delta ('Delta Force'), SEAL Team 6 and integral USAF support US Army Special Operations Command 35,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 5 SF gp (4 SF bn, 1 spt bn) 1 ranger regt (3 ranger bn; 1 cbt spt bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 civil affairs bde (5 civil affairs bn) 1 psyops gp (3 psyops bn) 1 psyops gp (4 psyops bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (sustainment) log bde (1 sigs bn) HELICOPTER 1 (160th SOAR) hel regt (4 hel bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 28:16 M1126 Stryker ICV; 12 Pandur AUV 640 M-ATV ARTILLERY 20 MOR • 120mm 20 XM905 EMTAS AIRCRAFT TPT 12: Medium 7 C-27J Spartan (parachute training); Light 5 C-212 (parachute training) HELICOPTERS MRH 51AH-6M/MH-6M Little Bird TPT 139: Heavy 67 MH-47G Chinook; Medium 72 MH- 60M Black Hawk UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 24 MQ-1C Gray Eagle ISR • Light 29:15 XPV-1 Tern; 14 XPV-2 Mako TPT • Heavy 28 CQ-10 Snowgoose Reserve Organisations_ Army National Guard FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF gp (3 SF bn) Army Reserve FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT 2 psyops gp 4 civil affairs comd HQ 8 civil affairs bde HQ 32 civil affairs bn (coy) North America 47 US Navy Special Warfare Command 10,500 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 8 SEAL team (total: 48 SF pl) 2 SEAL Delivery Vehicle team Reserve Organisations_ Naval Reserve Force FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 8 SEAL det 10 Naval Special Warfare det 2 Special Boat sqn 2 Special Boat unit 1 SEAL Delivery Vehicle det US Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) 3,500_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt (3 SF bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 int bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt gp Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) 16,800_ FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with AC-130J Ghostrider TRANSPORT 4 sqn with CV-22B Osprey 1 sqn with Do-328 (C-146A) 1 sqn with MC-130H Combat Talon 3 sqn with MC-130J Commando II 3 sqn with PC-12 (U-28A) TRAINING 1 sqn with M-28 Skytruck (C-145A) 1 sqn with CV-22A/B Osprey 1 sqn with HC-130J Combat King II; MC-130J Commando II 1 sqn with Bell 205 (TH-1H Iroquois) 1 sqn with HH-60W Jolly Green II; UH-1N Huey COMBAT/ISR UAV 3 sqn with MQ-9 Reaper EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 31 combat capable ATK 31AC-130J Ghostrider ISR 22 MC-12 Javaman CSAR 3 HC-130J Combat King II TPT 109: Medium 49: 8 MC-130H Combat Talon II; 41 MC-130J Commando II; Light 60: 20 Do-328 (C-146A); 5 M-28 Skytruck (C-145A); 35 PC-12 (U-28A) TILT-ROTOR 51 CV-22A/B Osprey HELICOPTERS CSAR 7 HH-60W Jolly Green II TPT • Light 34: 28 Bell 205 (TH-1H Iroquois); 6 UH- 1N Huey UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR • Heavy 50 MQ-9 Reaper Reserve Organisations_ Air National Guard FORCES BY ROLE ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with C-130J Hercules/EC-130] Commando Solo ISR 1 sqn with MC-12W Liberty TRANSPORT 1 fit with B-737-200 (C-32B) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT EW 7 EC-130J Commando Solo ISR 13 MC-12W Liberty TPT 5: Medium 3 C-130J Hercules; PAX 2 B-757-200 (C-32B) Air Force Reserve FORCES BY ROLE TRAINING 1 sqn with AC-130J Ghostrider (personnel only) 1 sqn with M-28 Skytruck (C-145A) (personnel only) COMBAT/ISR UAV 1 sqn with MQ-9 Reaper (personnel only) DEPLOYMENT_ ARABIAN SEA: US Central Command • US Navy • 5th Fleet 1,000: 2 SSGN; 2 DDGHM; Combined Maritime Forces • TF 53: 3 AKEH; 1AOR ARU BA: US Southern Command • 1 Forward Operating Location ASCENSION ISLAND: US Strategic Command • 1 detection and tracking radar at Ascension Auxiliary Air Field AUSTRALIA: US Pacific Command • 1,700; 1 SEWS at Pine Gap; 1 comms facility at Pine Gap; 1 SIGINT stn at Pine Gap; US Strategic Command • 1 detection and tracking radar at Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt BAHRAIN: US Central Command • 4,700; 1 HQ (5th Fleet); 10 PCFG; 4 MCO; 1 ESB; 1 ASW fit with 2 P-8A Poseidon; 1 EP-3E Aries II; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE BELGIUM: US European Command • 1,150 BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY: US Strategic Command • 300; 1 Spacetrack Optical Tracker at Diego Garcia; 1 ground-based electro-optical deep space surveillance system (GEODSS) at Diego Garcia US Pacific Command • 1 MPS sqn (MPS-2 with equipment for one MEB) at Diego Garcia with 2 AKRH; 3 AKR; 1 AKEH; 1ESD; 1 naval air base at Diego Garcia, 1 support facility at Diego Garcia BULGARIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 150; 1 armd inf coy with M2A3 Bradley CANADA: US Northern Command • 150 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 10 COLOMBIA: US Southern Command • 70 48 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 CUBA: US Southern Command • 650 (JTF-GTMO) at Guantanamo Bay CURACAO: US Southern Command • 1 Forward Operating Location DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 3 DJIBOUTI: US Africa Command • 4,000; 1 tpt sqn with C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 1 tpt sqn with 12 MV-22B Osprey; 2 KC-130J Hercules; 1 spec ops sqn with MC-130H/J; PC-12 (U-28A); 1 CSAR sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk; 1CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; 1 naval air base EGYPT: MFO 426; elm 1 ARNG inf bn; 1 ARNG spt bn EL SALVADOR: US Southern Command • 100; 1 ASW fit with 2 P-8A Poseidon; 1 Forward Operating Location (Military, DEA, USCG and Customs personnel) GERMANY: US Africa Command • 1 HQ at Stuttgart US European Command • 39,050; 1 Combined Service HQ (EUCOM) at Stuttgart-Vaihingen US Army 24,700 FORCES BY ROLE 1 HQ (US Army Europe & Africa (USAREUR-AF)) at Wiesbaden; 1 arty comd; 1 spec ops gp; 1 recce bn; 1 mech bde(-); 1 MRL bde (3 MRL bn); 1 fd arty bn; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde HQ; 1 int bde; 1 MP bde; 1 sigs bde; 1 (MDTF) cbt spt bde(-); 1 spt bde; 1 SAM bde; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set EQUIPMENT BY TYPE M1A2 SEPv2/v3 Abrains; M2A3/M3A3 Bradley; M1296 Stryker Dragoon, M109A6; M119A3; M777A2; M270A1; M142 HIMARS; AH-64D Apache; CH-47F Chinook; UH-60M Black Hawk; HH-60M Black Hawk; M902 Patriot PAC-3; MW97 Avenger; M-SHORAD US Navy 400 USAF 13,400 FORCES BY ROLE 1 HQ (US Air Forces in Europe and Africa) at Ramstein AB; 1 HQ (3rd Air Force) at Ramstein AB; 1 FGA wg at Spangdahlem AB with (1 FGA sqn with 24 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon); 1 tpt wg at Ramstein AB with 14 C-130J-30 Hercules; 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 5 Learjet 35A (C-21A); 1 B-737-700 (C-40B) USMC 550 GREECE: US European Command • 400; 1ELINT fit with 1 EP-3E Aries II; 1 naval base at Makri; 1 naval base at Souda Bay; 1 air base at Iraklion GREENLAND (DNK): US Strategic Command • 100; 1 AN/ FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar and 1 Spacetrack Radar at Thüle GUAM: US Pacific Command • 9,000; 4 SSGN; 1 MPS sqn (MPS-3 with equipment for one MEB) with 2 AKRH; 4 AKR; 1 ESD; 1 AKEH; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-135R Stratotanker; 1 tpt hel sqn with MH-60S; 1 ISR UAV unit with 2 MQ-4C Triton; 1 SAM bty with THAAD; 1 air base; 1 naval base HONDURAS: US Southern Command • 400; 1 avn bn with 4 CH-47F Chinook; 12 UH-60 Black Hawk HUNGARY: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 150; 1 armd inf coy with M2A3 Bradley ICELAND: US European Command • 100; 1 ASW fit with 2 P-8A Poseidon IRAQ: US Central Command • Operation Inherent Resolve 2,000; 1 mech inf bde(-); 1 atk hel bn with AH-64E Apache; MQ-1C Gray Eagle; 1 spec ops hel bn with MH-47G Chinook; MH-60M Black Hawk; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 12 ISRAEL: US Strategic Command • 100; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Mount Keren ITALY: US European Command • 13,050 US Army 4,250; 1 AB bde(-) US Navy 3,600; 1 HQ (US Naval Forces Europe-Africa (NAVEUR-NAVAF/6th Fleet) at Naples; 1 LCC; 1 ASW sqn with 5 P-8A Poseidon at Sigonella USAF 4,800; 1 FGA wg with (2 FGA sqn with 21 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon at Aviano; 1 CSAR sqn with 8 HH-60G Pave Hawk at Aviano); 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper at Sigonella; 1 ISR UAV fit with RQ-4B Global Hawk at Sigonella USMC 400; 1 tpt sqn with 6 MV-22B Osprey; 2 KC-130J Hercules JAPAN: US Pacific Command • 55,600 US Army 2,600; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 avn bn; 1 SAM bn with M903 Patriot PAC-3 MSE US Navy 20,000; 1 HQ (7th Fleet) at Yokosuka; 1 base at Sasebo; 1 base at Yokosuka FORCES BY ROLE 3 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 10 F/A-18E Super Hornet; 1 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 10 F/A-18F Super Hornet; 2 ASW sqn at Misawa/Kadena with 5 P-8A Poseidon; 2 EW sqn at Iwakuni/Misawa with 5 EA-18G Growler; 1 ELINT fit at Okinawa - Kadena AB with 2 EP-3E Aries II; 1 AEW&C sqn at Iwakuni with 5 E-2D Hawkeye; 2 ASW hel sqn at Atsugi with 12 MH-60R;1 tpt hel sqn at Atsugi with 12 MH-60S EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 CVN; 3 CGHM; 4 DDGHM; 4 DDGM; 1 LCC; 4 MCO; 1 LHA; 2 LPD; 2 LSD USAF 13,000 FORCES BY ROLE 1 HQ (5th Air Force) at Okinawa - Kadena AB; 1 ftr wg at Misawa AB with (2 FGA sqn with 22 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon); 1 wg at Okinawa - Kadena AB with (2 ftr sqn with 27 F-15C/D Eagle; 1 tkr sqn with 15 KC-135R Stratotanker; 1 AEW&C sqn with 2 E-3B Sentry; 1 CSAR sqn with 10 HH-60G Pave Hawk); 1 tpt wg at Yokota AB with 10 C-130J-30 Hercules; 3 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 1 Spec Ops gp at Okinawa - Kadena AB with (1 sqn with 5 MC-130J Commando II; 1 sqn with 5 CV-22B Osprey); 1 ISR sqn with RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR UAV fit with 5 RQ-4A Global Hawk USMC 20,000 FORCES BY ROLE 1 mne div; 1 mne regt HQ; 1 arty regt HQ; 1 recce bn; 1 mne bn; 1 amph aslt bn; 1 arty bn; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F/A-18D Hornet; 2 FGA sqn with 10 F-35B Lightning II; North America 49 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-130J Hercules; 2 tpt sqn with 12 MV-22B Osprey US Strategie Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Shariki; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kyogamisaki JORDAN: US Central Command • Operation Inherent Resolve 3,000:1 FGA sqn with 18 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 CISR UAV sqn with 12 MQ-9A Reaper KOREA, REPUBLIC OF: US Pacific Command • 30,400 US Army 21,500 FORCES BY ROLE 1 HQ (8th Army) at Pyeongtaek; 1 div HQ (2nd Inf) located at Pyeongtaek; 1 mech bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 MRL bde; 1 AD bde; 1 SAM bty with THAAD EQUIPMENT BY TYPE M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M2A3/M3A3 Bradley; M109A6; M270A1 MLRS; AH-64D/E Apache; CH-47F Chinook; UH-60L/M Black Hawk; M902 Patriot PAC-3; THAAD; FIM-92A Avenger; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set US Navy 350 USAF 8,350 FORCES BY ROLE 1 (AF) HQ (7th Air Force) at Osan AB; 1 ftr wg at Osan AB with (1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon; 1 atk sqn with 24 A-10C Thunderbolt II); 1 ftr wg at Kunsan AB with (2 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon); 1ISR sqn at Osan AB with U-2S USMC 200 KUWAIT: US Central Command • 10,000; 1ARNG armd bn; 1 ARNG (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 spt bde; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; 1 (APS) armd bde set; 1 (APS) inf bde set LIBYA: UN • UNSMIL 1 LITHUANIA: US European Command • 250; 1 radar unit MALI: UN • MINUSMA 10 MARSHALL ISLANDS: US Strategic Command • 20; 1 detection and tracking radar at Kwajalein Atoll MEDITERRANEAN SEA: US European Command • 6th Fleet 6,000; 1 CVN; 1 CGHM; 2 DDGHM; NATO • SNMG 2; 300; 1DDGHM MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2 NETHERLANDS: US European Command • 450 NIGER: US Africa Command • 800; 1 CISR sqn with MQ- 9A Reaper NORWAY: US European Command • 1,100; 1 (USMC) MEU eqpt set; 1 (APS) SP 155mm arty bn set PERSIAN GULF: US Central Command • US Navy • 5th Fleet 500:1 DDGHM; 6 (Coast Guard) PCC PHILIPPINES: US Pacific Command • Operation Pacific Eagle - Philippines 200 POLAND: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 700; 1 armd bn with M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M2A3 Bradley US European Command • 15,000; 1 corps HQ; 2 div HQ; 2 armd bde with M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M3A3 Bradley; M2A3 Bradley; M109A6/7; 1 AB bde with M119A3; M777A2; 2 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-22A Raptor; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper PORTUGAL: US European Command • 250; 1 spt facility at Lajes QATAR: US Central Command • 10,000: 1 ISR sqn with 4 RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR sqn with 4 E-8C ISTARS; 2 tkr sqn with 12 KC-135R/T Stratotanker; 1 tpt sqn with 4 C-17A Globemaster; 4 C-130H/T-30 Hercules; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar ROMANIA: US European Command • 4,000; 1 air aslt bde with M119A3; M777A3; 1 Aegis Ashore BMD unit with three 8-cell Mk 41 VLS launchers with SM-3 SAUDI ARABIA: US Central Command • 2,000; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-16C Fighting Falcon SERBIA: NATO • KFOR • Joint Enterprise 660; elm 1 ARNG inf bde HQ; 1 ARNG recce bn; 1 hel fit with UH-60 SINGAPORE: US Pacific Command • 200; 1 log spt sqn; 1 spt facility SLOVAKIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigiliance Activities 400; 1 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3 SOMALIA: US Africa Command • 100 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 8 SPAIN: US European Command • 3,250; 4 DDGM; 1 air base at Moron; 1 naval base at Rota SYRIA: US Central Command • Operation Inherent Resolve 900; 1 armd inf coy; 1 mne bn(-) THAILAND: US Pacific Command • 100 TURKEY: US European Command • 1,700; 1 tkr sqn with 14 KC-135; 1 air base at Incirlik; 1 support facility at Ankara; 1 support facility at Izmir US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Küreök UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: US Central Command • 5,000: 1 ISR sqn with 4 U-2; 1 AEW&C sqn with 4 E-3B/G Sentry; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-10A; 1 ISR UAV sqn with RQ-4 Global Hawk; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE UNITED KINGDOM: US European Command • 10,000 FORCES BY ROLE 1 ftr wg at RAF Lakenheath with (2 FGA sqn with 23 F-15E Strike Eagle, 1 FGA sqn with 21 F-35A Lightning II; 1 FGA sqn with F-35A Lightning II (forming)); 1 ISR sqn at RAF Mildenhall with OC-135/RC-135; 1 tkr wg at RAF Mildenhall with 15 KC-135R/T Stratotanker; 1 spec ops gp at RAF Mildenhall with (1 sqn with 8 CV-22B Osprey; 1 sqn with 8 MC-130I Commando II) US Strategic Command • 1AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar and 1 Spacetrack Radar at Fylingdales Moor FOREIGN FORCES_ Germany Air Force: trg units with 40 T-38 Talon; 69 T-6A Texan II; • Missile trg at Fort Bliss (TX) Netherlands 1 hel trg sqn with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D Chinook Singapore Air Force: trg units with F-16C/D; 12 F-15SG; AH-64D Apache; 6+ CH-47D Chinook hel Chapter Four Europe The war in Ukraine has caused many states to reassess their defence priorities, and it has effectively shifted the strategic centre of gravity in Europe further to the north and east. Poland has accelerated its project to recapitalise and expand its ground forces' armour and artillery capabilities. This change has been accompanied by a rapid increase in defence expenditure: a new spending level was set at 3% of GDP from 2023. As part of efforts to close Germany's long-standing defence-capabilities gap, Germany's Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced in February the creation of a EURIOObn (USD106bn) special fund to finance Bundeswehr investment and equipment projects. Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has reinvigorated NATO. At its Madrid summit in June 2022, NATO agreed a new force model to boost force size and readiness and to replace the NATO Response Force.The assumption under the new three-tier model is that the new force would be able to deploy at least 300,000 troops no later than 30 days. But as before, a key challenge will be in transforming members' commitments into a capability. Finland and Sweden were on the path to NATO membership in 2023. For NATO, their accession implies an expanded collective defence obligation. Nevertheless, NATO will benefit from Northern Europe becoming a more integrated space in terms of deterrence and defence. It means that, bar Russian coastlines in the Gulf of Finland and in Kaliningrad, the shores of the Baltic Sea will be controlled by NATO members. One outcome of the drive to deliver security assistance to Ukraine is that legacy equipment and ageing ammunition stocks are being flushed out of European inventories.This will be more pronounced in Central and Eastern European countries, where many states had retained Soviet-era legacy equipment in their inventories. It creates an opportunity to accelerate military modernisation and consider expanding equipment commonality. Europe defence spending, 2022 - top 5 United Kingdom France Active military personnel - top 10 (15,000 per unit) Germany USD70.0bn USD54.4bn USD53.4bn Italy Netherlands USD31.1bn USD15.2bn mrnmmn mumm IMttffltt mmm mmm mmti Romania 71,500 Bulgaria 36,950 355,200 France 203,250 Germany 183,150 Italy 161,050 United Kingdom 150,350 Greece 132,200 Spain 124,150 Poland 114,050 Global total 20,773,950 Regional 9.4% , total I 1,948,260 Regional defence policy and economics Arms procurements and deliveries Armed forces data section 52 ► 69 ► 72 ► Europe: selected tactical combat aircraft, 2022* *'Combat aircraft' includes fighter, fighter ground-attack and attack aircraft Europe: selected main battle tank fleets, 2022 2,500 Europe: medium transport aircraft, 2022 Operator Equipment Total Operator Equipment Total Austria C-130K Hercules 3 Norway C-130J-30 Hercules 4 Bulgaria C-27J Spartan 3 Poland C-130H/C-130E Hercules 7 Denmark C-130J-30 Hercules 4 Portugal C-130H/C-130H-30 Hercules 5 France C-130H/C-130H-30/C-130J-30 Hercules 16 Romania C-130B/C-130H Hercules/C-27J Spartan 12 Germany C-130J-30 Hercules 3 Slovakia C-27J Spartan 2 Greece C-130B/C-130H Hercules/C-27J Spartan 23 Sweden C-130H Hercules 5 Italy C-130J/C-130J-30 Hercules/C-27J Spartan 33 Turkey C-130B/C-130E Hereu/es/C-160D Transall 24 Lithuania C-27J Spartan 3 United Kingdom C-130J/C-130J-30 Hercules 14 Netherlands C-130H/C-130H-30 Hercules 4 52 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Europe Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has profoundly affected defence-policy debates in Europe, both at the national and at the multilateral level. It is leading some nations to reconsider the likely character of a potential war in Europe and resulting capability requirements, including doctrine, equipment and personnel, and also dispositions. Between January and the end of July, 20 European states announced defence spending increases. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the United Kingdom declared ambitions to raise their defence spending to 2.5% of GDP. The UK ambition was briefly raised to 3% by 2030 (the figure for which Poland is aiming) but by late year, and amid a changed economic outlook, the new administration of Rishi Sunak reduced the target back to 2% of GDP. Germany announced a special EUR100 billion (USDio6bn) fund to pay for defence-modernisation needs. NATO and European Union members also agreed to several packages of sanctions against Russia and began to deliver substantial military assistance to Ukraine. Russia's invasion caused other notable shifts in government policy and public opinion. Finland and Sweden applied for NATO membership, and Denmark held a referendum on 1 June which effectively ended Copenhagen's opt-out from the military aspects of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Finland and Sweden are likely to formally join NATO at some point in 2023. At NATO's Madrid Summit, held from 28-30 June, the Alliance formally invited the two nations to join, after they both applied the preceding month. By October, 28 NATO member states had ratified the required accession documents, with only Hungary and Turkey remaining. Finland and Sweden had previously collaborated closely with NATO, including on operations and through NATO: new posture, new strategy Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine reinvigorated the NATO Alliance. Furthermore, Russia's actions strengthened unity among Alliance members over threat perceptions, sharpened focus on deterrence and defence frameworks such as the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). In capability terms, both countries bring valuable assets into the Alliance, albeit in limited numbers. Taken together, their defence spending amounts to less than 5% of the combined spending of European NATO nations. For NATO, the accession of Finland and Sweden implies an expanded collective-defence obligation. This would include protecting Finland's 1,340-kilometre land border with Russia. Nevertheless, NATO will benefit from Northern Europe becoming a more integrated space in terms of deterrence and defence. It means that, bar Russian coastlines in the Gulf of Finland and in Kaliningrad, the shores of the Baltic Sea will be controlled by NATO members. However, both Finland and Sweden will likely need to make additional defence investments due to demand signals from the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), notwithstanding their history of partnering with NATO members. Filling billets in NATO's multinational command structure will increase the burden on the cohort of staff officers. At the same time, both states will need to consider how they would enable the inflow of a large number of NATO forces in the event of a collective defence contingency on NATO's eastern flank. No decisions have yet been made on permanent NATO structures in Finland and Sweden. But, at the very least, NATO states will likely want to discuss the prepositioning of equipment and command and control (C2) arrangements that, while primarily staffed by Finland and Sweden, include a multinational layer that could expand quickly if required. This will also require Finland's and Sweden's exercise posture to evolve further. Currently both states conduct some exercises with NATO members, but closer ties with Alliance members will mean closer integration with NATO exercise cycles. (underpinned by a new force model), and triggered applications to join NATO by Finland and Sweden. This followed a year in which the Alliance had to weather two crises. In August 2021, the fall of Kabul to the Taliban, Europe 53 after the collapse of the Afghan government and security forces, damaged NATO's standing and also suggested a degree of strategic failure. (Alliance members had withdrawn their troops earlier, in April 2021.) Then, in September 2021, France was caught off guard by the Australia-UK-US defence trilateral known as AUKUS, which caused significant upset in Paris. A new Strategic Concept, agreed at NATO's 28-30 June summit in Madrid, elaborated on some of these changes, stating that'the Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace'and that Russia is 'the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area'. The document also said that terrorism is 'the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity', reflecting NATO's 360-degree approach and the need to demonstrate concern for the security priorities of NATO's southern member states. China was, for the first time, explicitly assessed in a NATO Strategic Concept, and Beijing's ambitions and policies were considered to 'challenge [NATO] interests, security and values'. The Strategic Concept did not create any new core tasks for NATO-some had mooted resilience as a potential addition - but the task list has been reordered with deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security all folded under the overarching theme of collective defence. The summit declaration stated that NATO had'set a new baseline for our deterrence and defence posture. NATO will continue to protect our populations and defend every inch of Allied territory at all times' However, realising this ambition will require significant and coordinated efforts by member states. NATO members began to increase defence spending in the years after Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, and additional uplifts were announced by some after February 2022. Madrid saw additional commitments to 'build on' the 2014 defence investment pledge, agreed at that year's Wales Summit, and to 'decide next year on subsequent commitments beyond 2024'. As well as this, important outcomes evident after Madrid relate to additional forward-deployed personnel, more prepositioned equipment and a much-increased ambition for high-readiness forces. These efforts are intended to increase the defence and deterrence posture on the eastern flank. That said, certain media reports at the time of the Madrid Summit suggested that some of NATO's eastern members had hoped for an even greater effort to underpin a strategy of forward defence, making permanent some of the rotational deployments by NATO allies to their countries. However, despite NATO's newfound unity, member states disagree on the extent to which Russia threatens the Alliance and the desirability of accepting the costs - and loss of flexibility - that a larger and more permanent presence would demand. NATO's enhanced forward presence has expanded from four battlegroups - in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland - to eight with new multinational deployments in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. At the time of the Madrid Summit, these comprised some 9,600 personnel from 24 NATO nations. Furthermore, Canada, France, Germany and the UK have indicated that they will pre-assign forces to reinforce the countries where they already lead NATO's forward-presence battlegroups. These pre-assigned forces are up to brigade-level strength, but it is unclear whether dedicated assets exist to enable their rapid deployment, when needed, from their respective home bases. NATO also agreed a new force model to increase the scale and readiness of its forces and to replace the NATO Response Force (NRF). Founded in 2002 and expanded in 2015 to include up to 40,000 personnel, the NRF concept includes the ambition to be able to deploy initial elements within five days and the whole force no later than 30 days. In contrast, the new force model is based on a three-tier structure. The first tier, intended to be deployable in less than ten days, encompasses at least 100,000 troops. The second tier, ready at 10-30 days' notice, comprises 200,000 troops, and the third tier, ready at 30-180 days' notice, comprises an additional 500,000. As such, the assumption is that the new force model would generate at least 300,000 troops at a readiness level comparable to the NRF of old (i.e., deployed no later than 30 days). These forces are intended to be drawn together across multiple domains, including cyber elements, and will be pre-assigned to specific defence plans. NATO plans to transition to this new force model in 2023, even though the details of the composition and exact scale are still being discussed. Germany was the first country to publicly outline its intended offer to this new force model, suggesting that by 2025, Berlin would provide approximately 30,000 troops, 65 aircraft and 20 naval vessels for the high-readiness component (within the first 30 days). However, unless the US force posture in Europe changes significantly, it is likely that most of the high-readiness forces will need to be European. In the past, similar initiatives, including both the NRF and the NATO Readiness Initiative (agreed in 2020), suffered from the tendency of allies to make offers to contribute, while finding it time-consuming and challenging to actually meet the required standards. These issues are unlikely to disappear now that the ambition has increased significantly. 54 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Defence-policy decisions by Germany and Poland also attracted headlines. In July, Warsaw signed agreements to purchase up to 1,000 Hyundai Rotem K2 Black Panther main battle tanks, 672 Hanwha Defense K9 Thunder 155mm self-propelled artillery pieces and 48 Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) FA-50 Fighting Eagle light fighter ground-attack aircraft from South Korea. They will be acquired in stages that include technology transfer and local production, and initial deliveries began in 2022. Polish licensed production of the K2 and K9, in their Poland-specific variants, is set to start in 2026, and there are plans for follow-on joint development work by the two nations. If it is fully implemented, the scale of the deal will challenge South Korea's defence-industrial base, but it will also test Poland. With these orders coming alongside significant procurements from United States and European manufacturers, Warsaw will need to not only generate the required funding but also fulfil its plans to grow its armed forces, and at the same time maintain, sustain and enable the capability these purchases are intended to generate. While it is apparent that Russia's conventional military capability has been diminished as a result of its war on Ukraine, Warsaw clearly continues to see Moscow as a direct threat. This is evidenced by the speed with which Poland entered into initial negotiations with South Korea and Warsaw's interest in early delivery. In Europe, arguably the most significant gap between the potential and actual delivery of defence capability is in Germany. In a speech on 27 February, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz argued that Russia's invasion of Ukraine amounted to a new era (in German, Zeitenwende) for European security, which will mean radical shifts in policy. As part of efforts to close Germany's long-standing defence-capabilities gap, Scholz announced the creation of a EURioobn (USDio6bn) special fund to finance Bundeswehr investment and equipment projects. Germany's defence budget stood at 1.3% of GDP in 2021. Initially, there were expectations among some allies - and some observers in Germany - that the special fund would come on top of moves to raise the regular defence budget to 2% of GDP, in line with NATO recommendations. However, deliberations in Berlin since Scholz's announcement suggest that over the coming years it is instead likely to be used to reach 2% through successive drawdowns from the fund. In 2022, the German government announced its intention to purchase up to 70 additional Eurofighter aircraft, some 35 F-35A Lightning lis and about 60 CH-47F Chinook heavy transport helicopters. According to government plans, close to 41% of the special fund will be invested in air capabilities, followed by around 25% in the Bundeswehr's digitisation needs (primarily around C2), 20% in land systems and just under 11% in the maritime domain. It seems that the requirement for a wide-ranging replenishment of munitions stocks will have to be funded by the regular budget. It is likely that much of the special fund will be invested in programmes that were already planned before 24 February and had been indicated in both Bundeswehr and NATO planning documents, but which had not received adequate funding due to the limitations placed by Germany's core defence budget. Furthermore, it is not clear that Scholz's Zeitenwende speech has yet translated into a true shift in mindset. Berlin's Central and Eastern European partners have been disappointed by Germany's hesitance over supplying heavy weapons to Ukraine and extending into the energy and financial sectors meaningful sanctions against Russia. Nevertheless, Germany's defence-policy debate has evolved rapidly in 2022, and the country will adopt its first-ever national-security strategy in early 2023. Supporting Ukraine Ukraine's efforts to defend itself have been actively supported by NATO and EU members, though the level and speed of support has varied. Assistance has included ammunition, intelligence, some maintenance and repair support, as well as funding. Equipment donations have ranged from Soviet-era legacy equipment to more sophisticated systems in active service with NATO armed forces. They have also included refurbished equipment that waseither in deep storageor has been purchased from industry stocks. The EU used its European Peace Facility (EPF) to commit EUR3.1 billion (USD2.6bn) by October 2022 - half of the EPF budget for 2021-27 - and approve, for the first time ever, the supply of lethal weapons to a third country. (The EPF is an off-budget instrument, established in March 2021, to fund partner nations' equipment and infrastructure needs.) To help with the coordination and logistics of the national contributions to Ukraine, a US European Command (EUCOM) Control Europe 55 Centre Ukraine/International Donor Coordination Centre (ECCU/IDCC) was established in March 2022 under US and UK leadership, with a Ukrainian liaison element.This helps match Ukrainian requests with donor offers and assists with the delivery of equipment to Ukraine and training requirements for Ukrainian personnel. The EU agreed on 17 October to launch the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM Ukraine), which initially aims to train 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers on the territory of EU member states and is, at first, mandated for two years. Meanwhile, one notable effort has been the training programme set up in July by the UK, with the aim of training in the UK up to 10,000 Ukrainian recruits and existing personnel every 120 days. The programme, run by the UK's 11th Security Force Assistance Brigade, involves some 1,000 UK personnel. Since it started, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have indicated they would participate in the effort. One side effect of the drive todeliver security assistance to Ukraine is that legacy equipment and ageing ammunition stocks are being flushed out of European inventories. While these effects will be more pronounced in Central and Eastern European countries, where many states had retained Soviet-era legacy equipment in their inventories, this creates an opportunity to accelerate the pace of military modernisation and to consider expanding equipment commonality within the broader context of rising budgets. However, it is questionable whether (particularly) Europe's defence industries will be able to deliver at the timescales needed by customers. Another potential problem is that additional funding might tempt governments to either invest in their national defence-industrial base, where it exists, or pursue industrial-policy goals rather than focus on immediate capability needs. Careful calibration will be needed to balance national programmes and industrial capacity, given the desire by some to strengthen Europe's defence-industrial and technology base and the instinct of others to cement existing international partnerships through arms orders. The war in Ukraine has caused many states to reassess their defence priorities, and it has effectively shifted further north and east the strategic centre of gravity in Europe. For NATO, this will likely make it harder to maintain its 360-degree approach. The clear positioning of Russia as the key threat in the new Strategic Concept, when viewed alongside the mixed legacy of crisis-management operations - including arguable failure in Afghanistan and a sense in some capitals that the EU might be a more appropriate vehicle for dealing with instability and state fragility on NATO's southern periphery - is making it harder to ensure that the southern flank receives appropriate attention. Nevertheless, finding credible ways to do so will be needed for unanimity over NATO's engagement on the eastern flank. The Strategic Concept characterises China's attempts to undermine and reshape the international order as a systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security. But China has not been placed directly into a deterrence and defence framework because a number of NATO allies do not believe that Beijing poses a military threat to their security. That said, the return of war to Europe has not displaced the ambitions of several European governments to play a growing security and defence role in the Indo-Pacific, though resources to achieve this will be limited. The UK has demonstrated intent, with the deployment of two River-dass offshore-patrol vessels (OPVs) to the region, as well as the planned deployment of a new amphibious Littoral Response Group in 2023 and a frigate later in the decade. But while the Indo-Pacific tilt, announced in March 2021 by the UK government, is likely to remain only a modest driver of British military planning, the UK deployed forces in 2022 -including four Typhoon combat aircraft and an A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) - to take part in Australia's Pitch Black air exercise. Germany also sent aircraft to Pitch Black. Following on from the Indo-Pacific deployment of the frigate Bayern in 2021 and early 2022, Berlin sent six Eurofighter Typhoons, four A400M transport aircraft and three A330 MRTTs to Pitch Black and to Australia's navy-led Kakadu drill. Additional engagements with Japan, Singapore and South Korea were planned in the framework of this deployment. For its part, France maintains warships and troops in the region and routinely deploys additional vessels and aircraft. In 2022, it deployed to the region several Rafale combat aircraft and tanker and transport aircraft as part of a force-projection exercise, including some to take part in Pitch Black. EU defence initiatives In March 2022, the EU published its 'Strategic Compass for Security and Defence'. The process was initiated in June 2020, with a threat analysis presented in November 2020 and most of the writing 56 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 completed in 2021. The document was intended to provide strategic guidance for EU activity in relation to crisis management, resilience, military capability development and multinational partnerships. However, despite last-minute edits and additions, the profound change to Europe's security landscape resulting from Russia's war in Ukraine means that the Strategic Compass cannot but look like it has been overtaken by events. Josep Borrell, EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, wrote in its Foreword that the Compass should help to 'turn the EU's geopolitical awakening into a more permanent strategic posture'. Initiatives outlined in the strategy include the establishment of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) to deliver a 5,000-strong crisis-management capability for operations in non-permissive environments and to be fully operational by 2025. It also called for the development of an EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence, as well as for investment in common solutions for strategic enablers and in technology to drive defence innovation and next-generation capabilities, using the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The RDC is meant to be built on modified EU Battlegroups and forces and capabilities earmarked by member states. However, this approach has so far only generated limited success in an EU context. For instance, EU Battlegroups have been fully operational on paper since 2007 but have not been used once despite there, arguably, being no shortage of crises. Nonetheless, a military rapid-response concept document was in the drafting stages in mid-2022 to further inform RDC architecture and planning. As of summer 2022, the EU was also working on its first military strategy to assist the planning of EU operations and deliver military-specific guidance. The return of war to Europe has triggered a raft of other initiatives that may generate some effect in the future, particularly in relation to the defence-industrial sector. In March 2022, the European Commission was tasked with assessing, in coordination with the European Defence Agency, European defence-investment gaps and outlining measures to strengthen Europe's defence-industrial base. The findings were presented on 18 May and indicated that EU members should increase stocks of weapons and munitions, replace remaining Soviet-era equipment in their inventories and invest in air and missile defence. As a result, in July the Commission proposed a regulation to establish the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). EDIRPA is meant to have a EUR500 million (USD528m) budget between 2022 and 2024, and the plan is that it would effectively subsidise EU member states' procurement from the EU budget. In the longer run, steps like these towards directly incentivising joint procurement will inform and reinforce the European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP), another proposal the Commission planned to launch before the end of 2022. Overall, these initiatives are likely to encourage more intra-EU collaborative defence development and procurement, objectives that are already features of the EDF and PESCO. Sub-regional defence: the V4 and the JEF As well as national efforts and cooperation at the NATO and EU level, European states also use mini-lateral and other sub-regional defence formats to advance their defence-policy aims, although they have variable focus on the war in Ukraine. While the Visegrad Four (V4) seems largely to be continuing to implement existing work programmes with limited adjustments, others, like the UK-led JEF, have a greater operational focus. For instance, the work programmes for the V4 presidencies by Hungary (2021-22) and Slovakia (2022-23) reflected a focus on preparing the V4 Battlegroup that is due to go on standby for EU operations in the first half of 2023. The Battlegroup will be working on military-mobility projects within the context of the Strategic Compass, while also scaling up joint training and exercise activity to improve readiness and interoperability. In contrast, the JEF nations (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK) announced in March a set of enhanced exercises focused on the High North, the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea, reflecting key areas of concern for their governments. In May, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) based in Northwood, UK, began deploying forces to Lithuania and Latvia to help coordinate the military activities of JEF nations in the Baltic Sea (the decision to do so was made in February, just before Russia's invasion of Ukraine). Then, in July, JEF governments announced additional exercises while Finland and Sweden awaited ratification of their NATO membership. Europe 57 T Figure 2 The FREMM frigate: selected national variants In 2002, France and Italy agreed to jointly develop and acquire a new generation of multi-mission frigates (European multi-mission frigates, FREMM). Twenty-seven vessels were originally planned (17 French and ten Italian). While the different national versions share a common basic hull form and major common components, they differ significantly in detail design, and each navy operates different FREMM variants. The first vessel (for the French Navy) was launched in April 2010 and commissioned in November 2012. France has successfully exported one FREMM to Morocco and anotherto Egypt, while Italy has delivered two to Egypt and, in 2021, won an order for six from Indonesia. A much-modified version of the Italian FREMM was chosen by the US Navy (USN) as the basis for its FFG(X) (subsequently reclassified FFG-62) new-generation small surface combatant (or frigate). The USN plans to procure 20 of the vessels. The export successes of the FREMM family have been due largely to the fact that it represents a modern, capable and proven design that also remains relatively cost-effective. FREMM family basic dimensions/characteristics: FREMM customers: ■ France: 142m x 19.8m, 6,200 tonnes full-load displacement; ■ France: 8 ■ Egypt: 3 crew complement: 108-118 _ ., . „. ■ nephron nn nrjo, H ■ Italy: 8 (two general purpose ■ U!>. three on order ■ Italy: 144m x 19.7m, 6,700 tonnes; crew complement: 145-167 (QP) variants under construction) (with 20 planned) ■ US: 151m x 19.7m, (est.). 7,200 tonnes, crew complement: 200 (est) ■ Morocco: 1 ■ Indonesia: six on order France's Aquitaine class I x6 Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) variants I x2 Air Defence (AD) variant I Shared features Capacity for one NH90 medium helicopter 16-cellVLS with Aster 15 or Aster30 surface-to-air missile (SAM) I 16-cellVLS with Aster15 or Aster 30 SAM 16-cellVLS with MdCN (SCALP Naval) land-attack cruise missile (LACM) 1 x 76/62 Super /?3p/d76mm gun I CAPTAS 4 variable-depth sonar 2 x twin 324mm B-515ASTT with MU90 lightweight torpedoes I 2 x quad Inchrwith MM40 Exocet Block 3 long-range anti-ship missile (AShM) UMS4110 hull-mounted sonar French and Italian versions Differences between the Italian and French vessels reflect divergent national requirements as well as ambitions to maximise domestic defence industrial workshare. France's Aquitaine class was originally to have comprised eight anti-submarine warfare (ASW) variants and nine land-attack variants. However, ASW numbers were reduced to six, the land-attack variant was cancelled and two air defence vessels were added. France's ASW FREMMs have 16 vertical launch system (VLS) tubes for air defence missiles (either A43 or A50 launchers) and 16 A70 VLSs for land-attack missiles. France's air defence FREMMs are equipped with 32 A50 tubes, while Italy's two FREMM variants, comprising four ASW and six general-purpose (GP) ships, have 16 A50 tubes for air defence. For anti-surface warfare, the French FREMMs all carry up to eight MM40 Exocet anti-ship missiles (AShMs) on slanted deck launchers, while the Italian GP frigates carry eight Teseo AShMs and the ASW versions four Teseo missiles and four MILAS anti-submarine missiles. 58 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Italy's Bergamini c\ass ■ x4 Anti-Submarine Warfare variants ■ x4 General Purpose variants (two under construction) " Kronos radar " 16-ceN VLS with Aster ' 1 x 76/62 STRALES ■ CAPTAS4 ■ 2 x triple 324mm B-515 ■ 1 x quad lnchr with Otomat(Teseo) Mk2a long-range AShM ■ UMS 4110 hull- variable- ASTTwith MU90 1 x quad lnchr with MILAS anti-submarine missile mounted sonar depth sonar lightweight torpedo I ■ 2 x quad lnchr with Otomat(Teseo) Mk2a long-range AShM The US Navy's Constellation class ■ CAPTAS 4 »1x21 -cell Mk 49 GMLS with ■ 4 x quad lnchr with Naval Strike Missile variable-depth sonar RIM-116C RAM Block II (RGM-184A) long-range AShM The US Navy's FFG-62 In 2020, the US Navy chose Italy's ASW FREMM design as the basis for its future Constellation-c\ass (FFG-62) small surface combatant or frigate programme. The basic FREMM design has been heavily modified to meet the USN's requirements for larger and better armed and protected platforms, with an emphasis on survivability and surface warfare capability; the programme is also intended to secure workshare for US defence industry. The Constellation-c\ass will have a larger crew, 32 Mk 41 VLS tubes for Evolved SeaSparrow and SM-2 missiles (with some critics pressing to raise this to 48), 16 AShMs and a version of the Aegis combat system. The Constellation-c\ass will carry the same towed-array sonar as the French and Italian vessels, the CAPTAS 4 variable-depth sonar, but no bow-mounted sonar. Sources: IISS; Fincantieri, Naval Group, seaforces.org; navalanalyses.com; Congressional Research Service ©IISS Europe 59 Studies in capability generation: the regener In February 2020, the arrival at Royal Air Force (RAF) Lossiemouth of a Boeing P-8A Poseidon heralded the regeneration of the UK's fixed-wing maritime-patrol aircraft (MPA) capability after a decade's gap. The UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) declared initial operating capability (IOC) in April 2020 with two aircraft. The UK's MPA capability had been shelved following the retirement in March 2010 of the RAF's existing Nimrod MR2 MPA fleet and the subsequent cancellation in the Strategic Defence Review of October that year of the replacement Nimrod MRA4 programme. The gap in capability that resulted from the Nimrod's demise was widely criticised. The UK had been one of the leading MPA operators globally. Critically, as far as the government was concerned, the MRA4 programme had overrun and was over budget. Furthermore, there were doubts over whether the airframe would even be certified airworthy. However, concerns quickly emerged about the UK's ability to sustain a comprehensive maritime-surveillance picture amid reports of increased Russian naval (and especially submarine) activity in and around UK and NATO waters, particularly the challenge of supporting and protecting UK ballistic-missile submarines when transiting to and from their home base in Scotland. Although the House of Commons Defence ion of UK maritime-patrol aircraft capability Committee was critical, then-minister of state for the armed forces Nick Harvey told the committee in 2012 that the MOD believed it was carrying an 'acceptable level'of risk. Moreover, he added that the capability could one day be regenerated, stating, 'we have not, as yet, taken a view that we would not want to come back into this in the slightly longer term'. That time came in 2015, when the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review announced that the UK would 'buy nine new Maritime Patrol Aircraft, based in Scotland, to protect our nuclear deterrent, hunt down hostile submarines and enhance our maritime search and rescue'. There seems little doubt that the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine the year before, and the fact that European states subsequently began reassessing the risk of a major conflict in Europe, hastened this apparent U-turn. At the time, the UK government did not confirm the preferred aircraft. Speculation ranged from the Boeing P-8 Poseidon to the Airbus C295, to the Kawasaki P-1 and to uninhabited platforms, with these all offering differing levels of capability. The government finally committed publicly to the P-8 Poseidon in July 2016 when then-prime minister David Cameron made the announcement at the Farnborough international air show. Project Seedcorn The Nimrod MRA4 airframes were quickly broken up in the first months of 2011, and over the next few years the UK relied on other technical capabilities, such as signals intelligence, while allies also provided information as well as, on occasion, deploying MPAs to the UK to support maritime-surveillance operations. However, while Harvey's remarks in 2012 indicated that officials had not ruled out reinstating a dedicated maritime-patrol and antisubmarine warfare capability, the UK MOD was taking steps to sustain the required skills under Project Seedcorn. Seedcorn began in 2012 and was renewed for a further three years in 2015. It saw UK personnel - many of whom had worked on Nimrod - posted to Australia, Canada, New Zealand and, most significantly, the US to maintain and develop skills in maritime patrol, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. These countries all operated the P-3 Orion, but importantly the US Navy (USN) was, by the early 2010s, in the initial stages of transitioning its capability to the new Boeing P-8 Poseidon, based on the 737 airliner. In retrospect, the UK's posting of personnel to the US provided an indication of the UK's likely direction of travel towards regaining its MPA capability, in the form of the P-8A. In 2012, RAF personnel were sent to Naval Air Station Jacksonville, in Florida, to work with USN aircrew and mission specialists on the P-8 Poseidon, operating with the USN's Patrol Squadron 30 (VP-30) training establishment. This was one year before the USN itself declared that the Poseidon had reached IOC. RAF personnel comprised pilots, tactical coordinators and weapons-system operators. The year 2012 also saw UK personnel fly the P-8A during Exercise Joint Warrior off Scotland. The programme even resulted in an all-UK crew flying a US Poseidon. Over the years, more personnel trained with US forces, with some rising to become instructors in VP-30. UK personnel were also posted to the USN's VX-1 test and evaluation squadron at Naval Air Station Patuxent River. The effect of Seedcorn was broader, as the RAF reported in 2022 that UK personnel had also been involved in training Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and US personnel. Bar Canada, all these nations are, or will shortly be, Poseidon operators; Boeing is, meanwhile, offering the aircraft for Canada's project to replace its CP-140 Aurora aircraft. From the mid-2010s, USN P-8s occasionally flew from RAF Lossiemouth. This airbase, in northern Scotland, had been earmarked by the UK MOD for investment to 60 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 accommodate the new aircraft and related facilities. The first aircraft to arrive in the UK were based at RAF Kinloss (formerly the main Nimrod base) while works at Lossiemouth continued; Poseidon was moved to Lossiemouth in October 2020. The UK's P-8s arrived in rapid succession. The ninth, and final, aircraft was flown in to Lossiemouth in January 2022. According to analysts, this pace means that the RAF still lacks enough crew for the fleet. Nonetheless, the RAF still plans to declare full operational capability in October 2024. The P-8-related facilities at Lossiemouth will also be of broader use. In 2018, Norway and the UK announced a cooperation agreement relating to maritime-patrol aircraft, with Norway receiving its fifth and final P-8 in 2022. Germany has also ordered the type and may well seek a similar arrangement. Both of these nations, plus the US, are likely to make use of Lossiemouth. In addition, Germany, Norway and the UK will all be looking to benefit in terms of support functions as well as the operational advantages of using the same aircraft as the USN. Project Seedcorn is now being used to grow the UK's capability on the Boeing E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft. As of late 2022, personnel were embedded with the Royal Australian Air Force. DEFENCE ECONOMICS Macroeconomics European economies were buffeted by strong economic headwinds in 2022, and these are set to continue into 2023. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 caused widespread damage and disruption to European economies. Europe's short-term economic outlook is constrained by soaring energy prices, security-of-supply issues, high inflation and rising - and increasingly expensive - government debt levels. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), real GDP growth in the Eurozone will slow to 3.1% in 2022 and drop even lower to 0.5% in 2023, compared to the pandemic-related 6.3% contraction in 2020 and 5.2% growth in the recovery year of 2021. The UK saw real GDP contract by 9.3% in 2020, recover strongly by 7.4% in 2021 and, while it is projected to grow by 3.6% in 2022, the projection of 0.3% growth in 2023 points to a more challenging short-term outlook for both the UK and the Eurozone. In 2022, the Eurozone performed stronger than expected, partly because tourism picked up in Italy and Spain. But significant downside risks are weighing on growth, not least the disruption to gas supplies from Russia and the impact this will have on industrial production. Europe's economic foundations are weaker now than they were coming into 2020, when the continent was hit by the first wave of COVID-19 infections. Fiscal deficits extended from an average of 0.3% of GDP in 2019 to 6.5% in 2020 and have remained elevated ever since at 3.6% in 2021 and 2.7% of GDP in 2022. These figures indicate that Europe had not fully recovered from the economic fallout of the pandemic when Russia invaded Ukraine. Private consumption and investment were still below pre-pandemic levels. As a proportion of GDP, European debt levels extended from an average of 59.8% in 2019 to 71.5% in 2020; they remained high at 68.7% in 2021 and 64.8% in 2022. This level of debt was sustainable while 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 Germany Netherlands Italy UK France Spain Poland Source: IMFWorld Economic Outlook, October2022 ©IISS k Figure 3 Europe: selected countries, inflation (%) 2017-27 Montenegro USDO.IObn Bulgaria USD1.34bn Estonia USD0.84bn Iceland USD0.04bn Cyprus USD0.50bn Bosnia & Herzegovina USD0.17bn Czech Republic USD3.83bn Norway USD7.43bn Portugal USD2.59bn Austria USD3.B4bn Ireland USD1.17bn Romania USD5.19bn Turkey USDB.19bn Real % Change (2021-22) I More than 20% increase Between 0% and 3% decrease Between 10% and 20% increase H Between 3% and 10% decrease I Between 3% and 10% increase H Between 10% and 20% decrease | Between 0% and 3% increase | More than 20% decrease £ Estimate Q Spending 2% of GDP or above includes Armed Forces Pension Service and military aid to Ukraine [1] Map illustrating 2022 planned defence-spending levels (in USDbn at market exchange rates) as well as the annual real percentage change in planned defence spending between 2021 and 2022 (at constant 2015 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending between 2021 and 2022. Actual spending changes prior to 2021, and projected spending levels post-2022, are not reflected. ©IISS Map 1 Europe: regional defence spending (USDbn, %ch yoy)1 Sub-regional groupings referred to in defence economics text: Central Europe (Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Switzerland), Northern Europe (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden), Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain), Southeastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey), the Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia) and Western Europe (Belgium, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). 62 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 interest rates were low and borrowing was cheap. The IMF has characterised the war as a supply shock in economic terms, arguing its effects have aggravated the policy challenges created by the pandemic. As such, the IMF says that these new shocks are better addressed by fiscal policy than monetary policy, as the latter needs to be employed to stem inflation. Countries in the region are using monetary policy to stem rising inflation, with the effect that interest rate increases will make borrowing less manageable. Inflation across the region was a concern even before the February invasion. Rates increased globally in 2021 due to higher energy costs, a recovery in demand and ongoing pandemic-related supply-chain disruptions. Despite countries continuing to commit increasing amounts of funding to defence in 2021, surging rates of inflation in all regions resulted in a negative global trend in real terms. The impact was more acute in 2022 as inflation soared, driven by the commodity crisis, supply disruptions and heightened economic uncertainty resulting from the war in Ukraine. The disruption to energy supply caused the oil price to spike, after February, to levels in excess of USD100 per barrel. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) expects the price of Brent crude oil to average USD105 per barrel throughout 2022 and remain high at USD95 per barrel in 2023. In its October 2022 World Economic Outlook Update, the IMF revised upward its projection for global inflation in light of rising food and energy prices and lingering supply-demand imbalances. The year saw several countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, face double-digit inflation rates. In September 2022, rates reached 9.9% in the Eurozone and 10.1% in the UK. Policymakers in Europe now face the challenge of easing the impact of higher inflation by managing effectively fiscal and monetary instruments, but without allowing wage-price spirals (where the demand for higher wages drives up costs for suppliers with these costs then passed on to the consumer). Should wage-price spirals occur, inflation will increase further. Defence spending European defence spending grew significantly in 2021, with regional spending increasing by 3.5% in real terms, a rate higher than in any other region. Indeed, 2021 was the seventh consecutive year of real growth. It had been projected that, in the short term, European defence spending growth would be subdued in light 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 1.46 1.47 1.46 1.25 1.29 I I I I 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Figure 4 Europe: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average) of fiscal pressure following the pandemic. However, Russia's decision to invade Ukraine on 24 February caused a marked change of course. In the weeks and months that followed, around 20 countries pledged to increase defence spending, though the relative scale - and timelines - differed. Announcements spanned the region - from the UK, France, Germany and Italy to Poland and Romania as well as most Nordic and all Baltic states. The most notable uplift was the announcement on 27 February by Chancellor Olaf Scholz that Germany would establish a special fund for defence in 2022, amounting to EUR100 billion (USDio6bn), and the defence budget would reach 2% of GDP 'from now on'. The announcement came at the end of a period in which Germany's defence spending had seen increases averaging 4.4% in real terms since 2016. Germany's defence budget for 2022 was a 7.3% increase over the 2021 figure, rising to EUR50.4bn (USD534bn). However, the financial plan to 2026, approved on 1 July 2022, shows spending remaining flat at this level. As such, in order to reach 2% of GDP 'from now on', the defence budget will need to be supplemented by the special fund if the core budget is not increased to meet the target. This presents a significant divergence from trend in Germany. Therefore, the uplift will have to be managed effectively to ensure that funds are allocated according to strategic imperatives and managed well thereafter. Moreover, increased investment without a capability development plan raises questions over the ability of the armed forces and defence-industrial base to absorb new resources. Details of the special fund (Sondervermogen Bundeswehr) were announced in June 2022. The EURioobn (USDio6bn) falls to EUR82bn (USD87bn) Europe 63 Norway, 2.2% Other Northern / Other Western Germany Europe, 2.2% 15.9% Other Western Europe - Belgium, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg Other Central Europe-Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Switzerland Other Northern Europe - Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania Other Southern Europe - Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Portugal The Balkans - Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia Other South-Eastern Europe - Bulgaria, Romania ©IISS A Figure 5 Europe: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2022 after VAT and the costs of interest on borrowing are taken into account. Air procurement takes up 40.8% of the fund with major programmes being the Eurofighter and F-35 combat aircraft, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), heavy transport helicopters, uninhabited systems, space surveillance and ground-based air defence. A significant 25.3% of the funding is to be used for 'management ability/ digitisation' procurement with programmes including the digitisation of land-based operations, battle management systems, tactical wide area networks, data centre networks and satellite communications. Land procurement accounts for 20.3%, with this covering the retrofitting of all remaining Puma infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) in the first phase as well as a successor IF V. Naval procurement comprises only 10.8% with major programmes including K130 corvettes, F126 frigates, the Type-2i2CD diesel-electric submarine being jointly developed with Norway, the Future Naval Strike Missile and the submarine-launched Interactive Defence and Attack System for Submarines, which is being developed by Diehl and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and is designed to defeat airborne anti-submarine warfare threats. The UK also pledged to increase funding for defence, with then-prime minister Boris Johnson announcing at the Madrid NATO Summit that the country's defence budget would reach 2.5% of GDP by 2030. As part of her leadership campaign, the target was increased further to 3% of GDP in the same time frame by the next leader in London, prime minister Liz Truss, in July 2022. The viability of this commitment was questionable given other draws on public spending and caution was expressed at the time about the need for increases to be accompanied by greater oversight and targeted industrial development to help ensure higher funding translated into improved capability. Truss resigned in October 2022 and the 3% commitment was not repeated by her successor, Rishi Sunak, and his Chancellor Jeremy Hunt in the Autumn Statement, released on 17 November 2022. Pursuing a more fiscally conservative path, the target was reduced back to the NATO minimum of 2% of GDP. The statement did concede that defence spending needed to increase, but said that this would be considered as part of an update to the Integrated Review. The outlook for defence spending in the UK is therefore more subdued and likely to see cuts in real terms as inflation rates remain high. Other notable announcements in the region include the EUR700 million (USD74om) increase in Finland's 2022 defence budget, with EUR2.2bn (USD2.3bn) also added for defence over the 2023-26 fiscal plan first published in April 2022, the USD34om uplift to the Norwegian budget for border defence, and sizeable uplifts in Estonia and Lithuania as both move towards their goal of spending 2.5% of GDP. Latvia's budget will rise from 2.2% of GDP to 2.5% in 2025. Authorities in Italy have considered increasing military spending by EURi.5bn (USDi.6bn), with the longer-term goal to raise spending to 2% of GDP from 1.4%. The right-wing coalition government, elected in September 2022, stated in their election manifesto that the country would respect NATO commitments, including the pledge to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP, but progress is likely to be slow in light of economic realities. In March 2022, the Polish government announced its intention to increase the defence budget from 2.1% to 3% of GDP in 2023. The official budget for 2023 was approved in August and enacted this uplift with an increase in defence funding from PLN58bn (USDi34bn) to PLN97bn (USD20.8bn); this will bring the budget to 2.8% of GDP. In addition, in March the president signed into law homeland-defence legislation (the Law on the Defence of the Fatherland). 64 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 V Figure 6 Europe defence budget announcements, 2022 ! Denmark 2022 defence budget: USD5.1bn/1.3%GDP 6 March 2022 - Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen: defence budget will reach 2% of GDP by 2033. V Latvia 2022 defence budget: USD0.9bn/2.1%GDP 1 March 2022 - Cabinet approves increase in defence from 2.2% to2.5%ofGDPby2025. I Norway 2022 defence budget: USD7.4bn /1.5% GDP 18March 2022 -NOK3bn(USD313m) added to 2022 defence budget for border defence. Long-Term Defense Plan (April 2020) to reach 2% of GDP by 2028. I Lithuania 2022 defence budget: USDIibn / 2.3% GDP 14 March 2022 -State-budget amendment to add EUR298m to 2022 defence budget; aim to increase defence budgetto 2.5% of GDP by end of 2022. I Germany -H Finland Estonia 2022 defence budget: USD53.4bn/1.3%GDP 27 February 2022 - Chancellor Olaf Scholz: EURIOObn special fund for defence, with budget increasing to 2% of GDP. Slovenia 2022 defence budget: USD0.9bn/1.4%GDP 16March 2022-Minister of Defence MatejTonin: defence budget will reach 2% of GDP by 2030. g|s United Kingdom 2022 defence budget: USD70bn/ 2.2% GDP 30 June 2022 -Then-prime minister BorisJohnson: defence budget will increase to 2.5% of GDP by 2030. Liz Truss pledgeto reach 3% of GDP while briefly Prime Minister not reiterated by her replacement, Rishi Sunak. 2 Netherlands 2022 defence budget: USD15.2bn /1.5% GDP 7 March 2022-Prime Minister Mark Rutte: the Netherlands is already working towards a 2% of GDP goal and will now look at implementing further increases to defence, j ' | Slovakia 2022 defence budget: USD2.0bn /1.8% GDP 12 July 2022 - Minister of Defence Jaroslav Nad: first draft of 2023 budget increases defence budget to 2% of GDP. 2022 defence budget: USD5.8bn/2.1%GDP 5 April 2022 -EUR2.2bn additional funding for defence inthe2023-26fiscalplan. EUR700m more for 2022. p Luxembourg 2022 defence budget: USD0.4bn/0.5%GDP 24June 2022-Minister of Defence Francois Bausch: budget will increase to 1 ofGDPby 2028. 2022 defence budget: USD0.8bn / 2.1% GDP 25 March 22 - Government approved EUR476m uplift to defence between 2022-26 to boost air-defence capabilities. This is intended to increase the budget to over 2.5% of GDP. EUR1S.7m added to 2022 budget. 2022 defence budget as % of GDP* <2.0 >2.0 d Italy I Sweden I I France 2022 defence budget: USD31.1bn/1.6%GDP 31 March 2022 - Government considering increasing 2022 defence budget by EURI.Sbn. Long-term goal to reach 2% of GDP by 2028. 2022 defence budget: USD8.1bn /1.3% GDP lOMarch 2022 - Prime Minister Eva Magdalena Andersson: defence budget will increase to 2% of GDP 1 November 2022: Supreme Commander Micael Byden: 2% of GDPtarget reached by2026. / r 2022 defence budget: USD54.4bn/2.0%GDP 2 March 2022-President Emmanuel Macron: France will increase defence investment from the 2019-25LPM. I Austria 2022 defence budget: USD3.6bn/0.8%GDP 7 March 2022-Chancellor Karl Nehammer: need to increase defence budget from 0.7% to 1% of GDP. Poland | Romania 2022 defence budget: USD13.4bn/1.9% GDP 3 March 2022 - Minister of National Defence Mariusz Btaszczak: defence budget should increase from 2% to 3% of GDP in 2023. Uplift then enacted in the 2023 budget. 2022 defence budget: USD5.2bn/1.7%GDP 1 March 2022-President Klaus lohannis: Romania should raise budget from 2% to 2.5% of GDP. 1| Belgium 2022 defence budget: USD5.7bn /1.0% GDP 21 January 2022 (pre-invasion) -Minister of Defence Ludivine Dedonder: update of the Strategic Defense Vision for 2030; defence budget will be increased to 1.54% of GDP by 2030. ^ Czech Republic 2022 defence budget: USD3.8bn/1.3% GDP 6 April 2022 - Government approves plans to accelerate procurement over 2022-24. Minister of Defence Jana Černochová seeks to bring the 2% of GDP target forward by one year from 2025 to 2024. 1 Europe 65 This established an Armed Forces Support Fund. It will be funded through the National Economy Bank (BGK), a state development bank designed to support national economic and industrial growth, with up to PLN4obn (USD8.5bn) made available to fund foreign acquisitions for defence. In July, Poland signed a major procurement deal with South Korea for up to 1,000 Hyundai Rotem K2 Black Panther main battle tanks, 672 Hanwha Defense K9 Thunder 155 mm self-propelled artillery systems and 48 KAIFA-50 Fighting Eagle light fighter ground-attack aircraft. Defence investments across Europe will increase significantly over the next decade if all of the announced increases occur. The average allocation of GDP to defence among European NATO members would reach an estimated 1.8-1.9% or GDP by 2032, up from 1.6% in 2022 and 1.3% back in 2014. Despite these announcements, in 2022 European defence spending was still effectively flat in real terms, due to soaring inflation rates. Spending uplifts are set to continue into the 2020s and will be more effective as inflation abates. However, they will be tempered by other public-spending constraints, not least the higher costs of debt servicing as interest rates increase. Defence industry The challenges facing aerospace and defence supply chains sharpened from 2021-22 due to labour shortages and disruptions to global shipping caused by ongoing COVTD-19-related lockdowns in China, as well as Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. They have been exacerbated by the higher cost of raw materials, components, energy and labour, which have driven up costs of production. Countries like the UK have made adjustments within their defence budgets to accommodate for inflation, setting aside funding to cover cost uplifts. But any further disruption to supply chains or increased costs for raw materials and components will create further inflationary pressure. Higher costs for skilled personnel will also push up industry expenses, which will feed through to higher contract values. The primary focus for defence establishments, amid the wave of defence spending increases, is on equipment modernisation and enhancing overall capability. As such, the proportion of European defence budgets devoted to investments is set to increase. A key example is Poland, where the amount allocated to capital spending will jump to 40% in 2023, having remained steady at 30% for the previous five years. This is notwithstanding the extra-budgetary Armed Forces Support Fund that will be used for the acquisition of foreign equipment. With defence spending increasing swiftly and significantly, there is a sharpening focus on the absorptive capacity of domestic defence industries. Related to this, there are now questions over the amount that countries will invest in developing their domestic defence sector or whether the immediacy of the security threat posed by Russia will lead some to simply buy off-the-shelf to speed up capability acquisition. That said, a balanced combination of both is perhaps necessitated by the fragmented nature of the European defence-industrial base. As one example, Poland's deal with South Korea includes technology transfer and local production. Looking beyond the immediate efforts to raise defence spending, Russia's actions have refocused attention on how best to achieve scalable agile production and establish increased stockpiles with more strategic positioning across NATO: both require more weapons systems, such as missiles and other munitions. It is likely, therefore, that higher sales in the short term will focus on upgrades and modifications to existing equipment in order to ensure readiness and sustainment. The replacement of equipment donated to Ukraine is both a driver and a concern for defence industry. For some states, particularly those in the east, donating equipment designed in the Soviet-era - even if this was later upgraded - creates an opportunity to modernise their inventory, and an opportunity for defence industry. For others, such as the UK, it raises questions over the cost of resupply and the industrial capacity to do so. In 2022, the UK donated lethal equipment, including NLAW and Javelin anti-armour systems, multiple-launch rocket systems and Starstreak air-defence systems, and non-lethal equipment, including helmets, body armour and night vision goggles. Replacing equipment creates extra demand for defence firms in Europe. In June, the UK defence secretary held talks with defence suppliers over how to increase production. However, rising inflation and the higher factor input costs of raw materials will make it difficult to rapidly increase capacity, adding to the challenges for scalable and agile production. As a result, it may become more expensive to replace equipment, creating further upward pressure on defence spending. 66 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 POLAND A transformative moment Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine has prompted important changes to Poland's defence posture. It has vindicated the long-standing Polish concern about Russia's willingness to use its military power to subjugate a neighbouring nation. In the days immediately after 24 February, Poland was preoccupied with a potential Russian escalation against NATO and an increased risk of attacks on Polish territory. These anxieties grew when Poland became the hub for deliveries of weapons for Ukraine, via Rzeszow-Jasionka Airport, close to the Ukrainian border. For Poland, the material and human cost of Russia's war on Ukraine, and the nature of Moscow's military operations there, has changed Poland's perceptions of Russia. Indeed, towards the end of 2022, abroad consensus emerged among Poland's political class that Russia had evolved into a serious long-term threat, despite being temporarily weakened militarily by the war. It is assumed by Poland's leaders that Moscow's desire to erase Ukraine's sovereignty will persist as a policy regardless of the outcome of the war. Warsaw also fears that Russia may be able to rebuild the core of its ground forces' capacity relatively quickly and thereby continue to pose an existential threat to its neighbours, with Poland, as a flank nation, first in line. A change to budgeting This change in Poland's threat perception has been accompanied by a rapid increase in defence expenditure. Before 24 February, Warsaw planned to incrementally increase the defence budget from 2.2% of GDP in 2022 to 2.6% of GDP in 2026. This was amended in March, and a new spending level was set at 3% of GDP from 2023. In May, an extra-budgetary fund (Funduszu Wsparcia Sit Zbrojnych, FWSZ) was also established, having been announced in 2021, and is intended to finance investments by issuing sovereign bonds. The plan is that in 2023 the fund will bring an additional USD6.3-8.4 billion to the baseline USD20.8bn defence budget, potentially increasing Poland's total defence expenditure to over USD2cjbn. The latter figure would come close to 4% of GDP which would, according to this measure, make Poland the highest defence spender in NATO. Early lessons from the war in Ukraine The course of military operations in Ukraine has led Poland to double down on its technical modernisation and force transformation priorities. From the Polish perspective, while anti-armour weapons, man-portable air-defence systems and armed uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) enabled effective Ukrainian defences in the immediate aftermath of 24 February, Russia's attack was ultimately blunted by armour, firepower, air-defence and personnel strength. Meanwhile, Poland donated a significant amount of its own weapons to Ukraine. Transfers involved around 230 T-72 main battle tanks (MBTs), constituting the bulk of Poland's inventory; an unspecified number of other systems, such as PT-91 MBTs (a Polish derivative of the T-72), post-Soviet BMPs and various artillery systems, including 54 new Polish-designed Krab self-propelled howitzers. However, these donations led to gaps in the inventories of Poland's armoured and mechanised brigades and affected Polish stocks. New acquisitions The scale of Poland's weapons transfers to Ukraine, early operational lessons learned from the war and the change in Poland's threat perceptions have all informed Warsaw's decision to dramatically accelerate defence investments. In the months following 24 February, Poland launched several ambitious armaments programmes. Although the total cost of these projects is unclear at the time of writing, because some terms of the contracts and technical features of the equipment have yet to be finalised, they could be worth between USD30-4obn. Moreover, this figure comes on top of existing flagship programmes that are already under way, and it also does not include planned investments like the long-delayed programme for new submarines. The total value of Polish investments in 2022-35 may reach USDi35bn. Land systems comprise most of the new investments. In July, in an historic turn to an Asian prime contractor, Poland signed a framework agreement with South Korea regarding the delivery and licensed production of up to 1,000 K2 MBTs and 672 K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers. The first contracts were signed in August for 180 K2s and 212 K9S to be delivered in the 2022-26 timeframe. They are designed to fill the most pressing gaps in Polish armoured capabilities. In December, the first vehicles arrived by sea at Gdinya, in Poland. The total Europe 67 value of both contracts is USD6.o6bn. Contracts are also expected for the licensed production of further vehicles after 2026. These will be more advanced versions, tailored to Polish needs and dubbed K2PL and K9PL. It is noteworthy that the government highlighted security of supply issues in justifying the choice of South Korea as a strategic partner. This suggests that the bilateral defence relationship may be driven, at least in part, by a view that South Korean munitions and spares could be useful should the war in Europe escalate. In May, Poland sent a letter of request to the US regarding the potential acquisition of up to 500 M142 HIMARS launchers. This would equal 80 standard US Army batteries and, if the contract were to proceed at this scale, could be worth well over USDiobn. However, in October, Poland signed a framework contract for the delivery of 288 K239 Chunmoo launchers from South Korea in 2023-28, stating that the US would be unable to deliver the desired number of HIMARS systems in this timeframe. In July, Poland secured an agreement for the delivery in 2023-24 of 116 M1A1 SA Abrams MBTs from US Army stocks. The main motivation behind the Abrams decision was to quickly fill the gap in Poland's armoured brigades; it will be partly financed by the US through the Foreign Military Financing system. Meanwhile, Poland's 2021 request for 250 M1A2 SEPV3 Abrams remains on track. General Dynamics Land Systems said in August that it had received the order. The same month saw an Abrams Tank Training Academy open in Poland. In a move to strengthen close-air-support capability, hitherto reliant on some Soviet-era Mil Mi-24 helicopters, Poland announced in September its interest in purchasing 96 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters. A letter of request was sent to the US and included a proposal to lease US Army-owned helicopters until the new helicopters could be delivered. It is difficult to estimate the total value of the programme, but it could be in the region of USDi2-i5bn. A smaller contract, worth USDiobn, was signed in July with Italian firm Leonardo for the acquisition of 32 AW149 multi-role helicopters (with some close-air-support capability). Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability will be augmented with MQ-9A Reaper systems, which were leased in October from the US as a 'bridging' option, enabling both the rapid provision of a new capability and the establishment of a training package, in advance of the acquisition process. Against this backdrop, new investments in the air force seem less ambitious. Seeking a replacement for its ageing fleet of Soviet-era MiG-29 Fulcrum and Su-22 Fitter combat aircraft, in September Poland signed a contract worth approximately USD3.02bn for 48 FA-50 Fighting Eagle multi-role aircraft as part of its broader partnership with South Korea. The first batch of 12 FA-50S will be delivered in 2022-23 in a baseline lead-in jet-trainer configuration. This will be followed by 32 upgraded FA-50PL aircraft from 2025-28, including features such as an active electronically scanned array radar and designed to serve in both air-to-air and ground-attack roles. Force transformation The scale of the investment in new capabilities is accompanied by an ambitious plan to increase the armed forces to 300,000 personnel by 2035. This total is intended to comprise around 187,000 professionals (as of 2022, this number stood at approximately 114,000), augmented by 50,000 voluntary Territorial Defence Force personnel (32,000 as of the end of 2021) and a further 50,000 personnel recruited under a new type of one-year service. While this plan may resemble conscription, with troops undergoing one month of basic training and up to 11 months of specialist training, the roles are salaried (troops will be paid more than conscripts of previous years) and are designed for volunteers only. The new personnel plan stems from the decision to establish two more divisions (making six divisions in total) and to strengthen existing mechanised divisions with an additional armoured brigade each. These are understood to be key assumptions of Poland's 'Model 2035' concept, which is informing modernisation and transformation plans. The process of establishing the fifth division began in September. It will be deployed in eastern Poland, between the 16th Mechanised Division, which is generally focused towards the north and northeast (including the Suwalki Gap and the border with Russia's Kaliningrad exclave), and the 18th Mechanised Division, which is responsible for defending eastern and southeastern Poland. The latter unit is still being developed and will be equipped with the M1A1 SA and M1A2 SEPV3 Abrams MBTs and, in the future, the AH-64 Apache -in effect resembling US Army structures. The intent is for the unit to provide defence and deterrence against potential Russian-Belarussian operations from the direction of Brest, in Belarus. 68 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Sustainability Poland's technical-modernisation and force-transformation plans can be seen as an attempt to develop a posture capable of at least blunting, and possibly also stopping, potential Russian aggression against NATO's eastern flank below the nuclear level. The security guarantees under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty are undisputed by Poland's political class. So too is the broader strategic relationship with the US, which involves US deployments to Poland. And Poland welcomed, as a step in the right direction, the overhaul to NATO's defence and deterrence posture vis-a-vis Russia at the 2022 summit in Madrid. Nonetheless, Warsaw seems to be considering a scenario in which the military response to a potential Russian escalation by the US and NATO may be slower than required - perhaps because of a military contingency in the Indo-Pacific. This is also important in the context of the longstanding US calls for its European allies to take on a greater share of the burden of defence and deterrence in Europe. The 2022 Madrid Summit was followed by a process of updating not only NATO's capability plans but also the requirements that will be expected of allies. However, questions have been raised over the sustainability of Poland's plans. Concerns include personnel shortages and inadequate infrastructure, as well as doubts about the capacity of Poland's economy to continue funding defence at such a historically high level. The high level of inflation (17.2% year-on-year as of September 2022) and a possible recession are important factors that may limit Polish investment ambitions. In October, the issue of bonds worth USD3.2bn, intended to provide money for the extra-budgetary modernisation fund, was suddenly halted. According to analysts, this may suggest only limited interest by financial markets. These investments will also be required in areas other than equipment purchases. Poland's new systems will need a separate modernisation effort for military infrastructure, such as training and maintenance facilities. Moreover, there are doubts over whether the armed forces can attract enough young people to reach the 300,000 target, even with the flexibility offered by new types of service. Europe 69 Arms procurements and deliveries - Europe Significant events in 2022 JANUARY Poland transformed its Armaments Inspectorate (IU), the organisation responsible for procurement and offsets, into the Armaments Agency (AU).The reform is intended to simplify procedures and responsibilities. The government originally wanted the organisation to control the state-owned defence conglomerate Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ), though this idea was shelved. Since its inception in January, the AU has already overseen the signing of significant import contracts such as the USD13.35bn package of equipment with South Korea and the USD1.15bn deal for M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams main battle tanks (MBT) with General Dynamics. These deals all include significant work for local industry. Rheinmetall offered EUR190-210m (USD200.82-221.96m) for a49% stake in the Oto Melara division of Italian firm Leonardo, with an option to acquire an additional 2% of shares. Oto Melara has a dominant position within the naval gun sector and a smaller share of the armoured-vehicle gun market. Leonardo announced its intention to sell in 2021, saying it would also sell torpedo producer Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei, in order to focus on aircraft, electronics and helicopters. Initially, Leonardo offered all of Oto Melara for sale. KNDS and Fincantieri each expressed interest in Oto Melara in late 2021, and while the firms are reportedly willing to spend around EUR650m (USD687.03m) or EUR450-550m (USD475.64-581.33m) respectively for a 100% stake, neither has yet made an offer. However, reports indicated that any sale may be held up until Rome receives assurances regarding Italy's role in the Franco-German Main Ground Combat System MBT programme. JUNE Norway announced that it was cancelling its 2001 contract for 14 NH90 NATO Frigate Helicopters (NFH) for the Norwegian Armed Forces and the Coast Guard. Although deliveries were originally expected to begin in 2005 and be completed in 2008, the first NH90 only arrived in November 2011. In cancelling the contract, Oslo cited delivery delays and an inability by NHIndustries to meet Norwegian requirements. NHIndustries said it considered the termination to be 'legally groundless' 13 out of 14 helicopters have been delivered, but only eight are in fully operational configurations. Norway is looking to return to NHIndustries the helicopters that have been delivered and is seeking a refund of NOK5bn (USD521.01m). TEMPEST COLLABORATION 1 The United Kingdom said that, by 2027, it aims to fly the test demonstrator of its Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme, also known as Tempest. It also outlined a roadmap for a strategic partnership with Japan's F-X programme, with the nature of the bilateral collaboration between the Tempest/F-X projects to be decided before the end of 2022. Both countries already cooperate on multiple aerospace research projects including a new air-to-air missile (JNAAM), sensors (JAGUAR) and propulsion systems. Italy and Sweden also participate in the Tempest programme, which is led by BAE Systems and involves Rolls-Royce and the UK divisions of Leonardo and MBDA. Tempest and F-X are intended to start replacing the Typhoon and the F-2 from the late 2030s. France and Germany announced that discussions on the next phase of the French-German-Spanish FCAS/ SCAF programme, planned to replace the Rafale and the Eurofighter, had been concluded. A research and technology study (Phase 1 A) was completed in 2020-21, but the companies subsequently struggled to establish clear leadership, division of labour and intellectual property rules. The next stage, Phase 1B, is intended to define the architecture of the aircraft demonstrator and was originally planned for 2021-24, while Phase 2, covering the construction and testing of the demonstrator, was due to take place in 2024-27. The first flight of a demonstrator is not now expected until 2028, with the aircraft entering service in the 2050s. Despite the three governments hailing the announcement, Dassault head Eric Trappier described it as a "pseudo-political announcement" suggesting there was much yet to be done before Phase 1B could start. The trilateral relationship is already strained in part because Germany announced it would buy the F-35A in March; there is speculation that Spain may follow suit and buy the F-35 to replace its F/A-18A Hornets. T Table 7 Poland: Rosomak wbee\eú armoured vehicle family Over 870 Rosomak armoured vehicles have been produced since Poland selected the vehicle in 2002. They are manufactured, by a firm now also called Rosomak, at a factory in Siemianowice Életskie. Based on Finnish company Patria's Armoured Modular Vehicle (AMV), the family of variants in Polish service has over time had an increased level of local content. A 2003 contract for 690 vehicles was reduced to 570, increasing the number of infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) but delaying others, such as reconnaissance (recce) and command-post variants. Deliveries began in 2004 and up-armoured Rosomaks were deployed to Afghanistan in 2007. Licensed production was extended for another ten years in 2013 and was followed the same year by a contract for 307 additional base vehicles for conversion to variants under separate contracts. Today, as well as IFVs, the army also operates variants in the armoured engineering (WRT), mortar, command post, armoured ambulance and armoured personnel carrier (APC) roles. Some APCs can transport infantry squads equipped with Spike-lfí. Development of recce and recovery vehicles has taken longer (bar two recce versions delivered for use in Afghanistan), with deliveries now likely to be complete by the mid-2020s if the projects continue. A contract to deliver 70 Polish-designed ZSSW-30 turrets will be completed within the same time frame. These will be installed on base vehicles rather than replacing the IFVs already in service. The turret will be equipped with Spike beyond-line-of-sight missiles, unlike the Oto Melara Hitfist-30P turret that was licence-produced in Poland. (An earlier initiative to install Spike onto those turrets had been halted.) In September 2022, Rosomak announced that its production licence had been extended by five years, to the end of 2028. This will allow production of the delayed recce variants and possibly additional vehicles fitted with ZSSW-30 turrets. Selected Rosomak vehicle contracts* Date Variant Type Quantity Value Delivery dates Contract type Notes Apr 2003 WB; base vehicle Infantry fighting vehicle (IFV); armoured personnel carrier (APC) 570 PLN4.63bn(USD1.46bn) 2004-13 Production Originally 690 vehicles for PLN4.93bn (USD1.27bn) Dec 2010 WSRiD Reconnaissance 2 PLN49.85m(USD16.53m) 2012-13 Conversion Conducted by Elbit Systems Oct 2013 Base vehicle APC 307 PLN1.65bn(USD522.05m) 2014-20 Production Jun 2014 WRT Armoured engineering vehicle 33 PLN233.56m (USD74.06m) 2016-17 Conversion Dec 2014 WPT Armoured recovery vehicle 18 PLN230m (USD72.93m) By end of 2025 Conversion Development extended Dec 2018 Apr 2016 Rak 120mm mortar 96 PLN968.32m (USD245.4m) 2017-19 Conversion To equip eight companies (coy) Mar2018 WD Command post (CP) 7 PLN80m(USD22.15m) 2018 Conversion Sep 2019 WD CP 2 PLN24.7m (USD6.43m) 2020 Conversion Nov 2019 Rak 120mm mortar 24 PLN275.5m(USD71.75m) 2021 Conversion To equip two coy May 2020 Rak 120mm mortar 60 PLN703.1m(USD180.3m) 2022-24 Conversion To equip five coy Sep 2020 RSK Nuclear, biological and chemical defence 11 PLN524.4m (USD134.47m) 2028-29 Production Sep 2020 Rosomak-S APC 60 PLN105.5m(USD27.05m) 2021-ongoing Conversion Dec 2020 WD CP 8 PLN73.7m(USD18.9m) 2021-22 Conversion Jul 2022 ZSSW-30 IFVturret 70 PLN1.7bn(USD409.87m) 2023-27 Turret production Sep 2022 AWR Reconnaissance 30 PLN1.59bn(USD383.35m) 2024-26 Production *As of end of September 2022 AWR = artyleryjskie wozy rozpoznawcze [artillery reconnaissance vehicles]; RSK = rozpoznania skažeŕ kotowy transporter opancerzony [contamination recognition wheeled armoured vehicle]; WB = wozów bojowych [combat vehicles]; WD = wozach dowodzenia [command vehicles]; WPT = wozu pomocy technicznej [technical assistance vehicle]; WR = wozy rozpoznawcze [reconnaissance vehicles]; WRT = wóz rozpoznania technicznego [technical reconnaissance vehicle]; WSRiD = wielosensorowy system rozpoznania i dozorowania [multisensor surveillance and recognition system]; ZSSW = zdalnie sterowany system wiežowy [remote-controlled turret system] Europe 71 Table 8 Spain: selected aerospace procurement since 2010 Spain maintains a sophisticated defence-industrial base, largely centred on aerospace systems through part-ownership of European defence giant Airbus. Spain's state-owned industrial holding company, the Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI), holds 4.1% of Airbus shares, though the governments of France and Germany hold more, at 10.9% each. In the 2010s, Spain's aerospace procurement was generally limited to small-scale contracts, mostly due to budgetary constraints caused by delays to long-running international projects. However, once the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic became clear, the government signed several large deals that are partly intended to support the aerospace sector. After Airbus announced redundancies in Spain, in 2020, the government agreed to buy a number of aircraft in order to reinforce the industrial base. Madrid agreed to acquire three A330 transport aircraft (to be converted into the MRTT configuration in 2023-25), 36 H135 light transport helicopters (with an additional 59 in future), 20 Eurofighter combat aircraft and four C295 light transport aircraft. Contracts have been signed for all, apart from the C295s. Also, Spain is participating with other European Union members in Phase II of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme, the Tiger Mklll attack helicopter project and the Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (MALE RPAS) uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) venture. These will secure substantial local workshare into the 2020s and beyond. Although Spain has denied claims that it is interested in the F-35, speculation persists that the air force would like to acquire these to replace its F/A-18 Hornets. Following Germany's decision to acquire the F-35, any Spanish purchase would likely add to French unease over its partners' commitment to the FCAS programme. Contract Date Equipment Type Quantity Value Contractor Deliveries Feb 2010 H135 Light transport helicopter 12 n.k. Airbus 2010-12 Nov 2012 SH-60F Seahawk** Anti-submarine warfa re (ASW) helicopter 2 EUR24.51m (USD31.51m) US government surplus 2015 Dec 2013 H135(EC135T2) Light transport helicopter 8 EUR45m (USD59.77m) Airbus Mar2014-Feb 2015 Feb 2016 MQ-9A Reaper Heavy combat, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (CISR) uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) 4 EUR161m (USD178.16m) ==■ General Atomics Aeronautical Systems (GA-ASI) Dec 2019-Nov 2020 Jul 2016 H215 (AS332 C1e) Super Puma Search and rescue (SAR) helicopter 1 EUR15m (USD16.60m) Airbus Oct 2016 Dec 2016 SH-60F Seahawk** ASW helicopter 2 EUR40m (USD44.26m) US government surplus Aug 2017-Apr2018 c.2017 H215 (AS332 C1e) Super Puma SAR helicopter 2 EUR30m (USD338.78m) Airbus Nov 2017 Dec 2017 SH-60F Seahawk** ASW helicopter 2 EUR28m (USD31.62m) US government surplus n.k. Q2 2019 NH90 TTH Medium transport helicopter 16 EUR1.38bn (USD1.55bn) pvp NHIndustries 2023-28* NH90NFH ASW helicopter 7 May 2019 Spainsat NG Communications satellite 2 EUR850m (USDIbn) Airbus 2023-24* Nov 2019 SH-60F Seahawk** ASW helicopter 2 EUR35.97m (USD40.27m) US government surplus n.k. Jan 2020 PC-21 Training aircraft 24 EUR225m (USD256.79m) □ Pilatus Aircraft Sep 2021-Jun 2022 Nov 2021 A330 MRTT Tanker/transport aircraft 3 EUR810m (USD958.66m) Airbus Nov 2021-2025* Dec 2021 H135 Light transport helicopter 36 EUR310m (USD366.89m) Airbus 2022-26* Feb 2022 MALE RPAS Heavy CISR UAV 12 EUR1.43bn (USD1.51bn) pvp Airbus 2029* Jun2022 Eurofighter Fighter ground-attack aircraft 20 EUR2.04bn (USD2.16bn) Eurofighter 2026-30* *planned second-hand 72 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Albania ALB Albanian Lek ALL 2021 2022 2023 GDP ALL 1.89tr 2.06tr USD 18.3bn 18.3bn per capita USD 6,373 6,369 Growth % 8.5 4.0 Inflation % 2.0 6.2 Def exp [a] ALL 23.1 bn 32.6bn USD 224m 289m Def bdgt [b] ALL 25.2bn 32.2bn 40.3bn USD 245m 286m USD1=ALL 103.21 112.79 [a] NATO figure [b] Exdudes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- ---2022 Population 3,095,344 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 9.3% 3.1% 4.0% 4.6% 21.7% 6.5% Female 8.4% 2.8% 3.7% 4.4% 23.8% 7.6% Capabilities_ The MOD'S Defence Directive for 2022, published in February, listed priorities including improved conditions for personnel, equipment modernisation, institutional reform, strengthening civil defence capabilities, better cyber security and greater contributions to regional operations and engagements. An Integrity Plan 2022-2025 indicated broader efforts to bring Albania's armed forces closer to NATO standards. Tirana is looking to improve the readiness and capability of its infantry battalion, including with new equipment, and is trying to improve recruitment and retention with enhanced benefits and educational and training opportunities. Salary increases were announced in 2022. The Development Plan 2022-2031 will determine future military structures, capacities, capabilities and obligations. Limited modernisation is underway, including the acquisition of helicopters and the installation of an airspace-surveillance system. Additional helicopter aircrew graduated in 2022. A ground-based air defence capability may also be developed. Other priorities include increasing communications and cyber defence capabilities. Albania contributes to NATO, UN and EU missions but does not possess an independent expeditionary capability. In March 2022, a forward-deployed headquarters for US Special Operations Command Europe was established in Albania. NATO allies Greece and Italy police Albania's airspace, and Tirana is upgrading Kucova Air Base into a NATO tactical air base. A cyber-attack in mid-year, attributed to Iran by Albania and NATO Allies, affected government infrastructure and NATO and individual allies subsequently offered additional security assistance. Albania has little in the way of a domestic defence industry, with no ability to design and manufacture modern military platforms. Nevertheless, the country has some publicly owned defence companies that are capable of producing small arms, explosives and ammunition. ACTIVE 7,500 (Land Force 2,350 Naval Force 700 Air Force 650 Support Command 1,650 Other 2,150) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Land Force 2,350_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops regt (1 SF bn, 1 cdo bn) MANOEUVRE Light 3 It infbn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 mor bty 1 NBC coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV 40 MaxxPro Plus ARTILLERY • MOR 32: 82mm 20; 120mm 12 Naval Force 700_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD Coast Guard_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14 PB 9:4 Iiiria (Damen Stan Patrol 4207); 3 Mk3 Sea Spectre; 2 Shqypnia PBR 5: 2 Type-227; 1 Type-246; 2 Type-2010 Air Force 650_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS TPT 16: Medium 4 AS532AL Cougart; Light 12:1AW109; 3 Bell 205 (AB-205); 2 Bell 206C (AB-206C); 4 Bo-105; 2 H145 Military Police_ FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT IMP bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AUV 8 IVECO LMV Support Command 1,650_ FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn 1 cbt spt bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde (1 tpt bn, 1 log bn) 1 maint unit DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 1 BULGARIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activites 30; 1 inf pi LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 21; 1 EOD pi SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 61 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 Europe 73 Austria AUT Euro EUR 2021 2022 GDP EUR 403bn 443bn USD 477bn 468bn per capita USD 53,332 52,062 Growth % 4.6 4.7 Inflation % 2.8 7.7 Def bdgt [a] EUR 3.55bn 3.45 bn USD 4.20bn 3.64bn USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 2023 3.39bn [a] Includes military pensions Population 8,913,088 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 7.2% 2.4% 2.6% 3.2% 24.5% 9.0% Female 6.8% 2.3% 2.6% 3.1% 24.6% 11.5% Capabilities Austria remains constitutionally non-aligned, but is an EU member and actively engaged in the EU's CSDP. Defence-policy objectives are based on the 2013 National Security Strategy, the 2014 Defence Strategy and the 2017 Military Strategy, including providing military capabilities to maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity, to enable military assistance to the civil authorities and to participate in crisis-management missions. Authorities are now shifting emphasis from international operations to homeland defence, and capabilities needed to counter hybrid threats at home. Assets for international deployments may eventually be embedded in the EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core. In June 2021, plans to streamline Ministry of Defence structures were announced. Implementation began in May 2022. There is a plan to group Cyber, CIS and EW capabilities together in one directorate. While not a NATO member, Austria joined NATO's Partnership for Peace framework in 1995. A September 2019 defence ministry report defined recapitalisation requirements until 2030. It warned that the gap between requirements and available resources was growing and would ultimately undermine the ability of the armed forces to implement its missions. The level of ambition for crisis response is to be able to deploy and sustain a minimum (on average) of 1,100 troops. The September 2019 report also called for the Eurofighter fleet to be upgraded rather than replaced. In October 2022, plans were mooted to procure a small number of additional Eurofighters, two-seaters from the German inventory, and upgrade the existing fleet.There is cooperation with Italy over helicopter procurement. Austria's defence-industrial base is comprised of some 100 companies with significant niche capabilities and international ties in the areas of weapons and ammunitions, communications equipment and vehicles. ACTIVE 23,300 (Land Forces 13,000 Air 2,800 Support 7,500) Conscript liability 6 months recruit trg, 30 days reservist refresher trg for volunteers; 120-150 days additional for officers, NCOs and specialists. Authorised maximum wartime strength of 55,000 RESERVE 112,250 (Joint structured 36,050; Joint unstructured 76,200) Some 12,000 reservists a year undergo refresher trg in tranches ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE_ Land Forces 13,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (4th) armd inf bde (1 recce/SP arty bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 spt bn) Mechanised 1 (3rd) mech inf bde (1 recce/SP arty bn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn) Light 1 (7th) It inf bde (1 recce bn, 3 inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn) 1 (6th) mtn inf bde (3 mtn inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 56 Leopard 2A4 IFV 112 Ulan APC 153 APC (T) 32 BvS-10 APC (W) 121: 71 Pandur; 50 Pandur EVO AUV 216: 66 Dingo 2; 150 IVECO LMV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 65: 27 4KH7FA-SB Greif (11 more in store); 28 Dingo 2 ARV; 10 M88A1 NBC VEHICLES 12 Dingo 2 AC NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Bill 2 (PAL 2000) ARTILLERY 105 SP 155mm 48 M109A5ÖE MOR 120mm 57 sGrW 86 (40 more in store) Air Force 2,800_ The Air Force is part of Joint Forces Comd and consists of 2 bde; Air Support Comd and Airspace Surveillance Comd FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon ISR 1 sqn with PC-6B Turbo Porter TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130K Hercules TRAINING 1 trg sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with Bell 212 (AB-212) 1 sqn with OH-58B Kiowa 1 sqn with S-70A Black Hawk 2 sqn with SA316/SA319 Sonette III AIR DEFENCE 2bn 1 radar bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable FTR 13 Eurofighter Typhoon (Tranche 1) 74 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 TPT 11: Medium 3 C-130K Hercules; Light 8 PC-6B Turbo Porter TRG 16:12 PC-7 Turbo Trainer; 4 DA40NG HELICOPTERS MRH 18 SA316/SA319,4ZoMefe III ISR 10 OH-58B Kiowa TPT 32: Medium 9 S-70A-42 Black Hawk; Light 23 Bell 212 (AB-212) AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Mistral GUNS 35mm 24 GDF-005 (6 more in store) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • HR IRIS-T Special Operations Forces_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2SFgp 1 SF gp (reserve) Support 7,500_ Support forces comprise Joint Services Support Command and several agencies, academies and schools DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 167; 1 inf bn HQ; 1 inf coy; 1 hel unit CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 3 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 171; 1 log coy MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 5; UN • MINUSMA 2 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 4 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 244; 1 recce coy; 1 mech inf coy; 1 log coy; UN • UNMIK 1 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4 Belgium BEL Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023 GDP EUR 506bn 558bn USD 599bn 590bn per capita USD 51,849 50,598 Growth % 6.2 2.4 Inflation % 3.2 9.5 Def exp [a] EUR 5.28bn 6.53bn USD 6.24bn 6.90bn Def bdgt [b] EUR 4.66bn 5.36bn 5.99bn USD 5.52bn 5.66bn USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 [a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008-- ---2015--- -- 2022 Population 11,847,338 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.8% 2.9% 2.9% 3.1 % 23.0% 8.7% Female 8.4% 2.7% 2.8% 3.0% 22.8% 11.0% Capabilities In July 2016, the government published its Strategic Vision for Defence for 2030. This was updated in June 2022, when the Security/Service, Technology, Ambition, Resilience (STAR) Plan was approved by parliament. A month later, in July, a new military programming law was approved which heralded increased defence budgets out to 2030. These are intended to address three key areas: to increase personnel numbers, strengthen the defence technological and industrial base, and deliver major equipment investments. Recruitment and retention criteria are under scrutiny, after retirements and establishment reductions in recent decades. Investments are planned for the motorised brigade, medical support and mobility, with over half of the STAR Plan's investments slated for the land domain. There is focus on 'dual capability' investments that can used in contingencies at home as well as for miliary operations. A Cyber Command was inaugurated in October, falling under the authority of the military intelligence service. NATO, EU and UN membership are central to defence policy. Belgium often cooperates with neighbours and has committed with Denmark and the Netherlands to form a composite combined special-operations command. The air force is forming a joint A400M unit with Luxembourg. Investment projects include fighter aircraft, frigates, mine-countermeasures vessels (being procured jointly with the Netherlands), UAVs and land-combat vehicles. The army has ordered French Griffon and Jaguar wheeled armoured vehicles as well as the US JLTV. CAESAR NG self-propelled artillery pieces are being procured and will likely arrive from 2027. The air force has selected the F-35 to replace its F-16s and deliveries are planned from 2023, with IOC expected in 2025. It is also procuring UAVs and is looking to buy light utility, heavy transport and search-and-rescue helicopters. Belgium has an advanced, export-focused defense industry, focusing on components and subcontracting, though in FN Herstal it has one of the world's largest manufacturers of small arms. Europe 75 ACTIVE 23,200 (Army 8,500 Navy 1,400 Air 4,900 Medical Service 1,450 Joint Service 6,950) RESERVE 5,900 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Land Component 8,500_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops regt (1 SF gp, 1 cdo bn, 1 para bn, 1 sigs gp) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech bde (1ISR bn; 3 mech bn; 2 It inf bn; 1 arty bn; 2 engr bn; 2 sigs gp; 2 log bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 CIMIC gp 1 EOD unit 1 MP coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ASLT 18 Piranha III-C DF90 RECCE 30 Pandur Recce IFV 19 Piranha III-C DF30 APC • APC (W) 78:64 Piranha III-C; 14 Piranha Ill-PC (CP) AUV 655: 219 Dingo 2 (inc 52 CP); 436 IVECO LMV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AE V 14: 6 Pionierpanzer 2 Dachs; 8 Piranha III-C ARV 13:4 Pandur; 9 Piranha III-C VLB 4 Leguan ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike-MR ARTILLERY 60 TOWED 105mm 14 LG1 Mkll MOR 46: 81mm 14 Expal; 120mm 32 RT-61 Naval Component 1,400_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2 FFGHM 2 Leopold I (ex-NLD Kar el Doorman) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 116-cell Mk 48 mod 1 VLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS PCC 2 Castor (FRA Kermorvan mod) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES MHC 5 Flower (Tripartite) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 AGOR 1 Belgien AXS 1 Zenobe Gramme Air Component 4,900_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR 4 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with NH90 NFH TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Falcon 7X (VIP) 1 sqn (BEL/LUX) with A400M TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with SF-260D/M 1 OCU unit with AW109 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2sqnwithAW109 (ISR) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 53 combat capable FTR 53:44 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 9 F-16BM Fighting Falcon TPT 8: Heavy 6 A400M; PAX 2 Falcon 7X (VIP, leased) TRG 32: 9 SF-260D; 23 SF-260M HELICOPTERS ASW 4 NH90 NFH (opcon Navy) TPT 11: Medium 4 NH90 TTH; Light 7 AW109 (ISR) (7 more in store) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM BOMBS Laser-guided: GBU-10/-12 Paoeway II; GBU-24 Paoeway III Laser & INS/GPS-guided: GBU-54 Laser JDAM (dual-mode) INS/GPS guided: GBU-31 JDAM; GBU-38 JDAM; GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb Medical Service 1,450_ FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 4 med unit 1 fd hospital EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 10:4 Pandur (amb); 6 Piranha III-C (amb) AUV 10 Dingo 2 (amb) DEPLOYMENT_ DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 6; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 7 LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 150; 1 mech inf coy with Piranha DF30/DF90 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 15; UN • MINUSMA 53 MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 2: 50; 1 MHC MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 1 MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 3 ROMANIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 250; 1 mech inf coy with Piranha IIIC FOREIGN FORCES_ United States US European Command: 1,150 76 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Bosnia-Herzegovina BIH 2023 Convertible Mark BAM 2021 2022 GDP BAM 38.6bn 43.8bn USD 23.4bn 23.7bn per capita USD 6,712 6,818 Growth % 7.5 2.5 Inflation % 2.0 10.5 Def bdgt BAM 318m 313m USD 192m 169m USD1=BAM 1.65 1.85 324m Population 3,816,459 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 6.8% 2.3% 2.9% 3.2% 26.6% 7.0% Female 6.4% 2.2% 2.7% 2.9% 26.8% 10.2% Capabilities The armed forces' primary goals are to defend territorial integrity and contribute to peacekeeping missions and potential tasks relating to aid to the civil authorities. Bosnia-Herzegovina joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 2006 and a Membership Action Plan was presented in 2010. Its aspiration to join NATO has been delayed due to unresolved defence-property issues, and continuing ethnic tensions have seen the ethnic Serb community threaten to withdraw from national structures including the armed forces. The country is reforming its armed forces and modernising its equipment in accordance with its Defence Review, Development and Modernisation Plan for 2017-27 and its NATO aspirations. The armed forces are professional and represent all three ethnic groups. However, low salaries may negatively affect recruitment and retention. Bosnia-Herzegovina contributes to EU, NATO and UN missions, but the armed forces have no capacity to deploy independently and self-sustain beyond national borders. The inventory comprises mainly ageing Soviet-era equipment, though some new helicopters have been procured from the US. Bosnia-Herzegovina has little in the way of a domestic defence industry, with only the capability to produce small arms, ammunition and explosives. ACTIVE 10,500 (Armed Forces 10,500) RESERVE 6,000 (Armed Forces 6,000) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Armed Forces 10,500 1 ops comd; 1 spt comd FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 3 inf bde (1 recce coy, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt spt bde (1 tk bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EOD bn, 1 int bn, 1 MP bn, 1 CBRN coy, 1 sigs bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log comd (5 log bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 45 M60A3 APC • APC (T) 20 M113A2 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES VLB MTU MW Bozena ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 60: 8 9P122 Malyutka; 9 9P133 Malyutka; 32 BOV-1; 11 M-92 MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); HJ-8; Milan ARTILLERY 224 TOWED 122mm 100 D-30 MRL 122mm 24 APRA-40 MOR 120mm 100 M-75 Air Force and Air Defence Brigade 800_ FORCES BY ROLE HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Mi-8MTV Hip; Mi-17 Hip H 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); Mi-8 Hip; SA-341H/SA-342L Gazelle (HN-42/45M) AIR DEFENCE 1 ADbn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT EGA (7 J-22 Orao in store) ATK (6 J-l (J-21) Jastreb; 3 TJ-1(NJ-21) Jastreb all in store) ISR (2 RJ-1 (IJ-21) Jastreb* in store) TRG (1 G-4 Super Galeb (N-62)* in store) HELICOPTERS MRH 9: 4 Mi-8MTV Hip; 1 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 SA-341H Gazelle (HN-42); up to 3 SA-342L Gazelle (HN-45M) TPT17: Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip Light 9:6 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) (of which 2 MEDEVAC); 3 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) (1 UH-1H Huey II in store) AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 20 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) Point-defence 9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS • TOWED 40mm 47: 31 L/60,16 L/70 FOREIGN FORCES_ Part of EUFOR - Operation Althea unless otherwise stated Albania 1 Austria 167; 1 inf bn HQ; 1 inf coy; 1 hel unit Bulgaria 110; 1 inf coy Chile 7 Czech Republic 2 France 5 Germany 25 Greece 7 Europe 77 Hungary 192; 1 inf coy Ireland 5 Italy 346; 1 inf bn HQ; 1 inf coy; 1 ISR coy Macedonia, North 1 Poland 38 Portugal 1 Romania 203; 1 inf coy Slovakia 53 Slovenia 16 Spain 3 Switzerland 20 Turkey 242; 1 inf coy Bulgaria BLG Bulgarian Lev BGN 2021 2022 2023 GDP BGN 133bn 157bn USD 80.3bn 85.0bn per capita USD 11,746 12,505 Growth % 4.2 3.9 Inflation % 2.8 12.4 Def exp [a] BGN 2.1 Ibn 2.48bn USD 1.28bn 1.34bn Def bdgt [b] BGN 2.1 Obn 2.48bn 2.97bn USD 1.27bn 1.34bn USD1=BGN 1.65 1.85 [a] NATO figure [b] Excludes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) , 1730 ■■■■«• *_._._._I 565 2008--- ---2015--- ---2022 Population 6,873 ,253 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 7.3% 2.6% 2.5% 2.7% 25.4% 8.3% Female 6.9% 2.4% 2.3% 2.4% 24.9% 12.3% Capabilities The armed forces' main priority is defending state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Programme 2032 long-term development plan was adopted in 2021, involving significant re-equipment and modernisation and a focus on artificial intelligence and cyber capability. Bulgaria signed a ten-year Defence Cooperation Roadmap with the US in 2020 to assist force development. There are several bilateral defence cooperation agreements with regional states. Bulgaria's airspace is protected by joint activities with NATO's Air Policing Mission, due to the country's limited numbers of combat aircraft. In September, the defence ministry announced it had allocated funds to purchase a further eight F-16C/Ds, on top of the eight agreed earlier. These aircraft are not expected to arrive until 2025. Bulgaria's MiG-29s are due for retirement in 2023, and the government in October said it was looking at options to improve their availability, including by securing additional engines from Poland. The government also received offers for interim combat aircraft from Sweden and France, with offers requested also from Israel and the US. In 2022, Bulgaria established and led a NATO multinational battle group. In an attempt to cope with personnel shortfalls, the military retirement age and salaries have been increased, yet several roles needed to strengthen the armed forces remain understrength. Training is understood to be prioritised for units intended for international operations and those with certain readiness levels declared to NATO and the EU. Bulgaria regularly trains and exercises with NATO partners and regional allies. There are also plans for acquisitions to enable the formation of battalion battlegroups within its mechanised brigades. The navy is looking to procure a multipurpose patrol vessel and modernise its frigates to boost its presence in the Black Sea. T-72 modernisation is underway, and the local upgrade of 40 T-72s for the ground forces is expected to be complete in 2023, with this including upgraded battle management systems. Bulgaria's defence industry exports small arms but has limited capacity to design and manufacture platforms. ACTIVE 36,950 (Army 17,000 Navy 4,450 Air 8,500 Central Staff 7,000) RESERVE 3,000 (Joint 3,000) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 17,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bn Mechanised 2 mech bde (4 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 log bn, 1 SAM bn) Light 1 mtn inf regt COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt (1 fd arty bn, 1 MRL bn) 1 engr regt (1 cbt engr bn, 1 ptn br bn, 1 engr spt bn) 1NBC bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 90 T-72M1/M2I IFV 160: 90 BMP-1; 70 BMP-23 APC 120 APC (T) 100 MT-LB APC (W) 20 BTR-60 AUV 44:17 M1117 ASV; 27 Plasan SandCat ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV MT-LB ARV T-54/T-55; MTP-1; MT-LB VLB BLG67; TMM ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 24 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); (9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) in store) GUNS 126: 85mm (150 D-44 in store); 100mm 126 MT-12 78 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 ARTILLERY 176 SP 122mm 48 2S1 TOWED 152mm 24 D-20 MRL 122mm 24 BM-21 MOR 120mm e80 Tundza/Tundza Sani SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 9K79 Tochka (RS-SS-21 Scarab) AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela (RS-SA-7 Grail)%; 24 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko) GUNS 400 SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60 Navy 4,450_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 3 FFM 3 Drazki (ex-BEL Wielingen) (of which 2t) with 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 single 533mm ASTT with L5 mod 4 HWT, 1 sextuple Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher System 375mm A/S mor, 1 100mm gun (Fitted for but not with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 CORVETTES • FS 1 Smell (ex-FSU Koni) with 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm guns PCF 1 Molnyai (ex-FSU Tarantul II) with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCT 2 Reshitelni (ex-FSU Pauk I) with 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 76mm gun MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9 MHC 3: 2 Mesta (ex-NLD Alkmaar); 1 Tsibar (Tripartite -ex-BEL Flower) MSC 3 Briz (ex-FSU Sonya) (of which It) MSI 3 Olya (ex-FSU)t (3 more non-operational) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT LCM 2 Vydrat (capacity either 3 MBT or 200 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9: 3 AGS; 2 AOL; 1 ARS; 2 ATF; 1 AX Naval Aviation_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS ASW 2 AS565MB Panther MRH 1AS365N3+ Dauphin 2 Air Force 8,500_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/ISR 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-30 Clank; C-27] Spartan; L-410UVP-E; PC-12M TRAINING 1 sqn with L-39ZA Albatros* 1 sqn with PC-9M ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24D/V Hind D/E TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS532AL Cougar; Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Mi-17 Hip H EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 26 combat capable FTR 14:11 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 3 MiG-29UB Fulcrumf EGA (Some MiG-21bis Fis/ifed/MiG-21UM Mongol B in store) ATK 6: 5 Su-25K Frogfoot K; 1 Su-25UBK Frogfoot B ISR 1 An-30 Clank TPT 7: Medium 3 C-27J Spartan; Light 4:1 An-2T Colt; 2 L-410UVP-E; 1 PC-12M TRG 12: 6 L-39ZA stores*; 6 PC-9M (basic) HELICOPTERS ATK 6 Mi-24V Hmd E (6 Mi-24D Hind D in store) MRH 5 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 18: Medium 12 AS532AL Cougar; Light 6 Bell 206 Jet Ranger UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • EW Yastreb-2S AIR DEFENCE SAM 20 Long-range 20:12 S-200 (RS-SA-5 Gammon); 8 S-300PMU (RS-SA-10 Grumble) Short-range S-125M Neoa-M (RS-SA-3 Goa); 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 Atoll)%; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); SARH R-27R (RS-AA-10 Alamo A) ASM Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge); Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen) Special Forces_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bde (1 SF bn, 1 para bn) DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 110; 1 inf coy IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 4 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 30 FOREIGN FORCES_ Albania NATO Enhanced Vigilance Activities: 30; 1 inf pi Greece Enhanced Vigilance Activities: 30; 1 AT pi Italy NATO Enhanced Vigilance Activities: 750; 1 mech infBG Spain NATO Enhanced Air Policing: 130; 6 Eurofighter Typhoon United Kingdom NATO Enhanced Vigilance Activities: 120; 1 It mech inf coy United States NATO Enhanced Vigilance Activities: 150; 1 armd inf coy Europe 79 Croatia CRO Croatian Kuna HRK 2021 2022 GDP HRK 431 bn 494bn USD 67.7bn 69.4bn per capita USD 16,785 17,318 Growth % 10.2 5.9 Inflation % 2.6 9.8 Def exp [a] HRK 8.67bn 9.37bn USD 1.36bn 1.32bn Def bdgt [b] HRK 8.99bn 9.07bn USD 1.41bn 1.27bn USD1=HRK 6.36 7.13 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 2023 Joint 2,350 (General Staff) 8.43bn [a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 1209 620 2008 2015 -2022 Population 4,188,853 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 7.3% 2.5% 2.8% 3.1% 23.5% 9.2% Female 6.8% 2.3% 2.6% 2.9% 24.0% 13.0% Capabilities Principal tasks for the armed forces include defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as tackling terrorism and contributing to international peacekeeping missions. The defence ministry is working on a new long-term development plan and a new defence strategy. Croatia reformed its armed forces, to create a small professional force, prior to joining NATO in 2009. There have been recent moves to improve conditions of service and to increase the proportion of the budget focused on equipment investment. Zagreb has defence cooperation agreements with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary and Romania, and personnel frequently train with regional and international allies. Croatia hosts the NATO Multinational Special Aviation Programme and training centre and participates in EU and NATO missions, including NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence in Poland. The inventory is mainly composed of ageing Soviet-era equipment. In May 2021, Croatia announced the purchase of second-hand Rafale F3-R fighters from France. Maintenance personnel were training in France as of November 2022, with pilot training expected to start in 2023. The army will re-equip with Bradley IFVs, acquired from the US, and the year saw a modest boost to rotary-wing capability with the US donation of two UH-60M helicopters. The authorities are also looking to acquire short- and medium-range air-defence systems. Croatia has a small defence industry, focused on small arms, ammunition, explosives and naval systems. ACTIVE 16,700 (Army 11,100 Navy 1,650 Air 1,600 Joint 2,350) Conscript liability Voluntary conscription, 8 weeks FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 5SFgp Army 11,100 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bde (1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn) Mechanised 1 mech bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 It mech inf bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn) Other 1 inf trg regt COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty /MRL regt 1 engr regt 1NBC bn 1 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log regt AIR DEFENCE 1 ADA regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 74 M-84 IFV 102 M-80 APC 184 APC (T) 11: 7 BTR-50; 4 OT M-60 APC (W) 132:6 BOV-VP; 126 Patria AMV (ind variants) PPV 41: 21 Maxxpro Plus; 20 RG-33 HAGA (amb) AUV 133:10 IVECO LMV; 123 M-ATV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 22:12 JVBT-55A; 1 M-84AI; 1 WZT-2; 2 WZT-3; 5 Maxxpro Recovery VLB 5 MT-55A MW4MV-4 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 20 BOV-1 MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn) ARTILLERY 157 SP 21:122mm 8 2S1 Gvozdika; 155mm 13 PzH 2000 TOWED 122mm 24 D-30 MRL 122mm 18: 6 M91 Vulkan; 12 BM-21 Grad MOR 94: 82mm 54 LMB M96; 120mm 40 M-75/UBM 52 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9+: 3 9K35 SrreZa-10M3 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 6 9K35 Strela-IOCRO; 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS SP 20mm 6 BOV-3 SP RESERVE 21,000 (Army 21,000) Navy 1,650 Navy HQ at Split 80 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 PCFG 1 Koncar with 2 twin lnchr with RBS15B Mk I AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 57mm gun PCG 4: 2 Krai] with 4 single lnchr with RBS15B Mk I AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 157mm gun (with minelaying capability) 2 Vukovar (ex-FIN Helsinki) with 4 single lnchr with RBS15B Mk I AShM, 1 57mm gun MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1 MHI1 Korcula AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 5: LCT 2 Cetina (with minelaying capability) LCVP 3: 2 Type-21; 1 Type-22 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AKL 1 PDS 713 COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 3 RBS15K Marines_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 indep mne coy Coast Guard_ FORCES BY ROLE Two divisions, headquartered in Split (1st div) and Pula (2nd div) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 5:4 Mima; 1 Omis LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3: AAR 1 Faust Vrancic (YUG Spasilac) AKL 1 PT-71t AX 1 AndrijaMohorovicic (POL Project 861) Air Force and Air Defence 1,600_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 (mixed) sqn with MiG-21bis/UMD Fishbed TRAINING 1 sqn with PC-9M; Z-242L ISR HELICOPTER 1 hel sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; OH-58D Kiowa Warrior TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with Mi-8MTV Hip H; Mi-8T Hip C; Mi-171Sh EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable EGA 8:4 MiG-21bis Fishbed; 4 MiG-21UMD Fishbed TPT • Light (2 An-32 Cline in store) TRG 21:17 PC-9M; 4 Z-242L HELICOPTERS MRH 25:10 Mi-8MTV Hip H; 15 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior TPT 23: Medium 15: 3 Mi-8T Hip C; 10 Mi-171Sh; 2 UH- 60M Black Hawk; Light 8 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II AIR DEFENCE • SAM Point-defence 9K31 Strela-l (RS-SA-9 Gaskin); 9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60; R-60MK (RS-AA-8 Aphid) ASM AGM-114R Hellfire Special Forces Command FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2SF gp DEPLOYMENT HUNGARY: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 60 INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 8 IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 10 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1 POLAND: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 4 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 147; 1 inf coy; 1 hel unit with Mi-8 Hip WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 8 Cyprus CYP Euro EUR 2021 2022 GDP EUR 23.4bn 25.3bn USD 27.7bn 26.7bn per capita USD 30,957 29,535 Growth % 5.6 3.5 Inflation % 2.2 8.0 Def bdgt EUR 482m 470m USD 571m 497m USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 2023 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 465m 514 328 2008 -2015- 2022 Population 1,295,102 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.0% 2.8% 3.5% 4.4% 26.4% 5.9% Female 7.6% 2.4% 2.9% 3.7% 24.6% 7.7% Capabilities The National Guard is focused on protecting the island's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and safeguarding Cyprus's EEZ. Its main objective is to deter any Turkish incursion, and to provide enough opposition until military support can be provided by Greece, its primary ally. Cyprus has been enhancing its defence cooperation with Greece, including on cyber defence. Nicosia has also pledged deeper military ties with Israel, while France has renewed and enhanced its defence-cooperation agreement with Cyprus. In 2018 Cyprus also signed a memorandum of understanding on enhancing defence and security cooperation with the UK. Having reduced conscript liability in 2016, Nicosia began recruiting additional contract-service personnel, as part of the effort to modernise and professionalise its forces. Cyprus exercises with several international partners, most notably France, Greece and Israel. External deployments have been limited to some officers joining EU and UN missions. Cyprus has little logistics capability to support operations abroad. Equipment comprises a mix of Soviet-era and modern European systems and in 2022 an announcement was made relating to Europe 81 the procurement of H145M helicopters from France. Cyprus has little in the way of a domestic defence industry, with no ability to design and manufacture modern equipment. However, the government is looking for opportunities to cooperate with defence firms in Greece. ACTIVE 12,000 (National Guard 12,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 250 Conscript liability 15 months RESERVE 50,000 (National Guard 50,000) Reserve service to age 50 (officers dependent on rank; military doctors to age 60) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE National Guard 12,000 (incl conscripts)_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 comd (regt) (1 SF bn) MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bde (2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn) Mechanised 4 (1st, 2nd, 6th & 7th) mech bde Light 1 (4th) It inf bde 2 (2nd & 8th) It inf regt COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty comd (8 arty bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (3rd) spt bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 134; 82 T-80U; 52 AMX-30B2 RECCE 79 EE-9 Cascaoel IFV 43 BMP-3 APC 294 APC (T) 168 Leon idas APC (W) 126 VAB (incl variants) AUV8BOV M16 Milos ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 2+; 2 AMX-30D; BREM-80U ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 33; 15 EE-3 Jararaca with Milan; 18 VAB with HOT RCL 106mm 144 M40A1 GUNS • TOWED 100mm 6 M-1944 ARTILLERY 412 SP 155mm 48; 24 NORA B-52; 12 Mk F3; 12 Zuzana TOWED 60; 105mm 48 M-56; 155mm 12 TR-F-1 MRL 22; 122mm 4 BM-21; 128mm 18 M-63 Planten MOR 282; 81mm 170 E-44 (70+ M1/M9 in store); 120mm 112 RT61 AIR DEFENCE SAM 22+ Medium-range 4 9K37M1 Buk Ml-2 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly) Short-range 18; 12 Aspide; 6 9K331 Tor-Mi (RS- SA-15 Gauntlet) Point-defence Mistral GUNS • TOWED 60; 20mm 36 M-55; 35mm 24 GDF-003 (with Skyguard) Maritime Wing_ FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (coastal defence) AShM bty with MM40 Exocet AShM EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6 PCC 2; 1 Alasia (ex-OUNAl Mabrukha) with 1 hel landing platform; 1 OPV 62 (ISR Sa'ar 4.5 derivative) PBF 4; 2 Rodman 55; 2 Vittoria COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 3 MM40 Exocet Air Wing_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS ATK 11 Mi-35P Hind E (offered for sale) MRH 7; 3 AW139 (SAR); 4 SA342L1 Gazelle (with HOT for anti-armour role) Paramilitary 250_ Maritime Police 250_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 PBF 5; 2 Poseidon; 1 Shaldag; 2 Vittoria PB 5 SAB-12 DEPLOYMENT LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 2 FOREIGN FORCES_ Argentina UNFICYP 251; 2 inf coy; 1 hel fit Austria UNFICYP 3 Brazil UNFICYP 2 Canada UNFICYP 1 Chile UNFICYP 6 Ghana UNFICYP 1 Greece Army; 950 Hungary UNFICYP 13 India UNFICYP 1 Norway UNFICYP 2 Pakistan UNFICYP 3 Paraguay UNFICYP 12 Russia UNFICYP 6 Serbia UNFICYP 8 Slovakia UNFICYP 300; 2 inf coy; 1 engr pi United Kingdom 2,260; 2 inf bn; 1 hel sqn with 4 Bell 412 Twin Huey • Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader) 500; 1 FGA sqn with 10 Typhoon FGR4; 1 A330 MRTT Voyager KC3; 2 C-130J-30 Hercules • UNFICYP (Operation Tosca) 253; 2 inf coy TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL Data here represents the de facto situation on the northern section of the island. This does not imply international recognition as a sovereign state. 82 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Capabilities_ ACTIVE 3,000 (Army 3,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 150 Conscript liability 15 months RESERVE 15,000 Reserve liability to age 50 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army £3,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 5 inf bn 7 inf bn (reserve) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan RCL • 106mm 36 ARTILLERY • MOR • 120mm 73 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary_ Armed Police £l 50_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (police) SF unit Coast Guard_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6 PCC 5: 2 SG45/SG46; 1 Rauf Denktash; 2 US Mk 5 PB1 FOREIGN FORCES MOR 376:81mm 171; 107mm 70 M30; 120mm 135 HY-12 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 1 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3 Cessna 185 (U-17) HELICOPTERS • TPT 3: Medium 2 AS532UL Cougar Light 1 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) AIR DEFENCE SAM Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger GUNS • TOWED 150: 20mm 122:44 Rh 202; 78 GAI-D01; 35mm 28 GDF-003 Czech Republic CZE Czech Koruna CZK 2021 2022 2023 GDP CZK 6.11 tr 6.89tr USD 282bn 296bn per capita USD 26,849 28,095 Growth % 3.5 1.9 Inflation % 3.8 16.3 Def exp [a] CZK 84.9bn 89.2bn USD 3.91 bn 3.83bn Def bdgt [b] CZK 85.4bn 89.1 bn 112bn USD 3.94bn 3.83bn USD1=CZK 21.68 23.30 [a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008-- ---2015--- --2022 Population 10,705,384 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 7.7% 2.5% 2.4% 2.8% 25.1% 8.8% Female 7.3% 2.4% 2.2% 2.6% 24.2% 12.1% Capabilities_ The 'Long Term Outlook for Defence 2035' and the 'Czech Armed Forces Development Concept 2030', both published in 2019, discussed the evolving security environment, among other issues. In January 2022, the defence ministry released a priorities list that included recruiting more personnel, a commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence by 2025, to streamline the acquisition process and to establish an investment fund for strategic modernisation projects by 2024. After Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Prague announced a boost to defence spending and has donated a significant amount of materiel to Kyiv. In response, allies have donated equipment to the Czech armed forces including, from Germany, 14 Leopard 2A4 MBTs. A Defence Cooperation Agreement was agreed with the US in April 2022. The US has granted funds under the Foreign Military Financing programme in part to help replace equipment donated to Ukraine. Modernisation priorities include infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) for a heavy brigade, self-propelled howitzers, multi-role helicopters, transport aircraft, short-range air-defence systems and UAVs. In July, the government cancelled a tender for new IFVs, and opened negotiations with Sweden for the CV90. Prague has entered into negotiations with the US to acquire 24 F-35s as a long-term replacement for its leased Gripen combat aircraft, and it is reported that the ministry is looking to acquire Heron 1 UAVs from Israel. The armed forces TURKEY Army £33,800 FORCES BY ROLE 1 corps HQ; 1 SF regt; 1 armd bde; 2 mech inf div; 1 mech inf regt; 1 arty regt; 1 avn comd EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 287 M48A5T1 IFV 145ACVAIFV APC • APC (T) 488: 70 ACV AAPC (ind variants); 418 M113 (ind variants) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 66 ACV TOW MANPATS Milan RCL 106mm 219 M40A1 ARTILLERY 656 SP 155mm 178: 30 M44T; 144 M52T1; 4 T-155 Firtina TOWED 84:105mm 36 M101A1; 155mm 36 M114A2; 203mm 12 Ml 15 MRL 122mm 18 T-122 Europe 83 deploy on a variety of international crisis-management operations, including NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence, Air Policing and contributing to NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. There are plans to upgrade military training and simulation facilities by 2025.The defence-industrial base includes development and manufacturing capability, in particular small arms, vehicles, and training and light attack aircraft. The holding company Czechoslovak Group brings together several companies across the munitions, vehicles and aerospace sectors. ACTIVE 26,600 (Army 14,700 Air 5,850 Other 6,050) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 14,700_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1ISR/EW regt (1 recce bn, 1 EW bn, 1ISR UAV bn) Armoured 1 (7th) mech bde (1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mot inf bn) Mechanised 1 (4th) rapid reaction bde (2 mech inf bn, 1 mot inf bn) Airborne 1 AB regt COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (13th) arty regt (2 arty bn) 1 engr regt (2 engr bn, 1 EOD bn) 1 CBRN regt (2 CBRN bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log regt (2 log bn, 1 maint bn) Active Reserve_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 14 (territorial defence) comd MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd coy Light 14 inf coy (1 per territorial comd) (3 inf pi, 1 cbt spt pi, nog pi) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 30 T-72M4CZ (up to 89 T-72M1 in store) RECCE 50: 34 BPzV Svatava; 8 Pandur II (KBV-PZ); 8 Pandur II (KBV-PZLOK) IFV 227:120 BMP-2; 107 Pandur II (ind 17 CP, 14 comms, 4 amb); (up to 98 BMP-1; 65 BMP-2 all in store) APC • PPV 1 Titus AUV 141: 21 Dingo 2; 120 IVECO LMV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 4 Pandur II (KOT-Z) ARV 13+: 10 VPV-ARV (12 more in store); VT-55A; 3 VT-72M4 VLB 6 MT-55A (3 more in store) MW Bozena 5; UOS-155 Belarty NBC VEHICLES BRDM-2RCH ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); FGM-148 Javelin; Spike-LR RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 96 SP 152mm 48 M-77 Dana (up to 38 more in store) MOR 48: 81mm Expal; 120mm 40 M-1982; (45 more in store); SP 120mm 8 SPM-85 Air Force 5,850_ Principal task is to secure Czech airspace. This mission is fulfilled within NATO Integrated Extended Air Defence System (NATINADS) and, if necessary, by means of the Czech national reinforced air-defence system. The air force also provides CAS for army SAR, and performs a tpt role FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Gripen C/D 1 sqn with L-159 ALCA; L-159T1* TRANSPORT 2 sqn with A319CJ; C295M/MW; CL-601 Challenger; L-410FG/UVP-E Turbolet TRAINING 1 sqn with L-159 ALCA; L-159T1*; L-159T2* ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind D/E TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171Sh 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; PZL W-3A Sokol AIR DEFENCE 1 (25th) SAM regt (2 AD gp) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 38 combat capable EGA 14:12 Gripen C; 2 Gripen D ATK 16 L-159 ALCA TPT 15: Light 12: 4 C295M; 2 C295MW; 2 L-410FG Turbolet; 4 L-410UVP-E Turbolet; PAX 3: 2 A319CJ; 1 CL-601 Challenger TRG 8: 5 L-159T1*; 3 L-159T2* HELICOPTERS ATK 17: 7 Mi-24 Hind D; 10 Mi-35 Hind E MRH 5 Mi-17 Hip H TPT • Medium 30: 4 Mi-8 Hip; 16 Mi-171Sh; 10 PZL W3A Sokol AIR DEFENCE • SAM Point-defence 9K35 Strela-W (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K32 Strela-2% (RS-SA-7 Grail) (available for trg RBS-70 gunners); RBS-70 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES A AM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM BOMBS Laser-guided: GBU-12/-16 Paveway II Other Forces 6,050_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES ISFgp MANOEUVRE Other 1 (presidential) gd bde (2 bn) 1 (honour guard) gd bn (2 coy) 84 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 COMBAT SUPPORT 1 int gp 1 (central) MP comd 3 (regional) MP comd 1 (protection service) MP comd DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 2 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 3 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 2 EGYPT: MFO 18; 1 C295M IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 60; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 3 LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 81; 1 mor pi LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 135; 1 AD unit MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 90; UN • MINUSMA 5 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 8; UN • UNMIK 2 SLOVAKIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 400; 1 mech inf bn HQ; 1 mech inf coy SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 4 Denmark DNK Danish Krone DKK 2021 2022 2023 GDP DKK 2.50tr 2.73tr USD 398bn 387bn per capita USD 68,202 65,713 Growth % 4.9 2.6 Inflation % 1.9 7.2 Def exp [a] DKK 33.2bn 37.8bn USD 5.27bn 5.36bn Def bdgt [b] DKK 33.8bn 35.7bn 40.2bn USD 5.37bn 5.06bn USD1=DKK 6.29 7.05 [a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- 2022 Population 5,920,767 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.4% 3.0% 3.2% 3.5% 22.4% 9.4% Female 7.9% 2.8% 3.0% 3.3% 22.0% 11.0% Capabilities_ Denmark maintains a compact but effective force, with a focus on contributing to larger NATO operations. Ties to NATO, NORDEFCO and other regional neighbours have increased. In late 2019 the government agreed an action plan to ensure the promotion of Danish interests in the EU's European Defence Fund. Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine was the driving factor behind the June 2022 vote in which Denmark ended its'opt out'of EU military cooperation under CSDP. It has also spurred Denmark to increase defence spending, and further increase defence cooperation with Norway and Sweden. The January 2022 Foreign and Security Policy Strategy expressed concerns about cyber and hybrid attacks, as well as pandemic preparedness. Current defence-modernisation priorities include the acquisition of the F-35A, and the upgrade of armoured vehicles within the mechanised brigades. Other acquisition priorities include EW equipment, MALE UAVs and ASW capabilities, while authorities are also considering requirements for GBAD and longer-range artillery systems. The defence agreement for 2018-23 envisages increased defence spending to deal with a deteriorating security environment. The Danish armed forces consist primarily of professional personnel, supplemented by a substantial number of conscripts. The new defence agreement foresees retaining national service and that the annual conscript intake should rise modestly. The authorities are examining measures to improve recruitment and retention. The Danish armed forces have little ability to deploy independently but have contributed to a number of larger multinational deployments. Denmark is largely reliant on imported defence equipment but maintains a small defence industry focused on exports to Europe and North America. The Danish defence industry is mainly active in defence electronics and the design and manufacture of components and subsystems, including subcomponents for the F-35. ACTIVE 15,400 (Army 8,000 Navy 2,250 Air 3,000 Joint 2,150) Conscript liability 4-12 months, most voluntary RESERVES 44,200 (Army 34,400 Navy 5,300 Air Force 4,500) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 8,000_ Div and a bde HQ transforming into operational formations FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 (MND-N) div HQ MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (1st) mech bde (1 ISR bn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 log bn) 1 (2nd) mech bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 1 It inf bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 CBRN/construction bn 1 EOD bn 1 int bn IMP bn 2 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn 1 maint bn 1 spt bn Europe 85 AIR DEFENCE 1 ADbn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 44:15 Leopard 2A5 (to be upgraded to 2A7V); 29 Leopard 2A7V IFV 44 CV9035 Mklll APC 286 APC (W) 286:81 Piranha III (ind variants); 205 Piranha V AUV 158: 84 Eagle IV; 59 Eagle V; 15 HMT-400 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 3 Wisent ARV 8 Wisent VLB 6 BRP-1 Biber ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike-LR2 RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 50 SP 155mm 15 CAESAR 8x8 MOR 35: TOWED 120mm 20 Soltam K6B1; SP 120mm 15 Piranha V with Cardom-10 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger Navy 2,250_ Three naval squadrons, headquartered at naval bases in Frederikshavn and Kors0r EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5 DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 Iver Huitfeldt with 4 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (to be fitted with SM-2 SAM), 2 12-cell Mk 56 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm TT with MU90 LWT, 1 Millennium CIWS, 2 76mm guns (capacity 1 AW101 Merlin/MH-60R Seahawk hel) FRIGATES • FFGHM 2 Absalon (flexible support ships) with 4 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 3 12-cell Mk 56 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm TT with MU90 LWT, 2 Millennium CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2 AW101 Merlin/MH-60R Seahawk hel; 2 LCP, 7 MBT or 40 vehicles; 130 troops) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 PSOH 4 Thetis 1 76mm gun (capacity 1MH-60R Seahawk) PSO 3 Knud Rasmussen with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (ice-strengthened hull) PCC 5 Diana (1 other non-operational) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6 MCI 4 MSF Mk I MSD 2 Holm LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12 ABU 2 Gunnar Thorson (primarily used for MARPOL duties) AE 1 Sleipner AGS 2 Holm AKL 2 Seatruck AX 1 Solmen (DNK Flyvefisken) AXL 2 Holm AXS 2 Svanen Air Force 3,000_ Tactical Air Command_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AW101 Merlin 1 sqn with AS550 Fennec (ISR) TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130I-30 Hercules; CL-604 Challenger (MP/VIP) TRAINING 1 unit with MFI-17 Supporter (T-17) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 50 combat capable FTR 44: 34 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 10 F-16BM Fighting Falcon (30 operational) FGA 6 F-35A Lightning II TPT 8: Medium 4 C-130T-30 Hercules; PAX 4 CL-604 Challenger (MP/VIP) TRG 27 MFI-17 Supporter (T-17) HELICOPTERS ASW 9 MH-60R Seahawk SAR 8 AW101 Merlin MRH 8 AS550 Fennec (ISR) (4 more non-operational) TPT • Medium 6 AW101 Merlin AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES A AM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; HR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-24 Paveway III Laser & INS/GPS-guided EGBU-12 Paveway II INS/GPS guided GBU-31 ID AM Control and Air Defence Group_ 1 Control and Reporting Centre, 1 Mobile Control and Reporting Centre. 4 Radar sites Special Operations Command_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit 1 diving unit Reserves_ Home Guard (Army) 34,400 reservists (to age 50) 2 (local) def region Home Guard (Navy) 5,300 reservists (to age 50) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 30 PB 30:18 MHV800; 12 MHV900 Home Guard (Air Force) 4,500 reservists (to age 50) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 BN-2A Islander 86 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 DEPLOYMENT_ ESTONIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 155; 1 tk sqn with Leopard 2A7 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 39; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 125; 1 SF gp; 1 trg team LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 803; 1 mech inf bn with CV9035 Ivlklll; Piranha V MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 10 NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMG 1; 170; 1 FFGHM SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 35 UNITED KINGDOM: Operation Interflex 130 (UKR trg) Estonia EST Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023 GDP EUR 31.4bn 36.9bn USD 37.2bn 39.1 bn per capita USD 27,962 29,344 Growth % 8.0 1.0 Inflation % 4.5 21.0 Def Exp [a] EUR 633m 771m USD 749m 815m Def bdgt [b] EUR 658m 786m 1.14bn USD 779m 830m FMA (US) USD 10.0m 8.8m 9.8m USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 [a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008-- ---2015--- 2022 Population 1,211,524 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.1% 2.6% 2.2% 2.4% 24.1% 7.6% Female 7.7% 2.4% 2.0% 2.2% 24.4% 14.1% Capabilities_ Estonia has small active armed forces and is reliant on NATO membership as a security guarantor. Security policy is predicated on the goals of ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity, and Tallinn remains concerned by Russian security policy and military activity. In the wake of Russia's February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Estonia boosted defence spending and transferred military equipment to Ukraine, including ammunition, anti-armour systems and artillery. The MoD publishes medium-term development plans annually. Covering a four-year period, these are intended to ensure that the goals of long-term National Defense Development Plan (NDPP) will be achieved within the planned timeframe. The NDPP for 2031, adopted in December 2021, focuses on improving territorial defence and indirect fire and anti-tank capabilities, as well as boosting maritime and surveillance systems. Rocket artillery systems are being procured from the United States, medium-range air defence systems will be jointly procured with Latvia and short-range air-defence systems with Poland. Estonia signalled its intention in 2022 to join the European Sky Shield initiative, to boost air defence capacity. As well as capability development, modernisation spending is directed toward improving infrastructure and readiness. The active armed forces are supplemented by a reserve component and modernisation plans include the creation of a supplementary reserve and additional active and conscript personnel. The NATO battlegroup based in Estonia, present since mid-2017 as part of the Alliance's Enhanced Forward Presence, was bolstered in 2022. Amari air base hosts a NATO Air Policing detachment. Estonia is a member of the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force. Tallinn also hosts NATO's Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence. There is limited organic capability to deploy abroad, though Estonian forces take part in EU, NATO and UN missions on a small scale. The country has a niche defence-industrial capability, including robotics, ship repair and digital systems. ACTIVE 7,200 (Army 4,100 Navy 400 Air 400 Other 2,300) Conscript liability 8 or 11 months (depending on specialisation; conscripts cannot be deployed) RESERVE 17,500 (Joint 12,000;Territorial Defence 5,500) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 1,500; 2,600 conscript (total 4,100)_ 4 def region. All units except one inf bn are reserve based FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (1st) bde (1 recce coy, 1 armd inf bn; 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn, 1 AD bn) Light 1 (2nd) inf bde (1 inf bn, 1 spt bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 44 CV9035EE (ind 2 CP) APC • APC (W) 136; 56 XA-180 Sisu; 80 XA-188 Sisu ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 2 Pionierpanzer 2 Dachs ARV 2 BPz-2 VLB 2 Biber ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; Spfc-SR/-LR RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf; 90mm PV-1110 ARTILLERY 168 SP 155mm 6 K9 Thunder TOWED 122mm 36 D-30 (H 63) MOR 126; 81mm 60 B455/NM 95/M252; 120mm 66 2B11/ M/41D AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Mistral GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2 Reserve_ Reserve units subordinate to 2nd inf bde and territorial defence Europe 87 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce coy Light 3 inf bn 4 (territorial) inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bn 1 AT coy 1 cbt engr bn AIR DEFENCE 1 ADbn Navy 300; 100 conscript (total 400)_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2 Roland MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4: MCCS 1 Tasuja (ex-DNK Lindormen) MHC 3 Admiral Cowan (ex-UK Sandown) Air Force 400_ FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 sqn with M-28 Skytruck TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with R-44 Raven II EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 2 M-28 Skytruck TRG 1+ L-39C Albatros (leased) HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 R-44 Raven II Other 1,300; 800 conscript (total 2,100)_ Includes Cyber Command, Support Command and Special Operations Forces FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bn COMBAT SUPPORT 2 MP coy 1 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn Gendarmerie & Paramilitary_ Border Guard_ Subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 (all to be transferred to Navy in Jan 2023) PCO 1 Kindrai Kurvits (FIN Tursas derivative) PB 3:1 Pikker; 1 Raju (Baltic 4500WP); 1 Valve AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 3 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Beech 305ER King Air HELICOPTERS • MRH 3 AW139 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light some S-100 Camcopter DEPLOYMENT IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 10 • NATO Mission Iraq 40 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 10; UN • MINUSMA 2 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3 MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 1 FOREIGN FORCES All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated Denmark 155; 1 tk sqn France 219; 1 inf coy Germany NATO Baltic Air Policing; 150; 4 Eurofighter Typhoon United Kingdom 1,750; 1 armd BG; 1 It inf BG; 1 SP arty bty; 1 MRL bfy; 1 cbt engr coy Finland FIN Euro EUR GDP per capita Growth Inflation Def bdgt [a] USD1=EUR 2021 2022 EUR 251bn 266bn USD 298bn 281 bn USD 53,774 50,818 % 3.0 2.1 % 2.1 6.5 EUR 5.00bn 5.51 bn USD 5.91 bn 5.82bn 0.84 0.95 2023 6.62bn [a] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 5.42 3.07 2008 -2015- -2022 Population 5,601,547 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.3% 2.8% 2.8% 3.1% 22.2% 10.1% Female 8.0% 2.7% 2.6% 3.0% 21.6% 12.9% Capabilities Finland's armed forces are primarily focused on territorial defence. The country's long border with Russia has focused attention on Russia's military capabilities and plans. In October 2020, the government's report on foreign and security policy assessed a security environment that is rapidly changing and deteriorating. In May 2022, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Finland applied for NATO membership. An EU member state, key multilateral defence relationships have hitherto included NORDEFCO and the Northern Group, while there is also strong bilateral cooperation with Sweden and the US. In 2022 Finland signed a mutual security agreement with the UK and is looking to deepen defence ties with the US by negotiating a Defence Cooperation Agreement. The country participates in UN peacekeeping missions and contributes to NATO operations. Legislation limits the number of personnel deployed on international crisis-management operations to an upper ceiling of 2,000 troops. Finland maintains a largely conscript-based force and 88 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 intends to increase the number of personnel in the defence forces. There are plans to boost readiness by increasing the number of reservists participating in refresher training. In December 2021 the F-35 was selected for the air force's HX Fighter Program to replace its F/A-18s. Under the Squadron 2020 project, the navy will replace patrol boats and minelayers with corvette-sized vessels. Finland's defence industry consists largely of privately owned SMEs, concentrating on niche products for international markets, but it also features some internationally competitive larger companies producing wheeled armoured vehicles and turreted mortar systems. ACTIVE 19,250 (Army 13,400 Navy 3,150 Air 2,700) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,700 Conscript liability 165, 255 or 347 days (latter for NCOs, officers or those on'especially demanding'duties) RESERVE 238,000 (Army 185,000 Navy 24,000 Air 29,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,000 18,000 reservists a year conduct refresher training: total obligation 80 days (150 for NCOs, 200 for officers) between conscript service and age 50 (NCOs and officers to age 60) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE_ Army 4,400; 9,000 conscript (total 13,400) FORCES BY ROLE Finland's army maintains a mobilisation strength of about 285,000. In support of this requirement, two conscription cycles, each for about 9,000 conscripts, take place each year. After conscript training, reservist commitment is to the age of 60. Reservists are usually assigned to units within their local geographical area. All service appointments or deployments outside Finnish borders are voluntary for all members of the armed services. All brigades are reserve based Reserve Organisations 185,000_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bn MANOEUVRE Armoured 2armdBG (regt) Mechanised 2 (Karelia & Pori Jaeger) mech bde Light 3 (Jaeger) bde 6 It inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 AD regt 7 engr regt 3 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 log regt HELICOPTER 1 hel bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 100 Leopard 2A6; (100 Leopard 2A4 in store) IFV 212:110 BMP-2MD; 102 CV9030FIN APC 613 APC (T) 142:40 MT-LBu; 102 MT-LBV APC (W) 471: 260 XA-180/185 Sisu; 101 XA-202 Sisu (CP); 48 XA-203 Sisu; 62 AMV (XA-360) AUV 6 SISU GTP (in test) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 5 Docks ARV 36: 9 BPz-2; 15 MTP-LB; 12 VT-55A VLB 31:12 BLG-60M2; 10 Leopard 2L AVLB; 9 SISU Leguan MW 6+: Aardvark Mk 2; KMT T-55; 6 Leopard 2R CEV; RA-140 DS ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS NLAW; Spike-UR; Spike-LR ARTILLERY 682 SP 122mm 59: 23 K9 Thunder; 36 2S1 Gvozdika (PsH 74) TOWED 288: 122mm 234 D-30 (H 63); 155mm 54 K 83/ GH-52 (K 98) MRL 56:122mm 34 RM-70; 227mm 22 M270 MLRS MOR 279+: 81mm Krh/71; 120mm 261 Krh/92; SP 120mm 18 XA-361 AMOS HELICOPTERS MRH 7: 5 Hughes 500D; 2 Hughes 500E TPT • Medium 20 NH90 TTH UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR Medium 11ADS-95 Ranger AIR DEFENCE SAM 60+ Short-range 44: 20 Crotale NG (ITO 90); 24 NASAMS II FIN (ITO 12) Point-defence 16+: 16 ASRAD (ITO 05); FIM-92 Stinger (ITO 15); RBS 70 (ITO 05/05M) GUNS 407+: 23mm ItK 95/ZU-23-2 (ItK 61); 35mm GDF-005 (ItK 88); SP 35mm 7 Leopard 2 ITK Marksman Navy 1,400; 1,750 conscript (total 3,150)_ FORCES BY ROLE Naval Command HQ located at Turku; with two subordinate Naval Commands (Gulf of Finland and Archipelago Sea); 1 Naval bde; 3 spt elm (Naval Materiel Cmd, Naval Academy, Naval Research Institute) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 PCGM 4 Hamina with 4 RBS15 Mk3 (MTO-85M) AShM, 1 8-cell VLS with Umkhonto-IR (ITO2004) SAM, 157mm gun PBG 4 Rauma with 6 RBS15 Mk3 (MTO-85M) AShM PBF 12 Jehu (U-700) (capacity 24 troops) MINE WARFARE 8 MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3 MCC 3 Katanpaa (ITA Gaeta mod) MINELAYERS • ML 5: 2 Hameenmaa with 1 8-cell VLS with Umkhonto-IR (ITO2004) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 57mm gun (can carry up to 120 mines) 3 Pansio with 50 mines AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 52 LCM 1 Kampela LCVP1 Uto LCP £50 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7 AG 3:1 Louhi; 2 Hylje AX 4: 3 Fabian Wrede; 1 Lokki Europe 89 Coastal Defence FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt spt bde (1 AShM bty) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE AShM 4 RBS15K ARTY • 130mm 30 K-53tk (static) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike (used in AShM role) Air Force 2,050; 1,000 conscript (total 3,050) 3 Air Comds: Satakunta (West), Karelia (East), Lapland (North) FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet ISR 1 (survey) sqn with Learjet 35A TRANSPORT 1 fit with C295M 4 (liaison) fit with PC-12NG TRAINING 1 sqn with Hawk Mk50/51A/66* (air-defence and ground-attack trg) 1 unitwithG-115EA EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 107 combat capable EGA 62: 55 F/A-18C Hornet; 7 F/A-18D Hornet ELINT 1 C295M TPT • Light 11: 2 C295M; 3 Learjet 35A (survey; ECM trg; tgt-tow); 6 PC-12NG TRG 73:28 G-115EA; 29 Hawk Mk50/51 A*; 16 Hawk Mk66* AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM ALCM • Conventional AGM-158 JASSM BOMBS INS/GPS-guided GBU-31JDAM; AGM-154C JSOW Gendarmerie & Paramilitary_ Border Guard 2,700 Ministry of Interior. 4 Border Guard Districts and 2 Coast Guard Districts FORCES BY ROLE MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with Do-228 (maritime surv); AS332 Super Puma; Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey; Bell 412EP (AB-412EP) Twin Huey;AWU9KE Koala EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 43 PSO 1 Turva with 1 hel landing platform PCC 2 Tursas PB40 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 6 UCAC6 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 Do-228 HELICOPTERS MRH 3:1 Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412EP (AB-412EP) Twin Huey TPT 9: Medium 5 AS332 Super Puma; Light 4 AWU9KE Koala Reserve 12,000 reservists on mobilisation DEPLOYMENT_ IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 75; 1 trg team; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 5 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 161; 1 inf coy MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 12; UN • MINUSMA 4 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 14 MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 4 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 20 SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 12 UNITED KINGDOM: Operation Interflex 20 (UKR trg) France FRA 2023 Euro EUR 2021 2022 GDP EUR 2.50tr 2.63tr USD 2.96tr 2.78tr per capita USD 45,188 42,330 Growth % 6.8 2.5 Inflation % 2.1 5.8 Def exp [a] EUR 47.8bn 49.6bn USD 56.6bn 52.4bn Def bdgt [b] EUR 49.7bn 51.5bn USD 58.8bn 54.4bn USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 55.1bn [a] NATO figure [b] Indudes pensions Population 68,305,148 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 9.3% 3.1% 3.0% 2.9% 21.5% 9.2% Female 8.9% 3.0% 2.9% 2.8% 21.6% 11.9% Capabilities In November 2022, France published a new National Strategic Review (RNS), which highlighted the deteriorating security environment, the need to strengthen resilience in France and the importance of the NATO Alliance and European strategic autonomy. An updated Military Planning Law was under discussion at 90 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 the end of 2022. France plays a leading military role in the EU, NATO and the UN, and maintains globally deployed forces. In 2018, Paris launched the European Intervention Initiative, in order to foster a common strategic culture and develop the ability to jointly deploy quickly in case of crises. France is also expanding its capabilities in non-traditional domains, having set up a space command, developed a space strategy, formalised an offensive cyber doctrine and in February 2022 adopted a seabed warfare strategy. Deployments abroad have demonstrated the ability to support expeditionary forces independently, although some strategic and intra-theatre military air-transport requirements have been dependent on allies and external contractors. In October 2021, the French armed forces issued a new 'Strategic Outlook' document, illustrating a sharpened focus on improved readiness for high-intensity warfare. The 2019-25 Military Planning Law sought to increase the maintenance budget and accelerate modernisation to, among other concerns, mitigate the effect of operations on equipment availability in light of lessons from overseas deployments. The 2022 RNS discussed issues relating to weapons stocks, security of supply and industrial capacity, in light of the war in Ukraine. In 2022, France reorganised its presence in the Sahel, effectively leaving Mali, and transferred some forces to Niger. France has a sophisticated defence industry, exemplified by companies such as Dassault, MBDA and Nexter, with most procurements undertaken domestically. France has called for greater European defence-industrial cooperation and aims to increase its exports to Europe. It is also seeking to invest in future technologies and supports start-ups and innovation in the defence realm. ACTIVE 203,250 (Army 114,800 Navy 34,850 Air 40,200, Other Staffs 13,400) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 100,500 RESERVE 41,150 (Army 25,750 Navy 5,400 Air 5,300 Other Staffs 4,700) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 30,300 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Strategic Nuclear Forces_ Navy 2,200_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC 4 SSBN 4 Le Triumphant with 16 M51 SLBM with 6 TN-75 nuclear warheads, 4 single 533mm TT with SM39 Exocet AShM/F17 mod 2 HWT AIRCRAFT • EGA 20 Rafale U F3 with ASMPA msl Air Force 1,800_ Air Strategic Forces Command_ FORCES BY ROLE STRIKE 1 sqn with Rafale B with ASMPA msl 1 sqn with Rafale B with ASMPA msl (forming) TANKER 2 sqn with A330 MRTT; C-135FR; KC-135 Stratotanker EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 20 combat capable EGA 20 Rafale B TKR/TPT 15: 5 A330 MRTT; 10 C-135FR TKR 3 KC-135 Stratotanker Paramilitary_ Gendarmerie 40 Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 13 COMMUNICATIONS 4: 2 Syracuse-3 (designed to integrate with UK Skynet & ITA Sicral); 1 Syracuse-^; 1 Athena-Fidus (also used by ITA) ISR 6:1 CSO-1; 1 CSO-2; 1 Helios 2A; 1 Helios 2B; 2 Pleiades ELINT/SIGINT 3 CERES Army 114,800_ Regt and BG normally bn size FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 corps HQ (CRR-FR) 2 div HQ MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce regt Armoured 1 (2nd) armd bde (2 tk regt, 3 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt) 1 (7th) armd bde (1 tk regt, 1 armd BG, 3 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt) 1 armd BG HQ (UAE) Mechanised 1 (6th) It armd bde (2 armd cav regt, 1 armd inf regt, 1 mech inf regt, 1 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt) 1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf regt) 1 mech regt HQ (Djibouti) Light 1 (27th) mtn bde (1 armd cav regt, 3 mtn inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 engr regt) 3 inf regt (French Guiana & French West Indies) 1 inf regt HQ (New Caledonia) 2 inf bn HQ (Cote d'Ivoire & Gabon) Air Manoeuvre 1 (11th) AB bde (1 armd cav regt, 4 para regt, 1 arty regt, 1 engr regt, 1 spt regt) 1 AB regt (La Reunion) Amphibious 1 (9th) amph bde (2 armd cav regt, 1 armd inf regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt) Other 4 SMA regt (French Guiana, French West Indies & Indian Ocean) 3 SMA coy (French Polynesia, Indian Ocean & New Caledonia) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 MRL regt 2 engr regt 2 EW regt 1 int bn 1 CBRN regt 5 sigs regt Europe 91 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 5 tpt regt 1 log regt 1 med regt 3 trg regt HELICOPTER 1 (4th) hel bde (3 hel regt) ISR UAV 1 UAV regt AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM regt Special Operation Forces 2,200_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF regt HELICOPTER 1 hel regt Reserves 25,750 reservists_ Reservists form 79 UIR (Reserve Intervention Units) of about 75 to 152 troops, for 'Proterre' - combined land projection forces bn, and 23 USR (Reserve Specialised Units) of about 160 troops, in specialised regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 215 Leckre ASLT 245 AMX-10RC RECCE 64: 24 EBRC Jaguar; 40 ERC-90D Sagaie IFV 706: 599 VBCIVCI; 107 VBCIVPC (CP) APC 2,499 APC (T) 49 BvS-10 APC (W) 2,430: 373 VBMR Griffon; e2,000 VAB; 57 VAB VOA (OP) PPV 20 Araois AUV 1,503:1,416 VBL/VB2L; 72 VBL Ultima; 15 VBMR-L Serval ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 110: 38 AMX-30EBG; 72 VAB GE ARV 44: 27 AMX-30D; 17 Leclerc DNG; VAB-EHC VLB 48: 20 EFA; 18 PTA; 10 SPRAT MW 16+: AMX-30B/B2; 4 Buffalo; 12 Minotaur NBC VEHICLES 26 VAB NRBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 177: 64 VAB Milan; 113 VAB with MMP MANPATS Eryx; FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; MMP ARTILLERY 245+ SP 155mm 90: 32 AU-F-1; 58 CAESAR TOWED 155mm 12 TR-F-1 MRL 227mm 11 M270 MLRS MOR 132+: 81mm LLR 81mm; 120mm 132 RT-F-1 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 13: 5 PC-6B Turbo Porter; 5 TBM-700; 3 TBM-700B HELICOPTERS ATK 67: 20 Tiger HAP (to be upgraded to HAD); 47 Tiger HAD MRH 104: 18 AS555UN Fennec; 86 SA341F/342M Gazelle (all variants) TPT 167: Heavy 8 H225M Caracal (CSAR); Medium 124: 24 AS532UL Cougar; 2 EC225LP Super Puma; 52 NH90 TTH; 46 SA330 Puma; Light 35 H120 Colibri (leased) AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 12+: Mistral; 12 VAB ARLAD AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114 Hellfire II; HOT Navy 34,850_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 9 STRATEGIC • SSBN 4 Le Triomphant opcon Strategic Nuclear Forces with 16 M51 SLBM with 6 TN-75 nuclear warheads, 4 single 533mm TT with SM39 Exocet AShM/ F17 mod 2 HWT TACTICAL • SSN 5 4 Rubis (1 more severely damaged by fire) with 4 single 533mm TT with SM39 Exocet AShM/F17 mod 2 HWT 1 Suffren with 4 single 533mm TT with MdCN (SCALP Naval) LACM/SM39 Exocet AShM/Artémis (F-21) HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 22 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVN 1 Charles de Gaulle with 4 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM (capacity 30 Rafale M FGA ac, 2 E-2C Hawkeye AEW&C ac, 8 AS365 Dauphini NH90 NFH hel) DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4 2 Aquitaine (FREMM FREDA) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 4 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15 SAMMsfer 30 SAM, 2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel) 2 Forbin with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 4 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 30 SAM, 2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 2 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel) FRIGATES 17 FFGHM11: 4 Aquitaine (FREMM ASM) with 2 8-cell Sylver A70 VLS with MdCN (SCALP Naval) LACM, 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel) 2 Aquitaine (FREMM ASM) with 2 8-cell Sylver A70 VLS with MdCN (SCALP Naval) LACM, 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with^sfer 15 SAU/Aster 30 SAM, 2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel) 3 La Fayette with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther hel) 2 La Fayette with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral 3 SAM, 1100mm gun (capacity 1AS565SA Panther hel) FFH 6 Floreal with 1 100mm gun (fitted for but not with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM) (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther hel) 92 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 FSM 6 D'Estienne d'Orves with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 1100mm gun PSO 4 d'Entrecasteaux (BSAOM) with 1 hel landing platform PCO 6: 3 La Confiance, 1 Laperouse; 1 Le Malin; 1 Fulmar PCC 4:1 L'Audacieuse; 3 Flamant MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 16 MCD 4 Vm/coot MHC 3 Antares MHO 9 Eridan AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3 LHD 3 Mistral with 2 twin Simbad lnchr withMsfraZ SAM (capacity up to 16 NH90/SA330 Puma/AS532 Cougar/Tiger hel; 2 LCT or 4 LCM/LCU; 13 MBTs; 50 AFVs; 450 troops) LANDING CRAFT 40 LCU 2 Arbalete (EDA-S) (capacity 1 Leclerc MBT or 2 Griffon/Jaguar) LCT 4 EDA-R (capacity 1 Leclerc MBT or 6 VAB) LCM 11 CTM LCVP 25 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 33 ABU 1 Telenn Mor AG 2 Chamois AGB 1 Astrolabe with 1 hel landing platform AGE 2:1 Corraline; 1 Tfetis (Laperouse mod) (used as trials ships for mines and divers) AGI1 Dupuy de Lome AGM 1 Mwge AGOR 2: 1 Pourquoi pas? (used 150 days per year by Ministry of Defence; operated by Ministry of Research and Education otherwise); 1 Beautemps-beaupre AGS 3 Laperouse AORH 2 Durance with 3 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM (capacity 1 SA319 Alouette III/AS365 Dauphin/Lynx) ATS 4 Loire (BSAM) AXL 10: 8 Leopard; 2 G/ya'ne AXS 4: 2 La Belle Poule; 1 La Grand Hermine; 1 Mutin Naval Aviation 6,500_ FORCES BY ROLE STRIKE/FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with Rafale M F3 1 sqn with Rafale M F3/F3-R ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE 1 sqn with AS565SA Panther ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 2 sqn with NH90 NFH MARITIME PATROL 2 sqn with Atlantique 2 1 sqn with Falcon 20H Gardian 1 sqn with Falcon 50MI AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with AS365N/F Dauphin 2 TRAINING 1 sqn with EMB 121 Xingu 1 unit with SA319B Alouette III (to be WFU end of 2022) 1 unit with Falcon 10MER 1 unit with CAP 10M EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 60 combat capable FGA 42 Rafale M F3-R ASW 18: 9 Atlantique-2 (standard 6); 9 Atlantique-2 (being upgraded to standard 6) AEW&C 3 E-2C Hawkeye SAR 4 Falcon 50MS TPT 25: Light 10 EMB-121 Xingu; PAX 15: 6 Falcon 10MER; 5 Falcon 20H Gardian; 4 Fafcon 50MI TRG 6 CAP 10M HELICOPTERS ASW 27 NH90 NFH MRH 40: 3 AS365F Dauphin 2; 6 AS365N Dauphin 2; 2 AS365N3; 16 AS565SA Panther; 1 H160B; 12 SA319B Alouette III (to be WFU end of 2022) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Light 4 S-100 Camcopter AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IIR Mica IR; ARH Mica RF ASM AASM AShM AM39 Exocet LACM Nuclear ASMPA BOMBS Laser-guided: GBU-12/16 Paveway II Marines 2,200_ Commando Units 750_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce gp Amphibious 2 aslt gp 1 atk swimmer gp 1 raiding gp COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt spt gp COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt gp Fusiliers-Marin 1,450_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 2sy gp 7 sy coy Reserves 6,000 reservists Air and Space Force 40,200_ FORCES BY ROLE STRIKE 1 sqn with Rafale B with ASMPA msl 1 sqn with Rafale B with ASMPA msl (forming) SPACE 1 (satellite obs) sqn FIGHTER 1 sqn with Mirage 2000-5 1 sqn with Mirage 2000B Europe 93 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with Mirage 2000D 1 (composite) sqn with Mirage 2000-5/D (Djibouti) 2 sqn with Rafale B/C 1 sqn with Rafale B/C (UAE) ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 fit with C-160G Gabriel (ESM); Beech 350ER King Air AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 (Surveillance & Control) sqn with E-3F Sentry SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT 5 sqn with CN235M; SA330 Puma; AS555 Fennec (Djibouti, French Guiana, French Polynesia, Indian Ocean & New Caledonia) TANKER 1 sqn with A330 MRTT TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-135FR; KC-135 Stratotanker TRANSPORT 1 VIP sqn with A310-300; A330 2 sqn with A400M 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30/J-30 Hercules; KC-130J Hercules 1 sqn (joint FRA-GER) with C-130J-30 Hercules; KC-130J Hercules 2 sqn with CN235M 1 sqn with Falcon 7X (VIP); Falcon 900 (VIP); Falcon 2000 3 fit with TBM-700A 1 gp withDHC-6-300 Twin Otter TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with Mirage 2000D 1 OCU sqn with Rafale B/C 1 OCU sqn with SA330 Puma; AS555 Fennec 1 (aggressor) sqn with Alpha Jet* 4 sqn with Alpha Jet* 1 sqn with Grob G120A-F 2 sqn with Grob G120A-F; PC-21 1 sqn with EMB-121 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AS555 Fennec 2 sqn with AS332C/L Super Puma; SA330 Puma; H225M ISR UAV 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper AIR DEFENCE 3 sqn with Crotale NG; SAMP/T 1 sqn with SAMP/T EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES see Space AIRCRAFT 261 combat capable FTR 34: 27 Mirage 2000-5; 7 Mirage 2000B FGA 155: 65 Mirage 2000D; 51 Rafale B; 39 Rafale C (Rafale being upgraded to F3-R standard) ISR 2 Beech 350ER King Air ELINT 2 C-160G Gabriel (ESM) AEW&C 4 E-3F Sentry TKR 3 KC-135 Stratotanker TKR/TPT 17:5 A330 MRTT; 10 C-135FR; 2 KC-130J Hercules TPT 114: Heavy 19 A400M; Medium 16: 5 C-130H Hercules; 9 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 70:1 Beech 350i King Air; 19 CN235M-100; 8 CN235M-300; 5 DHC-6-300 Twin Otter; 22 EMB-121 Xingu; 15 TBM-700; PAX 9: 2 A310-300; 1A330; 2 Fafccm 7X; 2 Fflfccm 900 (VIP); 2 Falcon 2000 (2 A340-200 in store) TRG 127: 72 Alpha Jet*; 18 Grob G120A-F (leased); 17 PC-21; 13 SR20 (leased); 7 SR22 (leased) HELICOPTERS MRH 37 AS555 Fennec TPT 35: Heavy 10 H225M Caracal; Medium 25:1AS332C Super Puma; 4 AS332L Super Puma; 20 SA330B Puma UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 8 MQ-9A Reaper AIR DEFENCE • SAM 60: Long-range 40 SAMP/T; Short-range 20 Crotale NG AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-550 Magic 2; IIR Mica IR; ARH Meteor; Mica RF ASM AASM; Apache LACM Nuclear ASMPA Conventional SCALP EG BOMBS Laser-guided: GBU-12/-16 Paveway II Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II Security and Intervention Brigade_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 3SF gp MANOEUVRE Other 24 protection units 30 (fire fighting and rescue) unit Reserves 5,300 reservists_ Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 100,500_ Gendarmerie 100,500; 30,300 reservists EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 80: 60 VXB-170 (VBRG-170); 20 VAB ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm some PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 43 PB 42: 1 Armoise; 2 Athos; 4 Geranium; 3 Maroni; 24 VCSM; 9 VSMP HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 60: 25 AS350BA Ecureuil; 20 H135; 15 H145 DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 5 BURKINA FASO: 300; 1 SF gp; 1 C-130H; 1 DHC-6-300; 2 Tiger; 3 AS532UL Cougar; 2 H225M; 2 SA342 Gazelle CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: 160; EU • EUTM RCA 13; UN • MINUSCA 5 CHAD: 1,500; 1 mech inf BG; 1 FGA det with 3 Mirage 2000D; 1 tkr/tpt det with 1A330 MRTT; 1 C-130H; 2 CN235M CÖTE D'lVOIRE: 900; 1 inf bn; 1 (army) hel unit with 2 SA330 Puma; 2 SA342 Gazelle; 1 (air force) hel unit with 1 AS555 Fennec 94 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 CYPRUS: Operation Inherent Resolve 30:1 Atlantique-2 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 4 DJIBOUTI: 1,500; 1 combined arms regt with (2 recce sqn, 2 inf coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy); 1 hel det with 4 SA330 Puma; 3 SA342 GazeHe; 1 LCM; 1 FGA sqn with 4 Mirage 2000-5; 1 SAR/tpt sqn with 1 CN235M; 3 SA330 Puma EGYPT: MF O 1 ESTONIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence (Operation Lynx) 219; 1 It inf coy FRENCH GUIANA: 2,100: 2 inf regt; 1 SMA regt; 2 PCO; 1 tpt sqn with 3 CN235M; 5 SA330 Puma; 4 AS555 Fennec; 3 gendarmerie coy; 1 AS350BA Ecureuil; 1 H145 FRENCH POLYNESIA: 950: 1 inf bn; 1 SMA coy; 1 naval HQ at Papeete; 1 FFH; 1 PSO; 1 PCO; 1 AFS; 3 Falcon 200 Gordian; 1 SAR/tpt sqn with 2 CN235M; 3 SA330 Puma FRENCH WEST INDIES: 1,000; 1 inf regt; 2 SMA regt; 2 FFH; 1AS565SA Panther; 1 SA319 Alouette III; 1 naval base at Fort de France (Martinique); 4 gendarmerie coy; 1 PCO; 1 PB; 2 AS350BA Ecwrewö GABON: 350; 1 inf bn GERMANY: 2,000 (incl elm Eurocorps and FRA/GER bde); 1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf regt) GULF OF GUINEA: Operation Corymbe 1 LHD IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 6; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 3 JORDAN: Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 300: 4 Rafale F3 LA REUNION/MAYOTTE: 1,750; 1 para regt; 1 inf coy; 1 SMA regt; 1 SMA coy; 2 FFH; 1 PCO; 1 LCM; 1 naval HQ at Port-des-Galets (La Reunion); 1 naval base at Dzaoudzi (Mayotte); 1 Falcon 50M; 1 SAR/tpt sqn with 2 CN235M; 5 gendarmerie coy; 1 SA319 Alouette III LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 571; 1 mech inf bn(-); VBL; VBCI; VAB; Mistral MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 13; UN • MINUSMA 26 MEDITERRANEAN SEA: Operation Inherent Resolve 100: 1DDGHM MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 6 NEW CALEDONIA: 1,450; 1 mech inf regt; 1 SMA coy; 6ERC-90F1 Lynx; 1 FFHM; 1 PSO; 1 PCO; 1 base with 2 Fakon 200 Gordian at Noumea; 1 tpt unit with 2 CN235 MPA; 3 SA330 Puma; 4 gendarmerie coy; 2 AS350BA Ecureuil NIGER: 1,200; 1 mech inf coy; 1 hel fit with 3 NH90 TTH; 1 FGA det with 3 Mirage 2000D; 1 tkr/tpt det with 1 C-135FR; 1C-130J-30 Hercules; 1UAV det with 6 MQ-9A Reaper; 1ISR det with 1 Atlantique-2 QATAR: Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 70; 1E-3F Sentry ROMANIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 750; 1 armd BG with Leclerc; VBCI; 1 SAM bty with SAMP/T SAUDI ARABIA: 50 (radar det) SENEGAL: 400; 1 Falcon 50MI UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 700: 1 armd BG (1 tk coy, 1 arty bty); Leclerc; CAESAR; • Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal); 1 FGA sqn with 7 Rafale F3 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3 FOREIGN FORCES_ Germany 400 (GER elm Eurocorps) Singapore 200; 1 trg sqn with 12 M-346 Master Germany GER Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023 GDP EUR 3.60tr 3.8 Itr USD 4.26tr 4.03tr per capita USD 51,238 48,398 Growth % 2.6 1.5 Inflation % 3.2 8.5 Def exp [a] EUR 53.0bn 55.6bn USD 62.8bn 58.8bn Def bdgt [b] EUR 46.9bn 50.5bn 58.6bn USD 55.5bn 53.4bn USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 [a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- 2022 Population 84,31 6,622 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 7.0% 2.3% 2.6% 2.9% 24.4% 10.3% Female 6.7% 2.3% 2.5% 2.7% 23.6% 12.7% Capabilities The 2016 defence White Paper committed Germany to a leadership role in European defence. It also emphasised the importance of NATO and the need for the armed forces to contribute to collective-defence tasks. Work on a national security strategy began in March 2022 under the leadership of the foreign ministry and this is scheduled to be released in early 2023. Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the government-initiated preparations for a EUR100 billion special purpose vehicle to invest in modernisation of the Bundeswehr over the next five years; the funding was approved in early June. The 2018 Konzeption der Bundeswehr underlines that collective- and territorial-defence tasks will drive military-modernisation efforts and are of equal standing with international crisis-management operations. The key implication for defence modernisation is that Germany will need to invest in readiness and return to fully equipping operational units. Germany is aligning its defence-planning process with capability goals derived from multinational guidance. Close military cooperation has been established with the Czech Republic, France, the Netherlands and Romania, including the affiliation of units. The defence ministry has announced its objective to increase authorised active personnel numbers. Europe 95 In July 2020, the government launched a new voluntary conscript initiative, with 1,000 posts, focused on homeland-security tasks. Volunteers serve for seven months plus five months as reservists over the course of six years. This is in addition to the existing voluntary conscript model that requires between seven and 23 months of military service. In September 2022, Germany set up a Territorial Operations Command to strengthen the armed forces' homeland security functions and take on command-and-control functions for forces deployed in Germany. The armed forces are struggling to improve readiness levels in light of increasing demands on NATO's eastern flank. Germany is scheduled to again become the lead nation for NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force land component in 2023, with the earmarked units prioritised for modernisation and upgrades. Germany has indicated that it intends to provide, from 2025, some 30,000 personnel and some 85 vessels and aircraft at 30 days' notice for NATO's New Force Model, agreed at the Alliance's 2022 Madrid summit. Shortages of spare parts and maintenance problems are reported in all three services. Germany's defence-industrial base is able to design and manufacture equipment to meet requirements across all military domains, with strengths in land and naval systems. The government is pursuing a policy of closer defence-industrial cooperation in Europe. ACTIVE 183,150 (Army 62,950 Navy 15,900 Air 27,200 Joint Support Service 27,900 Joint Medical Service 19,850 Cyber 14,250 Other 15,100) Conscript liability Voluntary conscription only. Voluntary conscripts can serve up to 23 months RESERVE 32,650 (Army 7,600 Navy 1,450 Air 3,750 Joint Support Service 12,500 Joint Medical Service 4,000 Cyber 1,350 Other 2,000) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 8 COMMUNICATIONS 2 COMSATBw (1 & 2) ISR 6:1 SARah; 5 SAR-Lupe Army 62,950_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND elm 2 (1 GNC & MNC NE) corps HQ MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (1st) armd div (1 (9th) armd bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (21st) armd bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (41st) mech inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn); 1 tk bn (for NLD 43rd Bde); 1 SP arty bn; 1 sigs coy) 1 (10th) armd div (1 (12th) armd bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn); 1 (37th) mech inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn); 1 (23rd) mtn inf bde (1 recce bn, 3 mtn inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 SP arty bn; 1 SP arty trg bn; 2 mech inf bn (GER/FRA bde); 1 arty bn (GER/FRA bde); 1 cbt engr coy (GER/ FRA bde); 1 spt bn (GER/FRA bde)) Air Manoeuvre 1 (rapid reaction) AB div (1 SOF bde (3 SOF bn); 1 AB bde (2 recce coy, 2 para regt, 2 cbt engr coy); 1 atk hel regt; 2 tpt hel regt; 1 sigs coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn(-) (Joint GER-UK unit) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 321: 223 Leopard 2A5/A6; 98 Leopard 2A7/2A7V (55 Leopard 2A4 in store) RECCE 220 Fennek (incl 24 engr recce, 50 fires spt) IFV 680: 258 Marder 1A3/A4; 72 Marder 1A5; 350 Puma APC 812 APC (T) 112: 75 Bv-206S; 37 M113 (inc variants) APC (W) 700: 341 Boxer (inc variants); 359 TPz-1 Fuchs (inc variants) AUV 683: 247 Dingo 2; 363 Eagle IV/V; 73 Wiesel 1 Mk20 (with 20mm gun) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 51 Dachs ARV 170: 95 BPz-2 1; 75 BPz-3 Büffel VLB 59: 22 Biber; 7 Leopard 2 with Leguan; 30 M3 MW 30: 6 Fuchs KAI; 24 Keiler NBC VEHICLES 44 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 102 Wiesel ATGM with TOW or MELLS MANPATS Milan; Spike-LR (MELLS) ARTILLERY 245 SP 155mm 109 PzH 2000 MRL 227mm 38 M270 MLRS MOR 98:120mm 58 Tampella; SP 120mm 40 Ml 13 with Tampella HELICOPTERS ATK 51 Tiger TPT 102: Medium 82 NH90; Light 20:13 H135; 7 H145 (SAR) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR 123: Medium 35 KZO; Light 87 LUNA AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM HOT; PARS 3 LR Navy 16,250_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 6 SSK 6 Type-212A (fitted with AIP) with 6 single 533mm TT with DM2A4 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11 DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 Sachsen (F124) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA SAM/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Sea Lynx Mk88A hel) FRIGATES • FFGHM 8: 4 Baden-Württemberg (F125) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 2 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 1127mm gun (capacity 2 NH90 hel) 4 Brandenburg (F123) with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Sea Lynx Mk88A hel) 96 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 CORVETTES • FSGM 5 Braunschweig (K130) with 2 twin lnchr with RBS15 Mk3 AShM, 2 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 23 MHO 10: 7 Frankenthal (2 used as diving support); 3 Frankenthal (mod. MJ332CL) MSO 1 Ensdorf MSD 12 Seehund AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1 LCU 1 Type-520 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 23 AG 4: 2 Schwedeneck (Type-748); 2 Stollergrund (Type-745) AGI 3 Oste (Type-423) AGOR 1 Planet (Type-751) AOR 2 Rhön (Type-704) AORH 3 Berlin (Type-702) (fitted for but not with RIM-116 RAM SAM) (capacity 2 Sea King Mk41 hel) AORL 6 Elbe (Type-404) with 1 hel landing platform (2 specified for PFM support; 1 specified for SSK support; 3 specified for MHO/MSO support); ATF 3:1 Helgoland; 2 Wangerooge AXS 1 Gorch Fock Naval Aviation 1,850_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 6 combat capable ASW 6 AP-3C Orion TPT • Light 2 Do-228 (pollution control) HELICOPTERS ASW 22 Lynx Mk88A SAR 24:11 Sea King Mk41; 13 NH90 NFH (Sea Lion) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light 2 Skeldar V-200 (Sea Falcon) Naval Special Forces Command_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF coy Sea Battalion_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bn Air Force 27,200_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 3 wg (2 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 wg (2 sqn with Tornado IDS) 1 wg (2 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon (multi-role)) ISR 1 wg (1 ISR sqn with Tornado ECR/IDS; 2 UAV sqn with Heron) TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 (special air mission) wg (3 sqn with A319; A321; A321LR; A340; A350; AS532U2 Cougar II; Global 5000; Global 6000) TRANSPORT 1 wg (3 sqn (forming) with A400M Atlas) 1 sqn (joint FRA-GER) with C-130J-30 Hercules; KC-130J Hercules TRAINING 1 sqn located at Holloman AFB (US) with Tornado IDS 1 unit (ENJJPT) located at Sheppard AFB (US) with T-6A Texan II; T-38C Talon 1 hel unit located at Fassberg TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 tpt hel wg (3 sqn with CH-53G/GA/GE/GS Stallion; 1 sqn with H145M) AIR DEFENCE 1 wg (3 SAM gp) with M902 Patriot PAC-3 1 AD gp with ASRAD Ozelot; C-RAM Mantis and trg unit 1 AD trg unit located at Fort Bliss (US) with MIM-104C/F Patriot PAC-2/3 3 (tac air ctrl) radar gp Air Force Regiment_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 sy regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 226 combat capable FTR 138 Eurofighter Typhoon ATK 68 Tornado IDS ATK/EW 20 Tornado ECR* ISR 1A319CJ (Open Skies) TPT 58: Heavy 38 A400M; Medium 3 C-130J-30 Hercules PAX 16:1A321; 2 A321LR; 2 A340 (VIP); 2 A350 (VIP); 2 A319; 4 Global 5000; 3 Global 6000 TRG 109: 69 T-6A Texan II, 40 T-38C Talon HELICOPTERS MRH 16 H145M TPT 73: Heavy 70 CH-53G/GA/GS/GE Stallion; Medium 3 AS532U2 Cougar II (VIP) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Heavy 6 Heron 1 AIR DEFENCE SAM 50 Long-range 30 M902 Patriot PAC-3 Point-defence 20 ASRAD Ozelot (with FIM-92 Stinger) GUNS 35mm 12 C-RAM Mantis AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L/Li Sidewinder; HR IRIS-T; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM LACM Taurus KEPD 350 ARM AGM-88B HARM BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-24 Paoeway III; GBU-48 Enhanced Paveway II Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-54 Laser JDAM Joint Support Service 27,900_ FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT 3 MP regt 2 NBC bn Europe 97 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 6 log bn 1 spt regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AUV 451: 206 Dingo 2; 245 Eagle IV/V ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 35: 23 BPz-2; 12 BPz-3 Büffel NBC VEHICLES 35 TPz-1 Fuchs A6/A7/A8 NBC Joint Medical Services 19,850_ FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 4 med regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 109: 72 Boxer (amb); 37 TPz-1 Fuchs (amb) AUV 42 Eagle IV/V (amb) Cyber & Information Command 14,250_ FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT 4EW bn 6 sigs bn DEPLOYMENT_ BALTIC SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 1:100; 1 MHO; 1AORL BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea55 ESTONIA: NATO • Baltic Air Policing 150; 4 Eurofighter Typhoon FRANCE: 400 (ind GER elm Eurocorps) IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 80; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 15 JORDAN: Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 1 A400M LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 82; 1 FSGM LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 1,000; 1 mech inf bde HQ; 1 armd inf BG with Leopard 2A6; Fennek; Marder 1A3; Boxer MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 55; UN • MINUSMA 490; 1 sy coy; 1 hel sqn with 5 CH-53G; 1 UAV sqn MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMG 2:40; 1AOR NIGER: Operation Gazelle 200 (trg) POLAND: 95 (GER elm MNC-NE) SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 68 SLOVAKIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 480; 1 inf coy; 1 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 14 UNITED STATES: Trg units with 40 T-38 Talon; 69 T-6A Texan II at Goodyear AFB (AZ)/Sheppard AFB (TX); NAS Pensacola (FL); Fort Rucker (AL); Missile trg at Fort Bliss (TX) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4 FOREIGN FORCES France 2,000; 1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf regt) United Kingdom 185 United States US Africa Command: Army; 1 HQ at Stuttgart US European Command: 39,050; 1 combined service HQ (EUCOM) at Stuttgart-Vaihingen Army 24,700; 1 HQ (US Army Europe & Africa (USAREUR-AF) at Wiesbaden; 1 arty comd; 1 SF gp; 1 recce bn; 1 mech bde(-); 1 fd arty bn; 1 MRL bde (3 MRL bn); 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde HQ; 1 int bde; 1 MP bde; 1 sigs bde; 1 spt bde; 1 (MDTF) cbt spt bde(-); 1 SAM bde; 2 (APS) armd bde eqpt set; M1A2 SEPv2/ v3 Abrains; M3A3 Bradley; M2A3 Bradley; M1296 Stryker Dragoon; M109A6; M119A3; M777A2; M270A1; M142 HIMARS; AH-64D Apache; CH-47F Chinook; UH-60L/M Black Hawk; HH-60M Black Hawk; M902 Patriot PAC-3; M1097 Avenger; M-SHORAD Navy 400 USAF 13,400; 1 HQ (US Air Forces Europe & Africa) at Ramstein AB; 1 HQ (3rd Air Force) at Ramstein AB; 1 FGA wg at Spangdahlem AB with (1 FGA sqn with 24 F-16C Fighting Falcon); 1 tpt wg at Ramstein AB with 14 C-130J-30 Hercules; 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 5 Learjet 35A (C-21A); 1 B-737-700 (C-40B) USMC 550 Greece GRC Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023 GDP EUR 183bn 210bn USD 216bn 222bn per capita USD 20,263 20,876 Growth % 8.3 5.2 Inflation % 0.6 9.2 Def exp [a] EUR 6.76bn 7.45bn USD 8.01 bn 7.87bn Def bdgt [b] EUR 6.50bn 7.44bn 5.25bn USD 7.69bn 7.87bn USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 [a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) Population 10,533,871 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 7.3% 2.8% 2.9% 2.8% 22.8% 10.2% Female 6.9% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 24.1% 12.8% 98 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Capabilities_ Greece's 2014 National Military Strategy identifies safeguarding sovereignty and territorial integrity as principal defence objectives; in recent years there has been renewed focus on Eastern Mediterranean security. The armed forces would also be expected to support Cyprus in the event of a conflict. The Force Structure 2020-2034 document set out plans to increase military responsiveness and sustainability, which included the establishment of a special warfare command. Greece is a NATO member and has led the EU's Balkan Battlegroup. The port at Alexandroupoli has become a key hub for NATO members' moving military equipment for military exercises in southern Europe. There is close cooperation with the US.The Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement, amended in 2022, is the cornerstone of US-Greece defence cooperation and provides for a naval-support facility and an airfield at Souda Bay in Crete. A strategic partnership was agreed with France in 2021 that includes a mutual-assistance clause. There are also defence-cooperation agreements with Cyprus, Egypt and Israel while ties are developing with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The armed forces still contain conscripts but most personnel are regulars and Athens is looking to move to a fully professional force. Greece's deployments involve limited numbers of personnel and focus on the near abroad, although the country contributes to EU, NATO and UN missions. Athens is in the process of acquiring Rafale combat aircraft and frigates from France as part of a its defence partnership. F-16s are being upgraded. There has been significant investment in the new international flight training centre in Kalamata, reportedly run by Israel's Elbit systems. Greece hosts, and takes part in, a wide range of international exercises. There is an extensive defence industry focused on the domestic market, capable of manufacturing and developing naval vessels, subsystems, ammunition and small arms. ACTIVE 132,200 (Army 93,500 Navy 16,700 Air 22,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,000 Conscript liability 9 to 12 months RESERVE 289,000 (Army 248,900 Navy 6,100 Air 34,000) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 48,500; 45,000 conscripts (total 93,500) FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 2 corps HQ (incl NRDC-GR) 1 armd div HQ 3 mech inf div HQ 1 inf div HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF comd 1 cdo/para bde MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 4 recce bn Armoured 4 armd bde (2 armd bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn) Mechanised 10 mech inf bde (1 armd bn, 2 mech bn, 1 SP arty bn) Light 2 inf regt Air Manoeuvre 1 air mob bde 1 air aslt bde Amphibious 1 mne bde COMBAT SUPPORT 2 MRL bn 3 AD bn (2 with l-Hawk, 1 with Tor Ml) 3 engr regt 2 engr bn 1 EW regt 10 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log corps HQ 1 log div (3 log bde) HELICOPTER 1 hel bde (1 hei regt with (2 atk hel bn), 2 tpt hel bn, 4 hel bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 1,228; 170 Leopard 2A6HEL; 183 Leopard 2A4; 500 Leopard 1A4/5; 375 M48A5 IFV 175; up to 169 BMP-1; 6 Marder 1 A3 APC • APC (T) 2,107; 74 Leonidas Mkl/2; 1,846 M113A1/ A2; 187 M577 (CP) AUV 596 M1117 Guardian; 242 VBL ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 262; 12 Büffel; 43 BPz-2; 94 M88A1; 113 M578 VLB 52; 34 M48/M60 A VLB; 10 Biber; 8 Leopard 1 with Leguan MW Giant Viper ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 556; 195 HMMWV with 9K135 Kornet-E (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); 361 M901 MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); Milan; TOW RCL 687+; 84mm Carl Gustaf; 90mm EM-67; SP 106mm 687 M40A1 ARTILLERY 3,526 SP 599; 155mm 442; 418 M109A1B/A2/A3GEA1/A5; 24 PzH 2000; 175mm 12 M107; 203mm 145 M110A2 TOWED 463; 105mm 233; 214 M101; 19 M-56; 155mm 230 M114 MRL 144; 122mm 108 RM-70; 227mm 36 M270 MLRS MOR 2,320; 81mm 1,700; 107mm 620 M30 (incl 231 SP) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A ATACMS (launched from M270 MLRS) AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 12; 1 Beech 200 King Air (C-12C) 2 Beech 200 King Air (C-12R/AP Huron); 9 Cessna 185 (U-17A/B) HELICOPTERS ATK 28; 19 AH-64A Apache; 9 AH-64D Apache MRH 60 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior TPT 127; Heavy 25; 19 CH-47D Chinook; 6 CH-47SD Chinook; Medium 14 NH90 TTH; Light 88; 74 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 14 Bell 206 (AB-206) Jet Ranger UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 4 Sperwer AIR DEFENCE SAM 155+ Medium-range 42 MIM-23B l-Hawk Short-range 21 9K331 Tor-Mi (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) Point-range 92+; 38 9K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-8B Gecko); 54 ASRAD HMMWV; FIM-92 Stinger GUNS • TOWED 727; 20mm 204 Rh 202; 23mm 523 ZU-23-2 Europe 99 National Guard 38,000 reservists_ Internal security role FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 inf div Air Manoeuvre 1 para regt COMBAT SUPPORT 8 arty bn 4ADbn HELICOPTER 1 hel bn Navy 14,300; 2,400 conscript (total 16,700) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 10: 3 Poseidon (GER Type-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT 1 Poseidon (GER Type-209/1200) (fitted with AIP technology) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM/SUT HWT 2 Glavkos (GER Type-209/1100) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM/SUT HWT 4 Papanikolis (GER Type-214) (fitted with AIP) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM/SUT HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 13 FRIGATES • FFGHM 13: 4 Elli Batch I (ex-NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C/G Harpoon Block 1B/G AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel or 1 S-70B Seahawk hel) 2 Elli Batch II (ex-NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C/G Harpoon Block 1B/G AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 2 76mm gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel or 1 S-70B Seahawk hel) 3 £Wi Batch III (ex-NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C/G Harpoon Block 1B/G AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 lnchr with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) 4 Hydra (GER MEKO 200) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84G Harpoon Block 1G AShM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 2 VLS with RIM-162C ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 5 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1127mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B Seahawk ASW hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 36 PCGM 7 Roussen (Super Vita) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM (of which 2 still fitted with Block 2), 121-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 1 76mm gun PCFG 10: 5 Kavaloudis (FRA La Combattante HIB) with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 2 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT, 2 76mm gun 4 Laskos (FRA La Combattante III) with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 2 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT, 2 76mm gun 1 Votsis (ex-GER Tiger) with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 76mm gun PCF 1 Votsis (ex-GER Tiger) with 1 76mm gun PCO 8: 2 Armatolos (DNK Osprey) with 1 76mm gun 2 Kflsos (DNK Osprey derivative) with 1 76mm gun 4 Machitis with 1 76mm gun PBF 4 AeoZos (ex-US Mk V FPB) PB 6: 3 Andromeda (NOR Nasty); 2 Storno«; 1 To/mi MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3 MHO 3:1 Evropi (ex-UK Hunt); 2 Evniki (ex-US Osprey) AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 5 Chios (capacity 4 LCVP; 300 troops) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform LANDING CRAFT 15 LCU5 LCA7 LCAC 3 Kefallinia (Zubr) with 2 AK630 CIWS (capacity either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T); 230 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 27 ABU 2 AG 5: 3 Atlas I; 2 Pandora AGOR 1 Naftilos AGS 2:1 Stravon; 1 Pytheas AORH1 Prometheus (ITA Etna) with 1 Mk 15 P/iaZanz CIWS AORL 1 Ados (ex-GER Lüneburg) AOT 4 Ouranos AWT 6 Kerkini AXS5 Coastal Defence_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 2 MM40 Exoeet Naval Aviation_ FORCES BY ROLE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 div with S-70B Seahawk; Bell 212 (AB-212) ASW EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 1 combat capable ASW 1 P-3B Orion (4 P-3B Orion in store undergoing modernisation) HELICOPTERS ASW 14: 3 Bell 212 (AB-212) ASW; 11 S-70B Seahawk AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114 Hellfire AShM AGM-119 Penguin Air Force 18,800; 3,000 conscripts (total 21,800) Tactical Air Force_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-4E Phantom II 100 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 3 sqn with F-16CG/DG Block 30/50 Fighting Falcon 2 sqn with F-16CG/DG Block 52+ Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with F-16CG/DG Block 52+ Fighting Falcon; F-16V(C/D) Viper 2 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52+ ADV Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with Mirage 2000-5EG/BG Mk2 1 sqn with Mirage 2000EG/BG; Rafale B/C F-3R AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING 1 sqn with EMB-145H Erieye EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 240 combat capable FGA 240: 34 F-4E Phantom II; 69 F-16CG/DG Block 30/50 Fighting Falcon; 55 F-16CG/DG Block 52+; 28 F-16C/D Block 52+ ADV Fighting Falcon; 2 F-16V(C/D) Viper; 19 Mirage 2000-5EG Mk2; 5 Mirage 2000-5BG Mk2; 16 Mirage 2000EG; 2 Mirage 2000BG; 2 Rafale B F3-R; 8 Rafale C F3-R AEW 4 EMB-145AEW (EMB-145H) Erieye AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES A AM • IR AIM-9L/P Sidewinder; R-550 Magic 2; HR IRIS-T; Mica IR; ARH AIM-120B/C AMRAAM; Mica RF ASM AGM-65A/B/G Maverick LACM SCALP EG AShM AM39 Exocet ARM AGM-88 HARM BOMBS Electro-optical guided: GBU-8B HOBOS Laser-guided: GBU-10/12/16 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway III; GBU-50 Enhanced Paveway II INS/GPS-guided GBU-31JDAM; AGM-154C JSOW Air Defence_ FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 6 sqn/bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2 2 sqn/bty with S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) 12 bty with Skyguard/RIM-7 Sparrow/guns; Crotale NG/ GR; Tor-Mi (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM 81 Long-range 48:36 M901 Patriot PAC-2; 12 S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) Short-range 33:9 Crotale NG/GR; 4 9K331 Tor-Mi (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet); 20 RIM-7M Sparrow with Skygaurd GUNS 59: 20mm some Rh-202; 30mm 35+ Artemis-30; 35mm 24 GDF-005 with Skyguard Air Support Command_ FORCES BY ROLE SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS332C Super Puma (SAR/CSAR) 1 sqn with AW109; Bell 205A (AB-205A) (SAR); Bell 212 (AB-212 - VIP, tpt) TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-27J Spartan 1 sqn with C-130B/H Hercules 1 sqn with EMB-135BJ Legacy; ERJ-135LR; Falcon 7X; Gulfstream V EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT 27: Medium 23:8 C-27J Spartan; 5 C-130B Hercules; 10 C-130H Hercules; Light 2: 1 EMB-135BJ Legacy; 1 ERJ-135LR; PAX 2:1 Falcon 7X (VIP); 1 Gulfstream V HELICOPTERS TPT 31: Medium 12 AS332C Super Puma; Light 19: 12 Bell 205A (AB-205A) (SAR); 4 Bell 212 (AB-212) (VIP, Tpt); 3 AW109 Air Training Command_ FORCES BY ROLE TRAINING 2 sqn with T-2C/E Buckeye 2 sqn with T-6A/B Texan II 1 sqn with P2002JF; T-41D EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TRG 103: 12 P2002JF; 28 T-2C/E Buckeye; 20 T-6A Texan II; 25 T-6B Texan II; 18 T-41D Gendarmerie & Paramilitary_ Coast Guard and Customs 4,000_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 124 PCO 1 Gavdos (Damen 5009) PCC3 PBF 54 PB66 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 2 Cessna 172RG Cutlass; 2 TB-20 Trinidad HELICOPTERS • SAR 3 AS365N3 DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 7 BULGARIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 30; 1 AT pi with M901 CYPRUS: Army 950; 1 mech bde (1 armd bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn); 61 M48A5 MOLF MBT; 80 Leonidas APC; 12 M114 arty; 6 M110A2 arty IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 109; 1 FFGHM MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 2 MEDITERRANEAN SEA: EU • EUNAVFORMED • Operation Irini; 190; 1 FFGHM MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 8 SAUDI ARABIA: Air Force 100; 1 SAM bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 113; 1 inf coy FOREIGN FORCES_ United States US European Command: 400; 1 ELINT fit with 1 EP-3E Aries II; 1 naval base at Makri; 1 naval base at Souda Bay; 1 air base at Iraklion Europe 101 Hungary HUN Hungarian Forint HUF 2021 2022 2023 GDP HUF 55.3tr 62.9tr USD 182bn 185bn per capita USD 18,732 18,983 Growth % 7.1 5.7 Inflation % 5.1 13.9 Def exp [a] HUF 928bn 958bn USD 3.06bn 2.81 bn Def bdgt [b] HUF 794bn 1.02tr 1.58tr USD 2.62bn 2.99bn USD1=HUF 303.14 340.84 [a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2.58 2008--- --2015 0.98 2022 Population 9,699,577 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 7.4% 2.7% 2.7% 3.0% 23.6% 8.3% Female 7.0% 2.5% 2.5% 2.9% 24.2% 13.2% Capabilities Hungary published a new National Security Strategy in April 2020 and a new National Military Strategy in June 2021 .The strategy documents speak of a deteriorating security environment, marked by great-power competition and an increasing military component. The security strategy also characterises mass migration as a key concern for Hungary. Hungary is implementing the Zrinyi 2026 national-defence and armed-forces modernisation plan. Second editions of the doctrines on SOF, CBRN and CIMIC were published in 2021. A new Cyber- and Information Operations Centre was established in January 2022, and a Military Cyberspace Operations Doctrine was published in 2022. A doctrine for NEO operations is expected in 2023. Hungary coordinates policy with other member states of the Visegrád Group, including on defence, and hosts the NATO Centre of Excellence for Military Medicine. The armed forces participate in international crisis-management missions, notably in the Balkans and Iraq, but have very limited organic capacity to deploy forces beyond national borders. Announced equipment-modernisation priorities focus on individual-soldier equipment and fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. While the air-force-related elements of Zrinyi 2026 had been a focus of attention, and current air procurements include transport and trainer aircraft, at the end of 2018 the ministry also initiated land procurements, including for main battle tanks (Leopard 2A7), Lynx IFVs and PzH2000 self-propelled artillery. PzH 2000 deliveries began in mid-2022. Hungary's defence-industrial base is limited, though the defence ministry has set up an inter-ministerial working group to boost domestic capacity in the small-arms sector. In 2020, a new defence procurement agency, reporting to the national armaments director, began its work and is intended to coordinate defence and security acquisitions. ACTIVE 32,150 (Army 10,450 Air 5,750 Joint 15,950) RESERVE 20,000 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE_ Hungary's armed forces have reorganised into a joint force Land Component 10,450 (incl riverine element) FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde (4 spec ops bn) MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 ISR regt Mechanised 1 (5th) mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 1 (25th) mech inf bde (1 tk bn; 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, lATbn, Hog bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr regt 1 EOD/rvn regt 1 CBRN bn 1 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 56:12 Leopard 2A4HU; 44 T-72M1 IFV 121:120 BTR-80A/AM; 1 KF41 Lynx (in test) APC 322 APC (W) 260 BTR-80 PPV 62: 50 Ejder Yalcin 4x4 (Gidran); 12 MaxxPro Plus ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 5 BAT-2 ARV 9:1 BPz-3 Buffel; 8 VT-55A VLB 8 BLG-60; MTU; TMM NBC VEHICLES 14 BTR-80M-NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111- 1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) ARTILLERY 33 SP 155mm 2 PzH 2000 TOWED 152mm 31D-20 MOR 82mm PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 4 MINE COUNTERMEASURES • MSR 3 Nestin 102 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Air Component 5,750_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Gripen C/D TRANSPORT 1 sqn with A319; Falcon 7X TRAINING 1 sqn with Z-143LSi; Z-242L; AS350 Ecureuil ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24V/P Hind E/F TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with H145M AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM regt (9 bty with Mistral; 3 bty with 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful)) 1 radar regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable EGA 14:12 Gripen C; 2 Gripen D TPT • PAX 4: 2 A319; 2 Falcon 7X TRG 8: 2 Z-143LSi; 6 Z-242L HELICOPTERS ATK 8: 6 Mi-24V Hmd E; 2 Mi-24P Hind F MRH 20 H145M (ind 2 SAR) TPT • Light 2 AS350 Ecureuil AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 16 2K12 Km/3 (RS-SA-6 Gainful); Mistral AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65 Maverick; 3M11 Falanga (RS-AT-2 Swatter); 9K114 Shturm-N (RS-AT-6 Spiral) BOMBS • Laser-guided Paveway II DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • Operation Althea 192; 1 inf coy CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 13 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 133; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 3 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 16 LITHUANA: NATO • Baltic Air Polidng; 80; 4 Gripen C MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 20 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 469; 1 inf coy (KTM) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 6 FOREIGN FORCES_ Croatia NATO Enhanced Vigliance Activities: 60 United States NATO Enhanced Vigliance Activities: 150; 1 armd inf coy Iceland ISL Icelandic Krona ISK 2021 2022 GDP ISK 3.25tr 3.68tr USD 25.6bn 27.7bn per capita USD 69,422 73,981 Growth % 4.4 5.1 Inflation % 4.5 8.4 Sy Bdgt [a] ISK 5.53bn 5.56bn USD 43.5 m 41.8m USD1=ISK 126.99 133.02 [a] Coast Guard budget Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008-- ---2015--- ---2022 Population 357,603 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 10.3% 3.2% 3.2% 3.5% 22.3% 7.7% Female 9.9% 3.1% 3.2% 3.4% 21.9% 8.5% Capabilities_ Iceland is a NATO member but maintains only a coastguard service. In 2016, the country established a National Security Council to implement and monitor security policy. The Coast Guard controls the NATO Iceland Air Defence System, as well as a NATO Control and Reporting Centre that feeds into NATO air- and missile defence and air-operations centres. Increased Russian air and naval activities in the Atlantic and close to NATO airspace have led to complaints from Iceland. Iceland considers its bilateral defence agreement with the US as an important pillar of its security policy and also participates in the security-policy dialogue of NORDEFCO. Iceland joined the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force in 2021. Iceland hosts NATO and regional partners for exercises, transits and naval task groups, as well as a NATO Icelandic Air Policing mission. Despite there being no standing armed forces, Iceland makes financial contributions and on occasion deploys civilian personnel to NATO missions. Iceland hosts US Navy P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, in a rotational deployment based at Keflavik air base. ACTIVE NIL Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 250 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Gendarmerie & Paramilitary_ Iceland Coast Guard 250_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 2 PSO 2:1 Freyja; 1 Thor LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 Baldur AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 DHC-8-300 (MP) HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 3 H225 (leased) FOREIGN FORCES_ Icelandic Air Policing: Aircraft and personnel from various NATO members on a rotating basis United States 100; 2 P-8A Poseidon Europe 103 Ireland IRL Euro EUR 2021 2022 GDP EUR 426bn 492bn USD 505bn 520bn per capita USD 100,129 102,217 Growth % 13.6 9.0 Inflation % 2.4 8.4 Def bdgt [a] EUR 1.07bn 1.1 Ibn USD 1.27bn 1.17bn USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 [a] Indudes military pensions and capital expenditure Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- ---2022 Population 5,275,004 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 10.6% 3.2% 3.0% 2.9% 23.5% 6.6% Female 10.1% 3.1% 3.0% 2.9% 23.3% 7.7% Capabilities_ The armed forces' core mission is defending the state against armed aggression. A 2015 White Paper broadened the scope of the national-security risk assessment beyond military and paramilitary threats, noting inter- and intra-state conflict, cyber-attacks, terrorism, emergencies and natural disasters, among others. A White Paper update was issued in 2019 and Ireland's next strategy document is intended be a Strategic Defence Review. Ireland is active in EU defence cooperation and continues to contribute to multinational operations. A Commission on the Defence Forces report, published in February 2022, looked to address immediate requirements and set a longer-term vision beyond 2030. In July, the government decided to move to'Level of Ambition 2', as set out in the Commission's capability framework. This will build on 'current capability to address specific priority gaps in [Ireland's] ability to deal with an assault on Irish sovereignty and to serve in higher intensity Peace Support Operations.' Spending will rise and personnel numbers are to increase by 2,000 above the current establishment. A High Level Action Plan detailed government responses to recommendations in the Commission report and an implementation report was expected by end-2022. The Commission recommended the creation of a Chief of Defence post and that the air corps and naval service become services on a level with the army. Early actions for late 2022 include planning for military radar capabilities, including primary radar and the establishment of an Office of Reserve Affairs intended to develop a regeneration plan for the Reserve Defence Force. A 2020-24 Equipment Development Plan indicated priorities including a mid-life upgrade for Piranha armoured personnel carriers and the two fto/s/n-class offshore patrol ships. Other stated priorities include the procurement of two C295 maritime patrol aircraft and upgrades to the 84mm anti-tank system. In 2023, the country will receive two ex-New Zealand coastal patrol craft to replace decommissioned vessels. Ireland has a small, specialist defence industry focused on areas including drivetrain technologies for land systems. ACTIVE 8,200 (Army 6,750 Navy 750 Air 700) RESERVE 1,600 (Army 1,450 Navy 150) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 6,750_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 ranger coy MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd recce sqn Mechanised 1 mech inf coy Light 1 inf bde (1 cav recce sqn, 4 inf bn, 1 arty regt (3 fd arty bty, 1 AD bty), 1 fd engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, 1 tpt coy) 1 inf bde (1 cav recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty regt (3 fd arty bty, 1 AD bty), 1 fd engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, 1 tpt coy) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 6 Piranha IIIH 30mm APC 101 APC (W) 74: 56 Piranha III; 18 Piranha IIIH PPV 27 RG-32M ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTURCTURE MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 131 TOWED • 105mm 23: 17 L118 Light Gun; 6 L119 Light Gun MOR 108: 81mm 84 Brandt; 120mm 24 Ruag M87 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence RBS-70 Reserves 1,400 reservists_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 (integrated) armd recce sqn 2 (integrated) cav sqn Mechanised 1 (integrated) mech inf coy Light 14 (integrated) inf coy COMBAT SUPPORT 4 (integrated) arty bty 2 engr gp 2 MP coy 3 sigs coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2 med det 2 tpt coy Naval Service 750_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6 PSO 6: 2 Roisin (of which 1 in refit) with 1 76mm gun; 4 Samuel Beckett with 1 76mm gun LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AXS 2 104 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Air Corps 700_ 2 ops wg; 2 spt wg; 1 trg wg; 1 comms and info sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT MP 2 CN235 MPA TPT • Light 5:1 Learjet 45 (VIP); 4 PC-12NG TRG 8 PC-9M HELICOPTERS: MRH 6 AW139 TPT • Light 2 H135 (ind trg/medevac) DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 5 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 338; 1 mech inf bn(-) MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 20; UN • MINUMSA 12 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 12 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 13 SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 130; 1 inf coy Italy ITA Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023 GDP EUR 1.78tr 1.89tr USD 2.1 Otr 2.00tr per capita USD 35,473 33,740 Growth % 6.6 3.2 Inflation % 1.9 8.7 Def exp [a] EUR 28.0bn 28.8bn USD 33.2bn 30.4bn Def bdgt [b] EUR 28.3bn 29.4bn 27.9bn USD 33.5bn 31.1bn USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 [a] NATO figure [b] Indudes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015-- 2022 Population 61,095,551 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 6.3% 2.4% 2.4% 2.6% 24.4% 10.1% Female 6.0% 2.4% 2.4% 2.6% 25.4% 12.9% Capabilities_ Italy is concerned by security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic environment, as well as from Europe's southern flank. A defence White Paper was issued in 2015. The latest three-year defence plan for 2022-24 outlined modernisation goals. Command structure reforms are intended to improve cross-domain command and control. In July 2021, Italy issued its first directive for defence industrial policy. Italy has taken part in NATO's air-policing missions in the Baltic states, Iceland and Romania and since early 2017 has deployed to Latvia as part of the Enhanced Forward Presence. The EUNAVFOR-MED force is headquartered in Rome, while the US Navy 6th Fleet is based in Naples. The country takes part in and hosts NATO and other multinational exercises, continues to support NATO, EU and UN operations abroad and is planning to increasingly focus on Europe's southern flank. Force mobility is enabled by a fleet of medium transport aircraft and tankers, and there are plans to procure fixed-wing aircraft to support special forces. The White Paper and the latest multi-year planning document detailed upgrades to main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles as well as the procurement of armoured fighting vehicles to replace the Dardo and the M113s. The expected retirement of much of the naval fleet has triggered a long-term replacement plan which includes the acquisition of two attack submarines and two next-generation destroyers to replace the ageing Luigi Durand de la Penne-class vessels as well as eight new offshore patrol vessels. F-35As have been ordered for the air force and F-35Bs for both the air force and naval aviation, some of which have been already delivered. Italy signed a MoU with UK and Sweden relating to the development of the UK-led Tempest programme and in 2022 increased the funds allocated for the project. Italy takes part in European defence-industrial cooperation activities, including PESCO projects, and has an advanced defence industry capable of producing equipment across all domains. There are particular strengths in shipbuilding and in aircraft and helicopter manufacturing. The country hosts Europe's F-35 final assembly and checkout facility at Cameri. ACTIVE 161,050 (Army 93,100 Navy 28,700 Air 39,250) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 176,100 RESERVES 17,900 (Army 13,400 Navy 4,500) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 8 COMMUNICATIONS 3:1 Athena-Fidus (also used by FRA); 2 Sicral ISR 7:4 Cosmo (Skymed); 2 Cosmo SG; 1 OPTSAT-3000 Army 93,100_ Regt are bn sized FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 (NRDC-ITA) corps HQ (1 spt bde, 1 sigs regt, 1 spt regt) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (Vittorio Veneto) div (1 (Ariete) armd bde (1 cav regt, 2 tk regt, 1 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Pozzuolo del Friuli) amph bde (1 cav regt, 1 amph regt, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Folgore) AB bde (1 cav regt, 3 para regt, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Friuli) air mob bde (1 air mob regt, 2 atk hel regt)) 1 (Acqui) div (1 (Pinerolo) mech bde (1 cav regt, 3 armd inf regt, 1 fd arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Grana-tieri) mech bde (1 cav regt, 2 mech inf regt); 1 (Garibaldi Bersaglieri) mech bde (1 cav regt, 1 tk regt, 2 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Aosta) mech bde (1 cav regt, 1 armd inf regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 fd arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Sassari) It Europe 105 mech bde (1 armd inf regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt)) Mountain 1 (Tridentina) mtn div (2 mtn bde (1 cav regt, 3 mtn inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 mtn cbt engr regt, 1 spt bn, 1 log regt)) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty comd (1 arty regt, 1 MRL regt, 1 NBC regt) 1 AD comd (3 SAM regt) 1 engr comd (2 engr regt, 1 ptn br regt) 1 EW/sigs comd (1 EW/ISR bde (1 CIMIC regt, 1 EW regt, 1 int regt, 1 STA regt); 1 sigs bde with (7 sigs regt)) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log comd (3 log regt, 4 med unit) HELICOPTER 1 hei bde (3 hei regt) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 150:149 CI Ariete; 1 CI Ariete AUV (in test) ASLT 262: 255 Bl Centauro; 7 Centauw II IFV 434:165 VCC-80 Dardo; 269 VBM 8x8 Freccia (incl 20 CP and 44 with Spike-LR) APC 380 APC (T) 148 Bv-206S APC (W) 199 Puma 6x6 PPV 33 VTMM Orso (incl 16 amb) AUV 1,842: 10 Cougar; 1,798 IVECO LMV (incl 82 amb); 34 IVECO LMV 2 AAV 15:14 AAVP-7; 1 AAVC-7 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 25 Dachs; M113 ARV 70: 69 BPz-2; 1 AAVR-7 VLB 30 Biber MW 34: 6 Buffalo; 3 Miniflail; 25 VTMM Orso NBC VEHICLES 14: 5 VBR NBC; 9 VBR NBC Plus ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike ARTILLERY 769 SP 155mm 67 PzH 2000 TOWED 173:105mm 25 Oto Melara Mod 56; 155mm 148 FH-70 MRL 227mm 21 M270 MLRS MOR 508: 81mm 283 Expal; 120mm 204: 62 Brandt; 142 RT-61 (RT-F1) SP 120mm 21 VBM 8x8 Freccia AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 3 Do-228 (ACTL-1); 3 P.180 Avanti HELICOPTERS ATK 35 AW129CBT Mangusta MRH 14 Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey TPT 144: Heavy 16 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 56 NH90 TTH (UH-90A); Light 72: 2 AW169LUH (UH-169B); 29 Bell 205 (AB-205); 28 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206); 13 Bell 212 (AB-212) AIR DEFENCE SAM 20+ Long-range 20 SAMP/T Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM Spike-ER Navy 28,700_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 8: 4 Pelosi (imp Sauro, 3rd and 4th series) with 6 single 533mm TT with A184 mod 3 HWT 4 Salvátore Todaro (Type-212A) (fitted with AIP) with 6 single 533mm TT with Black Shark HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 18 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVS 2: 1 Cavour with 4 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 76mm guns (capacity mixed air group of 20 AV-8B Harrier II; F-35B Lightning II; AW101 Merlin; NH90; Bell 212) 1 G. Garibaldi with 2 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT (capacity mixed air group of 18 AV-8B Harrier II; AW101 Merlin; NH90; Bell 212) DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4: 2 Andrea Doria with 2 quad lnchr with Otomat (Teseo) Mk2A AShM, 6 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15/Aster 30 SAM, 2 single 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 3 76mm guns (capacity 1AW101 Merlini NH90 hel) 2 Luigi Durand de la Penne (ex-Animoso) with 2 quad lnchr with Otomat (Teseo) Mk2A AShM/Milas A/S msl, 1 Mk 13 mod 4 GMLS with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm B-515 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1127mm gun, 3 76mm guns (capacity 1 NH90 or 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) FRIGATES 12 FFGHM 10: 4 Bergamini (GP) with 2 quad lnchr with Otomat (Teseo) Mk2A AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15/'Aster 30 SAM, 2 triple 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 AW101/NH90 hel) 4 Bergamini (ASW) with 2 twin lnchr with Otomat (Teseo) Mk2A AShM, 2 twin lnchr with MILAS A/S msl, 2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 151 Aster 30 SAM, 2 triple 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 2 76mm gun (capacity 2 AW101/NH90 hel) 2 Maestrale with 4 single lnchr with Otomat (Teseo) Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 or 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) FFH 2 Paolo Thaon di Revel (Pattugliatori Polivalenti dAltura (PPA)) with 1 127mm gun, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 NH90 or 1 AW101) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16 PSOH 10: 4 Cassiopea with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel 4 Comandante CigalaFuligosi with 176mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/NH90 hel) 2 Sirio (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) or NH90 hel) PB 6: 2 Angelo Cabrini; 4 Esploratore MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10 MHO 10: 8 Gaeta; 2 Lerici 106 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 3: 2 San Giorgio (capacity 3-4 AW101/NH90/Bell 212; 3 LCM; 2 LCVP; 30 trucks; 36 APC (T); 350 troops) 1 San Giusto with 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 AW101 Mer/i>i/NH90/Bell 212; 3 LCM; 2 LCVP; 30 trucks; 36 APC (T); 350 troops) LANDING CRAFT 24:15 LCVP; 9 LCM LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 53 ABU 5 Ponza AFD9 AGE 3:1 Leonardo (coastal); 1 Raffaele Rosseti; 1 Vincenzo Martellota AGI1 Pleura AGOR 1 Alliance AGS 3:1 Ammiraglio Magnaghi with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Aretusa (coastal) AKSL 6 Gorgona AORH 2:1 ££«a with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1AW101/ NH90/Bell 212 hel); 1 Vw/cano (capacity 2 AW101/NH90/ Bell 212) AORL 1 Stromboli with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1AW101/ NH90 hel) AOT 4 Panarea ARSH 1 ylrireo (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) ATS 6 Ciclope AWT 3:1 Bormida; 2 Simeto AXS 8:1 Amerigo Vespucci; 5 Caroly; 1 ířoíia; 1 Palinuro Naval Aviation 2,000_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II; TAV-8B Harner II ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE/TRANSPORT 5 sqn with AW101ASW Merlin; Bell 212 ASW (AB-212AS); Bell 212 (AB-212); NH90 NFH MARITIME PATROL 1 fit with P-180 AIRBORNE EARLY WANRING & CONTROL 1 fit with AW101 AEW Merlin EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable FGA 13: 9 AV-8B Harrier II; 1 TAV-8B Harrier II; 3 F-35B Lightning II MP3P.180Aoti£i HELICOPTERS ASW 56: 8 AW101 ASW Merlin; 7 Bell 212 ASW; 41 NH90 NFH (SH-90) AEW 4 AW101 AEW Merlin TPT 22: Medium 20:10 AW101 Merlin; 10 NH90 MITT (MH-90); Light 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES A AM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM ASM AGM-65 Maverick AShMM?rfeMk2/S Marines 3,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne regt (1 recce coy, 2 mne bn, 1 log bn) 1 (boarding) mne regt (2 mne bn) 1 landing craft gp Other 1 sy regt (3 sy bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AAV 17:15 AAVP-7; 2 AAVC-7 AUV 70 IVECO LMV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 1AAVR-7 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL« MANPATS Spike ARTILLERY MOR 22: 81mm 16 Expal; 120mm 6 RT-61 (RT-F1) AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger Air Force 39,250_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 4 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 (SEAD/EW) sqn with Tornado ECR 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II; Tornado IDS 1 sqn with F-35A/B Lightning II FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR 1 sqn with AMX Ghibli MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn (opcon Navy) with ATR-72MP (P-72A) TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with KC-767A COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with AB-212 ICO; AW101 SAR (HH-101A) SEARCH & RESCUE 1 wg with AW139 (HH-139A); Bell 212 (HH-212) TRANSPORT 2 (VIP) sqn with A319CJ; AW139 (VH-139A); Falcon 50; Falcon 900 Easy; Falcon 900EX 2 sqn with C-130J/C-130J-30/KC-130J Hercules 1 sqn with C-27J Spartan 1 (calibration) sqn with P-l80 AvantilGxúistream G550 CAEW TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon 1 sqn with MB-339PAN (aerobatic team) 1 sqn with MD-500D/E (NH-500D/E) 1 OCU sqn with Tornado 1 OCU sqn with AMX-T Ghibli 1 sqn with MB-339A 1 sqn with M-346 1 sqn with SF-260EA; 3 P2006T (T-2006A) 1 sqn with AW101 SAR (HH-101A); Bell 212 (HH-212) ISR UAV 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; RQ-1B Predator AIR DEFENCE 2 bfy with Spada EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 231 combat capable FTR 94 Eurofighter Typhoon FGA 60: 31AMX GHbli; 8 AMX-T Ghibli; 17 F-35A Lightning II; 4 F-35B Lightning II ATK 34 Tornado IDS ATK/EW15 Tornado ECR* MP 4 ATR-72MP (P-72A) SIGINT 1 Beech 350 King Air AEW&C 3 Gulfstream G550 CAEW TKR/TPT 4 KC-767A TPT 78: Medium 33: 11 C-130J Hercules (5+ KC-130J tanker pods); 10 C-130J-30 Hercules; 12 C-27J Spartan; Light 37: 17 P-180 Avanti; 20 S-208 (liaison); PAX 8: 3 A319CJ; 2 Falcon 50 (VIP); 2 Falcon 900 Easy; 1 Falcon 900EX (VIP) TRG 115: 21 MB-339A; 28 MB-339CD*; 16 MB-339PAN (aerobatics); 2+ M-345; 22 M-346; 26 SF-260EA HELICOPTERS MRH 54: 13 AW139 (HH-139A/VH-139A); 2 MD-500D (NH-500D); 39 MD-500E (NH-500E) CSAR 12 AW101 (HH-101A) SAR 17 AW139 (HH-139B) TPT • Light 14 Bell 212 (HH-212)/AB-212 ICO UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 12 CISR • Heavy 6 MQ-9A Reaper (unarmed) ISR • Heavy 6 RQ-1B Predator AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Short-range SPADA AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; HR IRIS-T; ARH AIM- 120C AMRAAM; Meteor ARM AGM-88 HARM LACM SCALP EGlStorm Shadow BOMBS Laser-guided Lizard 2 Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II; GBU-54 Laser ID AM INS/GPS-guided GBU-31/-32/-38 JDAM; GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb Joint Special Forces Command (COFS)_ Army_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt (9th Assalto paracadutisti) 1 STA regt 1 ranger regt (4th Alpini paracadutisti) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 psyops regt TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 spec ops hel regt Navy (COMSUBIN)_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1SF gp(GOI) 1 diving gp (GOS) Europe 107 Air Force_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 wg (sqn) (17th Stormo Incursori) Paramilitary_ Carabinieri_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops gp (GIS) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 176,100_ Carabinieri 108,000_ The Carabinieri are organisationally under the MoD. They are a separate service in the Italian Armed Forces as well as a police force with judicial competence Mobile and Specialised Branch_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 (mobile) paramilitary div (1 bde (1st) with (1 horsed cav regt, 11 mobile bn); 1 bde (2nd) with (1 (1st) AB regt, 2 (7th & 13th) mobile regt)) HELICOPTER 1 hel gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (T) 3 VCC-2 AUV 30 IVECO LMV PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 66 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light: 2 P.180 Avanti HELICOPTERS MRH 15 Bell 412 (AB-412) TPT • Light 31:19 AW109; 2 AW109E; 2 AW139; 8 MD-500D (NH-500D) Customs 68,100_ (Servizio Navale Guardia Di Finanza) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 166 PCO 2 Monti (Damen Stan Patrol 5509) PCF 1 Antonio Zara PBF 140:19 Bigliani; 5 Corrubia; 9 Mazzei; 79 V-2000; 12 V-5000; 6 V-6000; 10 V-7000 PB 23 Buratti LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 Giorgio CM AIRCRAFT MP 8:4 ATR-42-500MP; 4 ATR-72-600 (P-72B) TPT • Light 2 P.180 Avanti HELICOPTERS TPT • Light 53: 10 AW109N; 17 AW139; 6 AW169M; 8 Bell 412HP Twin Huey; 4 MD-500MC (NH-500MC); 8 MD-500MD (NH-500MD) 108 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 346; 1 inf bn HQ; 1 inf coy; 1ISR coy BULGARIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 750; 1 mech inf BG with Centauro Bl; VBM Freccia8x8; PzH 2000 DJIBOUTI: 92 EGYPT: MFO 75; 3 PB GULF OF ADEN & INDIAN OCEAN: EU • Operation Atalanta 150; 1 FFGHM GULF OF GUINEA: Navy 190; 1 FFGHM INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 2 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 712; 1 inf regt; 1 trg unit; 1 hel sqn with 3 NH90; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 610 KUWAIT: Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 417; 4 Eurofighter Typhoon; 2 MQ-9A Reaper; 1 C-27J Spartan; 1 KC-767A; 1 SAM bfy with SAMP/T LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence (Baltic Guardian) 250; 1 armd inf coy with CI Ariete; Centauro Bl; VCC-80 Dardo LEBANON: MIBIL 22; UN • UNIFIL 868; 1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 hel sqn LIBYA: MIASIT 160; 1 inf coy; 1 CRBN unit; 1 trg unit MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 9; UN • MINUSMA 2 MEDITERRANEAN SEA: EU • EUNAVFOR MED: 70; 1 PSOH; NATO • SNMG 2: 170; 1 FFGHM; NATO • SNMCMG 2: 50; 1 MHO MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 15 NIGER: MISIN 220; 1 inf coy; 1 engr unit; 1 CRBN unit; 1 med coy; 1 trg unit; 1 ISR unit PERSIAN GULF: EMASOH 150; 1 FFGHM POLAND: NATO • Baltic Air Policing: 135; 4 Eurofighter Typhoon SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 715; 1 arty regt BG HQ; 1 Carabinieri unit SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 150 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2 FOREIGN FORCES_ United States US European Command: 13,050 Army 4,250; 1 AB bde(-) Navy 3,600; 1 HQ (US Naval Forces Europe-Africa (NAVEUR-NAVAF)/6th Fleet) at Naples; 1 ASW Sqn with 5 P-8A Poseidon at Sigonella USAF 4,800; 1 FGA wg with (2 FGA sqn with 21 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon at Aviano; 1 CSAR sqn with 8 HH-60G Pave Hawk); 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper at Sigonella; 1 ISR UAV fit with RQ-4B Global Hawk at Sigonella USMC 400; 1 tpt sqn with 6 MV-22B Osprey; 2 KC-130J Hercules Latvia LVA Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023 GDP EUR 32.9bn 38.4bn USD 38.9bn 40.6bn per capita USD 20,546 21,482 Growth % 4.5 2.5 Inflation % 3.2 16.5 Def exp [a] EUR 696m 806m USD 824m 852m Def bdgt [b] EUR 696m 806m 878m USD 824m 852m FMA (US) USD 10.0m 8.8m 9.8m USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 [a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008 ---2015--- ---2022 Population 1,842,226 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 7.8% 2.6% 2.3% 2.6% 24.0% 7.2% Female 7.3% 2.4% 2.1% 2.4% 25.3% 14.1% Capabilities_ Latvia has small armed forces focused on maintaining national sovereignty and territorial integrity and the country depends on NATO membership as a security guarantor. Russia is Latvia's overriding security concern. In the wake of the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Latvia boosted defence spending and transferred military equipment to Ukraine. A national service law was approved in September 2022 and will take effect in January 2023. Two intakes are planned annually. Males between 18-27 will be obliged to serve, with females serving voluntarily. Posts will be filled by volunteers but from late 2023 any unfilled quota will be filled com-pulsorily. Service will last for 11 months.The September 2020 State Defence Concept highlighted challenges including from new technologies and low military spending in Europe, and the resulting effect on capabilities and crisis response. It emphasised societal resilience and comprehensive defence as well as the significance of a NATO presence in the region. The NATO battlegroup based in Latvia, present since 2017 as part of the Alliance's Enhanced Forward Presence, was bolstered in 2022. Latvia is also a member of the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force. There is no capacity to independently deploy and sustain forces beyond national boundaries, although the armed forces have taken part in NATO and EU missions. Improvements are being made to logistics and procurement systems. A National Cyber Security Center is planned to be established in January 2023 under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence. Capability-development plans include medium-range air defence (jointly with Estonia), rocket artillery and coastal defence. Acquisition requirements include air, land and naval systems, transport assets and ammunition. Latvia has only a niche defence-industrial capability, with cyber security a focus. Europe 109 ACTIVE 6,600 (Army 1,800 Navy 500 Air 500 Joint Staff 2,300 National Guard 1,200 Other 300) RESERVE 15,500 (National Guard 10,000 Other 5,500) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Joint 2,300_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit COMBAT SUPPORT IMPbn Army 1,800_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech inf bde (2 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt spt bn (1 recce coy, 1 engr coy, 1 AD coy), 1 CSS bn HQ) National Guard 1,200; 10,000 part-time (11,200 total)_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit MANOEUVRE Light 1 (2nd) inf bde (4 inf bn; 1 engr bn) 3 (1st, 3rd & 4th) inf bde (3 inf bn; 1 sy bn; 1 spt bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cyber unit 1 NBC coy 1 psyops pi EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 3 T-55 (trg) RECCE 170 FV107 Scimitar (incl variants) APC • APC(W) 8 Patria 6x6 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MANPATS Spike-LR RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf, 90mm Pvpj 1110 ARTILLERY 112 SP 155mm 59 M109A5ÖE TOWED 100mm (23 K-53 in store) MOR 53: 81mm 28 L16; 120mm 25 M120 Navy 500 (incl Coast Guard)_ Naval Forces Flotilla separated into an MCM squadron and a patrol-boat squadron. LVA, EST and LTU have set up a joint naval unit, BALTRON, with bases at Liepaja, Riga, Ventspils (LVA), Tallinn (EST), Klaipeda (LTU). Each nation contributes 1-2 MCMVs EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 PB 5 Skrunda (GER Swath) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 MCCS 1 Vidar (ex-NOR) MHO 3 Imanta (ex-NLD Alkmaar/Tripartite) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1 AXL 1 Varonis (comd and spt ship, ex-NLD) Coast Guard_ Under command of the Latvian Naval Forces EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6 PB 6:1 Astra; 5 KBV 236 (ex-SWE) Air Force 500_ Main tasks are airspace control and defence, maritime and land SAR and air transportation FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 (mixed) tpt sqn with An-2 Colt; Mi-17 Hip H AIR DEFENCE 1 ADbn 1 radar sqn (radar/air ctrl) AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4 An-2 Colt HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 Mi-17 Hip H AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; RBS-70 GUNS • TOWED 40mm 24 L/70 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary_ State Border Guard_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3 PB 3:1 Valpas (ex-FIN); 1 Lokki (ex-FIN); 1 Randa HELICOPTERS TPT • Light 6: 2 AW109E Power; 2 AW119Kx; 2 Bell 206B (AB-206B) Jet Ranger II DEPLOYMENT_ IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 1; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 1 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 5; UN • MINUSMA 1 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 1 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 136; 1 inf coy FOREIGN FORCES_ All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence/Enhanced Vigilance Activities unless stated Albania 21; 1 EOD pi Canada 639; 1 mech inf bn HQ; 1 mech inf coy(+); 1 cbt spt coy; 1 spt coy; Czech Republic 81; 1 mor pi Denmark 803; 1 mech inf bn Italy 250; 1 armd inf coy Macedonia, North 9 Montenegro 11 Poland 177; 1 tk coy Slovakia 152; 1 arty bty Slovenia 42 Spain 504; 1 armd inf coy(+); 1 arty bty; 1 cbt engr coy; 1 SAM bty United States US European Command: 800; 1 AB bn 110 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Lithuania LTU Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023 GDP EUR 55.4bn 64.4bn USD 65.5bn 68.0bn per capita USD 23,386 24,032 Growth % 5.0 1.8 Inflation % 4.6 17.6 Def exp [a] EUR 1.1 Ibn 1.50bn USD 1.31 bn 1.58bn Def bdgt [b] EUR I.IObn 1.50bn 1.91bn USD 1.31 bn 1.58bn FMA (US) USD 10.0m 8.8m 9.8m USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 [a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008 2015 ---2022 Population 2,683,546 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 7.9% 2.5% 2.7% 3.0% 23.0% 7.2% Female 7.5% 2.3% 2.5% 2.7% 24.9% 13.9% Capabilities_ Lithuania's armed forces are focused on maintaining sovereignty and territorial integrity but the country relies on NATO membership for its security. Like the other Baltic states, it is reliant on NATO's air-policing deployment for a combat-aircraft capacity. A new National Security Strategy was adopted in December 2021, which reflected the worsening regional security environment. Russia is the country's predominant security concern, with this focus sharpened by Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The authorities signalled an increase in defence spending. Lithuania has transferred to Ukraine some military equipment and has also repaired combat-damaged equipment. The authorities are looking to improve readiness and the mobilisation system is being reformed. In mid-2022 the government raised the upper limit for conscript numbers. The numbers of reservists called to annual exercises is also to increase. Lithuania has a limited medium-airlift capability for use in supporting its forces on multinational deployed operations. It takes an active part in NATO and EU operations. Improvements to defence infrastructure are planned, alongside plans to bolster air surveillance and anti-tank capabilities. Lithuania signalled its intention in 2022 to join the European Sky Shield initiative, to boost air defence capacity. Vilnius is also looking to acquire new rocket artillery capabilities, in common with other Baltic states, and acquire additional self-propelled artillery as well as loitering munitions. The NATO battlegroup based in Lithuania, present since 2017 as part of the Alliance's Enhanced Forward Presence, was bolstered in 2022. Siauliai air base hosts a NATO Air Policing detachment. Lithuania is a member of the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force. A Regional Cyber Defence Centre was set up in 2021 and a cyber range was opened in 2022, both coming under the National Cyber Security Centre, itself under the defence ministry. Lithuania has a small defence-industrial base, with niche capabilities, for instance in helicopter support and maintenance and repair. ACTIVE 23,000 (Army 14,500 Navy 700 Air 1,500 Other 6,300) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,150 Conscript liability 9 months, 18-23 years RESERVE 7,100 (Army 7,100) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 8,850; 5,650 active reserves (total 14,500) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (1st) mech bde (4 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn) Light 1 (2nd) mot inf bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 trg regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 30 Boxer (Vote) (incl 2 trg) APC • APC (T) 236: 214 M113A1; 22 M577 (CP) AUV £100 JLTV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 8 MT-LB AEV ARV 6: 2 BPz-2; 4 Ml 13 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 10 M1025A2 HMMWV with FGM-148 Javelin MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 118 SP 16 PzH 2000 TOWED 105mm 18 M101 MOR 84: 120mm 42: 20 2B11; 22 M/41D; SP 120mm 42 M113 with Tampella AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence GROM Reserves_ National Defence Voluntary Forces 5,650 active reservists FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 6 (territorial) def unit Navy 700_ LVA, EST and LTU established a joint naval unit, BALTRON, with bases at Liepaja, Riga, Ventpils (LVA), Tallinn (EST), Klaipeda (LTU) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 PCC 4 Zemaitis (ex-DNK Flyvefisken) with 1 76mm gun MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 MHC 2 Skalvis (ex-UK Hunt) MCCS 1 Jotvingis (ex-NOR Video) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AAR 1 Sakiai Europe 111 Air Force 1,500 FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 1 ADbn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT 6: Medium 3 C-27J Spartan; Light 3:1 Cessna 172RG; 2 L-410 Turbolet HELICOPTERS MRH 3 AS365M3 Dauphin (SAR) TPT • Medium 3 Mi-8 Hip (tpt/SAR) AIR DEFENCE • SAM 4+ Short-range 4 NASAMS III Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; RBS-70 FOREIGN FORCES Special Operation Force FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF gp (1 CT unit; 1 laeger bn, 1 cbt diver unit) Logistics Support Command 1,400 FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn Training and Doctrine Command 1,500 FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 trg regt Other Units 2,600_ FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT IMPbn Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,150 Riflemen Union 10,600 State Border Guard Service 3,550_ Ministry of Interior EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 3: 1 Lokki (ex-FIN); 1 KBV 041 (ex-SWE); 1 Bakauskas (Baltic Patrol 2700) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 2 Christina (Griffon 2000) HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 5: 1 BK-117 (SAR); 2 H120 Colibri; 2 H135 DEPLOYMENT_ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 1 IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 34 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 2; UN • MINUSMA 45 MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 2 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 1 UNITED KINGDOM: Operation Interflex 15 (UKR trg) All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated Belgium 150; 1 mech inf coy Czech Republic 135; 1 AD unit Germany 1,000; 1 mech inf bde HQ; 1 armd inf bn(+) Hungary NATO Baltic Air Policing: 80; 4 Gripen C Luxembourg 6 Netherlands 270; 1 armd inf coy Norway 270; 1 armd inf coy(+) Luxembourg LUX Euro EUR GDP per capita Growth Inflation Def exp [a] Def bdgt USD1=EUR 2021 2022 EUR 73.3bn 77.7bn USD 86.8bn 82.2bn USD 136,701 127,673 % 6.9 1.6 % 3.5 8.4 EUR 341m 464m USD 404m 490m EUR 348m 420m USD 412m 444m 0.84 0.95 2023 543m [a] NATO figure Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008 388 154 -2015 2022 Population 650,364 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.6% 2.8% 3.1% 3.6% 25.2% 7.1% Female 8.1% 2.6% 3.0% 3.5% 23.9% 8.6% Capabilities Luxembourg maintains a limited military capability to participate in European collective security and crisis management. 'Defence Guidelines for 2025 and Beyond,' published in late 2017, express support for NATO and EU security policy and contributions to international missions. Defence spending is to rise to 1 % of GDP by 2028, and acquisition priorities in this timeframe include ISR, air transport and surveillance, cyber defence and uninhabited capabilities. There are plans to improve space situational awareness, SATCOM and Earth observation capabilites. In 2022, Luxembourg joined the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Luxembourg has contributed troops to NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence. It is part of the European Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet programme, in which it partially funds one A330 MRTT. It has contributed its A400M to an airlift squadron formed jointly with Belgium. The Belgian and Dutch air forces are responsible for policing Luxembourg's airspace. Sustaining the army's personnel strength depends on better recruiting and retention. A review is considering a specialist reserve of civilian experts. Industrial cooperation inside the EU framework and in NATO is a priority. There is a 112 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 small but advanced space industry and some foreign defence firms have a presence, but the country is otherwise reliant on imports. A strategy for defence industry, innovation and research is to be developed as part of the new defence guidelines. ACTIVE 410 (Army 410) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 600 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE_ Army 410_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 2 recce coy (1 to Eurocorps/BEL div, 1 to NATO pool of deployable forces) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AUV 48 Dingo 2 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS NLAW; TOW ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6+ AIRCRAFT • TPT • Heavy 1 A400M HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 H145M (jointly operated with Police) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 600_ Gendarmerie 600 Macedonia, North MKD DEPLOYMENT IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 1 LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 6 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 21; UN • MINUSMA 2 MEDITERRANEAN SEA: EU • EUNAVFOR MED 2 Merlin IIIC (leased) Macedonian Denar MKD 2021 2022 GDP MKD 723bn 821 bn USD 13.9bn 14.1bn per capita USD 6,714 6,816 Growth % 4.0 2.7 Inflation % 3.2 10.6 Def exp [a] MKD 10.6bn 13.7bn USD 204m 235m Def bdgt MKD 10.8bn 13.3bn USD 207m 229m USD1=MKD 52.07 58.21 2023 [a] NATO figure Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 106 2008 -2015 2022 Population 2,130,936 Age 0-1 4 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.3% 2.8% 3.4% 3.7% 25.2% 6.5% Female 7.8% 2.6% 3.1% 3.5% 24.8% 8.3% Capabilities The armed forces'primary goals are safeguarding the state's territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as contributing to operations under the EU, NATO and UN umbrellas. North Macedonia formally became NATO's 30th member on 27 March 2020. In the same month, it enacted a new Defence Strategy with a focus on capability development, and improved planning based on NATO and EU standards, among other areas. A 2019-2028 Defence Capability Development Plan (DCDP) consolidated long-term development goals aimed at developing collective defence, cooperative security and crisis-management capabilities. A Mid-Term Defence Capabilities Development Plan, adopted in January 2020, is intended to help implement the DCDP. The 2022 annual procurement plan, adopted in April, noted government-to-government contracts relating to JLTV vehicles, 105mm artillery systems, VSHORAD systems, and the overhaul of utility helicopters, among other matters. Work on MoD restructuring is under way.The armed forces are fully professional and the country aims to train all units, particularly those with deployable capability, to NATO standards. A number of units are earmarked for participation in NATO-led operations, The armed forces have increased their participation in NATO joint exercises since joining the Alliance. Participation in international peacekeeping missions has increased logistics capability. The country has modest maritime and air wings, and relies on Soviet-era equipment. There is little in the way of a domestic defence industry, with no ability to design and manufacture modern equipment. ACTIVE 8,000 (Army 8,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,600 RESERVE 4,850 Europe 113 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 8,000_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt (1 SF bn, 1 ranger bn) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech inf bde (4 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn IMPbn 1 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde (3 log bn) Reserves_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 inf bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 11:10 BMP-2; 1 BMP-2K (CP) APC 198 APC (T) 46: 9 Leonidas; 27 Ml 13; 10 MT-LB APC (W) 152:56 BTR-70; 12 BTR-80; 84 TM-170 Hermelin AUV 2 Cobra ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan RCL 82mm M60A ARTILLERY 131 TOWED 70:105mm 14 M-56; 122mm 56 M-30 M-1938 MRL 17:122mm 6 BM-21; 128mm 11 MOR • 120mm 44 Marine Wing_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 2 PB 2 Boticat Aviation Brigade_ FORCES BY ROLE TRAINING 1 fit with Z-242; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 206B ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24V Hind E TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-8MTV Hip; Mi-17 Hip H AIR DEFENCE 1 ADbn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 1 An-2 Colt TRG 5 Z-242 HELICOPTERS ATK 2 Mi-24V Hind E (8: 2 Mi-24K Hind G2; 6 Mi-24V Hind E in store) MRH 6:4 MÍ-8MTV Hip; 2 Mi-17 Hip H TPT • Light 6: 2 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 4 Bell 206B Jet Ranger AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 8+: 8 9K35 Strela-W (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS 40mm 36 L/60 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,600_ Police 7,600 (some 5,000 armed)_ ind 2 SF units EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (T) M113; APC (W) BTR-80; TM-170 Heimlin AUV Ze'ev HELICOPTERS MRH 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey TPT 3: Medium 1 Mi-171; Light 2:1 Bell 206B (AB-206B) Jet Ranger II; 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 1 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 1 IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 4 LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 9 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 3 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR65 Malta MLT Euro EUR 2021 2022 GDP EUR 147bn 16.2bn USD 17.4bn 17.2bn per capita USD 33,667 32,912 Growth % 10.3 6.2 Inflation % 0.7 5.9 Def bdgt [a] EUR 71.8m 82.7m USD 85.0m 87.4m USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 [a] Excludes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- ---2022 Population 464,186 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 7.5% 2.3% 2.7% 3.5% 24.2% 10.2% Female 7.0% 2.2% 2.5% 3.1% 22.8% 12.0% 114 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Capabilities The principal roles for the armed forces are maintaining external security and support for civil emergencies and the police. There is also focus on maritime security in the Mediterranean. The Armed Forces of Malta Strategy Paper 2016-2026 laid out defence-policy objectives, including operational and organisational reforms. Malta is neutral but is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme. The country also participates in bilateral and multilateral exercises. Although deployment capacity is limited, Malta has contributed to European missions. Italy has assisted Malta in meeting some security requirements, including air surveillance, while the European Internal Security Fund is funding some modernisation. Although there is some shipbuilding and ship-repair activity and a small aviation-maintenance industry, these are not defence-specific and Malta relies on imports to equip its armed forces. ACTIVE 1,700 (Armed Forces 1,700) RESERVE 260 (Volunteer Reserve Force 110 Individual Reserve 150) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE_ Armed Forces of Malta 1,700_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit MANOEUVRE Light 1 (1st) inf regt (3 inf coy, 1 cbt spt coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (3rd) cbt spt regt (1 cbt engr sqn, 1 EOD sqn, 1 maint sqn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (4th) CSS regt (1 CIS coy, 1 sy coy) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm L16 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 14.5mm 1 ZPU-4 DEPLOYMENT Maritime Squadron 500 Organised into 5 divisions: offshore patrol; inshore patrol; rapid deployment and training; marine engineering; and logistics EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8 PCO 1 Emer PCC 1 Diciotti (ITA Saettia mod) with 1 hel landing platform PB 6:4 Austal 21m; 2 Marine Protector LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AAR 2 Cantiere Vittoria Air Wing 1 base party. 1 fit ops div; 1 maint div; 1 integrated log div; 1 rescue section EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 5: 3 Beech 200 King Air (maritime patrol); 2 BN-2B Islander TRG 3 Bulldog T MK1 HELICOPTERS MRH 6: 3 AW139 (SAR); 3 SA316B Alouette III LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 9 Montenegro M NE Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023 GDP EUR 4.96bn 5.80bn USD 5.87bn 6.13bn per capita USD 9,433 9,850 Growth % 13.0 7.2 Inflation % 2.4 12.8 Def exp [a] EUR 77.0m 94.7m USD 91.2m 100m Def bdgt [b] EUR 77.0m 94.7m 113m USD 91.2m 100m USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 [a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008 -2015 2022 Population 604,966 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 9.3% 3.1% 3.3% 3.1% 22.9% 7.4% Female 8.7% 2.9% 3.1% 2.9% 23.6% 9.5% Capabilities According to its defence strategy, Montenegro intends to develop an integrated defence system, capable of defending and preserving independence, sovereignty and national territory. A key concern of the authorities is integrating Montenegro into relevant NATO and EU structures. A NATO member since 2017, Montenegro has accepted NATO's capability targets and has been aligning its defence-planning process with NATO standards. Reform and professional isation of the armed forces have been slow, and developments have been focused on structural issues around improving recruitment, outflow and professional development. The armed forces are not designed to have an expeditionary capability, and as such have little logistics capability to support deployments beyond national borders. Personnel have deployed to EU, UN- and NATO-led operations, although a planned increased in Montenegro's small contribution to KFOR stalled due to internal opposition; similar debates are reportedly taking place as authorities look to discuss what role Montenegro should play in NATO crisis response activities. Podgorica intends to replace ageing Soviet-era equipment. Procurement priorities include light and medium helicopters and light armoured vehicles, as well as improved communications capacities in accordance with NATO standards. A contract for 67 Oshkosh 4x4 JLTVs is expected to be fulfilled by 2023; the first vehicles arrived in October 2020. Future plans include the formation of a special-forces unit and an intelligence unit in the land forces. The country's defence industry is capable of producing small arms and ammunition. Europe 115 ACTIVE 2,350 (Army 1,275 Navy 350 Air Force 225 Other 500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,100 RESERVE 2,800 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 1,275_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce coy Light 1 mot inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt spt bn 1 sigs coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 med bn 1 spt bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 8 BOV-VP M-86 AUV 20 JLTV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE SP 9 BOV-1 MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) ARTILLERY 135 TOWED 122mm 12 D-30 MRL 128mm 18 M-63/M-94 Planten MOR 105: 82mm 73; 120mm 32 Reserve_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 2 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bn Navy 350_ 1 Naval Cmd HQ with 4 operational naval units (patrol boat; coastal surveillance; maritime detachment; and SAR) with additional sigs, log and trg units with a separate coastguard element. Some listed units are in the process of decommissioning EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PCF 2 Rode Koncari LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AXS 1 Jadrant Air Force 225_ Golubovci (Podgorica) air base under army command FORCES BY ROLE TRAINING 1 (mixed) sqn with G-4 Super Galeb; Utva-75 (none operational) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with SA341/SA342L Gazelle EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TRG (4 G-4 Super Galeb non-operational; 4 Utva-75 non-operational) HELICOPTERS MRH 16:1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412EPI Twin Huey; 13 SA341/SA342L (HN-45M) Gazelle TPT • Light 2 Bell 505 Jet Ranger X Gendarmerie & Paramilitary £4,100_ Special Police Units £4,100_ DEPLOYMENT_ LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 11 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 2 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR1 Multinational Organisations Capabilities_ The following represent shared capabilities held by contributors collectively rather than as part of national inventories ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE NATO AEW&C Force_ Based at Geilenkirchen (GER). Original participating countries (BEL, CAN, DNK, GER, GRC, ITA, NLD, NOR, PRT, TUR, US) have been subsequently joined by five more (CZE, ESP, HUN, POL, ROM) FORCES BY ROLE AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with B-757 (trg); E-3A Sentry (NATO standard) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT AEW&C 16 E-3A Sentry (NATO standard) TPT • PAX 1 B-757 (trg) NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance_ Based at Sigonella (ITA) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Heavy 5 RQ-4D Phoenix NATO Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet (MMF)_ Based at Eindhoven (NLD). Six participating countries (BEL, CZE, GER, NLD, NOR & LUX) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TKR/TPT 7 A330 MRTT Strategic Airlift Capability_ Heavy Airlift Wing based at Papa air base (HUN). 12 participating countries (BLG, EST, FIN, HUN, LTU, NLD, NOR, POL, ROM, SVN, SWE, US) 116 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Heavy 3 C-17A Globemaster III Strategic Airlift International Solution_ Intended to provide strategic-airlift capacity pending the delivery of A400M aircraft by leasing An-124s. 11 participating countries (BEL, CZE, FIN, FRA, GER, HUN, NOR, POL, SVK, SVN, SWE) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Heavy 2 An-124-100 (3 more available on 6-9 days' notice) Netherlands NLD 2023 Euro EUR 2021 2022 GDP EUR 856bn 937bn USD 1.01 tr 991 bn per capita USD 57,997 56,298 Growth % 4.9 4.5 Inflation % 2.8 12.0 Def exp [a] EUR 11.8bn 14.8bn USD 14.0bn 15.7bn Def bdgt [b] EUR 11.7bn 14.4bn USD 13.9bn 15.2bn USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 15.4bn [a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Population 17,400,824 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.2% 2.9% 3.1% 3.2% 22.7% 9.3% Female 7.8% 2.7% 3.0% 3.1% 22.7% 11.2% Capabilities The 2018 defence review tasked the armed forces with territorial defence, supporting national civil authorities, improving air transport and ISR capabilities, and boosting integrated air and missile defence. A new White Paper was issued in June 2022. Authorities are looking to improve readiness and deployability, combat power and institutional agility and adaptability. Training is slated to improve and efforts will be made to meet the establishment strength set for units. Defence spending is set to rise. A National Cyber Security Strategy 2022-2028 was published in September 2022. Dutch forces have increasingly integrated with NATO allies, particularly Germany. The army contributes to a Dutch-German tank battalion and there is also cooperation in the air and naval domains. The Dutch armed forces have air-policing agreements with France, Belgium and Luxembourg and the country is a member of the Joint Expeditionary Force and the European Intervention Initiative. The Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark have committed to forming a composite special-operations command. Dutch forces are fully professional and well trained and the Netherlands can deploy and sustain a medium-scale force for a single operation, or a small-scale joint force for an extended period. The Netherlands makes significant contributions to NATO and EU military operations. An agreement is in place with Belgium on the joint acquisition of new frigates and minehunters. Spending plans outlined in June indicated plans to increase the number of F-35A combat aircraft, set up a third airbase to operate the type, and double the number of MQ-9 Reaper UAVs. There are plans to replace C-130s with KC-390S, remanufacture AH-64D to AH-64E, and modernise the CH-47 fleet. A MLU is planned for CV90, Fennek, and the PzH2000. Replacement of the Walrus class submarines is likely delayed. There are plans to boost defence innovation and research and to expand the Defence Space Security Centre. The country has an advanced domestic defence industry focusing on armoured vehicles, naval ships and air-defence systems, and also hosts a range of international aerospace-company subsidiaries. Damen Scheide Naval Shipbuilding exports frigates, corvettes and fast-attack craft, while DutchAero manufactures engine components for the F-35. ACTIVE 33,600 (Army 15,350 Navy 7,350 Air 6,400 Other 4,500) Military Constabulary 6,500 RESERVE 6,000 (Army 3,900 Navy 1,100 Air 800 Other 200) Military Constabulary 300 Reserve liability to age 35 for soldiers/sailors, 40 for NCOs, 45 for officers ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE_ Army 15,350_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND elm 1 (1 GNC) corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 4 SF coy MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 ISR bn (2 armd recce sqn, 1 EW coy, 2 int sqn, 1 UAV bty) Mechanised 1 (43rd) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 engr bn, 1 maint coy, 1 med coy) 1 (13th) mech bde (1 recce sqn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 engr bn, 1 maint coy, 1 med coy) Air Manoeuvre 1 (11th) air mob bde (3 air mob inf bn, 1 engr coy, 1 med coy, 1 supply coy, 1 maint coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 SP arty bn (3 SP arty bty) 1 AD comd (1 AD sqn; 1 AD bty) 1 CIMIC bn 1 engr bn 2 EOD coy 1 (CIS) sigs bn 1 CBRN coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 med bn 5 fd hospital 3 maint coy 2 tpt bn Europe 117 Reserves 3,900 reservists_ National Command Cadre bde and corps tps completed by call-up of reservists (incl Territorial Comd) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 3 inf bn (could be mobilised for territorial def) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 197 Fennek IFV 117 CV9035NL (32 more in store) APC • APC (W) 200 Boxer (8 driver trg; 52 amb; 36 CP; 92 engr; 12 log) AUV 248; 98 Bushmaster IMV; 150 Fennek ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 10+; Dachs; 10 Kodiak ARV 25+; BPz-2; 25 BPz-3 Büffel VLB 22; 16 Leopard 1 with Legaun; 2 Leopard 2 with Leguan; 4 MLC70 with Leguan MW Bozena NBC VEHICLES 6 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike-UR ARTILLERY 122 SP 155mm 21 PzH 2000 (27 more in store) MOR 101: 81mm 83 L16/M1; 120mm 18 Brandt AIR DEFENCE • SAM 42+ Long-range 18 M902 Patriot PAC-3 Short-range 6 NASAMS II Point-defence 18+: FIM-92 Stinger; 18 Fennek with FIM-92 Stinger Navy 7,350 (incl Marines)_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 4 SSK 4 Walrus with 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 7 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6 DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4: 3 De Zeven Provincím with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 5 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CMS, 1127mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel) 1 De Zeven Provincím with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 5 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Goalkeeper CMS, 1127mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel) FRIGATES • FFGHM 2 Karel Doorman with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 1 VLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CMS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS PSOH 4 Holland with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6 MHO 6 Alkmaar (Tripartite) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 2: 1 Rotterdam with 2 Goalkeeper CMS (capacity 6 NH90/ AS532 Cougar hel; either 6 LCVP or 2 LCM and 3 LCVP; either 170 APC or 33 MBT; 538 troops) 1 Johan de Witt with 2 Goalkeeper CMS (capacity 6 NH90 hel or 4 AS532 Cougar hel; either 6 LCVP or 2 LCM and 3 LCVP; either 170 APC or 33 MBT; 700 troops) LANDING CRAFT 17 LCU 5 LCU Mk II LCVP 12 Mk5 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9 AGS 3:1 Hydrograaf; 2 Snellius AK 1 Pelikaan AKR 1 New Amsterdam (capacity 200 containers and 300 vehs) (leased) AORH1 Karel Doorman with 2 Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity 6 NH90/AS532 Cougar or 2 CH-47F Chinook hel; 2 LCVP) AS 1 Mercuur AXL 1 Van Kingsbergen AXS 1 Urania Marines 2,650_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF gp (1 SF sqn, 1 CT sqn) MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 mne bn 1 amph aslt gp COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt gp (coy) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (T) 65 BvS-10 Viking (incl 20 CP) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV8:4BvS-10;4BPz-2 MED 4 BvS-10 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike-UR ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 L16/M1 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger Air Force 6,400_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II 1 sqn (converting) with F-35A Lightning II ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE/SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with NH90 NFH TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules 1 sqn with Gulfstream IV TRAINING 1 OEU sqn with F-35A Lightning II 1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer 1 hel sqn with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D Chinook (based at Fort Hood, TX) 118 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AH-64D Apache TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS532U2 Cougar II; NH90 NFH 1 sqn with CH-47D/F Chinook EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 70 combat capable FTR 42 F-16 AM/BM Fighting Falcon FGA 28 F-35A Lightning II TPT 5: Medium 4: 2 C-130H Hercules; 2 C-130H-30 Hercules; PAX 1 Gulfstream IV TRG 13 PC-7 Turbo Trainer HELICOPTERS ATK 28: up to 27 AH-64D Apache (being remanufactured to E standard); 1+ AH-64E Apache ASW 19 NH90 NFH (of which 8 not fitted with sonar) TPT 32: Heavy 20 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 12 AS532U2 Cougar II UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR • Heavy 3 MQ-9 Reaper (unarmed) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L/M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM ASM AGM-114K Hellfire BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10/GBU-12 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway III (all supported by LANTIRN) INS/GPS guided GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 6,500_ Royal Military Constabulary 6,500_ Subordinate to the Ministry of Defence, but performs most of its work under the authority of other ministries FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 paramilitary comd (total: 28 paramilitary unit) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 24 YPR-KMar DEPLOYMENT_ IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 183; 2 trg unit; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1 LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 270; 1 mech inf coy MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 6; UN • MINUSMA 10 MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 2: 50; 1 MHO MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 12 NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMG 1: 230; 1 DDGHM ROMANIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 200; 1 air mob inf coy SLOVAKIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 125; 1 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3 SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 1 UNITED KINGDOM: Operation Interflex 90 (UKR trg) UNITED STATES: 1 hel trg sqn with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D Chinook based at Fort Hood (TX) FOREIGN FORCES_ United States US European Command: 450 Norway NOR Norwegian Kroner NOK 2021 2022 GDP NOK 4.14tr 4.84tr USD 482bn 505bn per capita USD 89,042 92,646 Growth % 3.9 3.6 Inflation % 3.5 4.7 Def exp [a] NOK 72.5bn 80.6bn USD 8.44bn 8.40bn Def bdgt [b] NOK 64.5bn 71.3bn USD 7.50bn 7.43bn USD1=NOK 8.59 9.60 [a] NATO figure [b] Indudes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- ---2022 Population 5,553,840 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 9.2% 2.9% 3.1% 3.4% 23.6% 8.3% Female 8.7% 2.8% 2.9% 3.3% 22.2% 9.6% Capabilities_ Norway sustains small but well-equipped and highly trained armed forces. Territorial defence is at the heart of security policy. A new Long Term Defence Plan was published in October 2020, arguing that the security environment had deteriorated faster than expected. It envisages a gradual increase in personnel numbers and further measures to strengthen readiness and capability in the High North. Following Russia's further invasion of Ukraine, in February 2022, Norway announced that it will allocate further funds to strengthening its defence in the North. A US Marine Corps contingent has deployed to Vaernes, on a rotational basis, since January 2017 and a second location was in 2018 added at Setermoen. In April 2021 Norway and the US signed a Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement which, among other things, provides authorities for US forces to access specific Norwegian facilities and conduct mutual defence activities. Four locations were mentioned as'focal points'for increased cooperation: Evenes, Rygge and Sola air stations and Ramsund naval station. Norway signed a cooperation agreement with the European Defence Agency in 2006. At any one time, around one-third of troops are conscripts. Senior officers reportedly expressed concerns in 2019 that Norway's force structure was too small for defence requirements. Norway maintains a small presence in a range of international crisis-management missions. Equipment recapitalisation is ongoing, but large procurements will stretch budgets. Norway retired its fleet of F-16s in Europe 119 early 2022, with the F-35 taking over responsibility for air defence. New submarines are being procured as part of a strategic partnership with Germany. There are plans to strengthen Brigade North with new equipment and manoeuvre and support units. In June 2018, it was announced that a planned upgrade to Norway's main-battle-tank fleet would be pushed to the mid-2020s. Norway has an advanced and diverse defence-industrial base with a high percentage of SMEs and a mix of private and state-owned companies. ACTIVE 25,400 (Army 8,300 Navy 4,600 Air 4,300 Central Support 7,400 Home Guard 800) Conscript liability 19 months maximum. Conscripts first serve 12 months from 19-28, and then up to 4-5 refresher training periods until age 35, 44, 55 or 60 depending on rank and function. Conscription was extended to women in 2015 RESERVE 40,000 (Home Guard 40,000) Readiness varies from a few hours to several days ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 3,900; 4,400 conscript (total 8,300) The armoured infantry brigade - Brigade North - trains new personnel of all categories and provides units for international operations. At any time around one-third of the brigade will be trained and ready to conduct operations. The brigade includes one high-readiness armoured battalion (Telemark Battalion) with combat-support and combat-service-support units on high readiness FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd recce bn (forming) HSRbn 1 (GSV) bn (1 (border) recce coy, 1 ranger coy, 1 spt coy, 1 trg coy) Armoured 1 armd inf bde (2 armd bn, 1 It inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP coy, 1 CIS bn, 1 spt bn, 1 med bn) Light 1 It inf bn (His Majesty The King's Guards) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 36 Leopard 2A4 (16 more in store) RECCE 21 CV9030 IFV 91: 76 CV9030N; 15 CV9030N (CP) APC 390 APC (T) 315 M113 (incl variants) APC (W) 75 XA-186 Sisw/XA-200 Sish/XA-203 (amb) AUV 165: 20 Dingo 2; 25 HMT Extenda; 120 IVECO LMV (36 more in store) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 34+: 20 CV90 STING; 8 M113 AEV; NM109; 6 Wis ent-2 ARV 12: 6 BPz-2; 6 Wisent-2 VLB 36: 26 Leguan; 1+ Leopard 2 with Leguan; 9 Leopard 1 MW9 910MCV-2 NBC VEHICLES 6 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 167 SP 155mm 24 K9 Thunder MOR 143: 81mm 115 L16; SP 81mm 28: 16 CV9030; 12 M125A2 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Medium-range NASAMS III Navy 2,350; 2,250 conscripts (total 4,600) Joint Command - Norwegian National Joint Headquarters. The Royal Norwegian Navy is organised into five elements under the command of the Chief of the Navy: the fleet (Marinen), the Coast Guard (Kystvakten), the recruit training school (KNM Harold Haarfagre), the naval medical branch and the naval bases (Haakonsvern and Ramsund) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 ISR coy (Coastal Rangers) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 EOD pi EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 6 SSK 6 Ula with 8 single 533mm TT with SeaHake (DM2A3) HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 4 FFGHM 4 Fridtjof Nansen with Aegis C2 (mod), 2 quad lnchr with NSM AShM, 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162A ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Sting Ray mod 1 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13 PSOH1 Nordkapp with 157mm gun (capacity 1 med tpt hel) PCFG 6 Skjold with 8 single lnchr with NSM AShM, 1 76mm gun PBF 6 CB90N (capacity 20 troops) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 MSC lAlta with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM MHC 2 Oksoy with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 6 AGI1 Marjata IV AGS 2:1 HU Sverdrup II; 1 Eger (Marjata III) with 1 hel landing platform AORH 1 Maud (BMT Aegir) (capacity 2 med hel) AXL 2 Reine Coast Guard_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 PSOH 2:1 Jan Mayen (capacity 2 med hel); 1 Nordkapp with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 med tpt hel) PSO 5: 3 Barentshav; 1 Harstad; 1 Svalbard with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCC 5 Nornen LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ATF 2 Jarl (leased) Air Force 2,900; 1,400 conscript (total 4,300) Joint Command - Norwegian National HQ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-35A Lightning II 120 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with P-3C Orion; P-8A Poseidon SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with Sea King Mk43B; AW101 TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules TRAINING 1 sqn with MFI-15 Safari TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with Bell 412SP Twin Huey AIR DEFENCE 2 bn with NASAMS III EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 45 combat capable EGA 37 F-35A Lightning II ASW 8: 3 P-3C Orion; 5 P-8A Poseidon TPT • Medium 4 C-130J-30 Hercules TRG 16 MFI-15 Safari HELICOPTERS ASW (13 NH90 NFH in store) SAR 19: 9 AW101; 10 Sea King Mk43B MRH 18: 6 Bell 412HP; 12 Bell 412SP AIR DEFENCE SAM • Medium-range NASAMS III AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; HR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; IRIS-T; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM; AIM-120C AMRAAM BOMBS Laser-guided EGBU-12 Paveway II INS/GPS guided ID AM Special Operations Command (NORSOCOM) FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (armed forces) SF comd (2 SF gp) 1 (navy) SF comd (1 SF gp) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBF 2IC20M Central Support, Administration and Command 5,850; 1,550 conscripts (total 7,400) Central Support, Administration and Command includes military personnel in all joint elements and they are responsible for logistics and CIS in support of all forces in Norway and abroad Home Guard 400; 400 conscripts (40,000 reserves)_ The Home Guard is a separate organisation, but closely cooperates with all services. The Home Guard is organised in 11 Districts with mobile Rapid Reaction Forces (3,000 troops in total) as well as reinforcements and follow-on forces (37,000 troops in total) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 11: 4 Harek; 2 Gyda; 5 Alusafe 1290 DEPLOYMENT_ CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 2 EGYPT: MFO 3 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 60; 1 trg unit; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2 JORDAN: Operation Inherent Resolve 20 LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 270; 1 armd inf coy(+); CV9030 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 29 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 13 BALTIC SEA: NATO • SNMG1: 50; 1 AORH SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 15 FOREIGN FORCES_ United States US European Command 1,100; 1 (USMC) MEU eqpt set; 1 (APS) 155mm SP Arty bn eqpt set Poland POL Polish Zloty PLN 2021 2022 GDP PLN 2.62tr 3.09tr USD 679bn 716bn per capita USD 17,946 19,023 Growth % 5.9 3.8 Inflation % 5.1 13.8 Def exp [a] PLN 58.3bn 73.9bn USD 15.1 bn 17.1bn Def bdgt [b] PLN 51.8bn 57.8bn USD 13.4bn 13.4bn USD1=PLN 3.86 4.31 [a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008-- ---2015-- 2022 Population 38,093,101 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 7.6% 2.4% 2.5% 3.0% 24.8% 8.1% Female 7.1% 2.3% 2.4% 2.9% 25.1% 11.9% Capabilities_ Territorial defence and NATO membership are central pillars of Poland's defence policy. The primary focus of the 2017-32 defence concept is to prepare the armed forces to deter Russian aggression. Russia is characterised as a direct threat to Poland and to a stable international order, a view sharpened by Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Poland is one of the main European contributors to efforts to support Ukraine and has delivered to Ukraine a variety of defence equipment including armour and anti-armour systems. There has been a rapid increase in defence expenditure, designed to support investment projects. An extra-budgetary fund Europe 121 will deliver funds additional to the base defence budget. The government continues to pursue a goal of permanently stationing US troops in the country.The US Army's V Corps Headquarters (Forward) was established in Poznah at the end of 2020.There are ambitious plans to boost personnel numbers to 300,000 by 2035, including 50,000 to be recruited under a new salaried one-year service scheme. This stems from plans to set up an additional heavy division in the east. Acquisition reform has been under way for some time and a central armaments agency was established in January 2022. A technical-modernisation plan, covering the period 2021-35, was released in October 2019, which extended the planning horizon from ten to 15 years. Ambitious modernisation plans are underway. F-35As are due to arrive from 2024, and land forces capabilities will be boosted by the arrival of Abrams main battle tanks. In 2022 agreements were signed with South Korea for the procurement of FA-50 combat aircraft, K2 MBTs and K9 self-propelled artillery pieces. Chunmoo MRLs will be bought, alongside US HIMARS systems. Warsaw continues plans to strengthen its domestic defence-industrial base, much of which is now consolidated in the state-owned holding company PGZ, using technology transfers and international partnering, such as the deals with South Korea. Beyond PGZ, several international defence companies have subsidiaries in Poland. ACTIVE 114,050 (Army 58,500 Navy 6,000 Air Force 14,300 Special Forces 3,150Territorial 3,800 Joint 28,300) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,300 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 58,500_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND elm 1 (MNC NE) corps HQ MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 3 recce regt Armoured 1 (11th) armd cav div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 arty regt) Mechanised 1 (12th) mech div (2 mech bde, 1 (coastal) mech bde, 1 arty regt) 1 (16th) mech div (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 arty regt, 1 AT regt) 1 (18th) mech div (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 log regt) Air Manoeuvre 1 (6th) AB bde (3 para bn) 1 (25th) air cav bde (2 air cav bn, 2 tpt hel bn, 1 (casevac) med unit) COMBAT SUPPORT 2 engr regt 2 ptn br regt 2 chem def regt COMBAT SUPPORT 2 log bde HELICOPTER 1 (1st) hel bde (2 atk hel sqn with Mi-24D/V Hind D/E, 1 CSAR sqn with Mi-24V Hind E; PZL W-3PL Gluszec; 2 ISR hel sqn with Mi-2URP; 2 hel sqn with Mi-2) AIR DEFENCE 3 AD regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 647: 10 K2; 108 Leopard 2A4 (being upgraded to 2PL); 105 Leopard 2A5; 34 Leopard 2PL; 28 M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams (on loan for trg) up to 232 PT-91 Twardy; 130 T-72A/T-72M1/M1R RECCE 407: 282 BRDM-2; 38 BWR-1 (being upgraded); 87 BRDM-2 R5 IFV 1,567: up to 1,212 BMP-1; 4 Borsuk (in test); 351 Rosomak IFV APC 450 APC (T) 6 WDSz (OP) APC (W) 344: 300 Rosomak APC (ind variants); 44 AWD RAK (arty CP) PPV 100 Maxxpro AUV 255: 210 Cougar; 45 M-ATV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 106+: IWT; 65 MT-LB AEV; 33 Rosomak WRT; 8 MID Bizon ARV 122: 28 BPz-2; 68 MT-LB ARV; 26 WZT-3M VLB 119:4 Biber; 103 BLG67M2; 12 MS-20 Daglezja MW 27:17 Bozena 4; 6 ISM Kroton; 4 Kalina SUM ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); Spike-LR ARTILLERY 773 SP 424:122mm up to 227 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 111 M-77 Dana; 155mm 86: 24 K9A1; 62 Krab MRL 122mm 179: up to 75 BM-21; 29 RM-70; 75 WR-40 Langusta MOR 170: 120mm 80: 15 2B11; 65 M120; SP 120mm 90 SMK120 RAK HELICOPTERS ATK 28 Mi-24D/V Hind D/E MRH 64: 7 Mi-8MT Hip; 3 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 Mi-17AE Hip (aeromedical); 5 Mi-17-lV Hip; 16 PZL Mi-2URP Hoplite; 24 PZL W-3W/WA Sokol; 8 PZL W-3PL Gluszec (CSAR) TPT 37: Medium 12: 6 Mi-8T Hip; 2 PZL W-3AE Sokol (aeromedical); 4 S-70i Black Hawk; Light 25 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 6 CISR • Medium 6 Bayraktar TB2 AIR DEFENCE SAM 166+ Short-range 23: 3 CAMM (Narew); 20 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) Point-defence 143+: 64 9K33 Osa-AK (RS-SA-8 Gecko); GROM; Piorun; 79 Poprad SPAAGM 23mm 20 ZSU-23-4MP Biala GUNS 345 SP 23mm 2 ZSU-23-4 TOWED 23mm 343: 268 ZU-23-2; 75 ZUR-23-2KG ]odek-G (with GROM msl) BOMBS • Laser-guided MAM-C/L 122 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Navy 6,000_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 1 Orzel (ex-FSU Ki7o)t with 6 single 533mm TT each with 53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2 FFH 2 Pulaski (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) (of which 1 used as training ship) with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SH-2G Super Seasprite ASW hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 CORVETTES • FSM 1 Kaszub with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT with SET-53 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun PSO 1 Slqzak (MEKO A-100) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCFGM 3 Orkan (ex-GDR Sassnitz) with 1 quad lnchr with RBS15 Mk3 AShM, 1 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 21 MCCS 1 Kontradmiral Xawery Czernicki MCO 2 Kormoran II MHO 1 Krogulec MSI 17:1 Gopto; 12 Gardno; 4 M?mn/ AMPHIBIOUS 8 LANDING SHIPS • LSM 5 Lublin (capacity 9 tanks; 135 troops) LANDING CRAFT • LCU 3 Deba (capacity 50 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 26 AGI 2 Moma AGS 8: 2 Heweliusz; 4 Wildcat 40; 2 (coastal) AORL1Bflffyfc AOL 1 Mosfcit ARS 4: 2 Piast; 2 ZM/szfco ATF 8: 6 BoZfco (B860); 2 H960 AX 1 Wodmfc with 1 twin AK230 CIWS AXS 1 Isfcra COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 12 NSM Naval Aviation 1,300_ FORCES BY ROLE ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE/SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with Mi-14PL Haze A; Mi-14PL/R Haze C 1 sqn with PZL W-3RM Anakonda; SH-2G Super Sea-sprite MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with An-28E/RM Bryza TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-28TD; M-28B TD Bryza 1 sqn with An-28TD; M-28B; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; PZL W-3T/A EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT MP 10: 8 An-28RM Bryza; 2 An-28E Bryza TPT • Light 4: 2 An-28TD Bryza; 2 M-28B TD Bryza HELICOPTERS ASW 8: 6 Mi-14PL Haze; 2 SH-2G Super Seasprite SAR 8: 2 Mi-14PL/R Haze C; 4 PZL W-3RM Anakonda; 2 PZL W-3WA RM Anakonda TPT • Light 7:4 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; 1 PZL W-3A; 2 PZL-W-3T Air Force 14,300_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52+ Fighting Falcon FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR 2 sqn with Su-22M-4 Fitter SEARCH AND RESCUE 1 sqn with Mi-2; PZL W-3 Sokol TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130H/E; M-28 Bryza 1 sqn with C295M; M-28 Bryza TRAINING 1 sqn with PZL-130 Orlik 1 sqn with M-346 1 hel sqn with SW-4 Puszczyk TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 (Spec Ops) sqn with Mi-17 Hip H 1 (VIP) sqn with Mi-8 Hip; W-3WA Sokol AIR DEFENCE 1 bde with S-125 Newa SC; S-200C Vega (RS-SA-5 Gammon) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 94 combat capable FTR 28: 22 MiG-29 A Fulcrum; 6 MiG-29UB Fulcrum FGA 66: 36 F-16C Block 52+ Fighting Falcon; 12 F-16D Block 52+ Fighting Falcon; 12 Su-22M4 Fitter; 6 Su- 22UM3K Fitter TPT 50: Medium 7:2 C-130H Hercules; 5 C-130E Hercules; Light 39:16 C295M; 10 M-28 Bryza TD; 13 M-28 Bryza PT; PAX 4: 2 Gulfstream G550; 2 B-737-800 (VIP) TRG 40:12 M-346; 28 PZL-130 Orlik HELICOPTERS MRH 8 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 65: Medium 29: 9 Mi-8 Hip; 10 PZL W-3 Sokol; 10 PZL W-3WA Sokol (VIP); Light 36: 14 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; 22 SW-4 Puszczyk (trg) AIR DEFENCE SAM 18 Long-range 1 S-200C Vega (RS-SA-5 Gammon) Short-range 17 S-125 Newa SC GUNS • TOWED 23mm 12 Pilica (with Piorun msl) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-HA^rc/ier); R-27T (RS-AA-10B Alamo); HR AIM-9X Sidwinder II; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65J/G Maverick; Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge) AL CM • Conventional AGM-158 JASSM Special Forces 3,150_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 3 SF units (GROM, FORMOZA & cdo) COMBAT SUPPORT/ 1 cbt spt unit (AGAT) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt unit (NIL) Europe 123 Territorial Defence Forces 3,800 (plus 20,000 reservists)_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 15 sy bde 2 sy bde (forming) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,300_ Border Guards 14,300_ Ministry of Interior Maritime Border Guard 2,000_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 18 PCC 2 Kaper PBF 6: 2 Straznik; 4IC16M PB 10: 2 Wisloka; 2 Baltic 24; 1 Project MI-6 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT UCAC 2 Griffon 2000TDX DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 38 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 2 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 150; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 30 LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 177; 1 tk coy LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 193; 1 mech inf coy MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 4 ROMANIA: NATO • MNB-SE 220; 1 mech inf coy; Rosomak SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 247; 1 inf coy; UN • UNMIK 2 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2 FOREIGN FORCES_ All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated Canada Operation Unifier 40 (UKR trg) Croatia 4 Germany MNC-NE corps HQ: 95 Italy NATO Baltic Air Policing: 135; 4 Eurofighter Typhoon United Kingdom 129; 1 recce sqn; Army: 250; 1 tk sqn with Challenger 2; 1 SAM bty with CAMM (Land Ceptor) United States: 780; 1 armd bn with M1A2 SEPv2 Abarms; M2A3 Bradley; • Operation Atlantic Resolve 15,000; 1 corps HQ; 2 div HQ; 2 armd bde with M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M3A3 Bradley; M2A3 Bradley; M109A6/A7; 1 AB bde with M119A3; M777A2; 2 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC3; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-22A Raptor 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper Portugal PRT Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023 GDP EUR 211bn 242bn USD 250bn 256bn per capita USD 24,296 24,910 Growth % 4.9 6.2 Inflation % 0.9 7.9 Def exp [a] EUR 3.30bn 3.33bn USD 3.90bn 3.52bn Def bdgt EUR 2.48bn 2.45bn 2.58bn USD 2.93bn 2.59bn USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 [a] NATO figure Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- 2022 Population 10,242,081 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 6.7% 2.7% 2.9% 2.8% 23.7% 8.6% Female 6.4% 2.6% 2.7% 2.7% 25.3% 13.0% Capabilities_ Principal tasks for Portugal's all-volunteer armed forces are homeland defence, maritime security, multinational operations and responding to humanitarian disasters. Investment plans support Portugal's ambition to field rapid-reaction and maritime-surveillance capabilities for territorial defence and multinational operations. A new military programme law for 2019-30 was approved by parliament, funding the acquisition of five KC-390 aircraft, six offshore-patrol vessels, a replenishment tanker and a multi-purpose logistics ship, as well as cyber-defence and soldier-combat systems. In 2022 a modest increase to defence spending was announced, with the country aiming to boost by 2024 the proportion of GDP spent on defence. Portugal hosts NATO's cyber-security academy and the country also contributes to EU military structures. There is a close relationship with former dependencies and with the US, which operates out of Lajes air base. All three services have programmes to modernise and sustain existing equipment platforms. There is an active defence industry, though principally in relation to shipbuilding, broader maintenance tasks and the manufacture of components, small arms and light weapons. ACTIVE 26,700 (Army 13,350 Navy 7,400 Air 5,950) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 24,700 RESERVE 23,500 (Army 10,000 Navy 9,000, Air Force 4,500) Reserve obligation to age 35 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 13,350_ 5 territorial comd (2 mil region, 1 mil district, 2 mil zone) 124 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1SF bn MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech bde (1 recce sqn, 1 tk regt, 1 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn) 1 (intervention) bde (1 recce regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn) Air Manoeuvre 1 (rapid reaction) bde (1 cdo bn, 1ISR bn, 2 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn) Other 1 (Azores) inf gp (2 inf bn, 1 AD bty) 1 (Madeira) inf gp (1 inf bn, 1 AD bty) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 STA bty 1 engr bn (1 construction coy; 1 EOD unit; 1 ptn br coy; I CBRN coy) 1 EW coy IMP bn 1 psyops unit 1 CIMIC coy (joint) 1 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 maint coy 1 log coy 1 tpt coy 1 med unit AIR DEFENCE 1 ADbn Reserves 210,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 3 (territorial) def bde (on mobilisation) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 37 Leopard 2A6 IFV 30 Pandur II MK 30mm APC 406 APC (T) 239:176 M113A1; 14 M113A2; 49 M577A2 (CP) APC (W) 167: 9 V-150 Commando; 12 V-200 Chaimite; 146 Pandur II (incl variants) AUV 16 VBL ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV M728 ARV 13: 6 M88A1, 7 Pandur II ARV VLB M48 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 26:17 M113 with TOW; 4 M901 with TOW; 5 Pandur II with TOW MANPATS Milan; TOW RCL • 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm 45 M40A1 ARTILLERY 320 SP 155mm 24: 6 M109A2; 18 M109A5 TOWED 62:105mm 39:17 L119 Light Gun; 21 M101A1; 155mm 24 M114A1 MOR 234: 81mm 143; SP 81mm 12: 2 M125A1; 10 M125A2; 107mm 11 M30; SP 107mm 18: 3 M106A1; 15 M106A2; 120mm 50 Tampella AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 20+: 1M48A2 Chaparral; 19 M48A3 Chaparral; FIM-92 Stinger GUNS • TOWED 20mm 20 Rh 202 Navy 7,400 (incl 950 Marines)_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 2 SSK 2 Tridente (GER Type-214) (fitted with AIP) with 8 533mm TT with UGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShU/Black Shark HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 5 FFGHM 5: 1 Bartolomen Dias (ex-NLD Karel Doorman) (MLU ongoing) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 1 VLS with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk95 (Super Lynx) hel) 1 Bartolomen Dias (ex-NLD Karel Doorman) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 1 VLS with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk95 (Super Lynx) hel) 3 Vasco Da Gama with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1100mm gun (capacity 2 Lynx Mk95 (Super Lynx) hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 22 CORVETTES • FS 2: 1 Baptista de Andrade with 1 100mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 1 Joao Coutinho with 1 twin 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PSO 4 Viana do Castelo with 1 hel landing platform PCC 5:1 Cacine; 4 Tejo (ex-DNK Flyvisken) PBR 10: 5Argos; 4 Centauro; 1 Rio Minho PB 1 Patrao Cego do Maio (SAR) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10 AGS4: 2D Carlos I (ex-US Stalwart); 2 Andromeda AXS 6:1 Sagres; 1 Creoula; 1 Polar; 2 Belatrix; 1 Zarco Marines 950_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF det MANOEUVRE Light lit infbn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 mor coy 1 MP coy Europe 125 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan; TOW RCL • 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY • MOR 30+: 81mm some; 120mm 30 Naval Aviation_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS • ASW 5: 4 Lynx Ivlk95 (Super Lynx); 1 Lynx Mk95A (Super Lynx) Air Force 5,950_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with P-3C Orion ISR/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C295M COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with with AW101 Merlin TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130H/C-130H-30 Hercules 1 sqn with Falcon 50 TRAINING 1 sqn with AW119 Koala 1 sqn with TB-30 Epsilon EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 35 combat capable FTR 30:26 F-16AMFightingFalcon;4:F-16BMFightingFalcon ASW 5 P-3C Orion ISR: 7: 5 C295M (maritime surveillance), 2 C295M (photo recce) TPT 13: Medium 5:2 C-130H Hercules; 3 C-130H-30 Hercules (tpt/SAR); Light 5 C295M; PAX 3 Falcon 50 (tpt/VIP) TRG 16 TB-30 Epsilon HELICOPTERS TPT 17: Medium 12 AW101 Merlin (6 SAR, 4 CSAR, 2 fishery protection); Light 5 AW119 Koala AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L/I Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65A Maverick AShM AGM-84A Harpoon BOMBS Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II INS/GPS guided GBU-31JDAM Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 24,700_ National Republican Guard 24,700_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32 PBF 12 PB20 HELICOPTERS • MRH 7 SA315 Lama DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 1 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 14; UN • MINUSCA 196; 1 AB coy IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 30 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 11 MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 2: 40; 1 PSO MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 120 SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 2 FOREIGN FORCES_ United States US European Command: 250; 1 spt facility at Lajes Romania ROM Romanian Leu RON 2021 2022 GDP RON 1.18tr 1.40tr USD 284bn 300bn per capita USD 14,795 15,619 Growth % 5.9 4.8 Inflation % 5.0 13.3 Def exp [a] RON 22.0bn 26.4bn USD 5.29bn 5.64bn Def bdgt [b] RON 23.1 bn 24.3bn USD 5.56bn 5.19bn USD1=RON 4.16 4.68 [a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- 2022 Population 18,519,899 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.1% 2.7% 2.5% 2.3% 23.7% 9.0% Female 7.7% 2.5% 2.5% 2.3% 23.9% 12.8% Capabilities_ Romania's armed forces are structured around territorial defence, support to NATO and EU missions, and contributing to regional and global stability and security. According to the National Defence Strategy 2020-2024, principal security threats include Russia's increased presence in the Black Sea, hybrid warfare, cyber-attacks, terrorism and the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic. Under the Armata 2040 project, authorities are looking to modernise and upgrade the armed forces to NATO standards. A defence budget increase was announced in March 2022. Bucharest has signed defence cooperation agreements with regional allies and, in the aftermath of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, bolstered cooperation with the US, France, and regional allies in the Bucharest Nine organisation. There is a strategic partnership with the US. Romania 126 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 hosts the Aegis Ashore ballistic-missile-defence system at Deveselu. In May 2022, NATO's multinational Battle Group Forward Presence achieved initial operational capability. Led by France, this unit is based at Cincu. Elements of the US Army's Task Force Cougar started to arrive at Mihail Kogalniceanu air base in early 2022. There is broad training with NATO and regional allies, and Romania contributes to EU and NATO missions. The inventory is mainly composed of Soviet-era equipment, which is seen as a factor-limiting capability. Though Romanian airspace benefits from NATO's Enhanced Air Policing mission, in May 2022 the authorities indicated a plan to extend the service life of the ageing MiG-21 Lancer aircraft by approximately a year, following delays in transitioning to the F-16. Romania has received a number of F-16s, purchased from Portugal, and in 2023 is expected to receive the first batch of F-16s purchased from Norway. Acquisition plans include armoured vehicles, air-defence radars, surface-to-air missiles and corvettes. The Naval Strike Missile will be procured for coastal defence from 2024, while Bucharest has received the first elements of the HIMARS system ordered in 2018.The country's defence industry has struggled since 1989. Current production focuses on small arms and ammunition. However, Bucharest has agreed a contract with General Dynamics to produce locally a new batch of PiranhaV armoured vehicles, and with Airbus to produce H215 helicopters. Bucharest continues to look for opportunities to boost its defence industry through offset agreements and technology transfers. ACTIVE 71,500 (Army 35,500 Navy 6,800 Air 11,700 Joint 17,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 57,000 RESERVE 55,000 (Joint 55,000) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 35,500_ Readiness is reported as 70-90% for NATO-designated forces (1 div HQ, 1 mech bde, 1 inf bde & 1 mtn inf bde) and 40-70% for other forces FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 2 div HQ (2nd & 4th) elm 1 div HQ (MND-SE) SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde (2 SF bn, 1 para bn, 1 log bn) MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bde 2 recce regt Mechanised 5 mech bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 log bn) 1 (MNB-SE) mech inf bde (2 armd inf bn, 1 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 log bn) Light 2 mtn inf bde (3 mtn inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 log bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 MRL bde (3 MRL bn, 1 STA bn, 1 log bn) 2 arty regt 1 engr bde (4 engr bn, 1 ptn br bn, 1 log bn) 2 engr bn 3 sigs bn 1 CIMIC bn IMP bn 3 CBRN bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 spt bn AIR DEFENCE 3 AD regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 377: 220 T-55AM; 103 TR-85; 54 TR-85 Ml IFV 241:41 MLI-84 (incl CP); 101 MLI-84M Jderul; 99 PiranhaV APC 749 APC (T) 76 MLVM APC (W) 613: 69 B33 TAB Zimbru; 37 Piranha IIIC; 354 TAB-71 (incl variants); 153 TAB-77 (incl variants) PPV 60 Maxxpro AUV 480 TABC-79 (incl variants) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 55: 3 MLI-84M TEHEVAC; 8 TERA-71L; 44 TERA-77L VLB 43 BLG-67 NBC VEHICLES 109 RCH-84 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 158:12 9P122 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 98 9P133 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 48 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) MANPATS Spike-LR GUNS SP 100mm (23 SU-100 in store) TOWED 100mm 218 M-1977 ARTILLERY 1,136 SP 122mm 40: 6 2S1 Gvodzika; 34 Model 89 TOWED 447:122mm 96 (M-30) M-1938 (A-19); 152mm 351: 247 M-1981; 104 M-1985 MRL 206:122mm 170:134 APR-40; 36 LAROM; 227mm 36 M142 HIMARS MOR 443: SP 82mm 177: 92 TAB-71 AR; 85 TABC-79 AR; 120mm 266 M-1982 AIR DEFENCE SAM 96 Short-range 48: 32 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); 16 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko) Point-defence 48 CA-95 GUNS 65+ SP 35mm 41 Gepard TOWED 24+: 14.5mm ZPU-2; 35mm 24 GDF-003; 57mm S-60 Navy 6,800_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 3 FFGH 1 Marasesti with 4 twin lnchr with P-22 (RS-SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 triple 533mm ASTT with 53-65 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 2 twin 76mm guns (capacity 2 SA-316 (IAR-316) Alouette III hel) FFH 2 Regele Ferdinand (ex-UK Type-22), with 2 triple STWS Mk.2 324mm TT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SA330 (IAR-330) Puma) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24 CORVETTES 4 FSH 2 Fetal H with 2 twin 533mm ASTT with SET-53M Europe 127 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SA316 (IAR-316) Alouette III hel) FS 2 Tetal I with 2 twin 533mm ASTT with SET-53M HWT, 2 RBU 2500 Smerch 1 A/S mor, 2 AK230 CIWS, 2 twin 76mm guns PCFG 3 Zborul with 2 twin lnchr with P-22 (RS-SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCFT 3 Naluca with 4 single 533mm ASTT PCR 8: 5 Brutar II with 2 BM-21 MRL, 1 100mm gun; 3 Kogalniceanu with 2 BM-21 MRL, 2 100mm guns PBR 6 VD141 (ex-MSR now used for river patrol) MINE WARFARE 11 MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10 MSO 4 Musca with 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 AK230 CIWS MSR 6 VD141 MINELAYERS • ML 1 Corsar with up to 120 mines, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 AK230 CIWS LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 AE 2 Constanta with 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 AK230 CIWS, 2 twin 57mm guns AGOR 1 Corsar AGS 2:1 £mä Racovita; 1 Catuneanu AOL 1 TiiZcea ATE 1 Grozaou AXS 1 Mreea Naval Infantry_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 naval inf regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AUV 14:11ABC-79M; 3 TABC-79M Air Force 11,700_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with MiG-21 Lancer C FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with IAR-99 Soim* TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-30 Clank; C-27J Spartan 1 sqn with C-130B/H Hercules TRAINING 1 sqn with IAR-99 Soim* 1 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (IAR-316B); Yak-52 (Iak-52) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 (multi-role) sqn with IAR-330 SOCAT Puma 2 sqn with SA330L/M Puma (IAR-330L/M) AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 engr spt regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 59 combat capable FTR17: UF-16AMFightingFalcon; 3 F-16BMFightingFalcon EGA 22: 6 MiG-21 Lancer B; 16 MiG-21 Lancer C ISR 2 An-30 Clank TPT • Medium 12: 7 C-27J Spartan; 4 C-130B Hercules; 1 C-130H Hercules TRG 32:10 IAR-99*; 10IAR-99C Soim*; 12 Yak-52 (Iak-52) HELICOPTERS MRH 29: 21 IAR-330 SOCAT Puma; 8 SA316B Alouette III (IAR-316B) TPT • Medium 24: 12 SA330L Puma (IAR-330L); 12 SA330M Puma (IAR-330M) AIR DEFENCE • SAM 17 Long-range 8 M903 Patriot PAC-3 MSE Medium-range 13:5 S-75M3 Volkhov (RS-SA-2 Guideline); 8 MIM-23 Hawk PIP III AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES A AM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); R-550 Magic 2; Python 3 HR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM ASM Spike-ER BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-12 Paveway; Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-54 Laser ID AM INS/GPS guided GBU-38 JDAM Gendarmerie & Paramilitary £57,000_ Gendarmerie £57,000_ Ministry of Interior DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 203; 1 inf coy CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 13 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 8 INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 2 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 30; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 170 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 25; UN • MINUSMA 5 MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 6 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 65; UN • UNMIK 1 SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 5 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 6 FOREIGN FORCES_ Canada NATO Air Policing: 170; 6 F/A-18A Hornet (CF-18AM) Belgium NATO Enhanced Vigilance Activities: 250; 1 mech inf coy France NATO Enhanced Vigilance Activities: 750; 1 armd BG; 1 SAM bty with SAMP/T Netherlands NATO Enhanced Vigilance Activities: 200; 1 air mob inf coy Poland NATO MNB-SE 220; 1 mech inf coy; Rosomak United States US European Command: 4,000; 1 air aslt bde with M119A3; M777A2; 1 Aegis Ashore BMD unit with 3 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-3 128 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Serbia SER Serbian Dinar RSD 2021 2022 GDP RSD 6.27tr 6.99tr USD 63.1 bn 62.7bn per capita USD 9,178 9,164 Growth % 7.4 3.5 Inflation % 4.1 11.5 Def bdgt RSD 103bn 136bn USD 1.03bn 1.22bn USD1=RSD 99.40 111.40 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015-- 2022 Population 6,739,471 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 7.5% 2.8% 2.8% 3.0% 24.6% 8.1% Female 7.0% 2.6% 2.7% 3.0% 24.5% 11.5% Capabilities_ Serbia's armed forces focus on territorial defence, internal security and limited support to peacekeeping missions. According to the 2019 National-Security Strategy, key threats include separatism, ethnic and religious extremism, climate change and further international recognition of Kosovo. The armed forces are modernising to address long-term capability shortfalls and personnel shortages. Priorities include procurements, improving availability, maintenance and readiness levels, and bolstering air-defence capability. Serbia has agreed to deepen cooperation with NATO through an Individual Partnership Action Plan. Belgrade aspires to join the EU but not NATO. Serbia also maintains a close relationship with Russia, from which it has received transfers of military equipment in recent years. However, the country has also intensified its security relations with China, purchasing Chinese military equipment, including air defence equipment. The armed forces have reduced in size over the last decade, though annual recruitment goals have not yet been met. The armed forces also lack skilled technicians to operate and maintain advanced systems and suffer from a shortage of pilots. Air force modernisation is a priority, including upgrading its MiG-29s, while there have been reports of negotiations with France and the UK over possible combat aircraft procurement. Serbia mostly trains with its Balkan neighbours, Russia and NATO countries. It contributes to EU, OSCE and UN peacekeeping missions. Serbia's defence industry focuses on missile and artillery systems, and small arms and ammunition, but the country is reliant on external suppliers for major platforms. Serbia continues to develop its defence industry, with a focus on the aerospace industry. ACTIVE 28,150 (Army 13,250 Air Force and Air Defence 5,100Training Command 3,000 Guards 1,600 Other MoD 5,200) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 3,700 Conscript liability 6 months (voluntary) RESERVE 50,150 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 13,250_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde (1 CT bn, 1 cdo bn, 1 para bn) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (1st) bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 log bn) 3 (2nd, 3rd & 4th) bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 2 inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 log bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (mixed) arty bde (4 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 spt bn) 2 ptn bridging bn 1 NBC bn 1 sigs bn 2 MP bn Reserve Organisations_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 8 (territorial) inf bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 229:197 M-84; 2 M-84AS1 (in test); 30 T-72MS RECCE 76:46 BRDM-2; 30 BRDM-2M IFV 326: 320 M-80; 3 M80AB1 APC 95 APC(T) 44:12 BTR-50 (CP); 32 MT-LB (CP) APC (W) 51: 39 BOV-VP M-86; 12 Lazar-3 APC AUV 25 BOV M16 Milos ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV IWT ARV M84A1; T-54/T-55 VLB MT-55; TMM ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 48 BOV-1 (M-83) with 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); Kornet-EM RCL 90mm M-79 ARTILLERY 461 SP 95:122mm 67 2S1 Gvozdika; 155mm 18 B-52 NORA TOWED 132: 122mm 78 D-30; 130mm 18 M-46; 152mm 36 M-84 NORA-A MRL 81:128mm 78:18 M-63 Plamen; 60 M-77 Organ]; 262mm 3 M-87 Orkan MOR 163: 82mm 106 M-69; 120mm 57 M-74/M-75 AIR DEFENCE SAM 94+ Short-range 77 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); Point-defence 17+: 12 9K31M Strela-IM (RS-SA-9 Gaskin); 5 9K35M Strela-WU; 9K32M Strela-2U (RS-SA-7B GraiT)%; Silo (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS SP 40mm 20 Pasars-16 TOWED 40mm 36 Bofors L/70 Europe 129 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Medium 6 CH-92A AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM FT-8C River Flotilla_ The Serbian-Montenegrin navy was transferred to Montenegro upon independence in 2006, but the Danube flotilla remained in Serbian control. The flotilla is subordinate to the Land Forces EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 PBR 4: 3 Type-20; 1 ]adar MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 MSI 4 Nestin with 1 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT LCVP 4 Type-22 (1 more non-operational) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 AG 1 Sabac (deguassing vessel also used for patrol and troop transport) (capacity 80 troops) AGF 1 Kozara AOL1 Air Force and Air Defence 5,100_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum B; MiG-29SE Fulcrum C FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with J-22/NJ-22 Orao 1 TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-2; An-26; Yak-40 (Jak-40); 1 PA-34 Seneca V TRAINING 1 sqn with G-4 Super Galeb* (adv trg/light atk); SA341/342 Gazelle; Lasta 95; Utva-75 (basic trg) ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with SA341H/342L Gazelle; (HN-42/45); Mi-24 Hind; Mi-35M Hind TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with H145M; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-17V-5 Hip AIR DEFENCE 1 bde (5 bn (2 msl, 3 SP msl) with S-125M Neva-M (RS-SA-3 Goa); 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet)) 2 radar bn (for early warning and reporting) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 maint bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 51 combat capable FTR 14; 3 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 3 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B; 8 MiG-29SE Fulcrum C FGA up to 18 J-22/NJ-22 Orao 1 ISR (10 IJ-22R Orao 1* in store) TPT • Light 8; 1 An-2 Colt; 4 An-26 Curl; 2 Yak-40 (Jak-40); 1 PA-34 Seneca V TRG 44; 19 G-4 Super Galeb*; 11 Utva-75; 14 Lasta 95 HELICOPTERS ATK 6; 2 Mi-24 Hindi; 4 Mi-35M Hind MRH 52; 5 H145M; 1 Mi-17 Hip H; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 2 SA341H Gazelle (HI-42); 26 SA341H Gazelle (HN-42)/ SA342L Gazelle (HN-45); 13 SA341H Gazelle (HO-42)/ SA342L1 Gazelle (HO-45) TPT • Medium 8 Mi-8T Hip (HT-40) AIR DEFENCE SAM 19+ Long-range 4 FK-3 (HQ-22) Short-range 15; 6 S-125M Neva-M (RS-SA-3 Goa); 9 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)%; 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) SPAAGM 30mm 6 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) GUNS • TOWED 40mm 24 Bofors L/70 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES A AM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); SARH R-27ER (RS-AA-10C Alamo); ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12 Adder) ASM AGM-65 Maverick; A-77 Thunder; Kh-29T (RS-AS-14B Kedge) Guards 1,600_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 (ceremonial) gd bde (1 gd bn, 1 MP bn, 1 spt bn) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 3,700_ Gendarmerie 3,700_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 24; 12 Lazar-3; 12 BOV-VP M-86 AUV BOV M16 Milos DEPLOYMENT_ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 7; UN • MINUSCA 78; 1 med coy CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 8 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 177; 1 mech inf coy MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 1 SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 6 TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL_ In February 2008, Kosovo declared itself independent. Serbia remains opposed to this, and while Kosovo has not been admitted to the United Nations, a number of states have recognised Kosovo's self-declared status. Data here represents the de facto situation in Kosovo. This does not imply international recognition as a sovereign state. 130 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Kosovo Security Force 2,500; reserves 800 The Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was formed in January 2009 as a non-military organisation with responsibility for crisis response, civil protection and EOD. The new president has reaffirmed the ambition to develop a regular army following NATO standards and to join the Alliance, although NATO members are divided on this and the Alliance is formally against such a development. The KSF has been upgrading its capabilities, including the acquisition of light armoured security vehicles from the United States starting in 2021. A small detachment deployed to Kuwait in 2021, alongside the US Iowa National Guard. A military police unit was reportedly established in 2022. The NATO peace-support mission, KFOR, continues to maintain a presence in Kosovo. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AUV 55 M1117 Guardian; some Cobra FOREIGN FORCES_ All under Kosovo Force (KFOR) command unless otherwise specified Albania 61 Armenia 40 Austria 244; 1 recce coy; 1 mech inf coy; 1 log coy • UNMIK1 obs Bulgaria 30 Canada 5 Croatia 147; 1 inf coy; 1 hel fit with Mi-8 Czech Republic 8 • UNMIK 2 obs Denmark 35 Finland 20 Germany 68 Greece 113; 1 inf coy Hungary 469; 1 inf coy (KTM) Ireland 13 Italy 715; 1 arty regt BG HQ; 1 Carabinieri unit Latvia 136; 1 inf coy Lithuania 1 Macedonia, North 65 Moldova 41 • UNMIK 1 obs Montenegro 1 Poland 247; 1 inf coy • UNMIK 2 obs Romania 65 • UNMIK 1 obs Slovenia 97; 1 mot inf coy; 1 MP unit; 1 hel unit Sweden 3 Switzerland 186; 1 inf coy; 1 engr pi; 1 hel fit with AS332 Turkey 335; 1 inf coy • UNMIK 2 obs Ukraine 40 United Kingdom 41 United States 561; elm 1ARNG inf bde HQ; 1ARNG inf bn; 1 hel fit with UH-60 Slovakia SVK Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023 GDP EUR 97.1 bn 106bn USD 115bn 112bn per capita USD 21,053 20,565 Growth % 3.0 1.8 Inflation % 2.8 11.9 Def exp [a] EUR 1.68bn 2.14bn USD 1.98bn 2.27bn Def bdgt EUR 1.68bn 1.90bn 2.46bn USD 1.99bn 2.01 bn USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 [a] NATO figure Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 1.78 0.75 2008 -2015 2022 Population 5,431,252 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 7.7% 2.5% 2.6% 3.0% 25.5% 7.2% Female 7.3% 2.4% 2.5% 2.8% 25.7% 10.9% Capabilities Slovakia is looking to modernise its armed forces and replace obsolete equipment while contributing to international crisis-management missions. A defence White Paper in September 2016 set out security priorities and a plan to increase defence capabilities. In 2017, the government approved a Long-Term Defence Development Plan. A new national-security strategy and a new defence strategy were drafted in 2020 and adopted by parliament in January 2021. A NATO and EU member state, Slovakia cooperates closely with the Visegrád Group, and there are reports that the country is considering forming a collective fighter jet pilot training programme. Bratislava has signed an agreement to enable air policing and closer integration of air-defence capabilities. A Defence Cooperation Agreement was signed with the United States in February 2022 and funds were allocated to Slovakia under the Foreign Military Financing Programme to help the country replace part of the military equipment sent to Ukraine since the Russian invasion. Germany is planning to supply 15 Leopard 2A4 MBTs, after Slovakia sent Infantry Fighting Vehicles to Ukraine. The air force is in the process of procuring new jet trainers in preparation for the delivery of its F-16s, expected between 2023 and 2024. US Patriot air defence systems arrived, after Slovakia donated S-300s to Ukraine. As part of plans to improve mechanised capabilities, agreements were signed in 2022 for the acquisition of Patria 8x8 armoured vehicles. CV90s will be delivered between 2025 and 2028. Slovakia has deployed a company-sized unit to NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence in Latvia and stood up the EFP Battle-group Slovakia to assist in defending NATO's eastern flank. In June 2021, Slovakia began planning for upgrades to Sliač air base, which is to become the main operating base for the F-16, and pilot training began in April in the US. Part of Slovakia's defence-industrial base is organised within the state-controlled holding company DMD Group, including KONSTRUKTA Defence, which produces land systems. Other companies focus on maintenance, repair and overhaul services. Europe 131 ACTIVE 17,950 (Army 10,300 Air 4,000 Central Staff 3,650) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Central Staff 3,650_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (5th) spec ops bn Army 10,300_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (2nd) armd bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mixed SP arty bn) Mechanised 1 (1st) mech bde (3 armd inf bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 engr bn, 1 NBC bn) COMBAT SUPPORT IMPbn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt bde (2 log bn, 1 maint bn, 1 spt bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHITING VEHICLES MBT 30 T-72M RECCE 18 BPsVI IFV 216:108 BMP-1; 91 BMP-2; 17 BVP-M APC 101+ APC (T) 72 OT-90 APC (W) 22: 7 OT-64; 15 Tatrapan (6x6) PPV 7+ RG-32M AUVIVECO LMV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV MT-55; VT-55A; VT-72B; WPT-TOPAS VLB AM-50; MT-55A MW Božena; UOS-155 Belarty ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE SP 9S428 with Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) on BMP-1; 9P135 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot) on BMP-2; 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) on BRDM-2 MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 60 SP 30: 152mm 3 M-77 Dana; 155mm 27: 16 M-2000 Zuzana; 11 Zuzana-2 MRL 30: 122mm 4 RM-70; 122/227mm 26 RM-70/85 MODULAR AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) Air Force 4,000_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29AS/UBS Fulcrum TRANSPORT 1 fit with C-27J Spartan 1 fit with L-410FG/T Turbolet TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H 1 sqn with UH-60M Black Hawk TRAINING 1 sqn with L-39CM/ZAM Albatros* AIR DEFENCE 1 bde with 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 19 combat capable FTR 11: 9 MiG-29 AS Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UBS Fulcrum; TPT 5: Medium 2 C-27J Spartan; Light 3: 1 L-410FG Turbolet; 2 L-410T Turbolet; (4 L-410UVP Turbolet in store) TRG 8:6 L-39CM,4Ztoros*; 2 L-39ZAM,4Ztoros* (1 more in store) HELICOPTERS ATK (15:5 Mi-24D Hind D; 10 Mi-24V Hind E all in store) MRH 13 Mi-17 Hip H (incl 4 SAR) TPT • Medium 9 UH-60M Black Hawk AIR DEFENCE • SAM Short-range 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); SARH R-27R (RS-AA-10A Alamo) DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 53 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 2 CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 300; 2 inf coy; 1 engr pi IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 5 LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 152; 1 arty bty with M-2000 Zuzana MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 4 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2 FOREIGN FORCES_ All under NATO Enhanced Vigilance Activities Czech Republic 400; 1 mech inf bn HQ; 1 mech inf coy Germany 480; 1 inf coy; 1 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3 Netherlands 125; 1 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3 Slovenia 101; 1 It inf coy United States 400; 1 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3 132 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Slovenia SVN Euro EUR 2021 2022 2023 GDP EUR 52.2bn 58.8bn USD 61.8bn 62.2bn per capita USD 29,298 29,469 Growth % 8.2 5.7 Inflation % 1.9 8.9 Def exp [a] EUR 645 m 699m USD 763m 739m Def bdgt [b] EUR 706m 835m 939m USD 836m 883m USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 [a] NATO figure [b] Indudes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008-- 2015 2022 Population 2,101,208 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 7.5% 2.4% 2.4% 2.6% 25.5% 9.7% Female 7.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.3% 23.5% 12.5% Capabilities_ Since joining NATO and the EU in 2004, territorial defence and the ability to take part in peace-support operations have been central to Slovenia's defence strategy. In January 2020, the defence ministry published a White Paper and in February 2022 authorised the Long-Term Development Programme for the Slovenian Armed Forces 2022-35. Subsequently, the government in April adopted a Medium-Term Development Programme to serve as the guiding document for defence programming and planning. Defence spending is increasing. Short term plans are focused on developing a medium infantry battalion (rather than two battalion groups originally envisaged) and equipped with IFVs and combat support and combat service support. In September, the country withdrew from an MOU for the acquisition of 45 Boxer armoured vehicles. Fixed-wing and rotary-wing transport capabilities are modestly improving with new acquisitions and upgrades. There are plans to establish a cyber reserve force. Slovenia has donated military equipment to Ukraine, reportedly including MBTs. Slovenia acts as the framework nation for the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence and in 2023 will provide units to the NATO VJTF. Italy and Hungary currently provide air policing capability under NATO arrangements. The country has contributed to EU, NATO and UN operations. Slovenia participates in NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence, where it contributes to the Canadian-led battle-group in Latvia and to the newly-formed battlegroup in Slovakia. Its defence industry relies heavily on exports for its revenue and focuses on personal equipment, small arms and ammunition, and CBRN protection and detection. ACTIVE 6,400 (Army 6,400) RESERVE 750 (Army 750) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 6,400_ FORCES BY ROLE Regt are bn sized SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit (1 spec ops coy, 1 CSS coy) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (1st) mech inf bde (1 mech inf regt, 1 mtn inf regt, 1 cbt spt bn (1 ISR coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy, 1 CBRN coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 SAM bty)) 1 (72nd) mech inf bde (2 mech inf regt, 1 cbt spt bn (1 ISR coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy, 1 CBRN coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 SAM bty)) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 EW coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde (1 log regt, 1 maint regt (1 tk coy), 1 med regt) Reserves_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mountain 2 inf regt (territorial - 1 allocated to each inf bde) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 14 M-84 (trg role) (32 more in store) APC 115+: APC (W) 115:85 Pandur 6x6 (Valuk); 30 Patria 8x8 (Svaruri) PPVCoHgar6x6JERRV AUV 38 JLTV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV VT-55A VLB MT-55A NBC VEHICLES 10 Cobra CBRN ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike MR/LR ARTILLERY 68 TOWED • 155mm 18 TN-90 MOR 50+: 82mm M-69; 120mm 50 MN-9/M-74 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) Army Maritime Element 130_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 2 PCC 1 Triglav III (RUS Svetlyak) PBF 1 Super Dvora Mkll Air Element 600_ FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Falcon 2000EX; L-410 Turbolet; PC-6B Turbo Porter TRAINING 1 unit with Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206); PC-9M*; Z-143L; Z-242L Europe 133 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS532AL Cougar; Bell 412 Twin Huey COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 maint sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 9 combat capable TPT 4: Light 3: 1 L-410 Turbolet; 2 PC-6B Turbo Porter PAX 1 Falcon 2000EX TRG 19: 9 PC-9M*; 2 Z-143L; 8 Z-242L HELICOPTERS MRH 8: 5 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412HP Twin Huey; 1 Bell 412SP Twin Huey TPT 8: Medium 4 AS532AL Cougar; Light 4 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206) DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 16 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 3 LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 42 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 9 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 97; 1 mot inf coy; 1 MP unit; 1 hel unit SLOVAKIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 101; 1 It inf coy Capabilities Spain ESP Euro EUR 2021 2022 GDP EUR 1.21tr 1.32tr USD 1.43tr 1.39tr per capita USD 30,090 29,198 Growth % 5.1 4.3 Inflation % 3.1 8.8 Def exp [a] EUR 12.5bn 13.1bn USD 14.8bn 13.9bn Def bdgt [b] EUR 12.8bn £l3.9bn USD 15.1bn £l4.7bn USD1=EUR 0.84 0.95 2023 £l7.5bn [a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Population 47,163,418 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 7.0% 2.7% 2.5% 2.4% 25.5% 8.7% Female 6.7% 2.6% 2.4% 2.4% 25.6% 11.5% The 2021 National Security Strategy indicated increased effort toward strengthening capacity against hybrid threats. Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the government unveiled plans to increase defence spending with the eventual goal of reaching by 2029 the NATO goal of spending 2% on defence. The National Defence Directive, issued in June 2020, updated defence policy guidelines and indicated a desire to foster an integrated approach to security alongside a drive to strengthen the national defence industry. Spain continues to support NATO, EU and UN operations abroad, and hosts one of NATO's two Combined Air Operations Centres.The armed forces are well trained and there is a routine exercise programme for both domestic and multinational exercises. The country's equipment and logistics-support capability appears to be sufficient to meet its national commitments and contribution to NATO operations and exercises. Equipment-modernisation plans include modernisation of army Chinook helicopters and Eurofighter combat aircraft, the acquisition of four S-80 submarines, new 8x8 armoured vehicles, and two military-communications satellites. Spain participates in the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project together with France and Germany. Spain's defence industry manufactures across all domains and exports globally, with major firms including state-owned shipbuilder Navantia, Airbus and Santa Barbara Sistemas, belonging to General Dynamics European Land Systems.The industry is largely integrated within the European defence-industrial manufacturing base. ACTIVE 124,150 (Army 71,900 Navy 20,500 Air 20,350 Joint 11,400) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 75,800 RESERVE 14,700 (Army 8,550 Navy 3,100 Air 2,550 Other 500) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 3 COMMUNICATIONS 2:1 Spainsat; 1 Xtar-Eur ISR 1 Paz Army 71,900 The Land Forces High Readiness HQ Spain provides one NATO Rapid Deployment Corps HQ (NRDC-ESP) FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 corps HQ (CGTAD/NRDC-ESP) (1 int regt, 1 MP bn) 2 div HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 comd (3 spec ops bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd cav regt (2 armd recce bn) Mechanised 2 (10th & 11th) mech bde (1 armd regt (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn), 1 mech inf regt (1 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn), 1 It inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 1 (12th) mech bde (1 armd regt (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn), 1 mech inf regt (1 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn), 1 mtn inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 134 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 1 (1st) mech bde (1 armd regt (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn), 1 armd inf regt (1 armd inf bn), 1 SP arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 2 (2nd/La Legion & 7th) It mech bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 mech inf regt (2 mech inf bn), 1 It inf bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) Mountain 1 mtn comd (1 mtn inf regt (1 mtn inf bn, 1 mtn inf coy); 1 mtn inf bn) Air Manoeuvre 1 (6th) bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1 It inf bn, 1 f d arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) Other 1 (Canary Islands) comd (1 It inf bde (2 mech inf regt (1 mech inf bn), 1 It inf regt (1 It inf bn), 1 fd arty regt, 1 AT coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn); 1 EW regt; 1 spt hel bn; 1 AD regt) 1 (Balearic Islands) comd (1 inf regt (1 It inf bn)) 2 (Ceuta and Melilla) comd (1 recce regt, 1 mech inf bn, 1 inf bn, 1 arty regt (1 fd arty bn, 1 ADA bn), 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty comd (1 arty regt; 1 MRL regt; 1 coastal arty regt) 1 engr comd (2 engr regt, 1 bridging regt) 1 EW/sigs bde (2 EW regt, 3 sigs regt) 1 NBC regt 1 info ops regt (1 CIMIC bn; 1 Psyops bn) 1 int regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde (5 log regt; 1 tpt regt; 1 med regt (1 log bn, 2 med bn, 1 fd hospital bn)) HELICOPTER 1 hel comd (1 atk hel bn, 2 spt hel bn, 1 tpt hel bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 log unit (1 spt coy, 1 supply coy)) AIR DEFENCE 1 AD comd (3 SAM regt, 1 sigs unit) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 327:108 Leopard 2A4; 219 Leopard 2E ASLT 84 Bl Centauro RECCE 187 VEC-M1 IFV 225: 204 Pizarro; 21 Pizarro (CP) APC 903 APC (T) 473: 20 Bv-206S; 453 M113 (incl variants) APC (W) 320 BMR-600/BMR-600M1 PPV 110 RG-31 AUV 258 IVECO LMV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 27 CZ-10/25E; 1 Pizarro CEV (Castor) (in test) ARV 51:16 Leopard REC; 5 BMR REC; 4 Centauro REC; 14 Maxxpro MRV; 12 Ml 13 VLB 15 M60 AVLB MW 6 Husky 2G ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike-LR; TOW ARTILLERY 1,552 SP 155mm 95 M109A5 TOWED 268:105mm 204: 56 L118 Light Gun; 148 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 64 SBT155/52 SIAC MOR 1,189: 81mm 777; SP 81mm 10 VAMTAC with Cardom 81mm; 120mm 402 COASTAL DEFENCE • ARTY 155mm 19 SBT 155/52 APU SBT V07 HELICOPTERS ATK 18 Tiger HAD-E TPT 84: Heavy 17:13 CH-47D Chinook (HT-17D); 4 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 48:16 AS332B Super Puma (HU-21); 12 AS532UL Cougar; 6 AS532AL Cougar; 14 NH90 TTH; Light 19: 3 Bell 212 (HU.18); 16 H135 (HE.26/HU.26) UAV • ISR • Medium 6: 2 Searcher MkH-J (PASI); 4 Searcher Mklll (PASI) AIR DEFENCE SAM 79+ Long-range 18 M901 Patriot PAC-2 Medium-range 40 MIM-23B l-Hawk Phase III Short-range 21: 8 NASAMS; 13 Skyguard/Aspide Point-defence Mistral GUNS • TOWED 35mm 67:19 GDF-005; 48 GDF-007 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM Spike-ER Navy 20,500 (incl Naval Aviation and Marines) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 2 SSK 2 Galerna with 4 single 533mm TT with F17 mod 2HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11 DESTROYERS • DDGHM 5 Alvaro de Bazan with Aegis Baseline 5 C2,2 quad lnchr with RGM-84F Harpoon Block ID AShM, 6 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA/ RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60B Seahawk ASW hel) FRIGATES • FFGH 6 Santa Maria with 1 Mk 13 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Meroka mod 2B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SH-60B Seahawk ASW hel) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3: LHD 1 Juan Carlos I (capacity 18 hel or 10 AV-8B FGA ac; 4 LCM-1E; 42 APC; 46 MBT; 900 troops) LPD 2 Galicia (capacity 6 Bell 212 or 4 SH-3D Sea King hel; 4 LCM or 2 LCM & 8 AAV; 130 APC or 33 MBT; 540 troops) LANDING CRAFT • LCM 12 LCM IE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 AORH 2:1 Patino (capacity 3 Bell 212 or 2 SH-3D Sea King hel); 1 Cantabria (capacity 3 Bell 212 or 2 SH-3D Sea King hel) Europe 135 Maritime Action Force_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 23 PSOH 6 Meteoro (Buques de Accion Maritima) with 1 76mm gun PSO 5: 3 Alboran each with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Descubierta with 1 76mm gun PCO 4 Serviola with 1 76mm gun PCC 3 Anaga with 1 76mm gun PB 4; 2 P-101; 2 ToraHa PBR 1 Čaro Fradera MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6 MHO 6 Segura LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 30 AGl lAlerta AGOR 2 (with ice-strengthened hull, for polar research duties in Antarctica) AGS 3; 2 Malaspina; 1 Castor AKR 1 Ysŕéd AP 1 Contramaestre Casado with 1 hel landing platform ASR 1 Neptuno ATF 3; 1 Mar Caribe; 1 Mahon; 1 La Gratia AXL 10; 6 Contramaestre; 4 Guardiamarina AXS8 Naval Aviation 850_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II Plus ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with SH-60B/F Seahawk TRANSPORT 1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 550 Citation II; Cessna 650 Citation VII TRAINING 1 sqn with Hughes 500MD8 1 fit with TAV-8B Harrier TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 212 (HU-18) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable EGA 13; 12 AV-8B Harrier II Plus; 1 TAV-8B Harrier (on lease from USMC) TPT • Light 4; 3 Cessna 550 Citation II; 1 Cessna 650 Citation VII HELICOPTERS ASW 18; 12 SH-60B Seahawk; 6 SH-60F Seahawk MRH 9 Hughes 500MD TPT • Light 7 Bell 212 (HA-18) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM ASM AGM-65G Maverick; AGM-114K/R Hellfire II AShM AGM-119 Penguin Marines 5,350_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bn MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bde (1 recce unit, 1 mech inf bn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn) Other 1 sy bde (5 mne garrison gp) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 34; 32 Piranha ETC; 1 Piranha IIIC (amb); 1 Piranha IIIC EW (EW) AAV 18; 16 AAV-7A1/AAVP-7A1; 2 AAVC-7A1 (CP) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 4 Piranha IIIC ARV 3; 1 AAVR-7A1; 1 M88; 1 Pironte IIIC ARTILLERY 30 SP 155mm 6 M109A2 TOWED 105mm 24 Model 56 pack howitzer ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike-LR; TOW-2 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Mistral Air Force 20,350_ The Spanish Air Force is organised in 3 commands -General Air Command, Combat Air Command and Canary Islands Air Command FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 5 sqn with F/A-18A/B MLU Hornet (EF-18A/B MLU) MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with P-3A/M Orion ISR 1 sqn with Beech C90 King Air 1 sqn with Cessna 550 Citation V; CN235 (TR-19A) SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with AS332B/B1 Super Puma; CN235 VIGMA 1 sqn with AS332B Super Puma; CN235 VIGMA; H215 (AS332C1) Super Puma 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar; CN235 VIGMA TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with A400M TRANSPORT 1 VIP sqn with A310; Falcon 900 1 sqn with A400M 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar 2 sqn with C295 1 sqn with CN235 TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon 1 OCU sqn with F/A-18A/B (EF-18A/B MLU) Hornet 1 sqn with Beech F33C Bonanza 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar 1 sqn with PC-21 1 sqn with T-35 Pillan (E-26) 2 (LIFT) sqn with F-5B Freedom Fighter 1 hel sqn with H120 Colibri 1 hel sqn with S-76C TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS332M1 Super Puma; AS532UL Cougar (VIP) ISR UAV 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper (forming) 136 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 175 combat capable FTR 88: 69 Eurofighter Typhoon; 19 F-5B Freedom Fighter FGA 84: 20 F/A-18A Hornet (EF-18A); 52 EF-18A MLU; 12 EF-18B MLU ASW 3 P-3M Orion MP 8 CN235 VIGMA ISR 2 CN235 (TR-19A) EW1 C-212 Aviocar (TM.12D) TPT 73: Heavy 13 A400M; Light 51: 3 Beech C90 King Air; 15 Beech F33C Bonanza; 10 C-212 Aviocar (ind 9 trg); 12 C295; 8 CN235; 3 Cessna 560 Citation V (ISR); PAX 9: 2 A310; 2 A330 (to be converted to MRTT tkt/tpt configuration); 5 Falcon 900 (VIP) TRG 60: 24 PC-21; 36 T-35 Pillan (E-26) HELICOPTERS TPT 43: Medium 21: 5 AS332B/B1 Super Puma; 4 AS332M1 Super Puma; 4 H215 (AS332C1) Super Puma; 2 AS532UL Cougar (VIP); 6 NH90 TTH; Light 22: 14 H120 Colibri; 8 S-76C UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR • Heavy 4 MQ-9A Reaper (unarmed) AIR DEFENCE • SAM Short-range Sky guar d/Aspide Point-defence Mistral AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L/IULI Sidewinder; HR IRIS-T; SARH AIM-7P Sparrow; ARH AIM-120B/C AMRAAM; Meteor ARM AGM-88B HARM ASM AGM-65G Maverick AShM AGM-84D Harpoon LACM Taurus KEPD 350 BOMBS Laser-guided: GBU-10/-12/-16 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway III; BPG-2000 Laser & INS/GPS-guided EGBU-16 Paveway II INS/GPS guided: GBU-38 ID AM Emergencies Military Unit (UME) 3,500 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 div HQ MANOEUVRE Other 5 Emergency Intervention bn 1 Emergency Support and Intervention regt COMBAT SUPPORT 1 sigs bn HELICOPTER 1 hel bn opcon Army Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 75,800 DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 2 BULGARIA: NATO • Enhanced Air Policing 130; 6 Eurofighter Typhoon CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 8 DJIBOUTI: EU • Operation Atalanta 60; 1 P-3M Orion GULF OF ADEN & INDIAN OCEAN: EU • Operation Atalanta 220; 1 FFGHM GULF OF GUINEA: Navy 50; 1 PCO IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 1 trg unit; 1 hel unit with 3 NH90 TTH; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 130; 1 armd inf coy LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 504; 1 armd inf coy(+); 1 arty bty; 1 cbt engr coy; 1 SAM bty with NASAMS LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 669; 1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn(-); 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 log coy MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 420; 1 hel unit with 3 NH90 TTH; UN • MINUSMA 1 MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMG 2: 200; 1 DDGHM; NATO • SNMCMG 2:40; 1 MHO MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 2 SENEGAL: Operation Barkhane 65; 2 C295M SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 20 TURKEY: NATO • Operation Active Fence 150; 1 SAM bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2 FOREIGN FORCES_ United States US European Command: 3,550; 4 DDGM; 1 air base at Moron; 1 naval base at Rota Guardia Civil 75,800_ 17 regions, 54 Rural Comds FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 8 (rural) gp MANOEUVRE Other 15 (traffic) sy gp 1 (Special) sy bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 64 PSO 1 with 1 hel landing platform PCC2 PBF34 PB27 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3:2 CN235-300; 1 King Air 350i HELICOPTERS MRH 20:4 AS653N3 Dauphin; 16 Bo-105ATH TPT • Light 21: 8 BK-117; 13 H135 Europe 137 Sweden SWE Swedish Krona SEK 2021 2022 GDP SEK 5.45tr 5.98tr USD 636bn 604bn per capita USD 60,816 56,361 Growth % 5.1 2.6 Inflation % 2.7 7.2 Def bdgt SEK 71.2bn 79.9bn USD 8.30bn 8.07bn USD1=SEK 8.58 9.89 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- 2022 Population 10,483,647 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.9% 2.9% 2.9% 3.3% 22.7% 9.6% Female 8.4% 2.7% 2.6% 3.1% 21.9% 11.0% Capabilities_ Sweden's armed forces remain configured for territorial defence and there has been growing concern over Russia's military activity in the Baltic area. There has also been a focus on increasing cooperation with neighbours and NATO in recent years. Sweden applied for NATO membership in May 2022, three months after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Sweden also plans to increase its defence budget to 2% of GDP. Under the 2021-25 defence bill, which was presented in October 2020, Sweden had already envisaged increased spending. Measures to enhance societal resilience and the ability to deal with civil emergencies have also been announced. In July 2019, Sweden joined the UK-led Tempest project for a future combat aircraft, and in 2022 signed a mutual security agreement with the UK. Concerns over readiness levels have led to greater cooperation with NORDEFCO. In May 2018, Sweden, Finland and the US signed a statement of intent to develop closer cooperation on exercises and interoperability. Sweden has started to re-garrison the island of Gotland, and is in the process of establishing five new regiments which will raise and train new infantry battalions. Readiness challenges in the air force triggered a discussion about extending the service life of the JAS-39C Gripens beyond their intended 2026 retirement date, not least since the air force was slated to receive a lower number of JAS-39Es than requested. Air defence has been boosted in recent years with the acquisition of the Patriot system. The country's export-oriented defence industry is privately owned and capable of meeting most of the armed forces'equipment needs, including for advanced combat aircraft and conventional submarines. ACTIVE 14,600 (Army 6,850 Navy 2,350 Air 2,700 Other 2,950) Voluntary Auxiliary Organisations 21,200 Conscript liability 4-11 months, depending on branch (selective conscription; 4,000 in total, gender neutral) RESERVE 10,000 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 6,850_ The army has been transformed to provide brigade-sized task forces depending on the operational requirement FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 2 bde HQ MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bn Armoured 5 armd bn 1 armd BG Mechanised 1 mech bn Light 1 mot inf bn 1 It inf bn Air Manoeuvre 1 ABbn Other 1 sy bn COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bn 2 engr bn 2 MP coy 1 CBRN coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 tpt coy AIR DEFENCE 2ADbn Reserves_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 40 Home Guard bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 120 Leopard 2A5 (Strv 122) IF V 411; 369 CV9040 (Strf 9040; ind 54 CP); 42 Epbv 90 (OP) APC 1,064 APC (T) 389; 239 Pbv 302 (ind variants); 150 BvS-10 Mkll APC (W) 315+; some Bastion APC; 34 XA-180 Sisu (Patgb 180); 20 XA-202 Sisu (Patgb 202); 148 XA-203 Sisu (Patgb 203); 113 Patria AMV (XA-360/Patgb 360) PPV 360 RG-32M ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 6 Pionierpanzer-3 Kodiak (Ingbv 120) ARV 40; 14 Bgbv 120; 26 Bgbv 90 VLB 3 Brobv 120 MW 33+; Aardvark Mk2; 33 Area Clearing System ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS NLAW; RBS-55 RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf 138 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 ARTILLERY 357 SP 155mm 35 Archer MOR 322: 81mm 201 IvI/86; 120mm 81 M/41D SP 120mm 40 CV90 Mjolner (Gkpbv 90) AIR DEFENCE SAM 14+ Long-range 6 M903 Patriot PAC-3 MSE Medium-range MIM-23B Hawk (RBS-97) Short-range 8 IRIS-T SLS (RBS-98); RBS-23 BAMSE Point-defence RBS-70 GUNS • SP 40mm 30 Lvkv 90 Navy 1,250; 1,100 Amphibious (total 2,350) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINE • SSK 5: 1 Gotland (fitted with AIP) with 2 single 400mm TT with Torped 431 LWT/Torped 451 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with Torped 613 HWT/Torped 62 HWT 2 Gotland mod (fitted with AIP) with 2 single 400mm TT with Torped 431 LWT/Torped 451 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with Torped 613 HWT/Torped 62 HWT 2 Sodermanland (fitted with AIP) with 3 single 400mm TT with Torped 431 LWT/Torped 451 LWT, 6 single 533mm TT with Torped 613 HWT/Torped 62 HWT PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 150 CORVETTES • FSG 5 Visby with 8 RBS15 Mk2 AShM, 4 single 400mm ASTT with Torped 45 LWT, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCGT 4: 2 Gbteborg with 4 twin lnchr with RBS15 Mk2 AShM, 4 single 400mm ASTT with Torped 431 LWT, 1 57mm gun 2 Stockholm with 4 twin lnchr with RBS15 Mk2 AShM, 4 single 400mm ASTT with Torped 431 LWT, 1 57mm gun PBF 133: 100+ Combat Boat 90H (capacity 18 troops); 27 Combat Boat HS (capacity 18 troops); 6 Combat Boat 90HSM (capacity 18 troops) PB 8 Tapper (Type 80) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7 MCC 5 Koster (SWE Landsort mod) MCD 2 Sparo (Styrs'6 mod) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 11 LCVP 8 Trossbat LCAC 3 Griffon 8100TD LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 15 AG 2: 1 Carlskrona with 1 hel landing platform (former ML); 1 Trosso (spt ship for corvettes and patrol vessels but can also be used as HQ ship) AGF 2 Ledningsbat 2000 AGI1 Orion AKL 1 Loke ARS 2:1 Belos III; 1 Furusund (former ML) AX5Altair AXS 2:1 Falken; 1 Gladan Amphibious 1,100_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 amph bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 M/86 COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 8 RBS-17 Hellfire Coastal Defence_ FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 1 AShM bfy with RBS-15 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM RBS-15 Air Force 2,700_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR 6 sqn with JAS 39C/D Gripen TRANSPORT/ISR/AEW&C 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules (Tp-84); KC-130H Hercules (Tp-84); Gulfstream IV SRA-4 (S-102B); S-100B/D Argus TRAINING 1 unit with Sk-60 AIR DEFENCE 1 (fighter control and air surv) bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 98 combat capable FGA 98: 96 JAS 39C/D Gripen; 2 JAS 39E Gripen (in test) ELINT 2 Gulfstream IV SRA-4 (S-102B) AEW&C 3:1 S-100B Argus; 2 S-100D Argus TKR/TPT 1 KC-130H Hercules (Tp-84) TPT 8: Medium 5 C-130H Hercules (Tp-84); Light 2 Saab 340 (OS-100A/Tp-100C); PAX 1 Gulfstream 550 (Tp-102D) TRG 67 Sk-60W UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 8 RQ-7 Shadow (AUV 3 Omen) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-65 Maverick (RB-75) AShM RB-15F AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder (RB-74); IIR IRIS-T (RB-98); ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM (RB-99); Meteor BOMBS Laser-Guided GBU-12 Paveway II INS/GPS guided GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb Armed Forces Hel Wing_ FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 3 sqn with AW109 (Hkp 15A); AW109M (Hkp-15B); NH90 TTH (Hkp-14) (SAR/ASW); UH-60M Black Hawk (Hkp-16) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS TPT 53: Medium 33:15 UH-60M Black Hawk (Hkp-16); 18 NH90 TTH (Hkp-14) (of which 9 configured for ASW); Light 20:12 AW109 (Hkp-15A); 8 AW109M (Hkp-15B) Special Forces_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops gp COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt spt gp Europe 139 Other 2,950_ Includes staff, logisitics and intelligence personnel FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT 1EW bn 1 psyops unit COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2 log bn 1 maint bn 4 med coy 1 tpt coy DEPLOYMENT_ INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 4 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 2; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 1 KOREA, REPUBLIC OF: NNSC • 5 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 8; UN • MINUSMA 184; 1 int coy MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 7 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 3 SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 5 UNITED KINGDOM: Operation Interflex 45 (UKR trg) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 1 Switzerland CHE Swiss Franc CHF 2021 2022 2023 GDP CHF 731bn 766bn USD 800bn 807bn per capita USD 92,249 92,434 Growth % 4.2 2.2 Inflation % 0.6 3.1 Def bdgt [a] CHF 5.20bn 5.27bn 5.30bn USD 5.69bn 5.55bn USD1=CHF 0.91 0.95 [a] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008-- ---2015--- 2022 Population 8,508,698 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.0% 2.5% 2.7% 3.0% 24.6% 8.6% Female 7.5% 2.4% 2.6% 3.0% 24.6% 10.6% Capabilities_ The conscript-based armed forces are postured for territorial defence and limited participation in international peace-support operations. The government has begun to reduce its armed forces, reflecting an assessment that in the militia-based system not all personnel would realistically be available for active service. With permanent neutrality a core feature of foreign and security policy, Switzerland is not a member of any alliances, although it joined NATO's Partnership for Peace programme in 1996 and on occasion contributes to NATO- and EU-led operations alongside its engagement in UN or OSCE missions. Switzerland does not participate in combat operations for peace-enforcement purposes and its deployments are limited in size. The 2016 armed-forces development plan emphasised improvements in readiness, training and equipment. In 2022, the defence ministry published a paper on the future of the armed forces out to the 2030s, summarising its approach to modernisation requirements for air defence and ground forces and for stronger cyber capabilities. The approach to readiness is changing to a flexible model in which different units are called up for active service gradually and on different timelines. A multi-stage selection process for aircraft to replace the F-5 Tiger II and F/A-18 Hornet was completed in June 2021 and the F-35A was chosen. The life of the Hornet fleet has been extended until 2030. This was approved by parliament in September 2022, after which the contract was signed. Plans for a referendum on the F-35 procurement gathered the required number of signatures but were withdrawn after the government indicated it would not diverge from the procurement timetable. The fighter-acquisition programme was capped at CHF6 billion in May 2019 and has been separated from the ground-based air-defence procurement. Previously both programmes were linked. Other priorities include upgrades to Switzerland's air-surveillance systems and to transport helicopters. Switzerland's defence industry has limited design and manufacturing capabilities, with recognised capacity in the land-vehicles sector, which has links to North American firms. ACTIVE 19,550 (Armed Forces 19,550) Conscript liability 260-600 compulsory service days depending on rank. 18 or 23 weeks'training (depending on branch) generally at age 20, followed by 6 refresher trg courses (3 weeks each). Alternative service available RESERVE 123,450 Civil Defence 73,000 (51,000 Reserve) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Armed Forces 3,100 active; 16,450 conscript (19,550 total)_ Operations Command 72,600 on mobilisation 4 Territorial Regions. With the exception of military police all units are non-active FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 4 regional comd SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF bn MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 (1st & 11th) bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs bn) Mechanised 1 (4th) bde (2 recce bn, 2 SP arty bn, 1 ptn br bn) Light 10 infbn 7 mtn inf bn 1 mtn inf unit 140 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 COMBAT SUPPORT 4 engr bn 4MPbn 1NBC bn 1 int unit COMBAT SUPPORT 4 engr rescue bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 134 Leopard 2 (Pz-87 Leo) IFV 186:154 CV9030CH; 32 CV9030 (CP) APC 1,233 APC (T) 309 M113A2 (incl variants) APC (W) 924 Piranha I/II/IIIC AUV 292:173 Eagle II; 119 Eagle III (CP) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 12 Kodiak ARV 25 Büffel VLB 9 Leopard 2 with Leguan MW 46: 26 Area Clearing System; 20 M113A2 NBC VEHICLES 12 Piranha IIIC CBRN ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • SP 106 Piranha ITOW-2 ARTILLERY 355 SP 155mm 133 M109 KAWEST MOR • 81mm 222 Mw-72 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14 PB 14 Watercat 1250 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger Air Force 18,900 on mobilisation_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II 3 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air; DHC-6 Twin Otter; PC-6 Turbo Porter; PC-12 1 VIP Fit with Cessna 560XL Citation; CL-604 Challenger; Falcon 900EX; PC-24 TRAINING 1 sqn with PC-7CH Turbo Trainer; PC-21 1 sqn with PC-9 (tgt towing) 1 OCU Sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 6 sqn with AS332M Super Puma; AS532UL Cougar; H135M ISR UAV 1 sqn with Hermes 900 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 55 combat capable FTR 25: 20 F-5E Tiger II; 5 F-5F Tiger II EGA 30: 25 F/A-18C Hornet; 5 F/A-18D Hornet TPT 23: Light 19:1 Beech 350 King Air; 1 Cessna 560XL Citation; 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 14 PC-6 Turbo Porter; 1 PC-6 (owned by armasuisse, civil registration); 1 PC-12 (owned by armasuisse, civil registration); PAX 4: 2 CL-604 Challenger; 1 Falcon 900EX; 1 PC-24 (VIP) TRG 40: 27 PC-7CH Turbo Trainer; 5 PC-9 (used for target training only); 8 PC-21 HELICOPTERS MRH 20 H135M TPT • Medium 24:15 AS332M Super Puma; 9 AS532UL Cougar UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 1 Hermes 900 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • A AM • HR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120B/C-7 AMRAAM Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD)_ GBAD assets can be used to form AD clusters to be deployed independently as task forces within Swiss territory EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 56+: 56 Rapier; FIM-92 Stinger GUNS 35mm 27 GDF-003/-005 with Skyguard Armed Forces Logistic Organisation 9,650 on mobilisation_ FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde (6 log bn; 1 tpt bn; 6 med bn) Command Support Organisation 11,150 on mobilisation_ FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt bde Training Command 37,350 on mobilisation COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 5 trg unit Civil Defence 73,000 (51,000 Reserve)_ (not part of armed forces) DEPLOYMENT_ BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR (Operation Althea) 20 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1 INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 3 KOREA, REPUBLIC OF: NNSC • 5 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 5 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 11 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 186 (military volunteers); 1 inf coy; 1 engr pi; 1 hel fit with AS332M Super Puma SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2 Europe 141 Turkey TUR New Turkish Lira TRY 2021 2022 GDP TRY 7.25tr 14.29tr USD 818bn 853bn per capita USD 9,654 9,961 Growth % 11.4 5.0 Inflation % 19.6 73.1 Def exp [a] TRY 117bn 138bn USD 13.1bn 8.2bn Def bdgt [b] TRY 84.6bn 104bn USD 9.55bn 6.19bn USD1=TRY 8.87 16.74 2023 206bn [a] NATO figure [b] Includes funding for Undersecretariat of Defence Industries; Defence Industry Support Fund;TUBITAK Defense Industries R&D Institute (SAGE); and military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 16.30 Population 83,047,706 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 11.5% 4.0% 3.9% 3.7% 23.0% 4.1% Female 11.0% 3.8% 3.7% 3.6% 22.7% 4.9% Capabilities Turkey has large, generally well-equipped armed forces that are primarily structured for national defence. Much recent activity has focused on internal security and cross-border operations in response to the continuing wars in Syria and Libya. The conflict with Kurdish armed groups continues. The armed forces'2033 strategic plan aims to modernise military equipment and force structures. Turkey is a NATO member and has provided access to its airspace and facilities for operations in Iraq and Syria. However, relationships with NATO allies have come underpressure after Ankara's decision to procure the Russian-made S-400 air-defence system, its operations in northern Syria, rising tensions with Greece in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, its role in Libya and its position regarding the fighting in recent years between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Following an attempted coup in July 2016, Ankara dismissed large numbers of officers from the armed forces. The armed forces train regularly, including with NATO allies. While key subcomponents are still often imported, a number of locally developed equipment designs are in production. Efforts are under way to increase military exports and Turkey has secured markets in Azerbaijan, Pakistan and Ukraine, as well as a number of African states, successfully offering cost-effective assets in specific sectors. The US government terminated Turkey's participation in the F-35 programme after deliveries under the S-400 contract began in 2019. Turkey is also developing a domestic fighter aircraft but is dependent on collaboration with external defence companies. The president has authority over defence procurement and control over Turkey's top defence companies. Turkey has signed defence-cooperation agreements with a focus on exports and technology transfer, in an effort to boost its national defence industry and achieve defence-industrial autonomy. ACTIVE 355,200 (Army 260,200 Navy 45,000 Air 50,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 156,800 Conscript liability 12 months (5.5 months for university graduates; 21 days for graduates with exemption) (reducing to 6 months) RESERVE 378,700 (Army 258,700 Navy 55,000 Air 65,000) Reserve service to age 41 for all services ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE_ Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • ISR 2 Gokturk-1/2 Army £260,200 (incl conscripts)_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 4 army HQ 9 corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 8 cdo bde 1 mtn cdo bde 1 cdo regt MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (52nd) armd div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde) 7 armd bde Mechanised 2 (28th & 29th) mech div 14 mech inf bde Light 1 (23rd) mot inf div (3 mot inf regt) 7 mot inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bde 1 trg arty bde 6 arty regt 2 engr regt AVIATION 4 avn regt 4 avn bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 2,378: 316 Leopard 2A4 (being upgraded); 170 Leopard 1A4; 227 Leopard 1A3; 100 M60A1; 650 M60A3 TTS; 165 M60TM Firat; 750 M48A5 T2 Patton IFV 645 ACV AIFV APC 6,403 APC (T) 3,579: 823 ACV AAPC; 2,813 M113/M113A1/ M113A2 APC (W) 57 Pars 6x6 (incl variants) PPV 2,710: 360 Edjer Yalcin 4x4; e2,000 Kirpi/Kirpi-ll; e350 Vuran AUV 1,450: e250 Akrep; 800+ Cobra; e400 Cobra II ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 12+: AZMIM; 12 M48 AEV; M113A2T2 ARV 150:12 BPz-2; 105 M48T5; 33 M88A1 VLB 88: 36 Leguan; 52 Mobile Floating Assault Bridge MW 14+: 4 Husky 2G; 10 Kirpi PMKI; Tamkar; Bozena 142 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 625:365 ACV TOW; 184 Kaplan STA; 76 Pars STA 4x4 MANPATS 9K135 Kornet-E (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); Eryx; FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; OMTAS; Tek-Er RCL 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY 2,760+ SP 1,080: 155mm 828: £150 M44T1; 365 M52T (mod); £280 T-155 Firtina; eY30 T-155 Firtina II; 175mm 36 M107; 203mm 219 M110A2 TOWED 675+: 105mm 82: 7 Boron (in test); 75+ M101A1; 155mm 557: 517 M114A1/M114A2; 40 Panter; 203mm 36+ M115 MRL 98+: 122mm £36 T-122; 227mm 12 M270 MLRS; 302mm 50+ TR-300 Kasirga (WS-1) MOR 907+ SP 329+: 81mm some; 107mm e150 M106; 120mm 179 TOWED 578+: 81mm some; 120mm 578 HY12 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional Bora; MGM-140A ATACMS (launched from M270 MLRS); J-600T Yildrim (B-611/CH-SS-9 mod 1) AIRCRAFT ISR 5 Beech 350 King Air TPT • Light 8: 5 Beech 200 King Air; 3 Cessna 421 TRG 49:45 Cessna T182; 4 T-42A Cochise HELICOPTERS ATK 96: 18 AH-1P Cobra; 12 AH-1S Cobra; 5 AH-1W Cobra; 4 TAH-1P Cobra; 9 T129A; 48 T129B MRH 28 Hughes 300C TPT 226+: Heavy 11 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 76+: 28 AS532UL Cougar; 48+ S-70A Black Hawk; Light 139: 12 Bell 204B (AB-204B); £43 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 64 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 20 Bell 206 Jet Ranger UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Medium 33 Bayraktar TB2 ISR • Heavy Falcon 600/Firebee; Medium CL-89; Gnat LOITERING & DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS Harpy AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM Mizrak-U (UMTAS) BOMBS Laser-guided MAM-C/L AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range HISAR-A/A+; HISAR-O Point-defence 148+: 70 Atilgan PMADS octuple Stinger lnchr, 78 Zipkin PMADS quad Stinger lnchr; FIM-92 Stinger GUNS 1,404 SP 35mm 42 Korkut TOWED 1,362:20mm 439 GAI-D01/Rh-202; 35mm 120 GDF-001/-003; 40mm 803 L/60/L/70 Navy £45,000 (incl conscripts)_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 12 4 Atilay (GER Type-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT 4 Gür (GER Type-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84 Harpoon AShM/Mk 24 Tigerfish mod 2 HWT/ SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT 4 Preveze (GER Type-209/1400) (MLU ongoing) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84 Harpoon AShM/Mk 24 Tigerfish mod 2 HWT/SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 16 FFGHM 16: 4 Barbaras (GER MEKO 200 mod) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 2 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 3 Sea Zenith CIWS, 1127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) 4 Gabya (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1 Mk 13 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM/SM-lMR Block VI SAM, 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B Seahawk/AB-212 ASW hel) 4 Gabya (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1 Mk 13 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM/SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B Seahawk/AB-212 ASW hel) 4 Yavuz (GER MEKO 200TN) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 3 Sea Zenith CIWS, 1127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 45 CORVETTES 10: FSGHM 4 Ada with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 1 Mk 49 21-cell lnchr with RIM-116 SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B Seahawk hel) FSG 6 Burak (ex-FRA d'Estienne d'Orves) with 2 single lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 4 single 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Creusot-Loire Mk 54 A/S mor, 1 100mm gun (1 vessel with 1 76mm gun instead) PCFG 19: 4 Dogan (GER Lurssen-57) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 1 76mm gun 9 Kilic with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 1 76mm gun 4 Riizgar (GER Lurssen-57) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 1 76mm gun 2 Yildiz with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 1 76mm gun PCC 16 Tuzla MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 15 MHO 11: 5 Engin (FRA Circe); 6Aydin MSC 4 Seydi (US Adjutant) Europe 143 AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 5: 2 Baymktar with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 hel landing platform (capacity 20 MBT; 250 troops) 1 Osmangazi with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 4 LCVP; 17 tanks; 980 troops; 1 hel landing platform) 2 Sarucabey with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 11 tanks; 600 troops; 1 hel landing platform) LANDING CRAFT 38 LCT 21: 2 C-120/130; 11 C-140; 8 C-151 LCM 9:1 C-310; 8 LCM 8 LCVP 8 Anadolu 16m LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 37 ABU 2:1 AG5; 1 AG6 with 1 76mm gun AGI1 Iffwfc (MILGEM) (capacity 1 S-70B Seahawk hel) AGS 2:1 Cesme (ex-US Silas Bent); 1 CutafcZn AOR 2 Afcar with 1 Mk 15 P/iatanx CIWS, 1 hel landing platform AOT 3: 2 Burak; 1 Yuzbasi Gungor Durmus with 1 hel landing platform AOL 1 Gurcan AP1 Iskenderun ASR 3:1 Alemdar with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Ism II ATF 9:1 Akbas; 1 Degirmendere; 1 Gazal; 1 Inebolu; 5 Onder AWT 3 SogHt AXL8 AX 2 Pass (ex-GER R/ieiVi) Marines 3,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bde (3 mne bn; 1 arty bn) Naval Aviation_ FORCES BY ROLE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 2 sqn with Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); S-70B Seahawk 1 sqn with ATR-72-600; CN235M-100; TB-20 Trinidad EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable ASW 4 ATR-72-600 MP 6 CN235M-100 TPT • Light 7: 3 ATR-72-600; 4 TB-20 Trinidad HELICOPTERS ASW 33:9 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); 24 S-70B Seahawk UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 20 CISR 20: Heavy 9: 3 Aksungur; 8 Anka-S; Medium 9 Bayraktar TB2 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114M Hellfire II BOMBS • Laser-guided MAM-C/L Air Force £50,000_ 2 tac air forces (divided between east and west) FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-4E Phantom 2020 8 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon ISR 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 unit with King Air 350 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn (forming) with B-737 AEW&C EW 1 unit with CN235M EW SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with AS532AL/UL Cougar TANKER 1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker TRANSPORT 1 sqn with A400M; C-160D Transall 1 sqn with C-130B/E Hercules 1 (VIP) sqn with Cessna 550 Citation II (UC-35); Cessna 650 Citation VII; CN235M; Gulfstream 550 3 sqn with CN235M 10 (liaison) fit with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); CN235M TRAINING 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn (display team) with NF-5A-2000/NF-5B-2000 Freedom Fighter 1 sqn with MFI-395 Super Mushshak; SF-260D 1 sqn with Hurkus-B; KT-IT 1 sqn with T-38A/M Talon 1 sqn with T-41D Mescalero COMBAT/ISR UAV 1 sqn with Akinci AIR DEFENCE 4 bn with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) 4 sqn with MIM-14 Nike Hercules 2 sqn with Rapier 8 (firing) unit with MIM-23 Hawk MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 295 combat capable FTR 16: up to 10 NF-5A-2000 Freedom Fighter (display team); up to 6 NF-5B-2000 Freedom Fighter (display team) EGA 279:19 F-4E Phantom 2020; 27 F-16C Fighting Falcon Block 30; 162 F-16C Fighting Falcon Block 50; 14 F-16C Fighting Falcon Block 50+; 8 F-16D Block 30 Fighting Falcon; 33 F-16D Fighting Falcon Block 50; 16 F-16D Fighting Falcon Block 50+ ISR 9:5 Beech 350 King Air; 3 C-160D Transall; 1 CN235M (Open Skies) EW 2 C-160D Transall SIGINT 3 CN235M AEW&C 4 B-737 AEW&C TKR 7 KC-135R Stratotanker TPT 84: Heavy 10 A400M; Medium 24:6 C-130B Hercules; 13 C-130E Hercules; 5 C-160D Transall; Light 49: 2 Cessna 550 Citation II (UC-35 - VIP); 2 Cessna 650 Citation VII; 45 CN235M; PAX 1 Gulfstream 550 TRG 174-AHurkus-B; 39 KT-IT; 3 MFI-395 Super Mushshak; 33 SF-260D; 70 T-38A/M Talon; 25 T-41D Mescalero HELICOPTERS TPT 35: Medium 20: 6 AS532AL Cougar (CSAR); 14 AS532UL Cougar (SAR); Light 15 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) 144 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 25: 6 Akinci; 19 Anka-S ISR 27: Heavy 9: 9 Heron; Medium 18 Gnat 750 AIR DEFENCE • SAM 32+ Long-range 32+: MIM-14 Nike Hercules; 32 S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) Medium-range MIM-23 Hawk Point-defence Rapier AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9S Sidewinder; Shafrir 2%; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7E Sparrow; ARH AIM- 120A/B AMRAAM ARM AGM-88A HARM ASM AGM-65A/G Maverick; Popeye I LACM Coventional AGM-84K SLAM-ER BOMBS Electro-optical guided GBU-8B HOBOS (GBU-15) Laser-guided MAM-C/-L; Paveway I/II INS/GPS guided AGM-154A JSOW; AGM-154C JSOW Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 156,800_ Gendarmerie 152,100_ Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Defence in war FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo bde MANOEUVRE Other 1 (border) paramilitary div 2 paramilitary bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 57+: Akrep; 57 Ates APC 760+ APC (W) 560: 535 BTR-60/BTR-80; 25 Condor PPV 200+: Edjer Yaclin 4x4; Kirpi; 200 Kirpi II; Vuran AUV Cobra; Cobra II; Otokar Ural AIRCRAFT ISR Some O-IE Bird Dog TPT • Light 2 Do-28D HELICOPTERS ATK 13 T129B MRH 19 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 35: Medium 12 S-70A Black Hawk; Light 23: 8 Bell 204B (AB-204B); 6 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 8 Bell 206A (AB-206A) Jet Ranger; 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR 24: Heavy 6 Anka-S; Medium 18 Bayraktar TB2 BOMBS Laser-guided MAM-C/L Coast Guard 4,700_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 99 PSOH 4 Dost PBF 50:18 Kaan 15; 10 Kaon 19; 9 Kaon 29; 13 Kaon 33 PB 45: 15 Damen SAR 1906; 8 Soar 33 (1 more non-operational); 4 Soar 35; 18 Type-80 AIRCRAFT • MP 3 CN235 MPA HELICOPTERS • MRH 8 Bell 412EP (AB-412EP - SAR) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 6 CISR • Medium 6 Bayraktar TB2 DEPLOYMENT_ AZERBAIJAN: Army 170; 1 EOD unit BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 242; 1 inf coy CYPRUS (NORTHERN): £33,800; 1 army corps HQ; 1 SF regt; 1 armd bde; 2 mech inf div; 1 mech inf regt; 1 arty regt; 1 avn comd; 287 M48A5T2; 145 ACV AIFV; 70 ACV AAPC (ind variants); 418 M113 (ind variants); 36 M101A1; 36 M114A2; 12 M115; 30 M44T; 144 M52T1; 4 T-155; 18 T-122; 171 81mm mor; 70 M30; 135 HY-12; Milan; 66 ACV TOW; 219 M40A1; FIM-92 Stinger; 44 Rh 202; 78 GAI-D01; 16 GDF-003; 3 Cessna 185 (U-17); 2 AS532UL Cougar; 1 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 PB IRAQ: Army: 1,000; 1 cdo unit; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 86 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 110; 1 FFGHM LIBYA: £500; ACV-AAPC; Kirpi; 1 arty unit with T-155 Firtina; 1 AD unit with MIM-23B Hawk; Korkut; GDF-003; 1 CISR UAV unit with Bayraktar TB2 MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMG 2: 220; 1 FFGHM • SNMCMG 2:120; 1 MHO; 1 AOT QATAR: Army: 300 (trg team); 1 mech inf coy; 1 arty unit; 12+ ACV AIFV/AAPC; 2 T-155 Firtina SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 335; 1 inf coy; UN • UNMIK 2 SOMALIA: 200 (trg team); UN • UNSOM 1 SYRIA: £3,000; some cdo units; 3 armd BG; 1 SAM unit; 1 gendarmerie unit FOREIGN FORCES_ Spain Active Fence: 150; 1 SAM bfy with M901 Patriot PAC-2 United States US European Command: 1,700; 1 tkr sqn with 14 KC-135; 1 spt fadlity at Izmir; 1 spt fadlity at Ankara; 1 air base at Incirlik • US Strategic Command: 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kiiredk Europe 145 United Kingdom UK British Pound GBP 2021 2022 2023 GDP GBP 2.32tr 2.54tr USD 3.19tr 3.20tr per capita USD 47,329 47,318 Growth % 7.4 3.6 Inflation % 2.6 9.1 Def exp [a] GBP 52.3bn 53.9bn USD 71.9bn 67.7bn Def bdgt [b] GBP 51.5bn £55.7bn USD 70.9bn £70.0bn USD1=GBP 0.73 0.80 [a] NATO figure [b] Includes total departmental expenditure limits; costs of military operations; Armed Forces Pension Service; military aid to Ukraine; and external income earned by the MoD Population 67,791,400 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.7% 2.9% 3.0% 3.4% 23.1% 8.6% Female 8.3% 2.8% 3.1% 3.4% 22.5% 10.2% Capabilities UK defence policy is based on the armed forces providing credible nuclear and conventional deterrence. The armed forces are well trained. They also have a role in supporting the management of domestic civil emergencies. Defence activity includes maintaining the nuclear deterrent and sustaining a broad range of conventional capabilities, including for counter-terrorism. The government published an Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR) in March 2021 followed by a Defence Command Paper (DCP) that set out modernisation and restructuring plans. An update of the review was underway in late 2022, in light of intervening events and particularly the war in Ukraine, with revisions to the DCP likely to follow. There was an ambition to raise defence expenditure to 3% of GDP by 2030, but by the end of 2022 a new government was committing only to 2% of GDP, amid economic headwinds. The IR and DCP underscored the intent to still play a central role in NATO while also enhancing engagement and presence in the Indo-Pacific region. The policy update will likely affect how those ambitions will be balanced. How the AUKUS defence technology accord between Australia, the UK and the US develops will also have an impact. A significant part of UK defence effort in 2022 was devoted to providing materiel and training support to Ukraine, raising some questions about the UK armed forces'own stocks and sustainment capacity. While plans to transform and ultimately grow naval capabilities were proving slow to materialise, the ambition to develop undersea surveillance capacity was accelerated. The prospects for the Future Combat Air System programme will be key to transforming air combat capability. The army has established a Deep Strike Reconnaissance Brigade. Efforts to develop greater integrated cross-domain capability centre on Strategic Command, comprising key joint-force elements, such as special forces, defence intelligence and the military component of the civil/military National Cyber Force. A new Space Command was set up within the air force in early 2021 and spending on military space capabilities is increasing. Weaknesses in defence procurement persist, not least with some troubled armoured vehicle programmes, while concerns continue over nuclear programme delivery. The UK's sophisticated defence industry is globally competitive in some areas of defence exports but cannot meet all of the UK's requirements. ACTIVE 150,350 (Army 83,450 Navy 33,750 Air 33,150) RESERVE 71,950 (Regular Reserve 34,750 (Army 22,700, Navy 5,750, Air 6,300); Volunteer Reserve 35,250 (Army 28,350, Navy 3,650, Air 3,250); Sponsored Reserve 1,950) Includes both trained and those currently under training within the Regular Forces, excluding university cadet units ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE_ Strategic Forces 1,000_ Royal Navy_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC SSBN 4 Vanguard with 16 UGM-133A Trident II D-5/ D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 533mm TT with Spearfish HWT (recent deployment practice of no more than 8 missiles/40 warheads per boat; each missile could carry up to 12 MIRV; some Trident D-5 capable of being configured for sub-strategic role) MSL • SLBM • Nuclear 48 UGM-133A Trident II D-5 Royal Air Force EQUIPMENT BY TYPE RADAR • STRATEGIC 1 Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) at Fylingdales Moor Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 6; 2 Skynet-4; 4 Skynet-5 Army 79,350; 4,100 Gurkhas (total 83,450) Regt normally bn size. Many cbt spt and CSS regt and bn have reservist sub-units FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 (ARRC) corps HQ MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (3rd) armd inf div (1 armd recce/arty bde (2 armd recce regt, 1 recce regt, 2 SP arty regt, 1 fd arty regt, 1 MRL regt, 1 STA regt, 1 maint bn); 1 (12th) armd inf bde (2 tk regt, 2 armd inf bn, 1 inf bn, 1 log regt, 1 maint regt, 1 med regt); 1 (20th) armd inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 1 tk regt, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 log regt, 1 maint regt, 1 med regt); 1 cbt engr gp (3 cbt engr regt); 1 int bn; 1 sigs bde (6 sigs regt); 1 log bde (3 log regt, 1 med regt); 1 AD gp (2 SAM regt)) Light 1 (1st) inf div (1 (4th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 5 inf bn); 1 (7th) It mech inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 It mech inf bn, 3 inf bn; 1 fd 146 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 arty regt; 1 cbt engr regt); 1 (11th) inf bde (2 inf bn); 1 engr bde (1 CBRN regt, 2 EOD regt, 1 (MWD) EOD search regt, 1 engr regt, 1 (air spt) engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 int bn; 1 log bde (2 log regt; 2 maint bn); 1 med bde (2 f d hospital)) 1 inf bn (London) 1 inf bn (Brunei) Air Manoeuvre 1 (16th) air aslt bde (1 recce pi, 2 para bn, 1 air aslt bn, 1 inf bn, 1 fd arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt, 1 med regt) Other 1 inf bn (trials gp) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (6th) cbt spt div (1 ranger bde (4 ranger bn); 1 ISR gp (1 EW regt, 1 int bn, 2 ISR UAV regt); 1 (77th) info ops bde (3 info ops gp, 1 spt gp, 1 engr spt/log gp)) 1 (geographic) engr regt 1 engr bn(-) (joint GER-UK unit) 1 MP bde (2 MP regt) 1 sigs bde (1 EW regt, 2 sigs regt; 1 (ARRC) spt bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde (3 log regt; 1 maint regt) Reserves_ Army Reserve 28,350 reservists The Army Reserve (AR) generates individuals, sub-units and some full units. The majority of units are subordinate to regular-formation headquarters and paired with one or more regular units FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce regt Armoured 1 armd regt Light 1 inf bde (2 recce regt, 8 inf bn) 7 inf bn Air Manoeuvre 1 para bn COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty regt 1 STA regt 1 MRL regt 3 engr regt I EOD regt 4 int bn 4 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT II log regt 3 maint regt 3 med regt 9 fd hospital AIR DEFENCE 1 AD regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 227 Challenger 2 RECCE 145:117 FV107 Scimitar; 28 Scimitar Mk2 IFV 388+: 388 FV510 Warrior; FV511 Warrior (CP); FV514 Warrior (OP); FV515 Warrior (CP) APC 796 APC (T) 409 FV430 Bulldog (ind variants) PPV387Mflstif (6x6) AUV 1,588: 399 Foxhound; 138 FV103 Spartan; 63 FV105 Sultan (CP); 17 Spartan Mk2; 4 Sultan Mk2 (CP); 197 Jackal; 110 Jackal 2; 130 Jackal 2A; 380 Panther CLV; 150 Ridgback ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 88: 56 Terrier; 32 Trojan ARV 243:80 Challenger ARRV; 12 FV106 Samson; 5 Samson Mk2; 105 FV512 Warrior; 41 FV513 Warrior MW 64 Aardvark VLB 68: 35 M3; 33 Titan NBC VEHICLES 8 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP Exactor-2 (Spike NLOS) MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; NLAW ARTILLERY 598 SP 155mm 89 AS90 TOWED 105mm 114 L118 Light Gun MRL 227mm 35 M270B1 MLRS MOR 81mm 360 L16A1 AMPHIBIOUS • LCM 3 Ramped Craft Logistic AIR DEFENCE • SAM 60+ Short-range CAMM (Land Ceptor) Point-defence 60 FV4333 Stormer with Starstreak; Star streak (LML) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium 13 Watchkeeper (34 more in store) Joint Helicopter Command_ Tri-service joint organisation induding Royal Navy, Army and RAF units Army_ FORCES BY ROLE HELICOPTER 1 bde (1 atk hel regt (2 sqn with AH-64E Apache; 1 trg sqn with AH-64D/E Apache); 1 atk hel regt (2 sqn with AH-64D Apache); 1 regt (2 sqn with AW159 Wildcat AH1; 1 trg sqn with AW159 Wildcat AH1); 1 regt (1 sqn with SA341B Gazelle AH1); 1 (spec ops) sqn with AS365N3; SA341B Gazelle AH1; 1 sqn with Bell 212 (Brunei); 1 fit with SA341B Gazelle AH1 (Canada); 1 maint regt) TRAINING 1 hel regt (1 sqn with AH-64E Apache; 1 sqn with AS350B Ecureuil; 1 sqn with Bell 212; SA341B Gazelle AH1) Army Reserve_ FORCES BY ROLE HELICOPTER 1 hel regt (4 sqn personnel only) Royal Navy_ FORCES BY ROLE ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 It sqn with AW159 Wildcat AH1 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AW101 Merlin HC4/4A Europe 147 Royal Air Force_ FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 3 sqn with CH-47D/F/SD Chinook HC6A/6/5 2 sqn with SA330 Puma HC2 TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with CH-47D/SD/F Chinook HC3/4/4A/6; SA330 Puma HC2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS ATK 50: 25 AH-64D Apache; 25 AH-64E Apache MRH 56: 5 AS365N3; 34 AW159 Wildcat AH1; 17 SA341B Gazelle AH1 TPT 114: Heavy 60: 38 CH-47D Chinook HC6A; 14 CH-47F Chinook HC6; 8 CH-47SD Chinook HC5; Medium 42: 25 AW101 Merlin HC4/4A; 17 SA330 Puma HC2; Light 12: 9 AS350B Ecureuil; 3 Bell 212 Royal Navy 33,750_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 10 STRATEGIC • SSBN 4 Vanguard, opcon Strategic Forces with 16 UGM-133A Trident II D-5/D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with Spearfish HWT (recent deployment practice of no more than 8 missiles/40 warheads per boat; each missile could carry up to 12 MIRV; some Trident D-5 capable of being configured for sub-strategic role) TACTICAL • SSN 6 1 Trafalgar with 5 single 533mm TT with UGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACU/Spearfish HWT 5 Astute with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM/Spearfish HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 20 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 2: CV 2 Queen Elizabeth with up to 3 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS (capacity 40 ac/hel, incl 24+ F-35B Lightning II, 14+ Merlin HU2/Wildcat HMA2/CH-47 Chinook hel) DESTROYERS 6: DDGHM 3 Daring (Type-45) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84D Harpoon Block 1C AShM, 6 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15/30 (Sea Viper) SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 AW159 WiWcflt/AWlOl Merlin hel) DDHM 3 Daring (Type-45) with 6 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15/30 (Sea Viper) SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 AW159 WiWcflt/AWlOl Merlin hel) FRIGATES • FFGHM 12: 3 Duke (Type-23) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84D Harpoon Block 1C AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Sea Wolf SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Sting Ray LWT, 1 114mm gun (capacity either 2 AW159 Wildcat or 1 AW101 Merlin hel) 9 Diifce (Type-23) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84D Harpoon Block 1C AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Sea Ceptor SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Sting Ray LWT, 1114mm gun (capacity either 2 AW159 Wi'/dcat or 1AW101 A&r/m hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 26 PSO 8: 3 River Batch 1; 5 Rroer Batch 2 with 1 hel landing platform PBF 2 CmHhss FBI 16 Archer (14 in trg role, 2 deployed to Gibraltar sqn) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9 MCO 6 Hunt (incl 4 mod Hunt) MHC 3 Sandown AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2 LPD 2 Albion with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS (capacity 2 med hel; 4 LCU or 2 LCAC; 4 LCVP; 6 MBT; 300 troops) (of which 1 at extended readiness) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4 AGB 1 Protector with 1 hel landing platform AGS 3:1 Scott with 1 hel landing platform; 1 £c/io with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Magpie Royal Fleet Auxiliary_ Support and miscellaneous vessels are mostly crewed and maintained by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), a civilian fleet owned by the UK MoD, which has approximately 1,900 personnel with type comd under Fleet Commander AMPHIBIOUS • PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3: LSD 3 Bay (capacity 4 LCU; 2 LCVP; 24 Challenger 2 MBT; 350 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12 AOEH 4 Tide (capacity 1 AW159 Wi/dcat/AWlOl Merlin hel) AORH 3: 2 Wave (extended readiness); 1 Fort Victoria with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS AG 1 Argus (primary casualty-receiving ship with secondary aviation trg ship role) AKR 4 Point (not RFA manned) Naval Aviation (Fleet Air Arm) 4,900_ FORCES BY ROLE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 3 sqn with AW101 ASW Merlin HM2 2 sqn with AW159 Wildcat HMA2 TRAINING 1 sqn with Beech 350ER King Air 1 sqn with G-115 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 4 Beech 350ER King Air (Avenger) TRG 5 G-115 HELICOPTERS ASW 58: 28 AW159 Wildcat HMA2; 30 AW101 ASW Merlin HM2 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM Martlet 148 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Royal Marines 6,600_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 (3rd Cdo) mne bde (2 mne bn; 2 sy bn; 1 amph gp; 1 amph aslt sqn; 1 (army) arty regt; 1 (army) engr regt; 1 ISR gp (1 EW sqn; 1 cbt spt sqn; 1 sigs sqn; 1 log sqn), 1 log regt) 2 amph sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC (T) 99 BvS-10 Mk2 Viking (incl 19 cabs with 81mm mor) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTUCTURE MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin ARTILLERY 39 TOWED 105mm 12 L118 Light Gun MOR 81mm 27 L16A1 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2 Island AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 26 LCU 10 LCU MklO (capacity 4 Viking APC or 120 troops) LCVP 16 LCVP Mk5B (capacity 35 troops) AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Starstreak Royal Air Force 33,150_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with Typhoon FGR4/T3 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with Typhoon FGR4/T3 (including one joint QTR-UK sqn) 1 sqn with Typhoon FGR4/T3 (aggressor) 1 sqn with F-35B Lightning II ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 2 sqn with P-8A Poseidon (MRA Mkl) ISR 1 sqn with Shadow Rl ELINT 1 sqn with RC-135W Rivet Joint SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with Bell 412EP Griffin HAR-2 TANKER/TRANSPORT 2 sqn with A330 MRTT Voyager KC2/3 TRANSPORT 1 (VIP) sqn with AW109SP; Falcon 900LX (Envoy IV CC Mkl) 2 sqn with A400M Atlas 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster 1 sqn with C-130J/J-30 Hercules TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with A4O0U Atlas; C-17A Globemaster; C-130J/J-30 Hercules 1 OCU sqn with F-35B Lightning II (forming) 1 OCU sqn with Typhoon FGR4/T3 1 OCU sqn with RC-135W Rivet Joint 1 sqn with EMB-500 Phenom 100 2 sqn with Hawk T2 1 sqn with T-6C Texan II 2 sqn with G-115E Tutor COMBAT/ISR UAV 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 201 combat capable FGA 153; 26 F-35B Lightning II; 121 Typhoon FGR4; 6 Typhoon T3; (10 Typhoon FGR4 in store) ASW 9 P-8A Poseidon (MRA Mkl) ISR 6 Shadow Rl ELINT 3 RC-135W Rivet Joint AEW&C 3 E-3D Sentry TKR/TPT 10; 3 A330 MRTT Voyager KC2 (of which 1 equipped for VIP tpt); 7 A330 MRTT Voyager KC3 TPT 44; Heavy 28; 20 A400M Atlas; 8 C-17A Globemaster; Medium 14; 1 C-130J Hercules; 13 C-130J-30 Hercules; PAX 2 Falcon 900LX (Envoy IV CC Mkl) TRG 144; 5 EMB-500 Phenom 100; 86 G-115E Tutor; 28 Hawk T2*; 11 Hawk Tl* (Red Arrows) (e60 more in store); 14 T-6C Texan II HELICOPTERS MRH 4; 1AW139; 3 Bell 412EP Griffin HAR-2 TPT • Light 1 AW109SP UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 11; 10 MQ-9A Reaper; 1 MQ-9B Sky Guardian (Protector RG Mkl) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L/L(I) Sidewinder; HR ASRAAM; ARH AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM; Meteor ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; Brimstone; Dual-Mode Brimstone; Brimstone II LACM Storm Shadow BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway III Laser & INS/GPS-guided Enhanced Paveway II/III; Paveway IV Royal Air Force Regiment_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 6 sy sqn No. 1 Flying Training School (Tri-Service Helicopter Training)_ FORCES BY ROLE TRAINING 1 hel sqn with H135 (Juno HT1); H145 (Jupiter) 3 hel sqn with H135 (Juno HT1) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS MRH 7 H145 (Jupiter) TPT • Light 31; 2 AW109E; 29 H135 (Juno HT1) Volunteer Reserve Air Forces_ (Royal Auxiliary Air Force/RAF Reserve) MANOEUVRE Other 5 sy sqn COMBAT SUPPORT 2 int sqn Europe 149 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 med sqn 1 (air movements) sqn 1 (HQ augmentation) sqn 1 (C-130 Reserve Aircrew) fit UK Special Forces_ Includes Royal Navy, Army and RAF units FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (SAS) SF regt 1 (SBS) SF regt 1 (Special Reconnaissance) SF regt 1 SF BG (based on 1 para bn) AVIATION 1 wg (includes assets drawn from 3 Army hel sqn, 1 RAF tpt sqn and 1 RAF hel sqn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 sigs regt Reserve_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 (SAS) SF regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AUV 24 Bushmaster IMV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; NLAW DEPLOYMENT_ ASCENSION ISLAND: 20 ATLANTIC (NORTH)/CARIBBEAN: 140; 1 PSO; 1 AOEH ATLANTIC (SOUTH): 40; 1 PSO BAHRAIN: Operation Kipion 1,000; 1 FFGHM; 2 MCO; 2 MHC; 1 LSD; 1 naval facility BELIZE: BATSUB 12 BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY: 40; 1 navy/marine det BRUNEI: 2,000; 1 (Gurkha) It inf bn; 1 jungle trg centre; 1 hel sqn with 3 Bell 212 BULGARIA: NATO • Enhanced Vigilance Activities 120; 1 It mech inf coy CANADA: BATUS 400; 1 trg unit; 1 hel fit with SA341 Gazelle AH1 CYPRUS: 2,260; 2 inf bn; 1 SAR sqn with 4 Bell 412 Griffin HAR-2; 1 radar (on det); Operation Shader 450:1 FGA sqn with 10 Typhoon FGR4; 1 A330 MRTT Voyager; 2 C-130J-30 Hercules; UN • UNFICYP (Operation Tosca) 253; 2 inf coy DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 3 EGYPT: MFO 2 ESTONIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence (Operation Cabrit) 1,750; 1 armdBG; 1 inf BG; 1 SP arty bty; 1 MRL bty; 1 cbt engr coy FALKLAND ISLANDS: 1,200: 1 inf coy(+); 1 sigs unit; 1 AD det with CAMM (Land Ceptor); 1 PSO; 1 ftr fit with 4 Typhoon FGR4; 1 tkr/tpt fit with 1 A330 MRTT Voyager; 1 A400M; 1 hel fit with 2 Chinook GERMANY: 185 GIBRALTAR: 600 (including Royal Gibraltar regt); 1 PSO; 2PBI IRAQ: Operation Shader 100; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 12 KENYA: BATUK 350; 1 trg unit KUWAIT: Operation Shader 50; 1 CISR UAV sqn with 8 MQ- 9A Reaper LIBYA: UN • UNSMIL (Operation Tramal) 1 MALI: UN • MINUSMA (Operation Newcombe) 256; 1 recce regt(-) NEPAL: 60 (Gurkha trg org) NIGERIA: 80 (trg team) OMAN: 90 PACIFIC OCEAN: 60; 2 PSO POLAND: Army 250; 1 tk sqn with Challenger 2; 1 SAM bty with CAMM (Land Ceptor); NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 129; 1 recce sqn QATAR: 200; 1 FGA sqn with 12 Typhoon FGR4 SAUDI ARABIA: 50 (radar det) SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 41 SOMALIA: 65 (trg team); UN • UNSOM (Operation Traiser) 2; UN • UNSOS (Operation Catan) 10 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS (Operation Vogul) 4 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 200; 1 tpt/tkr fit with C-17A Globemaster; A400M Atlas; A330 MRTT Voyager (on rotation) FOREIGN FORCES_ Canada Air Task Force Prestwick (ATF-P) 55; 3 C-130J-30 Hercules (CC-130J); Operation Unifier 170 (UKRtrg) Denmark Operation Interflex 120 (UKR trg) Finland Operation Interflex 20 (UKR trg) Lithuania Operation Interflex 15 (UKR trg) Netherlands Operation Interflex 90 (UKR trg) New Zealand Operation Interflex 149 (UKR trg) Sweden Operation Interflex 45 (UKR trg) United States US European Command: 10,000; 1 FGA wg at RAF Lakenheath (2 FGA sqn with 23 F-15E Strike Eagle, 1 FGA sqn with 21 F-35A Lightning II; 1 FGA sqn with F-35 Lightning II (forming)); 1 ISR sqn at RAF Mildenhall with OC-135/RC-135; 1 tkr wg at RAF Mildenhall with 15 KC-135R/T Stratotanker; 1 spec ops gp at RAF Mildenhall (1 sqn with 8 CV-22B Osprey; 1 sqn with 8 MC-130J Commando II) • US Strategic Command: 1 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar and 1 Spacetrack radar at Fylingdales Moor Chapter Five Russia and Eurasia Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine failed in its initial objectives and exposed significant shortcomings in several areas of the Russian armed forces, including strategy, command and control, training, logistics and industrial supply. By year's end, Russia had resorted to using Iranian uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) and direct attack munitions due to the Russian armed forces'heavy use of its own ballistic and cruise missiles and the continued threat posed by Ukraine's air defences. The performance of some Russian weapons has been underwhelming. Russia's tanks and infantry fighting vehicles proved vulnerable to modern anti-armour systems while some air-launched weapons, such as its cruise missiles, were not as successful as they were in Syria. Most notably, the Raduga Kh-101 (RS-AS-23A Kodiak) air-launched cruise missile failed to meet expectations. Russia's decision to'partially'mobilise shows that the plan to produce a full-time service component, of contractors, failed when confronted with a high-intensity war.The mobilisation process has highlighted institutional and infrastructure shortcomings as well as problems in training. The heavy losses to Russia's equipment inventory, particularly its armour and artillery, raises significant questions over the direction of Russia's state armament programme; the country needs to reconstitute its ground forces'combat capability while they are at war, balancing current needs against existing and future development plans. Both Russia and Ukraine have suffered significant casualties. Ukraine mobilised early, and Western training assistance is intended to produce a steady stream of trained troops, though the training package lasts weeks instead of months. The battlefield successes of Ukraine's troops have shown the benefits of the training delivered with Western assistance after 2014 and Kyiv's plan - also with Western assistance - to develop a professional noncommissioned officer cadre. Western materiel support has reshaped Ukraine's artillery capabilities. But much legacy-equipment remains and ammunition-supply for these will be a key near-term constraint. However, Kyiv's forces are now able to strike faster and further and have shown the capability to integrate real-time targeting into this process through the use of small UAVs. Russia real-terms total military expenditure, 2012-22 (USDbn, constant 2015) Active military personnel - top 10 (25,000 per unit) 70 60 50 40 \ Q OO 30 20 20 Russia 1,190,000 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 1 sf mmmmn Ukraine mmmmn 688,000 o 3 m Azerbaijan 64,050 *< CD CO Uzbekistan 48,000 o -r «» Belarus 47,950 lange M Armenia 42,900 Kazakhstan 39,000 « Turkmenistan 36,500 Georgia 20,650 Kyrgyzstan 10,900 I Global total 20,773,950 10.6% Regional total 2,201,900 Regional defence policy and economics 152 ► Arms procurements and deliveries 169 ► Armed forces data section 171 ► Central Asia: medium and light transport air fleets, 2014-22* Ukraine's artillery transformation Light Transport Aircraft I Medium Transport Aircraft Quantity Number Breakdown by type 2014 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan ■ Turkmenistan I Uzbekistan ■ 2 Kazakhstan 12 2018 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan ■ Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Kazakhstan ■ 2 2022 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan ■ 1 Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Kazakhstan 12 Turkmenistan 12 Uzbekistan 12 6 An-26 Curl, 2 An-72 Coaler, 2 C295M, 2Tu-134 Crusty 4 An-2 Colt, 2 An-26 Curl Tu-134A Crusty 1 An-26 Curl 1 An-24 Coke, 1 Tu-134 Crusty 2 An-12 Cub 6 An-26 Curl, 2 An-72 Coaler, 6 C295M, 2 Tu-134 Crusty 4 An-2 Colt, 2 An-26 Curl Tu-134A Crusty 1 An-26 Curl, An-74TK Coaler 1 An-24 Coke, 4 C295W, 1 Tu-134 Crusty 2 An-12 Cub 6 An-26 Curl, 2 An-72 Coaler, 8 C295M, 2Tu-134 Crusty 4 An-2 Colt, 2 An-26 Curl Tu-134A Crusty 1 An-26 Curl, 2 An-74TK Coaler 2 An-26 Curl, 4 C295W, 1 Tu-134 Crusty 2 An-12 Cub 2 C-27J Spartan 2 An-12 Cud 2014 2015 *active inventory 2021 Self Propelled 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika 292 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya 249 2S5 Giantsit-S 18 2S19 Msta-S 35 155mm 2S3 Akatsiya 18 203mm 2S7 Pion 13 Towed 122mm D-30 129 152mm 2A36 Giantsit-B 180 2A65 Msta-B 130 D-20 130 MRL 122mm 9P138 18 BM-21 191 220mm 9P140 Uragan 70 300mm 9A52 Smerch 83 Vilkha 2022 Self Propelled 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika 120 152mm M-77 Dana 18 DanaMl 1 + 2S3 Akatsiya 140 2S5 Giantsit-S 10 2S19 Msta-S 35 155mm M-2000 Zuzana 6 M109A3GN 50 M109L 20 Krab 53 PzH 2000 22 Caesar 17 203mm 2S7 Pion 20 Towed 105mm L119/M119A3 30 M101 3+ 122mm D-30 60 130mm M-46 18 152mm 2A36 Giantsit-B 90 2A65 Msta-B 80 D-20 60 155mm M777A2 132 FH-70 20 Gun/Mor 120mm 2B16 NONA-K MRL 122mm RM-70 Vampir 20 Tornado-G/BM-2] 100 220mm ßurewV/9P140 Uragan 40 227mm M142 HIMARS 20 M270A1/B1 MLRS 11 300mm 9A52 Smerch 40 VilkhaM Vilkha 152 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Russia and Eurasia The chaotic collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was followed by the creation of 15 new states from the former Soviet republics. These states continued to count large numbers of Russians within their new borders. Ethnic tensions, often accompanied by friction with Moscow, are a legacy of the Soviet empire's dissolution. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has roots in the break-up of the Soviet Union. More broadly, though, the war is the most egregious example of the problematic relations between Russia and what it sometimes refers to as its 'near abroad'. It also owes much to the failure of Russia's efforts during 2021 and earlier to exercise influence over those parts of Ukraine it did not already control, as well as its government, and to Vladimir Putin's world view, made apparent in his July 2021 extended text entitled 'On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians'. In this document, Putin described Russians and Ukrainians as 'one people'. However, the invasion has served only to cement Ukraine's identity as an independent state. Moscow's travails in its ill-judged and ill-executed invasion, furthermore, will make relationships with its other neighbouring countries more problematic. The war on Ukraine has led to a decline in Russia's influence over many of them and may inhibit its ability to manage regional disputes. The most westerly of the former Soviet republics that remains outside NATO is Moldova. The country's pro-European government is struggling with pro-Russian opposition and allegations of Russian disinformation operations. The government declared a state of emergency on the same day as Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with which it shares a border. Russian ground forces remain in the pro-Moscow Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria because of a civil war in 1992. Russia has hinted that it could use its forces in Transnistria against Ukraine. On 23 June 2022 Moldova gained candidate status from the European Union, in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Kyiv was also given candidate status at the same time. Meanwhile, Belarus has been pulled further into Russia's orbit. At the start of the year, Belarus was complicit in Russia's invasion, and by the end of the year its training grounds were being used to drill newly mobilised Russian troops. But the Belarusian armed forces themselves stayed out of the fight, instead serving a useful purpose for Moscow by 'fixing' elements of Ukraine's forces on its northern border as well as reportedly supplying equipment to Russia. Sporadic fighting also recurred in September 2022 between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia is a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Azerbaijan is a former member, but Moscow has been unable to force a lasting peace between the two. September 2022 also saw border clashes between two other CSTO members: Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The latter dispute also stems from contested territory and the lack of an agreed border. Both countries have also suffered from internal upheaval. In Tajikistan a civil war began in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, lasting from 1992 to 1997, that also involved Russian ground forces. Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, has seen three revolutions in the past two decades. Perhaps the most notable shift has been in Moscow's relationships with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In recent years, Kazakhstan has started to modernise its armed forces, with its land forces introducing equipment of Turkish origin and even signing an agreement with Turkey in late 2022 to develop 'long-term strategic cooperation'. In January, in the wake of fomented protests designed to unseat him, Kazakhstan's President Qasym-Jomart Toqaev requested assistance from the CSTO. Russia deployed elements of its airborne forces to secure Toqaev in power. Toqaev has not, however, supported Russia's war in Ukraine. Indeed, Kazakhstan sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and in June Toqaev refused to recognise - in Putin's presence - the independence of the Luhansk and Donetsk 'people's republics'; the foreign minister of Uzbekistan was reported as using a similar formulation in March, though he was out of office by mid-year. Regardless, Russia's influence over its former republics - it retains military installations in some - cannot be taken for granted by Moscow. Moreover, Russia's remaining Russia and Eurasia 153 influence in Central Asia must also contend with the financial heft of China, with Beijing building economic ties with all the former Soviet republics in the region. RUSSIA Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has proven a defining event for the Russian armed forces, 14 years after they fought an unsatisfactory short war against Georgia and subsequently launched the 'New Look military-modernisation process. The war on Ukraine has also proven a defining chapter of President Vladimir Putin's leadership. The operation had been telegraphed. Russian troops had assembled close to the border with Ukraine in April 2021, to exert pressure on Ukraine, and in late year began to return. These forces remained in position for some weeks. Western open-source analysts - and rapidly declassified US intelligence assessments - indicated after mid-February that some troops were deploying from their assembly areas into assault formations. Early on 24 February, the latest invasion began. Even in the early phases, instead of rapidly extinguishing Ukrainian resistance, Russia suffered a series of reversals. Since then, Moscow has become bogged down in an often-attritional war that has highlighted failings in its political and high-level military decisionmaking, while highlighting structural weaknesses in its armed forces, particularly its ground forces. At the same time, the course and conduct of the war is leading to renewed focus on the effectiveness and future of various modernisation initiatives pursued in recent years, such as the Battalion Tactical Group concept. It also raises questions over Russia's military culture and organisation and the degree to which Moscow can learn and implement lessons, as well as the future of the equipment-modernisation plans pursued under the latest State Armament Programme. The war: overconfidence and underestimation Russian forces advanced along multiple axes in the initial phase of the operation, estimated to involve 127 Battalion Tactical Groups and 150,000 personnel as well as additional Russian-led proxy forces. The aim was apparently to quickly topple Volodymyr Zelenskyy's government in a far larger version of the 2014 Crimean operation with a rapid assault focused on seizing leadership centres in Kyiv, while Ukraine's armed forces and society would be effectively paralysed by shaping operations and a push on multiple axes by ground forces from the north, the east and the south. However, the campaign was flawed before its execution. There were poor intelligence assessments of the attitudes of the Ukrainian population, combined with an underestimation of the combat capability of Ukraine's armed forces and an overestimation of the capability of the Russian armed forces. Russia hoped for a swift victory; its forces were not prepared for the long haul. At the start of the war, Russia's advances lacked the massed artillery fires traditionally associated with its ground forces, while Ukrainian critical national infrastructure was not targeted extensively. The forces deployed in the initial attacks do not appear to have been prepared for, or supplied for, sustained high-intensity fighting. Initially poorly coordinated, and with inadequate air-, fire- and logistics-support, these formations suffered very heavy losses in both personnel and equipment, and many were rendered combat ineffective within the first month of operations. Moreover, political imperatives to demonstrate success on the battlefield meant that battle-weary units were given little or no time to recover and reset, instead being rapidly thrown back into the fighting. Russia's comparative success in fighting Ukrainian forces in 2014-15 likely resulted in considerable overconfidence, as did the air-led campaign in Syria. The deployment in Syria allowed the air force to rotate crews and gain experience in operations at-reach and test new weapons, but it was nonetheless conducted in a permissive air environment. Meanwhile, Russia's annual large-scale exercises (each year there is one of the Kavkaz, Tsentr, Zapad and Vostok drills) with their extensive use of tube and rocket artillery and combat aviation - Zapad 2021 was the largest for some years, involving multiple military districts and large groups of forces - may have led to a distorted assessment of capability and readiness both by outside observers and by the Russian armed forces. Similar doubts remain about the value of smaller combat-readiness inspections. Such exercises, whether deliberately or otherwise, masked the structural problems that have now been exposed in Ukraine. Perhaps more fundamentally, while peacetime training and maintenance were nominally improved and made more realistic at the same time, in practice poor oversight, corruption and rapid turnover in both contract and conscript personnel seriously hindered the qualitative development of individual soldiers. Map 2 Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine: February-March 2022 _\_ I Russian controlled territory at 24 February I Russian controlled territory at 29 March Contested territory at 29 March Russian axis of advance Possible axis of approach J j UK MOD assessed Russian grouping of forces Important centres of Ukrainian resistance that either delayed or defeated Russian advances ' CENTRAL MD GROUPING ' EASTERN MD AND AIRBORNE GROUPING Cherniv: heavy fighting during March saw Ukrainian forces defeat Russian attempts to occupy the city Sumy: heavy fighting during March saw Ukrainian forces defeat Russian attempts to occupy the city Russian controlled territory SojfOb: uKjVIO^SS^titute for the Study^War; militaryla > -< CD > I— > z n Map 3 Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine: April-October 2022 28 April: Ukrainian counterattacks forced Russia to redeploy forces in April to concentrate instead on attacks in Ukraine's East, including around Izium. i 29 May: Russia attempts to consolidate. Ulldl IIHHV 29 June: Russia attempts to consolidate. Missile attack on CGHM Moskva, flagship of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, which sinks on 14 April. Ukrainian forces surrendered at Mariupol on 20 May, after having been besieged since February. ) After months of resistance against Russian forces, Ukrainian armed forces withdrew from Severodonetsk on 24 June and from Lysychansk on 3 July. Ukrainian forces re-occupied Snake Island on 4 July after an intense campaign to evict Russian forces, who left on 30 June. On 9 August, at least eight aircraft were destroyed at Saki airbase, likely by Ukrainian missiles. 8 October, suspected Ukrainian forces attack and severely damage the Kerch bridge between Russia and occupied Crimea. 31 October: Ukraine makes rapid progress in the northern sector and pushes to Kherson in the south 30 September: Ukrainian advances make progress. \-S a. Russian controlled territory Contested territory Nuclear Power Plant Ukrainian counterattacks ■ Russian line of advance: Sources: UK MOD; IISS; Institute for the Study of War, ACLED | Central MD Grouping Southern MD and Airborne Grouping | Eastern MD Grouping [J Southern MD Grouping Western MD Grouping © IISS Russia and Eurasia 156 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Moreover, Russia's forces have had to take account of large-scale personnel losses, including among the more experienced personnel that participated in the opening phase of the invasion. The subsequent inflow of reservists, and later of mobilised personnel, has exposed weaknesses in training, with many newly arrived personnel seemingly lacking both adequate equipment and enough ammunition, amidst infrastructure that appears to be failing to cope with the increased number of trainees. And the war has highlighted long-standing problems related to command and control at both junior and higher command levels, with inflexibility proving an important weakness. There are indications of some adaptation following the initial failings of the campaign. Commanders were replaced and there has been a move to improve and unify operational command and control; once Ukrainian forces had defeated Russia's push to Kyiv, forces were redeployed to Ukraine's east. Subsequently, Russian forces were concentrated on two axes, with efforts focused on the two 'self-proclaimed' Luhansk and Donetsk people's republics (LPR and DPR). Russian tactics were also revised, with far greater reliance on artillery. However, this has highlighted another challenge relating to ammunition supply. Estimates by some analysts suggest Russian forces have at times expended more than ten times the ammunition on a daily basis compared to the Ukrainians and, while it is difficult to verify such claims, it is clear that the supply of ammunition became a more significant factor as 2022 wore on. Initial Russian operations included heliborne assaults, and these seemed to follow the pattern of recent experimentation with such capability, but Russia's drills had not adequately prepared its forces for actions against a determined and well-armed opponent. And though the air war has been immensely destructive for Ukraine, Russia's relatively haphazard application of airpower, including missile strikes, did not allow it to gain control of the air. These failures forced Russia's helicopters and ground-attack aircraft to adopt unconventional weapons-release tactics, its fixed-wing aircraft to engage targets from greater range and commanders to use large numbers of long-range stand-off weapons. And both Russian and Ukrainian helicopters and ground-attack aircraft have, at least close to the front lines, been flown at extremely low-level in order to minimise the threat from air defences. The way Russia has employed its precision-guided weapons, coupled with problems in increasing production, means there was by late year a lack of such systems, while there have been reliability issues with those in the inventory. Russia's defence industry may have been slowly improving, but it remains bedevilled by inefficiencies. These include multiple plants producing varied types of combat aircraft. In terms of personnel, it has an ageing workforce and - while there is little firm information on their background beyond some reporting - the flight of thousands of Russians from the country after February will not help matters. There also appears to have been a failure to appreciate the need for near-real time intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), integrated with the targeting cycle. And in late summer, when Ukrainian forces employed offensive manoeuvre operations in regaining swathes of territory in the north and south, Russia's troops did not have an answer either tactically or operationally. While these are issues recognised by many in the armed forces and in the defence industry, they appear not to be acknowledged within decisionmaking circles, which remain conservative in nature. Moreover, Moscow's practice of simply replacing senior staff, or moving commanders from one military district to another, has not addressed the underlying issues of leadership culture in the Russian armed forces. A rigidly hierarchical structure remains embedded in military education and tradition. Also, continued revelations of entrenched corruption in the armed forces will almost certainly not help to improve mutual trust; in advanced Western armed forces this is seen as a key feature in assisting effective military leadership at all levels. Achieving change in Russia will require political will, combined with fundamental improvements in education and training. Ground Forces, Airborne Forces and Naval Infantry Russia's initial invasion employed around 75% of its total deployable ground-combat forces. Many of the formations engaged in February suffered heavy attrition in the months that followed. This initially forced the Russian armed forces to turn to a variety of sources to find new personnel in order to sustain operations, including reservists, mercenaries and conscripts from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, before ultimately opting for widespread mobilisation in Russia. Older armoured fighting vehicles and Russia and Eurasia 157 artillery pieces were taken out of store and reactivated to replace combat losses. These measures have, for now, proved just about sufficient to maintain an 'army in being' in Ukraine. However, attempts to generate the operational and strategic reserve forces needed to restart large-scale offensive operations on the ground appear to have been repeatedly thwarted by the battlefield pressure applied by Ukrainian forces. It is likely that Ukrainian forces will try to maintain this pressure, looking to prevent Russia gaining the space to reset its forces before spring 2023. The current focus on short-term operational requirements also raises questions about the future shape and sustainability of Russian ground-combat power. Under the New Look military-modernisation process, which started in 2008, the ground forces were, by 2022, the least modernised of all the armed forces, and they were the source of most of the formations employed. Between 2012 and 2022, and particularly after 2014, Russia's Ground Forces, Airborne Forces and Naval Infantry had attempted to balance their relatively low budgetary priority with a requirement to generate an increasing amount of deployable ground-combat power. This resulted in a series of compromises, with advanced-equipment programmes, such as the Armata, Kurganets and Bumerang universal combat platforms, delayed and most formations expected to deploy understrength by using limited numbers of contract service personnel in task-organised Battalion Tactical Groups. The invasion of Ukraine has laid bare many of the limitations of this approach. Against a determined adversary, many formations appear to have struggled to effectively conduct core military tasks, such as reconnaissance or combined-arms operations, a problem concealed to some extent by the relatively high level of performance of a small number of select units in Ukraine in 2014, and then in Syria. The exhaustion of surviving contract personnel, and the influx of inadequately trained and equipped reservists, conscripts and draftees, suggests that these performance levels are unlikely to improve in the short term. At the same time, the impact of economic sanctions imposed on Russia and restricted access to foreign technology is likely to curtail future re-equipment plans, even if the ground forces enjoy a larger share of the procurement budget than they have in previous years. If the compromise policies of the past decade are ultimately deemed a failure by Russian military and political leadership, it is unclear what alternative approaches might realistically be adopted in their stead. Both a larger, conscript-based, mass-mobilisation model and a substantially smaller higher-quality force would pose problems in terms of both resourcing and sustainment. Such a model may also not fit with the Russian government's apparent objectives. In the short term, the prospects for the project to deliver new equipment to the ground forces is unclear. Armata remains in test, and other equipment that has arrived during the last decade, such as the TOS-i multiple-rocket launcher and Typhoon protected patrol vehicle, has been seen in Ukraine and in some cases observed as destroyed. The armed forces have lost significant numbers of all types of their in-service main battle tanks, and bringing out of store older types is a gap-filler solution at best when confronted with modern anti-armour systems. But the course of the war has forced some innovation. It is likely that improving command and control and integrating new strike systems, such as the Lancet-3 loitering munition, will be prioritised. These were not procured in large volumes before the war and were operated only by special forces, but by late 2022 they were being more widely used. Even with increased budgets, it will be challenging to keep the military forces supplied for the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, and that is before taking into account issues related to industrial capacity and the impact of Western sanctions on component supplies. Weapons failings While Russian land-attack cruise missiles were used with comparative success during Moscow's intervention in Syria, this has not so far been the case in Ukraine. Most notably, the Raduga Kh-101 (RS-AS-23A Kodiak) air-launched cruise missile has failed to meet expectations. The problems do not appear to have been limited to the missile and extend to the launch aircraft. Furthermore, stocks of the Kh-101 have been depleted. As of the fourth quarter of 2022, the inventory was potentially as low as 25% of the pre-war holding. The Novator 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) naval land-attack cruise missile may have recorded a somewhat more reliable performance. The Russian armed forces have long recognised the need to increase the quality and quantity of precision-guided munitions but have so far failed to achieve this. There remains also an inability to knit together ISR and command and 158 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Figure 7 Recapitalising Russia's bomber inventory Russia has long held ambitions to recapitalise its bomber fleets, but efforts so far have been piecemeal. Ambition has risked overreaching capacity in industrial, technical and economic terms. As of 2022, Moscow was following three paths simultaneously: upgrading current types, restarting manufacture of one design, and supporting the research and development of a new bomber. The Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfire C, Tu-95MS BearH and Tu-160 Blackjack A are all the subject of upgrade programmes, while the last is also re-entering production as the Tu-160M Blackjack B. Tupolev is also working on the Item 80 design to meet the Aerospace Forces' (VKS) Future Long-Range Aviation Complex (PAK DA) project. A prototype of this design, almost certainly a subsonic low-observable flying wing, could be flown possibly by the middle of this decade. Meanwhile, after a three-decade gap in production, the first new-build Tu-160 was flown for the first time at the beginning of 2022. The modernised Tu-160M is being built at the Gorbunov production site in Kazan, and the design to meet the PAK DA requirement will likely be built there too. However, it remains unclear whether Russia has the economic and industrial capacity to sustain all its currently planned bomber projects. Next-generation Blackjack The Tu-160M draws on upgrade programmes implemented for the Blackjacks, but with a new airframe and aerostructures. The VKS hasten aircraft on order for delivery by 2027, and a notional ambition to field up to 50Tu-160Ms by the mid-2030s. The upgrade also includes a revamp of the aircraft's passive and active defensive aids, though the exact configuration of the Redut-70M suite fitted to the /7 aircraft is not known. y/ The original Obzor-K (Clam Pipe) navigation and attack radar is replaced by the NV-70M radar developed by the St Petersburg-based JSC Zaslon. The original analogue cockpit systems are replaced with digital multi-function displays, with the aircraft's communications suite also improved. The Tu-160M is powered byfour Kuznetsov NK-32-02 afterburning turbofan engines. This development of the original NK-32 includes a digital engine-control system. Improved fuel burn is claimed to have extended the aircraft's combat radius by up to 500 kilometres. Kh-101 (RS-AS-23A Kodiak) The aircraft may be able to carry several long-range land-attack cruise missile (LACM) designs, with the most obvious system the Raduga Kh-101/102 (RS-AS-23A/B Kodiak) which is already operated with the Tu-160. The Kh-BD (Item 506) is also in development by Raduga and is intended to provide a yet-longer-range LACM. The Kh-BD could be based on an extended-length Kh-101/102. As well as subsonic LACMs, the aircraft's weapons suite could also include high-speed missiles now reportedly in development. / I I " 1 ~T ID PAK DA, Item 80 A Tupolev patent published in March 2022 provides possible insight into the configuration of the VKS's next bomber. The patent illustration showed a twin-engine flying wing, with the patent related to the engine intake duct. Tupolev was awarded a 36-month bomber study contract in 2009, with the programme given the go-ahead in 2013. However, while the 2014 decision to return the Tu-160 to production appeared to show a near-term shift in priorities, an initial operational capability for the low-observable design at around the end of this decade remains possible, at least notionally. ©uss Russia and Eurasia 159 control at the tactical level to make better use of its artillery. Even when operating the same Soviet-era equipment, Ukraine's use of artillery has generally been more effective than Russia's. This is likely down to a closer linkage and better use of ISR-roled uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), combined with the adoption of digital tactical command and control systems. Inadequate command and control The repeated setbacks have also prompted numerous changes in the military leadership, and the failures following February resulted in the gradual centralisation of operational command. Setbacks during the third quarter of 2022, including defeats in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions, prompted the appointment of General of the Army Sergei Surovikin as the overall commander. The defeat in the Kharkiv region showed that many new units, especially volunteer battalions, were not well integrated with the regular army units, and a loss of effective command and control was still a regular problem. This has rendered offensive operations and counterattacks more difficult, with the effect that some Russian offensive actions have been predictable, with an increasing reliance on artillery and little emphasis on manoeuvre. To mobilise or not Having avoided declaring mobilisation for over six months, Russia's hand was finally forced in September 2022, following the collapse of its position in the Kharkiv region. The 21 September announcement by Putin was likely prompted by a recognition that overall defeat was an increasing possibility. According to official statements, the goal was to call up 300,000 reservists, but some Russian commentators put the figure at nearer to one million. Mobilisation was implemented too late, with those called up receiving as little as two weeks' training before being deployed to make up for combat losses in existing units. Prior to mobilisation, and since in parallel to it, Russia has also used 'volunteer battalions' as well as private military companies, the largest of which is Wagner Group. Naval forces Russia adopted a new Maritime Doctrine on 31 July 2022, replacing the 2015 document. Notably, the revised document identified the United States and NATO as 'threats'; in the previous volume the US had been described as only a 'rival'. The 2022 document was also more ideological, with echoes of Soviet-era rhetoric. Maritime dominance was held to be the aim of the US, with the additional goal of reducing Russia's ability to exploit and develop maritime resources. The doctrine also recognised the challenge of Russia's lack of overseas naval bases, and the sanctions-based constraints on its shipbuilding capacity. Nonetheless, the document identified building 'modern aircraft carriers' as a priority. But the practicality of this is a different matter: for years, Russia's surface-ship programme has funded only comparatively small warships. The revised doctrine reflected the adversarial relations between Russia, the US and NATO, but lacked realism concerning the state of Russian naval shipbuilding. Russia's navy suffered some spectacular setbacks in 2022 and its impact on the invasion of Ukraine has been less than might have been expected. The Black Sea Fleet has exhibited poor command direction and slow responsiveness to threats as well as questionable operational readiness. Nevertheless, it continued to exert influence through at least a partial and distant blockade plus the use of both surface and submarine platforms to launch land-attack cruise-missile strikes against Ukrainian targets. In the run-up to the opening of hostilities, there was a significant massing of Russian naval forces in the Mediterranean, including from the Northern, Baltic and Pacific fleets, as well as activity in northern European waters, ostensibly for exercises but no doubt for strategic signalling and to exert pressure. There was also reinforcement of the Black Sea Fleet with a number of amphibious ships, including a Project 11711 Ivan Gren-class vessel and several Project 775 Ropucha-dass landing ships. After 24 February, this reinforced amphibious capability played only a limited role, in part because of the known hazards of such operations in the area, the fact that the land war did not advance as Moscow planned, and also subsequently the innovative approaches Ukraine employed to put Russian naval vessels at risk. Russian shipping in the Mediterranean may have had some deterrent effect with, for example, the Project 1164 Slava-class cruisers from the Northern and Pacific fleets shadowing NATO aircraft-carrier formations in the area for a time. However, Turkey's decision to close to warships the transit route into and out of the Black Sea has likely affected Russia's ability both to support 160 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 its Mediterranean presence and to reinforce its forces in the Black Sea itself. The most attention-grabbing Russian naval setback was the sinking of the then Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Project 1164 Slava-dass cruiser Moskva. Poor operational tactics in the use of the vessel and questions over the readiness and effectiveness of both the crew and the ship's systems appear to have contributed to the sinking. This raises new questions over the combat effectiveness of the other large legacy Soviet-era surface combatants on which the Russian fleet continues to rely for the bulk of its blue-water operations and power-projection missions. The navy also lost a Project 1171 Alligator-class landing ship alongside in the port of Berdyansk in March 2022 plus a number of minor war vessels in different attacks. The attack with uncrewed air and surface vehicles at the end of October on the naval base at Sevastopol appeared to cause damage to the new Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Project 11356 Grigorovich-class frigate Admiral Makarov. Again, Ukraine's use of novel capabilities and combinations of capabilities, as well as audacious tactics, has hampered Black Sea Fleet operations. That said, the Russian Navy continued to display an ability to conduct operations on a global basis. These included several, albeit relatively limited, joint manoeuvres with the Chinese navy in the Western Pacific, including in the waters around Japan. There were a number of important additions to the submarine-fleet inventory. The second Project 955A Borey-A nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) and the second Project 08851 Yasen-M nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine, which were commissioned at the end of 2021, have both joined the Pacific Fleet, boosting its capabilities. A third Project 08551 Yasen-M was undergoing sea trials in mid-2022. July saw the commissioning of the new nuclear-powered special-mission submarine Belgorod, although there remains continuing uncertainty over the operational status of the Poseidon nuclear-powered and potentially nuclear-tipped large uninhabited underwater vehicle that it is designed to carry. The final Project 941UM Typhoon-class SSBN, which had for some time essentially been a reserve asset for training and trials, now appears to have been retired. Otherwise, additions to the fleet have been limited, reflecting the continuing poor performance of the naval-industrial base. This has no doubt been exacerbated by additional Western sanctions. The ambition outlined in the new maritime doctrine only served to highlight the fitful and accident-prone modernisation of the sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov; the timing of its completion was uncertain as was the vessel's likely combat effectiveness even if it does return to the fleet. DEFENCE ECONOMICS Russia Assessments of Russian defence spending in 2022 have to consider the situation before the start of the 'special military operation' against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, and the circumstances after that date. After growing by 2.3% on average in 2017-19, the economic fallout of the coronavirus pandemic caused a 2.7% contraction in Russia's real GDP in 2020. The economic recovery got off to a strong start in 2021, with real GDP growing by 4.7%, but, following the invasion of February 2022, contractions of 3.4% and 2.3% are projected for 2022 and 2023. After increasing rapidly in the early years (2011-15) of the State Armament Programme (SAP) to 2020, military expenditure slowed and declined in real terms in 2016-18 before recovering to a modest extent in 2019. Growth in real terms in 2019 and 2020 was followed by a decline in 2021 when inflation rose to 6.7% from an average of 3.6% in 2017-20. With the exception of 2020, when Russian GDP dipped amid the coronavirus pandemic, the proportion of GDP allocated to total military spending fell below 4% in recent years until the revised 2022 budget following the invasion of Ukraine. The scale of the annual state defence order (SDO) for 2021 and 2022 has not been revealed but appears to be approximately RUB1.5 trillion (USD21.4 billion) in both years, which means it is declining in real terms. Monitoring Russian military spending in 2022 was complicated by a Ministry of Finance decision to limit the publication of data on the implementation of the federal budget and, from April, only provide figures for total income and expenditure. The Federal Treasury initially followed suit but later resumed publication of detailed figures, issuing a report of spending during the first half of the year and then in July. During January-July, Russia's core 'National Defence' budget amounted to RUB2.89tr (USD41 -3bn), more than 19% of total budget expenditure, compared with the 14.8% set out in budget law for 2022. Total military spending amounted to RUB3.68tr (USD52.6bn), almost one-quarter of the total and an Tajikistan USD0.11bn Georgia USD0.34bn Kyrgyzstan n.k Turkmenistan Uzbekistan n.k n.k Real % Change (2021-22) More than 20% increase Between 10% and 20% increase Between 3% and 10% increase Between 0% and 3% increase *Total defence expenditure (in line with NATO definition) based on official budget data given in 2023 budget. Official 2022 budget. Actual spending expected to be much higher. The official 2023 defence budget of UAH1.14tr(USD31bn) is almost 9 times the 2022 official level. Significant real cut in 2022 due to 21% inflation rate. Between 0% and 3% decrease Between 3% and 10% decrease Between 10% and 20% decrease More than 20% decrease Estimate Q Spending 2% of GDP or above Insufficient data [1] Map illustrating 2022 planned defence-spending levels (in USDbn at market exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change in planned defence spending between 2021 and 2022(at constant2015 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending between 2021 and 2022. Actual spending changes prior to 2021, and projected spending levels post-2022, are not reflected. ©IISS ▲ Map 4 Russia and Eurasia: regional defence spending (USDbn, %ch yoy)1 estimated 4.5% of GDP. However, this total did not reflect the full cost to Russia of the war with Ukraine, as the evidence suggested that various aspects of the conflict were funded from other sections of the budget. The share of GDP was probably nearer to 6-7% at a time when the Russian economy was under T Figure 8 Russia: defence expenditure as % of GDP 4.03 3.78 3.84 4.04 I 1 1 2017 2018 2019 2020 4.12 3.71 ■ I I pressure from sanctions and living standards were being depressed. Beyond equipment and operational costs, Russia was also reportedly seeking to increase the size of its armed forces. The submission of the draft Russian 2023 budget to the State Duma on 30 September did offer more transparency in revealing that, as expected, final allocations for defence in 2022 were much higher than initially budgeted. The original core 2022 budget of RUB3.5otr (USD50.obn) was revised upward to RUB4.68tr (USD66.c)bn), with corresponding total military expenditure increasing from an estimated RUB4.g8tr (USD7i.ibn) to RUB6.i5tr (USD87.gbn). Using purchasing-power-parity rates of conversion to better reflect the lower costs of production and labour in Russia, total Russian military expenditure is estimated to be USDi92bn in 2022, the third largest globally behind the United States and China. The official projection for 2023 shows that military expenditure will be maintained at this higher level, 162 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Table 9 Russia: defence expenditure, 2015-22 (trillion roubles, current prices) Year 'National Defence' ('ND') Annual state defence order (SDO) Total military expenditure1 RUB (trillion) % of GDP RUB (trillion)2 % of 'ND' RUB (trillion) % of GDP % change real terms 2022R3 4.680 3.13 n.k. n.k. 6.153 4.12 +7.3 2022B3 3.502 2.68 1.500 42.8 4.975 3.80 -1.6 2021 3.573 2.73 1.500 42.0 4.859 3.71 -6.5 2020 3.169 2.87 1.500 47.3 4.460 4.04 +5.2 2019 2.997 2.73 1.500 50.1 4.211 3.84 +3.8 2018 2.827 2.72 1.450 51.3 3.928 3.78 -3.6 2017 2.666" 2.90 1.400 52.5 3.7044 4.03 -8.2 2016 2.982" 3.48 1.600 53.7 3.8314 4.47 -7.4 2015 3.181 3.83 1.800 56.6 4.026 4.85 +16.5 1. According to NATO definition. GDP figures from IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2022. 2. Approximate; the annual SDO is classified, but every a few years an approximate total is released. 3.2022B shows the initial 2022 budget, and 2022R shows the revised budget following the invasion of Ukraine. 4. Excludes a one-off payment to reduce accumulated debts of defence-industry enterprises under the scheme of state-guaranteed credits. If this debt payment is included, the total share of GDP rises to 5.4% in 2016 and 4.2% in 2017. with the core budget held at RUB4.98tr (USD/i.ibn) and total funding reaching an estimated RUB6.65tr (USD95.obn). Weapons procurement Due to the war and the imposition of sanctions, less information is available on the development and procurement of new weapons than in previous years. But the limited evidence suggests that many new systems are behind schedule and the rate of production of the latest weapons and other military hardware has fallen. The fulfilment of the main success indicator used, the share of modern weapons in the active stock of the armed forces, is now less frequently cited. The SDO is now based on the SAP to 2027. President Vladimir Putin signed off on it in early 2018, with total funding of approximately USDigtr plus an additional USDitr for infrastructure relating to the deployment of new systems. It is claimed that work is under way on its successor for 2024-33, but no details have been provided. Its drafting must now be extremely difficult given the current highly uncertain military and economic circumstances, rendering any forecasting and planning highly problematic. However, some details of new systems have become available. Former chief of Roscosmos Dmitri Rogozin in early 2022 claimed that the new, long-overdue Sarmat heavy intercontinental ballistic missile would be deployed by the end of 2022, though it had only had one flight test, in April, and will need more than that (some analysts estimate at least ten) before it can be approved for service, though it remains unclear whether war exigencies will lead Russia to curtail this test schedule. Deployment looks more likely in late 2023 or 2024. Testing of the new Tsirkon hypersonic missile for surface ships and submarines continues, with optimistic claims that it will enter service in 2022-23. While it was reported last year that a contract had been signed with Almaz-Antey for the delivery of ten new S-500 air-defence systems, scheduled to start in the first half of 2022, there have been no reports of its deployment. Still, there have been claims that some elements of it are in production. The medium-range S-350 Vityaz (RS-SA-28) air-defence system is reported to have been first deployed in 2020, but the available evidence suggests that very few have entered service. Only six 'fifth generation' Su-57 Felon fighters had been supplied by September 2022 under the present contract, and the rate of production is such that the supply of a planned 76 by the end of 2027 is beginning to look in doubt. Development of the new Checkmate fighter continues, with a first flight test planned for 2024. But it remains unclear who will buy it, as the Russian air force appears to have no interest in acquiring the aircraft. Naval deliveries have been limited in 2022 and include the new strategic Borey-A-class submarine Knyaz Oleg; the multi-role Yasen-M (Severodvinsk II) boat Krasnoyarsk; and two Project 677 Loda-class (Petersburg) diesel-electric submarines, Kronstadt and Velikiye Luki. The Project 09582 special-purpose submarine Belgorod was handed over to the navy in July 2022 and will enter service with the Pacific Fleet. It is associated with the future Poseidon nuclear-powered and potentially nuclear-tipped large uninhabited underwater vehicle still under Russia and Eurasia 163 development. The main new surface ships will be the Project 22350 (Gorshkov) frigate Admiral Golovko, likely to be the first ship equipped with the Tsirkon missile, and the Project 20380 (Steregushchiy II) corvette Rezkiy. As for the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier under repair and limited modernisation, delays keep arising and it is now unlikely that it will return to service before the end of 2024. There is little evidence of anything but very limited building of the new Armata tank and some Russian military specialists think that it will never enter serial production given its high unit cost and considerations that it would offer capability outcomes too marginal to justify its adoption. This may also apply to the new Kurganets and Bumerang armoured vehicles, now not often mentioned in the specialist military media. Defence industry It has become difficult to follow the development of the Russian defence industry in quantitative terms as published data has become increasingly scarce, especially since the start of the war. By the summer of 2022 there were mounting reports of defence companies working with two or three shifts in sectors such as munitions, armoured vehicles, artillery systems and high-precision missiles. This followed government measures in the summer facilitating the transfer of companies to defence work on a temporary basis and requiring some workers to perform overtime or night work and delay holidays in order to 'optimise' work on orders for the armed forces. Repair facilities also appear to have become more active than usual, and Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in early September approved a decree for the quick establishment of two new tank and armoured-vehicle repair facilities, one near Moscow and the other in the Rostov region. There are reports that sanctions are disrupting the work of defence enterprises, though some of these have turned out to be misleading. They include a report that the vast Uralvagonzavod tank and rail-wagon works had ceased military production because of an inability to obtain imported components. In reality, batches of new tanks and armoured vehicles were still being delivered several months after the start of the war, including T-90M Proryv tanks in early September. The ground forces also took delivery of some BREM-iM armoured recovery vehicles, and batches of modernised BMP-iK, BRM-iK and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, but overall for the ground forces, combat losses in Ukraine dwarfed 2022 delivery numbers. Moreover, as stocks of imported systems and components have become exhausted, the manufacture of some products has come to a halt. They include the Ansat helicopter, which has a Pratt & Whitney power unit, and the Czech L-410 small transport plane assembled in Russia, which has General Electric turboprop engines. Analysis of Russian weapons captured in Ukraine has revealed extensive use of foreign electronic components. Now that sanctions on integrated circuits and many other components have been tightened, there is a question as to the ability of the defence industry to maintain the output of some weapons. However, it is likely that quite large reserve stocks of imported components were built up, following long-established Soviet practice. Belarus, meanwhile, has been an important source of supply of electronic components suitable for use in military hardware; its role may increase. The Russian government is engaged in a vigorous import-substitution campaign, but rapid results are unlikely. It may prove difficult to obtain suitable advanced production equipment in some cases, for example for integrated circuits. Russia's sole volume producer of microchips, Mikron, is able to produce only at the 180-190-nanometre level, with a modest annual output by international standards. Taiwan was fabricating more advanced chips and processors to Russian designs, but sanctions will be restricting Russia's ability to secure such technologies from abroad. Notable organisational changes in the defence industry in 2022 include completion of the merger of the Sukhoi and MiG design bureaus, in June 2022, while the United Aircraft Corporation is in the process of converting from a holding company to a fully integrated single company. In July 2022 there was a significant change of official personnel. Yuri Borisov, deputy prime minister responsible for oversight of the defence industry since May 2018, was replaced by the industry minister since 2012, Denis Manturov, who retains that ministerial post. Borisov became director general of Roscosmos, replacing Rogozin. The diversification of the defence industry into civil high-technology fields continues with a 26.7% share of civil and dual-use output in 2021, a modest increase on the 25.6% of 2020. The Rosatom nuclear corporation is at the fore in diversification: its civil share was 42% in 2020 with a goal of 48% by the end of 2022 and 53% in 2024. That process for much of the defence industry, however, may be pushed off 164 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Table 10 Russia: Volume of military-technical cooperation and arms exports (USD billion, current) 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 FSVTS military-technical cooperation 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.2 15.6 14.6 Inc'Rosoboronexport' 13.0 13.4 13.7 11.0 13.0 (13.0)' TsAMTO arms sales 1T2 120 143 124 ill % of world arms sales 14.1 14.8 18.7 15.5 13.0 1. Rosoboronexport's claimed approximate total, possibly overstated. FSVTS: Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation. TsAMTO: Centre for the Analysis of the World Trade in Arms, Moscow. The centre measures all arms exports in terms of current US dollars. Note, the centre has revised its data for 2016-19 on the basis of new information presenting a slightly more modest volume for Russia. course by the war and sanctions. Given the scale of equipment losses during the war, it may prove necessary to increase the state defence order over the next few years, reducing the scope for diversification. There have been mounting reports that the defence industry is facing a shortage of labour, especially personnel with higher education, including IT specialists. In June 2022, Borisov said that about 400,000 workers were needed, including 120,000 graduates. Meeting this challenge may well necessitate increased salaries and wages. Arms exports In recent years, the value of Russian arms exports has been maintained at a stable level, notwithstanding the imposition of sanctions on some countries opting to buy weapons from Russia and the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. In fact, the volume of sales increased in 2020. Russia's own measure of export volumes relates to so-called military-industrial cooperation, which includes sales of weapons and other military equipment, components, licence sales, repairs, servicing and training. The annual volume is reported by the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS). The valuation of Russian arms exports is becoming more complex, as there is increasing reliance on payment in national currencies rather than US dollars and on non-transparent barter and offset deals. Russia's share of the global arms market has been declining when valued in current US dollars. Prospects for 2022 are uncertain. Speaking in August, Aleksandr Mikheev, head of Rosoboronexport, said that sales had reached USD54bn, suggesting that the annual total may turn out to be less than in 2021. Some potential purchases appear to be on hold as importers fear falling foul of US sanctions. A deal with Turkey to buy a second batch of S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) air-defence systems has been signed in principle, but the issue of part localisation of production in Turkey has not been resolved. There have been reports in the Russian media that the fulfilment of some export contracts is being delayed - aircraft for Algeria and artillery systems for Vietnam being examples - to prioritise production for the domestic armed forces, while the Philippines cancelled a contract for 16 Mi-17 helicopters to avoid US sanctions. Indeed, Russia has been resorting to arms imports to meet urgent needs posed by its invasion of Ukraine, particularly Iranian Shahed 136 direct-attack munitions. Russia seriously lags in strike uninhabited aerial vehicle development. It is held back by an inability to develop and manufacture in quantity suitable small piston engines, with their import blocked by sanctions. There have also been claims that North Korea has sent munitions but, contrary to the expectations of some commentators, there is no evidence of China supplying weapons to Russia. Regional defence economics The war in Ukraine has had a dramatic economic impact on countries in Central Asia. Inflation rates, already high in 2021, rose even further in all countries primarily due to increased food prices. Balancing this are the 'unexpected spillovers' that the IMF identifies as the relocation of workers and firms from Russia with associated money and capital inflows which strengthened the consumption component of GDP. Furthermore, the spike in oil prices has bolstered the revenues of the oil exporters in the region -Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The short-term outlook, however, does face downside risks through the exposure of these economies to that of Russia. Several countries rely on remittances, primarily from Russia, which are threatened by the impact of sanctions on Russia's economy and indeed the cost of war. Russian real GDP is estimated to have contracted by 3.4% in 2022 with a further 2.3% contraction in 2023. Defence spending in the region is difficult to ascertain for certain countries - for example Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan - but of the countries Russia and Eurasia 165 that The Military Balance assesses, it is evident that there has been strong growth in recent years. Armenia's defence budget has grown from USD435m in 2017 to USD749m in 2022 and is projected to increase to USDi.ibn in 2023. As a proportion of GDP, the country allocated 4.4% on average to defence between 2017 and 2022, spiking to 5.57% in 2023. Growth is also evident in Azerbaijan where spending increased from USDi.5bn in 2017 to USD2.6bn in 2022 and reaching USD3.ibn in 2023, thus maintaining a 3:1 ratio with Armenia's defence budget over this period. Growth in Kazakhstan's budget has also been significant, from USDi.3bn in 2017 to USDi.cjbn in 2022. Across the region, high rates of inflation erode increases, or result in cuts, in defence spending in real terms, an issue that will be exacerbated until the elevated rates seen in 2021 and 2022 start to abate. The economic impact on Ukraine following Russia's invasion has been severe. Real GDP is projected to have contracted by 35% in 2022 while inflation rose from 9.4% in 2021 to 20.6% in 2022. Projections for 2023 are difficult due to the high levels of uncertainty around the trajectory of the war in the short term. The instability caused by the war means it is difficult to determine the actual level of military spending in Ukraine in 2022. The original 2022 budget came to UAHi3ibn (USD3.6bn), presenting a 10.8% real cut from 2021 owing to the spike in the inflation rate. Actual spending was expected to be much higher. Indeed, the official 2023 defence budget of UAHi.i4tr (USD3ibn) is almost nine times the 2022 official level. UKRAINE Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014. The seizure of Crimea in March 2014, and Russia's subsequent fomenting of discord and political and military support for proxy forces in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, provided the impetus for significant changes in Ukraine's armed forces. Up to then, they had been significantly degraded through disinvestment in the post-Soviet period. Reform activities after 2014 were designed to improve not only the capability of Ukraine's armed forces, but also its defence and security institutions. These reforms were designed to produce armed forces and a defence sector more aligned with Western military standards, and that were capable of territorial defence. Volunteer battalions were formed, and territorial-defence units were established. But moves to empower and strengthen resilience in local administrations and develop civil-defence measures were also important. The 2016 Strategic Defence Bulletin outlined reform plans and guided the strategic development of the armed forces. Defence assistance by Western states since 2014 significantly aided the development of institutions by boosting capability in areas such as cyber security and supplying limited amounts of military equipment, including Javelin anti-armour systems and counter-battery radars. Defence education has also been important. Since 2008, NATO has delivered a Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) that has been used as a framework to deliver training assistance in a number of countries, ranging from Armenia to Tunisia. A number of NATO trust funds, headed by individual member states, also delivered targeted assistance in defence-transformation initiatives. DEEP projects in Ukraine included assistance to Ukrainian forces in developing professional military education capacity, as well as plans to develop professional non-commissioned officers. Some Western states also delivered training assistance in Ukraine, including at the Yaroviv training centre. This led to the generation of a force that had since 2014-15 cycled a large number of personnel through the front lines in Ukraine's east, with those personnel out of regular service going into reserve. It also sparked a culture change that included the development of a group of officers and non-commissioned officers who are more empowered than their predecessors to take decisions on the battlefield. As 2022 wore on, and Ukrainian losses mounted, continued training support became more important. Mobilisation has led to a significant influx of recruits. However, with many training grounds in Ukraine under threat, and given the Western decision not to deploy training troops to Ukraine itself, this expanded training initiative saw the development of plans to train Ukrainians in European countries. Since mid-year, the United Kingdom has led a training programme that at its inception aimed to train 10,000 Ukrainian personnel by the end of 2022; it also includes instructors from NATO allies and partners. Training includes modules on weapons skills, basic patrolling and combat tactics, and battlefield first aid in a compressed five-week package. According to the UK Ministry of Defence, this has, over time, also seen Ukrainians bringing with them their battlefield experiences, which have brought mutual benefits for 166 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Figure 9 Ukraine: selected Ukrainian main battle tank (MBT) upgrades Ukraine inherited a large fleet of main battle tanks (MBTs) from the former Soviet army, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. (Ukraine had earlier declared independence in August 1991.) This fleet included examples of all three of the major Soviet MBT families in frontline service in 1991: the T-64, T-72, and T-80. Ukraine's post-Soviet inventory has included a notably large fleet of T-64 series vehicles, as the primary factory for the construction of T-64s - and the home of its design bureau - was (and still is) located in Kharkiv. The country has continued to develop upgrades for all three of these Soviet-era MBT families, with the most recent examples shown below. The heritage of the T-72AMT and T-64BM2 Bulat\s readily apparent; the base-T-84, meanwhile, is a variant of the Soviet T-80 and was designed in Kharkiv in the 1990s. Prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, these upgrades were principally carried out at the Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Lviv Armoured Plants. Combat losses, and vehicles captured from Russian forces and received from Eastern European operators of Soviet-era tank fleets, mean that Ukraine's tank fleet is now in transition, while authorities look to improve overall capability with more modern armour, including from foreign suppliers. T-64BM2 Bulat Upgrades: ■ Thermal-imaging gunner's sight ■ Improved fire-control systems ■ Nizh explosive reactive armour ■ Bar armour ■ Upgraded 1,000 hp engine ■ Improved communications and GPS systems T-84 Oplot-M Upgrades: ■ New welded turret ■ Thermal-imaging gunner's sight ■ Thermal-imaging commander's panoramic periscope ■ Improved fire-control systems ■ Duplet explosive reactive armour ■ Varta soft-kill active protection system ■ Upgraded 1,200 hp engine ■ Auxiliary power unit T-72AMT Upgrades: ■ Improved fire-control systems ■ Nizh explosive reactive armour ■ Bar armour ■ Improved communications and GPS systems ©MSS Russia and Eurasia 167 Western training personnel. The European Union also launched a training initiative in October that will see Ukrainian personnel trained in Germany and Poland. Adaptation and innovation During 2022, the Ukrainian armed forces that had developed since 2014 blunted Russia's attempt to seize the capital and occupy other cities, including Kharkiv and Mykolaiv. The post-2014 Ukrainian forces, which had been developed for what Kyiv termed anti-terrorist operations and, after 2018, joint-forces operations, were in 2022 faced with a different type of war due to the geographic scope of Russia's assault and the greater numbers of artillery and (at least initially) personnel among the assault troops. By late year this force had regained territory in the north and forced a Russian retreat from Kherson in the south by drawing upon its strengths and exploiting the weaknesses of the Russian ground forces. Combat losses of personnel and equipment mounted on both sides during the year, but Ukrainian forces were able to gain advantage in several important areas through adaptation, flexibility and innovation. Communications The provision of robust communications systems, including the much-reported Starlink, has been an important factor. The distribution of these systems -reportedly down to company level and below - has given Ukrainian commanders the capacity to correct artillery fire by aerial surveillance and to maintain operational control of distributed units, including those on the offensive. It was reported that these were important in maintaining control of forces in efforts to regain territory around Kharkiv and Kherson, among others. There was concern that these signals failed at times, such as when Ukrainian forces moved into previously occupied territory. This highlighted the importance of counter-jamming activity and the measures data providers may be taking to prevent the exploitation of any captured material by Russian troops. At the same time, many Russian troops relied on what turned out to be vulnerable systems, including commercial radios and mobile phones; Ukraine's security services regularly published intercepted calls for propaganda purposes. Transport The rapid increase in personnel strength after mobilisation, and the wide front of operations and related mobility and supply demands, created issues around the supply of transport vehicles. The civilian car market has become the main source for increasing the mobility of these formations. Here, too, private funding has been vital. Limited funds, even before this latest invasion, meant that the Ukrainian forces were already using pickups, jeeps, minibuses and minivans, as well as cars. This was partly down to insufficient funds to acquire more suitable vehicles, but also the limited availability of four-wheel-drive vehicles on the second-hand market, including in Europe. Dry conditions during the offensive in Kharkiv somewhat hid the weaknesses of such vehicles, but mobility challenges increase as weather conditions change, raising requirements for military-style vehicles or civilian 4x4 vehicles through winter and into the spring. Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance While some foreign and Ukrainian uninhabited aerial vehicles are available, commercial quadcopters have also proved their utility at the tactical level. Ukrainian specialists consider these to primarily be the DJI Mavic 3, DJI Matrice 300 and 30, as well as the Autel Evo 2, including a version with a thermal-imaging camera. These have been primarily supplied by charitable foundations and volunteer organisations or purchased by individual servicemen and their families. While such devices have proven vulnerable to Russian electronic-warfare interference, small-arms fire and weather conditions, as well as operator error, they have rapidly proliferated in the Ukrainian armed forces. The quadcopters have been important in enabling junior commanders to deploy organic reconnaissance assets and have improved information sharing on a horizontal basis (between units) as well as vertically (with higher-formation headquarters). They have helped increase the effectiveness of Ukrainian artillery, principally mortars and towed-and self-propelled artillery, and have also been used to deliver munitions directly onto targets. Moreover, they have had an important psychological effect in being used to directly target troops, including in ostensibly defensive positions. Artillery Ukraine's inventory of legacy Soviet-era artillery systems has been depleted by combat loss, overuse and also because the high rate of fire has caused ammunition-supply issues. Foreign assistance has supplied large numbers of 152-millimetre shells, but foreign stocks are reducing too. Ukrainian analysts 168 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 have said that the limited numbers of artillery pieces, coupled with ammunition challenges and the wide operational front, have caused Ukraine's artillery forces to be dispersed, with engagements conducted by small units rather than batteries and higher formations. In these instances, accuracy was of increased importance and, even in distributed operations, the arrival of more precise artillery pieces from abroad has helped decentralised operations to remain effective. Precision-guided Western-made projectiles such as the GPS-guided M982 Excalibur and SMArt 155, suitable for newly supplied 155mm systems, are said to have been particularly important. Given the central role of rocket artillery to the capabilities of both Russia and Ukraine, the arrival in Kyiv's inventory of the M142 HIMARS and M270 MLRS systems has been important. Ukraine's widespread use of GMLRS missiles has turned these systems into a key part of offensive operations and, because of the increased range they offer over Ukraine's legacy systems, has enabled Ukrainian forces to hold at risk Russian command posts, supply depots and other targets previously out of range. It has also reportedly enabled Ukraine to assign to these assets some tasks previously performed by tactical aircraft. Anti-armour weapons Western deliveries of anti-armour weapons have expanded Ukraine's inventories of these systems, ranging from lightweight disposable grenade launchers to more advanced NLAWs and Javelins; small numbers of the latter had been supplied after 2018. Some Ukrainian specialists claim that the outcome of this has been a significant loss of Russian armour as well as an apparent shift in the way these forces operate, now looking to avoid close-quarters battle and instead focusing on long-range engagements, often from concealed locations. In turn, this has encouraged Ukrainian anti-tank units to actively search for enemy armoured vehicles using mobile teams with four-wheel-drive vehicles and buggies employing anti-armour weapons, including the Stugna-Y, Corsar, 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot) and the Western-supplied FGM-148 Javelin. At the same time, the groups use grenade launchers and NLAWs in close combat. Aviation Although Russia has proven unable to establish control of the air, its aerospace forces and missile strikes have forced Ukraine's aviation forces to disperse in order to survive, in turn increasing supply and maintenance demands. Although Ukraine has lost a number of aircraft and helicopters, it has succeeded in maintaining a level of effective capability. Western-supplied equipment has been important. Although there has been no supply of Soviet-era aircraft, weapons have been sent, including AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles, which have been employed by Ukrainian aircraft against Russian air defences. Moreover, Ukraine managed to retain some S-300 and Buk air-defence systems and has used them to defend rear areas. This has led Russia to largely abandon attempts to penetrate deep into Ukrainian airspace with crewed aircraft and switch to stand-off munitions; in turn, Russia's frequent use of systems like cruise missiles (along with increasingly effective Ukrainian defences) has reduced the available numbers of these systems. This pattern was established before the receipt of modern Western surface-to-air missiles, such as NASAMS and IRIS-T. On the battlefield, man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADs) have become Ukraine's primary air-defence assets. Indeed, the threat from MANPADS has forced tactical adaptation on both sides, with ground-attack aircraft and helicopters having to not only fly extremely low but also adopt novel Tofted launch' tactics for unguided missiles, reducing the effectiveness of these attacks. Russia and Eurasia 169 Arms procurements and deliveries - Russia and Eurasia Significant events in 2022 r FEBRUARY UKRAINE'S DEFENCE INDUSTRY Russia's armed forces have attacked defence-industrial facilities across Ukraine following Moscow's full-scale invasion. Targets have included facilities in the land, sea and aerospace sectors, including plants capable of repairing armoured vehicles and also missile production facilities. While many facilities have suffered visible damage, the precise impact on defence-industrial capacity is less clear. Continued Ukrainian combat capability indicates that local maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) capacity persists, even if some defence equipment newly supplied in 2022 has been repaired outside Ukraine. Meanwhile, plans to reorganise UkrOboronProm, the state-owned conglomerate, have been postponed indefinitely. The company is now seeking to provide MRO capabilities for much of the NATO-standard equipment donated to Ukraine both in the short term and as part of a post-war development plan. Plans include the licensed production of foreign systems and a Ukraine Startup Fund; the latter will encompass 13 development initiatives including for new armed UAVs, new vehicles and dual-use technology. KAZAKHSTAN'S DEFENCE-INDUSTRIAL AMBITIONS Kazakhstan's defence minister informed parliament of plans to increase both defence exports and the share of domestically produced products in the armed forces'inventory. This followed a series of earlier defence-industrial announcements. In May, Kazakhstan Engineering (KE) - owned since 2019 by the Ministry of Industry and Infrastructural Development - signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) to set up a final assembly linefor the Anka uninhabited air vehicle (UAV).There are reports that a contract for three aircraft was signed in October 2021, with deliveries due in 2023. In February, the ministry announced a series of initiatives, including the assembly of Mi-171 Sh helicopters (the assembly of other variants began in 2019) and the establishment of an Airbus maintenance centre. Kazakhstan's defence-industrial modernisation process has so far seen agreements with foreign firms, typically through joint ventures, rather than the local design of platforms. This strategy has had some success, with several dozen Airbus H145 helicopters and over 100 Arlan 4x4 protected patrol vehicles delivered to Kazakh customers so far. Export contracts are rarer, though in August, Eurocopter Kazakhstan Engineering (an Airbus-KE joint venture) began delivering H125 helicopters to Kyrgyzstan's Ministry of Emergency Situations, following an export contract signed with Kyrgyzstan in March. AUGUST RUSSIAN DEFENCE EXPORTS Rosoboronexport claimed that it had signed agreements worth more than USD14.5bn during the Army-2022 exhibition. Companies from Belarus, China, India, Iran and Thailand travelled to the show, notwithstanding international sanctions on Russia.The war in Ukraine, and sanctions on Russia, have raised questions over the future of Russia's defence exports. There is the potential for sanctions to be imposed on prospective purchasers, while Russia's customers may also make judgements on the effectiveness of its military equipment and combat losses may make Moscow prioritise domestic deliveries over exports. In August, the Philippines announced it was cancelling a November 2021 contract with Russian Helicopters for 16 Mi-17 medium transport helicopters worth PHP12.7bn (USD257.84m). Similarly, Egypt's 2018 contract for Su-35 combat aircraft seems to have been either postponed or cancelled. Continued sanctions will likely make it harder for Russia to export defence materiel. This may lead Moscow to attempt to secure exports by setting more flexible terms, offering yet more advanced equipment or looking to find new customers. SEPTEMBER RUSSIA LOOKS TO SECURE DEFENCE-INDUSTRY WORKFORCE President Vladimir Putin signed legislation outlining harsher prison sentences for desertion, looting and evading mobilisation. These measures include a sentence of up to ten years for violating the terms of a contract under the state defence order, causing damage worth at least 5% of the order's contract value, or failing to fulfil it. Earlier, in August, it had been reported that Rostec was preventing key managers from travelling on holiday. While this was ostensibly intended to help fulfil the state defence order, it may also have been designed to stop personnel fleeing the country. The loss in Ukraine of large amounts of Russia's most modern equipment is likely fuelling anxiety over defence production. Moreover, Russia's efforts to substitute domestic for foreign defence components since 2014 have seen limited success, and analysis of defence equipment damaged and destroyed in Ukraine has pointed to continued dependencies, including in microelectronics. Tighter international sanctions after February will increase the challenge for Russia in maintaining the development and production of defence equipment. 170 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Table 11 ^m Selected equipment donations to Ukraine, February-September 2022 Armoured fighting Artillery Missiles vehicles Air defence Country MANPADS Coastal Air-defence launched *crew operated Short- SPAAG to long-range SAM Origin of equipment: Delivered Pending Western ■ ■ Soviet/Warsaw Pact era ■ n/a Both ■ n/a Russia and Eurasia 171 Armenia ARM Armenian Dram AMD 2021 2022 2023 GDP AMD 6.98tr 8.04tr USD 13.9bn 17.7bn per capita USD 4,701 5,972 Growth % 5.7 7.0 Inflation % 7.2 8.5 Def bdgt [a] AMD 312bn 340bn 501bn USD 622m 749m USD1=AMD 501.36 454.30 [a] Includes imported military equipment, excludes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 609 344 2008 2015- 2022 Population 3,000,756 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 9.6% 2.9% 3.0% 3.4% 24.3% 5.6% Female 8.6% 2.6% 2.7% 3.4% 25.8% 8.1% Capabilities The armed forces' focus is defence and maintenance of the territorial integrity of the state. The country is involved in a longstanding dispute with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Fighting flared again in September 2022, the worst since the short war in September 2020. The goal of moving the armed forces from a conscript to a contract-based force remains an ambition, though with no timetable apparent. The 2020 National Security Strategy unsurprisingly identified Azerbaijan as Armenia's primary security concern, while also highlighting the role it claims Turkey plays in supporting Azerbaijan's policy aims. The country retains close ties with Russia, and irrespective of Moscow's invasion of Ukraine, Russia was viewed still as Armenia's strategic partner as of late 2022. Yerevan has also begun to build defence relations with India. The 2021 delivery of counter-battery radars was followed in September 2022 with an order that included the Pinaka multiple rocket launcher and anti-tank weapons. Armenia is a member of the CSTO, with military doctrine continuing to be influenced by Russian thinking. Armenia is also engaged in a NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan. Personnel train regularly and take part in annual CSTO exercises and in bilateral drills with Russia. Equipment is mainly of Russian origin. Agreements have been reached in recent years to purchase modem Russian systems, though only in small quantities. Serviceability and maintenance of mainly ageing aircraft have been a problem for the air force. There is some capacity to manufacture defence equipment for the domestic market, including electro-optics, light weapons and UAVs, but Armenia is reliant on Russia for other equipment platforms and military systems. The government has set the goal of further developing its domestic defence industry, while also looking to improve the quality of systems fielded. ACTIVE 42,900 (Army 40,000 Air/AD Aviation Forces (Joint) 1,100 other Air Defence Forces 1,800) Paramilitary 4,300 Conscript liability 24 months RESERVE Some mobilisation reported, possibly 210,000 with military service within 15 years ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE_ Army £40,000_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (Special) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn(-), 5 MR regt, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn) 1 (2nd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 It inf regt, 1 arty bn) 1 (3rd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 5 MR regt, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn) 1 (5th) corps (2 MR regt) Other 1 indep MR trg bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 MRL bde 1 AT regt 1 AD bde 2 AD regt 2 (radiotech) AD regt 1 engr regt SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Available estimates should be treated with caution following losses suffered in the fighting since late 2020 in Nagorno-Karabakh ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 109: 3 T-54; 5 T-55; £100 T-72A/B; 1 T-90A RECCE 12 BRM-1K (CP) IFV 140:100 BMP-1; 25 BMP-IK (CP); 15 BMP-2 APC 150 APC (T) 20 MT-LB APC (W) 130:108 BTR-60 (ind variants); 18 BTR-70; 4 BTR-80 AUV Tigr ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV MT-LB ARV BREhM-D; BREM-1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • SP 22+: 9 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 13 9P149 Shturm (RS-AT-6 Spiral); 9K129 Kornet-E (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) ARTILLERY 225 SP 37:122mm 9 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 28 2S3 Akatsiya TOWED 122:122mm 60 D-30; 152mm 62: 26 2A36 Giatsint-B; 2 D-l; 34 D-20 MRL 54:122mm up to 50 BM-21 Grad; 273mm 2 WM-80; 300mm 2 9A52 Smerch MOR 120mm 12 M120 172 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 14: 7+ 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud B); 3+ 9K79 Tochka (RS-SS-21 Scarab); 4 9K720 Iskander-E UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Light Krunk AIR DEFENCE SAM Medium-range 2K11 Krug (RS-SA-4 Ganef); S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline); 9K37M Buk-Ml (RS-SA-11 Gadfly) Short-range 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); S-125 Pechora (RS-SA-3 Goa); 9K331MKM Tor-M2KM Point-defence 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K35M Strela-W (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 9K333 Verba (RS-SA-29 Gizmo); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2 Air and Air Defence Aviation Forces 1,100 1 Air & AD Joint Command FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25UBK Frogfoot EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 17 combat capable EGA 4 Su-30SM Flanker H ATK 13: up to 12 Su-25 Frogfoot; 1 Su-25UBK Frogfoot TPT 4: Heavy 3 11-76 Candid; PAX 1A319CJ TRG 14:4 L-39 Albatros; 10 Yak-52 HELICOPTERS ATK 7 Mi-24P Hind ISR 4: 2 Mi-24K Hind; 2 Mi-24R Hind (cbt spt) MRH 14:10 Mi-8MT (cbt spt); 4 Mi-8MTV-5 Hip C2 2 Mi-9 Hip G (cbt spt) TPT • Light 7 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Long-range S-300PT (RS-SA-10 Grumble); S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); SARH R-27R (RS- AA-10A Alamo) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,300_ Police_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 4 paramilitary bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 5 BRM-1K (CP) IFV 45:44 BMP-1; 1 BMP-IK (CP) APC • APC (W) 24 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-152 ABCV 5 BMD-1 Border Troops_ Ministry of National Security EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 3 BRM-1K (CP) IFV 35 BMP-1 APC • APC (W) 23: 5 BTR-60; 18 BTR-70 ABCV 5 BMD-1 DEPLOYMENT LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 31 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 40 FOREIGN FORCES Russia 3,500:1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80 BMP-1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 ftr sqn with 18 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 4 Su-30SM Flanker H; 1 hel sqn with 11 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8AMTSh Hip; 4 Mi-8MT Hip; 2 SAM bty with S-300V (RS-SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); 1 SAM bty with Buk-Ml-2 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly) Azerbaijan AZE Azerbaijani New Manat AZN 2021 2022 2023 GDP AZN 92.9bn 119bn USD 54.6bn 70.1 bn per capita USD 5,398 6,842 Growth % 5.6 3.7 Inflation % 6.7 12.2 Def bdgt [a] AZN 4.59bn 4.49bn USD 2.70bn 2.64bn USD1=AZN 1.70 1.70 [a] Official defence budget. Excludes a significant proportion of procurement outlays. Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2.61 1.15 2008 -2015- -2022 Population 10,353,296 Age 0-14 Male 11.7% Female 10.5% Capabilities 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus 3.7% 3.4% 4.1% 23.6% 3.2% 3.2% 2.9% 3.8% 25.1% 4.9% The armed forces' principal focus is territorial defence. There was renewed fighting between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces in September 2022, two years after a six-week war between the two over Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia has been the traditional defence partner for Azerbaijan, but more recently it has bought from Israel and forged a strategic relationship with Turkey. In June 2021, Baku and Ankara signed the'Shusha Declaration', which included cooperation if either nation is threatened by a third state. Both parliaments ratified the accord in early 2022. Pakistan has also begun to emerge as a defence-industrial partner. Azerbaijan maintains a defence relationship with NATO, concluding in 2019 a fifth cycle of its NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan. Readiness within Azerbaijan's conscript-based armed services varies between units. Azerbaijan has taken part in multilateral exercises and its forces also train bilaterally with Turkey.The two air forces held TurAz Eagle 2022 in September, while Azerbaijani personnel also took part in the multinational Efes-2022 drill held in Turkey. The armed forces have little expeditionary capability. Defence modernisation and procurement has been a focus in the past decade, intended to replace the ageing inventory of mainly Soviet-era equipment. Russia and Eurasia 173 Recent orders include air-defence and artillery systems and wheeled and tracked armoured vehicles, predominantly of Russian origin. In recent years there has been significant procurement and industrial cooperation with Israel, focused on UAVs and guided weapons, and increasingly with Turkey as a key defence partner. Azerbaijan's limited but growing defence-industrial capabilities are centred on the Ministry of Defence Industry, which manages and oversees the production of small arms and light weapons. While the country is reliant on external suppliers for major defence-equipment platforms and systems, some defence companies have started to export to foreign markets. ACTIVE 64,050 (Army 44,500 Navy 1,750 Air 8,650 Other 9,150) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 15,000 Conscript liability 18 months (12 for graduates) RESERVE 300,000 Some mobilisation reported; 300,000 with military service within 15 years ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 44,500_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 5 corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 5 cdo bde MANOEUVRE Mechanised 4 MR bde Light 17 MR bde COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bde 1 MRL bde 1 engr bde 1 sigs bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 497:404 T-72A/AV/B/SIM2; 93 T-90S RECCE 7 BRM-1K IFV 325: 64 BMP-1; 101 BMP-2; 46 BMP-3; 7 BTR-80A; 107 BTR-82A APC 506 APC (T) 336 MT-LB APC (W) 142:10 BTR-60; 132 BTR-70 PPV 28:14 Marauder; 14 Matador AUV 121: 35 Cobra; 86 Sand Cat ABCV 20 BMD-1 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEVIMR-2; MT-LB ARV BREM-L Brelianka MW Božena; GW-3 (minelayer) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 18 9P157-2 Khrizantema-S (RS-AT-15 Springer); Cobra with Skif; 23 Sand Cat with Spike-ER; 7 Sand Cat with Spike-LR MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) (reported); Spike-LR GUNS • TOWED 85mm some D-44 ARTILLERY 1,251 SP 153: 122mm 68 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 68: 14 2S3 Akatsiya; 18 2S19 Msta-S; 36 Dana-MIM; 155mm 5 ATMOS 2000; 203mm 12 2S7 Pion TOWED 551:122mm 423 D-30; 130mm 36 M-46; 152mm 92:49 2A36 Giatsint-B; 43 D-20 GUN/MOR 120mm 17 2S31 Vena MRL 282: 107mm 71 T-107; 122mm 130: 78 BM-21 Grad; 16IMI Lynx; 18 RM-70 Vampir; 18 T-122; 128mm 10 RAK-12; 220mm 17 TOS-1A; 300mm 36: 30 9A52 Smerch; 6 Polonez; 302mm 18 T-300 Kasirga MOR 248:120mm 230:5 Cardom; 27 M-1938 (PM-38); 198 2S12; SP 120mm 18 Sand Cat with Spear SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 7:4IAILORA; 3 9K79-1 Tochka-U (RS-SS-21B Scarab) AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 9K33-1T Osa-IT (RS-SA-8 Gecko) Point-defence 9K35 Strela-W (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K32 Strela (RS-SA-7 Grail)%; 9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-l (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2 Navy 1,750_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11 CORVETTES • FS 1 Kusar (ex-FSU Petya II) with 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun PSO 1 Luga (Wodnik 2) (FSU Project 888; additional trg role) PCC 3: 2 Petrushka (FSU UK-3; additional trg role); 1 Shelon (ex-FSU Project 1388M) FB3:lAraz (ex-TUR AB 25); 1 Bryza (ex-FSU Project 722); 1 Poluchat (ex-FSU Project 368) PBF 3 Stenka MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 MHC 4: 2 Korund (Project 1258 (Yevgenya)); 2 Yakhont (FSU Sonya) AMPHIBIOUS 5 LSM 2:1 Project 770 (FSU Polnochny A) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops); 1 Project 771 (Polnochny B) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops) LCM 3: 2 T-4 (FSU); 1 Vydrat (FSU) (capacity either 3 MBT or 200 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ATF 2 Neftegaz (Project B-92) (ex-Coast Guard) 174 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Marines Coast Guard FORCES BY ROLE The Coast Guan MANOEUVRE State Border Ser Amphibious EQUIPMENT BY lmnebn PATROL AND Air Force and Air Defence 8,650_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum A; MiG-29UB Fulcrum B GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-25UB Frogfoot B TRANSPORT 1 sqn with I1-76TD Candid TRAINING 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 regt with Bell 407; Bell 412; Ka-32 Helix C; MD-530; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17-lV Hip; Mi-24 Hind; Mi-35M Hind EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 52 combat capable FTR 14:11 MiG-29 Fulcrum A; 3 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B ATK 38: 33 Su-25 Frogfoot; 5 Su-25UB Frogfoot B TPT • Heavy 2 I1-76TD Candid TRG 22:12 L-39 Albatros; 10 Super Mushshak HELICOPTERS ATK 44: 20 Mi-24 Hind; 24 Mi-35M Hind MRH 33:1 Bell 407; 3 Bell 412; 1 MD-530; 28 Mi-17-lV Hip TPT 11: Medium 11: 3 Ka-32 Helix C; 8 Mi-8 Hip UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Medium Bayraktar TB2 ISR 7+: Heavy 3+ Heron; Medium 4+ Aerostar AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range S-200 Vega (RS-SA-5 Gammon); S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) Medium-range S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline); 9K37M Buk-Ml (RS-SA-11 Gadfly); Buk-MB; £24 S-125-2TM Pechora-2TM; Barak-LRAD Short-range Abisr (Barak-MRAD) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-27T (RS-AA-10B Alamo); R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); SARH R-27R (RS-AA- 10 A Alamo) ASM Barrier-N BOMBS Laser-guided MAM-L Gendarmerie & Paramilitary s15,000_ State Border Service £5,000_ Ministry of Internal Affairs EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 168 BMP-l/BMP-2 APC • APC (W) 19 BTR-60/70/80 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 40 An-2 Colt (modified for use as decoys) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 7+: 4+ Hermes 450; 3+ Hermes 900 LOITERING & DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS Harop; Skystriker (two variants) d was established in 2005 as part of the :vice TYPE COASTAL COMBATANTS 19 PCG 6 Sa'ar 62 with 1 8-cell Typhoon MLS-NLOS lnchr with Spike NLOS SSM, 1 hel landing platform PBF 9:1 Project 205 (FSU Osa II); 6 Shaldag V; 2 Silver Ships 48ft PB 4: 2 Baltic 150; 1 Point (US); 1 Grif (FSU Zhuk) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 ATF 3 Neftegaz (Project B-92) (also used for patrol duties) Internal Troops 10,000+_ Ministry of Internal Affairs EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 7 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80 DEPLOYMENT_ SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1 FOREIGN FORCES Turkey 170; 1 EOD unit TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL The status of Nagorno-Karabakh is disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan. Renewed clashes occurred in September 2022 following a short war in September-November 2020. The fighting in 2020 saw Azerbaijan's forces regain most of the territory lost prior to a 1994 ceasefire. This had brought an uneasy cessation to the first outbreak of hostilities following the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. Data presented here represents the de facto situation and does not imply international recognition. Nagorno-Karabakh £5,000_ Available estimates vary with reference to military holdings in Nagorno-Karabakh and must be treated with caution due to the heavy levels of attrition in the 2020 conflict and subsequent clashes. FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 MR div(-) 1 mtn div(-) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 22: £20 T-72AV/B; 1 T-72 SIM2; 1 T-90S RECCE BRDM-2 IFV 150: £50 BMP-1; e100 BMP-2 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) RCL 73mm SPG-9 Russia and Eurasia 175 ARTILLERY TOWED 122mm some D-30 MRL 122mm some BM-21 Grad AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 9K331 Tor-Mi (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) Point-defence 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2 FOREIGN FORCES_ Russia 1,960; 1 MR bde(-) (peacekeeping) Belarus BLR Belarusian Ruble BYN 2021 2022 GDP BYN 173bn 195bn USD 68.2bn 79.7bn per capita USD 7,295 8,567 Growth % 2.3 -7.0 Inflation % 9.5 16.5 Def bdgt BYN 1.63bn 2.00bn USD 640m 818m USD1=BYN 2.54 2.44 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- 2022 Population 9,413,505 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.2% 2.5% 2.5% 2.9% 24.8% 5.6% Female 7.8% 2.4% 2.3% 2.7% 27.0% 11.2% Capabilities_ Located between Russia and NATO European members, the main task of Belarus's armed forces is maintaining territorial integrity, though the army has also been used for internal security tasks. As of late 2022, the country was working on a revised national state security concept to address what the regime views as changes in the security environment over the last decade. The current military doctrine was approved in July 2016 and identified as security challenges'hybrid methods'and'colour revolutions'. A further plan for the development of the armed forces until 2030 was approved in late 2019. Belarus is a member of the CSTO and reportedly may apply for membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Russia remains the country's principal defence partner, with Belarus vocal in support of Moscow's war in Ukraine. Russian forces used Belarussian territory to launch attacks on Ukraine. In June 2022, Russia suggested that Belarussian armed forces could be provided at least notionally with a nuclear-capable delivery system, either in the form of the 9M723 (RS-SS-26 Stone) short-range ballistic missile or through an air-delivered munition. Despite Moscow's invasion of Ukraine joint training continued with Russian forces during 2022, including air defence exercises, and military training areas were being used in late year to train newly-mobilised Russian troops. The forces remain conscript-based and train regularly with other CSTO partners. As of the fourth quarter of 2022, Belarus had not imposed mobilisation, despite the war on its borders. There has been increased emphasis on the training of territorial-defence troops to allow them to operate more effectively with the regular forces. There is a small heavy-airlift fleet that could be supplemented by civil transport aircraft, and Minsk has a special-forces brigade trained for the air-assault role. There is no requirement to independently deploy and sustain the armed forces, but it could be possible for elements assigned to the CSTO. Russia continues to be Minsk's main defence-equipment supplier. There is a renewed emphasis on air defence, with Minsk expressing interest in 2021 in acquiring additional systems from Russia. The local defence industry manufactures vehicles, guided weapons and electronic-warfare systems, among other equipment. However, there is no capacity to design or manufacture modern combat aircraft. The sector also undertakes upgrade work for foreign customers. ACTIVE 47,950 (Army 11,700 Air 11,300 Special Operations Forces 6,150 Joint 18,800) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 110,000 Conscript liability 18 months; 12 months for graduates (alternative service option) RESERVE 289,500 (Joint 289,500 with mil service within last 5 years) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 11,700_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 2 comd HQ (West & North West) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 4 mech bde COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bde 1 engr bde 1 engr regt 2 sigs regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 497:477 T-72B; 20 T-72B3 mod RECCE 132 BRM-1 IFV 937: 906 BMP-2; 31+ BTR-82A APC • APC (T) 58 MT-LB AUV Tigr ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV BAT-2; IMR-2; MT-LB ARV 2 BREM-K VLB 24: 20 MTU-20; 4 MT-55A MW UR-77 NBC VEHICLES BRDM-2RKhB; Cayman NRBC Chimera; RKhM-4; RKhM-K ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 160: 75 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 85 9P149 Shturm (RS-AT-6 Spiral) MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn) ARTILLERY 583 SP 333: 122mm 125 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 208: 125 2S3 Akatsiya; 71 2S5; 12 2S19Msra-S 176 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 TOWED 152mm 72 2A65 Msta-B MRL 164:122mm 128 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 36 9P140 Uragan MOR 120mm 14 2S12 AIR DEFENCE SAM Point-defence 2K22 Tunguska (RS-SA-19 Grison) GUNS • SP 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch) Air Force and Air Defence Forces 11,300 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with MiG-29/S/UB Fulcrum A/C/B GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot A/B TRANSPORT 1 base with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; 11-76 Candid; Tu-134 Crusty TRAINING Some sqn with L-39 Albatros ATTACK HELICOPTER Some sqn with Mi-24 Hind TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Some (cbt spt) sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip; Mi-26 Halo EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 71 combat capable FTR 34: 28 MiG-29 Fulcrum A/MiG-29S Fulcrum C; 6 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B EGA 4 Su-30SM Flanker H; (21 Su-27/UB Flanker B/C non-operational/stored) ATK 22 Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot A/B TPT 8: Heavy 211-76 Candid (+9 civ 11-76 available for mil use); Light 6:1 An-24 Coke; 4 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Crusty TRG 11+: Some L-39 Albatros; 11 Yak-130 Mitten* HELICOPTERS ATK 12 Mi-24 Hind TPT 26: Heavy 6 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 20: 8 Mi-8 Hip; 12 Mi-8MTV-5 Hip AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-A AS Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer) SARH R-27R (RS-AA-W Alamo A) ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge) ARM Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 Kilter) (likely WFU) Air Defence_ AD data from Uzal Baranovichi EW radar FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 1 bde S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) 3 regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) 1 bde with 9K37 Buk (RS-SA-11 Gadfly); 9K331ME Tor-UIE (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) 1 regt with 9K331ME Tor-M2E (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) 2 regt with 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) Medium-range 9K37 Buk (RS-SA-11 Gadfly) Short-range 21 9K331ME Tor-WZE (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) Point-defence 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 Strela-W (RS-SA-13 Gopher) Special Operations Command 6,150_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde MANOEUVRE Mechanised 2 mech bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 13+ Cayman BRDM APC • APC (W) 217: £64 BTR-70M1; 153 BTR-80 AUV 12 CS/VN3B mod ARTILLERY 114 TOWED 122mm 24 D-30 GUN/MOR • TOWED 120mm 18 2B23 NONA-MI ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn) Joint 18,800 (Centrally controlled units and MoD staff)_ FORCES BY ROLE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 MRL bde 2 engr bde 1 EW unit 1 NBC regt 1 ptn bridging regt 2 sigs bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (T) 20 MT-LB NBC VEHICLES BRDM-2RKhB; RKhM-4; RKhM-K ARTILLERY 112 SP 152mm 36 2S5 Giatsint-S TOWED 152mm 36 2A65 Msta-B MRL 300mm 42: 36 9A52 Smerch; 6 Polonez SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 96: 36 9K79 Tochka (RS-SS-21 Scarab); 60 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud B) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 110,000_ State Border Troops 12,000_ Ministry of Interior Militia 87,000_ Ministry of Interior Internal Troops 11,000_ DEPLOYMENT_ LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 5 FOREIGN FORCES_ Russia 10,000; 1 SSM bn with Iskander-U; 1 FGA sqn(-) with Su-34; Su-35S; 1 atk fit with MiG-31K; 2 SAM bn with S-400; 1 radar station at Baranovichi (Volga system; leased); 1 naval comms site Russia and Eurasia 177 Georgia GEO Georgian Lari GEL 2021 2022 2023 GDP GEL 60.2bn 73.5bn USD 18.7bn 25.2bn per capita USD 5,014 6,770 Growth % 10.4 9.0 Inflation % 9.6 11.6 Def bdgt GEL 900m 918m 1.26bn USD 279m 314m FMA (US) USD 35m 25m 25m USD1=GEL 3.22 2.92 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 914 274 2008 -2015- 2022 Population 4,935,518 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 9.6% 2.7% 2.9% 3.4% 22.4% 6.9% Female 9.0% 2.5% 2.5% 3.1% 24.5% 10.7% Capabilities Georgia's main security preoccupations concern Russian military deployments and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, concerns heightened by Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The country has the goal of joining NATO, and a package of'tailored support measures'were agreed at the alliance's 2022 Madrid Summit in response to the invasion of Ukraine. Bilateral security cooperation with the US continues with the Georgia Defense Readiness Program (GDRP) succeeded by the Georgia Defense and Deterrence Enhancement Initiative, signed in October 2021. The GDRP was intended to bring nine Georgian infantry battalions to a NATO-standard. Forces take part in several NATO multinational exercises. Georgia's armed forces have limited expeditionary logistic capability. The backbone of the armed forces' military equipment remains legacy Soviet-era systems, though the aim is to increasingly replace these. The Major Systems Acquisitions Strategy 2019-25 outlines efforts to procure new equipment in several areas, though funding availability will be key to meeting aspirations. Plans have included boosting special-forces capacity and anti-armour and air-defence capability. The country has begun to develop a defence-industrial base, and this is intended mainly to support the armed forces. The State Military Scientific-Technical Center has demonstrated some maintenance, repair, overhaul and design capabilities for the production of light armoured vehicles. A combat training centre is being developed under the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre. Conscription was reinstated with revised terms and increased pay in early 2017. ACTIVE 20,650 (Army 19,050 National Guard 1,600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,400 Conscript liability 12 months ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE_ Army 15,000; 4,050 conscript (total 19,050) FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (4th) mech inf bde (1 armd bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn) Light 1 (1st) inf bde (1 mech inf bn, 3 inf bn) 1 (2nd) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 f d arty bn) 1 (3rd) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 SP arty bn) Amphibious 2 mne bn (1 cadre) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (5th) arty bde (1 fd arty bn; 1 MRL bn) 1 (6th) arty bde (1 SP arty bn; 1 MRL bn) 1 engr bde 1 engr bn 1 sigs bn 1 SIGINT bn IMPbn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 med bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 123: 23 T-55AM2; 100 T-72B/SIM1 RECCE 41:1BRM-1K; 40+ Didgori-2 IFV 71: 25 BMP-1; 46 BMP-2 APC 221 APC (T) 69+: 3+ Lazika; 66 MT-LB APC (W) 152+: 25 BTR-70; 19 BTR-80; 40+ Didgori-l; 3+ Didgori-3; 65 Ejder AUV 10+: ATF Dingo; Cobra; 10 Cougar ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARVIMR-2 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); FGM-148 Javelin GUNS • TOWED £40: 85mm D-44; 100mm T-12 ARTILLERY 240 SP 67:122mm 20 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 46: 32 M-77 Dana; 13 2S3 Akatsiya; 1 2S19 Msta-S; 203mm 1 2S7 Pion TOWED 71:122mm 58 D-30; 152mm 13: 3 2A36 Giatsint-B; 10 2A65Mste-B MRL 122mm 37:13 BM-21 Grad; 6 GradLAR; 18 RM-70 MOR 120mm 65:14 2S12 Sani; 33 M-75; 18 M120 AIR DEFENCE • SAM Short-range Spyder-SR Point-defence Grom; Mistral-2; 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)%; 9K35 Strela-W (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) Aviation and Air Defence Command 1,300 (incl 300 conscript)_ 1 avn base, 1 hel air base EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 5 combat capable ATK 5: 3 Su-25KM Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot B (2 Su-25 Frogfoot in store) TPT • Light 9: 6 An-2 Colt; 2 Yak-40 Codling 178 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 HELICOPTERS ATK 6 Mi-24 Hind TPT 18: Medium 17 Mi-8T Hip; Light 1+ Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) (up to 8 more in store) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 1+ Hermes 450 AIR DEFENCE • SAM Medium-range 9K37 Buk-Ml (RS-SA-11 Gadfly) (1-2 bn) Point-defence 8 9K33 Osa-AK (RS-SA-8B Gecko) (two bty); 9K33 Osa-AKM (6-10 updated SAM systems) National Guard 1,600 active reservists opcon Army_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 2 inf bde Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,400_ Border Police 5,400_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS TPT • Medium 3 Mi-8MTV-1 Hip Coast Guard_ HQ at Poti. The Navy was merged with the Coast Guard in 2009 under the auspices of the Georgian Border Police, within the Ministry of the Interior EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24 PCC 2 Ochamchira (ex-US Island) PBF 7:4 Ares 43m; 1 Kaan 33; 1 Kaan 20; 1 Project 205P (Stenka) PB 15:1 Akhmeta; 2 Dauntless; 2 Dilos (ex-GRC); 1 Kutaisi (ex-TUR AB 25); 2 Point; 7 Zhuk (3 ex-UKR) DEPLOYMENT_ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 35 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 1 TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL Following the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared themselves independent. Data presented here represents the de facto situation and does not imply international recognition as sovereign states. FOREIGN FORCES Kazakhstan KAZ Kazakhstan Tenge KZT 2021 2022 GDP KZT 84.0tr 103tr USD 197bn 224bn per capita USD 10,306 11,591 Growth % 4.1 2.5 Inflation % 8.0 14.0 Def bdgt KZT 655bn 859bn USD 1.54bn 1.88bn USD1=KZT 425.91 457.73 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008------------------2015-------------------2022 Population 19,398,331 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 12.5% 3.6% 3.1% 3.7% 21.4% 3.2% Female 13.2% 3.4% 3.0% 3.6% 23.4% 5.8% Capabilities_ Kazakhstan's October 2017 military doctrine indicates a change in focus from countering violent extremism towards a wider concern for border security and hybrid threats. In 2022, this doctrine was updated by consolidating the authority of the president's office, enhancing the capabilities of the National Guard to respond to domestic disorder, strengthening of cyber and information capabilities across all security agencies, and creating a new military territorial directorate. Kazakhstan entered a bilateral military agreement with Uzbekistan in September 2017 to cooperate on training and education, countering violent extremism and reducing militant movements in their region. There has traditionally been a close defence relationship with Russia, reinforced by CSTO and SCO membership. Moscow operates a radar station at Balkash. In January 2022, Russian troops led a brief CSTO mission to the country following anti-government protests. Kazakhstan takes part in regional and CSTO exercises, including anti-terror drills. However, Kazakhstan also in 2022 sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine and did not recognise the independence of the Luhansk and Donetsk 'people's republics.' By regional standards, the armed forces are relatively sizeable and well equipped, following the acquisition of significant amounts of new and upgraded materiel in recent years, primarily from Russia. Russia has supplied Kazakhstan with S-300PS self-propelled surface-to-air missile systems as part of a Joint Air-Defence Agreement, boosting its long-range air-defence capability. Kazakhstan is expanding its indigenous defence industry, and joint ventures and the production of rotary-wing and medium-lift fixed-wing aircraft are envisaged with European companies. In 2021 following a two-day summit of the CSTO and in light of instability in Taliban-led Afghanistan, it was announced that Kazakhstan's military-industrial complex will be used to expand the CSTO's defense capabilities. However, Kazakhstan announced in August 2022 that it would suspend arms exports for one year. Russia e4,000; 1 mil base at Gudauta (Abkhazia) with 1 MR bde(-); 1 SAM regt with S-300PS; 1 mil base at Djava/ Tskhinvali (S. Ossetia) with 1 MR bde(-) ACTIVE 39,000 (Army 20,000 Navy 3,000 Air 12,000 MoD 4,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 31,500 Conscript liability12 months (due to be abolished) Russia and Eurasia 179 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 20,000_ 4 regional comd: Astana, East, West and Southern FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 tk bde 2 mech bde 1 aslt bde Mechanised 1 naval inf bde 1 (peacekeeping) inf regt Air Manoeuvre 4 air aslt bde COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty bde 1 SSM unit 3 cbt engr regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 350 T-72BA TSV 3 BMPT RECCE 100:40 BRDM-2; 60 BRM-1 IFV 413: 280 BMP-2; 70 BTR-80A; 63 BTR-82A APC 340 APC (T) 50 MT-LB APC (W) 152: 2 BTR-3E; 150 BTR-80 PPV138:138 Arlan AUV 17+: 17 Cobra; SandCat ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV MT-LB ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 6+: HMMWV with 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 6 9P149 Shturm (MT-LB with RS-AT-6 Spiral) MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn) GUNS 100mm 20 MT-12 ARTILLERY 490 SP 126:122mm 66: 60 2S1 Gvozdika; 6 Semser; 152mm 60 2S3M Akatsiya TOWED 194:122mm 100 D-30; 152mm 94: 70 2A65 Msta-B; 24 D-20 MRL 107:122mm 80 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 3 TOS-1A; 300mm 24: 6 BM-30 Smerch; 18 IMI Lynx (with 50 msl) MOR 63+: 82mm some; SP 120mm 18 Cardom; 120mm 45 2B11 Sfl«i/M120 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 12 9K79 Tochka (RS-SS-21 Scarab) Navy 3,000_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14 PCGM 3 Kazakhstan with 1 4-cell lnchr with 4 Barrier-VK SSM, 1 Arbalet-K lnchr with 4 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse), 1AK630 CIWS PCC 1 Kazakhstan with 1122mm MRL PBF 3 Sea Dolphin PB 7: 3 Archangel; 1 Dauntless; 1 Lashyn; 1 Turk (AB 25); 1 Other MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1 MCC 1 Alatau (Project 10750E) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 Zhuik Air Force 12,000 (incl Air Defence)_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum A/B 2 sqn with MiG-31B/MiG-31BM Foxhound A/C FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with MiG-27 Flogger D; MiG-23UB Flogger C 1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker B/C 1 sqn with Su-27/Su-30SM Flanker B/H GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot TRANSPORT 1 unit with Tu-134 Crusty; Tu-154 Careless 1 sqn with An-12 Cub, An-26 Curl, An-30 Clank, An-72 Coaler, C295M TRAINING 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros ATTACK HELICOPTER 5 sqn with Mi-24V Hind TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Some sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); H145; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17V-5 Hip; Mi-171Sh Hip; Mi-26 Halo AIR DEFENCE 1 bty with 9K317M2 Buk-M2E (RS-SA-17 Grizzly) 2 bty with S-75M Volkhov (RS-SA-2 Guideline) 1 bty with S-125-1T 1 bty with S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon) 10 bty with S-300PS (RS-SA-10 Grumble) Some regt with 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 120 combat capable FTR 45:12 MiG-29 Fulcrum A; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B; 31 MiG-31/MiG-31BM Foxhound EGA 61: 12 MiG-27 Flogger D; 2 MiG-23UB Flogger C; 20 Su-27 Flanker; 4 Su-27UB Flanker; 23 Su-30SM Flanker H ATK 14:12 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot ISR 1 An-30 Clank TPT 21: Medium 2 An-12 Cub; Light 18: 6 An-26 Curl, 2 An-72 Coaler; 8 C295; 2 Tu-134 Crusty; PAX 1 Tu-154 Careless TRG 19:17 L-39 Albatros; 2 Z-242L 180 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 HELICOPTERS ATK 32: 20 Mi-24V Hind (some upgraded); 12 Mi-35M Hind MRH 26: 20 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 6 Mi-171Sh Hip TPT 16: Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo; Light 12:4 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 8 H145 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 2 Wmg Loong (GJ-1) AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range 43+: 3 S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); 40+ S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) Medium-range 15: 3 9K317M2 Buk-MIE (RS-SA-17 Grizzly); 12 S-75M Volkhov (RS-SA-2 Guideline) Short-range 3+: some 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); 3 S-125-1T Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-27T (RS-AA-10B Alamo); R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); SARH R-27ER (RS-AA-10C ,4Zamo); R-27R (RS-AA-WA Alamo); R-33 (RS-AA-9 A Amos); ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder - on MiG-31BM) ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge) ARM Kh-27 (RS-AS-12 Kegler); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 Kilter) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 31,500_ National Guard £20,000_ Ministry of Interior EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLE APC APC (W) Kamaz-43629 Vystrel PPV Ural-W AIRCRAFT TPT • Medium 1Y-8F-200WA State Security Service 2,500_ Border Service £9,000_ Ministry of Interior EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 6: Light 5: 3 An-26 Curl; 1 An-74T; 1 An-74TK; PAX 1 SSJ-100 HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 15:1 Mi-171; 14 Mi-171Sh Coast Guard_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25 PBF 12: 2 Aibar (Project 0210); 8 FC-19; 2 Saygak PB 13: 7 Almaty; 6 Sardar DEPLOYMENT_ LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 9 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 6 Kyrgyzstan KGZ Kyrgyzstani Som KGS 2021 2022 GDP KGS 723bn 853bn USD 8.54bn 9.75bn per capita USD 1,283 1,435 Growth % 3.7 3.8 Inflation % 11.9 13.5 Def bdgt KGS n.k n.k USD n.k n.k USD1=KGS 84.69 87.45 Population 6,071,750 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 15.3% 4.2% 3.7% 4.1% 19.2% 2.4% Female 14.5% 4.0% 3.6% 4.0% 21.0% 3.9% Capabilities_ Kyrgyzstan has started to expand its ties with its neighbours on issues such as defence-industrial cooperation, though it remains generally dependent on Russian assistance for its defence requirements. Kyrgyzstan is a member of both the CSTO and the SCO. However, Kyrgyzstan cancelled CSTO command staff exercises at the last minute in 2022 following heightened border tensions with Tajikistan. Moscow maintains a military presence, including a squadron of Su-25SM ground-attack aircraft at Kant air base, which it has leased since 2003. Plans were reported in 2020 to add air-defence systems and UAVs to the Russian air base. In 2020, Kyrgyzstan increased its annual fees, reportedly because Russian forces are using more land than outlined in the 2003 agreement. Talks are ongoing over a possible second Russian base. Joint training is held with regional countries, including on anti-terror drills, but combat readiness remains an issue. In 2021, Indian and Kyrgyz special forces held the eighth iteration of bilateral exercises that focus on high-altitude and mountain operations in the broader context of counter-terrorism missions. Kyrgyzstan has a limited capability to deploy externally, and personnel have been deployed to OSCE and UN missions. The armed forces possess ageing land equipment and limited air capabilities, relying instead on Russian support, training and deployments. There is little local defence industry, although in 2018 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan discussed defence-industrial cooperation. Defence ties with India have increased and a joint working group has been formed on defence cooperation. Reports in 2019 that India might provide a credit line to enable Kyrgyzstan to make defence purchases have yet to transpire. Reports in 2020 indicated discussions with Russia over the transfer of air-defence equipment and helicopters. ACTIVE 10,900 (Army 8,500 Air 2,400) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,500 Conscript liability 18 months ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 8,500 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde Russia and Eurasia 181 MANOEUVRE Mechanised 2 MR bde 1 (mtn) MR bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 AD bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 150 T-72 RECCE 39: 30 BRDM-2; 9 BRDM-2M IFV 320: 230 BMP-1; 90 BMP-2 APC • APC (W) 55: 25 BTR-70; 20 BTR-70M; 10 BTR-80 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) RCL 73mm SPG-9 GUNS 100mm 36:18 MT-12/T-12; 18 M-1944 ARTILLERY 228 SP 122mm 18 2S1 Gvozdika TOWED 123: 122mm 107: 72 D-30; 35 M-30 (M-1938); 152mm 16 D-l GUN/MOR 120mm 12 2S9 NONA-S MRL 21:122mm 15 BM-21; 220mm 6 9P140 Uragan MOR 120mm 54: 6 2S12; 48 M-120 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)%; 9K35 Strela-W (RS-SA-13 Gopher) GUNS 48 SP 23mm 24 ZSU-23-4 TOWED 57mm 24 S-60 Air Force 2,400_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 regt with L-39 Albatros* TRANSPORT 1 regt with An-2 Colt; An-26 Curl ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 regt with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE 2 bty with S-125 Neva-Mi (RS-SA-3 Goa) 1 bty with S-75M3 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable TPT • Light 6: 4 An-2 Colt; 2 An-26 Curl JKG H-39 Albatros* HELICOPTERS ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind MRH 4 Mi-8MT Hip TPT • Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE • SAM Medium-range 6 S-75M3 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline) Short-range 8 S-125M1 Neva-Ul (RS-SA-3 Goa) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,500 Border Guards 5,000 (KGZ conscript, RUS officers)_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AUV 54 Tigr Internal Troops 3,500_ National Guard 1,000 DEPLOYMENT_ SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2 FOREIGN FORCES_ Russia £500 Military Air Forces: 13 Su-25SM Frogfoot; 2 Mi-8 Hip Moldova MDA Moldovan Leu MDL 2021 2022 GDP MDL 242bn 278bn USD 13.7bn 14.0bn per capita USD 5,285 5,529 Growth % 13.9 0.0 Inflation % 5.1 28.5 Def bdgt MDL 914m 902m USD 51.7m 45.5 m USD1=MDL 17.69 19.80 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015-- 2022 Population 3,287,326 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 9.4% 3.0% 2.8% 3.3% 24.5% 6.0% Female 8.8% 2.8% 2.6% 3.1% 24.8% 9.0% Capabilities_ The primary role of Moldova's armed forces is to maintain territorial integrity, though their size means they would be unable to offer more than very limited resistance to a determined adversary. The country is constitutionally neutral. Tensions with Russia over the breakaway region of Transnistria, which Moscow supports, worsened following Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Russia alleged its'peace-keeping'forces in Transnistria had been threatened, a claim Moldova rejected, instead arguing it was a Russian attempt to destabilise the government. A state of emergency was declared after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Moldova continues to build relations with European states and with NATO. The June 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid agreed measures to support Moldova's 'national resilience and civil preparedness'. A Long-Term Military Capabilities Development Plan was 182 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 approved in March 2020, covering the period to 2030, with a review of the goals to be concluded by the end of 2022. There is an emphasis on improving land forces mobility and in developing more capable ground-based air defence. The services exercise regularly with NATO states. Moldova has no requirement or capability to independently deploy and support its forces overseas, though personnel again deployed to the NATO-led KFOR mission during 2022. The country has no defence-industrial capabilities beyond the basic maintenance of front-line equipment. The country aims to move to an all-professional army and end conscription.The goal of achieving this by the end of 2021, however, was not met. ACTIVE 5,150 (Army 3,250 Air 600 Logistic Support 1,300) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 900 Conscript liability 12 months (3 months for university graduates) RESERVE 58,000 (Joint 58,000) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 1,300; 1,950 conscript (total 3,250) FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1SF bn MANOEUVRE Light 3 mot inf bde lit infbn Other 1 gdbn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bn 1 engr bn 1 NBC coy 1 sigs bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC 153 APC (T) 61: 9 BTR-D; 52 MT-LB (variants) APC (W) 92:12 BTR-80; 80 TAB-71 ABCV 44 BMD-1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) RCL 73mm SPG-9 GUNS 100mm 31 MT-12 ARTILLERY 219 TOWED 67:122mm 16 M-30 (M-1938); 152mm 51: 20 2A36 Giatsint-B; 31D-20 GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 9 2S9 NONA-S MRL 220mm 11 9P140 Uragan MOR 132: 82mm 75 BM-37; 120mm 57: 50 M-1989; 7 PM-38 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 39: 23mm 28 ZU-23; 57mm 11 S-60 Air Force 600 (incl 250 conscripts)_ FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-2 Colt; Mi-8MTV-l/PS Hip; Yak-18 AIR DEFENCE 1 regt with S-125M1 Neva-Mi (RS-SA-3 Goa) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 3: 2 An-2 Colt; 1 Yak-18 Max HELICOPTERS TPT • Medium 6: 2 Mi-8PS Hip; 4 Mi-8MTV-1 Hip AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Short-range 3 S-125M1 Neva-Mi (RS-SA-3 Goa) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 900_ Special Police Brigade 900_ Ministry of Interior DEPLOYMENT_ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 4 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 4 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 1 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 41; UN • UNMIK1 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3 TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL Data presented here represents the de facto situation in the territory of Transnistria and does not imply international recognition. FOREIGN FORCES_ Russia gl,500 (including 400 peacekeepers); 7 Mi-24 Hindi Mi-8 Hip Russia and Eurasia 183 Russia RUS Russian Rouble RUB 2021 2022 GDP RUB 131 tr 149tr USD 1.78tr 2.13tr per capita USD 12,219 14,665 Growth % 4.7 -3.4 Inflation % 6.7 13.8 Def exp [a] RUB 4.86tr 6.1 Str USD 66.0bn 87.9bn Def bdgt RUB 3.58tr 4.68tr USD 48.5bn 66.9bn USD1=RUB 73.66 70.00 [a] Calculated to be comparable with NATO definition of defence expenditure Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- 2022 Population 142,021,981 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.8% 2.7% 2.3% 2.6% 24.5% 5.4% Female 8.3% 2.5% 2.2% 2.5% 27.0% 11.2% Capabilities_ Russia supports large conventional military forces and retains the world's second-largest nuclear arsenal. However, its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine exposed weaknesses in terms of leadership, planning, personnel, and equipment, particularly in the ground and airborne forces, when faced with a committed opponent. A lack of airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems has also been evident. Russian ground forces, in particular, have suffered heavy personnel and equipment losses. Estimates of personnel losses vary widely but some units became combat ineffective. The ground forces have lost a large number of main battle tanks and armoured fighting vehicles, while the conflict also exposed the relative vulnerability of VDV units and their armour when faced with an opponent well-equipped with heavier assets. The navy and air force have also suffered reverses, including the sinking of the S/ai/a-class cruiser Moskva and losses of modern combat aircraft and helicopters. The invasion of Ukraine reflects the armed forces' role in Russia's foreign policy. Military aims are guaranteeing sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as maintaining and increasing Russia's influence in its near abroad and further afield. An updated National Security Policy was adopted in June 2021 extending beyond core military concerns to include countering the influence of the US and its allies. The 2021-2025 Defence Plan was also agreed, though this remains classified. The defence ministry has also been working on a follow-on to the State Armament Programme (SAP) 2027, SAP 2033. It remains unclear how far the current SAP and its successor will need to be re-shaped to accommodate the costs of the Ukraine war, including Russia's considerable equipment losses. Russia is a leading member of both the CSTO and the SCO. An updated CSTO security strategy is planned, to cover 2026-2030. Moscow, as of October 2022, was having to continue to manage tensions within the CSTO resulting from member states' differing responses to the Armenia—Azerbaijan conflict in 2020, renewed skirmishes between the two in September 2022 and also stemming from the war in Ukraine. In January 2022, Russian forces briefly deployed to Kazakhstan, after Almaty appealed to the CSTO in the wake of anti-government protests. Prior to the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, volunteers outweighed conscripts in the armed forces. Defence reforms launched in 2008 had emphasised the shift from a conscript-based mass-mobilisation army to smaller, more professional ground forces. However, the limits of Russia's professionalisation process have become evident in Ukraine. Setbacks and losses in Ukraine led President Vladimir Putin to introduce a partial mobilisation in September 2022, a move in itself that appeared to have been poorly executed initially. The armed forces can independently deploy and sustain forces on a global scale, although likely only in modest size at extended distances. Ground force losses in Ukraine, however, may further limit the size, and the competency, of the units Moscow is able to deploy. Russia continues to modernise its nuclear and conventional weapons. The SAP 2020 was broadly successful, although several of the more ambitious procurement goals were not met. SAP 2027 continues the emphasis on modernisation, though some aims are more modest. Russia can design, develop, and manufacture advanced nuclear and conventional weaponry. Its defence-industrial base suffered from a lack of investment in the 1990s, and more recently from the loss of access to Ukrainian components. Tighter Western sanctions after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine will further restrict the supply of foreign components. The defence-aerospace sector has been notably successful in terms of exports, particularly of combat aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems. ACTIVE 1,190,000 (Army 550,000 Navy 145,000 Air 165,000 Strategic Rocket Force 50,000 Airborne 40,000 Special Operations Forces 1,000 Railway Forces 29,000 1 st & 2nd Army Corps 30,000 Command and Support 180,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 559,000 Conscript liability 12 months (conscripts now can opt for contract service immediately, which entails a 24-month contract) RESERVE 1,500,000 (all arms) Some 1,500,000 with service within last 5 years; reserve obligation to age 50 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Strategic Deterrent Forces £80,000 (incl personnel assigned from the Navy and Aerospace Forces)_ Navy_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 11: 6 Delfin (Project 667BDRM (Delta IV)) with 16 R-29RMU2 Si«eofl/R-29RMU2.1 Layner (RS-SS-N-23 Skiff) nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT 3 Borey (Project 955 (Dolgorukiy)) with 16 Bulaoa (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K Keramika HWT/UGST Fizik HWT 2 Borey-A (Project 955A) with 16 Bulava (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K Keramika HWT/UGST Fizik HWT 184 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Strategic Rocket Forces 50,000_ 3 Rocket Armies operating silo and mobile launchers organised in 12 divs. Regt normally with 6 to 10 silos or 9 mobile launchers, and one control centre FORCES BY ROLE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 ICBM regt with RS-12M Topol (RS-SS-25 Sickle) 8 ICBM regt with RS-12M2 Topol-M (RS-SS-27 mod 1) 2 ICBM regt with RS-18 (RS-SS-19 Stiletto) 1 ICBM regt with RS-18 with Avangard HGV (RS-SS-19 mod 4 Stiletto) 8 ICBM regt with RS-20 (RS-SS-18 Satan) 14 ICBM regt with RS-24 Yars (RS-SS-27 mod 2) 7 ICBM regt with Yars-S EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS ICBM • Nuclear 339: 9 RS-12M Topol (RS-SS-25 Sickle) (mobile single warhead); 60 RS-12M2 Topol-M (RS-SS-27 mod 1) silo-based (single warhead); 18 RS-12M2 Topol-M (RS-SS-27 mod 1) road mobile (single warhead); up to 20 RS-18 (RS-SS-19 Stiletto) (mostly mod 3, 6 MIRV per msl) (being withdrawn); e6 RS-18 with Avangard HGV (RS-SS-19 mod 4 Stiletto); 46 RS-20 (RS-SS-18 Satan) (mostly mod 5, 10 MIRV per msl); £99 RS-24 Yars (RS-SS-27 mod 2; £3 MIRV per msl) road mobile; e18 RS-24 Yars (RS-SS-27 mod 2; e3 MIRV per msl) silo-based; e63 Yars-S (e3 MIRV per msl) road mobile COUNTERSPACE • DE • Laser Peresvet Long-Range Aviation Command_ FORCES BY ROLE BOMBER 1 sqn with Tu-160/Tu-160 mod Blackjack 3 sqn with Tu-95MS/MS mod Bear EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT BBR 76: 9 Tu-160 Blackjack with Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B Kent) nuclear LACM; 7 Tu-160 mod Blackjack with Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B Kent)/Kh-W2 (RS-AS-23B Kodiak) nuclear LACM; 42 Tu-95MS Bear H with Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B Kent) nuclear LACM; 18 Tu-95MS mod Bear H with Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B Kent)/Kh-W2 (RS-AS-23B Kodiak) nuclear LACM Space Command_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 89 COMMUNICATIONS 32: 4 Blagovest; 1 Garpun; 3 Globus-M (Raduga-IM); 6 Meridian; 3 Meridian-M; 15 Rodnik-S (Strela-3M) POSITIONING, NAVIGATION & TIMING 27: 3 GLONASS-K1; 24 GLONASS-M ISR 10: 3 Bars-M; 2 GEO-IK-2; 1 Neuron; 2 Persona; 2 Resurs-P ELINT/SIGINT 8: 6 Lotos-S; 1 Pion-NKS; 1 Tselina-2 EARLY WARNING 5 Tundra (EKS) RENDEZVOUS & PROXIMITY OPERATIONS 7: 6 Nivelir; 1 Olymp-K (Luch) MISSILE DEFENCE some S-500 (entering service) RADAR 12; Russia leases ground-based radar stations in Baranovichi (Belarus) and Balkhash (Kazakhstan). It also has radars on its own territory at Lekhtusi (St Petersburg); Armavir (Krasnodar); Olenegorsk (Murmansk); Mishelevka (Irkutsk); Kaliningrad; Pechora (Komi); Yeniseysk (Krasnoyarsk); Baranul (Altayskiy); Orsk (Orenburg); and Gorodets/Kovylkino (OTH) Aerospace Defence Command_ FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 2 AD div HQ 4 SAM regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) 5 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM • Long-range 186: 90 S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); 96 S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) SPAAGM30mm 36 96K6Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) MISSILE DEFENCE 68 53T6 (RS-AB-4A Gazelle) RADAR 1 BMD engagement system located at Sofrino (Moscow) Army £550,000 (incl el 00,000 conscripts & up to 300,000 mobilised personnel)_ FORCES BY ROLE As a result of heavy losses suffered during the invasion of Ukraine, almost all of the manoeuvre formations listed are currently significantly understrength and some are now effectively only cadre-sized until mobilised personnel can be drafted into them. COMMAND 12 army HQ 1 corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 8 (Spetsnaz) SF bde 1 (Spetsnaz) SF regt MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 2 recce bde Armoured 1 (4th) tk div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 1 MR regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) 1 (47th) tk div (1 tk regt) 1 (90th) tk div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 1 MR regt, 1 arty regt) 1 tk bde (1 armd recce bn, 3 tk bn, 1 MR bn, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EW coy, 1 NBC coy) 1 (3rd) MR corps (1 MR div, 1 MR bde, 1 SP arty bde, 1 fd arty regt) 2 (3rd & 144th) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1 arty regt) 1 (19th) MR div (2 MR regt, 1 arty regt) 1 (20th) MR div (2 MR regt, 1 arty regt) 1 (127th) MR div (1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) Russia and Eurasia 185 I (150th) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 2 MR regt; 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) II (BMP) MR bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 armd inf bn, 2 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AT bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EW coy, 1 NBC coy) Mechanised 1 (2nd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) 1 (42nd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 3 MR regt, 1 arty regt) 8 (BTR/MT-LB) MR bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 mech inf bn, 2 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AT bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn,l EW coy, 1 NBC coy) 2 MR bde (4-5 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 engr bn) 3 (lt/mtn) MR bde (1 recce bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn) 1 (18th) MGA div (1 tk bn, 2 MGA regt, 1 arty regt, 2 AD bn) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 12 SRBM/GLCM bde with 9K720 Iskander-M (RS-SS-26 Stone/RS-SSC-7 Southpaw) (3+ brigades also with 9M729 (RS-SSC-8 Screwdriver)) COMBAT SUPPORT 9 arty bde 1 hy arty bde 4 MRL bde 4 engr bde 7 engr regt 1 ptn br bde 5 EW bde 5 NBC bde 10 NBC regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 11 log bde AIR DEFENCE 16 AD bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Surface-to-surface missile systems may have very limited numbers of available missiles remaining. ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 1,800: 150 T-62M/MV; 400 T-72B/BA; 500 T-72B3; 250 T-72B3M; 100 T-80BV/U; 100 T-80BVM; 200 T-90A; 100 T-90M; (5,000 T-62M/T-62MV/T-72/T-72A/T-72B/T-80B/T-80BV/T-80U/T-90/T-90A in store) TSV £9 BMPT RECCE 700 BRM-1K (CP); (1,000+ BRDM-2/-2A in store) IFV 4,150:500 BMP-1/-1AM; 2,350 BMP-2/-2M; 400 BMP-3/-3M; 100 BTR-80A; 800 BTR-82A/AM; (4,000 BMP-1/-2 in store) APC 5,350+ APC (T) 3,050+: some BMO-T; 3,000 MT-LB; 50+ MT-LB VM1K; (2,000 MT-LB in store) APC (W) 2,300: 800 BTR-60 (all variants); 200 BTR-70 (all variants); 1,300 BTR-80; (4,000 BTR-60/70 in store) PPV Typhoon-K 4x4; Typhoon-K 6x6 AUV IVECO LMV; Linza; Tigr; Tigr-M; Tigr-M SpN; Vystrel ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV BAT-2; IMR; IMR-2; IMR-3; IRM; MT-LB ARV BMP-1; BREM-1/64/K/L; BTR-50PK(B); M1977; MTP-LB; RM-G; T-54/55; VT-72A VLB KMM; MT-55A; MTU; MTU-20; MTU-72; PMM-2 MW BMR-3M; GMX-3; MCV-2 (reported); MTK; MTK- 2; UR-77 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 9P149 with 9K114 Shturm (RS-AT-6 Spiral); 9P149M with 9K132 Shturm-SM (RS-AT-9 Spiral-2); 9P157-2 with 9K123 Khrizantema (RS-AT-15 Springer); 9P163-3 with 9M133 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); 9K128-1 Kornet-T (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) MANPATS 9K111M Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115-1 Metis-M (RS-AT-13); 9K115-2 Metis-Mi (RS-AT-13); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) RCL 73mm SPG-9 GUNS • TOWED 100mm 520 MT-12 (100mm 1,000 T-12/MT-12 in store) ARTILLERY 4,458 SP 1,678: 122mm 130 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 1,493: 700 2S3/2S3M Akatsiya; 85 2S5 Giatsint-S; 400 2S19/2S19M1 Msta-S; 300 2S19M2/2S33 Msta-SM; 8 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV (in test); 203mm 55 2S7M Malka (4,260 in store: 122mm 2,000 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2,000:1,000 2S3 Akatsiya; 850 2S5 Giatsint-S; 150 2S19 Msta-S; 203mm 260 2S7 Pion) TOWED 220: 152mm 220: 20+ D-l (M-1943); 100 D-20; 100 2A65 Msta-B (7,190 in store: 122mm 4,500:2,500 D-30; 2,000 M-30 (M-1938); 130mm 350 M-46; 152mm 2,300:600 2A36 Giatsint-B; 400 2A65 Msta-B; 500 D-l (M-1943); 750 D-20; 100 M-1937 (ML-20); 203mm 40 B-4M) GUN/MOR 160 SP 120mm 75: 27 2S23 NONA-SVK; 48 2S34 TOWED 120mm 85 2B16 NONA-K MRL 886: 122mm 610: 450 BM-21 Grad; 160 9K51M Tornado-G; 220mm 156+: 150 9P140 Uragan; 6 9K512 Uragan-IM; some TOS-1A; 300mm 120:100 9A52 Smerch; 20 9K515 Tornado-S; (3,220 in store: 122mm 2,420: 2,000 BM-21 Grad; 420 9P138; 132mm 100 BM-13; 220mm 700 9P140 Uragan) MOR 1,514: 82mm 800+ 2B14; 120mm 675 2S12 Sani; 240mm 39 2S4 Tulpan (1,300 in store: 120mm 950: 500 2S12 Sani; 450 M-1938 (PM-38); 160mm 150 M-160; SP 240mm 200 2S4 Tulpan) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM 200: Dual-capable 200: 50 9K79-1 Tochka-M (RS-SS-21B Scarab); 150 9K720 Iskander-M (RS-SS-26 Stone) GLCM • Dual-capable Some 9M728 (RS-SSC-7 Southpaw); some 9M729 (RS-SSC-8 Screwdriver) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Heavy Tu-243 Rei/s/Tu-243 Keys D (service status unclear); Light BLA-07; Pchela-1; Pchela-2 LOITERING & DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS Geran 1 (Shahed 131); Geran 2 (Shahed 136); (multiple systems below 20kg in weight) AIR DEFENCE SAM 1,520+ Long-range S-300V (RS-SA-12A/B Gladiator/Giant); S-300V4 (RS-SA-23) Medium-range 350: £200 9K37M1-2 Buk-Ml-2 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly); £90 9K317 Buk-M2 (RS-SA-17 Grizzly); £60 9K317M Buk-U3 (RS-SA-27) Short-range 120+ 9K331/9K331M/9K331MU Tor-Ml/M2/M2U (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) (9M338 msl entering service) 186 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Point-defence 800+: 400 9K33M3 Osa-AKM (RS-SA-8B Gecko); 400 9K35M3 Strela-W (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-l (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 9K333 Verba (RS-SA-29 Gizmo); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) SPAAGM 30mm 250+ 2K22M Tunguska (RS-SA-19 Grisori) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60 Navy £145,000 (incl conscripts)_ 4 major fleet organisations (Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet) and Caspian Sea Flotilla EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 51 STRATEGIC • SSBN 11: 6 Delfin (Project 667BDRM (Delta IV)) with 16 R-29RMU2 Si«eDfl/R-29RMU2.1 Layner (RS-SS-N-23 Skiff) nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT 3 Borey (Project 955 (Dolgorukiy)) with 16 Bulava (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K Keramika HWT/UGST Fizik HWT 2 Borey-A (Project 955A) with 16 Bulava (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K Keramika HWT/UGST Fizik HWT TACTICAL 40 SSGN 9: 6 Antey (Project 949A (Oscar II)) (2 more non-operational, in long-term refit) with 24 single SM-225A lnchr with 3M45 Granit (RS-SS-N-19 Shipwreck) dual-capable AShM, 2 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT/RPK-7 (RS-SS-N-16 Stallion) ASW msl, 4 single 553mm TT with 53-65K HWT/ SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT 1 Yasen (Project 885 (Severodvinsk I)) with 8 4-cell SM-346 VLS with 3M14K (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54K1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear); 10 single 533mm TT with USET-80K Keramika HWT/UGST Fizik HWT 2 Yasen-M (Project 08851 (Severodvinsk II)) with 8 4-cell SM-346 VLS with 3M14K (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54K1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear); up to 10 single 533mm TT with UGST Fizik HWT SSN 10: 1 Kalmar (Project 667BDR (Delta III)) with 2 single 400mm TT with SET-72 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (re-roled SSBN) 2 Kondor (Project 945A (Sierra II)) with 4 single 533mm TT with TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) has replaced 3M10 Granat (RS-SS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; AShM capability unconfirmed), 4 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT 2 Schuka (Project 671RTMK (Victor III)) with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/ USET-80K Keramika HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) has replaced 3M10 Granat (RS-SS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; AShM capability unconfirmed), 2 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT 3 Schuka-B (Project 971 (Akula I)) (5 more non-operational, return to service significantly delayed) with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) has replaced 3M10 Granat (RS-SS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; AShM capability unconfirmed), 4 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT/RPK-7 (RS-SS-N-16 Stallion) ASW msl 2 Schuka-B (Project 971/09711 (Akula II)) with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) has replaced 3M10 Granat (RS-SS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; AShM capability unconfirmed), 4 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT/RPK-7 (RS-SS-N-16 Stallion) ASW msl (1 Barracuda (Project 945 (Sierra I)) (in reserve) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) has replaced 3M10 Granat (RS-SS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; AShM capability unconfirmed)) SSK 21: 10 Paltus (Project 877 (Kilo)) (1 more non-operational, in long-term refit) with 6 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT 10 Varshavyanka (Project 06363 (Improved Kilo)) with 6 single 533mm TT with 3M14K Kalibr-PL (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54Kl (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear) 1 Lada (Project 677 (Petersburg)) (in test) with 6 single 533mm TT with 3M14K Kalibr-PL (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54Kl (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/ USET-80K Keramika HWT (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 31 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1 Admiral Kuznetsov (in extended refit) with 12 single SM-233A lnchr with 3M45 Granit (RS-SS-N-19 Shipwreck) AShM, 24 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kinzhal (RS-SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2 RBU 12000 Udav 1 A/S mor, 8 3M87 Kortik CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 6 AK630M CIWS (capacity 18-24 Su-33 Flanker D/MiG-29KR/KUBR Ftr/FGA ac; 15 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel, 2 Ka-31R Helix AEW hel) CRUISERS 3: CGHMN 1 Orlan (Project 11442 (Kirov I)) (1 other non-operational; undergoing extensive refit and planned Russia and Eurasia 187 to return to service in 2023) with 20 single SM-233 lnchr with 3M45 Granit (RS-SS-N-19 Shipwreck) AShM, 6 6-cell B-203A VLS with S-300F Fort (RS-SA-N-6 Grumble) SAM, 6 6-cell B-203A VLS with S-300FM Fort-M (RS-SA-N-20 Gargoyle) SAM, 16 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kinzhal (RS-SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm TT with RPK-6M Vodopad-NK (RS-SS-N-16 Stallion) A/S msl, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3 A/S mor, 6 3M87 Kortik CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 3 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) CGHM 2 Atlant (Project 1164 (Slava)) with 8 twin SM-248 lnchr with 3M70 Vulkan (RS-SS-N-12 mod 2 Sandbox) AShM, 8 octuple VLS with S-300F Fort (RS-SA-N-6 Grumble) SAM/S-300FM Fort M (RS-SA-N-20 Gargoyle) SAM, 2 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33 Osfl-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecfco) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm PTA-53-1164 ASTT with SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 6 AK630 CIWS, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) DESTROYERS • DDGHM 11: 3 Sarych (Project 956 (Sovremenny I)) (1 more non-operational) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80 Moskit (RS-SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 2 twin 3S90 lnchr with 9M317 Yezh (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 twin DTA-53-956 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 twin 130mm guns (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) 6 Fregat (Project 1155 (Udaloy I)) with 2 quad lnchr with URK-5 Rastrub-B (RS-SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 8 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kinzhal (RS-SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ChTA-53-1155 ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 100mm guns (capacity 2 Ka-27 HeZix ASW hel) 1 Fregar (Project 1155 {Udaloy I)) with 2 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54Tl (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 quad 533mm ChTA-53-1155 ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1100mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) 1 Fregat (Project 11551 (Udaloy II)) (in refit) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80 Moskit (RS-SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 8 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kinzhal (RS-SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2 3M87 Xorhl CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) FRIGATES 16 FFGHM 14: 3 Project 11356 (Grigorovich) with 1 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54Tl (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM/91RT2 A/S msl (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 12-cell 3S90.1 VLS with 9M317 Yezh (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM/9M317M Yezh (RS-SA-N-7C) SAM, 2 twin DTA-53-11356 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 1 RBU 6000 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) 1 Jastreb (Project 11540 (Neustrashimyy)) (1 other non-operational, in long-term refit) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 4 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kinzhal (RS-SA-N-9 Gauntlet), 6 single 533mm ASTT with RPK-6M Vodopad-NK (RS-SS-N-16 Stallion) A/S msl, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 3M87 Kortik CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 1100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) 1 Project 20380 (Steregushchiy I) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 quad 324mm SM-588 ASTT with MTT LWT, 13M87 Kortik-U CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) 6 Project 20380 (Steregushchiy II) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 3 4-cell 3S97 VLS with 3K96-3 Redut (RS-SA-N-28) SAM, 2 quad 324mm SM-588 ASTT with MTT LWT, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) 1 Project 20385 (Gremyashchiy) with 1 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54Tl (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 4 4-cell 3S97 VLS with 3K96-2 Poliment-Redut (RS-SA-N-28) SAM, 2 quad 324mm TT with MTT LWT, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) 2 Project 22350 (Gorshkov) with 2 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54Tl (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 4 8-cell 3S97 VLS with 3K96-2 Poliment-Redut (RS-SA-N-28) SAM, 2 quad 324mm TT with MTT LWT, 2 3M89 Palash CIWS (RS-CADS-N-2), 1 130mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) FFGM 2: 1 Burevestnik (Project 1135 (Krivak I))t with 1 quad lnchr with URK-5 Rastrub-B (RS-SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 1 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with Osa-U (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ChTA-53-1135 ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm guns 1 Burevestnik M (Project 1135M (Krivak II)) with 1 quad lnchr with URK-5 Rastrub-B (RS-SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 2 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-U (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko SAM), 2 quad 533mm ChTA-53-1135 ASTT with 53-65K HWT/ SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 100mm guns 188 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 128 CORVETTES 42 FSGM 14 9 Buyan-M (Project 21631 (Sviyazhsk)) with 1 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54Tl (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 sextuple 3M47 Gibka lnchr with Igla-IM (RS-SA-N-10 Grouse) SAM, 1AK630M-2 CIWS, 1100mm gun 1 Karakurt (Project 22800 (Uragan)) with 18-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54Tl (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 Pantsir-M with 57E6 SAM, 1 76mm gun 1 Project 11661K (Gepard I) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun 1 Project 11661K (Gepard II) with 1 8-cell VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54Tl (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 1 3M89 Palash CIWS with 9M337 Sosna-R SAM (RS-CADS-N-2), 1 76mm gun 2 Sivuch (Project 1239 (Dergach)) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80 Moskit (RS-SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 1 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33AM Osa-MA2 (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun FSG 2 Karakurt (Project 22800 (Uragan)) with 1 8-cell 3S14 VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54Tl (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun FSM 26: 2 Albatros (Project 1124 (Grisha III)) with 1 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-1124 ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 twin 57mm gun 18 Albatros (Project 1124M (Grisha V)) with 1 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-1124 ASTT, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun 6 Project 1331M (Parchim II) with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun PSOH 4 Project 22160 (Bykov) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Hdiz ASW hel) PCGM 10: 9 Ovod-1 (Project 1234.1 (Nanuchka III)) with 2 triple lnchr with P-120 Malakhit (RS-SS-N-9 Siren) AShM, 1 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun 1 Ctood-1 (Project 1234.1 (Nanuchka III)) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 1AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCFG 23: 5 Molnya (Tarantul II) with 2 twin lnchr with P-22 Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun 17 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 twin lnchr with 3M80 Moskit (RS-SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun 1 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 twin lnchr with 3M80 Moskit (RS-SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 1 3K89 Palash (RS-CADS-N-2) CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCM 3 Buyan (Project 21630 (Astrakhan)) with 1 sextuple lnchr with 3M47 Gibka lnchr with Igla-IM (RS-SA-N-10 Grouse) SAM, 1 A-215 Grad-M 122mm MRL, 1 100mm gun PCF 1 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun PBF 14:12+ Raptor (capacity 20 troops); 2 Mangust PBR 4 S/imeZ with 117-cell BM-14 MRL, 1 76mm gun PB 27 Grachonok MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 43 MCC 6 Alexandrit (Project 12700) MHI 7 Sap/i'r (Project 10750 (Lids)) with 1 AK630 CIWS MHO 2 Riibm (Project 12660 (Gorya)) with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun MSC 20: 19 Yakhont (Project 1265 (Sonya)) with 4 AK630 CIWS (some with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM); 1 Korund-E (Project 1258E (Yeugem/a)) MSO 8: 7 Afct?amarai-M (Project 266M (Natya)); 1 Agat (Project 02668 (Natya II)) (all with 2 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin AK230 CIWS AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 20: 12 Project 775 (Ropucha I/II) with 2 twin 57mm guns (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops) 3 Project 775M (Ropucha III) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops) 3 Tapir (Project 1171 (Alligator)) with at least 2 twin lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 57mm guns (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops) 2 Project 11711 (Gren) with 1 AK630M-2 CIWS, 2 AK630M CIWS (capacity 1 Ka-29 Helix B hel; 13 MBT/36 AFV; 300 troops) LANDING CRAFT 26 LCM 24: 8 Akula (Project 1176 (Ondatra)) (capacity 1 MBT); 5 Dyugon (Project 21820) (capacity 5 APC or 100 troops); 11 Serna (Project 11770) (capacity 2 APC or 100 troops) LCAC 2 Zubr (Project 12322 (Pomornik)) with 2 22-cell 140mm MS-227 Ogon MRL, 2 AK630 CIWS (capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC(T)) Russia and Eurasia 189 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 281 SSAN 9: 1 Belgorod (Project 22870 (Oscar II mod)) 2 Halibut (Project 18511 (Paltus)) 3 Kashalot (Project 1910 (Uniform)) 1 Ndrna (Project 1851 (X-Ray)) 1 Orenburg (Delta III Stretch) 1 Podmoskovye (Project 09787) (1 non-operational Losharik (Project 10831 (Norsub-5)) reportedly damaged by fire in 2019) SSA 1 Sarov (Project 20120) ABU 12: 8 Kashtan; 4 Project 419 (Sura) AE 9: 6 Muna; 1 Dubnyak; 2 Akademik Kovalev (Project 20181) with 1 hel landing platform AEM 2:1 Xa/mfl-3 (Project 1791R); 1 Lama AFS 2 Longvinik (Project 23120) AG 1 Potok AGB 5: 1 Dobrynya Mikitich; 1 I/j/a Muromets; 2 Ivan Susanin; 1 Vladimir Kavraisky AGE 3: 2 Seliger; 1 Tchusovoy AGHS 6 Project 23040G AGI14: 2 Alpinist; 2 Dubridium (Project 1826); 1 Mama; 7 Vishnya; 2 Yuri Ivanov AGM1 Marshal Nedelin AGOR 7: 1 Akademik Alexandrov (Project 20183); 1 Akademik Krylov; 2 Sibiriyakov; 2 Vinograd; 1 Yantar AGS 67: 8 Bij/a; 16+ Finik; 7 Kamenka; 5 Mima; 8+ Onega; 6 BafcZan (Project 19920); 4 BafcZan (Project 19920B); 4 Vaygach; 9+ Yug AGSH 1 Samara AH 3 Obt AK 3: 2 Irgiz; 1 Pevek AOL 8: 2+ Diibna; 3 Uda; 3+Altay (mod) AOR 4: 3 Bon's Chilikin; 1 Akademik Pashin (Project 23130) AORL 2:1 Kaliningradneft; 1 Olekma AOS 1 Lmza AOTL 1 Platforma-Arktika (Project 03182) with 1 hel landing plaftorm AR €7 Amur ARC 5:4 Emba; 1 Improved Klasma ARS 33: 1 Kommuna; 5 Goryn; 4 Mikhail Rudnitsky; 22 Project 23040; 1 Zvezdochka (Project 20180) AS 3 Project 2020 (Molina) ASR 2:1 Elbrus; 1 Igor Belousov ATE 54: 1 Okhotsk; 1 BafcZan; e3 Katun; 3 IngH?; 1 Neftegaz; 10 Okhtensky; 13 Prometey; 3 Project 23470 with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Prat; 4 SZiw?; 14 Sorum ATS 5 Project 22870 AWT 1 Manych AXL 9: 7 Petrushka; 2 Smolny with 2 RBU 2500 Smerc/i 1 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm guns Naval Aviation £31,000_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 regt with MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound 1 regt with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker 1 regt with Su-33 Flanker D; Su-25UTG Frogfoot FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with MiG-29KR/KUBR Fulcrum 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound; Su-24M/M2/MR Fencer ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/I SR 2 regt with Su-24M/MR Fencer; Su-30SM ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 regt with I1-38/I1-38N May*; I1-18D; I1-20RT Coot A; 11-22 Coot B 2 sqn with I1-38/I1-38N A%*; I1-18D; I1-20RT Coot A; 11-22 Coot B 1 regt with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix 1 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix 2 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J* 1 unit with Ka-31R Helix MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT 1 regt with An-26 Curl; Be-12 Mail*; Ka-27 HeZix; Mi-8 Hip SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-12PS Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-12BK Cub; An-24RV Coke; An-26 Curl; An-72 CoflZer; An-140 2 sqn with An-26 ChcZ; Tu-134 TRAINING 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros; Su-25UTG Frogfoot 1 sqn with An-140; Tu-134; Tu-154,11-38 May ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE 4 AD div HQ 1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) 1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) 1 SAM regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) 1 SAM regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble); S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) 4 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 207 combat capable FTR 67: 10 MiG-31B/BS Foxhound; 22 MiG-31BM Foxhound C; 17 Su-33 Flanker D; 18 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker EGA 45:19 MiG-29KRFiiZcram; 3 MiG-29KUBRFH/eram; up to 19 Su-30SM Flanker H; 4 Su-30SM2 Flanker H ATK 35: up to 30 Su-24M Fencer; 5 Su-25UTG Frogfoot (trg role) ASW 44:12 Tu-142MK/MZ Bear F; 10 Tu-142MR Bear J (comms); 15 11-38 May; 7 I1-38N May MP 7: 6 Be-12PS Mh7*; 111-18D ISR 10 Su-24MR Fencer E* SAR 4: 3 An-12PS Cub; 1 Be-200ES ELINT 4: 2 I1-20RT Coot A; 2 11-22 Coot B TPT 49: Medium 2 An-12BK Ciifc; Light 45:1 An-24RV Cofce; 24 An-26 Curl; 6 An-72 Coaler; 4 An-140; 9 Tu-134; 1 Tu-134UBL; PAX 2 Tu-154M Cardess TRG 4 L-39 Albatros HELICOPTERS ATK 8 Mi-24P Hind ASW 52: 30 Ka-27PL Helix; 22 Ka-27M HeZix EW 8 Mi-8 Hip J 190 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 AEW 2 Ka-31R Helix SAR 16 Ka-27PS Helix D TPT 41: Medium 35:27 Ka-29 Helix; 4 Mi-8T Hip; 4 Mi-8MT Hip; Light 6 Ka-226T AIR DEFENCE SAM • Long-range 200: 56 S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); 40 S-300PS (RS-SA-lOB Grumble); 104 S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) SPAAGM 30mm 30 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES A AM • IR R-27T/ET (RS-AA-10B/D Alamo); R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); R-74M (RS-AA-11B Archer); ARH R-77-1 (RS-AA-12B Adder); SARH R-27R/ER (RS-AA-10A/C Alamo); R-33 (RS-AA-9 A Amos) ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A Kegler); Kh-31P (RS-AS- 17A Krypton); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 Kilter) ASM Kh-59 (RS-AS-13 Kingbolt); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo); Kh-29T (RS-AS-14 Kedge) AShM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B Krypton) Naval Infantry (Marines) £30,000_ FORCES BY ROLE As a result of heavy losses suffered during the invasion of Ukraine, almost all of the manoeuvre formations listed are currently significantly understrength and some are now effectively only cadre-sized until mobilised personnel can be drafted into them. COMMAND 3 corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 4 (OMRP) SF unit 11 (PDSS) cbt diver unit MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bde Mechanised 1 MR div (1 tk regt, 2 MR regt; 1 SAM regt) 2 MR bde 1 MR regt 6 naval inf bde 1 naval inf regt SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM/GLCM bde with 9K720 Iskander-U (RS-SS-26 Sfo«e/RS-SSC-7 Southpaw) COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bde 2 engr regt AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM regt with 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); Strela-V Strela-W (RS-SA-9 Gflsfci«/RS-SA-13 Gopher) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 220:170 T-72B/B3/B3M; 50 T-80BV/BVM IFV 1,010: 300 BMP-2; 70 BMP-3; 40 BMP-3F; 600 BTR-82A APC 300 APC (T) 250 MT-LB APC (W) 50 BTR-80 AUV Vystřel ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 60+: 60 9P148 with 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9P149 with 9K114 Shturm (RS-AT-6 Spiral); 9P157-2 with 9K123 Khrisantema (RS-AT-15 Springer) MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) GUNS 100mm T-12 ARTILLERY 395 SP 171: 122mm 85 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 86: 50 2S3 Akatsiya; 36 2S19M1 Msta-S TOWED 152mm 100: 50 2A36 Giatsint-B; 50 2A65 Msta-B GUN/MOR 66 SP 120mm 42:12 2S23 NONA-SVK; 30 2S9 NONA-S TOWED 120mm 24 2B16 NONA-K MRL 58:122mm 36 BM-21 Grad/Tornado-G; 220mm 18 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 4+ 9A52 Smerch SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHER SRBM • Dual-capable 12 9K720 Iskander-U (RS-SS-26 Stone) GLCM • Dual-capable Some 9M728 (RS-SSC-7 Southpaw) AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 12+ Tor-M2DT Point-defence 70+: 20 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 50 9K31 Strela-l/9K35 Strela-V) (RS-SA-9 Gaskinl RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) GUNS • SP 23mm 60 ZSU-23-4 Coastal Missile and Artillery Forces 2,000 FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 5 AShM bde 1 AShM regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE ARTY • SP 130mm £36 A-222 Bereg AShM 96+: 40 3K60 Bai (RS-SSC-6 Sennight); 56 3K55 Bastion (RS-SSC-5 Stooge); some 4K44 Redut (RS-SSC-1 Sepal); some 4K51 Rubezh (RS-SSC-3 Styx) Aerospace Forces £165,000 (incl conscripts) A joint CIS Unified Air Defence System covers RUS, ARM, BLR, KAZ, KGZ, TJK, TKM and UZB FORCES BY ROLE BOMBER 3 regt with Tu-22M3 Backfire C 3 sqn with Tu-95MS/MS mod Bear 1 sqn with Tu-160/Tu-160 mod Blackjack FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum (Armenia) 2 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound C 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound C; Su-35S Flanker M 1 regt with Su-27/Su-27SM/Su-27UB Flanker B/J/C; Su-30M2 Flanker G 2 regt with Su-30SM Flanker H Russia and Eurasia 191 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound C; Su-27SM Flanker J; Su- 30M2 Flanker G; Su-30SM Flanker H; Su-35S Flanker M 1 regt with Su-27SM Flanker J; Su-35S Flanker M 1 regt with Su-35S Flanker M; Su-30SM F/a«/cer H 1 regt with Su-27SM3 Flanker; Su-30M2 Flanker G 1 regt with Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-30SM Flanker H GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with MiG-31K 1 regt with Su-24M/M2 Fencer; Su-34 Fullback 1 regt with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25SM Frogfoot 3 regt with Su-25SM/SM3 Frogfoot 1 sqn with Su-25SM Frogfoot (Kyrgyzstan) 3 regt with Su-34 Fullback GROUND ATTACK/ISR 1 regt with Su-24M/MR Fencer ISR 3 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer 1 fit with An-30 Clank AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with A-50/A-50U Mainstay TANKER 1 sqn with I1-78/I1-78M Midas TRANSPORT 6 regt/sqn with An-12BK Cub; An-148-100E; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty; Tu-154 Careless; Mi-8 Hip 1 regt with An-124 Condor; I1-76MD Candid 1 regt with An-124 Condor; I1-76MD/MD-90A Candid 1 regt with An-12BK Cub; I1-76MD Candid 1 sqn with An-22 Cock 3 regt with I1-76MD Candid ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip 1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8 Hip 1 bde with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-26 Haio; Mi-8 Hip 2 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Haooe B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip 1 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8MTPR-1 Hip; Mi-8 Hip 1 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip 1 regt with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip 1 regt with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-24P Hind; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip 2 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip 2 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE 9 AD div HQ 4 regt with 9K37M1-2 Buk-Ml-2 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly); 9K317 BMfc-M2 (RS-SA-17 Grizzly); S-300V (RS-SA-12 G/fldifltor/Giflnt) 1 bde with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) 2 regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) 6 regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) 12 regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 1,153 combat capable BBR 137: 60 Tu-22M3 Backfire C; 1 Tu-22MR Backfiret (1 in overhaul); 33 Tu-95MS Bear; 27 Tu-95MS mod Bear; 7 Tu-160 Blackjack; 7 Tu-160 mod Blackjack; 2 Tu-160M Blackjack (in test) FTR 185: 70 MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 85 MiG-31BM Foxhound C; 12 Su-27 Flanker B; 18 Su-27UB Flanker C EGA 410+: 15 MiG-29SMT Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UBT Fulcrum; 6 MiG-35S/UB Fulcrum (in test); 47 Su-27SM Flanker J; 24 Su-27SM3 Flanker; 19 Su-30M2 Flanker G; e80 Su-30SM Flanker H; £105 Su-34 Fullback; 7+ Su-34 mod Fullback; 99 Su-35S Flanker M; 6 Su-57 Felon ATK 262: 12 MiG-31K; 70 Su-24M/M2 Fencer; 40 Su-25 Frogfoot; £125 Su-25SM/SM3 Frogfoot; 15 Su-25UB Frogfoot ISR 58: 4 An-30 Clank; up to 50 Su-24MR Fencer*; 2 Tu-2140N; 2 Tu-214R EW 311-22PP Mute ELINT 31:1411-20M Coot A; 511-22 Coot B; 1211-22M Coot B AEW&C 10: 3 A-50 Mainstay; 7 A-50U Mainstay C2 8:211-80 Maxdome; 111-82; 4 Tu-214SR; 1 Tu-214PU-SBUS TKR 15: 511-78 Midas; 10 I1-78M Midas TPT 446: Heavy 125: 11 An-124 Condor; 4 An-22 Cock; 98 I1-76MD Candid; 3 I1-76MD-M Candid; 9 I1-76MD-90A Candid; Medium 65 An-12BK Cub; Light 224: e113 An-26 Curl; 25 An-72 Coaler; 5 An-140; 27 L-410; 54 Tu-134 Crusty; PAX 32:15 An-148-100E; 17 Tu-154 Careless TRG 262:35 DA42T; 118 L-39 Albatros; 109 Yak-130 Mitten* HELICOPTERS ATK 361+: £105 Ka-52A Hokum B; 100 Mi-24D/V/P Hind; 80+ Mi-28N Havoc B; 13 Mi-28UB Havoc; e60 Mi-35 Hind EW £20 Mi-8MTPR-1 Hip TPT 313: Heavy 33 Mi-26/Mi-26T Halo; Medium 280 Mi-8/AMTSh/AMTSh-VA/MT/MTV-5/MTV-5-l Hip TRG 69:19 Ka-226U; 50 Ansat-M UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy some Inokhodets; Medium Forpost R; Mohajer 6 ISR • Medium Forpost {Searcher II) AIR DEFENCE SAM 714: Long-range 584: 160 S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble); 150 S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); 20 S-300V (RS-SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); 6 S-350 Vityaz (RS-SA-28); 248 S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) Medium-range 80 9K37M1-2 BMfc-Ml-2/9K317 Buk-M2 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly/RS-SA-17 Grizzly) SPAAGM 30mm 50 96K6 PonfeiV-Sl/S2 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES A AM • IR R-27T/ET (RS-AA-10B/D Alamo); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); R-74M (RS-AA-11B Archer); R-60T (RS-AA-8 Aphid); SARH R-27R/ER (RS-AA-10A/C Alamo); R-33 (RS-AA-9A Amos); ARH R-77-1 (RS-AA-12B Adder); R-37M (RS-AA-13A Axehead); PRH R-27P/EP (RS-AA-10E/F,4Zamo) ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A Kegler); Kh-31P/PM (RS-AS-17A/C Krypton); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 Kilter) ASM Item 305/LMUR; Kh-25ML (RS-AS-12B Kegler); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge); Kh-38; Kh-59 (RS-AS-13 Kingbolt) Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo); Kinzhal (RS-AS-24 Killjoy); 9M114 Kokon (RS-AT-6 Spiral); 9M120 Atoka (RS-AT-9 192 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Spiral 2); 9M120-1 Vikhr (RS-AT-16 Scallion) AShM Kh-22 (RS-AS-4 Kitchen); Kh-31A/AM (RS-AS- 17B/D Krypton); Kh-32 (RS-AS-4A mod); Kh-35U (RS- AS-20 Kayak) LACM Nuclear Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B Kent); Kh-102 (RS-AS-23B Kodiak) Conventional Kh-101 (RS-AS-23A Kodiak); Kh-555 (RS-AS-22 Kluge) BOMBS INS/GLONASS-guided KAB-500S Laser-guided KAB-500L; KAB-1500L TV-guided Ghaem-5; KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR; KAB- 500OD; UPAB 1500 Airborne Forces £40,000_ FORCES BY ROLE As a result of heavy losses suffered during the invasion of Ukraine, almost all of the manoeuvre formations listed are currently significantly understrength and some are now effectively only cadre-sized until mobilised personnel can be drafted into them. SPECIAL FORCES 1 (AB Recce) SF bde MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 2 AB div (1 tk bn, 3 para/air aslt regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) 2 AB div (2 para/air aslt regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) 1 indep AB bde 2 air aslt bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 50 T-72B3/B3M IFV 120 BTR-82AM APC 700+ APC (T) 700: 600 BTR-D; 100 BTR-MDM PPV Typhoon-VDV ABCV 850: 600 BMD-2; 250 BMD-4M AUV GAZ Tigr; UAMZ Toros ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV BREM-D; BREhM-D ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 100 BTR-RD MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115-1 Metis-M (RS-AT-13); 9K135 Komet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) RCL 73mm SPG-9 GUNS • SP 125mm 36+ 2S25 Sprut-SD ARTILLERY 550+ TOWED 122mm 140 D-30 GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 210: 180 2S9 NONA-S; 30 2S9 NONA-SM; (500 2S9 NONA-S in store) MOR • TOWED 200+ 82mm 150 2B14; 120mm 50+ 2B23 NONA-MI AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 30+: 30 Strela-WUN (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (RS- SA-18 Grouse); 9K333 Verba (RS-SA-29 Gizmo); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch); 9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin) GUNS • SP 23mm 150 BTR-ZD Special Operations Forces £1,000_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF unit Railway Forces £29,000_ 4 regional commands FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 10 (railway) tpt bde 1 st & 2nd Army Corps £30,000_ Formations drawn from the Russian-backed 'Donetsk People's Republic' and 'Luhansk People's Republic' and integrated into the Russian command structure FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 7 MR bde 15 MR regt COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-64A; T-72A; T-72B IFV BMP-1; BMP-2 APC APC (T) MT-LB APC (W) BTR-60/-70/-80 ARTILLERY SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika TOWED 122mm D-30; 152mm 2A36 Giatsint-B; D-l (M-1943); D-20 MRL 122m BM-21 Grad MOR 120mm 2S12 Sani Russian Military Districts_ 5 military districts each with a unified Joint Strategic Command. Organisational data presented here represents peacetime assignments rather than operational deployments resulting from Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Western Military District_ HQ at St Petersburg Army_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 army HQ SPECIAL FORCES 2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bde Armoured 2 tk div 1 MR corps 3 MR div Mechanised 1 MR div 3MRbde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 3 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bde 1 (hy) arty bde 1 MRL bde 1 engr bde 3 engr regt 1 ptn br bde 1 EW bde 1 NBC bde 2 NBC regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 log bde AIR DEFENCE 4 AD bde Baltic Fleet_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 1 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6:1DDGHM; 5 FFGHM (1 more non-operational, in long-term refit) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 35: 3 FSGM; 2 FSG; 6 FSM; 4 PCGM; 7 PCFG; 12 PBF; 1 PB MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 11:1MCC;4MSC;6MHI AMPHIBIOUS 13:4 LST; 7 LCM; 2 LCAC Naval Aviation_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 regt with Su-27 Flanker B ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR 1 regt with Su-24M/MR Fencer, Su-30SM Flanker H TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 regt with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix; Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE 2 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) Naval Infantry_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 corps HQ MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 MR div 1 MR regt 1 naval inf bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde Russia and Eurasia 193 Coastal Artillery and Missile Forces_ FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 1 AShM regt Military Air Force_ 6th Air Force & Air Defence Army_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 regt with Su-30SM Flanker H 1 regt with MG-31BM Foxhound C; Su-35S Flanker M 1 regt with Su-27SM Flanker J; Su-35S Flanker M GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with Su-34 Fullback ISR 1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E; An-30 Clank TRANSPORT 1 regt with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip 1 regt with Mi-24P/Mi-35 Hind; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-8 Hip 1 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-8PPA Hip AIR DEFENCE 3 SAM regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) 4 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) Airborne Forces_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (AB Recce) SF bde MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 3 AB div Northern Fleet Military District_ HQ at Severomorsk Northern Fleet_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 26 STRATEGIC 8 SSBN (of which 2 in refit) TACTICAL 19: 5 SSGN; 8 SSN; 5 SSK PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10: 1 CV (in refit); 1 CGHMN; 1 CGHM; 5 DDGHM (1 more in reserve); 2 FFGHM PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16: 6 FSM; 2 PCGM; 8 PB MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8: 1 MHO; 1 MSO; 6 MSC AMPHIBIOUS 8: 6 LST; 2 LCM Naval Aviation_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 regt with Su-33 Flanker D; Su-25UTG Frogfoot 194 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with MiG-29KR/KUBR Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound C; Su-24M/M2/ MR Fencer ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 regt with I1-38/I1-38N May; I1-20RT Coot A; Tu-134 1 regt with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix 1 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J AIR DEFENCE 5 SAM regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble); S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) Naval Infantry_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 corps HQ MANOEUVRE Mechanised 2 MR bde 1 naval inf bde COMMAND 1 engr regt Coastal Artillery and Missile Forces_ FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 1 AShM bde Central Military District_ HQ at Yekaterinburg Army_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 2 army HQ SPECIAL FORCES 2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 tk div 3 MR bde Mechanised 3 (lt/mtn) MR bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 2 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bde 1 MRL bde 1 engr bde 3 engr regt 1 EW bde 2 NBC bde 2 NBC regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2 log bde AIR DEFENCE 3 AD bde Military Air Force_ 14th Air Force & Air Defence Army_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound C GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with Su-34 Fullback 1 sqn with Su-25SM Frogfoot (Kyrgyzstan) ISR 1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E TRANSPORT 1 regt with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty; Tu-154; Mi-8 Hip ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 bde with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip 1 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip 1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip (Tajikistan) AIR DEFENCE 1 regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) 1 bde with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) 1 regt with S-300PM2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) 4 regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) Airborne Troops_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bde Southern Military District_ HQ at Rostov-on-Don Army_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 army HQ SPECIAL FORCES 3 (Spetsnaz) SF bde 1 (Spetsnaz) SF regt MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bde Armoured 3 MR div 1 MR bde 1 MR bde (Armenia) 1 MR bde (South Ossetia) Mechanised 1 MR div 1 MR bde 1 MR bde (Abkhazia) 1 (lt/mtn) MR bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 3 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M Russia and Eurasia 195 COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty bde 1 MRL bde 1 engr bde 1 EW bde 1 NBC bde 2 NBC regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2 log bde AIR DEFENCE 3 AD bde Black Sea Fleet_ The Black Sea Fleet is primarily based in Crimea, at Sevastopol, Karantinnaya Bay and Streletskaya Bay EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 6 SSK PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5:3 FFGHM; 2FFGM PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32: 8 FSGM; 6 FSM; 3 PSOH; 5 PCFG; 6 PB; 4 PBF MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10: 3 MCC; 1 MHO; 5 MSO; 1 MSC AMPHIBIOUS 8: 6 LST; 2 LCM Naval Aviation_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR 1 regt with Su-24M/MR Fencer, Su-30SM Flanker H MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT 1 regt with Ka-27 Helix; An-26 Curl; Be-12PS Mail; Mi-8 Hip TPT • Medium Mi-8 Hip Naval Infantry_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 corps HQ MANOEUVRE Mechanised 2 naval inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt 1 engr regt AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM regt Coastal Artillery and Missile Forces_ FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 2 AShM bde Caspian Sea Flotilla_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 15: 3 FSGM; 1 PCFG; 3 PCM; 3 PB; 1 PBF; 4 PBR MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3: 2 MSC; 1 MHI AMPHIBIOUS 9 LCM Naval Infantry_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 naval inf regt Military Air Force_ 4th Air Force & Air Defence Army_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 regt with Su-30SM Flanker H 1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; Su-30SM Flanker H (Armenia) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with Su-27/Su-27SM Flanker B/J; Su-30M2 Flanker G 1 regt with Su-27SM3 Flanker; Su-30M2 Flanker G GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25SM Frogfoot 2 regt with Su-25SM/SM3 Frogfoot 1 regt with Su-34 Fullback GROUND ATTACK/ISR 1 regt with Su-24M/MR Fencer D/E TRANSPORT 1 regt with An-12 Cub/Mi-8 Hip ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 bde with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-26 Halo 1 regt with MÍ-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip 2 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8AMTSh Hip 1 sqn with MÍ-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip (Armenia) AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM regt with 9K317 Buk-M2 (RS-SA-17 Grizzly) 1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) 3 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) Airborne Forces_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 1 AB div Eastern Military District_ HQ at Khabarovsk Army_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 4 army HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 (Spetsnaz) SF bde MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 tk bde 1 MR div 6 MR bde Mechanised 2 MR bde 1 MGA div 196 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 4 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M COMBAT SUPPORT 4 arty bde 1 MRL bde 1 engr bde 1 EW bde I NBC bde 4 NBC regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 4 log bde AIR DEFENCE 5 AD bde Pacific Fleet_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 17 STRATEGIC 3 SSBN TACTICAL 15: 4 SSGN (2 more non-operational in long-term refit); 2 SSN (3 more non-operational in long-term refit; 9 SSK PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10:1 CGHM; 5 DDGHM; 4 FFGHM PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28: 8 FSM; 4 PCGM; 10 PCFG; 6 PB MINE WARFARE 11: 2 MCC; 2 MSO; 7 MSC AMPHIBIOUS 9:4 LST; 5 LCM Naval Aviation_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-31BS/BM Foxhound A/C ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix 2 sqn with I1-38/I1-38N May; I1-18D; 11-22 Coot B 1 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-12BK Cub; An-26 Cur/; Tu-134 AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) Naval Infantry_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 2 naval inf bde Coastal Artillery and Missile Forces_ FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 2 AShM bde Military Air Force_ II th Air Force & Air Defence Army_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound C; Su-27SM Flanker J; Su-30M2 Flanker G; Su-30SM Flanker H; Su-35S Flanker M 1 regt with Su-35S Flanker M; Su-30SM Flanker H 1 regt with Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-30SM Flanker H GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with Su-24M/M2 Fencer D/D mod; Su-34 Fullback 1 regt with Su-25SM Frogfoot ISR 1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E TRANSPORT 1 regt with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty I Tu-154 Careless ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-26 Halo 1 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-26 Hnio 1 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE 1 regt with 9K37M Buk-Ul-2 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly); 1 regt with S-300V (RS-SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) 4 regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble); S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) Airborne Forces_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 2 air aslt bde Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 559,000_ Border Guard Service £l 60,000_ Subordinate to Federal Security Service FORCES BY ROLE 10 regional directorates MANOEUVRE Other 7 frontier gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV/APC (W) 1,000 BMP/BTR/ AUV BPM-97 ARTILLERY 90 SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 2S9 NONA-S MOR 120mm 2S12 Sani PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 205 PSOHM 2 Nerey (Krivak III) with 1 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad PTA-53-1135 533mm TT lnchr, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix A ASW hel) PSO 6: 4 Komandor; 2 Okean (Project 22100) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCM 1 Okhotnik (Project 22460) with 1 sextuple GMLS with Igla-IM (RS-SA-N-10 Grouse) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS PCO 29: 8 Alpinist (Project 503); 1 Sprut; 13 Okhotnik (Project 22460) with 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 hel landing platform; 8 Purga with 1 hel landing platform Russia and Eurasia 197 FCC 33:4 Molnya II (Pauk II); 6 Svetlyak (Project 10410); 13 Svetlyak (Project 10410) with 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun; 8 Svetlyak (Project 10410) with 2 AK630M CIWS; 1 Soetf j/afc (Project 10410) with 1AK630M CIWS; 1 Yakhont PCR 1 SZepe« (Yaz) with 1 AK630 CIWS, 2 100mm guns PBF 87: 57 Mangust; 3 Mraz/i (Project 14310); 4 Mustang-2 (Project 18623); 21 SofcoZ; 2 Sofcz/ioi PBR 27: 4 Ogonefc; 8 Pn/arfa? with 1 AK630 CIWS; 15 Moskit (Vosli) with 1 AK630 CIWS, 1100mm gun PB 18: 6 Gj/hj/s (Project 03050); 2 Morz/i (Project 1496M; 10 Lamantin (Project 1496M1) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 34 AE 1 Muna AGB 2 Ioti Susanin (primarily used as patrol ships) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform AK 8 Peoefc AKSL 5 Kanin AO 3:1 Is/ii'm (Project 15010); 2 Envoron ATE 15:14 Sorum (primarily used as patrol ships) with 2 AK230M CIWS; 1 Sorum (primarily used as patrol ship) AIRCRAFT • TPT £86: 70 An-24 Cofce/An-26 CMrZ/An-72 Coalerfll-76 CandidjT\x-\2A Crusty/Yak-40 Codling; 16 SM-92 HELICOPTERS: e200 Ka-27PS Helix/Mi-24 Hind/Mi-26 Halo/Ui-8 Hip Federal Guard Service £40,000-50,000 Org include elm of ground forces (mech inf bde and AB regt) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech inf regt Air Manoeuvre 1 AB regt Other 1 (Presidential) gd regt Federal Security Service Special Purpose Centre £4,000_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF unit (Alfa and Vympel units) National Guard £335,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 10 paramilitary div (2-5 paramilitary regt) 17 paramilitary bde (3 mech bn, 1 mor bn) 36 indep paramilitary rgt 90 paramilitary bn (ind spedal motorised units) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt TRANSPORT 8 sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE some BRDM-2A IFV/APC (W) 1,600 BMP-2/BTR-70M/BTR-80/ BTR-82A/BTR-82AM PPV Ural-VV AUV Patrol-A; Tigr ARTILLERY 35 TOWED 122mm 20 D-30 MOR 120mm 15 M-1938 (PM-38) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 PBF 3 BK-16 (Project 02510) PB 2+ Grachonok AIRCRAFT TPT 29: Heavy 9 11-76 Candid; Medium 2 An-12 Cub; Light 18:12 An-26 Curl; 6 An-72 Coaler HELICOPTERS TPT 71: Heavy 10 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 60+: 60 Mi-8 Hip; some Mi-8AMTSh Hip; Light 1 Ka-226T Wagner Group £10,000_ Elements of Russian private military company 'Wagner' and assodates integrated into the Russian command structure within Ukraine. DEPLOYMENT_ ARMENIA: 3,500:1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80 BMP-1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 ftr sqn with 18 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 4 Su-30SM Flanker H; 1 hel sqn with 11 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8AMTSh Hip; 4 Mi-8MT Hip; 2 AD bty with S-300V; 1 AD bty with Buk-Ul-2) AZERBAIJAN: 1,960; 1 MR bde(-) (peacekeeping) BELARUS: 10,000; 1 SSM bn with Iskander-U; 1 FGA sqn(-) with Su-34; Su-35S; 1 atk fit with MiG-31K; 2 SAM bn with S-400; 1 radar station at Baranovichi (Volga system; leased); 1 naval comms site CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 14 CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 6 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 9 GEORGIA: e4,000; Abkhazia: 1 mil base with 1 MR bde(-); 1 SAM regt with S-300PS; South Ossetia: 1 mil base with 1 MR bde(-) KAZAKHSTAN: 1 radar station at Balkash (Dnepr system; leased) KYRGYZSTAN: e500; 13 Su-25SM Frogfoot; 2 Mi-8 Hip MEDITERRANEAN SEA: 2 SSK; 1 FFGHM; 1 FFGM; 1 AGI MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 4 MOLDOVA: Transnistria £1,500 (induding 400 peacekeepers): 2 MR bn; 7 Mi-24 Hind; some Mi-8 Hip SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2 SYRIA: 4,000:1 inf BG; 3 MP bn; 1 engr unit; e10 T-72B3; £20 BTR-82A; BPM-97; Typhoon-K; Tigr; 12 2A65; 4 9A52 Smerch; 10 Su-24M Fencer D; 6 Su-34; 6 Su-35S Flanker U; 1A-50U Mainstay; 111-20M; 12 Mi-24P/Mi-35M Hind; 4 Mi-8AMTSh Hip; 1 AShM bty with 3K55 Bastion; 1 SAM bty with S-400; 1 SAM bty with Pantsir-Sl/S2; air base at Latakia; naval facility at Tartus 198 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 TAJIKISTAN: £3,000; 1 (201st) mil base with 1 MR bde(-); 1 hel sqn with 4 MÍ-24P Hind; 4 MÍ-8MTV Hip; 2 Mi-8MTV-5-1 Hip; 1 SAM bn with 8 S-300PS UKRAINE: Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk & Zaporizhzhia: £150,000; Crimea: £25,000; 1 recce bde, 2 naval inf bde(-); 1 air aslt regt(-); 1 arty bde; 1 NBC regt; 1 AShM bde with 3K60 Bal; 3K55 Bastion; 1 FGA regt with Su-24M/MR; Su-30SM; 1 FGA regt with Su-27SM/SM3; Su-30M2; 1 atk regt with Su-24M/Su-25SM; 1 atk/tpt hel regt; 1 ASW hel regt; 2 AD regt with S-400; Pantsir-Sl; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (Dnepr system) and Mukachevo (Dnepr system) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 13 Tajikistan UK Tajikistani Somoni TJS 2021 2022 GDP TJS 99.0bn 112bn USD 8.75bn 9.98bn per capita USD 906 1,015 Growth % 9.2 5.5 Inflation % 9.0 8.3 Def bdgt [a] TJS £l.06bn £l.19bn USD £94.0m £l07m USD1=TJS 11.31 11.18 [a] Excludes budget for law enforcement Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008 ---2015--- 2022 Population 9,119,347 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 15.5% 4.7% 4.5% 4.2% 19.2% 1.6% Female 14.9% 4.6% 4.3% 4.1% 20.0% 2.3% Capabilities_ The Tajik armed forces have little capacity to deploy other than token forces and most equipment is of Soviet-era origin. Regional security and terrorism remain key security concerns, given the border with Afghanistan. Tajikistan has been building its capability by hosting CSTO counter-terrorism exercises and by taking part in exercises, organised by US CENTCOM, focused on scenarios including counter-terrorism. Tajikistan is a member of the CSTO and the SCO, and the armed forces also conduct exercises with Russian troops based at Russia's 201 st military base. In 2021, bilateral military exercises and CSTO joint drills concerned scenarios focused on the border with Afghanistan. Reports in early 2019 indicated that there may be a Chinese military facility in eastern Tajikistan, though this remains unconfirmed by either Beijing or Dushanbe. In 2021, reports indicated that China was to fund an outpost for Tajikistan's police special forces near to the border with Afghanistan. Though the pre-existing base is still officially denied by Beijing and Dushanbe, there were reports that full control of the facility would be transferred to Beijing and future rent will be waived in exchange for military aid from China. In 2018, India and Tajikistan agreed to strengthen defence cooperation, in particular on counter-terrorism and there were reports in 2021 of agreements on security cooperation with Iran. Border deployments have been stepped up recently in response to concerns about regional and border security and terrorism. In late 2016, a Military Cooperation Plan was signed with Russia. Moscow has indicated that Tajikistan is to receive military equipment, including aircraft. Some personal equipment has been donated by the US. Barring maintenance facilities, Tajikistan has only minimal defence-industrial capacity, though in 2022, Iran reportedly opened a UAV production line in the country. ACTIVE 8,800 (Army 7,300 Air Force/Air Defence 1,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500 Conscript liability 24 months RESERVE 20,000 (Army 20,000) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 7,300_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 3 MR bde Air Manoeuvre 1 air aslt bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 38: 28 T-72 Ural/T-72A/T-72AV/T-72B; 3 T-72B1; 7 T-62/T-62AV/T-62AM RECCE 31: 9 BRDM-2; 22 BRDM-2M IFV 23: 8 BMP-1; 15 BMP-2 APC 36 APC (W) 23 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80 PPV 13 VP11 AUV 24 CS/VN3B mod; Tigr ARTILLERY 40 SP 122mm 3 2S1 Gvozdika TOWED 122mm 13 D-30 MRL 122mm 14 BM-21 Grad MOR 10+: SP 82mm CS/SS4; 120mm 10 AIR DEFENCE SAM Medium-range 3 S-125 Pechora-2U (RS-SA-26) Short-range 5 S-125M1 Neva-Ul (RS-SA-3 Goa) Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 GraiT)% GUNS SP 23mm 8 BTR-ZD TOWED 23mm ZU-23M1 Air Force/Air Defence 1,500_ FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Tu-134A Crusty ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17TM Hip H Russia and Eurasia 199 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 1 Tu-134A Crusty TRG 4+: 4 L-39 Albatros; some Yak-52 HELICOPTERS ATK 4 Mi-24 Hind TPT • Medium 11 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17TM Hip H Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500 Internal Troops 3,800_ National Guard 1,200 Emergencies Ministry 2,500 Border Guards FOREIGN FORCES_ China £300 (trg) Russia £3,000; 1 (201st) mil base with 1 MR bde(-); 1 hel sqn with 4 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8MTV Hip; 2 Mi-8MTV-5-l Hip; 1 SAM bn with 8 S-300PS Turkmenistan TKM Turkmen New ManatTMT 2021 2022 GDP TMT 218bn 261 bn USD 62.2bn 74.4bn per capita USD 10,111 11,929 Growth % 4.6 1.2 Inflation % 15.0 17.5 Def bdgt TMT n.k n.k USD n.k n.k USD1=TMT 3.50 3.50 Population 5,636,011 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 12.6% 3.8% 4.0% 4.6% 21.9% 2.7% Female 12.2% 3.8% 3.9% 4.6% 22.5% 3.5% Capabilities_ Turkmenistan has concerns over potential spillover from security challenges in Afghanistan, but its armed forces lack significant capabilities and equipment. Ashgabat has maintained a policy of neutrality since 1995 and confirmed this commitment in its 2016 military doctrine. This aimed to increase the armed forces' defensive capability in order to safeguard national interests and territorial integrity. Turkmenistan is not a member of the CSTO or the SCO. In 2022, Turkmenistan participated in the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) with observer status. The summit agreed to continue regular security cooperation and called for closer defence industrial and military cooperation. While the ground forces are shifting from a Soviet-era divisional structure to a brigade system, progress is slow. The armed forces are largely conscript-based and reliant on Soviet-era equipment and doctrine, and the government has stated a requirement to improve conditions of service. Turkmenistan has participated in multinational exercises and is reported to have restarted joint exercises with Russia and Uzbekistan, but has limited capacity to deploy externally and maintains no international deployments. In October 2019, in Saint Petersburg, Turkmenistan and four other Caspian littoral states signed a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation, among other discussions, including on maritime security.There are plans to strengthen the border guard with new equipment and facilities. Plans to bolster the naval forces have resulted in some procurements, leading to a modest improvement in the naval presence in the Caspian Sea. There has been limited procurement of systems such as UAVs, including from China and Turkey. A 2021 military parade also featured a range of new military equipment, including C-27J Spartan, EMB-314 Super Tucano and and M-346FA aircraft and BayraktarJB2 UAVs. Apart from maintenance facilities, Turkmenistan has little domestic defence industry, but is building a number of patrol vessels of Turkish design under licence. ACTIVE 36,500 (Army 33,000 Navy 500 Air 3,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000 Conscript liability 24 months ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 33,000_ 5 Mil Districts FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops regt MANOEUVRE Armoured ltkbde Mechanised 1 (3rd) MR div (1 tk regt; 3 MR regt, 1 arty regt) 1 (22nd) MR div (1 tk regt; 1 MR regt, 1 arty regt) 4 MR bde 1 naval inf bde Other 1 MR trg div SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM bde with 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud B) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 (mixed) arty/AT regt 1 MRL bde 1 AT regt 1 engr regt AIR DEFENCE 2 SAM bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPEt ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 654:4 T-90S; 650 T-72/T-72UMG RECCE 260+: 200 BRDM-2; 60 BRM-1; Nimr Ajban IFV 1,050:600 BMP-1/BMP-1M; 4 BMP-1UM; 430 BMP-2; 4 BMP-2D; 4 BMP-3; 4 BTR-80A; 4 BTR-80 Grom APC 907+ APC (W) 870+: 120 BTR-60 (all variants); 300 BTR-70; 450 BTR-80 PPV 37+: 28+ Kirpi; 9+ Titan-DS; some Typhoon-K AUV 12+: 8 Nimr Ajban 440A; 4+ Cobra ABCV 8 BMD-1 200 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 58+: 8 9P122 Malyutka-M (RS-AT-3 Sagger on BRDM-2); 8 9P133 Malyutka-R (RS-AT-3 Sagger on BRDM-2); 2 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel on BRDM-2); 36 9P149 Shturm (RS-AT-6 Spiral on MT-LB); 4+ Baryer (on Karakal) MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konfciirs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn) GUNS 100mm 60 MT-12/T-12 ARTILLERY 769 SP 122mm 40 2S1 TOWED 457: 122mm 350 D-30; 130mm 6 M-46; 152mm 101:17 D-l; 72 D-20; 6 2A36 Giatsint-B; 6 2A65 Msta-B GUN/MOR 120mm 17 2S9 NONA-S MRL 158:122mm 92:18 9P138; 70 BM-21 Grad; 4 BM-21 A; RM-70; 220mm 60 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 6 9A52 Smerch MOR 97: 82mm 31; 120mm 66 M-1938 (PM-38) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 16 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud B) AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range: FM-90 (CH-SA-4); 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) Point-defence 53+: 40 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 13 9K35 Strela-10 mod (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K38 Igla (RS- SA-18 Grouse); 9K32M Strela-2U (RS-SA-7 Grail)%; 9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); Mistral (reported); QW-2 (CH-SA-8) GUNS 70 SP 23mm 48 ZSU-23-4 TOWED 22+: 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm 22 S-60 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM CM-502KG; AR-1 Navy 500_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 CORVETTES • FSGM 1 Deniz Han with 4 twin lnchr with Otomat AShM, 1 16-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA, 1 Roketsan ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor, 1 Gokdeniz CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCFG 2 Edermen (RUS Molnya) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCGM 2 Arkadag (TUR Tuzla) with 2 twin lnchr with Otomat AShM, 2 twin Simbad-RC lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 Roketsan ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT* AGHS 1 (Dearsan41m) Air Force 3,000_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with MiG-29A/S/UB Fulcrum GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot 1 sqn with Su-25MK Frogfoot 1 sqn with M-346FA* TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24 Hind TRAINING 1 unit with EMB-314 Super Tucano* 1 unit with L-39 Albatros AIR DEFENCE 1 bty with FD-2000 (CH-SA-9) 1 bty with KS-1C (CH-SA-12) 3 bty with S-125 Neva-Ul (RS-SA-3 Goa) 1 bty with S-125 Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26) 2 bty with S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 65 combat capable FTR 24: 22 MiG-29A/S Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum ATK 31:19 Su-25 Frogfoot; 12 Su-25MK Frogfoot TPT 5: Medium 2 C-27J Spartan; Light 3:1 An-26 Curl; 2 An-74TK Coaler TRG 12: 5 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 5 M-346FA*; 2 L-39 Albatros HELICOPTERS ATK 10 Mi-24P Hind F MRH 2+ AW139 TPT 11+: Medium 8: 6 Mi-8 Hip; 2 Mi-17V-V Hip; Light 3+ AW109 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR 3+: Heavy CH-3A; WJ-600; Medium 3+ Bayraktar TB2 ISR 3+: Medium 3+ Falco Light Orbiter-2 LOITERING & DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS Skystriker AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range 18: 2 2K11 Krug (RS-SA-4 Ganef); 4 FD-2000 (CH-SA-9); 12 S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); Medium-range 8:4 S-125 Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26); 4 KS-1A (CH-SA-12) Short-range 12:12 S-125M1 Neva-Ul (RS-SA-3 Goa); some S-125-2BM Pechora AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer) BOMBS Laser-guided MAM-C; MAM-L Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000_ Internal Troops £l 5,000_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 2+ Lazar-3 APC • PPV 9: 4+ Survivor II; 5 Titan-DS AUV 4+ Plasan Stormrider Federal Border Guard Service £5,000_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV 8: 4+ Kirpi; 4+ Survivor II AUV 6+ Cobra ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 4 BM-21A AIR DEFENCE GUNS • TOWED • 23mm ZU-23-2 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 33 Russia and Eurasia 201 PCGM 8 Arkadag (TUR Tuzla) with 2 twin lnchr with Otomat AShM, 2 twin Simbad-RC lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 Roketsan ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor PBFG 6 Nazya (Dearsan 33) with 2 single lnchr with Marte Mk2/N AShM PBF 18:10 Bars-12; 5 Grif-T, 3 Sobol PB 1 Point AMPHIBIOUS • LCM 1 Dearsan LCM-1 HELICOPTERS MRH 2 AW139 TPT 3+: Medium some Mi-8 Hip; Light 3 AW109 Ukraine UKR Ukrainian Hryvnia UAH 2021 2022 2023 GDP [a] UAH 5.46tr n.k USD 200bn n.k per capita USD 4,862 n.k Growth % 3.4 £-35.0 Inflation % 9.4 £20.6 Def bdgt [b] UAH 118bn 131bn 1.14tr USD 4.30bn 3.55bn FMA (US) USD 115m 115m 165m USD1=UAH 27.34 36.93 [a] Limited IMF economic data available for Ukraine in 2022 [b] Official budget (including military pensions). Actual spending expected to be much higher in 2022 following Russian invasion in February. Significant uplift announced for 2023. Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- 2022 Population 43,528,136 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.3% 2.5% 2.3% 2.9% 24.4% 6.0% Female 7.8% 2.4% 2.2% 2.8% 26.8% 11.7% Capabilities_ After absorbing the initial assault of Russia's February 2022 invasion, Ukrainian forces halted Russia's apparent attempt to seize Kyiv. By late-year Ukraine's forces were on the offensive, retaking territory in the Donetsk region and also around Kherson in the south and to the east of Kharkiv further north. Ukraine has received considerable support from Western states in the form of military materiel, most notably the US. This support has included the supply of main battle tanks, tube and rocket artillery, anti-armour and anti-air weapons. Intelligence support has also been forthcoming from some of these states. Substantial numbers of Ukrainian personnel have been killed or wounded, and equipment losses have been significant, but Ukrainian forces have also inflicted heavy losses on Russian forces. In response, at the end of September 2022, to Russian President Vladimir Putin's illegal annexation of several regions and claims that these were now Russian, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced Ukraine's application to join NATO. This move is unlikely to succeed in the near term, but it may have had an immediate propaganda value. General mobilisation was declared on 24 February: 18-60-year-old men were not allowed to leave the country, while women between 18-60 in certain professions also had to register for military service. After the invasion, substantial numbers of civilians volunteered for defence duties. At the outset of the war Ukraine's equipment inventory consisted predominantly of Soviet-era weaponry, though more modern ground equipment from Western sources has increasingly supplemented the inventory. After the February invasion there have been repeat deliveries of Turkish-manufactured UAVs while numerous countries have provided portable anti-armour and anti-air weapons. Western states have also started to provide heavier weapons, including main battle tanks and artillery, as well as training on these systems. A number of Western states are now offering training assistance to Ukrainian troops in their own nations, with this ranging from basic training and combat skills to training on new equipment. There is also some maintenance support. Since 2014, Western-delivered training support developed combat and command skills, including relating to NCOs. Ukraine's development of an NCO cadre after 2014 has proven valuable. In 2021, Ukraine replaced its Military Doctrine with a new Military Security Strategy, which built on the 2020 National Security Strategy. Part of the reform programme included the establishment of several new commands, including a Joint Forces Command. The war will spur Kyiv's ambition to replace its Soviet-era equipment, though the country will need considerable financial support in meeting this goal, as it will with wider reconstruction costs. Ukraine has a broad defence-industrial base, operating in all sectors, though its capability remains shaped, and limited, by its Soviet heritage. The condition of its defence-industrial facilities is unclear; many have been subject to Russian attacks. Ongoing combat, and Ukraine's mobilisation, means that equipment, forces and personnel assessments in the data sections should be treated with caution. ACTIVE 688,000 (Army 250,000 Navy 13,000 Air Force 37,000 Airborne 30,000 Special Operations Forces 3,000Territorial Defence 350,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 250,000 Conscript liability Army, Air Force 18 months, Navy 2 years. Minimum age for conscription raised from 18 to 20 in 2015 RESERVE 400,000 (Joint 400,000) Military service within 5 years ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army £250,00_ 4 regional HQ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 5 recce bn Armoured 2tkbde Mechanised 9 mech bde 2 mtn bde Light 4 mot inf bde 1 (volunteer) It inf regt SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES 1 SSM bde 202 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 COMBAT SUPPORT 5 arty bde 1 MRL bde 1 MRL regt 1 STA regt 1 engr bde 1 engr regt 1 ptn br regt 1 EW regt 1EW bn 2 EW coy 1 CBRN regt 4 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 engr spt bde 3 maint regt 1 maint coy HELICOPTERS 4 avn bde AIR DEFENCE 4 AD regt Reserves_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 3 tk bde Mechanised 4 mech bde Light 1 mot inf bde lit inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Warsaw Pact calibre artillery and missile systems may have limited or no available ammunition. ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 953: 28 M-55S; 30 T-62M/MV; 250 T-64BV/BV mod 2017; 50 T-64BM Bulat; 500 T-72AV/AV mod 2021/ B1/B3/M1/M1R/PT-91 Twardy; 80 T-80BV/BVM/U/UK; 10 T-90A; 5 T-84 Oplot RECCE 200:150 BRDM-2/-2L1/-2T; 50 BRM-1K (CP) IFV 770: 500 BMP-1/-1AK/-2; 40 BMP-3; 60 BTR-3DA/-3E1/-4E/-4MV1; 80 BTR-82A; 35 BVP M-80A; 55 PbV-501; YPR-765 APC 1,159 APC (T) 550: 350 M113A1/AS4/G3DK/G4DK; 200 MT-LB APC (W) 239:39 ACSV; 200 BTR-60/-70/-80; XA-180 Sisu PPV 370: 50 Kozak-2/-2M; 240 Maxxpro; 80 Varta AUV 95: 30 Dingo 2; 35 FV103 Spartan; 30 Novator; Roshel Senator ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 40 BAT-2; MT-LB ARV 10+: 10 BPz-2; BREM-1; BREM-M; BREM-2; BREM-64; BTS-4; IMR-2; VT-72M4CZ VLB 17 Biter; MTU-20 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9P148 with Stugna-P; 9P149 with 9K114 Shturm (RS-AT-6 Spiral); M1064A1 HMMWV with TOW; Brimstone; Brimstone II MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); Corsar; FGM-148 Javelin; NLAW: Stugna-P GUNS 100mm £200 MT-12/T-12 ARTILLERY 1,536 SP 512: 122mm 120 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 204: 140 2S3 Akatsiya; 10 2S5 Giatsint-S; 35 2S19 Msta-S; 1+ Dana-W2; 18 M-77 Dana; 155mm 168: 17 Caesar; 53 Krab; 50 M109A3GN/A4/A5Oe; 20 M109L; 6 M-2000 Zuzana; 22 PzH 2000; 203mm 20 2S7 Pion TOWED 493:105mm 33: 30 L119 Light Gun/M119A3; 3+ M101; 122mm 60 D-30; 130mm 18 M-46; 152mm 230: 90 2A36 Giatsint-B; 80 2A65 Msta-B; 60 D-20; 155mm 152: 20 FH 70; 132 M777A2 GUN/MOR • 120mm • TOWED 2B16 NONA-K MRL 231: 122mm 120: 100 9K51M Tornado-G/BU-21 Grad; 20 RM-70 Vampir; 220mm 40 Bureivy/9P14Q Uragan; 227mm 31: 20 M142 HIMARS; 11 M270A1/B1 MLRS; 300mm 40+: Vilkha/Vilkha-M; 40 9A52 Smerch MOR 300:120mm 300:100 2S12 Sani; 140 EM-120; some Krh/92; 60 M120-15; SP 120mm BTR-3M2 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional some 9K79 Tochka (RS-SS-21 Scarab) COASTAL • DEFENCE AShM RBS-17 Hellfire HELICOPTERS ATK £35 Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind TPT • Medium e15 Mi-8 Hip LOITERING & DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS (Multiple systems below 20kg in weight) AIR DEFENCE SAM 81+ Long-range Some S-300V (RS-SA-12A Gladiator) Short-range 10: 4 Crotale NG; 6 9K330 Tor-M (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) Point-defence 9K33 Osa-AKM (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 Strela-W (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 6 FV4333 Stormer with Starstreak; Martlet; Mistral; Piorun; Starstreak SPAAGM 30mm 75 2K22 Tunguska (RS-SA-19 Grison) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka; 35mm 30 Gepard TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM Barrier-N Navy £13,000_ After Russia's annexation of Crimea, HQ shifted to Odessa. Several additional vessels remain in Russian possession in Crimea EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13 PCC 3 Slavyansk (ex-US Island) PBG 3 Gyurza-M (Project 51855) with 2 Katran-M RWS with Barrier SSM PBF 7: 6 Defiant 40; 1 Kentavr-LK Russia and Eurasia 203 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 ABU 1 Project 419 (Sura) AG 1 Bereza AGI1 Muna AKL 1 AWT 1 Siidafc AXL 3 Petrushka Naval Aviation el,000_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT ASW (2 Be-12 Mail non-operational) TPT • Light (2 An-26 Curl in store) HELICOPTERS ASW 7+: 4+ Ka-27 Helix A; 1 MÍ-14PS Haze A; 2 Mi-14PL Haze C TPT • Medium 1 Ka-29 HeZix-B TRG 1 Ka-226 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Medium Bayraktar TB2 BOMBS • Laser-guided MAM-C/-L Naval Infantry £4,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bn Light 1 nav inf bde 1 nav inf bde(-) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-64BV IFV BMP-1; BMP-3 APC APC (T) MT-LB APC (W) BTR-60; BTR-80 PPV £40 Mastiff; Varta ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE GUNS 100mm MT-12 ARTILLERY SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika TOWED 152mm 2A36 Giatsint-B AIR DEFENCE GUNS • SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 Coastal Defence £1,500_ FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 1 arty bde 1 MRL regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARTILLERY TOWED 152mm D-20 MRL 220mm 9P140 Uragan COASTAL DEFENCE AShM Maritime Brimstone; RGM-84 Harpoon; RK- 360MC Neptun Air Forces 37,000_ 4 Regional HQ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 4 bde with MiG-29 Fulcrum; Su-27 Flanker B; L-39 Albatros FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 bde with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25 Frogfoot ISR 2 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E* TRANSPORT 3 bde with An-24 Curl; An-26 Coke; An-30 Clank; Ü-76 Candid; Tu-134 Crusty TRAINING Some sqn with L-39 Albatros TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Some sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-9 Hip; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite AIR DEFENCE 6 bde with S-300PS/PT (RS-SA-10 Grumble) 3 regt with S-300PS/PT (RS-SA-10 Grumble) 3 regt with 9K37M Buk-Ml (RS-SA-11 Gadfly) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 79 combat capable FTR 50: £20 MiG-29 Fulcrum; e30 Su-27 Flanker B ATK 20: e5 Su-24M Fencer D; e20 Su-25 Frogfoot ISR 12: 3 An-30 Clank; e9 Su-24MR Fencer E* TPT 26: Heavy 411-76 Candid; Medium 1 An-70; Light £21: 3 An-24 Coke; i\7 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Crusty TRG £31 L-39 Albatros HELICOPTERS C2 £14 Mi-9 Hip MRH £25 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 25: Medium £20 Mi-8 Hip; Light £5 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Medium Bayraktar TB2 ISR • Heavy some Tu-141 Strizh AIR DEFENCE SAM 271: Long-range 208: 200 S-300PS/PT (RS-SA-10 Grumble); 8 S-300PMU (RS-SA-10 Grumble) Medium-range 63: 60 9K37M Buk-Ml (RS-SA-11 Gadfly); 3+ IRIS-T SLM Short-range NASAMS GUNS • TOWED 23mm some ZU-23-2 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-27ET (RS-AA-10D Alamo); R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); SARH R-27R (RS-AA-10A Alamo); R-27ER (RS-AA-10C4Zamo) ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge) ARM AGM-88 HARM; Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A Kegler); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 Kilter) BOMBS • Laser-guided MAM-C/-L Airborne Assault Troops £30,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bn Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bde 4 air aslt bde 1 air aslt regt 2 air mob bde 1 air mob bde (forming) 204 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 COMBAT SUPPORT 1 SP arty bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-80BV mod IFV BTR-3E1; BTR-4 Bucephalus APC 166 APC (T) 30 BTR-D APC (W) 93+: BTR-80; 10 Dozor-B; 27+ Oncilla; 56+ VAB PPV 43+ Kirpi ABCV 70: 20 BMD-lt; 50 BMD-2 AUV 56+: 56 Bushmaster, IVECO LMV; KrAZ Spartan; MLS Shield; Novator ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); NLAW ARTILLERY SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya TOWED • 122mm D-30 MRL 122mm BM-21 Grad GUN/MOR • SP • 120mm 30 2S9 NONA-S MOR 120mm 2S12 Sani AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K35M Strela-WM; Piorun GUNS • SP 23mm some ZU-23-2 (truck mounted) Special Operations Forces £3,000_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF regt 1 (volunteer) SF regt 1SF bn 1 spec ops regt 1 spec ops bn Territorial Defence Force £350,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 30 (territorial def) inf bde Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 250,000_ National Guard £90,000_ Ministry of Internal Affairs; 5 territorial comd FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech inf bde Light 1 mot inf bde(-) 2 mot inf regt 2 inf bde Other 3 sy bde 1 sy regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-64; T-64BV; T-64BM; T-72; T-90M IFV BMP-2; BTR-3; BTR-3E1; BTR-4 Bucephalus; BTR-4E APC APC (W) BTR-70; BTR-80 PPV Streit Cougar; Streit Spartan; Kozak-2; Varta AUV Novator ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS NLAW RCL 73mm SPG-9 ARTILLERY TOWED 122mm D-30 MOR 120mm some AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 24: 20 An-26 Curl; 2 An-72 Coaler; 2 Tu-134 Crusty HELICOPTERS • TPT 14: Medium 11: 4 H225M; 7 Mi-8 Hip; Light 3: 2 H125; 1 Mi-2MSB AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); Piorun GUNS • SP 23mm some ZU-23-2 (tch) Border Guard £60,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 (mobile) sy bn 19 sy bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV Kozak-2 Maritime Border Guard_ The Maritime Border Guard is an independent subdivision of the State Commission for Border Guards and is not part of the navy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21 PCT 1 Molnya (Pauk I) with 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 76mm gun PCC 4 Tarantul (Stenka) PB 12:11 Zhuk; 1 Orion PBR 4 Shmel with 1 76mm gun LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGF 1 AIRCRAFT • TPT Medium An-8 Camp; Light An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; An-72 Coaler HELICOPTERS • ASW: Ka-27 Helix A National Police £100,000_ Ministry of Internal Affairs DEPLOYMENT SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 40 TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL Russia annexed the Ukrainian region of Crimea in March 2014, having occupied the territory the previous month. It has been used by Russia as a basing area since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Data presented here represents the de facto situation and does not imply international recognition. Russia and Eurasia 205 FOREIGN FORCES_ Russia Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk & Zaporizhzhia, £150,000; Crimea: £25,000; 1 recce bde(-), 2 naval inf bde(-); 1 air aslt regt; 1 arty bde; 1 NBC bde; 1 AShM bde with 3K60 Bal; 3K55 Bastion; 1 FGA regt with Su-24M/MR; Su-30SM; 1 FGA regt with Su-27SM/SM3; Su-30M2; 1 atk regt with Su-24M/Su-25SM; 1 atk sqn(-) with Su-34; 1 atk/tpt hel regt; 1 ASW hel regt; 1 AD regt with S-300PM; 1 AD regt with S-400; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (Dnepr system) and Mukachevo (Dnepr system) Uzbekistan UZB Uzbekistan i Som UZS 2021 2022 GDP UZS 735tr 866tr USD 69.2bn 79.1 bn per capita USD 2,002 2,243 Growth % 7.4 5.2 Inflation % 10.8 11.2 Def exp UZS n.k n.k USD n.k n.k USS1=UZS 10615.12 10942.97 Population 31,1 04,937 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 11.6% 3.8% 4.1% 4.8% 22.6% 2.8% Female 11.1 % 3.7% 3.9% 4.8% 23.2% 3.7% Capabilities Uzbekistan introduced a new military doctrine in early 2018, which highlighted increased concern over terrorism and the potential impact of conflicts including in Afghanistan. It noted a requirement for military modernisation. The doctrine also focuses on border security and hybrid-warfare concerns. Uzbekistan is a member of the SCO but suspended its CSTO membership in 2012. Uzbekistan is a member of the Organization of Turkic States, and the 2022 Summit Communique called for closer defence industrial cooperation and a common security concept. It maintains bilateral defence ties with Moscow. However, in 2022 Uzbekistan sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine and did not recognise the independence of the Luhansk and Donetsk'people's republics.' In late 2018 a defence-cooperation agreement was reported with India. Military cooperation is developing with Turkey. Bilateral exercises were held in 2021, and in 2022 the two countries signed an agreement on military cooperation. The armed forces are army-dominated and conscript-based. Uzbekistan has a limited capacity to deploy its forces externally and does not have any international deployments. A sizeable air fleet was inherited from the Soviet Union, but minimal recapitalisation in the intervening period has substantially reduced the active inventory. Logistical and maintenance shortcomings hinder aircraft availability. Uzbekistan is reliant on foreign suppliers for advanced military equipment and procured equipment including military helicopters and armoured personnel carriers from Russia in 2019. Meetings took place with India in 2020 to advance defence cooperation (three defence-related MOUs were signed in 2019) and in 2021 the leaders of Pakistan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on defence cooperation. A State Committee for the Defence Industry was established in late 2017 to organise domestic industry and defence orders. The 2018 doctrine callsfor improvements to the domestic defence industry. In recent years, Uzbekistan's defence industry has showcased domestically produced light-armoured vehicles. ACTIVE 48,000 (Army 24,500 Air 7,500 Joint 16,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000 Conscript liability 12 months ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 24,500_ 4 Mil Districts; 2 op comd; 1 Tashkent Comd FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES I SF bde MANOEUVRE Armoured ltkbde Mechanised II MR bde Air Manoeuvre 1 air aslt bde 1 AB bde Mountain 1 It mtn inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty bde 1 MRL bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 340: 70 T-72; 100 T-64B/MV; 170 T-62 RECCE 19:13 BRDM-2; 6 BRM-1 IFV 370: 270 BMP-2; £100 BTR-82A APC 388 APC (T) 50 BTR-D APC (W) 259: 24 BTR-60; 25 BTR-70; 210 BTR-80 PPV 79: Cougar 4x4; 24 Ejder Yalcin; 50 Maxxpro+; 5 Typhoon-K 4x4 ABCV 129:120 BMD-1; 9 BMD-2 AUV 11+: 7 Cougar; 4+ M-ATV; some Tigr-M ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 20 Maxxpro ARV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot) GUNS 100mm 36 MT-12/T-12 ARTILLERY 487+ SP 83+: 122mm 18 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 17+: 17 2S3 Akatsiya; 2S5 Giatsint-S (reported); 203mm 48 2S7 Pion TOWED 200:122mm 60 D-30; 152mm 140 2A36 Giatsint-B GUN/MOR 120mm 54 2S9 NONA-S MRL 108: 122mm 60: 36 BM-21 Grad; 24 9P138; 220mm 48 9P140 Uragan MOR 120mm 42: 5 2B11 Sani; 19 2S12 Sani; 18 M-120 AIR DEFENCE • SAM Point-defence QW-18 (CH-SA-11) 206 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Air Force 7,500_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum A/B GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25BM Frogfoot TRANSPORT 1 regt with 11-76 Candid; An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; C295W; Tu-134 Crusty TRAINING 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 regt with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-35M Hind; Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE 1 bty with FD-2000 (CH-SA-9) 1 bty with S-125-2M Pechora-2U (RS-SA-26) 2 bty with S-125M1 Neva-Mi (RA-SA-3 Goa) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 24 combat capable FTR 12 MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum A/B; (18 more in store); (26 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker B/C in store) ATK 12; 12 Su-25/Su-25BM Frogfoot; (15 Su-24 Fencer in store) TPT 11; Heavy 2 11-76 Candid; Medium 2 An-12 Cub; Light 7; 2 An-26 Curl; 4 C295W; 1 Tu-134 Crusty TRG 6 L-39 Albatros HELICOPTERS ATK 41: 29 Mi-24 Hind; 12 Mi-35M Hind TPT 69: Heavy 9:8 H225M Caracal; 1 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 52 Mi-8 Hip; Light 8 AS350 Ecureuil AIR DEFENCE • SAM 18 Long-range 4 FD-2000 (CH-SA-9) Medium-range 4 S-125-2M Pechora-2U (RS-SA-26) Short-range 10 S-125M1 Neva-Ul (RS-SA-3 Goa) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo) ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen) ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A Kegler); Kh-28 (RS-AS-9 Kyle); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 Kilter) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary up to 20,000 Internal Security Troops up to 19,000_ Ministry of Interior National Guard 1,000_ Ministry of Defence an Miss strategic dossier ISSUE IALOGUE NITIATIVE C\ MISSILE TECHNOLOGY: ACCELERATING CHALLENGES The IISS Strategic Dossier Missile Technology: Accelerating Challenges examines the ballistic-and cruise-missile developments of the world's most prominent users and producers; the impact of development and procurement programmes on regional and strategic stability; the arms-control processes designed to restrain proliferation; and the trajectory of future technological developments, particularly Mach 5+ systems. Missile Technology: Accelerating Challenges focuses on the missile forces of China, Russia and the United States, given the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of their arsenals, and prominent producers and operators of ballistic and cruise missiles in Asia, Europe and the Middle East. The dossier examines the prospects for arms- and export-control mechanisms and confidence-building measures in an increasingly competitive environment characterised by accelerating proliferation and deteriorating global security. IISS THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES DOWNLOAD FREE £ https://go.iiss.org/MDISD O Chapter Six Asia China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) held naval and air exercises to the north, southwest and east of Taiwan for three days in early August 2022, at the time of the visit to Taiwan of then-speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi. After this, PLA assets have more frequently crossed the Taiwan Strait'median line' In China, 2022 saw continued deliveries of the Chengdu J-20 combat aircraft. Since at least 2021, the air force has been taking delivery of J-20s fitted with a domestic afterburning turbofan, the Shenyang WS-10C, replacing the Russian Saturn AL-31F variant. China began fielding JL-3 (CH-SS-N-20) ballistic missiles on its submarines. According to the Pentagon, newer longer-ranged missiles like the JL-3 give'the PLAN the ability to target the continental United States from littoral waters.' By late October, North Korea had launched some 40 ballistic missiles - more than in any previous year. US and South Korean officials claimed that North Korea was in the final stages of planning its first nuclear test since 2017. ■ Concerns were raised in India about potential dependence on Russia for defence supplies. Deliveries of S-400 systems continued, but only because of US congressional support for ensuring'India's immediate defense needs' by waiving CAATSA sanctions in this specific case. ■ Japan's government completed reviews of its National Security Strategy, National Defense Program Guidelines and Medium-Term Defense Program. Prime Minister Kishida Fumio set 2027 as a target for the defence budget to reach 2% of GDP. ■ The new Australian government announced a Defence Strategic Review to deliver recommendations in early 2023. Meanwhile, discussions continued with the UK and US over the provision of a new fleet of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines and other advanced military capabilities. ■ Overall regional defence budget growth was below trend in real terms compared to the previous decade. This is partially a result of constrained government spending, but also related to the effect of inflation on the spending power of defence budgets. Asia defence spending, 2022 - top 5 USD66.6bn USD242.4bn Japan South Korea Australia USD48.1bn USD43.0bn USD33.8bn Active military personnel - top 10 (25,000 per unit) mmmmmmmmmm mmmmmmmmmm mmmmnnmm mmmmmmmmmm mmmmmmmmmm mmmmmmmmmm mmmw. mmmmmmmmat mmtmmmmm\ mmmnmmm nnmmmm mmmmm mmmmm mmmt] China 2,035,000 India 1,463,700 North Korea 1,280,000 South Korea 555,000 Vietnam 482,000 Indonesia 395,500 Thailand 360,850 Myanmar 356,000 Sri Lanka 255,000 Global total 20,773,950 44.2% Regional total 9,177,730 Regional defence policy and economics Arms procurements and deliveries Armed forces data section 210 ► 226 ► 229 ► Asia: selected tactical combat aircraft, 2022* 0 500 1,000 *'Combat aircraft' includes fighter, fighter ground-attack and attack aircraft 1,500 2,000 Advanced ■ Modern Mixed I Ageing Obsolescent I Obsolete 2,500 Asia: selected main battle tank fleets, 2022 China \ India Japan Mongolia North Korea ^^^^ Pakistan China's heavy airlift and tanker fleets, 2016-22 2016 2018 2020 2022 210 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Asia Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 further complicated the challenges faced by some Asia-Pacific defence establishments at a time when the region's security outlook was already deteriorating as a result of growing Chinese threats to Taiwan. Fears that developments in Ukraine might provide an opportunity for China to invade Taiwan while the United States and other Western powers were distracted proved unrealistic in the short term, but the war highlighted the danger of major interstate conflict resulting from the failure of diplomacy and deterrence. In addition, Russia's lack of success in its initial offensive and the successes of the Western-backed Ukrainian armed forces provided reasons for Asia-Pacific armed forces to reassess their own capabilities and requirements. Focus on dependence on Russian weapons Almost immediately, the war in Ukraine posed challenges for Asian countries reliant on military equipment supplied by Russia. The considerable strengthening of US and European Union sanctions against Russia's defence-industrial sector following the invasion quickly affected India's defence procurement. In May, New Delhi reportedly halted negotiations for additional Ka-31 naval airborne early-warning helicopters and suspended plans to upgrade SU-30MKI combat aircraft with Russian assistance. Deliveries of S-400 systems continued, but only because of US congressional support for ensuring 'India's immediate defense needs' by waiving CAATSA (Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) sanctions in this specific case. Although important equipment has also recently come from contracts with French, UK and US suppliers, there remain considerable dependencies in all domains on Russian suppliers. Absent any significant weakening of sanctions, India will need to consider alternative sources for some of its equipment purchases, as well as for spares and support for many of its Soviet- and Russian-origin systems, while bolstering its co-development and co-production of defence systems with foreign partners. India's aim remains to produce more defence materiel itself, and the government has redoubled its efforts in this area, but India's defence industry remains largely unable to deliver advanced-weapons systems in significant numbers and on time. Speaking in July 2022, India's chief of army staff, General Manoj Pande, stressed that India's dependence on imported arms was 'a matter of concern'. Along with some other Asian countries, such as Myanmar, Vietnam was similarly affected, and it seemed likely that the new obstacles to importing Russian arms would reinforce Hanoi's drive to widen the range of military equipment and technology it imports from other sources. The 'Vietnam Defence 2022' exhibition scheduled for Hanoi in December 2022 seemed designed to attract a wide range of potential suppliers to Vietnam. Sino-Russian collaboration Russian military equipment and technology have been important for the modernisation of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA): key examples during the last decade include Su-35 combat aircraft and S-400 air-defence systems, and assistance for China's development of a ballistic missile early-warning system. In the past two decades, however, China's defence industry has produced increasing volumes of advanced equipment itself as part of Beijing's military modernisation ambitions. Indeed, since the 2014 crisis over Ukraine and the Western sanctions against Russia following its annexation of Crimea, bilateral defence-industrial interdependence has grown, with China becoming a vital source for components that Russia cannot now obtain from the West and, more importantly, a major partner in joint projects to develop air-defence systems and engines for combat aircraft. The 'no limits' bilateral relationship declared by the two countries' leaders in early February 2022 may exaggerate the depth and potential of contemporary Sino-Russian relations, and a formal Sino-Russian military alliance or direct Chinese military support for Russia's war in Ukraine both seem unlikely prospects. Nevertheless, the bilateral partnership is now closer and includes an increasingly strong military dimension that goes beyond defence-industrial cooperation. In October 2021, the Joint Sea-2021 bilateral exercise brought the two countries' navies together in the Sea of Japan, Asia 211 Map 5 I China and Russia: selected military cooperation activities, 2019-22 Military cooperation between China and Russia has increased in recent years. Between 2013 and 2015, exercises took place annually, but since then they have gradually increased in number. 2022 saw the two countries' military cooperation increase in frequency with a number of joint air or naval patrols and joint exercises. These have included airlift, manoeuvring and live-fire drills, predominantly taking place in and above waters to the west of Japan, with limited instances in the Arabian Sea and Pacific Ocean. The joint exercises have not entered Japanese territorial waters. While the two countries likely use this military cooperation as a form of political signalling, such as of their'no limits'friendship following Russia's war in Ukraine, the depth of this bilateral military cooperation, including its utility in terms of developing combat capability and interoperability, remains unclear. _RUSSIA 4 September B 3x FPGHM ■ 1 x CGHM; 1 FFGHM; 1 x AORH 9 September B 1 x DDGHM Pacific Ocean 27 September B 1 x DDGHM; 3 x FFGHM f 28-29 September H 1 xCGHM; 1 FFGHM; 1 xAORH 1 x DDGHM: 3 x FFGHM 27 September □ 1 x CGHM; 1 x FFGHM; 1 x AORH 26 September □ 1 x CGHM; 1 x FFGHM; 1 x AORH Joint Naval Patrol: September 2022 and Vessels I Naval Vessels Naval Vessels Live Firing Location Joint Aerial Patrol: 24 May 2022 2x H-6 bomber (aircraft 1, 2) ■*■ 2x H-6 bomber (aircraft 3, 4) (replacing aircraft 1 and 2) -► 2xTu-95 bomber 1x11-20 ELI NT 2019 Joint Aerial Patrol 2019 23 July 2019 Sea of Japan (East Sea) Joint bomber patrol Maritime Cooperation / Joint Sea 2019 1-4 September 2019 Yellow Sea Live-fire exercise Joint Aerial Patrol 2020 22 October 2020 Sea of Japan (East Sea) Joint bomber patrol Zapad/lnteraction 2021 9-13 August 2021 China Air exercise during Zap3rf2021 Joint Sea 2021 14-23 October 2021 Tsugaru Strait, Sea of Japan (East Sea) Naval cruise and maritime and mine countermeasure exercise Joint Aerial Patrol 202] 19 November 2021 Sea of Japan (East Sea) Joint bomber patrol Counter-Piracy Exercise 21 January 2022 Arabian Sea Joint cruise, SAR and air movement exercise Joint Aerial Patrol 2022 24 May 2022 Sea of Japan (East Sea) Joint bomber patrol Vostok 2022 1-7 September 2022 Sea of Japan (East Sea) Maritime exercise Joint Naval Patrol September 2022 (multiple dates) Sea of Japan (East Sea); Pacific Ocean Maritime and live-fire exercise 212 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 with the participating Chinese flotilla led by a Type-055 cruiser. In early September 2022, around 2,000 Chinese personnel along with air, land and naval equipment took part in Russia's Vostok 2022 exercise. In addition, in November 2021 and May 2022 the Chinese and Russian air forces conducted their third and fourth 'joint strategic patrols' in the Asia-Pacific region. Nonetheless, how far these ties advance combat capability remains unclear. Defending Taiwan These developments occurred against the background of growing strategic tensions between China on one side and the US and its allies on the other. Chinese pressure on Taiwan increasingly made the island a focal point of these tensions. In March 2022, Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral John Aquilino said that Russia's actions had reinforced concerns that China might attack Taiwan and called for the US to re-examine its policy of 'strategic ambiguity' towards defending the island. That policy broadly prevailed despite President Joe Biden's indications during 2021-22 that the US was willing to defend Taiwan militarily. Meanwhile, PLA aircraft have continued to cross the notional 'median line' in the Taiwan Strait. While Taipei claimed these flights were supposed to intimidate Taiwan and wear down its air defences' effectiveness by provoking frequent alerts and scrambles, some of them may have had genuine training purposes or supported PLA efforts to track US and other submarines. Nonetheless, these flights appear to have increased in frequency after US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan on 2 August. Major PLA naval and air exercises held to the north, southwest and east of Taiwan for three days in early August 2022 were widely viewed as a measure of Beijing's strong disapproval of Pelosi's visit. However, the exercises, which were some of the largest organised by the PLA in Taiwan's vicinity, would have required months of planning and may have been part of Beijing's overall drive to improve China's military. It is also possible that the annual August exercises were adapted in light of Pelosi's visit or that the PLA was executing a pre-planned contingency response, or a blend of the two. Following the exercises, President Tsai Ing-wen identified flights by Chinese-operated uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) over the Kinmen and Matsu islands as among Beijing's 'grey-zone tactics'. On 1 September, Taiwan's armed forces shot down an 'unidentified civilian drone' that entered airspace near Shiyu, an islet in the Kinmen group only ten kilometres from China's coast. Meanwhile, the Biden administration -perhaps taking to heart early lessons from the war in Ukraine - reinforced its encouragement of Taiwan's development of 'asymmetric' or 'porcupine' defence capabilities suited to slowing down any Chinese invasion attempt. By September 2022, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency was listing a number of approved sales of defence equipment and support services to Taipei since Biden took office, the most recent including contractor support for Taiwan's PAVE PAWS long-range surveillance radar system together with additional RGM-84L Harpoon Block II coastal-defence systems and AIM-9X Sidewinder II air-to-air missiles. However, these sales remain subject to congressional approval in the US. Taiwan: lessons from 2022 For Taiwan, 2022 presented an opportunity to learn how to prepare for and respond to an armed attack, as well as measures to deter Beijing in a worsening political and military-security environment across the Taiwan Strait. In her'Double-Ten'National Day speech, President Tsai Ing-wen outlined a number of ambitions: increase Taiwan's defence budget each year, ramp up production of precision-guided missiles and naval vessels, work to acquire asymmetric warfare capabilities, make progress in domestic aircraft and shipbuilding (including the indigenous submarine programme), establish a defence-mobilisation agency to train reservists and broaden public awareness of Taiwan's self-defence needs. Taipei and its armed forces have watched closely both the successes and the failures of Russia's armed forces in Ukraine, as well as Ukraine's military and civil response, for any potential lessons that may be helpful in a possible Taiwan contingency. The armed forces' continued balancing of asymmetric and conventional capabilities reflects the need to respond to both grey-zone and full-scale invasion threats posed by the PLA. While US President Joe Biden has on several occasions mentioned the United States' unequivocal military support for Taiwan in any armed attack launched by the PLA, Taipei and Washington reportedly disagree about how much focus should be placed on the development Asia 213 of asymmetric capabilities; according to specialists, the US would prefer to see Taipei prioritise these. The PLA's exercises following Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taipei in August 2022 created a'new normal'for PLA activity across the strait. This has included regular air and naval incursions across the Taiwan Strait 'median line', which Beijing has said does not exist. The PLA has also begun integrating uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) into its air defence identification zone incursions and has leveraged civilian UAV technology to conduct surveillance of islands close to the Chinese mainland. On one such occasion,Taiwanese soldiers were filmed throwing stones to ward off the UAV, apparently uncertain of how to respond. Later, Taiwanese armed forces shot down a PLA UAV, likely in an attempt to set a precedent against further provocation. Nevertheless, lessons learned from the war in Ukraine may be more helpful than any gleaned from the post-Pelosi exercises. For instance, plans have been discussed to raise the duration of conscription from four months to one year. Similarly, Taipei is developing a centralised approach to civil-defence preparedness. This has until now been a largely bottom-up process and a meagre area of work for few in Taiwanese civil society. Nonetheless, these efforts remain nascent and, so far, Taiwan lacks the same level of investment in civil defence that Ukraine looked to develop following Russia's 2014 assault and annexation of Crimea. Japan and South Korea modernise at pace The war in Ukraine as well as Taiwan-related developments influenced thinking about defence policy by the new Japanese government led by Kishida Fumio, who became prime minister in October 2021, reinforcing the view that a tougher posture was needed to deter 'grey-zone' coercion as well as larger-scale aggression. In November, the Cabinet approved a supplementary budget which boosted annual defence spending to JPY6.17 trillion (USD48.ibn) for 2022. In late 2021, Kishida's administration started reviewing the country's National Security Strategy, National Defense Program Guidelines and Medium-Term Defense Program. These reviews were completed at the end of 2022 and may yield substantial increases in defence spending. In his keynote address to the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2022, Kishida said that no military option, including 'counter-strike capabilities' to deter missile attacks, would be ruled out. Tokyo's annual Defense of Japan White Paper, published in July 2022, said that Japan's security environment was 'growing increasingly severe at an unprecedented pace', meaning Japan needed to strengthen its defence capabilities 'dramatically'. The White Paper emphasised Tokyo's particular concern over China's efforts to 'change the status quo by coercion in the East China Sea and South China Sea', its deepening ties 'with Russia, an aggressor nation', and Beijing's threats to reunify with Taiwan 'by force'. In August the defence ministry requested a budget for FY2023 that was 1.1% larger than that for 2022 and included funding for a joint next- generation combat-aircraft programme with the UK; additional F-35A and F-35B Lightning II fighter ground-attack aircraft; Joint Strike Missiles to arm the F-35A; AGM-158B JASSM-ER air-to-surface missiles; continued modifications to the two Izumo-class helicopter carriers to allow shipborne F-35B operations; large-scale production of indigenously developed Type-12 coastal-defence missiles; and continued research on hypersonic missiles. In addition, the Japan Self-Defense Forces continued to strengthen their deterrent posture by establishing additional forces on Kyushu and the southwestern island chain: during 2022, these were scheduled to include surface-to-air- and anti-ship-missile as well as electronic-warfare and radar units. Tokyo expressed concern over the new phase of North Korea's ballistic-missile tests that started in September 2021. These initially included tests of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile but by the end of the year there had also been claims of a hypersonic-glide-vehicle test and an apparent land-attack cruise-missile launch. By late October 2022, North Korea had launched some 40 ballistic missiles - more than in any previous year. While these were predominantly shorter-range types, they also included - for the first time since 2017 - a series of intercontinental ballistic missile-related launches in March and May as well as an overflight of Japan by a claimed new intermediate-range ballistic missile in October. US and South Korean officials repeatedly claimed during 2022 that Kim Jong-un's regime was in the final stages of planning a seventh nuclear test, its first since 2017. Under President Yoon Suk-yeol, elected in May 2022, South Korea continued to 214 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 combine economic incentives and military deterrence in response to the missile and nuclear challenges from Pyongyang. However, the Yoon administration was less conciliatory than its predecessor and stressed the development of independent national military capabilities and strengthened military cooperation with the US. In July, Yoon publicly emphasised the importance of South Korea's 'Kill Chain' system, which would involve pre-emptive strikes against key North Korean targets. The president also announced that a joint-service Strategic Command would be established by 2024 to take responsibility for Seoul's 'three-axis' strategic deterrence and defence, comprising 'Kill Chain' and two other systems: Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (under which conventionally armed ballistic missiles would be launched in response to an attack by North Korea, potentially targeting its senior leaders as well as nuclear and missile installations and long-range artillery) and Korean Air and Missile Defense. Developing all three systems will depend in large measure on South Korea's space and missile capabilities. The lifting of US-imposed 'missile guidelines' in 2021 has allowed Seoul to accelerate its development of ballistic missiles with two-ton warheads which could, in combination with enhanced surveillance, provide a powerful precision-strike capability. In July 2021, Seoul contracted the US private-sector company SpaceX to launch five surveillance satellites by 2025. Separately, in June, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute achieved its first satellite launch using the domestically produced KSLV-2 rocket. From 22 August to 1 September South Korean and US forces held their largest joint exercise since 2017; it was also the first in five years to involve joint field training, which had been paused due to the previous South Korean administration's policy of seeking dialogue with Pyongyang and restrictions related to the coronavirus pandemic. Details of Exercise Ulchi Freedom Shield were classified, but one significant feature was that for the first time the US Forces Korea commander shared control with a South Korean senior officer. The US has set such experience for South Korean military commanders as one of many requirements to be fulfilled before South Korea can assume command responsibility for its armed forces in wartime. During the exercise, President Yoon ordered the armed forces to accelerate their 'updating' of operational plans to counter the North Korean threat. Budgetary constraints slow Southeast Asian capability improvements Southeast Asian states facing Chinese pressure on their South China Sea interests continued efforts to enhance their naval and air capabilities. In the Philippines, a new administration led by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr was elected in May 2022. A spokesman for the country's Department of National Defense emphasised in August that all major military-modernisation contracts agreed by the previous administration would proceed. These included the purchase of two multi-role missile-armed HDC-3100 frigates and six offshore patrol vessels from South Korea, BrahMos anti-ship missiles from India and additional S-7oi helicopters from Poland. Nevertheless, because of budgetary constraints the new administration launched a review of the armed forces' modernisation programme and some projects were halted, including mooted plans to acquire conventionally-powered submarines. Although some domestic critics claimed that efforts to strengthen Indonesia's navy and air force were not effective responses to Beijing's 'grey-zone' strategy in the South China Sea (which included a Chinese survey vessel mapping the seabed inside Jakarta's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for seven weeks during 2021), Jakarta's defence plans continued to be among Southeast Asia's most expansive. In February 2022, defence minister Prabowo Subianto signed agreements with France covering the purchase of 42 Rafale combat aircraft and two Scorpene-dass submarines. These agreements represented significant changes in the country's defence procurement: an earlier plan to buy Su-35 aircraft from Russia was apparently abandoned owing to fears over the potential imposition of US sanctions, and it seemed likely that Jakarta would cancel a project to acquire a second batch of three Type 209/1400 submarines from South Korea. Also in February, the US government conditionally approved the sale to Indonesia of up to 36 F-15EX aircraft. However, these major procurement plans - combined with other recent contracts, including one for six FREMM and two Maestrale-dass frigates ordered from Italy, and another for two A400M transport aircraft - threatened to overwhelm Indonesia's defence budget, which in 2021 required a presidentially approved USD2.06 billion special supplement to cover equipment and defence-industrial costs. By July 2022, it was reported that the defence ministry was struggling to find the funds to honour existing contracts. Asia 215 Malaysia also experienced Beijing's 'grey-zone' tactics, particularly off the coasts of Sabah and Sarawak states, such as in October 2021 when Chinese vessels including a survey ship entered its EEZ. However, there was no perceived acute threat to Malaysia's security and continuing budgetary restrictions impeded efforts to modernise its military capabilities. Procurement priorities remained confined to new light combat aircraft, long- and medium-range air defence radars, maritime patrol aircraft and medium-altitude long-endurance UAVs, but near-term acquisitions mainly focused on less expensive equipment. In March 2022, defence minister Hishammuddin Hussein said that current procurement projects for the army included armoured personnel carriers for use by the Malaysian battalion with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 155-millimetre self-propelled howitzers, logistic-support bridges and light anti-tank weapons. New naval equipment 'in the pipeline' included a second batch of three Littoral Mission Ships, three AW139 utility helicopters and 'about 13' fast interceptor craft. Hishammuddin also announced plans to acquire 24 new helicopters from 2026 and highlighted the conversion of three CN235 transport aircraft to maritime patrol configuration with funding from the US government's regional Maritime Security Initiative. Thailand is not a claimant in the South China Sea but is concerned about the region's increasingly tense maritime security environment and continues efforts to enhance its naval capabilities. Submarine acquisition remains a priority, although this project faces major challenges. Bangkok suspended plans to buy two additional S26T Ywan-class submarines on order from China (along with other defence-equipment contracts) in April 2020 owing to the financial constraints imposed by the coronavirus pandemic. During March 2022, Thailand's navy confirmed that construction in China of the first boat had stopped following Germany's refusal - due to the EU's arms embargo on Beijing - to supply the MTU396 diesel engines needed to power its electric generators. It was reported that China had offered to transfer two ex-PLA Navy (PLAN) submarines to Thailand instead, but naval acquisitions director-general Rear Admiral Apichai Sompolgrunk said in April that, though it was too early to talk of cancelling the contract, only the Ywan-class boat was acceptable. In August 2022, it was reported that the China Shipbuilding & Offshore International Co. was offering replacement engines. Thailand's air force also faced re-equipment challenges. In January, the Cabinet approved in principle a plan to acquire four F-35AS in FY2023, to be followed by a further four of the same type. However, in August objections from Thailand's House Budget Scrutiny Committee, in light of the country's economic downturn, cut initial proposed procurement to two aircraft. Another potential impediment was that the purchase needed approval from the US government: some analysts thought this might not be granted because of Thailand's close defence relations with China and the information-security requirements associated with the sale of the F-35. A brief incursion by one of Myanmar's combat aircraft into Thai airspace in June highlighted the dangers that this neighbour* s internal conflict posed for Thailand's security, despite the generally equable relations between the two countries' governments. Since May 2021, airstrikes and artillery fire in Myanmar's Kayin and Kayah states have also forced thousands of displaced people to cross the border into Thailand. Meanwhile, fighting between forces loyal to the State Administration Council (SAC) junta (including the Pyusawhti militias as well as the Tatmadaw, Myanmar's armed forces) and opposition groups comprising the People's Defence Forces aligned with the pro-democracy National Unity Government and some of the country's ethnic armed organisations was increasingly widespread across the country. Economic weakness and the Tatmadaw's preoccupation with internal-security threats meant that efforts to improve conventional military capabilities were no longer prioritised to the extent they had been before the February 2021 military coup. Until early 2022, the country's main military-equipment suppliers had been Russia and Ukraine, and the war in Ukraine and international sanctions have raised questions over the durability of these supplier relationships and where else Myanmar might look for its defence equipment. Although the Tatmadaw has a long-standing aversion to overly heavy reliance on Beijing, in December 2021 Myanmar's navy took delivery of an ex-PLAN Type-035B (Ming) submarine from China. And reports indicated that Myanmar was strengthening its military relations with North Korea, though it was unclear what the implications might be in terms of equipment supplies. Nonetheless, there were reports in September that Myanmar was to receive SU-30SM combat aircraft from Russia, under a 2018 contract. 216 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Australia's new government and defence policy Although Australia had a new Labor government following elections in May 2022, there was considerable continuity in defence policy. During the election campaign, Labor indicated its support for the then-government's defence-spending increases, [Labour have since released their own budget in October] in the March 2022 budget; it also agreed with the country's major investments in new frigates and nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), the latter to be provided through the trilateral AUKUS arrangement with the UK and US. However, these are long-term programmes (the first SSN not being delivered until the mid-204.os, according to Richard Maries, the new defence minister) and the new government inherited a major challenge in terms of how to improve Australia's defence capability to deter fast-emerging threats during the current decade. Responding to this challenge, in August the government announced a Defence Strategic Review that will examine 'force structure, force posture and preparedness, and investment prioritisation' and deliver recommendations to the government in early 2023. The government is also due to announce by March 2023 the type of SSN that Australia will acquire, and there may be a decision by then on whether an interim non-nuclear submarine capability will be needed during the 2030s, pending the commissioning of SSNs. Meanwhile, in late August, Maries announced that Australian submariners would train aboard British Astwte-class SSNs. DEFENCE ECONOMICS Macroeconomics While Asia's recovery from the coronavirus pandemic continued through 2022, GDP remained lower than pre-pandemic levels in two-thirds of the region's economies, with mounting headwinds calling into doubt future prospects for growth. Real GDP growth had recovered to 6.5% in 2021. However, a new wave of infections and consequent lockdowns, coupled with the impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, quickly saw expectations for 2022 diminished. In October 2021, the IMF was forecasting real GDP growth of 5.7% for the Asia-Pacific in 2022, but this was subsequently revised down to 4.9% in April 2022 and further to 4.0% in October 2022 as a result of mounting impediments to growth, largely in China. The economic problems facing the Asia-Pacific region are broadly similar to those faced elsewhere, though their impact varies. As much of the world adjusts to living with COVID-19, sporadic and severe lockdowns have continued in China because of Beijing's then zero tolerance approach to outbreaks. This in turn has had a significant impact on economic growth in Asia's largest economy, with knock-on effects for the rest of the region. Similarly, the impact of the war in Ukraine was initially less severe than in other regions, though increases in energy and food prices within the region served to dampen demand, both directly and indirectly through their influence on both domestic and foreign consumers. Inflation began to rise through the second half of 2022, but it remains low in most Asian economies. In general, Asia's commodity exporters find themselves in a stronger position than its importers given these pressures, though the negative effect upon growth is expected to be felt throughout the region. Higher energy prices and other key commodities have also had an immediate impact on government finances in a number of Asian states because of the tendency for the region's emerging economies to provide related subsidies to their populations. For example, Indonesia initially earmarked USD10.2 billion for energy subsidies in its 2022 budget, but by mid-year had been forced to increase this total to USD33.8bn. Wider inflationary pressures have had a similar impact in Malaysia, where the Ministry of Finance announced in June that the overall subsidies Japan, 9.3% Note: Analysis excludes Afghanistan, North Korea and Lao PDR. ©IISS Figure 10 Asia: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2022 Asia 217 bill for energy, basic foodstuffs, agriculture and welfare would reach its highest-ever level in 2022 at USDi7.9bn. Combined with a need to rein in budget deficits, which proliferated through the pandemic, this new and unexpected spending has placed considerable strain on government budgets and left little headroom for expansionary policy in alternative areas. Defence spending Against the backdrop of these mounting economic and fiscal challenges, overall defence budget growth in the region was significantly below trend in real terms compared to the previous decade. This is partially a result of constrained government spending, but also related to the effect of inflation on the spending power of defence budgets. Where significant growth did occur, it was generally the result of the approval of large special budgets for defence, such as in Japan and Taiwan. This suggests that, as in Europe, strategic factors have enabled defence-spending trends to overcome wider budgetary constraints. However, trends are far from universal, with Southeast Asian budgets particularly likely to come under pressure in the short term as a result of fiscal consolidation and competing priorities for strained government resources. The limited real-terms growth in Asia-Pacific military spending over the course of 2022 hides the fact that a number of countries announced significant increases to their defence budgets earlier in the year, before inflationary pressures began to mount. In February, India announced a 2022-23 defence budget of INR5.25 trillion (USD66.6bn), a 4.4% increase over the revised figure for 2021-22. Perhaps more crucially, the new budget made progress in rebalancing resources towards modernisation, with the capital budget -which provides funding for research and development (R&D) and procurement - increasing by 12.7%. As recently as 2013-14, capital spend accounted for 31% of India's budget. However, rising pay and pension costs, combined with lower rates of top-line growth, saw that share drop to 23% by 2018-19. The new budget takes the share of spending dedicated to capital investment back to 29%, close to previous highs. India's new budget also continued the recent practice of prioritising domestic programmes and suppliers within its procurement plans, with 68% of the capital budget earmarked for indigenous manufacturers, up from 58% in 2021-22. The R&D budget is also being used to support the local 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 1.90 1.71 1.68 1.72 1.82 1.63 I I I I 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Figure 11 Asia: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average) defence sector. Government officials stated that 25% of spending earmarked for this purpose in 2022-23 will be opened up to private industry. Most of this amount had traditionally been funnelled through state-owned agencies like the Defence Research and Development Organisation. In Japan, the re-election of the Liberal Democratic Party in October 2021 also appears to have reinvigorated efforts to raise defence spending. Having campaigned on a platform that included the pledge to double defence spending as a proportion of GDP to 2%, the Kishida government is now reportedly working on ways to realise this ambition, or at least heavily augment current resources for defence. In the immediate term, this included the approval of the 'Defense-Strengthening Acceleration Package', which ostensibly added JPY773.8bn (USD6.obn) to the FY2022 budget in order to accelerate a number of projects initially earmarked for inclusion in the FY2023 budget. In effect, this provided the Japan Ministry of Defense with a 15.6% nominal uplift in spending for FY2022, a significant development for a country where annual increases in core spending have averaged less than 1% over the last decade. Reports in late 2022 suggest that this practice of raising defence expenditure through the use of supplemental appropriations is likely to be retained over the coming years; it seems likely to be the main method used to raise spending towards 2% of GDP, a target that Prime Minister Kishida Fumio is seeking to reach by 2027. Taiwan's use of supplemental budgets to bolster defence spending was also expanded in 2022 with the approval of new special appropriation aimed at enhancing navy and air force capabilities. Specifically, the new budget will provide TWD237bn (USD8.ibn) Tonga USD0.01bn Tlmor-Leste USD0.04bn New Zealand USD3.35bn Bangladesh USD4.32bn Maldives USDO.IObn Nepal USD0.42bn Fiji USD0.04bn Afghanistan n.k ® Brunei USD0.44bn USD1.88bn Real % Change (2021-22) I More than 20% increase I Between 10% and 20% increase I Between 3% and 10% increase I Between 0% and 3% increase Between 0% and 3% decrease Between 3% and 10% decrease Between 10% and 20% decrease More than 20% decrease Estimate Spending 2% of GDP or above ^/ Insufficient data [1] Map illustrating 2022 planned defence-spending levels (in USDbn at market exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change in planned defence spending between 2021 and 2022 (at constant 2015 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending between 2021 and 2022. Actual spending changes prior to 2021, and projected spending levels post-2022, are not reflected. ©IISS ▲ Map 6 Asia: regional defence spending (USDbn, %ch yoy)1 between 2022 and 2026 for new ships, shore-based anti-ship missiles and air-defence systems that are set to be developed and manufactured by the local defence sector. This funding comes on top of the previously approved TWD247bn (USD8.5bn) special budget for the procurement of 66 F-16V combat aircraft with a further TWD4obn (USDi.4bn) appropriated for this acquisition in 2022. When taken alongside the Ministry of National Defense's annual core budget, overall defence spending for 2022 represents a 20.5% increase in spending over the previous two years. This was followed in August by the announcement that the Cabinet had approved a further large increase in core spending for 2023 which, when combined with ongoing special budget appropriations, will see a further 19.6% increase next year. In May, Australia elected a Labor government for the first time in almost nine years. Initially Asia 219 ■ 2021 ■ 2022 • Real-terms growth k Figure 12 Asia: sub-regional real-terms defence-spending growth, 2021-22 (USDbn, constant 2015) this created a degree of uncertainty around future funding for defence, following a period under the Liberal/National coalition where core defence spending had risen by 79% since 2013. However, the new government has been explicit in its support for maintaining defence spending at levels above 2% of GDP. It announced plans for a Defence Strategic Review which will make recommendations to government in early 2023. Meanwhile, the new government backed the enhanced investments in the Australian Defence Force outlined in the 2016 White Paper and reaffirmed in the 2020 Strategic Update, firmly suggesting that spending will continue to rise in the coming years in line with those long-term plans. The Labor government's first budget, which was released in October 2022, maintained funding for defence largely in line with the Strategic Update, while future decisions will likely be shaped by the upcoming Defence Strategic Review. The budget also announced AUD900 million (USD638m) and AUD47om (USD333m) in overseas assistance for Pacific Island nations and Southeast Asia respectively. Defence industry The new Labor government will also continue with plans for the new trilateral strategic agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States - referred to as AUKUS - which intends to provide Australia with a new fleet of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines and other advanced military capabilities such as hypersonic missiles. Coupled with the announcement in May that Australia would acquire another seven MQ-28A Ghost Bat uninhabited aerial vehicles (bringing the Royal Australian Air Force's planned total order to ten) to be made locally by Boeing Australia, it is apparent that investment in the local defence sector continues to increase, with local companies moving up the value chain through their development and production of systems and platforms. This move aligns with Australia's Defence Export Strategy, released in 2018, which aims to turn the country into one of the top ten global exporters of defence equipment by 2028. Over the course of 2022, the defence-industrial relationship between Japan and the UK continued to strengthen, most notably in relation to cooperation on future combat aircraft development. With both countries making progress on their respective projects but acutely aware of the attendant costs, London and Tokyo are exploring potential collaboration. After announcements on cooperation around engines and sensor technology, both countries launched, with Italy in December, the 'Global Combat Air Programme'. Speaking during a visit to the UK in May, Prime Minister Kishida stated that the work could become the cornerstone of a much closer UK-Japan bilateral defence relationship; Japanese and UK companies are already cooperating in a number of key areas. In August, Vietnam unveiled reforms aimed at developing the local defence sector and increasing equipment self-sufficiency. The new policies will focus on restructuring the existing defence industrial base, encouraging greater cooperation with civil industry and international partners. The most significant changes are likely to relate to reform and restructuring within the General Department of Defence Industry (GDDI), a state-owned network of around 60 manufacturing facilities and research institutes in Vietnam, in an attempt to expand its existing capabilities. 220 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 India continued its import substitution drive, against the backdrop of potential shortages of spare parts for Russian military equipment in light of the war in Ukraine. New Delhi announced a new list of 780 'strategically important' components that it intends to produce domestically. The list included parts for Russian-designed T-90 main battle tanks and SU-30MKI combat aircraft at a time when concern has been growing over the ability to source components from Russia. Reports from India, citing defence officials, suggest that the conflict has added impetus to plans to upgrade the air force's SU-30MKI fleet with an indigenous radar, cockpit avionics and flight-control computer in order to reduce dependence upon Russia and offset potential challenges in sustaining the inventory. South Korea arguably had the region's most significant industrial success in 2022 with the framework agreements for the sale to Poland of 1,000 K2 main battle tanks, 672 K9 self-propelled howitzers and 48 FA-50 light combat aircraft. The initial contracts for 180 K2 tanks and 212 K9 artillery pieces, finalised in August, were valued at USD6.o6bn, while Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) announced the signed FA-50 deal would be worth a further USD3.3ibn. Even if additional orders do not materialise as expected, the agreements between Poland and Korea represent by some distance the largest defence export deal secured by an Asian country. Earlier in July, South Korea had celebrated the first flight of the indigenously developed KF-21 combat aircraft, further advancing the country's growing industrial capabilities and expanding its equipment portfolio to multi-role combat aircraft. These deals highlighted the maturity of South Korea's defence industry and the price point and perceived quality of its products, but they also raised potential prioritisation challenges (particularly for the land sector) for a domestic defence sector that must also meet local modernisation requirements. CHINA In 2022, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) continued its plan to build a modernised army by 2027 and to 'basically achieve' defence and armed forces modernisation by 2035. Xi Jinping started 2022, after his new year's speech, by signing a mobilisation order for military training, instructing the armed forces to 'redouble their efforts to better combine training with combat operations, and strengthen systematic training and the use of technologies to develop an elite force that is capable of fighting and winning wars'. In March, Xi stressed the importance of operating the armed forces in accordance with the law, calling for advances in military legislation, stepping up enforcement of laws and regulations, strengthening troop management and enhancing oversight. The 20th Party Congress In late October, the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China took stock of the PLA's achievements since 2017 and set the agenda for the next five years. The PLA is still aiming towards its 2027 and 2035 targets. The 20th Party Congress work report included a mention of the 2027 goal, which was officially announced by Xi in 2020; it is important as 2027 marks the centenary of the foundation of the PLA's antecedent. It was the first time that a party congress work report contained an explicit reference to this goal. The report also stated that following reforms the PLA had by 2022 become a 'much more modern and capable fighting force'. For the next five years, it continued, the PLA should focus on measures including maintaining political loyalty to the Party, intensifying training and enhancing combat preparedness, establishing 'a strong system of strategic deterrence', speeding the development of uninhabited and 'intelligent' combat capabilities and promoting the coordinated development and application of network information systems. The latter suggests that the goal of 'informatisation' has not yet been achieved and that 'intelligentisation' remains an ambition. Informatisation is generally held to refer to efforts to improve technical sophistication (likened by the Pentagon to 'net-centric' capability) while intelligentisation may refer to the idea that military systems will be improved by the integration of automation, big data and artificial intelligence. Additionally, the report said that the command system for joint operations required improvement, and that the PLA's systems and capacity for reconnaissance and early warning, joint strikes, battlefield support and integrated logistics support also needed to be enhanced. Moreover, further efforts were required in areas such as joint and force-on-force training, military-civil fusion, and hastening the development of modern logistics. The text mentioned accelerating progress towards certain objectives, but language like this is common in Party documents and therefore does not signal an Asia 221 ambition to speed up the drive to achieve military modernisation by 2035. Two notable deductions from the work report's section on the PL A are that informatisation remains a work in progress and that the PLA has been directed to focus more on strategic capabilities and deterrence, including in the use of emerging and disruptive technologies and 'new-domain forces'. Xi's speech at the Party Congress signalled little new in terms of China's approach to Taiwan. However, the Party's constitution was amended to include a line to 'resolutely oppose and deter Taiwan independence'. This represents a shift from the previous revision in 2017 where there was a pledge to 'facilitate national unification'. However, the work report also shifted tone slightly to be conciliatory to China's Taiwan compatriots, and instead made clear that the option of taking all measures necessary to ensure reunification was 'directed solely at interference by outside forces and the few separatists seeking Taiwan independence'. The Party Congress also unveiled a new Central Military Commission (CMC) line-up. Personnel changes mirrored wider changes in the Politburo standing and central committees that broke with long-held norms around retirement age and promotional ladders. The new CMC is less diverse, lacking PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) representation, and puts the army back at the centre of PLA decision-making. While Admiral Miao Hua remains as a member of the CMC, his background is in the PLA Army (PLAA) prior to transferring to the PLAN as political commissar. Only three members of the former CMC remain. Zhang Youxia was promoted to first vice chairman, while He Weidong was promoted to the second-ranking vice chairman, having previously served on the Joint Operations Command Center, as commander of the Eastern Theatre Command and deputy commander of the Western Theatre Command and commander of the Western Theatre Command Army. While Zhang brings his experience from the Sino-Vietnam war in 1979, he has been in command positions for recent Taiwan- and Doklam-related activities. Li Shangfu will likely become the new minister of national defence, despite being sanctioned by the US government in 2018 while he was head of the Equipment Development Department. The new chief of the Joint Staff Department, Liu Zhenli, fought in the Sino-Vietnam war but has not served in any joint position. Later in the year, China's military training went beyond national exercises in what some analysts called a 'fourth Taiwan Strait crisis'. Following a visit by then Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, China's drills, which began on 3 August, were widely viewed as a measure of Beijing's strong disapproval of Pelosi's visit. Components of these drills included anti-submarine warfare, joint-service logistic support, in-flight refuelling, aircraft-carrier and submarine operations and the firing of a range of ballistic missiles, including DF-15B (CH-SS-6 Mod 3) missiles launched to Taiwan's north, east and south. The PLAN held exercises off the coast of Taiwan's main ports in six locations, though it did not enter into Taiwan's territorial seas. The PLA's army- and navy-aviation forces conducted numerous large-scale incursions into Taiwan's air defence identification zone (ADIZ), crossing over the politically sensitive Taiwan Strait median line. Since August, the latter has become a more routine occurrence. Amphibious exercises were absent from the exercises that followed Pelosi's visit, as the PLA likely calibrated its response to limit misunderstanding. PLA Army Having completed its organisational transition to a combined-arms battalion- and brigade-based structure, the PLAA now appears to be focused on training and developing the skills necessary to use these new formations effectively, both as an individual service and in conjunction with other elements of the PLA. The army has almost certainly paid close attention to the performance of Russian and Ukrainian ground forces during Russia's invasion of Ukraine, in relation to equipment, organisations and operational concepts. This may ultimately lead to some further changes in force design, but the perceived lessons of the campaign will likely take some time to digest before practical changes occur. As in 2021, PLAA brigades continued to participate in established annual exercise series, such as Stride. However, these exercises again received less coverage in China's media than they had before 2020. Official reporting contrasts the progress achieved in these exercises over the last decade with persistent shortfalls in some areas. It also suggests that at least some brigades are participating in the same exercise series over multiple consecutive years, implying an iterative, long-term approach to skills transfer. 222 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Although the army played a lower-profile role than other PLA services in the large-scale exercises following Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, it has increased both the profile and the frequency of its amphibious training. However, most publicised exercises still appear to be conducted at the brigade level or below, and the scale at which the PLAA physically participates in the larger annual theatre-level exercises remains unclear in open sources. While modern equipment platforms now comprise the majority of the army's armoured-vehicle and tube-artillery inventories, it continues to operate ageing and sometimes obsolescent systems in a number of its combat brigades. The continued presence of such systems would likely hinder these brigades' ability to effectively conduct the kind of mechanised and 'informationised' operations envisaged by the PLA. The apparent acceptance of short-term risk in this area may reflect an understanding among the PLAA leadership that training personnel across the force to use newly issued equipment effectively is an ongoing, and perhaps lengthy, process. Exports of Chinese ground combat systems have previously been focused on cheaper, light- to medium-weight armoured fighting vehicles and artillery systems. In recent years, however, there have been a number of export successes with more advanced heavy armour and sophisticated tactical missile and air- and missile-defence systems, including directed-energy systems. Customers have included armed forces in Asia, the Middle East and Africa, such as those of Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Thailand. At Airshow China 2022 (commonly known as the Zhuhai Airshow), NORINCO advertised a full mechanised brigade concept, designated as the 'New-Generation Army Brigade Combat Team' and including uninhabited aerial and ground systems in a number of roles. This included an Urban Combat Module - a particular focus of PLAA uninhabited-systems development work. Ground-combat systems were not the primary focus of the air show, but a significant number of air-defence systems were displayed, including export variants of some of the PLA's most advanced medium- or long-range surface-to-air missile systems, such as the HQ-9BE, and several new short-range air-and missile-defence systems, including the H-11 and the FK-3000 SPAAGM. PLA Navy In September 2022, the PLAN marked the tenth anniversary of the commissioning of its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning. A second carrier, a near-copy called Shandong, followed in 2019. In June 2022, Beijing launched its third carrier, Fujian. Over the past decade, the PLAN's development of its carrier operations has been steady and incremental, perhaps even cautious. The latest carrier represents something of a step change. While it is unlikely to be fully commissioned before 2025 (the Pentagon estimated it will commission in 2024 in its 2022 report on Chinese military capability), it is larger than the earlier vessels at an estimated 85,000 tonnes full load displacement and is configured for catapult-assisted but arrested recovery-aircraft operation (possibly utilising an electromagnetic aircraft launch system), allowing for a larger and more comprehensive embarked air group. Flight-testing of the Xian KJ-600 airborne early-warning and control aircraft appears to be well advanced. When embarked, this will provide considerably greater mission performance than the available helicopter types. The development of a new low-observable aircraft, apparently based on the Shenyang J-31 and unofficially dubbed the Shenyang J-35, could in future also complement the existing Shenyang J-15 carrier-based fixed-wing combat aircraft aboard the new carrier. Deployments of the other two carriers during 2022 also hinted that Beijing is now focusing on developing the skills needed for integrated carrier group operations. The assumption remains that further, and possibly even larger, carriers will follow by the end of this decade and into the 2030s. More broadly, the PLAN made further strides in 2022 in fielding new, high-capability surface units that will add to its maturing capacity to deploy a blue-water naval capability. A further three Type-055 (Renhai) cruisers appear to have joined the fleet since December 2021, bringing the total in service to seven. Three additional Type-052D mod (Luyang III mod) destroyers also entered service. The rapid construction and induction into service of the Type-075 (Yushen) large-deck amphibious ships also point to efforts being directed at rectifying shortfalls in this area of capability. The second ship commissioned at the end of 2021 and the third in October 2022. Exercises in August 2022 also appeared to provide further evidence of China's plans to incorporate civilian car ferries into its amphibious-lift capacity. Asia 223 The PLAN also undertook a number of joint exerdses with Russian navy units. However, while these involved significant numbers of vessels, attracted considerable attention and were no doubt meant to send a diplomatic message, they remained relatively limited in scope and operational ambition. Another notable deployment was that of the space-and missile-tracking ship Yuan Wang 5 (part of the Strategic Support Force) into the Indian Ocean, including a port visit to Hambantota in Sri Lanka. International attention has also remained focused on the continuing assertive use by Beijing of its other maritime-security agencies, the China Coast Guard and the maritime militia. Among improvements in the coastguard's capabilities has been the transfer of all Type-056 corvettes from the PLAN, modified by the removal of air-defence and anti-ship missile systems, significantly enhancing the coastguard's inventory of ocean-deployable units. PLA Air Force The PLAAF played a notable role in what appeared to be Beijing's display of displeasure over Pelosi's visit to Taiwan at the beginning of August 2022. The increase in PLAAF activity near Taiwan also likely provided the air force with a valuable opportunity, and an excuse, to package comparatively large formations in an operationally relevant environment. While the scope of the air force's ongoing combat aircraft recapitalisation is readily apparent, with older types being replaced by modern platforms, less easily observed is the extent of the progress being made in the training and skills required for joint and integrated air operations. This remains a focus of PLAAF attention, as does improving and shortening the training syllabus for combat aircraft aircrew. Deliveries of the Chengdu J-20 and J-10C Firebird, and Shenyang J-16 combat aircraft, continued during 2022. As of the fourth quarter of 2022, development of a two-seat variant of the J-20 is also ongoing with one or two aircraft in flight test. The PLAAF has, since at least 2021, been taking delivery of J-20S fitted with a domestic afterburning turbofan, the Shenyang WS-10C, replacing the Russian Saturn AL-31F variant used originally. The PLAAF also appears to be looking at further upgrades for its Shenyang J-11B Flanker L aircraft. Engine upgrades are also being introduced in the PLAAF's Xian Y-20 heavy transport. The Y-20 was introduced into service using a version of the Russian Soloviev D-30KP, which has a late-i96os design heritage. It is being replaced by the Shenyang WS-20, a more modern and more powerful engine. Indeed, the Y-20 transport aircraft, and the YY-20A tanker variant, are now starting to be built fitted with the WS-20 rather than the Russian powerplant. The YY-20A will be used to replace the H-6U tanker variant of the H-6 Badger and likely also the Ilyushin II-78 Midas tanker. In August 2022 the PLAAF released footage of a YY-20A being used to refuel J-i6s. With the emergence in early December of the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider bomber in the United States, it remained to be seen whether this might prompt Beijing to show the Xian H-20 bomber now assessed to be in development. Still possibly under wraps is a fighter-bomber design alluded to by the US Defense Intelligence Agency. At Airshow China 2022, a variant of the turbojet-powered Wing Loong-10 uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) was displayed with the designation WZ-10 and in PLAAF markings. This supports earlier commercial satellite imagery suggesting that the type has now entered PLA service, but in an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)/ electronic-warfare role rather than the combat ISR role advertised for the Wing Loong-10 export variants. There was also a display featuring the FH-97 'loyal wingman' UAV, depicted operating with J-20 on display screens. This suggests that the PLAAF may be considering operating these assets in similar roles to those being considered by advanced Western air forces for such assets. PLA Rocket Force The modernisation and expansion of China's conventional and nuclear missile forces continues at a steady pace. In 2021, the discovery by non-government analysts of three intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo fields in northern China was seen to potentially signify a significant change in China's nuclear-force structure and posture. According to the United States' annual military report on China, the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is projected to increase the number of warheads it possesses from around 400 to 1,500 by 2035 and increase its number of deployed strategic-range launchers by at least 300. If China were to significantly expand the size of its ICBM forces but continue its historic policy of nuclear ambiguity, this could have significant implications for strategic stability with the United States and possible knock-on effects for bilateral Russian-US arms control. Meanwhile, 224 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 the PLARF continues to add additional brigades of conventional missiles to its force structure and modernise its equipment, underlining the importance the PLARF continues to place on these systems for regional deterrence and war-fighting purposes. Construction at the Hami, Ordos and Yumen silo fields progressed significantly between 2021 and 2022, and most temporary shelters that have been used to conceal excavation and construction work have been removed, revealing reinforced silo hatches. Although US government reports have estimated that China's ICBM force has increased from 100 to 300 launchers and from 150 to 300 missiles, satellite imagery analysis of the silo fields does not appear to display evidence that these silos have been filled. Moreover, additional construction work will be required to support the necessary infrastructure for these to become fully operational. Once ready, however, China is likely to fill these silos with either the solid-fuel DF-41 (CH-SS-20) or the DF-31A (CH-SS-10 Mod 2), both of which can reach targets on the United States' eastern seaboard. Although the DF-5A/B variants (CH-SS-4 Mod 2/3 respectively) are also capable of striking targets at similar ranges, both systems are liquid-fuelled, and their lengthy fuelling process means that they can be vulnerable to pre-emptive attack. Whether the PLARF will fill all of these silos is a matter of debate among analysts. Some specialists have suggested that the gradual evolvement of the PLARF's force structure reflects statements from China's leadership, such as Xi's directive at the Communist Party of China's 20th Party Conference to 'establish a strong system of strategic deterrence'. The increasingly tense Sino-US security relationship is likely an important reason for China's apparent slow drift from its historic restraint in deploying a small nuclear force. Although Chinese policymakers have not provided an official explanation for the developments to its nuclear force structure and posture, some Chinese officials have noted that China's nuclear forces will be influenced by changes in the international security environment. Finally, some specialists have suggested that assessments of changes to the PLARF's force structure should be considered alongside broader changes in other branches of the PLA, given qualitative and quantitative developments in the PLAAF and PLAN. In addition to improving its nuclear forces, the PLARF continues to expand, improve and modernise its conventional missile capabilities, evidenced by the expansion in the number of brigades operating medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBM and IRBM respectively). Although the DF-21C/-D (CH-SS-5 Mod 4/5) MRBM had been the primary instrument for the PLARF's conventional mission, it appears to have been superseded in this role by the DF-26 (CH-SS-18) IRBM since the missile reached initial operational capability in 2016. It is assessed that at least six brigades have been equipped with the DF-26 (CH-SS-18), with a significant increase in launchers noted in US government reports between 2019 and 2020. Although the DF-26 is a dual-capable system, meaning it can be equipped with either a nuclear or a conventional warhead, most of these systems are believed to have a conventional mission. China has also begun to deploy its new DF-17 (CH-SS-22) medium-range hypersonic boost-glide vehicle and at least two brigades have been identified as being equipped with the DF-17 since the system was unveiled in 2019. It is possible that the PLARF will continue increasing the number of brigades operating this system, especially among units that are based in eastern China, considering current deployments. At the same time, the number of short-range ballistic-missile launchers possessed by the PLARF, such as the DF-11A (CH-SS-7 Mod 2), has gradually decreased according to US government assessments. Finally, while China's ballistic missiles are a focus of attention from analysts and policymakers, the PLARF also operates several types of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), including the CJ-100 (CH-SSC-13). However, there is very little open-source information available on the service status of the PLARF's GLCMs and their deployment. DEFENCE ECONOMICS Despite the economic challenges posed by ongoing lock downs and the country's zero-tolerance approach to COVTD-19, China's defence-budget growth remained in line with recent trends in 2022. In February, Beijing announced that it would raise defence spending by 7% for 2022 in nominal terms, taking military spending to CNY1.45 trillion (USD238 billion) from CNYi.36tr (USD224bn). Taking into account the funding of local militias, the budget increased to CNYi.47tr (USD242bn) in 2022. The new budget represented a marginal acceleration in growth from the 6.9% increase approved in 2021 but remains largely in line with the average 7.3% nominal growth seen over the previous five years. Asia 225 As a result of this sustained and robust growth in Chinese military spending, the 7% increase for 2022 represents a CNY95bn (USDi6bn) boost in funding for the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the largest-ever annual increase in absolute terms. Growth in real terms, however, has stalled in the last five years. As a proportion of overall government spending, Chinese military expenditure had declined in the early 2000s, dropping from 9.0% in 2000 down to 5.2% by the time Xi Jinping became president in 2013. Since that time, this decline has been arrested, suggesting an increased focus on ensuring the PLA receives the resources it requires. Officially, the 2022 budget represents around 5.4% of overall government spending, slightly below the 5.5% spent in 2021. The official 2022 defence budget comes to 1.2% of GDP, a level at which it has hovered throughout President Xi's ten years in power, yet still well below the global average of around 2%. There remains, however, significant debate over the extent to which the official budget represents the entirety of the country's spending on defence, with additional funding thought to be provided from other sources. A key example is through the government's long-standing commitment to the policy of military-civil fusion, which aims to leverage technological advances between the civil and military functions. Ostensibly, this creates the potential for substantial levels of research and development spending, not specifically counted as part of the defence budget, to feed into military programmes through investments made in parallel domains such as aeroengines and advanced electronics. A further transparency problem exists with regard to how even the official defence budget is spent. Priorities for the 2022 budget were not laid out, but a communique on China's 14th Five-Year Plan issued in October 2020 outlined plans to 'make major strides in the modernization of national defense and the armed forces' and in 'building a modernised military by 2027'. Data contained within the country's 2019 defence White Paper also showed spending on military equipment - which includes procurement and support - had increased from 33.2% of total spending in 2010 to 41.1% by 2017, as the government sought to direct more funding towards technological modernisation. This prioritisation of modernisation has been a hallmark of Xi's leadership, with the PLA reduced in size by 300,000 personnel between 2015 and 2017 in order to channel more funding into equipment. News that emerged in 2021 of a pay increase of up to 40% for some military personnel is likely to have precluded any further growth in the share of spending directed towards equipment given the resultant increase in personnel expenses. Nevertheless, with the president having outlined plans to largely complete the modernisation of the PLA by 2035 as part of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2017, the focus on technological advancement will remain over the coming years. Figure 13 China: defence budget compared with the rest of Asia (total), 2008-22, USDbn, constant 2015 ^ 200 I I I I I 511 S ' I I iil I I i I III I I I I 10 ° 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 China defence budget 1 China defence budget (% change yoy) Rest of Asia total 1 Rest of Asia total (% change yoy) ©IISS 226 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Arms procurements and deliveries - Asia Significant events in 2022 r MARCH CHINA ISSUES NEW PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS New procurement regulations, set by the Central Military Commission (CMC), entered into force in March. The new statute empowers the CMC to regulate, manage and supervise the PLA's procurement activities and gives the PLA and CMC greater control over various stages of procurement together with the defence industrial base. It followed other recent initiatives. In January 2021, revised regulations were published focusing, among other measures, on management and maintenance as well as research and development, reportedly also clarifying the military tasks allocated to units. Subsequently, regulations issued in November 2021 focused on improving procurement processes while new procedures on testing military equipment were issued in February 2022. APRIL New Delhi announced that as of the end of 2021,21 foreign defence contractors had been penalised since January 2016 for not fulfilling offset obligations on time. The contracts include the 2016 deal for 36 Rafale fighter ground-attack aircraft, and contracts for MM7V-5 Hip multi-role helicopters, Heron UAVs and Harop loitering munitions. Reforms to offsets were introduced in 2020 that require the original equipment manufacturer to submit offset plans a year before each contract is signed rather than at the point of signature. Meanwhile, offset obligations for government-to-government agreements have been lifted. AUuUb I South Korea secured defence export contracts worth KRW23.99tr (USD18.88bn) from January-November 2022, with August the most profitable month. Starting in January with the UAE's purchase of the Cheongung medium-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system for KRW4.29tr (USD3.38bn), export deals were signed in February with Egypt for the K9 Thunder 155mm self-propelled artillery systems for KRW2tr (USD1.57bn), and in June with the Philippines for six offshore patrol vessels worth KRW744.9bn (USD586.4m). In August, Poland signed contracts for 212 K9s and 180 K2 Black Panther main battle tanks worth a combined KRW7.7tr (USD6.06bn). Then, in September and November, Warsaw signed contracts for 48 FA-50 Fighting Eagle fighter ground-attack aircraft and 218 Chunmoo multiple rocket launchers worth KRW4.21tr (USD3.31bn) and KRW5.05tr (USD3.97bn) respectively. Almost all of these contracts include the participation of local defence industry, and South Korea's willingness to offer this is likely a key attraction. However, these contracts are leading to prioritisation challenges for South Korean defence industries, which also have to fulfil local orders. SEPTEMBER rniLirriwca: iviuucnnisHi iuw \.vv* i inucj In Manila, the House of Representatives allocated PHP45bn (USD833.5m) to its FY2023 plan for the last phase of the Philippines' 15-year-long defence modernisation programme, Horizon Three, covering the period 2023-28. The new government is continuing pre-existing plans on condition that any unsigned contracts left from the Horizon Two phase (2018-22) will go through a prioritisation review. However, due to budget constraints, several important projects including diesel-electric powered submarines will not now be pursued. During the first (2013-17) and second Horizon phases, equipment was mainly acquired from Israel, South Korea and the United States. While these suppliers are likely to remain prominent, the 2022 deal with India for the BrahMos anti-ship missile suggests that the Philippines is also looking elsewhere. Asia 227 Table 12 ^1 Philippines: selected aerospace procurement since 2010 Contract Date Equipment Type Quantity Value (USD millions) Prime Contractor Deliveries Phase* Service Mar2013 AW109 Light transport helicopter 3 PHP1.33bn (USD31.33m) 1 AgustaWestland Dec 2013 Horizon 1 Navy Feb 2014 AW109E Power Multi-role helicopter (MRH) 2 Jul 2015 Nov 2013 AW109E Power MRH 8 PHP3.44bn (USD81.04m) 1 AgustaWestland Dec 2014-Dec2015 Horizon 1 Air Force Jan 2014 C-212 Aviocar (NC-212i) Light transport aircraft 2 PHP814m (USD18.34m) Dirgantara Indonesia (Dl) Jun2018 Horizon 1 Air Force Feb 2014 C295 Light transport aircraft 3 PHP5.39bn (USD121.41m) ~m] Airbus Mar 2015-Dec2015 Horizon 1 Air Force Mar2014 Bell 412EP MRH 8 USD105.9m Bell (formerly Bell Helicopter) 2015 Horizon 1 Air Force Mar2014 FA-50PH Fighting Eagle Fighter ground-attack aircraft 12 USD421.64m Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) Nov 2015-May2017 Horizon 1 Air Force Mar2016 AW159 Wildcat Anti-submarine warfare helicopter 2 PHP5.36bn (USD112.92m) 1 Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica) May 2019 Horizon 1 Navy Nov 2017 EMB-314 Super Tucano (A-29B) Training aircraft*** 6 PHP4.97bn (USD98.56m) Embraer Sep-Oct 2020 Horizon 2 Air Force c. 2018 Hermes 450 Medium intelligence, 4 PHP8.47bn (USD160.84m) Elbit Systems 2019-20 Horizon 2 Air Force Hermes 900 surveillance and reconnaissance uninhabited air vehicle 9 Dec 2018 C295M Light transport aircraft 1 EUR28.81m (USD34.04m) ~m] Airbus Sep 2019 Horizon 2 Air Force c. 2019 C295M Light transport aircraft 3 PHP5.29bn (USDIOZIOm) ~m] Airbus Mar 2022-ongoing Horizon 2 Air Force c. 2019 Spyder-MR Medium-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system 9 PHP6.85bn (USD132.19m) Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Sep 2022-ongoing Horizon 2 Air Force Apr 2019 S-70i Black Hawk Medium transport helicopter 16 USD241.46m PZLMielec Nov 2020-Dec 2021 Horizon 2 Air Force Jul 2020 T129B Attack helicopter 6 PHP13.73bn (USD276.62m) ca Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) Mar 2020-ongoing Horizon 2 Air Force Feb 2022 S-70i Black Hawk Medium transport helicopter 32 USD624m 5 PZLMielec 2023-26** Horizon 2 Air Force *Horizon 1 (2013-17); Horizon 2 (2018-22); Horizon 3 (2023-28) - excluding equipment that was second-hand, donated or given in an assistance or aid programme **Planned **Combat capable Ml = multinational 228 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Table 13 Q Pakistan: selected naval procurement since 2000 In 2000, the Pakistan Navy (PN) largely comprised platforms of French and UK origin with a handful of Chinese-designed patrol craft. Today, many of the navy's key vessels have been, or are being, replaced by Chinese-designed ships. Indeed, a 2005 deal for Sword-class frigates - based on the Chinese navy's Type-053H3 (Jiangwei II) design - heralded the construction of the first new-build principal surface combatants for the PN since its establishment in 1947. The fourth vessel was built in Pakistan by the state-owned Karachi Shipyards & Engineering Works (KSEW) shipyard. This provided a template for subsequent purchases from China, with the first vessels built at a Chinese shipyard and subsequent platforms at KSEW. This pattern has been reflected in procurements from China by the other armed services, coming at a time when Pakistan's economic and strategic relationship with China has deepened significantly. But while China may now be the predominant naval supplier, Pakistan's shipbuilding sector is benefiting from other ties: the most recent deal was for Turkish-designed corvettes, two of which will also be built at KSEW. Contract Equipment Type Quantity Value (USD Contractor Deliveries Notes Date millions) 2002 Jurrat Patrol boat with surface-to-surface missiles 2 n.k. ia Karachi Shipyards & Engineering Works (KSEW); Marsun 2006 Based on the M39 design by Thai firm Marsun c. 2003 Ml6 Fast Assault Boat Patrol boat 4 n.k. = KSEW; Marsun 2004 2005 Sword (?-22P) (Type-053H3 derivative (Jiangwei II)) Frigate 4 600 ■ Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding 2009- -13 Fourth vessel built in Pakistan. Contract includes six Z-9C hel 2006 MRTP-33 Fast patrol boat 2 n.k. Q Yonca-Onuk Shipyard 2007- -08 2007 Madadgar Light oiler 2 20 E9 KSEW 2011 2010 Azmat Patrol craft with surface-to-surface missiles (PCG) 2 n.k. m 19 China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC); KSEW 2012- -14 Second vessel built in Pakistan 2010 Alamgir (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) Frigate 1 0 Government surplus 2010 2013 Azmat PCG 1 n.k. 19 KSEW 2017 2013 Mo a win Fleet replenishment oiler 1 n.k. a Savunma Teknolojileri ve MiJhendislik (STM) 2018 Built at KSEW 2014 Azmat PCG 1 n.k. 19 KSEW 2022 2015 Hangor(Yuan) Attack submarine 8 n.k. an China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC); KSEW 2022- -28 Four built in China, four in Pakistan 2017 Yarmook (Damen OPV 1900) Corvette 2 n.k. n Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding (DSNS) 2020 Constructed in Romania 2017 Tughril (Type-054AP (JiangkaiW)) Frigate 4 n.k. m CSSC 2021-Ongoing 2018 Babur{Ada (MILGEM)) Corvette 4 1,000 a AS FAT 2023- -24 Two built in Pakistan, two in Turkey 2020 Indigenously Designed Gunboat Patrol boat 1 + n.k. 19 KSEW 2023* c. 2021 OPV 2600 Frigate 2 n.k. n DSNS n.k. *planned Asia 229 Afghanistan AFG New Afghan Afghani AFN 2021 2022 GDP [a] AFN n.k n.k USD n.k n.k per capita USD n.k n.k Growth % n.k n.k Inflation % n.k n.k Def bdgt [b] AFN £l72bn n.k USD n.k n.k USD1=AFN n.k n.k ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 2023 Taliban £100,000 [a] IMF economic data unavailable for Afghanistan from 2021 [b] Security expenditure. Includes expenditure on Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Security Council and the General Directorate of National Security. Also includes donor funding. Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 3.60 2008 -2015- 2022 Population 38,346,720 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 20.3% 5.2% 5.3% 4.6% 14.0% 1.3% Female 19.7% 5.0% 5.1% 4.4% 1 3.6% 1.5% Capabilities Over one year after the collapse of the former Afghan National Security and Defence Forces (ANSDF), it remains difficult to assess the strength and capability of the Afghan Taliban's armed forces and the extent to which they have been able to use the foreign-supplied equipment seized from former government forces. US authorities indicate that the Taliban administration is reorganising its MOD structure, and they have also retained some formation structures used by the ANSDF, particularly in regions outside Kabul. They have been able to employ some armoured vehicles and a small number of Soviet-era helicopters for troop movements as well as - according to the Taliban - low numbers of Western-supplied helicopters and an An-32 and Cessna 208. It is likely that, over time, the Taliban's ability to maintain in service its Western-derived equipment will reduce, because of sanctions and limited supplies of spares. While it appears that the Taliban have tried to recruit former ANSDF personnel, including pilots and maintainers, the success of these initiatives is unclear, not least because of continued attacks against former members of the ANDSF. And the Taliban policy on female education is another disincentive to those who might otherwise return to the country. The government's priority for its forces is internal and border security. It has prioritised operations against the National Resistance Front in the mountainous east of the country, as well as intelligence-led operations against Islamic State terrorist eel Is. The lack of international recognition and continued financial challenges will likely inhibit efforts to modernise the security forces. ACTIVE 100,000 (Taliban 100,000) The Taliban has announced plans to expand their regular armed forces to 150,000 personnel FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 3 spec ops bn MANOEUVRE Light 8 inf corps EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-62Mt APC • PPV Maxxpro AUV MSFV ARTILLERY TOWED 122mm D-30 MRL 122mm BM-21 MOR 82mm 2B14 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2:1 An-32 Cline; 1 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan HELICOPTERS ATK 4 Mi-35 Hind MRU 14: 8 MD-530F; 6 Mi-17 Hip H TPT • Medium 4 UH-60A Black Hawk Australia AUS Australian Dollar AUD 2021 2022 GDP AUD 2.18tr 2.43tr USD 1.64tr 1.72tr per capita USD 63,464 66,408 Growth % 4.9 3.8 Inflation % 2.8 6.5 Def bdgt [a] AUD 45.5bn 47.8bn USD 34.2bn 33.8bn USD1=AUD 1.33 1.41 2023 51.7bn [a] Includes pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 30.8 2008--- 2015 2022 Population 26,141,369 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 9.6% 3.1 % 3.5% 3.8% 22.1% 7.6% Female 9.0% 2.9% 3.2% 3.6% 22.8% 8.8% Capabilities The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is capable, well trained and well equipped. It also has considerable recent operational experience. In 2016, the government published Australia's third defence White Paper in seven years.This identified China's growing regional role, regional military modernisation and inter-state rivalry as 230 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 among the influences shaping defence policy. A'Strategic Update' to the White Paper, published in July 2020, outlined plans to adjust Australia's defence posture in order to develop a more powerful and self-reliant military deterrent. The document pointed to an increased prospect of war in Australia's region, claimed that a ten-year'strategic warning time'could no longer be assumed, and highlighted potential threats from'grey-zone activities'. In August 2022, the new Labor government announced a Defence Strategic Review to examine military posture, structures and investments. This is due to report in early 2023. The country's primary ally is the US, but it is also forging closer defence ties with India, Japan, South Korea and the UK, while remaining committed to the Five Power Defence Arrangements and to its close defence relations with New Zealand. A defence agreement was signed with Fiji in 2022, and there are plans for closer defence cooperation with Papua New Guinea. The AUKUS partnership, signed in September 2021, will see the UK and US assist Australia in developing a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability and other defence and security technologies. The plan is to build the nuclear-powered submarines in Adelaide, though some doubt has been cast on the timeline for delivering the first Australian-built boat, raising questions over what interim capability may be required. Australia is also building frigates and patrol ships, based on European designs. Strategic air- and sea-lift platforms give the capability to move and sustain deployments. Combat-air, maritime-patrol and armoured-vehicle capabilities are also being boosted, and more closely integrating Australia's armed forces - and their modern platforms - is a priority. Australia imports most of its significant defence equipment but possesses an increasingly capable defence industry. Its largest naval shipbuilders are ASC and Austal, whose US subsidiary, Austal USA, builds vessels for the US Navy. ACTIVE 59,800 (Army 29,400 Navy 15,500 Air 14,900) RESERVE 29,750 (Army 20,100 Navy 3,950 Air 5,700) Integrated units are formed from a mix of reserve and regular personnel. All ADF operations are now controlled by Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 Optus CI (dual use for civil/mil comms) Army 29,400_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 (1st) div HQ (1 sigs regt) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 3 mech inf bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf bn, 1 It mech inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 sigs regt, 1 CSS bn) Amphibious 1 (2nd RAR) amph bn Aviation 1 (16th) avn bde (1 regt (2 ISR hel sqn), 1 regt (3 tpt hel sqn), 1 regt (2 spec ops hel sqn, 1 avn sqn)) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (6th) cbt spt bde (1 STA regt (1 STA bty, 2 UAV bty, 1 CSS bty), 1 AD/FAC regt (integrated), 1 engr regt (2 construction sqn, 1 EOD sqn), 1 EW regt, 1 int bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (17th) CSS bde (3 log bn, 3 med bn, 1 MP bn) Special Operations Command_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (SAS) SF regt 1 (SF Engr) SF regt 2 cdo regt COMBAT SUPPORT 3 sigs sqn (ind 1 reserve sqn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 CSS sqn Reserve Organisations 20,100 reservists FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 (2nd) div HQ MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 3 (regional force) surv unit (integrated) Light 1 (4th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 2 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 1 spt bn) 1 (5th) inf bde (1 recce bn, 4 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 2 spt bn) 1 (9th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 spt bn) 1 (11th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 1 spt bn) 1 (13th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 spt bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt 1 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 trg bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 59 M1A1 Abrains RECCE 25 Boxer CRV (ind variants) IFV 221 ASLAV-25 (ind 100 variants) APC • APC (T) 416 M113AS4 AUV 1,950: e950 Bushmaster IMV; 1,000 Hawkei ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 45:15 ASLAV-F; 17 ASLAV-R; 13 M88A2 VLB 5 Biber MW 20:12 Husky; 8 MV-10 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin RCL • 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 264 TOWED 155mm 48 M777A2 MOR 81mm 216:40 L16; 176 M252A1 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence RBS-70 AMPHIBIOUS 15 LCM 8 (capadty either 1 MBT or 200 troops) HELICOPTERS ATK 22 Tiger MRH 2 AW139 (leased) TPT 89: Heavy 14 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 75:41 NH90 TTH (MRH90); 34 S-70A Black Hawk UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 15 RQ-7B Shadow 200 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114M Hellfire Asia 231 Navy 15,500_ Fleet Comd HQ located at Sydney. Navy HQ located at Canberra EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 6 SSK 6 Collins with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM/Mk 48 ADCAP mod 7 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11 DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 Hobart with Aegis Baseline 8.1 C2,2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 6 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block TUB SAM/RIM-162A ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with MU90 LWT/Mk 54 LWT, 1 MK 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1127mm gun (capacity 1 MH-60R Seahawk) FRIGATES • FFGHM 8 Anzac (GER MEKO 200) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 5 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1127mm gun (capacity 1 MH-60R Seahawk ASW hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 15 PCO15:10 Armidale (Bay mod); 5 Cape (of which 2 leased) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 MHC 4 Huon AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3 LHD 2 Canberra (capacity 18 hel; 4 LCM-1E; 110 veh; 12 Ml Abrams MBT; 1,000 troops) LSD 1 Choules (ex-UK Bay) (capacity 1 med hel; 24 MBT; 350 troops) LANDING CRAFT • LCM 12 LCM-1E LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11 AGHS 2 Leeuwin with 1 hel landing platform AGS 2 Paluma AORH 2 Supply (ESP Cantabria) (capacity 1MH-60R Seahawk) AX 1 Sycamore (capacity 1 med hel) (operated by private company, Teekay Shipping; multi-role aviation training vessel) AXS 1 Young Endeavour The following vessels are operated by a private company, DMS Maritime: ASR 2:1 Besant; 1 Stoker AXL 1 Seahorse Mercator Naval Aviation 1,450_ FORCES BY ROLE ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with NH90 TTH (MRH90) 1 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with MH-60R Seahawk 1 sqn with HI35 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS ASW 24 MH-60R Seahawk TPT 21: Medium 6 NH90 TTH (MRH90) (operated on rotational basis); Light 15 H135 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114M Hellfire Clearance Diving Branch_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 diving unit Air Force 14,900_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F/A-18F Super Hornet 2 sqn with F-35A Lightning II 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II (forming) ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with P-8A Poseidon ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with EA-18G Growler ISR 1 (FAC) sqn with PC-21 1 sqn with AP-3C Orion AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with E-7A Wedgetail TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with A330 MRTT (KC-30A) TRANSPORT 1 VIP sqn with B-737BBJ; Falcon 7X 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III 1 sqn with C-27J Spartan 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with F-35A Lightning II 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air 2 sqn with PC-21 2 (LIFT) sqn with Hawk MK127* EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 136 combat capable EGA 80: 24 F/A-18F Super Hornet; 56 F-35A Lightning II ASW 12 P-8A Poseidon EW13: 2 AP-3C Orion mod; 11 EA-18G Growler* AEW&C 6 E-7A Wedgetail TKR/TPT 7 A330 MRTT (KC-30A) TPT 47: Heavy 8 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 22:10 C-27J Spartan; 12 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 12 Beech 350 King Air; PAX 5: 2 B-737BBJ (VIP); 3 Falcon 7X (VIP) TRG 82: 33 Hawk Mkl27*; 49 PC-21 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES A AM • IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ASRAAM; ARH AIM-120B/C-5/C-7 AMRAAM ARM AGM-88B HARM; AGM-88E AARGM AShM AGM-84A Harpoon ALCM • Conventional AGM-158A JASSM BOMBS Laser-guided Paveway II Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-54 Laser JDAM; Paveway IV INS/GPS-guided AGM-154C JSOW; JDAM; JDAM-ER DEPLOYMENT EGYPT: MFO (Operation Mazurka) 27 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve (Okra) 110; 1 SF gp; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1 232 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 MALAYSIA: 120; 1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours); 1 P-8A Poseidon (on rotation) MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO (Operation Paladin) 11 PHILIPPINES: Operation Augury 100 (trg team) SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS (Operation Asian) 15 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: Operation Accordion 400; 1 tpt det with 2 C-130J-30 Hercules FOREIGN FORCES_ Singapore 230; 1 trg sqn at Pearce with PC-21 trg ac; 1 trg sqn at Oakey with 12 AS332 Super Puma; AS532 Cougar United States US Pacific Command; 1,700; 1 SEWS at Pine Gap; 1 comms facility at NW Cape; 1 SIGINT stn at Pine Gap • US Strategic Command; 1 detection and tracking radar at Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt Bangladesh BGD Bangladeshi Taka BDT 2021 2022 GDP BDT 35.3tr 39.8tr USD 416bn 461 bn per capita USD 2,498 2,734 Growth % 6.9 7.2 Inflation % 5.6 6.2 Def bdgt BDT 344bn 373bn USD 4.06bn 4.32bn USD1=BDT 84.81 86.30 2023 400bn Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 3.44 1.23 Population 165,650,475 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 13.1% 4.4% 4.5% 4.2% 19.4% 3.4% Female 12.6% 4.3% 4.5% 4.4% 21.2% 3.9% Capabilities Bangladesh has limited military capability, which is optimised for border and domestic security, including domestic disaster relief. A defence-modernisation plan is under way, called Forces 2030, although acquisitions have been limited. Bangladesh has relied on Chinese and Russian aid and credit to overcome its limited procurement funding. It has increased defence collaboration with India. Increased tensions on its border with Myanmar may result in enhancements to border security. The country has a long record of UN peacekeeping deployments. A naval-recapitalisation and -expansion programme, including local manufacture of patrol boats, is underway to better protect the country's large EEZ. There are plans to recapitalise the combat air fleet, and there has also been recent investment in the fixed-wing training inventory. Airlift capability has improved with the addition of C295Ws and ex-UK C-130Js. Substantial efforts have also been made to strengthen the shipbuilding industry and work has begun on a new submarine-support facility. The armed forces reportedly retain extensive commercial interests, including in real estate, banks and other businesses. ACTIVE 163,050 (Army 132,150 Navy 16,900 Air 14,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 63,900 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE_ Army 132,150_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 10 inf div HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo bde (2 cdo bn) MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bde 3 indep armd regt Light 25 inf bde 2 (composite) bde COMBAT SUPPORT 10 arty bde 1 engr bde 1 sigs bde AVIATION 1 avn regt (1 avn sqn; 1 hel sqn) AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 276; 174 Type-59/-59G(BD); 58 Type-69/-69G; 44 Type-90-II (MBT-2000) LT TK 8+; 8 Type-62; some VT-5 RECCE 8+ BOV Mil APC 545 APC (T) 134 MT-LB APC (W) 330 BTR-80 PPV 81+ Maxxpro AUV 138; 36 Cobra; 102 Cobra II ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV MT-LB ARV 3+; T-54/T-55; Type-84; 3 Type-654 VLB MTU ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K115-2 Metis Ml (RS-AT-13) RCL 106mm 238 M40A1 ARTILLERY 907+ SP 155mm 18 NORA B-52 TOWED 363+; 105mm 170 Model 56 pack howitzer; 122mm 131: 57 Type-54/54-1 (M-30); 20 Type-83; 54 Type-96 (D-30), 130mm 62 Type-59-1 (M-46) MRL 54; 122mm 36+ WS-22; 302mm 18 T-300 MOR 472; 81mm 11 M29A1; 82mm 366 Type-53/type-87/M-31 (M-1937); 120mm 95 AM-50/UBM 52 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 3; 1 LCT; 2 LCVP AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 7; 1 C295; 5 Cessna 152; 1 PA-SIT Cheyenne HELICOPTERS MRH 2 AS365N3 Dauphin TPT 7; Medium 3 Mi-171Sh Light 4; 2 Bell 206L-4 Long Ranger IV; 2 Bell 407GXÍ Asia 233 AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range FM-90 (CH-SA-4) Point-defence FN-16 (CH-SA-14); QW-2 (CH-SA-8) GUNS • TOWED 174:35mm 8 GDF-009 (with Skyguard-3); 37mm 132 Type-65/74; 57mm 34 Type-59 (S-60) Navy 16,900_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 2 SSK 2 Nabajatra (ex-PRC Type-035G (Ming)) with 8 single 533mm TT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 6 FFGHM 3: 1 Bangabandhu (ROK modified Ulsan) with 2 twin lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple FM-90N (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple ILAS-3 (B-515) 324mm TT with A244/S LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1AW109E hel) 2 Umar Farooq (ex-PRC Type-053H3 (Jiangwei II)) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 octuple GMLS with HHQ-7 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 FQF 3200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 hel) FFG3: 2 Abu Bakr (ex-PRC Type-053H2 (Jianghu III)) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802A AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun 1 Osman (ex-PRC Type-053H1 (Jianghu I)) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 46 CORVETTES 6 FSGM 4 Shadhinota (PRC C13B) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with FL-3000N (HHQ-10) (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FSG 2 Bijoy (ex-UK Castle) (of which 1 damaged in 2020 Beirut port explosion) with 2 twin lnchr with C-704 AShM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PSOH 2 Somudra Joy (ex-US Hero) with 1 76mm gun, hel landing platform PCFG 4 Durdarsha (ex-PRC Huangfeng) with 4 single lnchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 Safflower) AShM PCG 2 Durjoy with 2 twin lnchr with C-704 AShM, 1 76MM gun PCO 8: 1 Madhumati (Sea Dragon) with 1 57mm gun; 5 Kapatakhaya (ex-UK Island); 2 Durjoy with 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun PCC 8: 2 Meghna with 1 57mm gun (fishery protection); 1 Mrfc/wi/ (ex-PRC Hainan) with 4 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor; 2 twin 57mm gun; 5 Padma PBFG 5 Durbar (PRC Hegu) with 2 single lnchr with SY-1 (CH-SS-N-1 Scrubbrush) AShM PBF 4 Titas (ROK Sea Dolphin) PB 7:1 Barfcat (ex-PRC Shanghai III); 2 Karnaphuli; 1 SaZam (ex-PRC Huangfen); 3 Shaheed Daulat (PRC Shanghai II) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5 MSO 5:1 Sagar; 4 Snap/a (ex-UK RiW) AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LSL 1 LANDING CRAFT 14 LCU4(of which 2t) LCT2 LCM 5 Darshak (Yuchin) LCVP 3t LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11 AG 1 AGHS 2:1 Agradoot; 1 Anushandhan AGS 2 Dars/iafc AOR 2 (coastal) AOT 1 K/ian Jahangir Ali AR It ATE It AX 1 Shaheed Ruhul Amin Naval Aviation_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • MP4Do-228NG HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 AW109E Power Special Warfare and Diving Command 300 Air Force 14,000_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-7MB/FT-7B Airguard 1 sqn with F-7BG/FT-7BG Airguard 1 sqn with F-7BGI/FT-7BGI Airguard GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Yak-130 Mitten* TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-32 Cline 1 sqn with C-130B/J Hercules 1 sqn with L-410UVP TRAINING 1 sqn with K-8W Karakorum*; L-39ZA Albatros* 1 sqn with PT-6 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AW139; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-17-lV Hip H; Mi-171Sh 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-17-lV Hip H; Mi-171Sh 1 sqn with Bell 212 1 trg sqn with Bell 206L Long Ranger; AW119 Koala EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 88 combat capable FTR 53: 9 F-7MB Airguard; 11 F-7BG Airguard; 12 F-7BGI Airguard; 5 FT-7B Airguard; 4 FT-7BG Airguard; 4 FT-7BGI Airguard; 6 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B TPT 16: Medium 8: 4 C-130B Hercules; 4 C-130J Hercules; Light 8: 3 An-32 Clinei; 2 C295W; 3 L-410UVP TRG 81:4 DA40NG; 12 G 120TP; 15 K-8W Karakorum*; 7 L-39ZA Albatros*; 30+ PT-6; 13 Yak-130 Mitten* HELICOPTERS MRH 16: 2 AW139 (SAR); 12 Mi-17 Hip H; 2 Mi-17-lV Hip H (VIP) TPT 19: Medium 11 Mi-171Sh; Light 8: 2 Bell 206L Long Ranger; 4 Bell 212; 2 AW119 Koala AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); PL-5; PL-7; SARH R-27R (RS-AA-1Q A Alamo) 234 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 63,900_ Ansars 20,000+_ Security Guards Rapid Action Battalions 5,000_ Ministry of Home Affairs FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 14 paramilitary bn Border Guard Bangladesh 38,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 rvn coy Other 54 paramilitary bn Coast Guard 900_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 23 PSO 4 Syed Nazrul (ex-ITA Minerva) with 1 hel landing platform PCC 5 Sobuj Bangla (Padma mod) PB 9:1 Ruposhi Bangla; 4 Shaheed Daulat; 2 Shetgang; 2 Sonadia PBR 5 Pabna DEPLOYMENT_ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1,382; 1 cdo coy; 1 inf bn; 1 med coy; 1 hel coy DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1,637; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 avn sqn; 1 hel coy LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 118; 1 FSGM MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1,297; 1 mech inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,628; 1 inf bn; 2 rvn coy; 2 engr coy SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 508; 1 inf bn WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 27; 1 fd hospital Brunei BRN Brunei Dollar BND 2021 2022 GDP BND 18.8bn 25.4bn USD 14.0bn 18.5bn per capita USD 32,573 42,939 Growth % -1.6 1.2 Inflation % 1.7 2.5 Def bdgt BND 610m 598m USD 454m 435m USD1=BND 1.34 1.37 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008-- --2015-- --2022 Population 478,054 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 11.3% 3.5% 4.1% 4.6% 22.0% 3.3% Female 10.7% 3.5% 4.2% 4.9% 24.5% 3.4% Capabilities_ The Royal Brunei Armed Forces are professional and well trained. In May 2021, the government published Brunei's fourth defence White Paper in 17 years, within the context of the Vision Brunei 2035 framework. C4ISR capabilities are being improved to offset the forces'relatively small size, and the White Paper advocates procurements to strengthen airspace control and harden C4 systems. Under a long-standing bilateral arrangement, which currently extends to 2025, Brunei continues to host a British military presence including a Gurkha infantry battalion, a helicopter-flight and a jungle-warfare school. Brunei has a close defence relationship with Singapore and hosts a permanent Singapore Armed Forces training facility. There are regular bilateral exercises with Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries. The armed forces also take part in multinational exercises organised by the ADMM-Plus. Brunei has limited capacity to deploy forces abroad without assistance, but has nevertheless maintained a small deployment to UNIFIL in Lebanon since 2008. Brunei has no domestic defence industry and imports all its military equipment. In 2010, the Centre of Science and Technology Research and Development was established to conduct defence-technology research and provide engineering and support services to the armed forces. ACTIVE 7,200 (Army 4,400 Navy 1,200 Air 1,100 Special Forces 500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 400-500 RESERVE 700 (Army 700) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 4,400 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 3 inf bn Asia 235 COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt spt bn (1 armd recce sqn, 1 engr sqn) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 2inf bn(-) Reserves 700 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 inf bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 20 FV101 Scorpion (ind FV105 Sultan CP) APC • APC (W) 45 VAB ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 2 Samson ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 24 Navy 1,200_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9 CORVETTES • FSG 4 Darussalam with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCC 4 Ijtihad PBF 1 Mustaed AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 4: 2 Teraban; 2 Cheverton Loadmaster Air Force 1,100_ FORCES BY ROLE MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with CN235M TRAINING 1 sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 214 (SAR) 1 sqn with S-70i Black Hawk AIR DEFENCE 1 sqn with Mistral 1 sqn with Rapier EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 1 CN235M TRG 4 PC-7 HELICOPTERS TPT 15: Medium 13: 1 Bell 214 (SAR); 12 S-70Í Black Hawk; Light 2 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Mistral; Rapier Special Forces Regiment £500_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 400-500_ Gurkha Reserve Unit 400-500 DEPLOYMENT LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 30 FOREIGN FORCES_ Singapore 1 trg camp with infantry units on rotation; 1 trg school; 1 hel det with AS332 Super Puma United Kingdom 2,000; 1 (Gurkha) inf bn; 1 jungle trg centre; 1 hel sqn with 3 Bell 212 Cambodia CAM Cambodian Riel KHR 2021 2022 GDP KHR 109tr 119tr USD 26.3bn 28.3bn per capita USD 1,662 1,771 Growth % 3.0 5.1 Inflation % 2.9 5.2 Def bdgt [a] KHR 4.25tr 4.21 tr USD 1.02bn 1 .OObn USD1=KHR 4154.25 4199.86 [a] Defence and security budget Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008--■ --2015-- ---2022 Population 16,713,015 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 15.2% 4.3% 3.8% 4.1% 19.3% 1.8% Female 14.8% 4.4% 4.0% 4.4% 20.8% 3.2% Capabilities_ Despite their name, which reflects Cambodia's formal status as a constitutional monarchy, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) are essentially the modern manifestation of the armed forces of the former People's Republic of Kampuchea, and were established in 1979 following Vietnam's invasion. Cambodia faces no direct external military threats, besides border clashes with Thailand which last occurred in 2011. Relations have developed since then and a seventh meeting on border issues took place in September 2022, the same month as reports that both sides had resumed talks on overlapping maritime border claims. There were reports in November 2022 of an agreement on demining activities on the border. Internally, security concerns include civil unrest and transnational threats that can generate instability, such as drug trafficking. Skirmishes on the border with Thailand provided little indication of capacity for high-intensity combat. However, Cambodia has contributed personnel to UN peacekeeping missions, including UNMISS in South Sudan. Cambodia's most important international defence links are with China's and Vietnam's armed forces. While traditionally reliant on Russia for defence equipment, China has emerged 236 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 as a key supplier in recent years. Training ties have also developed with China and exercises have grown in scale. Cambodia lacks significant resources for personnel training, which is partly financed by Chinese military assistance. In response to deepening Chinese military influence in Cambodia, the US imposed an arms embargo on Cambodia in December 2021. Funds for equipment purchases are limited, although the 2022 National Defence White Paper stated that modernisation of the RCAF is the top priority. There is no domestic defence industry, with Cambodia possessing no ability to design and manufacture modern equipment for its armed forces. ACTIVE 124,300 (Army 75,000 Navy 2,800 Air 1,500 Provincial Forces 45,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 67,000 Conscript liability 18 months service authorised but not implemented since 1993 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army £75,000_ 6 Military Regions (ind 1 spedal zone for capital) FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (Spec Ops Comd) AB/SF Bde MANOEUVRE Light 2 (2nd & 3rd Intervention) inf div (3 inf bde) 5 (Intervention) indep inf bde 8 indep inf bde Other 1 (70th) sy bde (4 sy bn) 17 (border) sy bn COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bn 4 fd engr regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (construction) engr regt 2 tpt bde AIR DEFENCE 1 ADbn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 200+: 50 Type-59; 150+ T-54/T-55 LT TK 20+: Type-62; 20 Type-63 RECCE 20+ BRDM-2 IFV 70 BMP-1 APC 230+ APC (T) M113 APC (W) 230: 200 BTR-60/BTR-152; 30 OT-64 AUV 27:12 Dongfeng Mengshi; 15 Tiger 4x4 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV T-54/T-55 MW Bozena; RA-140DS ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 82mm B-10; 107mm B-ll ARTILLERY 486+ SP 155mm 12 SH-1 TOWED 400+: 76mm ZIS-3 (M-1942)/122mm D-30/ 122mm M-30 (M-1938)/130mm Type-59-I MRL 74+: 107mm Type-63; 122mm 48+: 8 BM-21; g20 PHL-81; some PHL-90B; 20 RM-70; 132mm BM-13-16 (BM-13); 140mm 20 BM-14-16 (BM-14); 300mm 6 PHL-03 MOR 82mm M-37; 120mm M-43; 160mm M-160 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence FN-6 (CH-SA-10); FN-16 (CH-SA-14) (reported) GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60 Navy £2,800 (ind 1,500 Naval Infantry)_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13 PBF 4 Project 205P (Stenka) PB 7: 3 (PRC 20m); 4 (PRC 46m) PBR 2 Kaoh Chhlam AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1 LCU1 Type-067 (Yunnan) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AFDL 1 Naval Infantry 1,500_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 (31st) nav inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bn Air Force 1,500_ FORCES BY ROLE ISR/TRAINING 1 sqn with P-92 Echo TRANSPORT 1 VIP sqn (reporting to Coundl of Ministers) with An-24RV Coke; AS350 Ecureuil; AS355F2 Ecureuil II 1 sqn with BN-2 Islander; Y-12 (II) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-8 Hip; Z-9 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 9: 2 MA60; 5 P-92 Echo (pilot trg/recce); 2 Y-12 (II) (2 An-24RV Coke; 1 BN-2 Islander in store) TRG (5 L-39C Albatros* in store) HELICOPTERS MRH 14: 3 Mi-17 Hip H; 11 Z-9 TPT 4: Heavy (2 Mi-26 Halo in store); Light 4: 2 AS350 Ecureuil; 2 AS355F2 Ecureuil II Provincial Forces 45,000+_ Reports of at least 1 inf regt per province, with varying numbers of inf bn (with It wpn) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 67,000_ Police 67,000 (including gendarmerie)_ DEPLOYMENT_ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 225; 1 engr coy LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 180; 1 EOD coy MALI: UN • MINUSMA 289: 2 engr coy; 1 EOD coy SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 84; 1 MP coy SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1 Asia 237 China, People's Republic of PRC Chinese Yuan Renminbi CNY 2021 2022 GDP CNY 114tr 123tr USD 17.7tr 20.3tr per capita USD 12,562 14,340 Growth % 8.1 3.2 Inflation % 0.9 2.2 Def exp CNY £l .84tr £l.95tr USD £285bn £319bn Def bdgt [a] CNY 1.38tr 1.47tr USD 214bn 242bn USD1=CNY 6.45 6.08 2023 [a] Central Expenditure budget including local militia funding Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008 ---2015-- 2022 Population 1,418,451,639 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.9% 2.9% 3.0% 3.6% 26.3% 6.3% Female 7.8% 2.4% 2.6% 3.3% 25.6% 7.3% Capabilities_ China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the world's largest armed force, with an increasingly advanced equipment inventory. Its operational effectiveness, however, remains hampered by training and doctrine issues. China's 2019 defence White Paper did not significantly alter the strategic direction laid out in the 2015 edition and was focused more on updating the progress of PLA modernisation efforts. In 2021, amendments to the National Defense Law were enacted, which handed responsibility for defence mobilisation fully to the Central Military Commission and removed the role of the State Council. A major restructuring process is now mostly complete and the Strategic Support Force continues to develop China's cyber, space and information-dominance capabilities. China does not maintain any formal alliances, but it does have a number of key defence relationships with regional states and through its membership of the SCO and has also worked to develop defence ties with several African and Middle Eastern states. In February 2022, China and Russia announced a friendship with 'no limits', though China has been reluctant to assist Russia militarily in its war on Ukraine. Improving readiness for combat operations is a key objective of the current reforms; the PLA currently lacks any significant recent combat experience and its training has traditionally suffered from over-scripted and unrealistic exercises. Though these weaknesses are acknowledged, it is unclear how effective the newly established structures will be at generating and controlling high-intensity combined-arms capabilities. In 2021, the PLA's conscription pattern changed from once to twice a year, with the aim of improving force readiness. Recruitment maintains a particular focus on college graduates and those skilled in science and engineering. The requirement for out-of-area operations is relatively new for the PLA; the navy is the only service to have experience in extended deployments, assisted by its support base in Djibouti. Major platform inventories in all the services comprise a mix of modem, older and obsolescent designs as modernisation efforts continue. China has an extensive defence-industrial base, capable of producing advanced equipment across all domains, although questions persist over quality and reliability. ACTIVE 2,035,000 (Ground Forces 965,000 Navy 260,000 Air Force 395,000 Strategic Missile Forces 120,000 Strategic Support Force 145,000 Other 150,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 500,000 Conscript liability Selective conscription; all services 24 months RESERVE £510,000 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Strategic Missile Forces 120,000+_ People's Liberation Army Rocket Force_ The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force organises and commands its own troops to launch nuclear counterattacks with strategic missiles and to conduct operations with conventional missiles. Organised as launch brigades subordinate to 6 army-level missile bases. FORCES BY ROLE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 ICBM bde with DF-4 3 ICBM bde with DF-5A/B 1 ICBM bde with DF-31 1 ICBM bde with DF-31A 5 ICBM bde with DF-31A(G) 2 ICBM bde with DF-41 6 IRBM bde with DF-26 3 MRBM bde with DF-17 with HGV 2 MRBM bde with DF-21A/E 1 MRBM bde with DF-21C/D 2 SRBM bde with DF-11A/DF-15B 2SRBM bde with DF-16 3 GLCM bde with CJ-lO/CJ-lOA/CJ-100 8 SSM bde (forming) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS ICBM • Nuclear 140: £10 DF-4 (CH-SS-3); £20 DF-5A/B (CH-SS-4 Mod 2/3); £8 DF-31 (CH-SS-10 Mod 1); £24 DF-31A (CH-SS-10 Mod 2); £54 DF-31A(G) (CH-SS-10 Mod 3); £24 DF-41 (CH-SS-20) IRBM • Dual-capable 110+ DF-26 (CH-SS-18) MRBM 94: Nuclear £40 DF-21A/E (CH-SS-5 Mod 2/6); Conventional 54: £24 DF-17 with HGV (CH-SS-22); £30 DF-21D (CH-SS-5 Mod 5 - ASBM) SRBM • Conventional 225: £108 DF-11A (CH-SS-7 Mod 2); £81 DF-15B (CH-SS-6 Mod 3); £36 DF-16 (CH-SS-11 Mod 1/2) GLCM • Conventional 108: £54 CJ-10/CJ-lOA (CH-SSC-9 mod 1/2); £54 CJ-100 (CH-SSC-13 Splinter) Navy_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC 6 SSBN 6 Type-094 (Jin) with up to 12 JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14)/ JL-3 (CH-SS-N-20) strategic SLBMs, 6 single 533mm TT withYu-6HWT 238 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Defensive_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE RADAR • STRATEGIC: 4+ large phased array radars; some detection and tracking radars Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 207 COMMUNICATIONS 11: 2 Shen Tong-l; 4 Shen Tong-2; 2 Feng Huo-1; 3 Feng Huo-2 POSITIONING, NAVIGATION & TIMING 45:3 Beidou-2(M); 5 Beidou-2(G); 7 Beidou-2(IGSO); 24 Beidou-3(U); 3 Beidou-3{G); 3 Beidou-3(ISGO) METEOROLOGY/OCEANOGRAPHY 8: 2 Yunhai-1; 6 Yunhai-2 ISR 55:2 ]ianbing-5; 4 ]ianbing-6; 4 ]ianbing-7; 5 ]ianbing-9; 3 ]ianbing-10; 3 Jianbing-U/-12; 3 ]ianbing-16; 4 LKW; 4 Tianhui-2; 3 Yaogan-29; 2 Yaogan-31; 15 Yaogan-35; 3 Yaogan-36 ELINT/SIGINT 81: 30 Chuangxin-5 (Yaogan-30); 15 ]ianbing-8; 3 Qianshao-3; 10 Shijiun-6 (5 pairs - reported ELINT/SIGINT role); 7 Shijian-U (reported ELINT/ SIGINT role); 12 Yaogan-31; 4 Yaogan-32 EARLY WARNING 5: 5 Huoyan-1 RENDEZVOUS & PROXIMITY OPERATIONS 2: 1 Shijian-17; 1 Shijian-21 REUSABLE SPACECRAFT 1 CSSHQ COUNTERSPACE • MSL SC-19 (reported) Army £965,000_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 13 (Group) army HQ SPECIAL FORCES 15 spec ops bde MANOEUVRE Armoured 33 (cbd arms) armd bde Mechanised 2 (high alt) mech inf div (3 (cbd arms) mech regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) 17 (cbd arms) mech inf bde 2 indep mech inf regt Light 2 (high alt) inf div (3 (cbd arms) inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) 25 (cbd arms) inf bde Air Manoeuvre 2 air aslt bde Amphibious 6 amph aslt bde Other 1 (OPFOR) armd bde 1 mech gd div (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) 1 sy gd div (4 sy regt) 16 (border) sy bde 15 (border) sy regt 1 (border) sy gp COMBAT SUPPORT 15 arty bde 9 engr/NBC bde 5 engr bde 5 NBC bde 1 engr regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 13 spt bde COASTAL DEFENCE 19 coastal arty/AShM bde AVIATION 1 mixed avn bde HELICOPTER 12 hel bde TRAINING 4 hel trg bde AIR DEFENCE 15 AD bde Reserves_ The People's Liberation Army Reserve Force is being restructured, and the army component reduced. As a result some of the units below may have been re-roled or disbanded FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 armd regt Light 18 inf div 4 inf bde 3 indep inf regt COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty div 7 arty bde 15 engr regt 1 ptn br bde 3 ptn br regt 10 chem regt 10 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 9 log bde 1 log regt AIR DEFENCE 17 AD div 8 AD bde 8 AD regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 4,800: 600 ZTZ-59/-59-II/-59D; 200 ZTZ-79; 300 ZTZ-88A/B; 1,000 ZTZ-96; 1,500 ZTZ-96A; 600 ZTZ-99; 600 ZTZ-99A LT TK 1,250: 750 ZTD-05; 500 ZTQ-15 ASLT 1,200 ZTL-11 IFV 7,700:400 ZBD-04; 1,900 ZBD-04A; 3,000 ZBL-08; 600 ZBD-86; 650 ZBD-86A; 550 ZSL-92; 600 ZSL-92B APC 3,900 APC (T) 2,250: 500 ZSD-63; 1,750 ZSD-89/-89A APC (W) 1,650: 700 ZSL-92A; 900 ZSL-10; 50 ZSL-93 AAV 750 ZBD-05 AUV Dongfeng Mengshi; Tiger 4x4 Asia 239 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV Type-73; Type-84; Type-85; Type-97; Type-654 VLB MTU; TMM; GQL-110A (Type-84A); GQL-111 (HZQL75); GQL-321 (HZQL22); GQL-410; High Altitude VLB; HZQL-18; ZGQ-84 MWType-74; Type-79; Type-81-II; Type-84 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 1,125: 450 HJ-8 (veh mounted); 200 HJ-10; 25 HJ-10A; 450 ZSL-02B MANPATS HJ-73D; HJ-8A/C/E; HJ-11; HJ-12 RCL 3,966: 75mm PF-56; 82mm PF-65 (B-10); PF-78; 105mm PF-75; 120mm PF-98 GUNS 1,788 SP 480:100mm 250 PTL-02; 120mm 230 PTZ-89 TOWED • 100mm 1,308 PT-73 (T-12)/PT-86 ARTILLERY 9,550+ SP 3,180: 122mm 2,110: 300 PLZ-89; 550 PLZ-07A; 150 PLZ-07B; 300 PCL-09; 600 PLL-09; 60 PCL-161; 120 PCL-171; 30 PCL-181152mm 150 PLZ-83A/B; 155mm 920:320 PLZ-05; 600 PCL-181; (600 in store: 122mm 400 PLZ-89; 152mm 200 PLZ-83A) TOWED 900: 122mm 300 PL-96 (D-30); 130mm 100 PL-59 (M-46)/PL-59-I; 152mm 500 PL-66 (D-20); (4,700 in store: 122mm 3,000 PL-54-1 (M-1938)/PL-83/PL-60 (D-74)/PL-96 (D-30); 152mm 1,700 PL-54 (D-l)/PL-66 (D-20)) GUN/MOR 120mm 1,250:450 PLL-05; 800 PPZ-10 MRL 1,320+ 107mm PH-63; 122mm 1,095: 200 PHL-81/ PHL-90; 350 PHL-11; 375 PHZ-89; 120 PHZ-11; 30 PHL-20; 10+ PHL-21; 10 PHL-161; 300mm 175 PHL-03; 370mm 50+ PHL-19; (1,000 in store: 122mm 1,000 PHL-81) MOR 2,800: 82mm PP-53 (M-37)/PP-67/PP-82/PP-87; SP 82mm PCP-001; 100mm PP-89 COASTAL DEFENCE AShM HY-1 (CH-SSC-2 Silkworm); HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 Seersucker); HY-4 (CH-SSC-7 Sadsack); YJ-62 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25 PB 25: 9 Huzong; 16 Shenyang AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM255:3+ Yugong; 50+ Yunnan II; 100+ Yupen; 2+ Yutu; approx. 100 Yuwei LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 22 AK 6+ Leizhuang AKR 1 Yunsong (capacity 1 MBT; 1 med hel) ARC1 AOT 11:1 Fuzhong; 8 Fubing; 2 Fulei ATE 2 Huntao AX 1 Haixun III AIRCRAFT • TPT 6: Medium 4: 2 Y-8; 2 Y-9; Light 2 Y-7 HELICOPTERS ATK 320+: 200 WZ-10; 120+ WZ-19 MRH 208: 22 Mi-17 Hip H; 3 Mi-17-lV Hip H; 38 Mi-17V-5 Hip H; 25 Mi-17V-7 Hip H; £120 Z-9WZ TPT 452: Heavy 125: 9 Z-8A; 96 Z-8B; £20 Z-8L; Medium 259:140 Mi-171; 19 S-70C2 (S-70C) Black Hawk; e100 Z-20; Light 68:15 H120 Colibri; 53 Z-ll UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 5+ CH-4B ISR • Heavy BZK-005; BZK-009 (reported); Medium BZK-006 (ind variants); BZK-007; BZK-008 LOITERING & DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS Harpy AIR DEFENCE SAM 754+ Medium-range 250 HQ-16A/B (CH-SA-16) Short-range 504:24 9K331 Tor-Mi (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet); 30 HQ-6D (CH-SA-6); 200 HQ-7A/B (CH-SA-4); 200 HQ-17 (CH-SA-15); 50 HQ-17A (CH-SA-15) Point-defence HN-5A/B (CH-SA-3); FN-6 (CH-SA-10); QW-1 (CH-SA-7); QW-2 (CH-SA-8) SPAAGM 25mm 270 PGZ-04A GUNS 7,126+ SP126:30mm some PGL-19; 35mm 120 PGZ-07; 37mm 6 PGZ-88 TOWED 7,000+: 25mm PG-87; 35mm PG-99 (GDF-002); 37mm PG-55 (M-1939)/PG-65/PG-74; 57mm PG-59 (S-60); 100mm PG-59 (KS-19) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR TY-90 ASM AKD-8; AKD-9; AKD-10 Navy £260,000_ The PLA Navy is organised into five service arms: submarine, surface, naval aviation, coastal defence and marine corps, as well as other specialised units. There are three fleets, one each in the Eastern, Southern and Northern theatre commands EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 59 STRATEGIC • SSBN 6 Type-094 (Jin) with up to 12 JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14)/JL-3 (CH-SS-N-20) strategic SLBMs, 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-6 HWT TACTICAL 53 SSN 6: 2 Type-093 (Shang I) with 6 single 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT 4 Type-093A (Shang II) with 6 single 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT (3 Type-091 (Han) in reserve with 6 single 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM/Yu-3 HWT) SSK 46: 2 Project 636 (Improved Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT 8 Project 636M (Improved Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT/3M54E Klub-S (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM 4 Type-035B (Ming) with 8 single 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-4 HWT 12 Type-039(G) (Song) with 6 single 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT 4 Type-039A (Yuan) (fitted with AIP) with 6 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT 16+ Type-039B (Yuan) (fitted with AIP) with 6 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT (10 Type-035(G) (Ming) in reserve with 8 single 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-4 HWT) SSB 1 Type-032 (Qing) (SLBM trials) 240 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 92 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 2: 1 Type-001 (Kuznetsov) with 3 18-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 3 H/PJ-11 CIWS (capacity 18-24 J-15 ac; 17 Ka-28/Ka-31/Z-8S/Z-8JH/Z-8AEWhel) 1 Type-002 (Kuznetsov mod) with 3 18-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 3 H/PJ-11 CIWS (capacity 32 J-15 ac; 12 Ka-28/Ka-31/Z-8S/Z-8JH/Z-8AEW hel) CRUISERS • CGHM 7 Type-055 (Renhai) with 14 8-cell VLS (8 fore, 6 aft) with YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/ HHQ-9B (CH-SA-N-21) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1130mm gun (capacity 2 med hel) DESTROYERS 42 DDGHM 40; 2 Hangzhou (Project 956EM (Sovremenny II)) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80MVE Moskit-E (RS-SS-N-22B Sunburn) AShM, 2 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M38E M-22E Shtil (RS-SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-956 ASTT with SET-65KE HWT/53-65KE HWT, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3 A/S mor, 2 Kashtan (RS-CADS-N-1) CIWS, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28 Helix A hel) 2 Hangzhou (Project 956E (Sovremenny III)) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-12A AShM, 4 8-cell H/AJK-16 VLS with HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 4 AK630M CIWS, 2 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28 Helix A hel) 1 Type-051B (Luhai) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-12A AShM, 4 8-cell H/AJK-16 VLS with HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C/Ka-28 HeZix A hel) 2 Type-052 (Lh/jh) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 2500 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C hel) 2 Type-052B (Luyang I) (in refit) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 2 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M317E Shtil-1 (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A hel) 6 Type-052C (Luyang II) (of which 1 in refit) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-62 AShM, 8 8-cell VLS with HHQ-9 (CH-SA-N-9) SAM (CH-SA-N-9), 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1100mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 Helix A hel) 10 Type-052D (Luyang III) with 8 8-cell VLS with YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/HHQ-9B (CH-SA-N-21) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 Helix A hel) 3 Type-052D (Luyang III) with 8 octuple VLS with YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/HHQ-9B (CH-SA-N-21) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 Helix A hel) 12 Type-052D mod (Luyang III mod) with 8 octuple VLS with YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/HHQ-9B (CH-SA-N-21) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9/Z-20 hel) DDGM 2 Type-051C (Luzhou) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM; 6 6-cell B-204 VLS with S-300FM Rif-M (RS-SA-N-20 Gargoyle) SAM, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1100mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FRIGATES • FFGHM 41 2 Type-053H3 (Jiangwei II) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C hel) 6 Type-053H3 (Jiangwei II Upgrade) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C hel) 2 Type-054 (Jiangkai) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A/Z-9C hel) 31 Type-054A (Jiangkai II) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Yu-8 A/S msl/HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 3200 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-11/12 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A/Z-9C hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 142+ CORVETTES • FSGM 50 Type-056A (Jiangdao) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCFG £60 Type-022 (Houbei) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 H/PJ-13 CIWS PCG 22; 4 Type-037-II (Houjian) with 2 triple lnchr with YJ-8 (CH-SS-N-4) AShM; 18 Type-037-IG (Houxin) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-8 (CH-SS-N-4) AShM PCC some Type-037-IS (Haiqing) with 2 FQF-3200 A/S mor PB up to 10 Type-062-1 (Shanghai III) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 57; MCO 20; 4 Type-081 (Wochi); 9+ Type-081A (Wochi mod); 7+ Type-08211 (Wozang) MSC16; 4 Type-082 (Wosao I); 12 Type-082-II (Wosao II) MSD 21 Type-529 (Wonang) (operated by Wozang MCO) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 11; LHD 3 Type-075 (Yushen) with 2 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS (capacity 3 Yuyi LCAC; 800 troops; at least 60 AFVs; 28 hel) Asia 241 LPD 8 Type-071 (Yuzhao) with 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 4 Yuyi LCAC plus supporting vehicles; 800 troops; 60 armoured vehs; 4 hel) LANDING SHIPS 49 LST 28: 4 Type-072-IIG (Yukon) (capacity 2 LCVP; 10 tk; 200 troops) 9 Type-072-II/III (Yuting I) (capacity 10 tk; 250 troops; 2 hel) 9 Type-072A (Yuting II) (capacity 4 LCVP; 10 tk; 250 troops) 6 Type-072B (Yuting II) (capacity 4 LCVP; 10 tk; 250 troops) LSM 21: 1 Type-073-II (Yudeng) with 1 twin 57mm gun (capacity 5 tk or 500 troops) 10 Type-073A (Yunshu) (capacity 6 tk) 7 Type-074 (Yuhai) (capacity 2 tk; 250 troops) 3 Type-074 (mod) LANDING CRAFT 60 LCU 11 Type-074A (Yubei) (capacity 10 tanks or 150 troops) LCM £30 Type-067A (Yunnan) LCAC 19:15+ Type-726 (Yuyi); 4 Zubr LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 153 ABU 1 Type-744A AFS 2:1 Type-904 (Dayun); 1 Type-904A (Danyao I) AFSH 2 Type-904B (Danyao II) AG 7: 6 Kanhai; 1 Kanwu AGB 2 Type-272 (Yanrao) with 1 hel landing platform AGE 7: 2 Type-909 (Dahua) with 1 hel landing platform (weapons test platform); 1 Kantan; 3 Type-636 (Shupang); 1 Yuting I (naval rail gun test ship) AGI19:1 Dadie; 1 Type-815 (Dongdiao) with 1 hel landing platform; 9 Type-815A (Dongdiao) with 1 hel landing platform; 8 FT-14 AGOR 2 Da/ma AGOS 4 Dongjian AGS 8 Type-636A (Shupang) with 1 hel landing platform AH 8: 5 Ankang; 1 Type-920 (Anwei); 2 Anshen AOEH 2 Type-901 (Fmj/m) with 2 H/PJ-13 CIWS AORH 10: 2 Type-903 (Fuchi); 7 Type-903A (Fuchi II); 1 Fmsm AOT 22:4 Fifbai; 16 Type-632 (Fujian); 2 Fuxiao AP 4: 2 Daguan; 2 Darong ARC 2 Youlan ARS 18: 1 Dfldao; 1 Dadong; 1 Type-922111 (Datog II); 3 Type-922IIIA (Dalang III); 3 Dasan; 4 Dafoo; 2 Dazhou; 3 Hfli Jim 101 with 1 hel landing platform ASR 6:3 Type-926 (Dato); 3 Type-925 (Dajiang) (capacity 2Z-8) ATF 14: £ll Hujiu; 3 Tuqiang AWT 8:4 Fujian; 3 Fushi; 1 Jinyou AX 4: 1 Type-0891A (Dashi) with 2 hel landing platforms 1 Dazm with 2 FQF 1200 A/S mor, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 1 Type-927 (Qi ]i Guang) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 1 Yudao ESD 1 Donghaidao COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 72 YJ-12/YJ-62 (3 regt) Naval Aviation 26,000_ FORCES BY ROLE Naval aviation fighter/ground-attack units adopted brigade structure in 2017 BOMBER 2 regt with H-6DU/G/J FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 bde with J-10A/S Firebird; Su-30MK2 Flanker G 1 bde with J-11B/BS Flanker L 1 bde with J-11B/BS Flanker L; JH-7A Flounder 1 bde with J-8F Finback; JH-7 A Flounder 2 regt with J-15 Flanker GROUND ATTACK 1 bde with JH-7 Flounder ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 2 regt with KQ-200 ELINT/ISR/ASW 1 regt with Y-8JB/X; Y-9JZ; KQ-200 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 3 regt with Y-8J; KJ-200; KJ-500 TRANSPORT 1 regt with Y-7H; Y-8C; CRJ-200/700 TRAINING 1 regt with CJ-6A 1 regt with HY-7 2 regt with JL-8 1 regt with JL-9G 1 regt with JL-9 1 regt with JL-10 1 regt with Z-9C HELICOPTER 1 regt with Ka-27PS; Ka-28; Ka-31 1 regt with AS365N; Z-9C/D; Z-8J/JH 1 regt with Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J; Z-8S; Z-9C/D AIR DEFENCE 2 SAM bde with HQ-9; HQ-9B: HQ-6A EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 456 combat capable BBR 45: 27 H-6G/G mod; 18 H-6J FTR 24 J-8F Finback EGA 179: 16 J-10A Firebird; 7 J-10S Firebird; 72 J-11B/ BS Flanker L; £60 J-15 Flanker; 24 Su-30MK2 Flanker G ATK 120:48 JH-7; 72 JH-7A Flounder ASW 20+ KQ-200 ELINT 13: 4 Y-8JB High New 2; 3 Y-8X; 6 Y-9JZ AEW&C 24: 6 KJ-200 Moth; 14+ KJ-500; 4 Y-8J Mask TKR 5 H-6DU TPT 38: Medium 6 Y-8C; Light 28: 20 Y-5; 2 Y-7G; 6 Y-7H; PAX 4: 2 CRJ-200; 2 CRJ-700 TRG 118:38 CJ-6; 12 HY-7; 16 JL-8*; 28 JL-9*; 12 JL-9G*; 12 JL-10* HELICOPTERS ASW 33:14 Ka-28 Helix A; 14 Z-9C; 5 Z-18F AEW12: 9 Ka-31; 3 Z-18 AEW MRH 18: 7 AS365N; 11 Z-9D SAR 11: 3 Ka-27PS; 4 Z-8JH; 2 Z-8S; 2 Z-9S TPT 42: Heavy 34: 8 SA321 Super Frelon; 9 Z-8; 13 Z-8 J; 4 Z-18; Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip 242 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR Heavy BZK-005; Medium BZK-007 AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range 32:16 HQ-9 (CH-SA-9); 16 HQ-9B (CH-SA-21) Short-range HQ-6A (CH-SA-6) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES A AM • IR PL-5; PL-8; PL-9; R-73 (RS-AA-llA^rc/ier); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); SARH PL-11; ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder); PL-12 (CH-AA-7 A Adze) ASM KD-88 AShM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B Krypton); YJ-12; YJ-61; YJ-8K; YJ-83K; YJ-9 ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton); YJ-91 BOMBS Laser-guided: LS-500J TV-guided: KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR Marines £35,000_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bde MANOEUVRE Mechanised 3 mne bde Amphibious 3 mne bde HELICOPTER 1 bde (forming) with Z-8C EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 80+: e80 ZTD-05; some ZTQ-15 ASLT £50 ZTL-11 IFV £150 ZBL-08 AAV £240 ZBD-05 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS HJ-73; HJ-8 RCL 120mm Type-98 ARTILLERY 40+ SP 122mm 40+: 20+ PLZ-07; 20+ PLZ-89 MRL 107mm PH-63 MOR 82mm£ HELICOPTERS TPT • Heavy 5 Z-8C AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence HN-5 (CH-SA-3); FN-6 (CH-SA-10); QW-2 (CH-SA-8) Air Force 395,000_ FORCES BY ROLE BOMBER 1 regt with H-6M 2 regt with H-6H 4 regt with H-6K 1 bde with H-6N (forming) FIGHTER 1 bde with J-7 Fishcan 5 bde with J-7E Fishcan 5 bde with J-7G Fishcan 1 bde with J-8F/H Finback 2 bde with J-ll A/Su-27UBK Flanker 3 bde with J-ll A/J-11B/Su-27UBK Flanker 2 bde with J-11B/BS Flanker L FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 5 bde with J-10 A/S Firebird 1 bde with J-10B/S Firebird 6 bde with J-10C/S Firebird 1 bde with Su-35 Flanker M; Su-30MKK Flanker G 6 bde with J-16 Flanker 2 bde with Su-30MKK Flanker G 5 bde withJ-20A GROUND ATTACK 5 bde with JH-7A Flounder ELECTRONIC WARFARE 4 regt with Y-8CB/DZ/G/XZ; Y-9G/XZ ISR 1 regt with JZ-8F Finback* 1 bde with JZ-8F Finback* AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 regt with KJ-500 1 regt with KJ-200 Moth; KJ-2000; Y-8T SEARCH & RESCUE 4 bde with Y-5; Mi-171E; Z-8 1 regt with Y-5; Mi-171E; Z-8 TANKER 1 bde with H-6U TRANSPORT 1 (VIP) regt with A319; B-737; CRJ-200/700 1 (VIP) regt with Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D 1 regt with I1-76MD/TD Candid 1 regt with I1-76MD Candid; 11-78 Midas 1 regt with Y-7 2 regt with Y-9 2 regt with Y-20/YY-20A TRAINING 5 bde with CJ-6/6A/6B; Y-5 3 bde with J-7; JJ-7A 14 bde with JJ-7A; JL-8; JL-9; JL-10; J-10A/S 1 trg bde with Y-7; Y-8C TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 (VIP) regt with AS332 Super Puma; H225 ISR UAV 2bdewithGJ-l;GJ-2 1 regt with WZ-7 AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM div (3 SAM regt) 24 SAM bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 2,566 combat capable BBR176: £12 H-6A (trg role); £60 H-6H/M; £100 H-6K; 4+ H-6N FTR 446:50 J-7 Fishcan; 119 J-7E Fishcan; 120 J-7G Fishcan; 30 J-8F/H Finback; 95 J-ll; 32 Su-27UBKFlanker EGA 1,182+: 220 J-10A Firebird; 55 J-10B Firebird; 220 J-10C Firebird; 70 J-10S Firebird; 130 J-11B/BS Flanker L; 250 J-16 Flanker; 140+ J-20A; 73 Su-30MKK Flanker G; 24 Su-35 Flanker M ATK 120 JH-7A Flounder EW 31: £12 J-16D Flanker*; 4 Y-8CB High New 1; 2 Y-8DZ; 6 Y-8G High New 3; 2 Y-8XZ High New 7; 3 Y-9G; 2 Y-9XZ ELINT 4 Tu-154M/D Careless ISR 48: 24 JZ-8 Finback*; 24 JZ-8F Finback* Asia 243 AEW&C 28: 4 KJ-200 Moth; 20 KJ-500; 4 KJ-2000 C2 5: 2 B-737; 3 Y-8T High New 4 TKR 13:10 H-6U; 3 11-78 Midas TKR/TPT 8 YY-20A TPT 271: Heavy 70: 20 I1-76MD/TD Candid; 50 Y-20; Medium 60: 30 Y-8C; 30 Y-9; Light 111: 70 Y-5; 41 Y-7/Y-7H; PAX 30: 3 A319; 9 B-737 (VIP); 5 CRJ-200; 5 CRJ-700; 8 Tu-154M Careless TRG 1,012+: 400 CJ-6/-6A/-6B; 12+ HY-7; 50 JJ-7*; 150 JJ- 7 A*; 350 JL-8*; 30 JL-9*; 50+ JL-10* HELICOPTERS MRH 22: 20 Z-9; 2 Mi-17V-5 Hip H TPT 31+: Heavy 18+ Z-8; Medium 13+: 6+ AS332 Super Puma (VIP); 3 H225 (VIP); 4+ Mi-171 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 12+ GJ-1; some GJ-2; GJ-11 (in test) ISR • Heavy 14+: 12+ WZ-7; 2+ WZ-8; some WZ-10 (EW/ISR) AIR DEFENCE SAM 862+ Long-range 638+: 180 HQ-9 (CH-SA-9); 80 HQ-9B (CH-SA-21); 130+ HQ-22; 32 S-300PMU (RS-SA-10 Grumble); 64 S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); 120 S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); 32 S-400 (RS-SA-21B Growler) Medium-range 150 HQ-12 (CH-SA-12) Short-range 74+: 50+ HQ-6A (CH-SA-6); 24 HQ-6D (CH-SA-6) GUNS • TOWED • 57mm PG-59 (S-60) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR PL-5B/C; PL-8; R-73 (RS-AA-HA^rc/ier); IIR PL-10 (CH-AA-9); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); SARH PL-11; ARH PL-12 (CH-AA-7A Adze); PL-12A (CH-AA-7B Adze); PL-15 (CH-AA-10); R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder); R-77-1 (RVV-SD) (RS-AA-12B Adder) ASM AKD-9; AKD-10; KD-88; Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge); Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B Krypton); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo) AShM YJ-12 ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton); YJ-91 (Domestically produced Kh-31P variant) AL CM • Conventional CJ-20; YJ(KD)-63 BOMBS Laser-guided: LS-500J; LT-2 TV-guided: KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR Airborne Corps_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bde MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 5 AB bde 1 air aslt bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt bde TRANSPORT 1 bde with Y-5; Y-7; Y-8; Y-12 HELICOPTER 1 regt with WZ-10K; Z-8KA; Z-9WZ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ABCV 180 ZBD-03 APC • APC (T) 4 ZZZ-03 (CP) AUV CS/VN3 mod ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE SP some HJ-9 ARTILLERY 162+ TOWED 122mm £54 PL-96 (D-30) MRL 107mm £54 PH-63 MOR 54+: 82mm some; 100mm 54 AIRCRAFT • TPT 40: Medium 6 Y-8; Light 34: 20 Y-5; 2 Y-7; 12 Y-12D HELICOPTERS ATK 8 WZ-10K CSAR 8 Z-8KA MRH 12 Z-9WZ TPT • Medium Z-20K AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence QW-1 (CH-SA-7) GUNS • TOWED 25mm 54 PG-87 Strategic Support Force s175,000_ The Strategic Support Force reports to the Central Military Commission and is responsible for the PLA's space and cyber capabilities EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGM 4 Type-718 (Yuan Wang) (space and missile tracking) Theatre Commands_ Eastern Theatre Command_ Eastern Theatre Ground Forces_ 71st Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) 72nd Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) 73rd Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) Eastern Theatre Navy_ Coastal defence from south of Lianyungang to Dongshan (approx. 35°10'N to 23°30'N), and to seaward; HQ at Ningbo; support bases at Fujian, Zhoushan, Ningbo 16 SSK; 16 DDGHM; 18 FFGHM; 19 FSGM; £30 PCFG/PCG; £22 MCMV; 3 LPD; £22 LST/M Eastern Theatre Navy Aviation_ 1st Naval Aviation Division (1 AEW&C regt with KJ-500:1 ASW regt with KQ-200) 244 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Other Forces (1 bbr regt with H-6DU/G/J; 1 FGA bde with JH-7; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MK2; J-10A; 1 hel regt with Ka-27PS; Ka-28; Ka-31) Eastern Theatre Air Force_ 10th Bomber Division (1 bbr regt with H-6H; 1 bbr regt with H-6K; 1 bbr regt with H-6M) 26th Special Mission Division (1 AEW&C regt with KJ-500; 1 AEW&C regt with KJ- 200/KJ-2000/Y-8T) Fuzhou Base (1 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MKK; 2 SAM bde) Shanghai Base (1 ftr bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 2 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with J-20A; 1 atk bde with JH-7 A; 1 trg bde with J-10/JL-10; 2 SAM bde) Other Forces (1ISR bde with JZ-8F; 1 SAR bde; 1 Flight Instructor Training Base with CJ-6; JL-8; JL-9; JL-10) Other Forces_ Marines (2 mne bde) Southern Theatre Command Southern Theatre Ground Forces_ 74th Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) 75th Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 3 inf bde, 1 air aslt bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 AD bde) Other Forces (1 (composite) inf bde (Hong Kong); 1 hel sqn (Hong Kong), 1 AD bn (Hong Kong)) Southern Theatre Navy_ Coastal defence from Dongshan (approx. 23°30'N) to VNM border, and to seaward (including Paracel and Spratly islands); HQ at Zhanjiang; support bases at Yulin, Guangzhou 6 SSBN; 2 SSN; 15 SSK; 1 CV; 3 CGHM; 14 DDGHM; 12 FFGHM; 21 FSGM; £30 PCFG/PCG; £16 MCMV; 2 LHD; 5 LPD; £21 LST/M Southern Theatre Navy Aviation_ 3rd Naval Aviation Division (1 ASW regt with KQ-200; 1 AEW&C regt with KJ-500) Other Forces (1 bbr regt with H-6DU/G/J; 1 FGA regt with J-15; 1 FGA bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-11B; JH-7 A; 1 tpt/hel regt with Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J; Z-8S; Z-9C/D; 1 SAM bde) Southern Theatre Air Force_ 8th Bomber Division (2 bbr regt with H-6K) 20th Special Mission Division (3 EW regt with Y-8CB/DZ/G/XZ; Y-9G/XZ) Kunming Base (1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 trg bde with JJ-7A; 1 SAM bde) Nanning Base (1 ftr bde with J-11A; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with J-20A; 1 FGA bde with Su-35; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MKK; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 3 SAM bde) Other Forces (1 tkr bde with H-6U; 1 SAR bde; 1 UAV bde) Other Forces_ Marines (1 spec ops bde; 2 mne bde) Western Theatre Command_ Western Theatre Ground Forces_ 76th Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 2 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) 77th Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde; 3 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) Xinjiang Military District (1 spec ops bde, 3 (high alt) mech div, 1 (high alt) inf div, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 engr regt, 1 hel bde) Xizang Military District (1 spec ops bde; 1 mech inf bde; 2 inf bde; 1 arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 hel bde) Western Theatre Air Force_ 4th Transport Division (2 tpt regt with Y-9; 1 tpt regt with Y-20A) Lanzhou Base (1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 1 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 SAM bde) Urumqi Base (1 ftr bde with J-8F/H; 1 FGA bde with J-20A; 1 atk bde with JH-7 A; 2 SAM bde) Lhasa Base (1 SAM bde) Xi'an Flying Academy (1 trg bde with JJ-7A; 1 trg bde with JL-9A; 2 trg bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with Y-7; Y-8) Other Forces (1 SAR regt) Northern Theatre Command_ Northern Theatre Ground Forces_ 78th Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) 79th Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, Asia 245 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) 80th Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde; 2 mech inf bde, 3 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) Northern Theatre Navy_ Coastal defence from the DPRK border (Yalu River) to south of Lianyungang (approx 35°10'N), and to seaward; HQ at Qingdao; support bases at Lushun, Qingdao. 4 SSN; 15 SSK; 1 CV; 4 CGHM; 10 DDGHM; 2 DDGM; 11 FFGHM; 10 FSGM; £18 PCFG/PCG; e18 MCMV; £7 LST/M Northern Theatre Navy Aviation_ 2nd Naval Air Division (1 EW/ISR/ASW regt with KQ-200; Y-8JB/X; Y-9JZ; 1 AEW&C regt with Y-8J; KJ-200; KJ-500) Other Forces (1 FGA regt with J-15; 1 FGA bde with JH-7A; J-8F; 1 hel regt with AS365N; Z-8J/JH; Z-9C/D1 tpt regt with Y-7H/Y-8C/CRJ-200/CRJ-700; 1 trg regt with CJ-6A; 2 trg regt with JL-8; 1 trg regt with HY-7; 1 trg regt with JL-9G; 1 trg regt with JL-9; 1 trg regt with JL-10) Northern Theatre Air Force_ 16th Special Mission Division (1 EW regt with Y-8CB/G; 1 ISR regt with JZ-8F; 1 UAV regt with WZ-7) Dalian Base (1 ftr bde with J-7; 2 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 ftr bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 FGA bde with J-10B; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with J-20A; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 3 SAM bde) Jinan Base (1 ftr bde with J-7G; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 2 SAM bde) Harbin Flying Academy (1 trg bde with CJ-6; Y-5; 1 trg bde with H-6; HY-7; 2 trg bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with JL-9) Other Forces (1 SAR bde) Other Forces_ Marines (2 mne bde; 1 hel bde) Central Theatre Command_ Central Theatre Ground Forces_ 81st Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 1 (OPFOR) armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 avn bde, 1 AD bde) 82nd Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 2 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) 83rd Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 4 mech inf bde, 1 air aslt bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 AD bde) Other Forces (2 (Beijing) gd div) Central Theatre Air Force_ 13th Transport Division (1 tpt regt with Y-20A; 1 tpt regt with I1-76MD/TD; 1 tpt regt with I1-76MD; 11-78) 34th VIP Transport Division (1 tpt regt with A319; B-737; CRJ200/700; 1 tpt regt with Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D; 1 tpt regt with Y-7; 1 hel regt with AS332; H225) 36th Bomber Division (1 bbr regt with H-6K; 1 bbr regt with H-6H) Datong Base (3 ftr bde with J-7E/G; 1 ftr bde with J-ll A/B; 2 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 SAM div; 4 SAM bde) Wuhan Base (2 ftr bde with J-7E/G; 1 ftr bde with J-ll A; 1 FGA bde with J-20A; 1 trg bde with J-7/JJ-7A; 3 SAM bde) Shijiazhuang Flying Academy (3 trg bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with JL-8; JL-10) Airborne Corps (5 AB bde; 1 air aslt bde; 1 tpt bde; 1 hel regt) Other Forces (1 bbr bde with H-6N; 1 SAR bde) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 500,000+ active People's Armed Police £500,000_ In 2018 the People's Armed Police (PAP) divested its border-defence, firefighting, gold, forest, hydropower and security-guard units. In addition to the forces listed below, PAP also has 32 regional commands, each with one or more mobile units FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 (1st Mobile) paramilitary corps (3 SF regt; 9 (mobile) paramilitary units; 1 engr/CBRN unit; 1 hel unit) 1 (2nd Mobile) paramilitary corps (2 SF unit; 9 (mobile) paramilitary units; 1 engr/CBRN unit; 1 hel unit) China Coast Guard (CCG)_ In 2018 the CCG was moved from the authority of the State Oceanic Administration to that of the People's Armed Police. The CCG is currently reorganising its pennant-number system, making it problematic to assess the number of vessels that entered service since 2019. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 546 PSOH 42: 2 Zhaotou with 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 med hel) 3 Type-053H2G (Jiangwei I) (capacity 1 med hel) (ex-PLAN) 7 Type-054 mod (Zhaoduan) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) 4 Shuoshi II (capacity 1 med hel) 2 Shucha I (capacity 1 med hel) 10 Shucha II (capacity 1 med hel) 12 Zhaoyu (capacity 1 med hel) 1 Zhaochang (capacity 1 med hel) 1 Zhongyang (capacity 1 med hel) 246 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 PSO 49: 9 Type-718B (Zhaojun) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 1 Type-922 (Dalang I) (ex-PLAN) 1 Type-625C (Hai Yang) (ex-PLAN) 1 Type-053H Qianghu I) (ex-PLAN) 1 Type-636A (Kanjie) with 1 hel landing platform (ex-PLAN) 6 Shusheng with 1 hel landing platform 3 Shuwu 3 Tuzhong (ex-PLAN) 4 Type-056 mod (Zhaogao) with 1 hel landing platform 1 Type-918 (Wolei) (ex-PLAN) 1 Xitag ^"g Hong 9 (ex-PLAN) 4 Zhaolai with 1 hel landing platform 14 Zhaotim PCOH 22 Type-056 Qiangdao) (ex-PLAN) with 1 76mm gun PCO 29: 1 State I; 4 State II; 14 State III; 3 Staj/oh; 4 Zhaodai; 3 Zhaoming PCC 104: 25+ Type-618B-II; 45 HtaiVi I/II; 1 Stazao II; 14 Shuzao III; 10 Zhongeng; 2 Zhongmel; 7 Zhongsui PB/PBF 300+ AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS 2 LST 2 Type-072-II (Yurmg I) (ex-PLAN; used as hospital vessels and island supply) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 27 AG 6: 5+ Kaobo; 1 Shutu AGB 1 Type-210 (Yanbing) (ex-PLAN) AGOR 9: 4 Haijian; 3 Shuguang 04 (ex-PLAN); w2 Xiang Yang Hong 9 ATF 11 AIRCRAFT MP 1+ MA60H TPT • Light Y-12 (MP role) HELICOPTERS TPT • Light Z-9 Maritime Militia_ Composed of full- and part-time personnel. Reports to PLA command and trains to assist PLAN and CCG in a variety of military roles. These include ISR, maritime law enforcement, island supply, troop transport and supporting sovereignty claims. The Maritime Militia operates a variety of civilian vessels including fishing boats and oil tankers. DEPLOYMENT_ DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 233; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital DJIBOUTI: 240; 1 mne coy(-); 1 med unit; 2 ZTL-11; 8 ZBL-08; 1 LPD; 1 ESD GULF OF ADEN: 1 DDGHM; 1 FFGHM; 1AORH LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 419; 2 engr coy; 1 med coy MALI: UN • MINUSMA 430; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 5 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,054; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 87; 1 hel fit with 2 Mi-171 TAJIKISTAN: £300 (trg) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 11 Fiji FJI Fijian Dollar FJD 2021 2022 2023 GDP FJD 8.90bn 10.5bn USD 4.30bn 4.86bn per capita USD 4,749 5,341 Growth % -5.1 12.5 Inflation % 0.2 4.7 Def bdgt FJD 95 m 94m 109m USD 45.8m 43.6m USD1=FJD 2.07 2.16 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) • 74 2008--- -2015-- ---2022 Population 943,737 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 13.1 % 4.1 % 3.7% 3.9% 22.1% 3.8% Female 12.6% 4.0% 3.5% 3.8% 21.0% 4.4% Capabilities The Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) are an infantry-dominated defence force with a small naval element. The RFMF has intervened heavily in Fiji's domestic politics and after a third coup in 2006, democracy was effectively suspended until 2014. Guidelines issued in 2018 emphasised the need to confront non-traditional threats such as climate change, terrorism and transnational crime. The RFMF is developing a deployable-force headquarters, funded by Australia, which will also administer and train personnel for peacekeeping and HA/DR roles. Engagement in international peacekeeping operations is an important source of revenue for the government. Fiji's principal defence relationships are with Australia and New Zealand, with which the RFMF regularly conducts training and maritime patrols. A status of forces agreement was signed with Australia in October 2022. Defence relations with China, South Korea and the US are growing, with all three countries providing training or donating equipment. The RFMF is attempting to improve the quality of senior NCOs and to raise standards across the rest of the force. Fiji has no significant defence industry and is only able to carry out basic equipment maintenance domestically. Significant upgrade and maintenance work is usually conducted in Australia. ACTIVE 4,040 (Army 3,700 Navy 340) RESERVE £6,000 (to age 45) Asia 247 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE India IND Army 3,700 (incl 300 recalled reserves) FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops coy MANOEUVRE Light 3 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bty 1 engr bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 log bn Reserves 6,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 5 inf bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AUV 10 Bushmaster IMV ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 Navy 340_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4: PCO 1 Guardian (AUS Bay mod) PB 3:1 Kula (AUS Pacific); 2 Levuka LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 AGHS 2:1 Kacau; 1 Volasiga DEPLOYMENT_ EGYPT: MFO 170; elm 1 inf bn IRAQ: UN • UN AMI 174; 2 sy unit LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3 SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 150; 1 inf coy Indian Rupee INR 2021 2022 GDP INR 237tr 273tr USD 3.18tr 3.47tr per capita USD 2,280 2,466 Growth % 8.7 6.8 Inflation % 5.5 6.9 Def bdgt [a] INR 5.03tr 5.25tr USD 67.5bn 66.6bn USD1=INR 74.50 78.80 2023 [a] Includes defence civil estimates, which include military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 61.4 27.8 2008 2015 - -2022 Population 1,389,637,446 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 13.2% 4.6% 4.7% 4.6% 21.3% 3.2% Female 11.9% 4.2% 4.2% 4.1% 20.5% 3.7% Capabilities India continues to modernise its armed forces, though progress in some areas remains slow. The armed forces are orientated against both Pakistan and China. India is looking to improve military infrastructure on its northern border. Mutual reaffirmation of the 2003 ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan reduced conflict across the Line of Control in the disputed region of Kashmir. There is growing focus on Indian Ocean security. Indian forces participate in numerous bilateral and multilateral exercises, and the country is one of the main troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. In April 2022, it was announced after the annual US-India 2+2 talks that India would join the Combined Maritime Forces multinational maritime partnership as an associate member. Large numbers of paramilitary forces remain employed in the internal-security role. A Joint Armed Forces Doctrine was issued in 2017. It set out doctrine for Indian nuclear command and control, and envisaged an 'emerging triad' of space, cyber and special-operations capabilities complementing conventional land, sea and air capabilities. India continues to develop its nuclear capabilities. Army doctrine issued in late 2018 identified requirements including for'integrated battle groups'and improved cyber, information-warfare and electronic-warfare capabilities. In 2020 the first Chief of Defence Staff was appointed. India operates significant quantities of equipment of Soviet as well as Russian origin and there is cooperation with Russia on missile developments. In 2022 concerns were raised over dependence on Russia for some weapons and spare parts, after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Recent imports of foreign equipment have primarily been from the US and France. However, the overall capability of India's large conventional forces is limited by inadequate logistics, maintenance and shortages of ammunition, spare parts and maintenance personnel. Though modernisation continues, many equipment projects have seen delays and cost overruns, particularly indigenous systems. The government's 'Make in India' policy aims to strengthen the defence-industrial base. 248 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 ACTIVE 1,463,700 (Army 1,237,000 Navy 73,850 Air 139,850 Coast Guard 13,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,608,150 RESERVE 1,155,000 (Army 960,000 Navy 55,000 Air 140,000) Gendarmerie& Paramilitary 941,000 Army first-line reserves (300,000) within 5 years of full-time service, further 500,000 have commitment to age 50 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Strategic Forces Command_ Strategic Forces Command (SFC) is a tri-service command established in 2003. The commander-in-chief of SFC, a senior three-star military officer, manages and administers all strategic forces through army, navy and air-force chains of command FORCES BY ROLE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM bde with Agni I 1IRBM bde with Agni II/III 2 SRBM bde with SS-250 Prithvi II EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 54 ICBM • Nuclear Agni V (in test) IRBM • Nuclear z4Agni Hl; Agni IV (entering service) MRBM • Nuclear e8 Agni II SRBM • Nuclear 54: til Agni I; e42 SS-250 Prithvi II; some SS-350 Dhanush (naval testbed) SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 1 Arihant with 4 1-cell VLS with K-15 Sagarika SLBM, 6 533mm TT AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AL CM • Nuclear Nirbhay (likely nuclear capable; in development) Some Indian Air Force assets (such as Mirage 2000H or Su-30MKI) may be tasked with a strategic role Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 25 NAVIGATION, POSITIONING, TIMING: 7IRNSS COMMUNICATIONS: 2 GSAT-7/-7A ISR 15: 9 Cartosat; 6 RISAT ELINT/SIGINT 1 EMISAT Army 1,237,000_ 6 Regional Comd HQ (Northern, Western, Central, Southern, Eastern, Southwestern), 1 Training Comd (ARTRAC) FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 4 (strike) corps HQ 10 (holding) corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 8 SF bn MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 armd div (3 armd bde, 1 arty bde (2 arty regt)) 1 armd div (3 armd bde, 1 SP arty bde (2 SP arty regt)) 8 indep armd bde Mechanised 6 (RAPID) mech inf div (1 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 arty bde) 2 indep mech bde Light 15 inf div (2-5 inf bde, 1 arty bde) 1 inf div (forming) 7 indep inf bde 12 mtn div (3-4 mtn inf bde, 1 arty bde) 2 indep mtn bde Air Manoeuvre 1 para bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 IRBM bde with Agni II/III 1 SRBM bde with Agni I 2 SRBM bde with SS-250 Prithvi II 3 GLCM regt with PJ-10 Brahmos COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty div (2 arty bde, 1 MRL bde) 2 indep arty bde 4 engr bde ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 atk hel sqn HELICOPTER 25 hel sqn AIR DEFENCE 8 AD bde Reserve Organisations_ Reserves 300,000 reservists (first-line reserve within 5 years full-time service); 500,000 reservists (commitment until age 50) (total 800,000) Territorial Army 160,000 reservists (only 40,000 regular establishment) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 42 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 6 (Railway) engr regt 2 engr regt 1 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 6 ecological bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 3,740:122 Arjun; 2,418 T-72M1; e1,200 T-90S (e1,100 various models in store) RECCE Ferret (used for internal-security duties along with some indigenously built armd cars) IFV 3,100: 700 BMP-1; 2,400 BMP-2 Sarath (ind some BMP-2K CP) APC 369+ APC (W) 163:157+ OT-64; 6 TASL IPMV PPV 206+: 165 Casspir; 27 Kalyani M4; some TASL QRFV; 14+ Yukthirath MPV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV BMP-2; FV180 ARV 730+: T-54/T-55; 156 VT-72B; 222 WZT-2; 352 WZT-3 Asia 249 VLB AM-50; BLG-60; BLG T-72; Kartik; MTU-20; MT-55; Sumatra MW24 910 MCV-2 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 110 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) MANPATS 9K113 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); Milan 2 RCL 3,000+: 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm 3,000+ M40A1 (10 per inf bn) ARTILLERY 9,743+ SP 155mm 100 K9 Vajra-T TOWED 3,095+: 105mm 1,350+: 600+ IFG Mkl/Mk2/ Mk3; up to 700 LFG; 50 M-56; 122mm 520 D-30; 130mm £600 M-46 (500 in store) 155mm 625: e300 FH-77B; e200 M-46 (mod); 125 M777A2 MRL 228: 122mm £150 BM-21/LRAR 214mm 36 Pinaka; 300mm 42 9A52 Smerch MOR 6,320+: 81mm 5,000+ El; 120mm £ 1,500 AM-50/E1; SP 120mm El SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS IRBM • Nuclear some ^Igm-Iil (entering service) MRBM • Nuclear e12 Agni-ll SRBM • Nuclear 42: e12 Agni-l; e30 250 Prithvi II GLCM • Conventional 15 PJ-10 Brahmos HELICOPTERS ATK 5 LCH Prachand MRH 342: 79 Dhruv; 12 Lancer; 74 Rudra; 117 SA315B Lama (Cheetah); 60 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 25:13 Nishant; 12 Searcher Mk I/II AIR DEFENCE SAM 748+ Medium-range e48 Akash Short-range 180 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) Point-defence 500+: 50+ 9K33AKM Osa-AKM (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 200 9K31 Strela-1 (RS-SA-9 Gaskin); 250 9K35 Strela-W (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse) SPAAGM 30mm up to 80 2K22 Tunguska (RS-SA-19 Grisori) GUNS 2,315+ SP 23mm 75 ZSU-23-4; ZU-23-2 (truck-mounted); TOWED 2,240+: 20mm Oerlikon (reported); 23mm 320 ZU-23-2; 40mm 1,920 L40/70 Navy 73,850 (incl 7,000 Naval Avn and 1,200 Marines)_ Fleet HQ New Delhi. Commands located at Mumbai, Vishakhapatnam, Kochi and Port Blair EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 16 STRATEGIC • SSBN 1 Arihant with 4 1-cell VLS with K-15 Sagarika SLBM, 6 533mm TT TACTICAL 15 SSK 15: 3 Shishumar (GER T-209/1500) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT mod 1 HWT 1 Shishumar (GER T-209/1500) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84L Harpoon II AShM/SUT mod 1 HWT 7 Sindhughosh (FSU Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with 3M54E1/E Klub-S (RS-SS-N-27A/B) (Klub-S AShM variant unclear) AShM/53-65KE HWT/ TEST-71ME HWT/SET-65E HWT 4 Kalvari (FRA Scorpene) with 6 533mm TT with SM39 Exocet Block 2 AShM PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 28 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 2 1 Vikramaditya (ex-FSU Kiev mod) with 3 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 4 AK630M CIWS (capacity 12 MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum FGA ac; 6 Ka-28 Helix A ASW hel/Ka-31 Helix B AEW hel) 1 Vikrant with 3 AK630M CIWS (to be fitted with Barak 8 SAM) (capacity 30 aircraft including MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum, Ka-31 Helix B, MH-60R Seahawk, Dhruv) DESTROYERS 10 DDGHM 7: 2 Delhi (Project 15) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M38E M-22E Shtil (RS-SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with SET-65E HWT/ Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor; 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity either 2 Dhruv hel/Sea King Mk42A ASW hel) 1 Delhi (Project 15) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M38E M-22E Shtil (RS-SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with SET-65E HWT/Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor; 2 AK630 CIWS, 1100mm gun (capacity either 2 Dhruv hel/Sea King Mk42A ASW hel) 3 Kolkata (Project 15A) with 2 8-cell UVLM VLS with Brahmos AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-8 SAM; 2 twin 533mm TT with SET-65E HWT/Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Dhruv/Sea King Mk42B hel) 1 Visakhapatnam (Project 15B) with 2 8-cell UVLM VLS with Brahmos AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-8 SAM; 2 twin 533mm TT with Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Dhruv/SeaKing Mk42B hel) DDGM 3: 1 Rajput (FSU Kashin) with 2 twin lnchr with P-27 Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 twin ZIF-101 lnchr with4K91 M-l Volnya (RS-SA-N-1 Goa) SAM, 5 single 533mm PTA-51-61ME ASTT with SET-65E HWT/Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity Ka-28 Helix A hel) 2 Rajput (FSU Kashin) with 1 8-cell UVLM VLS with Brahmos AShM, 2 twin lnchr with P-27 Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 1 twin ZIF-101 lnchr with 4K91 M-l Volnya (RS-SA-N-1 Goa) SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with SET-65E HWT/Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A hel) FRIGATES 16 FFGHM 12: 3 Brahmaputra (Project 16A) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 250 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 3 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 2 triple ILAS-3 (B-515) 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)/Sea King Ivlk42 ASW hel) 3 Shivdik (Project 17) with 1 8-cell 3S14E VLS with 3M54TE Klub-N (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/ Brahmos AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 1 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M317E Shtil-1 (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Sea King Mk42B ASW hel) 3 Talwar I with 1 8-cell 3S14E VLS with 3M54TE Klub-N (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM, 1 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M317E Shtil-1 (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-11356 ASTT with SET-65E HWT/Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 Kas/jtan (RS-CADS-N-1) CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 D/irao/Ka-28 HeZix A ASW hel) 3 Talwar II with 1 8-cell UVLM VLS with Brahmos AShM, 1 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M317E Shtil-1 (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-11356 ASTT with SET-65E HWT/Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1100mm gun (capacity 1 D/irao/Ka-28 HeZix A ASW hel) FFH 4 Kamorta (Project 28) with 2 twin 533mm ITTL ASTT with Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerc/i 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Dhruvl Ka-28 HeZix A ASW hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 164 CORVETTES • FSGM 7: 3 Khukri (Project 25) with 2 twin lnchr with P-27 Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 twin lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (for D/icmei/SA316 Alouette III (Chetak)) 4 Kora (Project 25A) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (for D/icmei/SA316 Alouette III (Chetak)) PSOH 10: 4 Saryu with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Dhruv); 6 Sukanya with 4 RBU 2500 A/S mor (capacity 1 SA316 Alouette III (Chetak)) PCFGM 7: 5 Veer (FSU Tarantul) with 4 single lnchr with P-27 Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun 2 Prabal (mod Veer) each with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCMT 1 Abhay (FSU Pauk II) with 1 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53 ASTT with SET-65E, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCC 15:4 Bangaram; 10 Car Nicobar; 1 Trinkat (SDB Mk5) PCF 4 Tarmugli (Car Nicobar mod) PBF 120: 9 Immediate Support Vessel (Rodman 78); 14 Immediate Support Vessel (Craftway); 15 Plascoa 1300 (SPB); 5 Super Dvora; 77 Solas Marine Interceptor AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 1 Jalashwa (ex-US Austin) with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity up to 6 med spt hel; either 9 LCM or 4 LCM and 2 LCAC; 4 LCVP; 930 troops) LANDING SHIPS 8 LSM 3 Kumbhir (FSU Polnochny C) (capacity 5 MBT or 5 APC; 160 troops) LST 5: 2 Magar (capacity 15 MBT or 8 APC or 10 trucks; 500 troops); 3 Magar mod (capacity 11 MBT or 8 APC or 10 trucks; 500 troops) LANDING CRAFT 12 LCT 8 LCU Mk-IV (capacity 1 Arjun MBT/2 T-90 MBT/4IFV/160 troops) LCM 4 LCM 8 (for use in Jalashwa) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 41 AFD 2:1 FDN-1; 1 FDN-2 AGOR 1 Sagardhwani with 1 hel landing platform AGHS 7:1 Makar; 6 Sandhayak AGM 1 D/irat? AO 4 GSL 1,000T Fuel Barge AOL 10:1 Ambika; 2 Poshak; 7 Purak AOR 1 /i/oti with 1 hel landing platform AORH 3:1 yWifr/a (based on Deepak (1967) Bremer Vulkan design); 2 Deepafc with 4 AK630 CIWS AP 3 Nicobar with 1 hel landing platform ASR1 ATF 1 AWT3,4ml7Mdfl AX 1 Tir AXS 4: 2 Mhadei; 2 Tarangini Naval Aviation 7,000_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with Ka-28 Helix A 1 sqn with Sea King Mk42B MARITIME PATROL 4 sqn with BN-2 Islander; Do-228-101 1 sqn with Do-228 1 sqn with I1-38SD May 2 sqn with P-8I Neptune AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with Ka-31 Helix B SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); Sea King Mk42C 4 sqn with Dhruv Mkl/Mklll TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Do-228-101; HS-748M (HAL-748M) TRAINING 1 sqn with Do-228 1 sqn with HJT-16 Kiran Mkl/II, Hawk Mkl32* 1 hel sqn with Sea King Mk42B TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with UH-3H Sea King Asia 251 ISR UAV 3 sqn with Heron; Searcher Mkll EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 74 combat capable FTR 42 MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum ASW15: 3 I1-38SD May; 12 P-8I Neptune MP 12+ Do-228-101 TPT 37: Light 27:17 BN-2 Islander; 10 Do-228 PAX 10 HS-748M (HAL-748M) TRG 29: 6 HJT-16 Kiran Mkl; 6 HJT-16 Kir cm Mkll; 17HawkMkl32* HELICOPTERS ASW 36:12 Ka-28 Helix A; 6 MH-60R Seahawk; 18 Sea King Mk42B MRH 73:10 Dhruv Mkl; 16 Dhruv Mklll; 24 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); 23 SA319 Alouette III AEW11 Ka-31 Hdiz B TPT • Medium 11: 5 Sea King Mk42C; up to 6 UH-3H Sea King UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR 10: Heavy 4 Heron; Medium 6 Searcher Mk II AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-550 Magic/Magic 2; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); ARH: R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder) AShM AGM-84 Harpoon (on P-8I ac); Kh-35 (RS-AS-20 Kayak) BOMBS • TV-guided KAB-500KR/OD Marines el,200 (Additional 1,000 for SPB duties)_ After the Mumbai attacks, the Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB), with 80 PBF, was established to protect critical maritime infrastructure FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (marine) cdo force MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 amph bde Air Force 139,850_ 5 regional air comds: Western (New Delhi), Southwestern (Gandhinagar), Eastern (Shillong), Central (Allahabad), Southern (Trivandrum). 2 support comds: Maintenance (Nagpur) and Training (Bangalore) FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 3 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with Jaguar IB/IS 6 sqn with MiG-21 Bison 3 sqn with Mirage 2000E/ED/I/IT (2000H/TH - secondary ECM role) 2 sqn with Rafale DH/EH 11 sqn with Su-30MKI Flanker 2 sqn with Tejas ANTI SURFACE WARFARE 1 sqn with Jaguar IM ISR 1 unit with Gulfstream IV SRA-4 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with I1-76TD Phalcon TANKER 1 sqn with 11-78 Midas TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III 5 sqn with An-32/An-32RE Cline 1 (comms) sqn with B-737; B-737BBJ; EMB-135BJ 4 sqn with Do-228; HS-748 1 sqn with I1-76MD Candid 1 fit with HS-748 TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with Su-30MKI Flanker ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AH-64E Apache Guardian 1 sqn with LCH Prachand 2 sqn with Mi-25 Hind; Mi-35 Hind TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 5 sqn with Dhruv 7 sqn with Mi-17/Mi-17-lV Hip H 12 sqn with Mi-17V-5 Hip H 2 sqn with SA316B Alouette III {Chetak) 1 fit with Mi-26 Halo 2 fit with SA315B Lama (Cheetah) 2 fit with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak) ISR UAV 5 sqn with Heron; Searcher Mkll SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 2 GLCM sqn with PJ-10 Brahmos AIR DEFENCE 6 sqn with 9K33M3 Osa-AKM (RS-SA-8B Gecko) 8 sqn with Akash 2 sqn with Barak-8 MR-SAM 25 sqn with S-125M Pechora-U (RS-SA-3B Goa) 2 sqn with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) 10 fit with 9K38 Igla-l (RS-SA-18 Grouse) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 800 combat capable FTR 61: 54 MiG-29 Fulcrum (ind 12+ MiG-29UPG); 7 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B EGA 523: 109 MiG-21 Bison; 37 MiG-21U/UM Mongol; 38 Mirage 2000E/I (2000H); 10 Mirage 2000ED/IT (2000TH); 8 Rafale DH; 28 Rafale EH; 263 Su-30MKI Flanker H; 30 Tejas ATK 115: 28 Jaguar IB; 79 Jaguar IS; 8 Jaguar IM ISR 3 Gulfstream IV SRA-4 AEW&C 5: 2 EMB-145AEW Netra (1 more in test); 3 I1-76TD Phalcon TKR 6 11-78 Midas TPT 243: Heavy 28:11 C-17A Globemaster III; 17 I1-76MD Candid; Medium 10 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 141:47 An-32; 55 An-32RE Cline; 35 Do-228; 4 EMB-135BJ; PAX 64: 1 B-707; 4 B-737; 3 B-737BBJ; 56 HS-748 TRG 308: 101 Hawk Mkl32*; 90 HJT-16 Kiran Mkl/IA; 42 HJT-16 Kiran Mkll; 75 PC-7 Turbo Trainer Mkll HELICOPTERS ATK 43:22 AH-64E Apache Guardian; 4 LCH Prachand; 17 Mi-25/Mi-35 Hind 252 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 MRH 402: 60 Dhruv; 35 Mi-17 Hip H; 45 Mi-17-lV Hip H; 148 Mi-17V-5 Hip H; 59 SA315B Lama (Cheetah); 39 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); 16 Rudra TPT • Heavy 16:15 CH-47F Chinook; 1 Mi-26 Halo UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Heavy 9 Heron; Medium some Searcher Mkll LOITERING & DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS Harop AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range 16 S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) Medium-range 72: z(AAkash; 8 Barak-8 (MRSAM) Short-range S-125M Pechora-M (RS-SA-3B Goa); Spyder-SR Point-defence 9K33M3 Osa-AKM (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer) R-550 Magic; IIR Mica IR; IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); SARH Super 530D ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder); Mica RF AShM AGM-84 Harpoon; AM39 Exocet; Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B Krypton) ASM AASM; AGM-114L/R Hellfire; Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge); Kh-59 (RS-AS-13 Kingbolt); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo); AS-30; Popeye II (Crystal Maze) ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A Kegler); Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton) ALCM Conventional SCALP-EG Nuclear Nirbhay (likely nuclear capable; in development) BOMBS INS/SAT guided Spice Laser-guided Griffin; KAB-500L; Paveway II TV-guided KAB-500KR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS GLCM • Conventional PJ-10 Brahmos Coast Guard 13,000_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 140 PSOH 27: 2 Sankalp (capacity 1 Chetak/Dhruv hel); 4 Samar with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Chetak/Dhruv hel); 11 Samarth; 7 Vikram (capacity 1 Dhruv hel); 3 Vishwast (capacity 1 Dhruv hel) PSO 3 Samudra Prahari with 1 hel landing platform PCC 44: 20 Aadesh; 8 Rajshree (Flight I); 4 Rajshree (Flight II) 5 RaniAbbakka; 7 Sarojini Naidu PBF 66: 6 C-154; 2 C-141; 11 C-143; 47 C-401 AMPHIBIOUS • UCAC 17: 5 H-181 (Griffon 8000TD); 12 H-187 (Griffon 8000TD) AIRCRAFT • MP 23 Do-228-101 HELICOPTERS • MRH 37:4 Dhruv Mkl; 16 Dhruv Mklll; 17 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,608,150_ Rashtriya Rifles 65,000_ Ministry of Defence. 15 sector HQ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 65 paramilitary bn Assam Rifles 65,150_ Ministry of Home Affairs. Security within northeastern states, mainly army-officered; better trained than BSF FORCES BY ROLE Equipped to roughly same standard as an army inf bn COMMAND 7 HQ MANOEUVRE Other 46 paramilitary bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 252 Border Security Force 263,900_ Ministry of Home Affairs FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 192 paramilitary bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Small arms, It arty, some anti-tank weapons ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 942+ AIRCRAFT • TPT some (air spt) HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 Mi-17V-5 Hip Central Industrial Security Force 144,400 (lightly armed security guards)_ Ministry of Home Affairs. Guards public-sector locations Central Reserve Police Force 324,800_ Ministry of Home Affairs. Internal-security duties, only lightly armed, deployable throughout the country FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 215 paramilitary bn 15 (rapid action force) paramilitary bn 10 (CoBRA) paramilitary bn 6 (Mahila) paramilitary bn (female) 2sy gp COMBAT SUPPORT 5 sigs bn Defence Security Corps 31,000_ Provides security at Defence Ministry sites Indo-Tibetan Border Police 89,450_ Ministry of Home Affairs. Tibetan border security SF/ guerrilla-warfare and high-altitude-warfare specialists FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 56 paramilitary bn Asia 253 National Security Guards 12,000_ Anti-terrorism contingency deployment force, comprising elements of the armed forces, CRPF and Border Security Force Railway Protection Forces 70,000_ Sashastra Seema Bal 79,450_ Guards the borders with Nepal and Bhutan FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 73 paramilitary bn Special Frontier Force 10,000_ Mainly ethnic Tibetans Special Protection Group 3,000_ Protection of ministers and senior officials State Armed Police 450,000_ For duty primarily in home state only, but can be moved to other states. Some bn with GPMG and army-standard infantry weapons and equipment FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 144 (India Reserve Police) paramilitary bn Reserve Organisations_ Civil Defence 500,000 reservists Operate in 225 categorised towns in 32 states. Some units for NBC defence Home Guard 441,000 reservists (547,000 authorised str) In all states except Arunachal Pradesh and Kerala; men on reserve lists, no trg. Not armed in peacetime. Used for civil defence, rescue and firefighting provision in wartime; 6 bn (created to protect tea plantations in Assam) DEPLOYMENT_ CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 1 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1,891; 2 inf bn; 1 med coy LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 895; 1 inf bn; 1 med coy MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2 SOMALIA: UN • UNSOM 1 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2,396; 2 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 fd hospital SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 325; 1 mech inf bn(-) SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 198; 1 inf pi, 1 MP pi, 1 log coy(-) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3 FOREIGN FORCES_ Total numbers for UNMOGIP mission in India and Pakistan Argentina 3 Croatia 8 Italy 2 Korea, Republic of 7 Mexico 1 Philippines 5 Romania 2 Sweden 4 Switzerland 3 Thailand 6 Uruguay 3 Indonesia IDN Indonesian Rupiah IDR 2021 2022 2023 GDP IDR 16971tr 18988tr USD 1.19tr 1.29tr per capita USD 4,361 4,691 Growth % 3.7 5.3 Inflation % 1.6 4.6 Def bdgt IDR 120tr 133tr 132tr USD 8.41 bn 9.06bn FMA (US) USD 14m 14m 14m USD1=IDR 14293.37 14725.86 Real-terms defence b udget trend (USDb n, constant 2015) 8.23 3.30 -*3fl1 ^ - 1 HI" ZUUo ZU 1 D jLKJjLjL Population 277 329,163 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 12.6% 4.3% 4.1 % 3.9% 21.7% 3 .4% Female 12.0% 4.1% 3.9% 3.7% 22.2% 4 .0% Capabilities The Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed Forces) are the largest armed forces in Southeast Asia. They have traditionally been concerned primarily with internal security and counter-insurgency. The army remains the dominant service and is deployed operationally for counter-insurgency tasks in West Papua and in a counter-terrorist role in central Sulawesi. A modernisation plan, adopted in 2010, called for establishing a 'Minimum Essential Force' including strengthened naval and air forces by 2024. The 2015 defence White Paper outlined Indonesia's'Global Maritime Fulcrum' policy and advocated building up maritime, satellite and UAV capabilities. Some of these objectives were reflected in the 2020-24 State Defence Policy document. In 2018, Indonesia expanded its forces in the country's east and established a third naval fleet command and a third air-force regional command in that region. A new army reserve division and a third marine corps group were also established in the east. Indonesia has no formal defence alliances but there are a number of defence-cooperation agreements with regional and extra-regional partners. China has supplied some military equipment, including armed UAVs. 254 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 The armed forces have contributed to UN and other international peacekeeping operations and exercise regularly with Australian and US armed forces as well as those of other Southeast Asian states. The TNI's inventory comprises equipment from diverse international sources, and the country uses technology-transfer agreements to develop its national defence industry which has significant capabilities in specific areas, including naval construction and the manufacture of transport aircraft and helicopters. Indonesia consolidated its five leading defence firms into the state-owned Defend ID in 2022 as part of plans to achieve more than 40% localisation in defence production. ACTIVE 395,500 (Army 300,400 Navy 65,000 Air 30,100) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 280,000 Conscription liability 24 months selective conscription authorised (not required by law) RESERVE 400,000 Army cadre units; numerical str n.k., obligation to age 45 for officers ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army £300,400_ Mil Area Commands (KODAM)_ 15 comd (I, II, III, IV, V, VI, IX, XII, XIII, XIV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, Jaya & Iskandar Muda) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 3 armd cav bn 8 cav bn 1 mech inf bde (1 cav bn, 3 mech inf bn) 1 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn) 3 indep mech inf bn Light 1 inf bde (3 cdo bn) 1 inf bde (2 cdo bn, 1 inf bn) 1 inf bde (1 cdo bn, 2 inf bn) 2 inf bde (3 infbn) 3 inf bde (1 cdo bn, 1 inf bn) 3 inf bde (2 infbn) 24 indep inf bn 20 indep cdo bn COMBAT SUPPORT I SP arty bn II fd arty bn 11 cbt engr bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 4 construction bn AVIATION 1 composite avn sqn HELICOPTER 1 hel sqn with Bo-105; Bell 205A; Bell 412; Bell 412EPI Twin Huey; AH-64E Apache Guardian 1 hel sqn Mi-35P Hind; Mi-17V-5 Hip H AIR DEFENCE 1 AD regt (2 ADA bn, 1 SAM unit) 9 ADA bn 3 SAM unit Special Forces Command (KOPASSUS) FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 3 SF gp (total; 2 cdo/para unit, 1 CT unit, 1 int unit) Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 div HQ MANOEUVRE Armoured 2tkbn Mechanised 1 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn) Light 2 inf bde (3 cdo bn) 1 inf bde (2 infbn) Air Manoeuvre 3 AB bde (3 AB bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty regt (1 SP arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 1 fd arty bn) 1 fd arty bn 2 cbt engr bn AIR DEFENCE 3ADbn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 103; 42 Leopard 2A4; 61 Leopard 2RI LT TK 350; 275 AMX-13 (partially upgraded); 15 PT-76; 60 FV101 Scorpion-90 ASLT 7 Babak RECCE 142; 55 Ferret (13 upgraded); 69 Saladin (16 upgraded); 18 VBL IF V 64; 22 Black Fox; 42 Marder 1 A3 APC 860+ APC (T) 267; 75 AMX-VCI; 34 BTR-50PK; 15 FV4333 Stornier; 143 M113A1-B APC (W) 593+; 376 Anoa; some Barracuda; 40 BTR-40; 45 FV603 Saracen (14 upgraded); 100 LAV-150 Commando; 32 VAB-VTT PPV some Casspir AUV 39; 14 APR-1; 3 Bushmaster; 22 Commando Ranger; Komodo 4x4 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 4; 3 PiPz-2RI Dachs; 1 M113A1-B-GN ARV 15+; 2 AMX-13; 6 AMX-VCI; 3 BREM-2; 4 BPz-3 Büffel; Stormer; T-54/T-55 VLB 19; 10 AMX-13; 3 BPR Biber-1; 4 M3; 2 Stormer ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; SS.ll; Milan; 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) RCL 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1 RL 89mm LRAC ARTILLERY 1,243+ SP 92; 105mm 20 AMX Mk61; 155mm 72; 54 CAESAR; 18 M109A4 TOWED 133+; 105mm 110+; some KH-178; 60 M101; 50 M-56; 155mm 23; 5 FH-88; 18 KH-179 MRL 127mm 63 ASTROS II Mk6 MOR 955; 81mm 800; 120mm 155; 75 Brandt; 80 UBM 52 Asia 255 AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 2 ADRI LI with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 8 MBT; 500 troops) LANDING CRAFT • LCU 17: 1 ADRI XXXII; 4 ADRI XXXIII; 1 ADRI XXXIX; 1 ADRI XL; 3 ADRI XLI; 2 ADRI XLIV; 2 ADRI XLVI; 2 ADRI XLVIII; 1 ADRI L AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 9: 1 BN-2A Islander, 6 C-212 Aviocar (NC-212); 2 Turbo Commander 680 HELICOPTERS ATK 14: 8 AH-64E ,4pae/ie Guardian; 6 Mi-35P Hind MRH 51: 12 H125M Fennec; 17 Bell 412 Twin Huey (NB-412); 6 Bell 412EPI TiotVi Huey; 16 Mi-17V-5 Hip H TPT • Light 29: 7 Bell 205A; 20 Bo-105 (NBo-105); 2 H120 Colibri TRG up to 19 Hughes 300C AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 95+: 2 Kobra (with 125 GROM-2 msl); Starstreak; TD-2000B (Giant Bow II); 51 Rapier; 42 RBS-70; QW-3 GUNS • TOWED 411: 20mm 121 Rh 202; 23mm Giant Bow; 40mm 90 L/70; 57mm 200 S-60 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114 Hellfire Navy £65,000 (including Marines and Aviation) Three fleets: East (Sorong), Central (Surabaya) and West (Jakarta). Two Forward Operating Bases at Kupang (West Timor) and Tahuna (North Sulawesi) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 4: 1 Cakra (Type-209/1300) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT 3 Nagapasa (Type-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with Black Shark HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7 FRIGATES 7: FFGHM 5: 1 Ahmad Yani (ex-NLD Van Speijk) with 2 twin-cell VLS with 3M55E Yakhont (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM; 2 twin Simbad lnchr (manual) with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel) 2 Ahmad Yani (ex-NLD Van Speijk) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 twin Simbad lnchr (manual) with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel) 2 R.E. Martadinata (SIGMA 10514) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 6-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS- 3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 Millennium CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) FFHM 2 Ahmad Yani (ex-NLD Van Speijk) with 2 twin Simbad lnchr (manual) with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 138 CORVETTES 24 FSGM 7: 3 Bung Tomo with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 18-cell VLS with Sea Wolf SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun (capacity: 1 Bo-105 hel) 4 Diponegoro (SIGMA 9113) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 2 quad Tetral lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FSGH 1 Nala with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 twin Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher System 375mm A/S mor, 1 120mm gun (capacity 1 It hel) FS 16: 2 Fatahillah with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 twin 375mm A/S mor, 1 120mm gun 14 Kapitan Pattimura (GDR Parchim I) with 4 single 400mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 twin 57mm gun PCFG 3 Mandau with 4 single lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 57mm gun PCG 4: 2 Sampari (KCR-60M) with 2 twin lnchr for C-705 AShM 2 Todafc with 2 single lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6), 1 57mm gun PCT 2 Andau with 2 single 533mm TT with SUT, 1 57mm gun PCC 14:4 Kakap with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Pandrong; 4 Pan'; 2 Sampan' (KCR-60M) with 1 NG-18 CIWS; 2 Todafc with 1 57mm gun PBG 8: 2 Clurit with 2 single lnchr with C-705 AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS; 6 CZiin't with 2 single lnchr with C-705 AShM PBF 4 Combat Boat AL D-18 PB 79: 2 Badau (ex-BRN Waspada); 9 Boa; 1 Cucut (ex-SGP Jupiter); 1 Klewang; 4 Kobra; 1 Xrai't; 8 Sibarau; up to 32 Sinabang (KAL 28); 4 Ton/in; 13 Tatite (PC-40); 4 Viper MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8 MCO 2 Ph/ah Rengat MSC 6 Ph/hh Rote (ex-GDR WoZgast) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 6: 1 Dr Soeharso (ex-Tanjung Dalpele) (capacity 2 LCU/ LCVP; 13 tanks; 500 troops; 2 AS332L Super Puma) (used in AH role) 4 Makassar (capacity 2 LCU or 4 LCVP; 13 tanks; 500 troops; 2 AS332L Super Puma) 1 Semarang (IDN Makassar mod) (capacity 2 LCM; 3 hels; 28 vehs; 650 troops) (used in AH role) LANDING SHIPS • LST 25 1 TelukAmboina (capacity 16 tanks; 800 troops) 4 Teluk Bintuni (capacity 10 MBT) 2 Teluk Cirebon (ex-GDR Frosch II) 9 Teluk Gilimanuk (ex-GDR Frosch) 5 Teluk Lada with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 4 LCVP; 470 troops; 15 APC; 10 MBT) 4 Teluk Semangka (capacity 17 tanks; 200 troops) LANDING CRAFT 54 LCM 20 LCU 4 LCVP 30 256 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 19 AGF 1 Multatuli with 1 hel landing platform AGOR 2 Rigel (OSV190) AGOS 1 Leuser AGHS 1 Deiw? Kemfcar (ex-UK Hecla) AGS 1 PhZah Rote (ex-GDR Wolgast) AH 1 Dr Sudirohusodo (Semarang mod) (capacity 3 med hel) AKSL1 AORLH (1 Arun (ex-UK Rover) damaged at sea 2018, non-operational and in repair) AOR 2:1 Bontang with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Tarakan with 1 hel landing platform AOT 1 Sorong AP 2; 1 Tanjung Kambani (troop transport) with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Karang Pilang (troop transport) ATF 1 Soputan AX 2 Kadet AXS 3; 1 Arung Samudera; 1 Bim« Sud; 1 Dewaruci Naval Aviation £l,000_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT MP 29; 3 C212-200; 6 CN235-220 (MPA); 14 N-22B Searchmaster B; 6 N-22SL Searchmaster L TPT • Light 32; 1 Beech 350i King Air (VIP transport); 7 Beech G36 Bonanza; 2 Beech G38 Baron; 17 C-212-200 Aviocar; 3 TB-9 Tampico; 2 TB-10 HELICOPTERS ASW 11 AS565MBe Panther MRH 4 Bell 412 (NB-412) Tiom Huey CSAR 4 H225M Caracas TPT 15; Medium 3 AS332L Super Puma (NAS322L); Light 12; 3 H120 Colibri; 9 Bo-105 (NBo-105) Marines £20,000_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bn MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 mne gp (1 cav regt, 3 mne bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt spt regt, 1 CSS regt) 1 mne gp (forming) 1 mne bde (3 mne bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 65; 10 AMX-10 PAC 90; 55 PT-76t RECCE 21 BRDM-2 IFV 114; 24 AMX-10P; 22 BMP-2; 54 BMP-3F; 2 BTR-4; 12 BTR-80A APC 103; APC (T) 100 BTR-50P; APC (W) 3 BTR-4M AAV 15; 10 LVTP-7A1; 5 M113 Arisgator ARTILLERY 71+ TOWED 50; 105mm 22 LG1 MKII; 122mm 28 M-38 MRL 122mm 21; 4 PHL-90B; 9 RM-70; 8 RM-70 Vampir MOR 81mm some AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • 40mm 5 L/60/L/70; 57mm S-60 Air Force 30,100_ 3 operational comd (East, Central and West) plus trg comd FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with F-16A/B/C/D Fighting Falcon FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with Su-27SK Flanker; Su-30MK Flanker 1 sqn with Su-27SKM Flanker; Su-30MK2 Flanker 2 sqn with Hawk Mkl09*/Mk209* 1 sqn with T-50i Golden Eagle* GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with EMB-314 (A-29) Super Tucano* MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with B-737-200 1 sqn with CN235M-220 MPA; CN235M-110 TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130B/KC-130B Hercules TRANSPORT 1 VIP sqn with B-737-200; C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100-30; F-27-400M Troopship; F-28-1000/3000 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100-30 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar (NC-212/NC-212Í) 1 sqn with C295M TRAINING 1 sqn with G 120TP 1 sqn with KT-1B TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with H225M; AS332L Super Puma (NAS332L); NAS332 C1+ Super Puma; SA330J/L Puma (NAS330J/L) 1 VIP sqn with AS332L Super Puma (NAS332L); SA330SM Puma (NAS300SM) 1 sqn with H120 Colibri ISR UAV 1 sqn with Aerostar AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM unit with NASAMS II EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Only 45% of ac op AIRCRAFT 107 combat capable FTR 9; 7 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 2 F-16B Fighting Falcon (8 F-5E Tiger II; 4 F-5F Tiger II non-operational) EGA 40; 19 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 5 F-16D Fighting Falcon; 2 Su-27SK Flanker; 3 Su-27SKM Flanker; 2 Su-30MK Flanker F; 9 Su-30MK2 Flanker G MP 8; 3 B-737-200; 2 CN235M-220 MPA ISR 1 C295M TKR/TPT 1 KC-130B Hercules TPT 53; Medium 18; 3 C-130B Hercules; 7 C-130H Hercules; 6 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 L-100-30; Light 26; 9 C295; 9 C-212 Aviocar (NC-212); 3 C-212 Aviocar (NC-212i); 5 CN235M-110; PAX 9; 1 B-737-200; 3 B-737-400; 1 B-737-500; 1 B-737-800BBJ; 1 F-28-1000; 2 F-28-3000 TRG 104; 15 EMB-314 (A-29) Super Tucano*; 30 G 120TP; 7 Hawk Mkl09*; 22 Hawk Mk209*; 16 KT-1B; 14 T-50Í Golden Eagle* HELICOPTERS TPT 37; Heavy 6 H225M (CSAR); Medium 19; 9 AS332 Super Puma (NAS332L) (VIP/CSAR); 1 NAS332 C1+ Super Puma; 1 SA330SM Puma (NAS330SM) (VIP); 4 SA330J Asia 257 Puma (NAS330J); 4 SA330L Puma (NAS330L); Light 12 H120 Colibri UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy CH-4B (in test) ISR • Medium Aerostar AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9P Sidewinder, R-73 (RS-AA-11A Arcfer); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo) ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder) ASM AGM-65G Maverick; AR-2; Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo); Kh-59T (RS-AS-14B Kedge) ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton) AIR DEFENCE SAM • Medium-range NASAMSII Special Forces (Paskhasau)_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 3 (PASKHASAU) SF wg (total: 6 spec ops sqn) 4 indep SF coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Chiron; QW-3 GUNS • TOWED 35mm 6 Oerlikon Skyshield Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 280,000+_ Police e280,000 (including 14,000 police 'mobile bde' (BRIMOB) org in 56 coy, incl CT unit (Gegana))_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC (W) 34 Tactica AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 2 Beech 18; 2 C-212 Aviocar (NC-212); 1 C295; 1 Turbo Commander 680 HELICOPTERS MRH 1 Bell 412EP TPT • Light 22:3 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 19 Bo-105 (NBo-105) KPLP (Coast and Seaward Defence Command)_ Responsible to Military Sea Communications Agency EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 37 PCO 7: 1 Arda Dedali; 3 Chundamani; 1 Kalimasada; 2 Trisula PB 30:4 Golok (SAR); 5 Kujang; 6 Rantos; 15 (various) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ABU 1 Jadayat Bakamla (Maritime Security Agency)_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 PSO 4: 3 Pulau Nipah with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Tanjung Datu with 1 hel landing platform PB 6 Bintang Laut (KCR-40 mod) Reserve Organisations_ Kamra People's Security £40,000_ Report for 3 weeks' basic training each year; part-time police auxiliary DEPLOYMENT_ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 241; 1 engr coy DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1,037; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1,106; 1 mech inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1FSGM MALI: UN • MINUSMA 10 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA4 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3 JapanJPN Japanese Yen JPY 2021 2022 GDP JPY 541 tr 552tr USD 4.93tr 4.30tr per capita USD 39,301 34,358 Growth % 1.7 1.7 Inflation % -0.2 2.0 Def bdgt JPY 5.73tr 6.17tr USD 52.2bn 48.1 bn USD1=JPY 109.75 128.42 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008-- 2015 2022 Population 124,214,766 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 6.4% 2.3% 2.5% 2.6% 21.9% 12.8% Female 6.0% 2.2% 2.3% 2.4% 22.3% 16.3% Capabilities_ Japan's concerns over its regional security environment have heightened, as evidenced in its 2022 Defence White Paper. These principally relate to security challenges posed by a more assertive China and continued concern over North Korea. As a result, there have been defence-budget increases and defence-policy and legislative reforms designed to enable Japan to play a more active international security role and strengthen the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). Due to their defensive mandate, JSDF deployments are mostly for peacekeeping purposes. While the JSDF's offensive capacity remains weak, the navy has strengths in anti-submarine warfare and air defence. An Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade has also been established, tasked mainly with the defence of remote islands. The Izumo helicopter carrier has completed the first stage of modifications to embark and operate fixed-wing aircraft. Final conversion work will take place at the end of FY 2024. JS Kaga began the first stage of its conversion in March 2022, with the second stage due in FY 2026. Japan is developing capabilities in space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum to develop a 'multi-domain defence force', based on the 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines and the 2019-23 Mid-Term Defense Program. In 2020, a Space Operations Squadron was set up, with the aim of enhancing space situational-awareness capabilities. 258 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 The Cyber Defense Group is to expand. Enhancing ballistic missile defence remains a key priority. In December 2020, the cabinet announced that two vessels equipped with Aegis ballistic missile defence systems would be developed as alternatives to the cancelled land-based Aegis Ashore. The Ministry of Defense requested a budget for the development of the vessels for FY2023. Japan's alliance with the US remains the cornerstone of its defence policy, reflected by continued US basing, the widespread use of US equipment across all three services and regular training with US forces. Meanwhile, meetings with Germany, India, Indonesia and the UK have indicated efforts to expand security relations. In November 2020, Australia and Japan agreed in principle on a Reciprocal Access Agreement, while India and Japan inked an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement in September 2020. Negotiations for a Reciprocal Access Agreement with the UK continued in 2022, as did discussions on closer cooperation on future combat aircraft development. Japan has an advanced defence-industrial base. Defence exports have mainly consisted of components, though there are ambitions to secure more significant export deals. Japan's ongoing military-procurement drive is focused on power projection, mobility and ISR. Budget documents also note research on a hypersonic glide body, new anti-ship missiles and research on advanced radar technology. ACTIVE 247,150 (Ground Self-Defense Force 150,700 Maritime Self-Defense Force 45,300 Air Self-Defense Force 46,950 Central Staff 4,200) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,550 RESERVE 55,900 (General Reserve Army (GSDF) 46,000 Ready Reserve Army (GSDF) 8,000 Navy 1,100 Air 800) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 11 COMMUNICATIONS 2:1 Kirameki-1; 1 Kirameh-2 ISR 9 IGS Ground Self-Defense Force 150,700_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 5 army HQ (regional comd) SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops unit (bn) MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (7th) armd div (1 armd recce sqn, 3 tk regt, 1 armd inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 AD regt, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 indep tk bn Mechanised 1 (2nd) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk regt, 1 mech inf regt, 2 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 AT coy, 1 ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 (4th) inf div (1 armd recce bn, 3 inf regt, 1 inf coy, 1 hel sqn, 1 AT coy, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 (6th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 mech inf regt; 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 (9th) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 (5th) inf bde (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 log bn) 1 (11th) inf bde (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 log bn) Light 1 (1st) inf div (1 armd recce bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 (3rd) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 (10th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 fd arty regt, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 (8th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 (13th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 tk coy, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 1 (14th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 1 (15th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 AD regt, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) Air Manoeuvre 1 (1st) AB bde (3 AB bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 1 (12th) air mob inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) Amphibious 1 amph bde (1 recce coy, 2 amph regt, 1 amph aslt bn, 1 log bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (1st) arty bde (1 SP arty regt (2 SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn); 1 SP arty regt (1 SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn); 3 AShM regt) 1 (Northwestern Army) arty bde (1 fd arty regt (4 fd arty bn); 1 AShM regt) 1 (Western Army) arty bde (1 fd arty regt (4 fd arty bn); 1 MRL bn; 1 AShM regt) 1 (Central Army) fd arty bn 4 engr bde 1 engr unit 1EW bn 5 int bn 1 MP bde 1 sigs bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 5 log unit (bde) 5 trg bde HELICOPTER 2 sqn with MV-22B Osprey (forming) Asia 259 HELICOPTER 1 hel bde (5 tpt hel sqn; 1 VIP tpt hel bn) 5 hel gp (1 atk hel bn, 1 hel bn) AIR DEFENCE 2 SAM bde (2 SAM gp) 2 SAM gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 555; 105 Type-10; 130 Type-74; 320 Type-90 ASLT 141 Type-16 MCV RECCE 111 Type-87 IFV 68 Type-89 APC 804 APC (T) 226 Type-73 APC (W) 578; 197 Type-82 (CP); 381 Type-96 AAV 52 AAV-7 AUV 8 Bushmaster ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 63; 5 Type-11; 28 Type-78; 30 Type-90 VLB 22 Type-91 NBC VEHICLES 55; 34 Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle; 21 NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 37 Type-96 MPMS MANPATS Type-79 /j/m-MAT; Type-87 Ojh-MAT; Type-01 LMAT RCL • 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 1,593 SP 167; 155mm 136 Type-99; 203mm 31 M110A2 TOWED 155mm 229 FH-70 MRL 227mm 54 M270 MLRS MOR 1,143; 81mm 656 L16120mm 463 RT-61; SP 120mm 24 Type-96 COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 92; 30 Type-12; 62 Type-88 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 8 Beech 350 King Air (LR-2) TILTROTOR • TPT 7+ MV-22B Osprey HELICOPTERS ATK 99; 50 AH-1S Cobra; 12 AH-64D Apache; 37 OH-1 TPT 249; Heavy 53; 18 CH-47D Chinook (CH-47J); 35 CH-47JA Chinook; Medium 43; 3 H225 Super Puma MkII+ (VIP); 40 UH-60L Black Hawk (UH-60JA); Light 153; 123 Bell 205 (UH-1J); 30 Enstrom 480B (TH-480B) AIR DEFENCE SAM 311+ Medium-range 130; 48 Type-03 Chu-SAU; 4 Type-03 Ojh-SAM Kai; 78 MIM-23B l-Hawk Short-range e44 Type-11 Tan-SAM Point-defence 137+; 46 Type-81 Tan-SAM; 91 Type-93 Kin-SAM; Type-91 Xei-SAM GUNS • SP 35mm 52 Type-87 Maritime Self-Defense Force 45,300_ Surface units organised into 4 Escort Flotillas with a mix of 8 warships each. Bases at Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru, Ominato. SSK organised into two flotillas with bases at Kure and Yokosuka EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 24; 11 Oyashio (of which 2 in trg role) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM/ Type-89 HWT 12 Soryu (of which 9 fitted with AIP and 2 fitted with lithium-ion fuel battery) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM/Type-89 HWT 1 Taigei with (fitted with lithium-ion fuel battery) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM/Type-89 HWT/Type-18 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 50 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVH 4; 2 Hyuga with 2 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with ASROC/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Mk 46/Type-97 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS (normal ac capacity 3 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel; plus additional ac embarkation up to 7 SH-60 Seahawk or 7 MCH-101) 2 Izumo (being converted to CVS) with 2 11-cell Mk 15 SeaRAM lnchr with RIM-116 SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS (normal ac capacity 7 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel; plus additional ac embarkation up to 5 SH-60 Seahawk/MCH-Wl hel) CRUISERS • CGHM 4; 2 Atago with Aegis Baseline 9 C2, 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (8 fore, 4 aft) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA/IB SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) 2 Maya (Atago mod) with Aegis Baseline 9 C2, w quad lnchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM/SSM-2 (Type-17) AShM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (8 fore, 4 aft) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA/IB SAM/ Type-07 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) DESTROYERS 34 DDGHM 28; 8 Asagiri with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 lnchr with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk 112 lnchr with ASROC, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) 4 Akizuki with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with ASROC/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Type-97 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) 2 Asahi (Akizuki mod) with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM/Type-07 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Type-12 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) 9 Murasame with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 0 VLS with RIM-162C ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT 260 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 with Mk 46 LWT, 2 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with ASROC, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 2 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) 5 Takanami (improved Murasame) with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) DDGM6: 2 Hatakaze (trg role) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 1 Mk 13 GMLS with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-301 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk 112 lnchr with ASROC, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 2 127mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 4 Kongou with Aegis Baseline 5 C2,2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (of which 2 only 5-cell and fitted with reload crane) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1127mm gun FRIGATES 8 FFGHM 2 Mogami with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-2 (Type-17) AShM, 1 11-cell Mk 15 SeaRAM GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk hel) (to be fitted with Mk 41 VLS) FFG 6 Abukuma with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-301 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk 112 lnchr with ASROC A/S msl, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6 PBFG 6 Hayabusa with 4 SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 1 76mm gun MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 22 MCCS 2: 1 Uraga with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (for MCH-101 hel) 1 Uraga with 1 hel landing platform (for MCH-101) MSC 17: 3 Hiroshima; 11 Sugashima; 3 Enoshima MSO 3 Ato/'i AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 3 Osumi with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity for 2 CH-47 hel) (capacity 10 Type-90 MBT; 2 LCAC(L) ACV; 330 troops) LANDING CRAFT 8 LCM 2 LCU-2001 LCAC 6 LCAC(L) (capacity either 1 MBT or 60 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 24 AGBH 1 Shirase (capacity 2 AW101 Merlin hel) AGEH 1 Asiifcfl (wpn trials) with 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk hel) AGOS 3 Hibiki with 1 hel landing platform AGS 3:1 Futami; 1 Nichinan; 1 Shonan AOE 5:2 Mashu (capacity 1 med hel); 3 Towada with 1 hel landing platform ARC 1 Mwroto ASR 2:1 Chihaya with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Chiyoda with 1 hel landing platform ATF 5 Hiuchi AX 3: 1 Kashima with 2 triple 324mm HOS-301 ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 1 Kurobe with 1 76mm gun (trg spt ship) 1 Tenryu (trg spt ship); with 1 76mm gun (capacity: 1 med hel) Naval Aviation £9,800_ 7 Air Groups FORCES BY ROLE ANTI SUBMARINE/SURFACE WARFARE 5 sqn with SH-60B (SH-60J)/SH-60K Seahawk MARITIME PATROL 2 sqn with P-l 2 sqn with P-3C Orion ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with EP-3 Orion MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1 sqn with MCH-101 SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with Shin Meiwa US-2 2 sqn with UH-60J Black Hawk TRANSPORT 1 sqn with AW101 Merlin (CH-101); Beech 90 King Air (LC-90); KC-130R Hercules TRAINING 1 sqn with Beech 90 King Air (TC-90) 1 sqn with P-3C Orion 1 sqn with T-5J 1 hel sqn with H135 (TH-135); SH-60K Seahawk EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 77 combat capable ASW 77: 33 P-l; 44 P-3C Orion ELINT 5 EP-3C Orion SAR 6 Shin MeiwaUS-2 TPT 24: Medium 6 C-130R Hercules; Light 18: 5 Beech 90 King Air (LC-90); 13 Beech 90 King Air (TC-90) (trg) TRG 30 T-5J HELICOPTERS ASW 87: 12 SH-60B Seahawk (SH-60J); 75 SH-60K Seahawk MCM 10 MCH-101 SAR 6 UH-60J Black Hawk TPT 18: Medium 3 AW101 Merlin (CH-101); Light 15 H135 (TH-135) (trg) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AShM ASM-1C (Type-90) Air Self-Defense Force 46,950_ 7 cbt wg FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 7 sqn with F-15J Eagle 3 sqn with Mitsubishi F-2 2 sqn with F-35A Lightning II ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with Kawasaki EC-1; YS-11EA ELINT 1 sqn with RC-2; YS-11EB Asia 261 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 2 sqn with E-2C/D Hawkeye 1 sqn with E-767 SEARCH & RESCUE 1 wg with U-125A Peace Krypton; UH-60J Black Hawk TANKER 1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus (forming) 1 sqn with KC-767J TRANSPORT 1 (VIP) sqn withB-777-300ER 1 sqn with C-l; C-2; Gulfstream IV (U-4) 1 sqn with C-2 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules; KC-130H Hercules Some (liaison) sqn with Gulfstream IV (U-4); T-4* TRAINING 1 (aggressor) sqn with F-15J Eagle TEST 1 wg with F-15J Eagle; T-4* TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 4 fit with CH-47JA Chinook EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 519 combat capable FTR 200; 156 F-15J Eagle; 44 F-15DJ Eagle FGA 122; 64 F-2A; 27 F-2B; 31 F-35A Lightning II EW 3; 1 Kawasaki EC-1; 2 YS-11EA SIGINT 4; 1 RC-2; 3 YS-11EB AEW&C 20; 10 E-2C Hawkeye; 6 E-2D Hawkeye; 4 E-767 SAR 26 U-125A Peace Krypton TKR/TPT 8; 2 KC-46A Pegasus; 2 KC-130H Hercules; 4 KC-767J TPT 54; Medium 34; 13 C-130H Hercules; 7 C-l; 14 C-2; PAX 20; 2 B-777-300ER (VIP); 13 Beech T-400; 5 Gulfstream IV (U-4) TRG 246; 197 T-4*; 49 T-7 HELICOPTERS SAR 37 UH-60J Black Hawk TPT • Heavy 15 CH-47JA Chinook UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 1 ISR • Heavy 1 RQ-4B Global Hawk AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AAM-3 (Type-90); HR AAM-5 (Type-04); SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AAM-4 (Type-99); AIM- 120C5/C7 AMRAAM (limited numbers) AShM ASM-1 (Type-80); ASM-2 (Type-93) BOMBS Laser & INS/SAT-guided GBU-54 Laser JDAM INS/SAT-guided GBU-38 JDAM Air Defence_ Ac control and warning. 4 wg; 28 radar sites FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 6 SAM gp (total; 24 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3) 1 AD gp with Type-81 Tan-SAM; M167 Vulcan EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM 146+ Long-range 120 M902 Patriot PAC-3 Short-range e26 Air Base Defense SAM Point-defence Type-81 Tan-SAM GUNS • TOWED 20mm M167 Vulcan Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,550_ Coast Guard 14,550_ Ministry of Land, Transport, Infrastructure and Tourism (no cbt role) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 378 PSOH 19; 2 Mizuho (capacity 2 hels); 1 Mizuho II (capacity 2 hels); 5 Shikishima (capacity 2 hels); 1 Shunko (capacity 2 hels); 1 Soya (capacity 1 hel) (icebreaking capability); 9 Tsugaru (Soya mod) (capacity 1 hel) PSO 48; 9 Hateruma with 1 hel landing platform; 3 Hida with 1 hel landing platform; 6 Iwami; 1 Izu with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Kojima (trg) with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Miura with 1 hel landing platform (trg role); 2 Miyako with 1 hel landing platform; 5 Ojika with 1 hel landing platform; 20 Taketomi with 1 hel landing platform PCO 13; 3 Aso; 9 Katori; 1 Teshio PCC 24; 4 Amami; 20 Tokara PBF 49; 24 Hayagumo; 2 Mihashi; 15 Raizan; 2 Takatsuki; 6 Tsuruugi PB 55; AAsogiri; 4 Hamagumo; 11 Hayanami; 15 Katonami; 1 Matsunami; 10 Shimoji; 10 Yodo FBI 170; 2 Hakubai; 1 Hayagiku; 167 Himegiku LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18 ABU 1 Teshio AGS 14; 6 Hamashio; 1 Jinbei; 2 Meiyo; 2 Peiyo; 1 Shoyo; 1 Takuya; 1 Tctij/o AX 3 AIRCRAFT MP 5 Fa/con 2000MSA SAR 4 Saab 340B TPT 27; Light 25; 5 Cessna 172; 10 Beech 350 King Air (LR-2); 10 DHC Dash-7 (Bombardier 300) (MP); PAX 2 Gulfstream V (MP) HELICOPTERS MRH 4 Bell 412 Twin Huey SAR 12 S-76D TPT 39; Medium 13; 2 AS332 Super Puma; 11 H225 Super Puma; Light 26; 19 AW139; 4 Bell 505 Jet Ranger X; 3 S-76C UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 1 CISR • Heavy 1 MQ-9B SeaGuardian (unarmed) DEPLOYMENT_ ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN: Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-151; 160; 1 DDGHM DJIBOUTI: 180; 2 P-3C Orion SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4 FOREIGN FORCES_ United States US Pacific Command; 55,600 Army 2,600; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 avn bn; 1 SAM bn with M903 Patriot PAC MSE Navy 20,000; 1 CVN; 3 CGHM; 4 DDGHM; 4 DDGM; 1 LCC; 4 MCO; 1 LHA; 2 LPD; 2 LSD; 3 FGA sqn with 10 F/A-18E Super Hornet; 1 FGA sqn with 10 F/A-18F Super 262 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Hornet; 2 ASW sqn with 5 P-8A Poseidon; 1 ELINT fit with 2 EP-3E Aries II; 2 EW sqn with 5 EA-18G Growler; 1 AEW&C sqn with 5 E-2D Hawkeye; 2 ASW hel sqn with 12 MH-60R Seahawk; 1 tpt hel sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk; 1 base at Sasebo; 1 base at Yokosuka USAF; 13,000; 1 HQ (5th Air Force) at Okinawa-Kadena AB; 1 ftr wg at Misawa AB (2 ftr sqn with 22 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon); 1 ftr wg at Okinawa-Kadena AB (2 ftr sqn with 27 F-15C/D Eagle; 1 tkr sqn with 15 KC-135R Stratotanker; 1 AEW sqn with 2 E-3B Sentry; 1 CSAR sqn with 10 HH-60G Pave Hawk); 1 tpt wg at Yokota AB with 10 C-130J-30 Hercules; 3 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 1 spec ops gp at Okinawa-Kadena AB with (1 sqn with 5 MC-130J Commando II; 1 sqn with 5 CV-22B Osprey); 1 ISR sqn with RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR UAV fit with 5 RQ-4A Global Hawk USMC 20,000; 1 nine div; 1 nine regt HQ; 1 arty regt HQ; 1 recce bn; 1 nine bn; 1 amph aslt bn; 1 arty bn; 1 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 12 F/A-18 A++/C+ Hornet; 2 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 12 F-35B Lightning II; 1 tkr sqn at Iwakuni with 15 KC-130J Hercules; 2 tpt sqn at Futenma with 12 MV-22B Osprey US Strategic Command; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Shariki; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kyogamisaki Korea, Democratic People's Republic of DPRK North Korean Won KPW 2021 2022 2023 GDP USD per capita USD Defexp KPW USD USD1=KPW Definitive economic data not available Population 25,955,138 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 10.4% 3.5% Female 9.9% 3.4% 3.7% 3.6% 3.9% 3.9% 23.6% 3.6% 24.0% 6.6% Capabilities Tensions on the Korean Peninsula rose in 2022, after diplomacy since 2018 had reduced overall tensions. North Korea's observed actions remain inconsistent with de-nuclearisation. 2022 saw Pyongyang conduct more ballistic missile tests than any other year on record. These included a resumption in flight tests of ICBM categorised systems and a separate IRBM overflight of Japan; these had not occurred since 2017. There remains scrutiny of North Korea's nuclear facilities, with increased concerns that the country may renew nuclear testing. Aware of the qualitative inferiority of its conventional forces, North Korea continues to invest in asymmetric capabilities, particularly the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems. Pyongyang's ambitions to further diversify its shorter-range delivery systems continue. These include quasi-ballistic missiles, claimed hypersonic glide vehicles and apparent land-attack cruise missiles. North Korea is also exploring new, potentially less vulnerable basing options, such as a rail-based system and additional SLBM designs. In October there was a reported incursion by a North Korean merchant vessel across the Northern Limit Line, and in November a North Korean missile crossed the NLL. North Korea remains diplomatically isolated. While foreign defence cooperation is restricted by international pressure and sanctions, Pyongyang has nonetheless often found ways to develop military ties. Official conscription for both men and women is often extended, sometimes indefinitely. Training is focused on fighting a short, intensive war on the peninsula, but the armed forces' overall effectiveness in a modern conflict against technologically superior opposition is unclear. Internal exercises are conducted regularly, but those publicised are staged and are not necessarily representative of wider operational capability. In May 2022 North Korea announced it had mobilised the armed forces to supply medicines, in response to the country's first acknowledged outbreak of COVID-19. North Korea's conventional forces remain reliant on increasingly obsolete equipment, with older Soviet-era and Chinese-origin equipment supplemented by a growing number of indigenous designs and upgrades, though the precise capability of these remains unclear. The overall effectiveness and serviceability of some equipment remains in doubt but there is local maintenance, repair and overhaul capacity. Local defence-industrial capacity includes the manufacture of light arms, armoured vehicles, artillery and missile systems. North Korea has exported weaponry in the past. In September 2022 Pyongyang denied any plans to supply Russia with ammunition, following US reporting that this had been requested. It is unclear whether the country would have had the capability to indigenously develop some of the technical advances it has demonstrated, including in rocket propulsion. ACTIVE 1,280,000 (Army 1,100,000 Navy 60,000 Air 110,000 Strategic Forces 10,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 189,000 Conscript liability Army 5-12 years, Navy 5-10 years, Air Force 3-4 years, followed by compulsory part-time service to age 40. Thereafter service in the Worker/Peasant Red Guard to age 60 RESERVE £600,000 (Armed Forces £600,000), Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,700,000 Reservists are assigned to units (see also Paramilitary) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Strategic Forces s10,000_ North Korea describes its ballistic missile force as nuclear capable, although there is no conclusive evidence to verify the successful integration of a warhead with any of these systems EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (e) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS ICBM 10+; 6+ Hwasong-U/-15/-15 mod 1 (all in test); 4+ Hwasong-YI mod 1 (in test); (Earlier Hwasong-13/-13 mod designs untested and presumed cancelled) IRBM 10+ Hwasong-10 (Musudan) (status uncertain)/ Hwasong-12/'-12 mod 1 (in test) MRBM 17+; eIO Nodong mod 1/mod 2 (e90+ msl); some Scud-ER; 7+ Pukgusong-2 (in test) SBRM 69+; 30+ Hwasong-51-6 (RS-SS-1C/D Scud-B/C) (£200+ msl); 1+ Hwasong-S/S mod 1 (in test); 9+ Hwasong-W mod (in test); 6+ Scud (mod) (in test); 17+ KN-23 (road & rail mobile variants); 6+ KN-23 mod 1 (in test); some KN-23 mod 2 (in test) GLCM some M-2021 (in test); some M-2021-2 (in test) Asia 263 Army £1,100,000_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 10 inf corps HQ 1 (Capital Defence) corps HQ MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd div 15 armd bde Mechanised 6 mech div Light 27 inf div 14 inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty div 21 arty bde 9 MRL bde 5-8 engr river crossing/amphibious regt 1 engr river crossing bde Special Purpose Forces Command 88,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 8 (Reconnaissance General Bureau) SF bn MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 17 recce bn Light 9 It inf bde 6 sniper bde Air Manoeuvre 3 AB bde 1 ABbn 2 sniper bde Amphibious 2 sniper bde Reserves 600,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 40 inf div 18 inf bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (e) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES The Korean People's Army displayed a number of new armoured-vehicle designs at a parade in 2020, but it is unclear if any of them have entered operational service MBT 3,500+ T-34/T-54/T-55/T-62/Type-59/C/jo«ma/ Pokpoong/Songun LT TK 560+: 560 PT-76; M-1985 IFV 32 BTR-80A APC 2,500+ APC (T) BTR-50; Type-531 (Type-63); VTT-323 APC (W) 2,500 BTR-40/BTR-60/M-1992/1/BTR-152/ M-2010 (6x6)/M-2010 (8x8) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); M-2010 ATGM MANPATS 2K15 Shmel (RS-AT-1 Snapper); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) RCL 82mm 1,700 B-10 ARTILLERY 21,600+ SP/TOWED 8,600: SP 122mm M-1977; M-1981; M-1985; M-1991; 130mm M-1975; M-1981; M-1991; 152mm M-1974; M-1977; M-2018; 170mm M-1978; M-1989 TOWED 122mm D-30; D-74; M-1931/37; 130mm M-46; 152mm M-1937; M-1938; M-1943 GUN/MOR 120mm (reported) MRL 5,500: 107mm Type-63; VTT-323 107mm; 122mm BM-11; M-1977 (BM-21); M-1985; M-1992; M-1993; VTT-323 122mm; 200mm BMD-20; 240mm BM-24; M-1985; M-1989; M-1991; 300mm some M-2015 (KN-SS-X-09) (in test); 600mm some M-2019 (in test) MOR 7,500: 82mm M-37; 120mm M-43; 160mm M-43 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SBRM 24+: 24 FROG-3/5/7; some Toksa (RS-SS-21B Scarab mod); some M-2022 (in test) AIR DEFENCE SAM Point-defence 9K35 Strela-W (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)% GUNS 11,000+ SP 14.5mm M-1984; 23mm M-1992; 37mm M-1992; 57mm M-1985 TOWED 11,000: 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60; 85mm M-1939 KS-12; 100mm KS-19 Navy £60,000_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 71 SSB 1 8.24 Yongung (Gorae (Sinpo-B)) (SLBM trials) with 1 Pukguksong-1 SLBM (status unclear)/KN-23 Mod 2 SLBM (in test) SSK e20 Type-033 (Romeo) with 8 single 533mm TT with SAET-60 HWT SSC e40 (some Sang-0 some with 2 single 533mm TT with 53-65E HWT; some Sang-0 II with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65E HWT) SSW glOt (some Yugo some with 2 single 406mm TT; some Yeono some with 2 single 533mm TT) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 2 FRIGATES • FFG 2: 1 Najin with 2 single lnchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A Styx) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 100mm gun, 2 twin 57mm gun 1 Najin with 2 twin lnchr with Kumsong-3 (KN-SS-N-2 Stormpetrel) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 100mm gun, 2 twin 57mm gun (operational status unclear) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 372+ CORVETTES • FS 5: 4 Sariwon with 2 twin 57mm gun; 1 Tral with 1 85mm gun (Two Tuman- and two Amnok-dass corvettes constructed since early 2010s; operational status unknown) PCG 10 Soju (FSU Project 205 mod (Osa)) with 4 single lnchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A Styx) AShM 264 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 PCC 18: 6 Type-037 (Hainan) with 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun 7 Taechong I with 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 85mm gun, 1 twin 57mm gun 5 Taechong II with 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 100mm gun, 1 twin 57mm gun PBFG 31+: 4 Huangfeng (Type-021) with 4 single lnchr with P-15 Termit (RS-SS-N-2 Styx) AShM, 2 twin AK230 CIWS 6 Komar with 2 single lnchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A Styx) AShM 8 Project 205 (Osa I) with 4 single lnchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A Styx) AShM, 2 twin AK230 CIWS 6 Sohung (Komar mod) with 2 single lnchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A Styx) AShM 1+ Nongo with 2 single lnchr with P-15 Termit (RS-SS-N-2 Styx) AShM (operational status unknown) 6+ Nongo with 2 twin lnchr with Kumsong-3 (KN-SS-N-2 Stormpetrel) AShM (operational status unknown) PBF 222: approx. 50 Chong-]in with 1 85mm gun; 142 Ku Song/Sin Hung/Sin Hung (mod); approx. 30 Sinpo PB 86: approx. 50 Chaho; 6 Chong-]u with 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 185mm gun; 12 Type-062 (Shanghai II); 18 SO-1 with 4 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 20 MSC 20:15 Yukto I; 5 Yukto II AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LSM 10 Hantae (capacity 3 tanks; 350 troops) LANDING CRAFT 255 LCM 25 LCPL approx. 95 Nampo (capacity 35 troops) UCAC 135 Kongbang (capacity 50 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 23: AGI14 (converted fishing vessels) AS 8 (converted cargo ships) ASR 1 Kowan Coastal Defence_ FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 2 AShM regt with HY-l/Kumsong-3 (6 sites, some mobile launchers) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE ARTY 130mm M-1992; SM-4-1 AShMHY-l; Kumsong-3 ARTILLERY • TOWED 122mm M-1931/37; 152mm M-1937 Air Force 110,000_ 4 air divs. 1st, 2nd and 3rd Air Divs (cbt) responsible for N, E and S air-defence sectors respectively; 8th Air Div (trg) responsible for NE sector. The AF controls the national airline FORCES BY ROLE BOMBER 3 It regt with H-5; 11-28 Beagle FIGHTER 1 regt with MiG-15 Fagot 6 regt with 1-5; MiG-17 Fresco 4 regt with J-6; MiG-19 Farmer 5 regt with J-7; MiG-21F-13/PFM Fishbed 1 regt with MiG-21bis Fishbed 1 regt with MiG-23ML/P Flogger 1 regt with MiG-29A/S/UB Fulcrum GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot TRANSPORT Some regt with An-2 Colt/Y-5 (to infiltrate 2 air-force sniper brigades deep into ROK rear areas); I1-62M Classic TRAINING Some regt with CJ-6; FT-2; MiG-21U/UM TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Some regt with Hughes 500D/E; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mil-26 Halo; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; Mi-4 Hound; Z-5 AIR DEFENCE 19 bde with S-125M1 Pechora-Mi (RS-SA-3 Goa); S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline); S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)% EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 545 combat capable BBR 80 11-28 BeaglejW-b\ (includes some 11-28 for ISR) FTR 401+: MiG-15 Fagot%; 107 MiG-17 Frescol]-b%; 100 MiG-19 Farmer/J-6 (incl JJ-6 trg ac); 120 MiG-21F-13 Fishbedl]-7; MiG-21PFM Fishbed; 46 MiG-23ML Flogger; 10 MiG-23P Flogger; 18+ MiG-29 A/S/UB Fulcrum EGA 30 MiG-21bis Fishbed (18 Su-7 Fitter in store) ATK 34 Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot TPT 205: Heavy 3 11-76 (operated by state airline); Light £200 An-2 Colt/Y-5; PAX 2 I1-62M Classic (VIP) TRG 215+: 180 CJ-6; 35 FT-2; some MiG-21U/UM HELICOPTERS MRH 80 Hughes 500D/E (some armed) TPT 206: Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 63: 15 Mi-8 Hip/M-17 Hip H; 48 Mi-4 Hound/Z-5; Light 139 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium some (unidentified indigenous type); Light Pchela-1 (Shmel) (reported) AIR DEFENCE • SAM 209+ Long-range 10 S-200 Angarai (RS-SA-5 Gammon) Medium-range 179+: some Pongae-5 (KN-SA-X-01) (status unknown); 179+ S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline) Short-range £20 S-125M1 Pechora-Mli (RS-SA-3 Goa) Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)%; 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 AtolT)%; R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); PL-5; PL-7; SARH R-23/24 (RS-AA-7 Apex); R-27R/ER (RS-AA-10 A/C Alamo) ASM Kh-23 (RS-AS-7 Kerry)%; Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29L (RS-AS-14A Kedge) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 189,000 active Security Troops 189,000 (incl border guards, public-safety personnel)_ Ministry of Public Security Asia 265 Worker/Peasant Red Guard £5,700,000 reservists_ Org on a province/town/village basis; comd structure is bde-bn-coy-pl; small arms with some mor and AD guns (but many units unarmed) Korea, Republic of ROK South Korean Won KRW 2021 2022 2023 GDP KRW 2072tr 2203tr USD 1.81 tr 1.73tr per capita USD 35,004 33,592 Growth % 4.1 2.6 Inflation % 2.5 5.5 Def bdgt KRW 52.9tr 54.6tr 57.1 tr USD 46.3bn 43.0bn USD1=KRW 1143.95 1270.29 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015-- 2022 Population 51,844,834 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 6.0% 2.3% 3.1% 3.8% 27.3% 7.7% Female 5.7% 2.1% 2.8% 3.3% 26.1% 9.9% Capabilities_ South Korea's forces are some of the best equipped and trained in the region. Defence policy remains focused on North Korea, and Seoul continues to prioritise developing new capabilities to respond to the nuclear and conventional threat from the DPRK. The new administration is replacing the 2018 Defense Reform 2.0 project with the Defense Innovation 4.0 programme. As well as redesigning overall defence policy to focus on advanced technology and cyber security, South Korea has again adopted the three-axis defence strategy comprising 'Kill Chain','Korea Air and Missile Defense' and 'Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation' components which were abandoned in 2019. The 2020 defence White Paper, released in February 2021, detailed plans to tackle North Korea's missile threats through a'four-Ds strategy'of detect, disrupt, destroy and defend. The next edition of the White Paper is expected to be released in early 2023. The long-established alliance with the US is a central element of defence strategy. The planned transfer of wartime operational control offerees to Seoul is now'conditions based'with no firm date set. A large number of US military personnel and equipment remain stationed in South Korea, along with THAAD missile-defence systems. In 2022, South Korea and the US resumed large-scale joint military exercises that had been scaled back in recent years. A space operations centre was inaugurated in 2021. South Korea has demonstrated the capacity to support small international deployments, including contributions to UN missions and counter-piracy operations in the Arabian Sea. The equipment inventory increasingly comprises modern systems. South Korea has developed a substantial domestic defence industry which supply a large proportion of equipment requirements, although some equipment - notably the F-35 combat aircraft - is still procured from the US. Local defence companies are finding growing export success globally, though industry will have to carefully balance new export contracts against existing local orders, particularly in land systems. ACTIVE 555,000 (Army 420,000 Navy 70,000 Air 65,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 13,500 Conscript liability Army and Marines 18 months, Navy 20 months, Air Force 21 months RESERVE 3,100,000 Reserve obligation of three days per year. First Combat Forces (Mobilisation Reserve Forces) or Regional Combat Forces (Homeland Defence Forces) to age 33 Reserve Paramilitary 3,000,000 Being reorganised ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS lAnasis Army 420,000_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 8 corps HQ 1 (Capital Defence) comd HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 (Special Warfare) SF comd (1 SF gp; 6 spec ops bde) 6 edo regt 2 indep cdo bn MANOEUVRE Armoured 7 armd bde 1 (Capital) armd inf div (1 armd cav bn, 2 armd bde, 1 armd inf bde, 1 SP arty bde, 1 engr bn) 1 (8th) armd inf div (1 armd cav bn, 1 armd bde, 2 armd inf bde, 1 SP arty bde, 1 engr bn) 1 (11th) armd inf div (1 armd cav bn, 3 armd inf bde, 1 SP arty bde, 1 engr bn) 2tkbn Light 15 inf div (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bn) 2 indep inf bde Air Manoeuvre 1 air mob div (2 cdo bde) 1 air aslt bde Other 5 sy regt SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 3 SSM bn COMBAT SUPPORT 6 arty bde 1 MRL bde (3 MRL bn; 1 SSM bn) 6 engr bde 5 engr gp 1 CBRN defence bde 8 sigs bde 266 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 4 log spt comd HELICOPTER 1 (army avn) comd AIR DEFENCE 1 ADA bde 5 ADA bn Reserves_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 army HQ MANOEUVRE Light 24 inf div EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 2,149: 1,000 K1/K1E1; 484 K1A1/K1A2; £225 K2; £400 M48A5; 40 T-80U IFV 540: £500 K21; 40 BMP-3 APC 2,566 APC (T) 2,260:1,700 KIFV; 420 M113; 140 M577 (CP) APC (W) 296; 20 BTR-80; 276 K806/K808 PPV 10 MaxxPro ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 207 M9; K600 ARV 238+: 200 Kl; K21 ARV; K288A1; M47; 38 M88A1 VLB 56 Kl ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP Hyeongung MANPATS 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); Hyeongung; TOW-2A RCL 75mm; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A2 GUNS 58 SP 90mm 50 M36 TOWED 76mm 8 M18 Hellcat (AT gun) ARTILLERY 12,128+ SP 2,330: 105mm £50 K105A1; 155mm 2,280: £ 1,240 K9/ K9A1 Thunder; 1,040 M109A2 (K55/K55A1) TOWED 3,500+: 105mm 1,700 M101/KH-178; 155mm 1,800+ KH-179/M114 MRL 298:130mm £40 K136 Kooryong; 227mm 58:48 M270 MLRS; 10 M270A1 MLRS; 239mm £200 K239 Cheonmu MOR 6,000: 81mm KM29 (M29); 107mm M30; 120mm Hanwha 120mm mortar SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 30+: 30 Hyonmu IIA/IIB; MGM-140A/B ATACMS (launched from M270/M270A1 MLRS) GLCM • Conventional Hyonmu III HELICOPTERS ATK 96: 60 AH-1F/J Cobra; 36 AH-64E Apache MRH 175:130 Hughes 500D; 45 MD-500 TPT 236+: Heavy 37: 31 CH-47D Chinook; 6 MH-47E Chinook; Medium 287: £200 KUH-1 Surion; 87 UH-60P Black Hawk; Light 12 Bo-105 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Chiron; Chun Ma (Pegasus); FIM-92 Stinger; Javelin; Mistral; 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS 477+ SP 317: 20mm £150 KIFV Vulcan SPAAG; 30mm 167 K30 Biho; some K-808 SPAAG TOWED 160: 20mm 60 M167 Vulcan; 35mm 20 GDF-003; 40mm 80 L/60/L/70; Ml AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114R1 Hellfire Navy 70,000 (incl marines)_ Three separate fleet elements: 1st Fleet Donghae (East Sea/ Sea of Japan); 2nd Fleet Pyeongtaek (West Sea/Yellow Sea); 3rd Fleet Busan (South Sea/Korea Strait); independent submarine command; three additional flotillas (incl SF, mine-warfare, amphibious and spt elements) and 1 Naval Air Wing (3 gp plus spt gp) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 19 SSB 1 Chang Bogo III (Batch I (GER Type-214 mod; KSS-III)) (fitted with AIP) with 6 SLBM (likely based on Hyeonmu-IJB), 8 single 533mm TT with K731 White Shark SSK 18: 6 Chang Bogo I (GER Type-209/1200; KSS-1) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT/K731 White Shark HWT 3 Chang Bogo I (GER Type-209/1200; KSS-1) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84 Harpoon AShM/SUT HWT/K731 White Shark HWT 9 Chang Bogo II (GER Type-214; KSS-2) (fitted with AIP) with 8 single 533mm TT with Hoe Sung III LACM/ Hae Sung I AShM/SUT HWT/K731 White Shark HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 26 CRUISERS • CGHM 3 Sejong (KDD-III) with Aegis Baseline 7 C2, 6 8-cell K-VLS with Hae Sung II LACM/ Red Shark A/S msl, 4 quad lnchr with Hae Sung I AShM, 10 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (6 fore, 4 aft) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2 Lynx Mk99/AW159 Wildcat hels) DESTROYERS • DDGHM 6 Chungmugong Yi Sun-Sin (KDD-II) with 2 8-cell K-VLS with Hae Sung II LACM/ Red Shark A/S msl, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM/Hae Sung I AShM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk99/AW159 Wildcat hel) FRIGATES 17 FFGHM13: 4 Daegu (Incheon Batch II)t (limited serviceability due to faulty propulsion system) with 2 8-cell K-VLS with Hae Sung II LACM/TSLM LACM/ Haegung (K-SAAM) SAU/Red Shark A/S msl, 2 quad lnchr with TSLM LACM/Hae Sung I AShM, 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk99/AW159 Wildcat hel) 3 Gwanggaeto Daewang (KDD-I) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 8-cell Mk 48 mod 2 VLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 2 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk99/AW159 Wildcat hel) Asia 267 6 Incheon with 2 quad lnchr with TSLM LACM/Hae Sung I AShM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 lnchr with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 127 mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk99/ AW159 Wildcat hel) FFG 4 Iflsan with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 76mm gun PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS e64 CORVETTES • FSG 7: 1 Po Hang (Flight IV) with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 76mm gun 6 Po Hang (Flight V/VI) with 2 twin lnchr with Hoe Sung I AShM, 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 2 76mm gun PCFG 22:18 Gumdoksuri with 2 twin lnchr with Hoe Sung I AShM, 1 76mm gun; 4 Chamsuri II with 112-cell 130mm MRL, 1 76mm gun PBF e35 Sea Dolphin MINE WARFARE 12 MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10 MHO 6 Kan Kyeong MSO 4 Yang Yang MINELAYERS • ML 2: 1 Nampo (MLS-II) with 1 4-cell K-VLS VLS with Haegung (K-SAAM) SAM, 2 triple KMk. 32 triple 324mm ASTT with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) I Won San with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT/K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 6 LHD 2: 1 Dofcdo with 1 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity 2 LCAC; 10 tanks; 700 troops; 10 UH-60 hel) 1 Marado {Dokdo mod) with 1 4-cell K-VLS with K-SAAM SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS (capacity 2 LCAC; 6 MBT, 7 AAV-7A1, 720 troops; 7-12 hels) LPD 4 Cheonwangbong (LST-II) (capacity 3 LCM; 2 MBT; 8 AFV; 300 troops; 2 med hel) LANDING SHIPS • LST 4 Go Jun Bong with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops) LANDING CRAFT 25 LCU 7+ Mulgae I LCT 3 Mulgae II LCM 10 LCM-8 LCAC 5: 3 Tsaplya (capacity 1 MBT; 130 troops); 2 LSF- II (capacity 150 troops or 1 MBT & 24 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11 AG 1 Sunjin (trials spt) AOEH 1 Soyangham (AOE-II) with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS (capacity 1 med hel) AORH 3 Chun ]ee ARS 1 Cheong Hoe Jin ATS 2 Tongyeong AX 3: 1 Hansando with 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 76mm gun (fitted for but not with K-VLS) (capacity 2 med hels; 300 students); 2 MTB Naval Aviation_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 16 combat capable ASW16: 8 P-3C Orion; 8 P-3CK Orion TPT • Light 5 Cessna F406 Caravan II HELICOPTERS ASW 31:11 Lynx Mk99; 12 Lynx Mk99A; 8 AW159 Wildcat TPT 15: Medium 8 UH-60P Black Hawk Light 7 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) Marines 29,000_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 mne div (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 mne bde, 1 amph bn, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bn) 1 mne bde (1 recce coy, 4 mne bn, 1 SP arty bn) 1 mne bde (3 mne bn, 1 fd arty bn) 1 mne BG (1 mne bn, 1 SP arty bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 100: 50 K1E1/A2; 50 M48A3 AAV 166 AAV-7A1 APC • APC(W) K808 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTUCTURE • MSL SP Spike NLOS MANPATS Hyeongung ARTILLERY 238 SP • 155mm 80: e40 K9 Thunder; e20 K9A1 Thunder; £20 M109A2 (K55/K55A1) TOWED 140:105mm £20 M101; 155mm £120 KH-179 MRL • 239mm 18 K239 Cheonmu MOR 81mm KM29 (M29) COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM RGM-84A Harpoon (truck mounted) HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 15+ MUH-1 Surion AIR DEFENCE GUNS • Towed • 20mm M167 Vulcan (direct fire role) Naval Special Warfare Flotilla_ Air Force 65,000_ 4 Comd (Ops, Southern Combat, Logs, Trg) FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-4E Phantom II 5 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II 3 sqn with F-15K Eagle 8 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (KF-16C/D) 2 sqn with F-35A Lightning II 3 sqn with FA-50 Fighting Eagle ISR 1 wg with KO-1 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (KF-16C/D) 268 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 SIGINT 1 sqn with Hawker 800RA/XP AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with B-737 AEW SEARCH & RESCUE 2 sqn with AS332L Super Puma; Bell 412EP; HH-47D Chinook; HH-60P Black Hawk; Ka-32 Helix C TANKER 1 sqn with A330MRTT TRANSPORT 1 VIP sqn with B-737-300; B-747-8; CN235-220; S-92A Superhawk; VH-60P Black Hawk (VIP) 3 sqn (ind 1 spec ops) with C-130H/H-30/J-30 Hercules 2 sqn with CN235M-100/220 TRAINING 1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 4 sqn with KT-1 1 sqn with KT-100 3 sqn with T-50/TA-50 Golden Eagle* TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with UH-60P Black Hawk (Spec Ops) ISR UAV 1 sqn with RQ-4B Global Hawk (forming) SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF sqn AIR DEFENCE 3 AD bde (total: 6 SAM bn with Chunggung; 2 SAM bn with M902 Patriot PAC-3 CRI) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 602 combat capable FTR 173:141 F-5E Tiger II; 32 F-5F Tiger II EGA 349: 29 F-4E Phantom II; 59 F-15K Eagle; 117 F-16C Fighting Falcon (KF-16C); 44 F-16D Fighting Falcon (KF-16D); 40 F-35A Lightning II; 60 FA-50 Fighting Eagle AEW&C 4 B-737 AEW ISR 24: 4 Hawker 800RA; 20 KO-1 SIGINT 6: 4 Hawker 800SIG; 2 Falcon 2000 (COMINT/SIGINT) TKR/TPT 4 A330 MRTT TPT 38: Medium 16: 8 C-130H Hercules; 4 C-130H-30 Hercules; 4 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 20:12 CN235M-100; 8 CN235M-220 (ind 2 VIP); PAX 2:1 B-737-300; 1 B-747-8 (leased) TRG 183: 83 KT-1; 49 T-50 Golden Eagle*; 9 T-50B Black Eagle* (aerobatics); 22 TA-50 Golden Eagle*; e20 KT-100 HELICOPTERS SAR 16: 5 HH-47D Chinook; 11 HH-60P Black Hawk MRH 3 Bell 412EP TPT • Medium 30: 2 AS332L Super Puma; 8 Ka-32 Helix C; 3 S-92A Super Hawk; 7 UH-60P Black Hawk; 10 VH-60P Black Hawk (VIP) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 7+: Heavy 4 RQ-4B Global Hawk; Medium 3+: some Night Intruder; 3 Searcher LOITERING & DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS Harpy AIR DEFENCE • SAM 120 Long-range 48 M902 Patriot PAC-3 CRI Medium-range 72 Chunggung (KM-SAM) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; HR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AIM-120B/C-5/7 AMRAAM ASM AGM-65A Maverick; AGM-130 AShM AGM-84L Harpoon Block II; AGM-142 Popeye ARM AGM-88 HARM AL CM AGM-84H SLAM-ER; KEPD-350 Taurus BOMBS Inertial/satellite-guided GBU-31/2/8 JDAM; GBU-39 SDB; KGGB; Spice 2000 Laser-guided GBU-28; Paveway II Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 13,500 active Civilian Defence Corps 3,000,000 reservists (to age 50)_ Coast Guard 13,500_ Part of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. Five regional headquarters with 19 coastguard stations and one guard unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 111 PSOH 16: 1 Lee Cheong-ho with 1 76mm gun; 1 Sambongho; 14 Toe Fung Yang with 1 med hel PSO 21: 3 Han Kang with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform; 5 Han Kang II with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing pllatform; 12 Jaemin with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Sumjinkang PCO 23 Toe Geuk PCC 21:4 Hoe Uri; 15 Hoe Uri II; 2 Hoe Uri III PB 30: 26 Haenuri; e4 (various) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8 UCAC 8:1 BHT-150; 4 Griffon 470TD; 3 Griffon 8000TD AIRCRAFT MP 5:1 C-212-400 MP; 4 CN235-110 MPA TPT • PAX 1 CL-604 HELICOPTERS MRH 7: 5 AS565MB Panther; 1 AW139; 1 Bell 412SP SAR 3 S-92 TPT • Medium 10: 8 Ka-32 Helix C; 2 KUH-1 Surion DEPLOYMENT_ ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN: Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-151: 200; 1DDGHM INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 7 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 254; 1 mech inf BG HQ; 1 mech inf coy; 1 inf coy; 1 log coy SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 277; 1 engr coy UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 170 (trg activities at UAE Spec Ops School) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4 FOREIGN FORCES_ Sweden NNSC: 5 Switzerland NNSC: 5 United States US Pacific Command: 30,400 Asia 269 Army 21,500; 1 HQ (8th Army) at Pyeongtaek; 1 div HQ at Pyeongtaek; 1 armd bde with MlA2 SEPv2 Abrams; M2A3/M3A3 Bradley; M109A6; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde with AH-64D/E Apache; CH-47F Chinook; UH-60L/M Black Hawk; 1 MRL bde with M270A1 MLRS; 1 AD bde with M902 Patriot PAC-3/FIM-92A Avenger; 1 SAM bty with THAAD; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set Navy 350 USAF 8,350; 1 HQ (7th Air Force) at Osan AB; 1 ftr wg at Kunsan AB (2 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon); 1 ftr wg at Osan AB (1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon, 1 atk sqn with 24 A-10C Thunderbolt II); 1ISR sqn at Osan AB with U-2S USMC 200 Laos LAO New Lao Kip LAK 2021 2022 2023 GDP LAK 181 tr 213tr USD 18.5bn 16.3bn per capita USD 2,513 2,172 Growth % 2.1 2.2 Inflation % 3.8 15.0 Def bdgt LAK n.k. n.k. USD n.k. n.k. USD1=LAK 9753.18 13082.84 Population 7,749,595 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 15.8% 4.9% 5.0% 4.5% 17.7% 2.1% Female 15.3% 4.8% 5.0% 4.5% 18.0% 2.4% Capabilities_ The Lao People's Armed Forces (LPAF) are closely linked to the ruling Communist Party and their primary role is internal security. Their main operational experience dates from the Second Indochina War and the 1988 border war with Thailand. Defence spending and military procurement have been constrained for the last two decades.There are military-to-military contacts including with the Cambodian, Chinese and Vietnamese armed forces, and there is defence cooperation with Russia. Training support has been provided by Russia and Vietnam. The LPAF have participated in exercises, including those organised by the ADMM-Plus, with other regional countries and international partners. However, they have made no international deployments and have little capacity for sustained operations. Laos still operates Soviet-era military equipment and relies on Russian supplies, as illustrated by ongoing deliveries of training aircraft, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and main battle tanks. The country lacks a traditional defence-industrial base and maintenance capacity is limited, reflected in a support contract with a Russian firm for helicopter maintenance in 2016. ACTIVE 29,100 (Army 25,600 Air 3,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 100,000 Conscript liability 18 months minimum ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • ISR 1 LaoSat-1 Army 25,600_ FORCES BY ROLE 4 mil regions MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bn Light 5 inf div 7 indep inf regt 65 indep inf coy COMBAT SUPPORT 5 arty bn 1 engr regt 2 (construction) engr regt AIR DEFENCE 9 ADA bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 25:15 T-54/T-55; 10 T-72B1 LT TK 10 PT-76 RECCE BRDM-2M IFV 10+ BMP-1 APC • APC (W) 50: 30 BTR-40/BTR-60; 20 BTR-152 AUV Dongfeng Mengshi 4x4; ZYZ-8002 (CS/VN3) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV T-54/T-55 VLB MTU ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 57mm M18/A1; 75mm M20; 106mm M40; 107mm B-ll ARTILLERY 62+ TOWED 62: 105mm 20 M101; 122mm 20 D-30/M-30 M-1938; 130mm 10 M-46; 155mm 12 M114 MOR 81mm; 82mm; 107mm M-1938/M2A1; 120mm M-43 AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 6+: 6 S-125M Pechora-Mt (RS-SA-3 God); some Yitian (CH-SA-13) Point-defence 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-7 Grml)%; 9K35 Strela-W (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-l/ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60 Army Marine Section £600_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR some AMPHIBIOUS • LCM some Air Force 3,500_ FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 regt with MA60; MA600; Mi-17 Hip H 270 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable TPT • Light 5:1 An-74TK Coaler; 2 MA60; 2 MA600 TRG 4 Yak-130 Mitten* HELICOPTERS MRH 15: 6 Mi-17 Hip H; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 4 Z-9A TPT 4: Medium 1 Ka-32T Helix C; Light 3 SA360 Dauphin Gendarmerie & Paramilitary_ Militia Self-Defence Forces 100,000+_ Village 'home guard' or local defence Malaysia MYS Malaysian Ringgit MYR 2021 2022 GDP MYR 1.55tr 1.69tr USD 373bn 434bn per capita USD 11,408 13,108 Growth % 3.1 5.4 Inflation % 2.5 3.2 Def bdgt MYR 15.9bn 16.1bn USD 3.83bn 4.15bn USD1=MYR 4.14 3.89 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008-- --2015-- --2022 Population 33,871,431 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 11.7% 4.0% 4.5% 4.7% 22.6% 3.8% Female 11.0% 3.8% 4.2% 4.4% 21.3% 4.0% Capabilities_ Modernisation programmes over the past 30 years have provided the Malaysian armed forces with a limited capacity for external defence. However, the army has continued to be the dominant service, reflecting a longstanding but now outdated focus on counter-insurgency. In December 2019, the then-government tabled the country's first defence White Paper; this was reaffirmed by the new government that took office in August 2021 .The White Paper identified the 'three pillars' of Malaysia's defence strategy as 'concentric deterrence' (the armed forces' protection of national interests in 'core', 'extended' and 'forward' zones); 'comprehensive defence' (involving whole-of-government and whole-of-society support for the national-defence effort); and 'credible partnerships' (involving engagement in regional and wider international defence cooperation). While the paper identified new defence challenges, including tensions in the South China Sea and cyber threats, it provided no detailed insights into future resource allocation or capability development. However, it is likely that budgetary constraints will continue to limit defence resources. Malaysian forces regularly participate in ADMM-Plus, Five Power Defence Arrangements and other exercises with regional and international partners, including the US. Malaysia has invested in synthetic military-training aids. In 2017, Malaysia began trilateral joint maritime patrols and joint Sulu-Sulawesi Seas air patrols with Indonesia and the Philippines. Much of Malaysia's military equipment is ageing and there are important capability gaps, particularly in air defence and maritime surveillance.There are plans to acquire new light combat aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft and MALE UAVs. An air force squadron was established in 2021 to operate UAVs. Funds have been earmarked for an F/A-18D sustainment and upgrade programme. Malaysia hosts Australian forces and the headquarters of the FPDA Integrated Area Defence System at RMAF Butterworth; Butterworth is set to be modernised in 2023-25. Malaysia's defence industry focuses mainly on providing maintenance, repair and overhaul services, and on naval shipbuilding and land vehicle production via offset agreements with European companies. ACTIVE 113,000 (Army 80,000 Navy 18,000 Air 15,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 22,500 RESERVE 51,600 (Army 50,000, Navy 1,000 Air Force 600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 244,700 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 80,000_ 2 mil region FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 5 div HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde (3 SF bn) MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 tk regt Mechanised 4 armd regt 1 mech inf bde (4 mech bn, 1 cbt engr sqn) Light 1 inf bde (6 inf bn, 1 arty regt) 4 inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty regt) 2 inf bde (3 infbn) 1 inf bde (2 inf bn, 1 arty regt) 1 inf bde (2 infbn) 1 inf bde (forming) Air Manoeuvre 1 (Rapid Deployment Force) AB bde (1 It tk sqn, 4 AB bn, 1 It arty regt, 1 engr sqn) Other 2 (border) sy bde (5 bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 9 arty regt 1 STA regt 1 MRL regt 1 cbt engr sqn 3 fd engr regt (total: 7 cbt engr sqn, 3 engr spt sqn) 1 construction regt 1 int unit 4 MP regt 1 sigs regt HELICOPTER 1 hel sqn 1 tpt sqn with S-61A-4 Nuri (forming) AIR DEFENCE 3 ADA regt Asia 271 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 48 PT-91M Twardy LT TK 21 Scorpion-90 RECCE 98: 74 SIBMAS (somet); 24 AV8 Gempita IFV 212: 31ACV300 Adnan (25mm Bushmaster); 13 ACV300 Adnan AGL; 46 AV8 Gempita IFV25; 122 AV8 Gempita IFV30 (ind 54 with Ingwe ATGM) AFC 629 AFC (T) 265: 149 ACV300 Adnan (ind 69 variants); 13 FV4333 Stormer (upgraded); 63 K200A; 40 K200A1 AFC (W) 335:35 AV8 Gempita APC (ind 13 CP; 3 sigs; 9 amb); 300 Condor (ind variants) PPV 29: 9 IAG Guardian; 20 Lipanbara ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 3 MID-M ARV 65+: Condor; 15 ACV300; 4 K288A1; 22 SIBMAS; 6 WZT-4; 18 AV8 Gempita ARV VLB 5+: Leguan; 5 PMCz-90 NBC VEHICLES 4+: 4 AV8 Gempita; K216A1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 8 ACV300 Baktar Shikan MANPATS 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115-2 Metis-Ul (RS-AT-13); Eryx; Baktar Shihan (HJ-8); SS.ll RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 438 TOWED 140: 105mm 118: 18 LG1 Mklll; 100 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 22 G-5 MRL 36 ASTROS II (equipped with 127mm SS-30) MOR 262: 81mm 232; SP 81mm 14: 4 K281A1; 10 ACV300-S; SP 120mm 16: 8 ACV-S; 8 AV8 Gempita AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT LCA 165 Damen Assault Craft 540 (capacity 10 troops) HELICOPTERS MRH 6 MD-530G TPT 12: Medium 2 S-61A-4 Nuri; Light 10 AW109 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 15+: 15 Jernas (Rapier 2000); Anza-ll; HY-6 (FN-6) (CH-SA-10); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); Starstreak GUNS 52+ SP 20mm K263 TOWED 52: 35mm 16 GDF-005; 40mm 36 L40/70 Reserves_ Territorial Army Some paramilitary forces to be incorporated into a reorganised territorial organisation FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 4 armd sqn Light 16 inf regt (3 inf bn) Other 5 (highway) sy bn COMBAT SUPPORT 5 arty bty 2 fd engr regt 1 int unit 3 sigs sqn COMBAT SUPPORT 4 med coy 5 tpt coy Navy 18,000_ 3 Regional Commands: MAWILLA 1 (Kuantan), MAWIL-LA 2 (Sabah) and MAWILLA 3 (Langkawi). A fourth is being formed (Bintulu) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 2 SSK 2 Tunku Abdul Rahman (FRA Scorpene) with 6 single 533mm TT with SM39 Exocet AShM/Black Shark HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2 FFGHM 2 Lekiu with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 16-cell VLS with Sea Wolf SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 57mm gun (capadty 1 Super Lynx 300 hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 55 CORVETTES 8 FSG 2 Kasturi with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FSH 6 Kedah (GER MEKO 100) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (fitted for but not with MM40 Exocet AShM & RAM SAM) PCFM 4 Laksamana with 1 Albatros quad lnchr with Aspide SAM, 1 76mm gun PCF 4 Perdana (FRA Combattante II) with 1 57mm gun FCC 4 Keris (Littoral Mission Ship) PBF 23: 6 Gading Marine FIC; 17 Tempur (SWE CB90) PB 12: 4 Handalan (SWE Spica-M) with 1 57mm gun; 6 Jerong (Lurssen 45) with 1 57mm gun; 2 Sri Perils MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 MCO 4 Mahamiru (ITA Lerici) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14 AFS 2: 1 Mahawangsa with 2 57mm guns, 1 hel landing platform; 1 Sri Indera Sakti with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform AG 3: 2 Bunga Mas Lima with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Tun Azizan AGS 2:1 Dayang Sari; 1 Perantau AP 2 Sri Gaya ASR 1 Mega Bakti ATE 1 AX 2 Gagah Samudera with 1 hel landing platform AXS 1 Tunas Samudera Naval Aviation 160_ FORCES BY ROLE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with Super Lynx 300 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS555 Fennec 1 sqn with AW139 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS ASW 6 Super Lynx 300 MRH 8: 6 AS555 Fennec; 2 AW139 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM Sea Skua 272 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Special Forces_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (mne cdo) SF unit Air Force 15,000_ 1 air op HQ, 2 air div, 1 trg and log comd, 1 Intergrated Area Def Systems HQ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F/A-18D Hornet 1 sqn with Su-30MKM Flanker 2 sqn with Hawk Mkl08*/Mk208* MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with Beech 200T TANKER/TRANSPORT 2 sqn with KC-130H Hercules; C-130H Hercules; C-130H-30 Hercules TRANSPORT 1 sqn with A400M Atlas 1 (VIP) sqn with A319CT; AW109; BD700 Global Express; F-28 Fellowship; Falcon 900 1 sqn with CN235M-220 TRAINING 1 unit with PC-7 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 4 (tpt/SAR) sqn with H225M Super Cougar; S-70A Black Hawk 1 sqn with AW139 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLE 1 sqn (forming) AIR DEFENCE 1 sqn with Starburst SPECIAL FORCES 1 (Air Force Commando) unit (airfield defence/SAR) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 42 combat capable FTR (8 MiG-29 Fulcrum (MiG-29N); 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B (MIG-29NUB) in store) FGA 26:8 F/A-18D Hornet (some serviceability in doubt); 18 Su-30MKM (some serviceability in doubt) MP 1 CN235 MPA ISR 3 Beech 200T TKR/TPT 4 KC-130H Hercules TPT 24: Heavy 4 A400M Atlas; Medium 10: 2 C-130H Hercules; 8 C-130H-30 Hercules; Light 6 CN235M-220 (incl 1 VIP and 2 being reconfigured); PAX 4:1A319CT (VIP); 1 BD700 Global Express; 1 F-28 Fellowship; 1 Falcon 900 TRG 70:4 Hawk Mkl08*; 12 Hawk Mk208*; 7 MB-339C; 30 PC-7; 17 PC-7 Mk II Turbo Trainer HELICOPTERS MRH 2 AW139 (leased) TPT 15: Heavy 12 H225M Super Cougar; Medium 2 S-70A Black Hawk; Light 1AW109 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Starstreak AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); HR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM; R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder) ASM AGM-65 Maverick; Kh-29T (RS-AS-14B Kedge); Kh-29L (RS-AS-14A Kedge); Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo) ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton); AShM AGM-84D Harpoon; Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B Krypton) BOMBS Electro-optical guided KAB-500KR; KAB-500OD Laser-guided Paveway II Gendarmerie & Paramilitary £22,500_ Police-General Ops Force 18,000_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 5 bde HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bn MANOEUVRE Other 19 paramilitary bn 2 (Aboriginal) paramilitary bn 4 indep paramilitary coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) AT105 Saxon AUV £30 SB-301 Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) £4,500_ Controls 5 Maritime Regions (Northern Peninsula; Southern Peninsula; Eastern Peninsula; Sarawak; Sabah), subdivided into a further 18 Maritime Districts. Supported by one provisional MMEA Air Unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 137 PSO 4: 1 Aran (ex-JPN Nojima) with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Langkawi with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform; 1 Pekan (ex-JPN Ojika) with 1 hel landing platform PCC 5 Bagan Datuk PBF 56:16 Penggalang 16; 18 Penggalang 17 (TUR MRTP 16); 2 Penggalang 18; 6 Penyelamat 20; 14 Tugau PB 72: 15 Gagah; 4 Malawali; 2 Nusa; 3 Nusa 28; 1 Peninjau; 7 Ramunia; 2 Rhu; 4 Semilang; 9 Sipadan Steel; 8 Icarus 1650; 10 Pengawal; 4 Penyelamat; 2 Perwira; 1 Sugut LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 Marlin AIRCRAFT • MP 2 Bombardier 415MP HELICOPTERS SAR 3 AW139 MRH 3 AS365 Dauphin Area Security Units 3,500 reservists_ (Auxiliary General Ops Force) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 89 paramilitary unit Asia 273 Border Scouts 1,200 reservists_ in Sabah, Sarawak People's Volunteer Corps 240,000 reservists (some 17,500 armed)_ RELA DEPLOYMENT_ DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 6 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 830; 1 mech inf bn(-); 1 sigs coy; 1 log coy; 1 maint coy; 1 tpt coy SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 9 FOREIGN FORCES_ Australia 130; 1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours); 1 P-8A Poseidon (rotational) Maldives MDV Maldivian Rufiyaa MVR 2021 2022 GDP MVR 80.2bn 90.9bn USD 5.20bn 5.90bn per capita USD 13,539 15,097 Growth % 37.0 8.7 Inflation % 0.2 4.3 Def bdgt MVR 1.42bn 1.55bn USD 92.4m 100m USD1=MVR 15.41 15.41 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008-- 2015 2022 Population 390,164 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 11.3% 3.8% 4.8% 5.8% 23.9% 2.4% Female 10.8% 3.3% 3.8% 4.7% 22.3% 3.0% ACTIVE 4,000 (Maldives National Defence Force 4,000) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Maldives National Defence Force 4,000_ Special Forces_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF sqn Marine Corps_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops unit MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech sqn Amphibious 7 mne coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 2 BMP-2 AUV 2 Cobra Coast Guard_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 PCC 3: 1 Ghazee; 1 Shaheed Ali; 1 Trinkat (Bangaram SDB Mk5) PBF 7: 5 SM50 Interceptor; 2 Super Dvora Mk III PB 2:1 Dhaharaat; 1 Kaamiyab AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 4: LCU1 L301 LCP3 AIRCRAFT MP 1 Do-228 HELICOPTERS MRH 2 Dhruv Capabilities_ The Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) is tasked with defence, security and civil emergency response over the wide-ranging and mostly oceanic territory of the archipelagic nation. It is therefore a maritime-centric organisation, with a littoral Coast Guard, including a small aviation wing, and a Marine Corps. There is focus on ISR, maritime security and counter-terrorist training and capability development needs. India is the MNDF's key defence partner, having supplied most of the force's major military platforms, and regularly donates surplus military equipment and offers training to MNDF personnel. In 2020 Malé signed a defence agreement with the United States and in 2021 the MNDF started capacity building work with the US Army. Training facilities are being developed, including a basic training school in 2020 and work is proceeding on the development of the Composite Training Centre on Maafilaafushi Island. 274 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Mongolia MNG Mongolian Tugrik MNT 2021 2022 2023 GDP MNT 43.6tr 50.2tr USD 15.3bn 15.7bn per capita USD 4,483 4,542 Growth % 1.6 2.5 Inflation % 7.1 14.8 Def bdgt MNT 284bn 287bn 31 Ibn USD 99.5m 89.8m FMA (US) USD 3m 3m 3m USD1=MNT 2849.37 3191.33 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008-- 2015 2022 Population 3,227,863 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 13.5% 3.7% 3.7% 3.8% 21.9% 2.1% Female 13.0% 3.5% 3.6% 3.9% 24.1% 3.2% Capabilities_ Mongolia's latest defence-policy document, from 2015, stresses the importance of peacekeeping and anti-terrorist capabilities. The country has no formal military alliances, but pursues defence ties and bilateral training with regional states and others including India, Turkey and the US. Mongolia hosts the annual Khaan Quest multinational peacekeeping-training exercise. The country's main exercise partners are India and Russia, with each country running regular bilateral exercises. In 2022, Mongolia and Russia held the counter-terrorism-focused exercise Selenga. In 2021, NATO completed a multi-year project that involved establishing a Cyber Security Centre and Cyber Incident Response Capability. Mongolia's most significant deployment is to the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan. The inventory generally comprises Soviet-era equipment, supplemented by deliveries of secondhand Russian weapons. Barring maintenance facilities, there is no significant defence-industrial base. ACTIVE 9,700 (Army 8,900 Air 800) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500 Conscript liability 12 months for males aged 18-25 RESERVE 137,000 (Army 137,000) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 5,600; 3,300 conscript (total 8,900) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised lMRbde Light 1 (rapid deployment) It inf bn (2nd bn to form) Air Manoeuvre 1 ABbn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 420: 370 T-54/T-55; 50 T-72A RECCE 120 BRDM-2 IFV 310 BMP-1 APC • APC (W) 210:150 BTR-60; 40 BTR-70M; 20 BTR-80 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV T-54/T-55 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE GUNS • TOWED 200: 85mm D-44/D-48; 100mm M-1944/MT-12 ARTILLERY 570 TOWED £300: 122mm D-30/M-30 (M-1938); 130mm M-46; 152mm ML-20 (M-1937) MRL 122mm 130 BM-21 MOR 140:120mm; 160mm; 82mm AIR DEFENCE SAM Medium-range 2+ S-125-2M Pechora-2U (RS-SA-26) GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2 Air Force 800_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29UB Fulcrum B TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-171 AIR DEFENCE 2 regt with S-60/ZPU-4/ZU-23 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 6 combat capable FTR 6 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B TPT • Light 3: 2 An-24 Coke; 1 An-26 Curl HELICOPTERS TPT • Medium 12:10 Mi-8 Hip; 2 Mi-171 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES IR R-73 (RS-AA-11A Ardier) AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 150: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23; 57mm S-60 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500 active_ Border Guard 1,300; 4,700 conscript (total 6,000) Internal Security Troops 400; 800 conscript (total 1,200)_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 4 gd unit Construction Troops 300_ Asia 275 DEPLOYMENT_ DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • IvIONUSCO 2 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 868; 1 inf bn SUDAN: UN • UNISFA4 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3 Myanmar MMR Myanmar KyatMMK 2021 2022 GDP MMK 98.7tr 118tr USD 65.2bn 59.5bn per capita USD 1,217 1,105 Growth % -17.9 2.0 Inflation % 3.6 16.2 Def bdgt MMK 5.16tr 3.70tr USD 3.41 bn 1.88bn USD1=MMK 1514.03 1974.80 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008 --2015-- 2022 Population 57,526,449 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 12.9% 4.2% 4.2% 4.1% 21.0% 2.9% Female 12.3% 4.1% 4.1% 4.2% 22.2% 3.7% Capabilities_ Since the country's independence struggle in the 1940s, Myanmar's large, army-dominated Tatmadaw (armed forces) has been intimately involved in domestic politics as well as internal security. Even though the National League for Democracy (NLD) won the November 2015 election, the armed forces remained politically powerful. A defence White Paper published in 2016 gave a'statebuilding'role to the Tatmadaw, further legitimising intervention in politics. Despite the NLD winning an increased majority in the November 2020 election, theTatmadaw declared the result illegitimate and seized power on 1 February 2021, declaring a year-long state of emergency which was extended to 31 July 2022 and then again to February 2023. The 2016 White Paper prioritised ending conflicts with domestic armed groups. However, widespread civil unrest and an escalation in clashes with ethnic-minority armed groups and People's Defence Force (PDF) groups since the coup has sharpened the Tatmadaw's focus on internal security and counter-insurgency. In response, the Tatmadaw launched a multipronged counter-insurgency campaign across 2021 and 2022. The Tatmadaw's actions have also focused attention on force health, including morale and general cohesion. The Tatmadaw has been accused of widespread human-rights abuses against non-combatants during counter-insurgency operations. These concerns intensified after the widely condemned actions aimed at the Rohingya ethnic minority in 2017. China and Russia are key partners in defence cooperation. In September 2022, Japan said it would stop from 2023 a training programme that has since 2015 seen small numbers of Myanmar military personnel attend defence educational institutions in Japan. Since the 1990s, the armed forces have attempted to develop limited conventional warfare capabilities, though these efforts have been called into question by the renewed focus on internal security and counter-insurgency. While defence-industrial capacity is limited, naval shipbuilding capability has grown, notably through the Naval Dockyard in Thanlyin, with satellite imagery revealing in December 2020 the construction of a new guided-missile frigate. The Aircraft Production and Maintenance Base in Meiktila has also engaged in final assembly and Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) services on trainer/light attack aircraft and combat helicopters since 2010. ACTIVE 356,000 (Army 325,000 Navy 16,000 Air 15,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 107,000 Conscript liability 24-36 months ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army £325,000_ 14 military regions, 7 regional op comd. Following the 2021 coup, and reports of desertions, combat losses and recruitment problems, personnel figures should be treated with caution FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 20 div HQ (military op comd) 10 inf div HQ 34+ bde HQ (tactical op comd) MANOEUVRE Armoured 10 armd bn Light 100 inf bn (coy) 337 inf bn (coy) (regional comd) COMBAT SUPPORT 7 arty bn 37 indep arty coy 6 cbt engr bn 54 fd engr bn 40 int coy 45 sigs bn AIR DEFENCE 7 ADbn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 195+: 10 T-55; 50 T-72S; 25+ Type-59D; 100 Type-69- II; 10+ Type-90-II (MBT-2000) LT TK 105 Type-63 (e60 serviceable) ASLT 24 PTL-02 mod RECCE 95+: £50 AML-90; 33 BRDM-2MS (incl CP); 12+ EE-9 Cascavel; MAV-1 IFV 36+: 10+ BTR-3U; 26+ MT-LBMSh APC 345+ APC (T) 305: 250 ZSD-85; 55 ZSD-90 APC (W) 30+ ZSL-92 PPV 10+: BAAC-87; Gaia Thunder; 10 MPV AUV MAV-2; MAV-3 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV Type-72 VLB MT-55A ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm M40A1 GUNS • TOWED 60: 57mm 6-pdr; 76mm 17-pdr 276 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 ARTILLERY 440+ SP 155mm 42: 30 NORA B-52; 12 SH-1 TOWED 282+: 105mm 150: 54 M-56; 96 M101; 122mm 100 D-30; 130mm 16 M-46; 140mm; 155mm 16 Soltam M-845P MRL 36+: 107mm 30 Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad (reported); Type-81; 240mm 6+ M-1985 mod MOR 80+: 82mm Type-53 (M-37); 120mm 80+: 80 Soltam; Type-53 (M-1943) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional some Hwasong-6 (reported) AIR DEFENCE SAM 4+ Medium-range 12+: 12+ KS-1A (CH-SA-12); S-125-2M Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26); 2K12 Kvadrat-U (RS-SA-6 Gainful) Point-defence HN-5 (CH-SA-3) (reported); 9K310 Igla- 1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) SPAAGM 30mm Some 2K22 Tunguska (RS-SA-19 Grison) GUNS 46 SP 57mm 12 Type-80 TOWED 34: 37mm 24 Type-74; 40mm 10 Ml Navy £16,000_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 2 1 Min Kyaw Htin (ex-PRC Type-035B (Ming)) with 8 single 533mm TT 1 Min Ye Thein Kha Thu (ex-IND Sindhughosh (Project 877EKM (Kilo))) with 6 single 533mm TT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 5 FFGHM 2 Kyansitthar with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 1 sextuple lnchr with MANPAD SAM, 2 RDC-32 A/S mor, 3 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) FFGM 1 Aung Zeya with 2 quad lnchr with DPRK AShM (possibly 3M24 derivative), 1 sextuple GMLS with MANPAD SAM; 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 RDC-32 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FFG 2 Mahar Bandoola (ex-PRC Type-053H1 (Jianghu I)) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 81 CORVETTES 3 FSGHM 1 Tabinshwethi (Anawrahta mod) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6), 1 sectuple lnchr with unknown MANPADs, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) FSG 2 Anawrahta with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 RDC-32 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PSOH 2 Inlay with 1 twin 57mm gun PCG 8: 6 Type-037-IG (Houxin) with 2 twin lnchr with C-801 (CH-SS-N-4) AShM; 2 FAC(M) mod with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 1AK630 CIWS PCT 2 Yan Nyein Aung (Project PGG 063) with 2 FQF 1200 A/S mor, 2 triple 324mm TLS with Shyena LWT PCO 2 Indaw PCC 7 Type-037 (Hainan) with 4 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun PBG 4 Myanmar with 2 single lnchr with C-801 (CH-SS-N-4) AShM PBF 7:1 Type-201; 6 Super Dvora Mk III PB 32:3 PB-90; 6 PGM 401; 6 PGM 412; 14 Myanmar, 3 Swift PBR 14: 4 Sagu; 9 Y-301t; 1 Y-301 (Imp) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 1: 1 Moattama (ROK Makassar) (capacity 2 LCVP; 2 hels; 13 tanks; 500 troops) LANDING CRAFT 21: LCU 5; LCM 16 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12 ABU1 AGHS 2:1 Innya; 1 (near shore) AGS1 AH 1 Thanlwin AK1 AKSL5 AP 1 Chindwin Naval Infantry 800_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 inf bn Air Force £15,000_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 4 sqn with F-7 Airguard; FT-7; JF-17 Thunder; MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29SE/SM Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with A-5C Font an TRANSPORT 1 sqn with F-27 Friendship; FH-227; PC-6AB Turbo Porter TRAINING 2 sqn with G-4 Super Galeb*; PC-7 Turbo Trainer*; PC-9* 1 (trg/liaison) sqn with Cessna 550 Citation II; Cessna 180 Skywagon; K-8 Karakorum* TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 4 sqn with Bell 205; Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-35P Hind; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; PZL W-3 Sokol; SA316 Alouette III EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 166 combat capable FTR 63: 21 F-7 Airguard; 10 FT-7; 11 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 6 MiG-29SE Fulcrum; 10 MiG-29SM Fulcrum; 5 MiG-29UB Fulcrum EGA 6: 4 JF-17 T/nmder (FC-1 Block 2); 2 JF-17B T/nmder (FC-1 Block 2) ATK 21 A-5C Fantan MP 2 ATR-42 TPT 26: Medium 5: 4 Y-8D; 1 Y-8F-200W Light 20: 1 ATR-42; 6 Beech 1900D; 4 Cessna 180 Skywagon; 1 Cessna 550 Citation II; 3 F-27 Friendship; 5 PC-6A/B Turbo Porter PAX 1+ FH-227 TRG 96: 11 G-4 Super Galeb*; 20 Grob G120; 24+ K-8 Karakorum*; 12 PC-7 Turbo Trainer*; 9 PC-9*; 20 Yak-130 Mitten* HELICOPTERS ATK 12 Mi-35P Hind Asia 277 MRH 23: 3 AS365; 11 Mi-17 Hip H; 9 SA316 Alouette III TPT 49: Medium 10 PZL W-3 Sokol; Light 39:12 Bell 205; 6 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 4 H120 Colibri; 17 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 4 CH-3 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR PL-5; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); PL-5E- II; IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); ARH PL-12 (CH-AA-7A Adze) AShM C-802A Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 107,000_ People's Police Force 72,000_ People's Militia 35,000_ Nepal NPL Nepalese Rupee NPR 2021 2022 GDP NPR 4.28tr 4.74tr USD 35.8bn 39.0bn per capita USD 1,209 1,293 Growth % 4.2 4.2 Inflation % 3.6 6.3 Def bdgt NPR 49.2bn 51.0bn USD 413m 421m USD1=NPR 119.32 121.38 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- 2022 Population 30,666,598 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 13.8% 5.0% 5.1% 5.0% 17.1% 2.9% Female 13.1% 4.7% 5.1% 5.1% 20.1% 3.0% Capabilities_ The principal role of Nepal's armed forces is maintaining territorial integrity, but they have also traditionally focused on internal security and humanitarian relief. Nepal has a history of deploying contingents to UN peacekeeping operations. Training support is provided by several countries, including China, India and the US. Following a 2006 peace accord with the Maoist People's Liberation Army, Maoist personnel underwent a process of demobilisation or integration into the armed forces. Gurkhas continue to be recruited by the British and Indian armed forces and the Singaporean police. The small air wing provides a limited transport and support capacity but mobility remains a challenge, in part because of topography. Nepal's logistic capability appears to be sufficient for internal-security operations; however, its contingents on UN peacekeeping operations appear to largely depend on contracted logistic support. Modernisation plans include a very limited increase in the size of its air force. Barring maintenance capacities there is no defence-industrial base, and Nepal is dependent on foreign suppliers for modern equipment. ACTIVE 96,600 (Army 96,600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 15,000 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 96,600_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 2 inf div HQ 1 (valley) comd SPECIAL FORCES 1 bde (1 SF bn, 1 AB bn, 1 cdo bn, 1 ranger bn, 1 mech inf bn) MANOEUVRE Light 18 inf bde (total: 62 inf bn; 32 indep inf coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 4 arty regt 5 engr bn 1 sigs bde AIR DEFENCE 2 AD regt 4 indep AD coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 40 Ferret APC 253 APC (W) 13: 8 OT-64C; 5 WZ-551 PPV 240: 90 Casspir; 150 MPV AUV Dongfeng Mengshi; CS/VN3C mod 2 ARTILLERY 92+ TOWED 105mm 22: 8 L118 Light Gun; 14 pack howitzer (6 non-operational) MOR 70+: 81mm; 120mm 70 M-43 (est 12 op) AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 32+: 14.5mm 30 Type-56 (ZPU-4); 37mm (PRC); 40mm 2 L/60 Air Wing 320_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPEt AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 7: 1 BN-2T Islander; 1 CN235M-220; 3 M-28 Skytruck; 2 PA-28 Cherokee (trg) HELICOPTERS MRH 14: 1 A139; 1 Bell 407GXP (VIP); 2 Dhruv; 2 Lancer; 3 Mi-17-lV Hip H; 2 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 1 SA315B Lama (Cheetah); 2 SA316B Alouette III TPT 3: Medium 1SA330J Puma; Light 2 AS350B2 Ecureuil Paramilitary 15,000_ Armed Police Force 15,000_ Ministry of Home Affairs DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 835; 1 inf bn; 1 MP pi DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1,154; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy 278 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 IRAQ: UN • UNAMI 77; 1 sy unit LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 872; 1 mech inf bn LIBYA: UN • UNISMIL 234; 2 sy coy MALI: UN • MINUSMA 177; 1 EOD coy MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,749; 2 infbn SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 89; 1 log coy SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 412; 1 mech inf coy; 1 inf coy; 1 log coy(-) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 5 FOREIGN FORCES_ United Kingdom 60 (Gurkha trg org) New Zealand NZL New Zealand Dollar NZD 2021 2022 GDP NZD 349bn 375bn USD 247bn 243bn per capita USD 48,317 47,278 Growth % 5.6 2.3 Inflation % 3.9 6.3 Def bdgt NZD 4.62bn 5.19bn USD 3.27bn 3.35bn USD1=NZD 1.41 1.55 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) • _ 3.09 1.96 2008-- 2015--- - - 2022 Population 5,053,004 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 10.0% 3.2% 3.3% 3.6% 22.4% 7.6% Female 9.4% 3.1 % 3.1% 3.4% 22.3% 8.6% Capabilities New Zealand has a strong military tradition. The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is well trained and has substantial operational experience. The June 2016 defence White Paper forecasted a range of challenges likely to affect the country's security in the period to 2040, including rising tension in the South and East China seas. In December 2021 the defence ministry released the Defence Assessment 2021, discussing challenges to New Zealand's strategic defence interests, including strategic competition and climate change. This proposed a defence policy review, which was formally announced in July 2022. A policy and strategy statement is due in March 2023, with a 'future force design principles' statement following in June. The terms of reference for the review noted that the 'impetus for a comprehensive review' had sharpened since the assessment was released, making reference to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. A Defence Capability Plan will accompany the policy review. New Zealand's closest defence partner is Australia and the country has revived defence relations with the United States. The 2019 Defence Capability Plan outlined plans to acquire a sealift vessel and C-130J Hercules transport aircraft before 2030, as well as to expand the army to 6,000 personnel by 2035. The year before, the decision was taken to purchase four P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. Replacement of the ANZAC frigates, both of which are being upgraded, has now been postponed until the 2030s. New Zealand has a small defence industry consisting of numerous private companies and subsidiaries of larger North American and European companies. These companies are able to provide some maintenance, repair and overhaul capability but significant work is contracted overseas. ACTIVE 9,200 (Army 4,500 Navy 2,200 Air 2,500) RESERVE 3,010 (Army 2,050 Navy 610 Air Force 350) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 4,500_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt MANOEUVRE Light 1 inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 2 It inf bn, 1 arty regt (2 arty bty), 1 engr regt(-), 1 MP coy, 1 sigs regt, 2 log bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 74 NZLAV-25 AUV 5+ Bushmaster ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 7 NZLAV ARV 3 LAV-R ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin ARTILLERY 56 TOWED 105mm 24 L118 Light Gun MOR 81mm 32 Reserves_ Territorial Force 1,850 reservists Responsible for providing trained individuals for augmenting deployed forces FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 (Territorial Force Regional) trg regt Navy 2,200_ Fleet based in Auckland. Fleet HQ at Wellington EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2 FFHM 2 Anzac (GER MEKO 200) with 1 20-cell VLS with Sea Ceptor SAM, 2 triple SVTT Mk 32 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite ASW hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 PSOH 2 Otago (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite ASW hel) (ice-strengthened hull) PCC 2 Lake Asia 279 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 2 LCM 2 (operated off HMNZS Canterbury) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • 3 AGHS 1 Manawanui with 1 hel landing platform AKRH 1 Canterbury (capacity 4 NH90 tpt hel; 1 SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite ASW hel; 2 LCM; 16 NZLAV; 20 trucks; 250 troops) AORH 1 Aotearoa (capacity 1 NH90/SH-2G(I) hel) Air Force 2,500_ FORCES BY ROLE MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with P-3K2 Orion TRANSPORT 1 sqn with B-757-200 (upgraded); C-130H Hercules (upgraded) ANTI-SUBMARINE/SURFACE WARFARE 1 (RNZAF/RNZN) sqn with SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite TRAINING 1 sqn with T-6C Texan II 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air (leased) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AW109LUH; NH90 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable ASW 3 P-3K2 Orion TPT 11: Medium 5 C-130H Hercules (upgraded); Light 4 Beech 350 King Air (leased); PAX 2 B-757-200 (upgraded) TRG 11 T-6C Texan II HELICOPTERS ASW 8 SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite TPT 13: Medium 8 NH90; Light 5 AW109LUH AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AGM-119 Penguin Mk2 mod7 DEPLOYMENT_ EGYPT: MFO 26; 1 trg unit; 1 tpt unit IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 9 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 8 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3 Pakistan PAK Pakistani Rupee PKR 2021 2022 GDP PKR 55.8tr 66.9tr USD 348bn 376bn per capita USD 1,462 1,658 Growth % 5.7 6.0 Inflation % 8.9 12.1 Def bdgt [a] PKR 1.65tr 174tr USD 10.3bn 9.8bn USD1=PKR 160.23 177.83 [a] Includes defence allocations to the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP), including funding to the Defence Division and the Defence Production Division Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008-- ---2015--- --2022 Population 242,923,845 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 18.0% 5.2% 4.7% 4.2% 16.7% 2.2% Female 17.2% 5.0% 4.4% 4.0% 16.0% 2.5% Capabilities_ The armed forces have considerable domestic political influence and are the dominant voice on defence and security policy. Pakistan's nuclear and conventional forces have traditionally been oriented and structured against a prospective threat from India. Since 2008, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism have been the forces' main effort. Although an army-led counter-terrorism operation has improved domestic security, terrorist attacks continue. Some analysts believe that the Pakistan government considered the Taliban victory in Afghanistan a policy success. Mutual reaffirmation of the 2003 ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan has reduced conflict across the Line of Control in the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir. The armed forces have a major role in disaster relief. China is Pakistan's main defence partner, with all three services employing a large amount of Chinese equipment. Military cooperation with the US is limited by sanctions aiming to improve cooperation on counter-terrorism. Recruitment is good, retention is high and the forces have experienced training establishments. The army and air force have considerable operational experience from a decade of counter-insurgency operations in Pakistan's tribal areas. Funds have been directed towards improving security on the border with Afghanistan. Major investment in military nuclear programmes continues, including the testing of a nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile. The navy plans to increase surface combatants, patrol vessels, submarines (in collaboration with China), maritime-patrol aircraft and UAVs.This is to both improve combat capability and the protection of sea-based nuclear weapons. The air force is modernising its inventory while improving its precision-strike and ISR capabilities. The indigenous defence industry has well-developed maintenance facilities for combat aircraft and exports platforms, weapons and ammunition; there is considerable defence-industrial collaboration with China. ACTIVE 651,800 (Army 560,000 Navy 21,800 Air 70,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 291,000 280 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Strategic Forces_ Operational control rests with the National Command Authority. The Strategic Plans Directorate (SPD) manages and commands all of Pakistan's military nuclear capability. The SPD also commands a reportedly 25,000-strong military security force responsible for guarding the country's nuclear infrastructure Army Strategic Forces Command 12,000-15,000_ Commands all land-based strategic nuclear forces EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 60+ MRBM • Nuclear 30+: £30 Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-V)/ Shaheen-ll (Hatf-VI); Shaheen-lll (in test) SRBM • Nuclear 30+: £30 Ghaznavi (Hatf-lll - PRC M-U)/Shaheen-l (Hatf-W); some Abdali (Hatf-II); some Nasr (Hatf-IX) GLCM • Nuclear Babur-I/IA (Hatf-VII); Ra'ad (Hatf-VIII - in test) Air Force_ 1-2 sqn of F-16A/B or Mirage 5 may be assigned a nuclear-strike role Army 560,000_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 9 corps HQ 1 (Northern) comd SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF gp (total: 4 SF bn) MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 armd div 7 indep armd bde Mechanised 2 mech inf div 1 indep mech bde Light 18 inf div 5 indep inf bde 4 (Northern Command) inf bde Other 2 sy div COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty div 14 arty bde 7 engr bde AVIATION 1 VIP avn sqn 4 avn sqn HELICOPTER 3 atk hel sqn 2 ISR hel sqn 2 SAR hel sqn 2 tpt hel sqn 1 spec ops hel sqn AIR DEFENCE 1 AD comd (3 AD gp (total: 8 AD bn)) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 2,537: 300 Al-Khalid (MBT 2000); £110 Al-Khalid I; 315 T-80UD; £500 Al-Zarrar; 400 Type-69; 268 Type-85-IIAP; 44 VT-4; £600 ZTZ-59 APC 3,545 APC (T) 3,200: 2,300 M113A1/A2/P; £200 Talha; 600 VCC-l/VCC-2; £100 ZSD-63 APC (W) 120 BTR-70/BTR-80 PPV 225 Maxxpro AUV 10 Dingo 2 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 262+: 175 Type-70/Type-84 (W653/W653A); Al-Hadeed; 52 M88A1; 35 Maxxpro ARV; T-54/T-55 VLB M47M; M48/60 MWAardvarkMkll ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP M901 TOW; £30 Maaz (HJ-8 on Talha chassis) MANPATS HJ-8; TOW RCL 75mm Type-52; 106mm M40A1 RL 89mm M20 GUNS 85mm 200 Type-56 (D-44) ARTILLERY 4,619+ SP 552: 155mm 492: 200 M109A2; £115 M109A5; 123 M109L; £54 SH-15; 203mm 60 M110/M110A2 TOWED 1,629: 105mm 329: 216 M101; 113 M-56; 122mm 570: 80 D-30 (PRC); 490 Type-54 (M-1938); 130mm 410 Type-59-I; 155mm 292: 144 M114; 148 M198; 203mm 28 M115 MRL 88+: 107mm Type-81; 122mm 52+: 52 Azar (Type- 83); some KRL-122; 300mm 36 A100 MOR 2,350+: 81mm; 120mm AM-50 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS MRBM • Nuclear 30+: £30 Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-V)/ Shaheen-ll (Hatf-VI); some Shaheen-lll (in test) SRBM 135+: Nuclear 30+: £30 Ghaznavi (Hatf-lll - PRC M-U)/Shaheen-l (Hatf-lV); some Abdali (Hatf-ll); some Nasr (Hatf-IX); Conventional 105 Hatf-l GLCM • Nuclear some Babur-I/IA (Hatf-VII) AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 13: 1 Beech 350 King Air; 3 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna 421; 1 Cessna 550 Citation; 1 Cessna 560 Citation; 2 Turbo Commander 690; 4 Y-12(II) TRG 87 MFI-17B Mushshak HELICOPTERS ATK 42: 38 AH-1F/S Cobra with TOW; 4 Mi-35M Hind; (1 Mi-24 Hind in store) MRH 115+: 10 H125M Fennec; 7 AW139; 26 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 38+ Mi-17 Hip H; 2 MÍ-171E Hip; 12 SA315B Lama; 20 SA319 Alouette III TPT 76: Medium 36: 31 SA330 Puma; 4 Mi-171; 1 Mi-172; Light 40: 17 H125 Ecureuil (SAR); 5 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 5 Bell 205A-1 (AB-205A-1); 13 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II TRG 10 Hughes 300C UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 5 CH-4 ISR • Light Bravo; Jasoos; Vector Asia 281 AIR DEFENCE SAM 27+ Long-range some FK-3 (HQ-22) Medium-range 27 LY-80 (CH-SA-16) Short-range FM-90 (CH-SA-4) Point-defence M113 with RBS-70; Anza-ll; FN-6 (CH-SA-10); Mistral; QW-18 (CH-SA-11); RBS-70 GUNS • TOWED 1,933: 14.5mm 981; 35mm 248 GDF-002/GDF-005 (with 134 Skyguard radar units); 37mm 310 Type-55 (M-1939)/Type-65; 40mm 50 L/60; 57mm 144 Type-59 (S-60); 85mm 200 Type-72 (M-1939) KS-12 Navy 21,800 (incl £3,200 Marines)_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 8 SSK 5: 2 Hashmat (FRA Agosta 70) with 4 single 533mm ASTT with UGM-84 Harpoon AShM/F-17P HWT 3 Khalid (FRA Agosta 90B) (of which 2 fitted with AIP) with 4 single 533mm ASTT with SM39 Exocet AShM/ SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT SSW 3 MG110 (SF delivery) each with 2 single 533mm TT with F-17P HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 8 FFGHM 6: 4 Sword (F-22P) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802A AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with FM-90N (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with ET-52C (A244/S) LWT, 2 RDC-32 A/S mor, 1 Type 730B (H/PJ-12) CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C Haitun hel) 2 Tughril (Type-054AP (Jiangkai II)) with 2 twin lnchr with CM-302 (YJ-12A) AShM, 4 8-cell H/AJK-16 VLS with LY-80N (HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16)) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C Haitun ASW hel) FFGH 1 Alamgir (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun FFHM 1 Tariq (ex-UK Amazon) with 1 sextuple lnchr with LY-60N SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 CORVETTES • FSH 2 Yarmook (Damen OPV 1900) (fitted for but not with 2 quad lnchr for AShM) with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 1 hel) PCG 4: lAzmat (FAC(M)) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802A AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS; 2 Azmat (FAC(M)) with 2 triple lnchr with C-602 AShM, 1AK630 CIWS PBG 4: 2 Jalalat with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM; 2 Jurrat with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM PBF 4: 2 Kaan 15; 2 Zarrar (33) PB 6:1 Larkana; 1 Rajshahii; 4 M16 Fast Assault Boat MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3 MCC 3 Munsif (FRA £ridan) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8 LCM 2 LCAC 2 Gn#tm 8100TD UCAC 4 Gn#bn 2000TD LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9 AGS 2:1 Behr Mosa; 1 Be/ir Pfli'ma AOL 2 Madadgar AORH 2:1 Filing with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 1 SA319 Alouette III hel); 1 Moawin (Fleet Tanker) with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 hel landing platform AOT 2 Gwadar AXS1 Marines £3,200_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo gp MANOEUVRE Amphibious 3 mne bn AIR DEFENCE 1 ADbn Naval Aviation_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 9 combat capable ASW 9: 7 P-3B/C Orion; 2 ATR-72-500 MP 7: 6 F-27-200 MPA; 1 Lineage 1000 TPT 3: Light 2 ATR-72-500; PAX 1 Hawker 850XP HELICOPTERS ASW 11:4 Sea King Mk45; 7 Z-9C Haitun MRH 6 SA319B Alouette III SAR 1 Sea King (ex-HAR3A) TPT • Medium 5:1 Commando Mk2A; 3 Commando Mk3;l Sea King (ex-HC4) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AM39 Exocet Coastal Defence_ FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL Defence 1 AShM regt with Zarb (YJ-62) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM Zarb (YJ-62) Air Force 70,000_ 3 regional comds: Northern (Peshawar), Central (Sargodha), Southern (Masroor). The Composite Air Tpt Wg, Combat Cadres School and PAF Academy are Direct Reporting Units FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 3 sqn with F-7PG/FT-7PG Air guard 1 sqn with F-16A/B MLU Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with F-16A/B ADF Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with Mirage IIID/E (IIIOD/EP) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Block 1) 3 sqn with JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Block 2) 1 sqn with JF-17B Thunder (FC-1 Block 2) 1 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52 Fighting Falcon 3 sqn with Mirage 5 (5PA) ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE 1 sqn with Mirage 5PA2/5PA3 with AM-39 Exocet AShM ELECTRONIC WARFARE/ELINT 1 sqn with Falcon 20F 282 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with Saab 2000; Saab 2000 Erieye 1 sqn with ZDK-03 SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with Mi-171Sh; AW139 (SAR/liaison) 5 sqn with SA316 Alouette III 2sqnwithAW139 TANKER 1 sqn with 11-78 Midas TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules; L-100-20 1 sqn with CN235M-220 1 VIP sqn with B-707; Cessna 560XL Citation Excel; CN235M-220; F-27-200 Friendship; Falcon 20E; Gulfstream IVSP 1 (comms) sqn with EMB-500 Phenom 100; Y-12 (II) TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with F-7P/FT-7P Skybolt 1 OCU sqn with Mirage Ill/Mirage 5 1 OCU sqn with F-16A/B MLU Fighting Falcon 2 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* 2 sqn with MFI-17 2 sqn with T-37C Tweet AIR DEFENCE 1 bty with HQ-2 (CH-SA-1); 9K310 Igla-l (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) 6 bty with Crotale 10 bty with SPADA 2000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 431 combat capable FTR 151: 46 F-7PG Airguard; 20 F-7P Skybolt; 23 F-16A MLU Fighting Falcon; 21 F-16B MLU Fighting Falcon; 9 F-16A ADF Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16B ADF Fighting Falcon; 21 FT-7; 5 FT-7PG; 2 Mirage IIIB EGA 229: 12 F-16C Block 52 Fighting Falcon; 6 F-16D Block 52 Fighting Falcon; 12+ J-10CE; 49 JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Block 1); 61 JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Block 2); 15 JF-17B Thunder; 7 Mirage HID (Mirage IIIOD); 30 Mirage HIE (IIIEP); 25 Mirage 5 (5PA)/5PA2; 2 Mirage 5D (5DPA)/5DPA2; 10 Mirage 5PA3 (ASuW) ISR 10 Mirage IIIR* (Mirage IIIRP) ELINT 2 Falcon 20F AEW&C 10: 6 Saab 2000 Erieye; 4 ZDK-03 TKR 411-78 Midas TPT 35: Medium 16: 10 C-130E Hercules; 5 C-130H Hercules; 1 L-100-20; Light 14: 2 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna 560XL Citation ExeeZ; 4 CN235M-220; 4 EMB-500 Pfenom 100; 1 F-27-200 Friendship; 2 Y-12 (II); PAX 5: 1 B-707; 1 FaZcon 20E; 2 Gulfstream IVSP; 1 Saab 2000 TRG 140: 38 K-8 Karakorum*; 79 MFI-17B Mushshak; 23 T-37C Tweet HELICOPTERS MRH 29:15 SA316 Alouette III; 14 AW139 TPT • Medium 4 Mi-171Sh UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy CH-3 (Burraq); CH-4 (reported) ISR • Medium Falco AIR DEFENCE • SAM 190+ Medium-range 6 HQ-2 (CH-SA-1) Short-range 184:144 Crotale; e40 SPADA 2000 Point-defence 9K310 Igla-l (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES A AM • IR AIM-9L/P Sidewinder; U-Darter; PL-5; PL-5E-II; IIR PL-10 (CH-AA-9); SARH Super 530; ARH PL-12 (CH-AA-7 A Adze); PL-15 (CH-AA-10); AM-120C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65 Maverick; Raptor II AShM AM39 Exocet; C-802 ARM MAR-1 ALCM • Nuclear Ra'ad BOMBS INS/SAT-guided FT-6 (REK) Laser-guided Paveway II Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 291,000 active Airport Security Force 9,000_ Government Aviation Division Pakistan Coast Guards_ Ministry of Interior EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5: PBF4 PB 1 Frontier Corps 70,000_ Ministry of Interior FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance I armd recce sqn Other II paramilitary regt (total: 40 paramilitary bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC (W) 45 UR-416 Maritime Security Agency £2,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with BN-2T Defender EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 PSO 2 Kashmir PCC 10:4 Barkat; 4 Hingol; 2 Sabqat (ex-US Island) PBF 5 Response Boat-Medium (RB-M) (ex-US) PB 3 Guns AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3 BN-2T Defender National Guard 185,000_ Ind Janbaz Force; Mujahid Force; National Cadet Corps; Women Guards Pakistan Rangers 25,000_ Ministry of Interior DEPLOYMENT_ ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN: Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-151:1 FFGHM Asia 283 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1,310; 1 inf bn; 2 engr coy; 1 hel sqn CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 3 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1,974; 2 inf bn; 1 hel sqn with SA330 Puma MALI: UN • MINUSMA 221; 1 hel fit with 3 Mi-17; 1 fd hospital SOMALIA: UN • UNSOS 1 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 286; 1 engr coy SUDAN:UN • UNISFA583; 1 infbn WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 13 FOREIGN FORCES_ Figures represent total numbers for UNMOGIP mission in India and Pakistan Argentina 3 Croatia 8 Italy 2 Korea, Republic of 7 Mexico 1 Philippines 5 Romania 2 Sweden 4 Switzerland 3 Thailand 6 Uruguay 3 Papua New Guinea PNG Papua New Guinea Kina PGK 2021 2022 GDP PGK 94.6bn 109bn USD 27.3bn 31.4bn per capita USD 3,050 3,427 Growth % 1.2 3.8 Inflation % 4.5 6.6 Def bdgt PGK 305m 344m USD 88.2m 99.4m USD1=PGK 3.46 3.46 2023 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) T . . 94 42 2008-- -2015-- --2022 Population 9,593,498 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 19.2% 5.0% 4.5% 4.1 % 16.1% 1.9% Female 18.4% 4.8% 4.4% 3.9% 1 5.9% 1.9% Capabilities Since independence in 1975, the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) has suffered from underfunding and lack of capacity to perform its core roles. After personnel reductions in the 2000s, the government made efforts in the next decade to revive defence capability. A 2013 defence White Paper identified core roles including defending the state and civil-emergency assistance, but noted that 'defence capabilities have deteriorated to the extent that we have alarming gaps in our land, air and maritime borders'. The White Paper called for strengthening defence capability on an ambitious scale, with long-term plans calling for a 'division-sized force' of 10,000 personnel by 2030. The PNGDF continues to receive substantial external military assistance from Australia and also from China, which has donated equipment. In late 2018, plans to build a joint US-Australia-Papua New Guinea naval base at Lombrum were announced. In 2022 there were discussions on closer defence cooperation with Australia. The PNGDF is not able to deploy outside the country without outside assistance and there have only been small PNGDF deployments to UN peacekeeping missions. The PNGDF will receive four of the Guard/an-class patrol boats that Australia is donating to small Pacific island nations. These will replace the four Pac/fic-class boats Australia donated in the 1980s. Papua New Guinea has no significant defence industry, though there is some local maintenance capacity. ACTIVE 4,000 (Army 3,700 Maritime Element 200 Air 100) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army £3,700_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops unit MANOEUVRE Light 2 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn 1 EOD unit 1 sigs sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARTILLERY • MOR 3+; 81mm Some; 120mm 3 Maritime Element £200_ HQ located at Port Moresby EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PCO 3 Guardian (AUS Bay mod) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 2 LCT 1 Salamaua (ex-AUS Balikpapan) LCM 1 Cape Gloucester Air Force £l 00_ FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 sqn with CN235M-100; IAI-201 Arava TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)i EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3; 1 CN235M-100 (1 more in store); 2 IAI-201 Aram HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 3; 2 Bell 412 (leased); 1 Bell 212 (leased) (2 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) non-operational) 284 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Philippines PHL Philippine Peso PHP 2021 2022 2023 GDP PHP 19.4tr 21.7tr USD 394bn 402bn per capita USD 3,576 3,597 Growth % 5.7 6.5 Inflation % 3.9 5.3 Def bdgt [a] PHP 279bn 295bn 333bn USD 5.66bn 5.46bn FMA (US) USD 40 m 40m 40m USD1=PHP 49.25 53.99 [a] Excludes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008-- --2015--- --2022 Population 114,597,229 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 15.7% 5.0% 4.6% 4.2% 18.4% 2.1% Female 15.1% 4.8% 4.5% 4.1% 18.3% 3.2% Capabilities_ Despite modest increases in defence funding, mainly in response to the growing challenge posed by China to Philippine interests in the South China Sea, the capabilities and procurement plans of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which have traditionally focused on maintaining internal security, remain limited.The National Defense Strategy 2018-22 identified policy priorities including ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity, and internal stability. In 2019, the Philippine Space Agency was set up, and an MoU on closer collaboration with the defence department was agreed in 2022. The Philippines remains an ally of the US, which provides support for the AFP's external security role and its counter-terrorist operations. Bilateral defence relations improved in 2021 after then-president Duterte agreed to maintain the bilateral Visiting Forces Agreement. The AFP continues to host the long-running Balikatan exercise series with US forces, and to participate in ADMM-Plus exercises. In 2017 it began trilateral joint maritime patrols in the Sulu Sea with Indonesia and Malaysia to counter regional terrorist activity. The armed forces continue to be deployed on internal-security duties in the south, where Manila faces continuing challenges from insurgent groups. The second phase (2018-22) of the'second horizon'AFP modernisation programme was approved in 2018, and projects still outstanding are set to transition to a third and final phase (2023-28). The new government has reviewed projects slated for the third phase and amid budget concerns some, such as the plan to acquire conventionally-powered submarines, are reportedly no longer a priority. The Philippine Aerospace Development Corporation, owned by the defence department since 2019, has assembled a variety of small helicopters and aircraft for the AFP, and also provides maintenance, repair and overhaul services for military aircraft. ACTIVE 145,300 (Army 103,200 Navy 24,500 Air 17,600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,300 RESERVE 131,000 (Army 100,000 Navy 15,000 Air 16,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 50,000 (to age 49) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 103,200_ 5 Area Unified Comd (joint service), 1 National Capital Region Comd FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops comd (1 ranger regt, 1 SF regt, 1 CT regt) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 armd div (2 mech bde (total: 3 It armd bn, 7 armd cav coy, 4 mech inf bn), 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 avn regt) Light 1 div (4 inf bde, 1 f d arty bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) 7 div (3 inf bde, 1 f d arty bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) 3 div (3 inf bde, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) Other 1 (Presidential) gd gp COMBAT SUPPORT 1 SP arty bn 2 MRL bfy (forming) 5 engr bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SSM bfy (forming) AIR DEFENCE IAD bfy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 7 FV101 Scorpion IFV 54: 2 YPR-765; 34 M113A1 FSV; 18 M113A2 FSV APC 387 APC (T) 168: 6 ACV300; 42 M113A1; 120 M113A2 (some with Dragon RWS) APC (W) 219: 73 LAV-150 Commando; 146 Simba PPV 2+ CS/VP-3 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV ACV-300; Samson; M578; 4 M113 ARV VLB 2+: some GQL-111; 2 Merkava MkIV AVLB ANTI-TANK-ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 75mm M20; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY 272+ SP 155mm 12 ATMOS 2000 TOWED 220: 105mm 204 M101/M102/Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 16: 10 M114/M-68; 6 Soltam M-71 MOR 40+: 81mm M29; 107mm 40 M30; 120mm some Cardom AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 4: 1 Beech 80 Queen Air; 1 Cessna 170; 1 Cessna 172; 1 Cessna P206A HELICOPTERS TPT • Light 2 R-44 Raven II UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium Blue Horizon Navy 24,500_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2 FFGHM 2 Jose Rizal (HDF-3000) with 2 quad lnchr with Hoe Sung I AShM, 2 twin Simbad-RC lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 324mm SEA TLS ASTT with K745 Blue Asia 285 Shark LWT, 1 76mm gun (fitted for but not with 1 8-cell VLS) (capacity 1AW159 Wildcat) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 53 CORVETTES • FS 1 Conrado Yap (ex-ROKPoHang (Flight III)) with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 2 76mm gun PSOH 3 Del Pilar (ex-US Hamilton) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo 105) PCF 1 General Mariano Alvares (ex-US Cyclone) PCO 4:3 Emilio Jacinto (ex-UK Peacock) with 1 76mm gun; 1 Miguel Malvar (ex-US) with 1 76mm gun PBFG 6 MPAC Mk3 with 1 Typhoon MLS-ER quad lnchr with Spike-ER SSM PBF 6 MPAC Mkl/2 PB 26: 22 Jose Andrada; 2 Kagitingan; 2 Point (ex-US) PBR 6 Silver Ships AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 2: 2 Tarlac (IDN Makassar) (capacity 2 LCVP; 3 hels; 13 tanks; 500 troops) LANDING SHIPS • LST 4: 2 Bacolod City (US Besson) with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 32 tanks; 150 troops) 2 LST-1/542 (ex-US) (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops) (1 other permanently grounded as marine outpost) LANDING CRAFT 15 LCM 2: 1 Manobo; 1 Tagbanua (capacity 100 tons; 200 troops) LCT 5 Ivatan (ex-AUS Balikpapan) LCU4:3 LCU Mk 6 (ex-US); 1 Mamanwa (ex-RoKMulgae I) LCVP 4 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4 AGOR 1 Gregorio Velasquez (ex-US Melville) AOL 1 AP 1 Aug Pangulo AWT 1 Lafce Buluan Naval Aviation_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 14: 5 Beech 90 King Air (TC-90); 3 BN-2A Defender; 4 Cessna 172; 2 Cessna 177 Cardinal HELICOPTERS ASW 2 AW159 Wildcat TPT 13: Medium 4 Mi-171Sh; Light 9: 3 AW109; 2 AW109E; 4 Bo-105 Marines 8,300_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (force recon) spec ops bn MANOEUVRE Amphibious 4 mne bde (total: 12 mne bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1CSS bde (6 CSSbn) COASTAL DEFENCE 1 coastal def bde (1 AShM bn (forming); 1 SAM bn (forming)) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 42:19 LAV-150 Commando; 23 LAV-300 AAV 67: 8 AAV-7A1; 4 LVTH-6t; 55 LVTP-7 ARTILLERY 37+ TOWED 37: 105mm 31: 23 M101; 8 M-26; 155mm 6 Soltam M-71 MOR 107mm M30 Naval Special Operations Group_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SEAL unit 1 diving unit 10 naval spec ops unit 1 special boat unit COMBAT SUPPORT 1 EOD unit Air Force 17,600_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with FA-50PH Fighting Eagle* GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano* 1 sqn with OV-10A/C Bronco*; SF-260F/TP* ISR 1 sqn with Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; Turbo Commander 690A SEARCH & RESCUE 4 (SAR/Comms) sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1M Iroquois); AUH-76; W-3A Sokol TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130B/H/T Hercules 1 sqn with C295/W; F-27-200 MP A; F-27-500 Friendship 1 sqn with N-22B Nomad; N-22SL Searchmaster; C-212 Aviocar (NC-212i) 1 VIP sqn with C295M; F-28 Fellowship; Gulfstream G280 TRAINING 1 sqn with SF-260FH 1 sqn with T-41B/D/K Mescalero 1 sqn with S-211* 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AH-1S Cobra; MD-520MG 1 sqn with AW109E TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) 1 sqn with S-70i Black Hawk 1 (VIP) sqn with Bell 412EP Twin Huey; S-70A Black Hawk (S-70A-5) ISR UAV 1 sqn with Hermes 450/900 AIR DEFENCE 2 bty with Spyder-MR EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 49 combat capable EGA 12 FA-50PH Fighting Eagle MP 3: 1 C-130T MP mod; 1 F-27-200 MP A; 1 N-22SL Searchmaster ISR 11:2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 9 OV-10A/C Bronco* TPT 17: Medium 4:1C-130B Hercules; 2 C-130H Hercules; 1 C-130T Hercules Light 11: 3 C295; 1 C295M; 2 C295W; 286 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 1 F-27-500 Friendship; 1 N-22B Nomad; 1 Turbo Commander 690A; 2 C-212 Aviocar (NC-212i); PAX 2:1 F-28 Fellowship (VIP); 1 Gulfstream G280 TRG 45:6 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 12 S-211*; 7 SF-260FH; 10 SF-260TP*; 10 T-41B/D/K Mescalero HELICOPTERS ATK 4: 2 AH-1S Cofcra; T129B MRH 39: 8 W-3A SofcoZ; 2 AUH-76; 8 AW109E; 8 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412HP Twin Huey; 11MD-520MG TPT 35: Medium 16: 1 S-70A Black Hawk (S-70A-5); 15 S-70i Black Hawk; Light 19 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) (25 more non-operational) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 5: 2 Blue Horizon II; 1 Hermes 450; 2 Hermes 900 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder ASM AGM-65D Maverick; AGM-65G2 Maverick BOMBS INS/GPS-guided: GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II AIR DEFENCE • SAM Medium-range 6 Spyder-MR Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,300_ Coast Guard 12,300_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Rodman 38 and Rodman 101 owned by Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 72 PSOH 1 Gabriela Silang (OCEA OPV 270) PCO 4 San Juan with 1 hel landing platform PB 56:4 Boracay (FPB 72 Mk II); 4 Ilocos Norte; 10 Parola (MRRV); 10 PCF 46; 12 PCF 50 (US Swift Mkl/2); 2 PCF 65 (US Swift Mk3); 4 Rodman 38; 10 Rodman 101 PBR11 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ABU 1 Corregidor AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 2 BN-2 Islander; 1 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan EX HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 4: 2 Bo-105; 2 H145 Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units 50,000 reservists_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 56 militia bn (part-time units which can be called up for extended periods) DEPLOYMENT_ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 3 INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 5 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 FOREIGN FORCES_ Australia Operation Augury 100 United States US Pacific Command: Operation Pacific Eagle -Philippines 200 Singapore SGP Singapore Dollar SGD 2021 2022 GDP SGD 533bn 582bn USD 397bn 424bn per capita USD 72,795 79,426 Growth % 7.6 3.0 Inflation % 2.3 5.5 Def bdgt SGD 15.4bn 16.4bn USD 11.4bn 11.9bn USD1=SGD 1.34 1.37 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- --2022 Population 5,921,231 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 7.8% 3.1% 3.8% 4.3% 24.9% 6.1% Female 7.3% 2.8% 3.5% 3.8% 25.7% 7.0% Capabilities The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) are the best equipped in Southeast Asia. They are organised essentially along Israeli lines, with the air force and navy staffed mainly by professional personnel while, apart from a small core of regulars, the much larger army is based on conscripts and reservists. Although there are no publicly available defence-policy documents, it is widely presumed that the SAF's primary role is to deter attacks on the city state or interference with its vital interests - particularly its sea lines of communication - by potential regional adversaries. There is an additional focus on counter-terrorist operations. With an ageing population and declining conscript cohort, there is a significant personnel challenge, which the defence ministry is addressing by lean staffing and increased use of technology. There is routine overseas training, and plans have been announced to further improve domestic training areas. The SAF also engages extensively in bilateral and multilateral exercises with regional and international partners. Singaporean forces have gradually become more involved - albeit on a small-scale - in multinational operations. While deployments have provided some operational experience, and training standards and operational readiness are high, the army's reliance on conscripts and reservists limits its capacity for sustained operations abroad. Equipment modernisation continues, which will be further enhanced by the 'SAF 2040' vision, launched in March 2022. This outlines procurement and upgrade priorities across all domains, including the establishment of a fourth service branch - the Digital and Intelligence Service, which was established in October 2022. Plans to acquire capabilities including F-35 combat aircraft, multi-role combat vessels, uninhabited surface vessels and uninhabited aerial vehicles, offshore patrol vessels, maritime patrol aircraft and land equipment are intended to maintain Singapore's military edge over other Southeast Asian countries.There is a small but sophisticated defence industry. ST Engineering manufactures armoured vehicles, artillery and naval vessels for the SAF. ACTIVE 51,000 (Army 40,000 Navy 4,000 Air 6,000 Digitial & Intelligence 1,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,400 Conscription liability 22-24 months Asia 287 RESERVE 252,500 (Army 240,000 Navy 5,000 Air 7,500) Annual trg to age 40 for army other ranks, 50 for officers ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 40,000 (including 26,000 conscripts) FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 (combined arms) div HQ 1 (rapid reaction) div HQ 4 armd bde HQ 9 inf bde HQ 1 air mob bde HQ 1 amph bde HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo bn MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 3 It armd/recce bn Armoured 1 armd bn Mechanised 6 mech inf bn Light 2 (gds) inf bn Other 2 sy bn COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bn 1 STA bn 2 engr bn 1 EOD bn 1 ptn br bn 1 int bn 2ISRbn 1 CBRN bn 3 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 med bn 2 tpt bn 3 spt bn Reserves_ Activated units form part of divisions and brigades listed above; 1 op reserve div with additional armd & inf bde; People's Defence Force Comd (homeland defence) with 12 infbn FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo bn MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 6 It armd/recce bn Mechanised 6 mech inf bn Light e56 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT e12 arty bn e8 engr bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 96+ Leopard 2SG LT TK £50 AMX-13 SMI (22 AMX-10 PAC 90; £300 AMX-13 SMI in store) IFV 600+: 250 Bionix IFV-25; 250 Bionix IFV-40/50; e50 Hunter AFV; 50+ M113A2 Ultra; (22 AMX-10P) APC 1,375+ APC (T) 1,100+: 700+ M113A1/A2; 400+ ATTC Bronco APC (W) 135 Terrex ICV; (250 LAV-150/V-200 Commando; 30 V-100 Commando in store) PPV 140: 74 Belrex; 15 MaxxPro Dash; 51 Peacekeeper ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 94:18 CET; 54 FV180; 14 Kodiak; 8 M728 ARV Bionix; Büffel; LAV-150; LAV-300 VLB 72+: Bionix; LAB 30; Leguan; M2; 60 M3; 12 M60 MW 910-MCV-2; Traäblazer ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan; Spike-SR; Spike-UR RCL 90+: 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm 90 M40A1 ARTILLERY 798+ SP 155mm 54 SSPH-1 Primus TOWED 88:105mm (37 LG1 in store); 155mm 88:18 FH-2000; £18 Pegasus; 52 FH-88 MRL 227mm 18 M142 HIMARS MOR 638+ SP 90+: 81mm; 120mm 90:40 on Bronco; 50 on M113 TOWED 548: 81mm 500 120mm 36 M-65; 160mm 12 M-58 Tampella Navy 4,000 (incl 1,000 conscripts)_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 4: 2 Archer (ex-SWE Västergötland) (fitted with AIP) with 3 single 400mm TT with Torped 431, 6 single 533mm TT with Black Shark HWT 2 Challenger (ex-SWE Sjoormen) with 2 single 400mm TT with Torped 431,4 single 533mm TT with Torped 613 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 6 FFGHM 6 Formidable with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 4 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B Sea Hawk hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 26 CORVETTES • FSM 8 Independence (Littoral Mission Vessel) with 1 12-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCGM 6 Victory with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 2 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 1 76mm gun PCO 4 Sentinel (Fearless mod) with 1 76mm gun PBF 8: 2 SMC Type 1; 6 SMC Type 2 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 MCC 4 Bedok AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 4 Endurance with 2 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 hel; 4 LCVP; 18 MBT; 350 troops) LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 23: £17 FCEP; 6 FCU LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5 288 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 ASR 1 Swift Rescue ATF2 AX 2:1 Avatar, 1 Stet Polaris Naval Diving Unit_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES ISFgp 1 (diving) SF gp COMBAT SUPPORT 1 EOD gp Air Force 6,000 (incl 3,000 conscripts)_ 5 comds FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-15SG Eagle 2 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (some used for ISR with pods) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with S-70B Seahawk MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with F-50 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with G550-AEW TANKER 1 sqn with A330MRTT TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with KC-130B/H Hercules; C-130H Hercules TRAINING 1 (aggressor) sqn with F-15SG Eagle; F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 (FRA-based) sqn with M-346 Master 4 (US-based) units with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D Chinook; F-15SG: F-16C/D 1 (AUS-based) sqn with PC-21 1 hel sqn with H120 Colibri ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AH-64D Apache TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with CH-47SD Super D Chinook 2 sqn with AS332M Super Puma; AS532UL Cougar ISR UAV 1 sqn with Hermes 450 2 sqn with Heron 1 AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn with Mistral (opcon Army) 3 AD bn with RBS-70; 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); Mechanised Igla (opcon Army) 1 ADA sqn with Oerlikon 1 AD sqn with SAMP/T 1 AD sqn with Spyder-SR 1 radar sqn with radar (mobile) 1 radar sqn with LORADS MANOEUVRE Other 4 (field def) sy sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 105 combat capable EGA 100: 40 F-15SG Eagle; 20 F-16C Block 52 Fighting Falcon; 20 F-16D Block 52 Fighting Falcon; 20 F-16D Block 52+ Fighting Falcon (incl reserves) MP 5 F-50 Maritime Enforcer* AEW&C 4 G550-AEW TKR/TPT 11: 6 A330 MRTT; 4 KC-130B Hercules; 1 KC-130H Hercules TPT 9: Medium 5 C-130H Hercules (2 ELINT); PAX 4 F-50 TRG 31:12 M-346 Master; 19 PC-21 HELICOPTERS ATK 19 AH-64D Apache ASW 8 S-70B Seahawk TPT 56: Heavy 21: 6 CH-47D Chinook; 10 CH-47SD Super D Chinook; 2+ CH-47F Chinook; 3+ H225M; Medium 30: 18 AS332M Super Puma (incl 5 SAR); 12 AS532UL Cougar; Light 5 H120 Colibri (leased) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR 17+: Heavy 8+ Heron 1; Medium 9+ Hermes 450; Light some Orbiter-4 AIR DEFENCE SAM 4+ Long-range 4+ SAMP/T Short-range Spyder-SR Point-defence 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); Mechanised Igla; Mistral; RBS-70 GUNS 34 SP 20mm GAI-C01 TOWED 34+: 20mm GAI-C01; 35mm 34 GDF (with 25 Super-Fledermaus fire-control radar) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9P/S Sidewinder; Python 4 (reported); IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7P Sparrow; ARH (AIM-120C5/7 AMRAAM in store in US) ASM: AGM-65B/G Maverick; AGM-114K/L Hellfire; AGM-154A/C JSOW AShM AGM-84 Harpoon; AM39 Exocet BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II; GBU-54 Laser JDAM INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM Digital & Intelligence Service 1,000_ Formed 2022 as fourth service of the Singapore Armed Forces, consolidating existing intelligence and cyber capabilities Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,400 active Civil Defence Force 5,600 (incl conscripts); 500 auxiliaries (total 6,100)_ Singapore Gurkha Contingent 1,800_ Under the Police FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 6 paramilitary coy DEPLOYMENT_ AUSTRALIA: 2 trg schools -1 with 12 AS332M1 Super Puma/ AS532UL Cougar (flying trg) located at Oakey; 1 with PC- Asia 289 21 (flying trg) located at Pearce. Army: prepositioned AFVs and heavy equipment at Shoalwater Bay training area BRUNEI: 1 trg camp with inf units on rotation; 1 hel det with AS332M1 Super Puma FRANCE: 200:1 trg sqn with 12 M-346 Master TAIWAN: 3 trg camp (ind inf and arty) THAILAND: 1 trg camp (arty, cbt engr) UNITED STATES: Trg units with F-16C/D; 12 F-15SG; AH-64D Apache; 6+ CH-47D Chinook FOREIGN FORCES_ United States US Indo-Pacific Command: 200; 1 naval spt fadlity at Changi naval base; 1 USAF log spt sqn at Paya Lebar air base Sri Lanka LKA Sri Lankan Rupee LKR 2021 2022 2023 GDP LKR 17.7tr 23.8tr USD 89.0bn 73.7bn per capita USD 4,016 3,293 Growth % 3.3 -8.7 Inflation % 6.0 48.2 Def bdgt LKR 308bn 373bn USD 1.55bn 1.15bn USD1=LKR 198.76 323.34 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2.04 2008 -2015 2022 Population 23,187,516 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 11.4% 4.0% 3.6% 3.5% 21.6% 4.8% Female 11.0% 3.8% 3.4% 3.4% 23.0% 6.6% Capabilities Since the defeat of the Tamil Tigers, the armed forces have reoriented to a peacetime internal-security role. Support has been provided by China, in an indication of a growing military-to-military relationship. The US has eased its long-standing military trade restrictions and Japan has stated an intention to increase maritime cooperation. Sri Lanka has little capacity for force projection beyond its national territory but has sent small numbers of troops on UN missions. The navy's littoral capability, based on fast-attack and patrol boats, has been strengthened with the acquisition of offshore-patrol vessels, while the US has gifted a former US coastguard cutter and China has gifted a frigate. The army is reducing in size and there appears to have been little spending on new equipment since the end of the civil war. Sri Lanka is looking to begin a series of procurements to fill key capability gaps but ambitions are limited by budget constraints. The effect of the 2022 political and economic crisis on Sri Lanka's defence policy and procurement is unclear. Beyond maintenance facilities and limited fabrication, such as at Sri Lanka's shipyards, there is no defence-industrial base. ACTIVE 255,000 (Army 177,000 Navy 50,000 Air 28,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 62,200 RESERVE 5,500 (Army 1,100 Navy 2,400 Air Force 2,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 30,400 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE_ Army 113,000; 64,00 active reservists (recalled) (total 177,000)_ Regt are bn sized FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 7 region HQ 21 div HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 indep SF bde MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 3 armd recce regt Armoured 1 armd bde(-) Mechanised 1 mech inf bde Light 60 inf bde 1 cdo bde Air Manoeuvre 1 air mob bde COMBAT SUPPORT 7 arty regt 1 MRL regt 8 engr regt 6 sigs regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 62 T-55A/T-55AM2 RECCE 15 Saladin IFV 62+: 13 BMP-1; 49 BMP-2; WZ-551 20mm APC 211+ APC (T) 30+: some Type-63; 30 Type-85; some Type-89 APC (W) 181: 25 BTR-80/BTR-80A; 31 Buffel; 20 WZ-551; 105 Unicorn ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 16 VT-55 VLB 2 MT-55 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MANPATS HJ-8 RCL 40:105mm £10 M-65; 106mm £30 M40 GUNS 85mm 8 Type-56 (D-44) ARTILLERY 908 TOWED 96: 122mm 20; 130mm 30 Type-59-I; 152mm 46 Type-66 (D-20) MRL 122mm 28: 6 KRL-122; 22 RM-70 MOR 784: 81mm 520; 82mm 209; 120mm 55 M-43 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 1 Seeker 290 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Navy £37,000; £l 3,000 active reserves (total 50,000) Seven naval areas EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1 FFH 1 Parakramabahu (ex-PRC Type-053H2G (Jiangwei I)) with 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 121 PSOH 5: 2 Gajabahu (ex-US Hamilton) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel); 1 Sayura (ex-IND Sukanya); 2 Sayurala (IND Samarth) PCO 2: 1 Samudura (ex-US Reliance); 1 Sagara (IND Vikram) with 1 hel landing platform PCC 3: 1 Jayasagara; 2 Nandimithra (ISR Sa'ar 4) with 1 76mm gun PBF 74: 26 Colombo; 6 Shaldag; 4 Super Doom Mk II; 6 Super Dvora Mk III; 5 Trinity Marine; 27 Wave Rider PB 11: 2 Mihikatha (ex-AUS Bay); 2 Prathapa (PRC mod Haizhui); 3 Ranajaya (PRC Haizhui); 1 Ranarisi (PRC mod Shanghai II); 3 Weerai/fl (PRC Shanghai II) PBR 26 AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LSM 1 S/iafct/ii (PRC Yh/wi) (capacity 2 tanks; 250 troops) LANDING CRAFT 5 LCM2 LCU 2 Yunnan UCAC 1 M 10 (capacity 56 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3: 2 AP; 1 AX Marines £500_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bn Special Boat Service s100_ Reserve Organisations_ Sri Lanka Volunteer Naval Force (SLVNF) 13,000 active reservists Air Force 28,000 (incl SLAF Regt)_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with F-7BS/G; FT-7 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Kfir C-2 1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-32B Cline; C-130K Hercules; Cessna 421C Golden Eagle 1 sqn with Beech B200 King Air; Y-12 (II) TRAINING 1 wg with PT-6, Cessna 150L ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24V Hind E; Mi-35P Hind TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171Sh 1 sqn with Bell 206A/B (incl basic trg), Bell 212 1 (VIP) sqn with Bell 212; Bell 412 Twin Huey ISR UAV 1 sqn with Blue Horizon II 1 sqn with Searcher Mkll MANOEUVRE Other 1 (SLAF) sy regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable FTR 5:3 F-7GS; 2 FT-7 (3 F-7BS; 1 F-7GS non-operational) EGA 1 Kfir C-2 (2 Kfir C-2; 1 Kfir C-7; 2 Kfir TC-2; 6 MiG-27M Flogger J; 1 MiG-23UB Flogger C non-operational) MP 1 Do-228-101 TPT 20: Medium 2 C-130K Hercules; Light 18: 3 An-32B Cline; 6 Cessna 150L; 1 Cessna 421C Golden Eagle; 6 Y-12 (II); 2 Y-12 (IV) TRG 13: 7 K-8 Karakorum*; 6 PT-6 HELICOPTERS ATK 11:6 Mi-24P Hind; 3 Mi-24V Hind E; 2 Mi-35V Hind MRH 18: 6 Bell 412 Tirói Huey (VIP); 2 Bell 412EP (VIP); 10 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 16: Medium 4 Mi-171Sh; Light 12: 2 Bell 206A Jet Ranger; 2 Bell 206B Jet Ranger; 8 Bell 212 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 2+: some Blue Horizon II; 2 Searcher Mkll AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 27: 40mm 24 L/40; 94mm 3 (3.7in) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR PL-5E Gendarmerie & Paramilitary £62,200_ Home Guard 13,000_ National Guard £15,000_ Police Force 30,200; 1,000 (women) (total 31,200) 30,400 reservists_ Ministry of Defence Special Task Force 3,000 Anti-guerrilla unit Coast Guard n/k_ Ministry of Defence EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28 PCO 1 Suraksha (ex-IND Vikram) with 1 hel landing platform PBF 22: 2 Dvora; 4 Super Dvora Mk I; 3 Killer (ROK); 10 (Inshore Patrol Craft); 3 (Fast Patrol Craft) PB 4: 2 Simonneau Type-508; 2 Samudra Raksha PBR1 DEPLOYMENT_ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 112; 1 hel sqn LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 126; 1 inf coy MALI: UN • MINUSMA 243; 1 sy coy SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 66; 1 fd hospital WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2 Asia 291 Taiwan (Republic of China) ROC organisations by service New Taiwan DollarTWD 2021 2022 GDP TWD 21.7tr 24.2tr USD 775bn 829bn per capita USD 33,143 35,513 Growth % 6.6 3.3 Inflation % 2.0 3.1 Def bdgt TWD 453bn 472bn USD 16.2bn 16.2bn USD1=TWD 28.02 29.18 2023 586bn Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 13.7 2008 -2015 2022 Population 23,580,712 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 6.3% 2.4% Female 6.0% 2.2% 3.1 % 2.9% 3.5% 3.4% 26.2% 26.7% 7.8% 9.5% Capabilities Taiwan's security policy is dominated by its relationship with China and its attempts to sustain a credible military capability. Taiwan's current focus is on air defence and deterrence in coastal areas, on both sides of the island. The 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review for the first time mentioned the need to counter the PLA's 'grey zone' threat. The armed forces exercise regularly. Demographic pressure has influenced plans for force reductions and a shift towards an all-volunteer force, which the 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review credited for helping the armed forces reach its staffing goals. Nonetheless, issues with recruitment and retention have reportedly created personnel challenges for combat units, and an extension of the current four-month military conscription requirement is under consideration, with a decision due by the end of 2022. Taiwan's main security partnership is with the US. The Taiwan Relations Act from 1979 states that 'the United States shall provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character'. In 2019, the United States approved the transfer of new F-16C/D Block 70 combat aircraft to Taiwan. Nevertheless, Taipei maintains an interest in the F-35. In 2022, Taiwan's purchase of MQ-9B UAVs was confirmed. Taiwan has allocated funding for the acquisition of HIMARS, ATACMS, SRBMs and precision-guided rockets in its defence budget. Taiwan's own defence-industrial base has strengths in aerospace, shipbuilding and missiles. The government launched a new defence-industrial policy in 2019, aimed at further strengthening independent defence-manufacturing capacities. ACTIVE 169,000 (Army 94,000 Navy 40,000 Air 35,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 11,800 Conscript liability (19-40 years) 12 months for those born before 1993; four months for those born after 1994 (alternative service available) RESERVE 1,657,000 (Army 1,500,000 Navy 67,000 Air Force 90,000) Some obligation to age 30 Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • ISR 1 Formosat-5 Army 94,000 (incl £5,000 MP) FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 corps HQ 5 defence comd HQ SPECIAL FORCES/HELICOPTER 1 SF/hel comd (5 spec ops bn, 2 hel bde) MANOEUVRE Armoured 4 armd bde Mechanised 3 mech inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty gp 3 engr gp 3 CBRN gp 3 sigs gp COASTAL DEFENCE 1 AShM bn Reserves FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 27 inf bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 650; 200 M60A3; 450 CM-11 Brave Tiger (M48H); (100 CM-12 in store) LT TK £100 M41A3/D IFV 173 CM-34 Yunpao APC 1,543 APC (T) 875; 225 CM-21A1; 650 M113A1/A2 APC (W) 668; 368 CM-32 Yunpao; 300 LAV-150 Commando ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 18 M9 ARV CM-27A1; 37 M88A1 VLB 22 M3; M48A5 NBC VEHICLES 48+; BIDS; 48 K216A1; KM453 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP M113A1 with TOW; M1045A2 HMMWV with TOW MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; TOW RCL 500+; 90mm M67; 106mm 500+; 500 M40A1; Type-51 ARTILLERY 2,093 SP 488; 105mm 100 M108; 155mm 318; 225 M109A2/A5; 48 M44T; 45 T-69; 203mm 70 MHO TOWED 1,060+; 105mm 650 T-64 (M101); 155mm 340+; 90 M59; 250 T-65 (M114); M44; XT-69; 203mm 70 M115 MRL 223; 117mm 120 KungFeng VI; 126mm 103; 60 Kung Feng lll/KungFeng IV; 43 RT 2000 Thunder MOR 322+ SP 162+; 81mm 72+; M29; 72 M125; 107mm 90 M106A2 292 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 TOWED 81mm 160 M29; T-75; 107mm M30; 120mm K5; XT-86 COASTAL DEFENCE ARTY 54:127mm e50 US Mk32 (reported); 240mm 4 Ml AShM Ching Feng HELICOPTERS ATK 96: 67 AH-1W Cobra; 29 AH-64E Apache MRH 38 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior TPT 38: Heavy 8 CH-47SD Super D Chinook; Medium 30 UH-60M Black Hawk TRG 29 TH-67 Creek UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Light Mastiff III AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 76+: 74 M1097 Avenger; 2 M48 Chaparral; FIM-92 Stinger GUNS SP 40mm M42 TOWED 40mm L/70 Navy 40,000_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 4: 2 Hai Lung with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM/SUT HWT 2 Hai Shihi (ex-US Guppy II (used in trg role)) with 10 single 533mm TT (6 fwd, 4 aft) with SUT HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 26 DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4 Keelung (ex-US Kidd) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 2 twin Mk 26 GMLS with SM-2 Block IIIA SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 2 127mm gun (capacity 1 S-70 ASW hel) FRIGATES 22 FFGHM 21: 8 Cheng Kung (US Oliver Hazard Perry mod) with 2 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng II/III AShM, 1 Mk 13 GMLS with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2S-70CASWhel) 2 Meng Chuan (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1 Mkl3 GMLS with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM/SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 S-70C ASW hel) 5 Chin Yang (ex-US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk 16 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple lnchr with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 twin lnchr with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 MD-500 hel) 6 Kong Ding with 2 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng II AShM, 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70C ASW hel) FFGH 1 Chin Yang (ex-US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk 112 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1127mm gun (capacity 1 MD-500 hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 44 CORVETTES • FSGM 1 Ta Jiang (Tuo Jiang mod) with 4 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng II AShM, 2 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng III AShM, 2 octuple lnchr with Tien Chien 2N (Sea Sword II) SAM, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun, I hel landing platform PCFG 1 Tuo Jiang (Hsun Hai) with 4 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng II AShM, 4 twin lnchr with Hisung Feng III AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS; 1 76mm gun PCG 10: 4 Jin Chiang with 2 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng II AShM, 1 76mm gun 6 Jin Chiang with 1 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng III AShM, 1 76mm gun PCC 1 Jin Chiang (test platform) PBG 31 Kwang Hua with 2 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng II AShM MINE WARFARE 9 MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7 MHC 6:4 Yung Feng; 2 Yung Jin (ex-US Osprey) MSO 1 Yung Yang (ex-US Aggressive) MINELAYERS • ML 2 FMLB COMMAND SHIPS • LCC 1 Kao Hsiung AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2 LPD 1 Yu Shan with 4 octuple lnchr with Tien Chien 2N (Sea Sword II) SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 med hel; 4 LCM; 9 AAV-7A1; approx 500 troops) LSD 1 S/ii'm Hoi (ex-US Anchorage) with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 hel landing platform (capacity either 2 LCU or 18 LCM; 360 troops) LANDING SHIPS LST 6: 4 Chung Hai (ex-US LST-524) (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops) 2 Chung Ho (ex-US Newport) with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 hel landing platform (capacity 3 LCVP, 23 AFVs, 400 troops) LANDING CRAFT 44 LCM e32 (various) LCU 12 LCU 1610 (capacity 2 M60A3 or 400 troops) (minelaying capability) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9 AGOR 1 Ta Kuan AOEH 1 Panshih with 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 3 med hel) AOE 1 Wu Yi with 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral SAM, 1 hel landing platform ARS 2:1 Da Hm (ex-US Dioer); 1 Da /Men (ex-US BoZster) ATE 4 Ta Tung (ex-US Cherokee) Asia 293 Marines 10,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 mne bde Other 1 (airfield def) sy gp COMBAT SUPPORT Some cbt spt unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 100 M60A3 TTS AAV 202: 52 AAV-7A1; 150 LVTP-5A1 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 2 AAVR-7 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE SP £25 CM-25 RCL 106mm ARTILLERY • TOWED 105mm; 155mm Naval Aviation_ FORCES BY ROLE ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE 2 sqn with S-70C Seahawk (S-70C Defender) 1 sqn with MD-500 Defender ISR UAV 1 bn with Chung Shyang II EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS ASW 19 S-70C Seahawk (S-70C Defender) MRH 10 MD-500 Defender UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium £28 Chung Shyang II Air Force 35,000_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 3 sqn with Mirage 2000-5E/D (2000-5EI/DI) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II 3 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon 3 sqn with F-16V(A/B) Fighting Falcon 5 sqn with F-CK-1A/B/C/D Ching Kuo ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with P-3C Orion ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with C-130HE Tien Gian ISR 1 sqn with RF-5E Tigereye AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with E-2T Hawkeye SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with H225; UH-60M Black Hawk TRANSPORT 2 sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 (VIP) sqn withB-727-100; B-737-800; Beech 1900; F-50; S-70C Black Hawk TRAINING 1 sqn with AT-3A/B Tzu-Chung* 1 sqn with Beech 1900 1 (basic) sqn with T-34C Turbo Mentor EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 471 combat capable FTR 215: 84 F-5E/F Tiger II (some in store); 77 F-16A/B Fighting Falcon; 9 Mirage 2000-5D (2000-5DI); 45 Mirage 2000-5E (2000-5EI) EGA 190: 127 F-CK-1C/D Ching Kuo; 63 F-16V(A/B) Fighting Falcon ASW 12 P-3C Orion EW1 C-130HE Tien Gian ISR 7 RF-5E Tigereye AEW&C 6 E-2T Hawkeye TPT 33: Medium 19 C-130H Hercules; Light 10 Beech 1900; PAX 4:1 B-737-800; 3 F-50 TRG 96: 54 AT-3A/B Tzu-Chung*; 42 T-34C Turbo Mentor HELICOPTERS TPT • Medium 17: 3 H225; 14 UH-60M Black Hawk AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES A AM • IR AIM-9J/P Sidewinder; R-550 Magic 2; Shafrir; Sky Sword I; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; Mica IR; ARH Mica RF; ARH AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM; Sky Sword II ASM AGM-65A Maverick AShM AGM-84 Harpoon ARM Sky Sword IIA ALCM • Conventional Wan Chien BOMBS • Laser-guided GBU-12 Paveway II Air Defence and Missile Command_ FORCES BY ROLE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 GLCM bde (2 GLCM bn with Hsiung Feng HE) AIR DEFENCE 1 (792) SAM bde (1 SAM bn with Tien Kung IE; 2 ADA bn) 2 (793 & 794) SAM bde (1 SAM bn with Tien Kung II; 1 SAM bn with M902 Patriot PAC-3; 1 SAM bn with MIM-23 Hawk) 1 (795) SAM bde (1 SAM bn with M902 Patriot PAC-3; 2 ADA bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS GLCM • Conventional zl2 Hsiung Feng HE AIR DEFENCE SAM 202+ Long-range 122+: 72+ M902 Patriot PAC-3; £50 Tien Kung II Medium-range 50 MIM-23 Hawk Short-range 30 RIM-7M Sparrow with Skyguard Point-defence Antelope GUNS • 20mm some T-82; 35mm 20+ GDF-006 with Skyguard MISSILE DEFENCE Tien Kung III Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 11,800_ Coast Guard 11,800_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 168 PSOH 5:1 Chiayi; 2 Tainan; 2 Yilan PSO 6:4 Miaoli with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Ho Hsing PCF 3 Anping (Tuo Jiang mod) PCO14:2 Kinmen; 2 Mou Hsing; 1 Shun Hul;3 Shun Hu 7; 4 Taichung; 2 Taipei PBF £58 (various) PB 82:1 Shun Hu 6; £81 (various) 294 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 FOREIGN FORCES_ Singapore 3 trg camp (ind inf and arty) Thailand THA Thai BahtTHB 2021 2022 2023 GDP THB 16.2tr 17.3tr USD 506bn 535bn per capita USD 7,232 7,631 Growth % 1.5 2.8 Inflation % 1.2 6.3 Def bdgt THB 215bn 200bn 195bn USD 6.7 Ibn 6.17bn FMA (US) USD 7m 10m 10m USD1=THB 31.98 32.40 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008-- ---2015--- --2022 Population 69,648,117 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.3% 3.0% 3.2% 3.6% 24.6% 6.2% Female 7.9% 2.9% 3.1% 3.5% 26.2% 7.7% Capabilities_ Thailand has large, well-funded armed forces and its air force is one of the best equipped and trained in Southeast Asia. Facing an increasingly unstable regional-security environment, the Royal Thai Armed Forces are moving towards a greater emphasis on deterring external threats, while continuing their longstanding internal-security role, particularly in the country's far south, where a Malay-nationalist insurgency continues.The Vision 2026 defence-modernisation plan, approved by the defence council in October 2017, outlined the armed forces'planned capability improvements for the following decade. Thailand is classed as a major non-NATO ally by the US, but it has also developed closer defence ties with China since 2014. The armed forces regularly take part in international military exercises, notably the multinational annual Cobra Gold series with the US and some of its allies and security partners. Personnel continue to be deployed to the UNMISS mission in South Sudan. The military-modernisation effort includes development of a submarine capability, as well as the strengthening of anti-submarine-warfare capability and procurement of new surface ships. The armoured-vehicle fleet has been recapitalised with deliveries from China and Ukraine. Saab 340 AEW&C aircraft, Gripen combat aircraft and a new command-and-control system have improved air capability. In January 2020, the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) issued a White Paper which detailed further acquisition and upgrade requirements through the 2020s, including fighters, tactical-transport and VIP aircraft. The RTAF launched a space-operations centre in August 2019, a priority identified in the National Strategy 2018-37 development programme. Under its Defence Industry Masterplan, the government indicates that expanding Thailand's presently limited defence sector could be an important way to develop military capability and improve self-reliance. The latter is of increasing importance in light of the defence budget cuts since 2020. More broadly, the government is making efforts to reform defence procurement and offsets by expanding the role of its Defence Technology Institute. ACTIVE 360,850 (Army 245,000 Navy 69,850 Air 46,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 93,700 Conscription liability 24 months RESERVE 200,000 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 45,000 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 130,000; el 15,000 conscript (total 245,000)_ Cav, It armd, recce and tk sqn are bn sized FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 4 (regional) army HQ 3 corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF div 1 SF regt MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (3rd) mech cav div (2 tk regt (2 tk sqn); 1 sigs bn; 1 maint bn; 1 hel sqn) Mechanised 1 (1st) mech cav div (1 armd recce sqn; 2 mech cav regt (3 mech cav sqn); 1 indep mech cav sqn; 1 sigs bn; 1 maint bn; 1 hel sqn) 1 (2nd) mech cav div (1 armd recce sqn; 2 (1st & 5th) mech cav regt (1 tk sqn, 2 mech cav sqn); 1 (4th) mech cav regt (3 mech cav sqn); 1 sigs bn; 1 maint bn; 1 hel sqn) 1 (2nd) mech inf div (1 armd recce sqn; 1 tk bn; 3 mech inf regt (3 mech inf bn); 1 arty regt (4 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (11th) mech inf div (2 mech inf regt (3 mech inf bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) Light 1 (1st) inf div (1 It armd sqn; 1 ranger regt (3 ranger bn); 1 arty regt (4 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (3rd) inf div (3 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (3 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (4th) inf div (1 It armd sqn; 2 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (3 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (5th) inf div (1 It armd sqn; 3 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (4 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (6th) inf div (2 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (4 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (7th) inf div (2 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (2 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (9th) inf div (1 mech cav sqn; 3 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (3 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (15th) inf div (1 mech cav sqn; 3 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty div (1 arty regt (1 SP arty bn; 2 fd arty bn); 1 arty regt (1 MRL bn; 2 fd arty bn)) 1 engr div COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 4 economic development div Asia 295 HELICOPTER Some hel fit ISR UAV 1 UAV bn with Hermes 450; Searcher II AIR DEFENCE 1 ADA div (6 bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 394; 53 M60A1; 125 M60A3; 105 M48A5; 49 T-84 Oplot; 62 VT-4; (50 Type-69 in store) LT TK 194; 24 M41; 104 Scorpion (50 in store); 66 Stingray RECCE 42; 10 M1127 Stryker RV; 32 S52 Shorland IFV 220; 168 BTR-3E1; 52 VN-1 (incl variants) APC 1,199 APC (T) 880; Bronco; 430 M113A1/A3; 450 Type-85 APC (W) 219; 9 BTR-3K (CP); 6 BTR-3C (amb); 18 Condor; 142 LAV-150 Commando; 44 M1126 Stryker ICV PPV 100 REVA ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 69+; 2 BREM-84 Atlet; 13 BTR-3BR; 22 M88A1; 6 M88A2; 10 M113; 5 Type-653; 11 VS-27; WZT-4 VLB Type-84 MW Bozena; Giant Viper ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 30+; 18+ M901A5 (TOW); 12 BTR-3RK MANPATS M47 Dragon RCL 180; 75mm 30 M20; 106mm 150 M40 ARTILLERY 2,579 SP 155mm 42; 16 ATMOS 2000; 6 CAESAR; 20 M109A5 TOWED 525; 105mm 296; 24 LG1 Mkll; 12 M-56; 200 M101A1; 60 L119 Light Gun; (12 M102; 32 M618A2 in store); 155mm 229; 90 GHN-45 Al; 118 M198; 21 M-71 (48 M114 in store) MRL 68; 122mm 4 SR-4; 130mm 60 PHZ-85; 302mm 4; 1 DTI-1 (WS-1B); 3 DTI-1G (WS-32) MOR 1,944+; 81mm/107mm/120mm 1,867; SP 81mm 39; 18 BTR-3M1; 21M125A3; SP 107mm M106A3; SP 120mm 38; 8 BTR-3M2; 6+ Elbit Spear; 12 M1064A3; 12 SM-4A AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 22; 2 Beech 200 King Air; 2 Beech 1900C; 1 C-212 Aoiocar; 1 C295W; 3 Cessna 182T Skylane; 9 Cessna A185E (U-17B); 2 ERJ-135LR; 2 Jetstream 41 TRG 33; 11 MX-7-235 Star Rocket; 22 T-41B Mescalero HELICOPTERS ATK 7 AH-1F Cobra MRH 20; 8 AS550 Fennec; 2 AW139; 10 MÍ-17V-5 Hip H TPT 122; Heavy 5 CH-47D Chinook; Medium 11: 8 UH-60L Black Hawk; 3 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 106: 27 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 52 Bell 212 (AB-212); 16 Enstrom 480B; 6 H145M (VIP tpt); 5 UH-72A Lakota TRG 53 Hughes 300C UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 4+: 4 Hermes 450; Searcher; Searcher II AIR DEFENCE SAM 8+ Short-range Aspide Point-defence 8+: 8 Starstreak; 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) GUNS 192 SP 54: 20mm 24 M163 Vulcan; 40mm 30 M1/M42 SP TOWED 138: 20mm 24 M167 Vulcan; 35mm 8 GDF-007 with Skyguard 3; 37mm 52 Type-74; 40mm 48 L/70; 57mm e6 Type-59 (S-60) (18+ more non-operational) Navy 44,000 (incl Naval Aviation, Marines, Coastal Defence); 25,850 conscript (total 69,850) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVH 1 Chakri Naruebet with 3 sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM (capacity 6 S-70B Seahawk ASW hel) FRIGATES 7 FFGHM 3: 2 Naresuan with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 8 cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple SVTT Mk 32 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1127mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx 300 hel) 1 Bhumibol Adulyadej (DW3000F) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 18-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SEA TLS ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) FFG4: 2 Chao Phraya (trg role) with 4 twin lnchr with C-802A AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun 2 Chao Phraya with 4 twin lnchr with C-802A AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 70 CORVETTES 7: FSGM 2 Rattanakosin with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Stingray LWT, 1 76mm gun FSG 1 Krabi (UK River mod) with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 1 76mm gun FS4: 1 Makut Rajakumarn with 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 114mm gun 1 Pin Klao (ex-US Cannon) (trg role) with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 3 76mm gun 2 Tapi with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun PSO 1 Krabi (UK River mod) with 1 76mm gun PCT 3 Khamronsin with 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Stingray LWT, 1 76mm gun PCOH 2 Pattani (1 in trg role) with 1 76mm gun PCO 4: 3 Hua Hin with 1 76mm gun; 1 M58 Patrol Gun Boat with 1 76mm gun PCC 9: 3 Chon Buri with 2 76mm gun; 6 Sattahip with 1 76mm gun PBF 4 M18 Fast Assault Craft (capacity 18 troops) PB 40: 3 T-81; 5 M36 Patrol Boat; 1 T-227; 2 T-997; 23 M21 Patrol Boat; 3 T-991; 3 T-994 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 17 MCCS 1 Thalang MCO 2 Lat Ya MCC 2 Bang Rachan MSR 12: 7 Tl; 5 T6 296 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 1 Angthong (SGP Endurance) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 hel; 19 MBT; 500 troops) LANDING SHIPS 2 LST 2 Sichang with 2 hel landing platform (capacity 14 MBT; 300 troops) LANDING CRAFT 14 LCU 9: 3 Man Not, 2 Mataphun (capacity either 3-4 MBT or 250 troops); 4 Thong Kaeo LCM2 UCAC 3 Griffon 1000TD LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13 ABU 1 Suriya AGOR 1 Sofc AGS 2:1 Chanthara; 1 Paruehatsabodi AOL 5: 1 Matra with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Proet; 1 Prong; 1 Samui AOR1Cte/fl AORH 1 Similan (capacity 1 hel) AWT 2 Naval Aviation 1,200_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable ASW 2 P-3A Orion (P-3T) ISR 9 Sentry 0-2-337 MP 1 F-27-200 MPA* TPT • Light 15:7 Do-228-212; 2 ERJ-135LR; 2 F-27-400M Troopship; 3 N-24A Searchmaster; 1 UP-3A Orion (UP-3T) HELICOPTERS ASW 8: 6 S-70B Seahawk; 2 Super Lyra 300 MRH 2 MH-60S Knight Hawk TPT 18: Medium 2 Bell 214ST (AB-214ST); Light 16: 6 Bell 212 (AB-212); 5 H145M; 5 S-76B AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AGM-84 Harpoon Marines 23,000_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 mne div HQ MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bn Light 2 inf regt (total: 6 bn) Amphibious 1 amph aslt bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt (3 fd arty bn, 1 ADA bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 3 VN-16 IFV 14 BTR-3E1 APC • APC (W) 24 LAV-150 Commando AAV 33 LVTP-7 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 1 AAVR-7 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 10 M1045A2 HMMWV with TOW MANPATS M47 Dragon; TOW RCL • SP 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY 54 SP 155mm 6 ATMOS-2000 TOWED 48:105mm 36 M101A1; 155mm 12 GC-45 AIR DEFENCE SAM Point-defence QW-18 GUNS 12.7mm 14 Naval Special Warfare Command_ Air Force £46,000_ 4 air divs, one flying trg school FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with F-5E/5F Tiger II 3 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Gripen C/D GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Alpha Jet* 1 sqn with AU-23A Peacemaker 1 sqn with T-50TH Golden Eagle* ELINT/ISR 1 sqn with DA42 MPP Guardian AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with Saab 340B; Saab 340 Erieye TRANSPORT 1 (Royal Flight) sqn with A319CJ; A340-500; B-737-800 1 sqn with ATR-72; BAe-748 1 sqn with BT-67 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules TRAINING 1 sqn with CT-4A/B Airtrainer; T-41D Mescalero 1 sqn with CT-4E Airtrainer 1 sqn with PC-9 1 sqn with HI35 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) 1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey; S-92A EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 122 combat capable FTR 75: 1 F-5B Freedom Fighter; 20 F-5E Tiger II; 2 F-5F Tiger II (F-5E/F being upgraded); 1 F-5TH(E) Tiger II; 1 F-5TH(F) Tiger II; 36 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 14 F-16B Fighting Falcon EGA 11: 7 Gripen C; 4 Gripen D ATK 16 AU-23A Peacemaker ISR 5 DA42 MPP Guardian AEW&C 2 Saab 340 Erieye ELINT 2 Saab 340 Erieye (COMINT/ELINT) TPT 42: Medium 14: 6 C-130H Hercules; 6 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 Saab 340B; Light 21: 3 ATR-72; 3 Beech 200 King Air; 8 BT-67; 1 Commander 690; 6 DA42M; PAX 7: 1 A319CJ; 1 A320CJ; 1 A340-500; 1 B-737-800; 3 SSJ-100- 95LR (1 A310-324 in store) TRG 87: 16 Alpha Jet*; 13 CT-4A Airtrainer; 6 CT-4B Airtrainer; 20 CT-4E Airtrainer; 21 PC-9; 7 T-41D Mescalero; 4 T-50TH Golden Eagle* HELICOPTERS MRH 11: 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412SP Twin Huey; Asia 297 1 Bell 412HP Twin Huey; 6 Bell 412EP Twin Huey CSAR 12 H225M Super Cougar TPT 23: Medium 3 S-92A Super Hawk; Light 20: 17 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 3 H135 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light U-l AIR DEFENCE SAM Medium-range 3+ KS-1C (CH-SA-12) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9P/S Sidewinder; Python 3; HR IRIS-T; Python 5 (reported); ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM; Derby (reported) ASM AGM-65 Maverick AShM RBS15F BOMBS Laser-guided Paveway II INS/GPS-guided GBU-38 JDAM Royal Security Command_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 2 inf regt (3 inf bn) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary £93,700_ Border Patrol Police 20,000 Marine Police 2,200_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 101 PCO 1 Srinakrin PCC 2 Hameln PB 52:1 Chasanyabadee; 3 Cutlass; 2 M25; 2 Ratayapibanbancha (Reef Ranger); 1 Sriyanont; 2 Wasuthep; 41 (various) PBR46 National Security Volunteer Corps 45,000 - Reserves Police Aviation 500_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 6 combat capable ATK 6 AU-23A Peacemaker TPT 16: Light 15: 2 CN235; 8 PC-6 Turbo-Porter; 3 SC-7 3M Skyvan; 2 Short 330UTT; PAX 1 F-50 HELICOPTERS MRH 12: 6 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 6 Bell 429 TPT • Light 61: 27 Bell 205A; 14 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 20 Bell 212 (AB-212) Provincial Police 50,000 (incl £500 Special Action Force)_ Thahan Phran (Hunter Soldiers) 21,000 Volunteer irregular force FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 22 paramilitary regt (total: 275 paramilitary coy) DEPLOYMENT_ INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 6 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 281; 1 engr coy FOREIGN FORCES_ United States US Pacific Command: 100 Timor-Leste TLS US Dollar USD 2021 2022 GDP USD 2.36bn 2.46bn per capita USD 1,754 1,793 Growth % 1.5 3.3 Inflation % 3.8 7.0 Def bdgt USD 39.2 m 44.3m Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- 2022 Population 1,445,006 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 20.2% 5.3% 4.9% 3.8% 13.6% 2.0% Female 19.1% 5.1% 4.8% 4.0% 14.9% 2.2% Capabilities_ The small Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) has been afflicted by funding, personnel and morale challenges since it was established in 2001. The F-FDTL was reconstituted in the wake of fighting between regional factions in the security forces in 2006, but is still a long way from meeting the ambitious force-structure goals set out in the Force 2020 plan published in 2007. In 2016, the government published a Strategic Defence and Security Concept (SDSC). This outlined the roles of the F-FDTL as including the protection of the country from external threats and combating violent crime. However, this parallel internal-security role has sometimes brought it into conflict with the national police force. The SDSC also stated that the F-FDTL needs to improve its naval capabilities, owing to the size of Timor-Leste's exclusive economic zone. The origins of the F-FDTL in the Falintil national resistance force, and continuing training and doctrinal emphasis on low-intensity infantry tactics, mean that the force provides a deterrent to invasion. The F-FDTL has received training from Australian and US personnel. Australia is also donating two Guard/an-class patrol vessels as part of its Pacific Patrol Boat Replacement programme; these are due to arrive in 2023. Maintenance capacity is limited and the country has no defence industry. ACTIVE 2,280 (Army 2,200 Naval Element 80) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 2,200_ Training began in January 2001 with the aim of deploying 1,500 full-time personnel and 1,500 reservists. Authorities are engaged in developing security structures with international assistance 298 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 2 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT IMP pi COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log spt coy Naval Element 80_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 PB 5: 2 Dili (ex-ROK); 2 Shanghai II; 1 Kamenassa (ex-ROK Chamsuri) Air Component_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna 172 Tonga TON Tongan Pa'angaTOP 2021 2022 2023 GDP TOP 1.07bn 1.14bn USD 470m 501m per capita USD 4,701 5,008 Growth % -2.7 -2.0 Inflation % 1.4 8.5 Def bdgt TOP 11.6m 18.5m 20.4m USD 5.09m 8.15m USD1=TOP 2.27 2.27 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 2008 2015 2022 Population 105,517 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 15.5% 5.2% 4.7% 4.0% 17.4% 3.2% Female 15.0% 5.0% 4.5% 4.0% 17.4% 3.9% Capabilities_ His Majesty's Armed Forces (HMAF) are a battalion-sized military based around the light infantry of the Tonga Royal Guards and the Royal Tongan Marines, and a small naval patrol squadron. Maritime security is a primary concern of defence operations, although, between 2002 and 2014, HMAF also contributed platoon-sized forces to multinational peacekeeping efforts in the Solomon Islands, and then international coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Australia and the United States are Tonga's key external defence partners, but the armed forces also undertake defence cooperation activities with China, India, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. ACTIVE 600 (Royal Guards & Land Force 140 Navy 130 Other 330) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Royal Guard & Land Force 140_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 inf coy(-) Other 1 sy coy(-) Navy 130_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS PCO 2 Guardian (AUS Bay mod) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 1 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AOL 1 Vietnam VNM Vietnamese Dong VND 2021 2022 GDP VND 8399tr 9325tr USD 366bn 414bn per capita USD 3,718 4,163 Growth % 2.6 7.0 Inflation % 1.8 3.8 Def bdgt VND £l45tr £l36tr USD £6.31 bn £6.03bn FMA (US) USD 10.9m 12.0m USD1=VND 22934.42 22534.02 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008 ---2015--- ---2022 Population 103,808,319 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 12.5% 3.8% 3.7% 4.1% 23.1% 3.0% Female 11.2% 3.6% 3.5% 3.9% 23.3% 4.5% Capabilities_ Vietnam has a stronger military tradition, and its armed forces have more operational experience, than its neighbours. Its defence efforts and armed forces also benefit from broad popular support, particularly in the context of tensions with China over conflicting claims in the South China Sea. Vietnam adopted a new Law on National Defence in 2018 and issued a defence White Paper in 2019. The latter referred several times to Vietnam's differences with China and the need for both sides to 'put more effort into maintaining stability'. It is evident, from Hanoi's perspective, that stability will depend in good measure on Vietnam bolstering its deterrent capabilities in the South China Sea. This explains the emphasis on strengthening naval and air capabilities, including development of an advanced submarine capability and procurement of new ISR, air-defence and naval anti-surface systems to boost the capacity for anti-access/area-denial operations in Vietnam's maritime littoral. A joint vision statement on defence cooperation and a memorandum of understanding on mutual logistics support Asia 299 were signed with India in June 2022. While Russia has been the dominant defence supplier, Washington lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam in 2016, and New Delhi and Seoul are understood to be seeking inroads into Vietnam's defence market. Japan also signed a defence trade deal with Vietnam in September 2021 to support defence exports to the country as well as future collaboration on research and development. Long-expected orders for new combat aircraft and maritime-patrol aircraft have failed to materialise, though Vietnam ordered a Japanese-produced satellite-based surveillance system in April 2020 and jet and turboprop trainers from the Czech Republic and United States, while the US has also transferred ex-Hamilton class vessels to Vietnam's coastguard under the US Excess Defense Articles programme. Vietnam is developing its limited defence-industrial capacities and launched a defence-focused subsidiary to state-owned Viettel Military Industry and Telecoms Group, called Viettel High Technology Industries Corporation, which focuses on defence electronics and communications. The 2019 White Paper promoted investment in Vietnam's defence industry with the aim to become internationally competitive and join the 'global value chain' by 2030. ACTIVE 482,000 (Army 412,000 Navy 40,000 Air 30,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000 Conscript liability 2 years army and air defence, 3 years air force and navy, specialists 3 years, some ethnic minorities 2 years RESERVES Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,000,000 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • ISR 1 VNREDSat Army £412,000_ 8 Mil Regions (incl capital) FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 4 corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde (1 AB bde, 1 demolition engr regt) MANOEUVRE Armoured 10 tk bde Mechanised 2 mech inf div Light 23 inf div SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM bde COMBAT SUPPORT 13 arty bde 1 arty regt 11 engr bde 1 engr regt 1 EW unit 3 sigs bde 2 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 9 economic construction div 1 log regt 1 med unit I trg regt AIR DEFENCE II AD bde Reserve_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 9 inf div EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 1,383: 45 T-34; 850 T-54/T-55; 4+ T-54B mod; 70 T-62; 64 T-90S; 350 Type-59; LT TK 620: 300 PT-76; 320 Type-62/Type-63 RECCE 100 BRDM-l/BRDM-2 IFV 300 BMP-l/BMP-2 APC 1,380+ APC (T) 280+: Some BTR-50; 200 M113 (to be upgraded); 80 Type-63 APC (W) 1,100 BTR-40/BTR-60/BTR-152 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV IMR-2 ARV BREM-1M VLB TMM-3 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9M14 mod RCL 75mm Type-56; 82mm Type-65 (B-10); 87mm Type-51 GUNS SP 100mm SU-100; 122mm SU-122 TOWED 100mm T-12 (arty); M-1944 ARTILLERY 3,040+ SP 30+: 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 30 2S3 Akatsiya; 175mm M107 TOWED 2,300: 105mm M101/M102; 122mm D-30/Type-54 (M-1938)/Type-60 (D-74); 130mm M-46; 152mm D-20; 155mm M114 MRL 710+: 107mm 360 Type-63; 122mm 350 BM-21 Grad; 140mm BM-14 MOR 82mm; 120mm M-1943; 160mm M-1943 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Coventional 9K72/9K77 (RS-SS-1C/D Scud B/C) AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)%; 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (RS-S A-18 Grouse) GUNS 12,000 SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 TOWED 14.5mm/30mm/37mm/57mm/85mm/100mm Navy £40,000 (incl £27,000 Naval Infantry) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 8 SSK 6 Hanoi (RUS Project 636.1 (Improved Kilo)) with 6 533mm TT with 3M14E Klub-S (RS-SS-N-30B) LACM/3M54E1/E Klub-S (RS-SS-N-27A/B) AShM (Klub-S AShM variant unclear )/53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME HWT SSW 2 Yugo (DPRK) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 61 CORVETTES 12: 300 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 FSGM 5: 1 BPS-500 with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 9K32 Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manually operated), 2 twin 533mm TT, 1 RBU 1600 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun 2 DiVi/j Tien Hoang (RUS Gepard 3.9 (Project 11661E)) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 3M89E PaZma (Palash) CIWS with Sos«fl-R SAM (RS-CADS-N-2), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 2 Tron Himg Dao (RUS Gepard 3.9 (Project 11661E)) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade), 1 3M89E Palma (Palash) CIWS with Sosna-R SAM (RS-CADS-N-2), 2 twin 533mm TT with SET-53M HWT, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FSG 1 Po Hang (Flight III) (ex-ROK) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 76mm guns FS6: 3 Project 159A (ex-FSU Petya II) with 1 quintuple 406mm ASTT, 4 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun 2 Project 159AE (ex-FSU Petya III) with 1 triple 533mm ASTT with SET-53ME HWT, 4 RBU 2500 Smerch 1 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun 1 Po Hang (Flight III) (ex-ROK) with 2 76mm guns PCFGM12: 4 Project 1241RE (Tarantul I) with 2 twin lnchr with P-15 Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 1 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manually operated), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun 8 Project 12418 (Tarantul V) with4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manually operated), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCO 7: 1 Project FC264; 6 TT-400TP with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCC 6 StxHj/afc (Project 1041.2) with 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun PBFG 8 Project 205 (Osa II) with 4 single lnchr with P-20U (RS-SS-N-2B Styx) AShM PBFT 1+ Shershenf (FSU) with 4 single 533mm TT PH 2 S/iform (ex-FSU Project 206M (Turya))f with 1 twin 57mm gun PHT 3 Shtorm (ex-FSU Project 206M (Turya))t with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65KE HWT, 1 twin 57mm gun PB 6:4 Z/iiifc (mod); 2 TP-01 PBR 4 StoZfcra/t MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8 MSO 2 Akvamaren (Project 266 (Yurka)) MSC 4 Som/a (Project 1265 (Yakhont)) MHI 2 Korund (Project 1258 (Yevgenya)) AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS 7 LST 2 Tran Kfian/i Du (ex-US LST 542) with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 16 Lt Tk/APC; 140 troops) LSM 5: 1 Polnochny A (capacity 6 Lt Tk/APC; 200 troops) 2 Polnochny B (capacity 6 Lt Tk/APC; 200 troops) 2 Nam Dinli LANDING CRAFT • LCM 13 8 LCM 6 (capacity 1 Lt Tk or 80 troops) 4 LCM 8 (capacity 1 MBT or 200 troops) 1 VDN-150 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 22 AGS 1 Tran Dai Nia (Damen Research Vessel 6613) AH 1 Khanh Hoa (Truong Sa mod) AKR 4 Damen Stan Lander 5612 AKSL 10+ AP 1 Truong Sa ASR 1 Yet Kieu (Damen Rescue Gear Ship 9316) AT 2 AWT1 AXS 1 Le Quy Don Naval Infantry £27,000_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK PT-76; Type-63 APC • APC (W) BTR-60 Coastal Defence_ FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 3 AShM bde 1 coastal arty bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 4K44 Redut (RS-SSC-1B Sepal); 4K51 Rubezh (RS-SSC-3 Styx); K-300P Bastion-P (RS-SSC-5 Stooge) ARTILLERY • MRL 160mm AccuLAR-160; 306mm EXTRA Navy Air Wing_ FORCES BY ROLE ASW/SAR 1 regt with H225; Ka-28 (Ka-27PL) Helix A; Ka-32 Helix C EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6 DHC-6-400 Twin Otter HELICOPTERS ASW 10 Ka-28 Helix A TPT • Medium 4: 2 H225; 2 Ka-32 Helix C Air Force 30,000_ 3 air div, 1 tpt bde FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 regt with Su-22M3/M4/UM Fitter (some ISR) 1 regt with Su-27SK/Su-27UBKFZařifcer 1 regt with Su-27SK/Su-27UBK FZařifcer; Su-30MK2 Flanker 2 regt with Su-30MK2 Flanker TRANSPORT 2 regt with An-2 Colt; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; M-28 Bryza; C295M TRAINING 1 regt with L-39 Albatros 1 regt with Yak-52 ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 regt with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171; Mi-24 Hind AIR DEFENCE 6 AD div HQ 2 SAM regt with S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) Asia 301 3 SAM regt with Spyder-MR 3 SAM regt with S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline) 4 SAM regt with S-125-2TM Pechom-2TU 2 SAM regt with S-125M Pechora-M 4 ADA regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 84 combat capable FGA 72:26 Su-22M3/M4/UM Fitter (some ISR); 6 Su-27SK Flanker; 5 Su-27UBK Flanker B; 35 Su-30MK2 Flanker G TPT • Light 12: 6 An-2 Colt; 3 C295M; 1 M-28 Bryza; 2 C-212 Adocor (NC-212Í) TRG 59:17 L-39 Albatros; 12 Yak-130 Mitten*; 30 Yak-52 HELICOPTERS MRH 6 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 28: Medium 17:14 Mi-8 Hip; 3 Mi-171; Light 11 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) AIR DEFENCE SAM 98+: Long-range 12 S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) Medium-range 65: e25 S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline); £30 S-125-2TM Pechora-2TU; elO Spyder-MR Short-range 21+: 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); 21 S-125M Pechora-M (RS-SA-3 Goa) Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grml)%; 9K310 Igla-l (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS 37mm; 57mm; 85mm; 100mm; 130mm AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder) ASM Kh-29L/T (RS-AS-14 Kedge); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo) AShM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B Krypton) ARM Kh-28 (RS-AS-9 Kyle); Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000+ active Border Defence Corps £40,000_ Coast Guard_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 79+ PSOH 2 Hamilton (ex-US) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) PSO 4 DN2000 (Damen 9014) PCO 13+: 1 Mazinger (ex-ROK); 9 TT-400; 3+ other PCC 2 Hoe Uri (ex-ROK) PBF 28: 26 MS-50S; 2 Shershen PB 30:1 MS-50; approx 14 TT-200; 14 TT-120; 1 other LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5 AFS1 ATF 4 Damen Salvage Tug AIRCRAFT • MP 5 C-212-400 MPA Local Forces £5,000,000 reservists_ Incl People's Self-Defence Force (urban units) and People's Militia (rural units); comprises static and mobile cbt units, log spt and village protection pi; some arty, mor and AD guns; acts as reserve DEPLOYMENT_ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 9 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 69; 1 fd hospital SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 190; 1 engr coy Chapter Seven Middle East and North Africa Iran emerged as a key military supporter of Russia in 2022, as the latter struggled during its war in Ukraine. Iran sent Shahed 131 and 136 Direct Attack Munitions to Ukraine, and there was speculation that in response Russia would step up sales to Iran, potentially selling the Su-35 aircraft originally intended for Egypt. Russia has also sought Iranian assistance to circumvent Western sanctions. 2022 saw regional governments embrace de-escalation and engage in diplomacy in ways not seen before. These developments were motivated largely by the post-pandemic recovery and the need for a greater focus on economic affairs. However, the picture was not wholly positive: violence persisted in Libya, Syria and Yemen, while Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE continued. Ties improved between Turkey and Gulf states, and between Turkey and Israel. Ankara obtained Gulf investment pledges and Gulf boycotts of Turkish goods were lifted. This occurred within a context of strengthening defence cooperation, including Saudi Arabia, real-terms defence budget trend, 2012-22 (USDbn, constant 2015)* 70 60 50 20 40 30 20 0 9? 0 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 Note: Defence budget only - excludes security expenditure maritime and air exercises, between Egypt, Greece and Cyprus, as well as between Greece and the UAE. To foster greater regional collective cooperation against Iran, the US has orchestrated initiatives that capitalised on warming relations between Israel and several regional states. In February, USCENTCOM launched a task force in the Gulf to conduct surveillance by using uninhabited systems and in April the US announced the creation of CTF-153, a maritime task force in the Red Sea designed to monitor the activities of Iran and its proxies. Amidst a challenging global economic context, regional real GDP growth is estimated to have increased from an average 4.1% in 2021 to an average 5.0% in 2022, excluding Lebanon, Libya and Syria. But regional trends mask sharp disparities driven by the surge in the oil price over 2022. Growth among oil importers is estimated to have reached 4.4% in 2022 compared to 5.2% for oil exporters and 6.5% for Gulf Cooperation Council member states. Fiscal conservatism still shaped spending decisions in 2022. Active military personnel - top 10 (25,000 per unit) Iran Global total 20,773,950 mmmmmm nmmm nmm nmn nmn mm tm m Egypt 438,500 Saudi Arabia 257,000 Morocco 195,800 Iraq 193,000 Israel 169,500 Syria 169,000 Algeria 139,000 Jordan 100,500 12.4% United Arab Emirates 63,000 Regional total 2,571,750 Regional defence policy and economics Arms procurements and deliveries Armed forces data section 304 ► 312 ► 315 ► Egypt's navy: selected assets by country of origin China France Germany Italy South Korea Spain United States Icons are for illustrative purposes only 304 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Middle East and North Africa Conflict and competition in the Middle East and North Africa reached their lowest levels of intensity in a decade, as 2022 saw regional governments embrace de-escalation and engage in diplomacy in ways not seen in previous years. These developments were motivated by the post-pandemic recovery and the need for a greater focus on economic affairs. While power projection by most of the major states engaged in regional competition appeared to decline, Iran stepped up its activities, exerting influence in the war in Ukraine by supplying weapons to Russia. Indeed, broader concerns about Iran's activities and the regional repercussions of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, together with the lack of formal settlements of various crises, suggested caution over the durability of this regional de-escalation in the medium term. Regional conflicts Since 2011, three major civil wars have engulfed the region. Although these conflicts saw their lowest levels of violence yet in 2022, they continue to destabilise the region's economies and societies, risking military confrontation between states and continuing to cause much human suffering for civilian populations. Yemen In Yemen, a United Nations-brokered ceasefire was agreed in April. This froze the front lines and, though it was extended in July, ended in October. In the months leading up to April, Houthi forces had made further advances towards the south and the east. Meanwhile, United Arab Emirates-supported militias made progress pushing back Houthi advances in Shabwa and along the western coast. The forces of the UAE-backed secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) pushed into Abyan province. In recent years, the STC had clashed with forces loyal to the central government of president Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi and expelled them from several regions in the south. In contrast, government forces retained the greater authority in Marib, the last major government-held city in central Yemen, thanks largely to Saudi military support. Non-governmental organisations reported a 60% decrease in civilian casualties during the ceasefire, along with greater humanitarian access and a boost to the local economy, though the reopening of roads across zones of control was limited. The Houthis had agreed to the ceasefire after months of ground attacks aimed at seizing Marib. Several thousand Houthi fighters were reportedly killed in this campaign, mainly after operations by Saudi Arabia's air force. The Houthis were believed to have only agreed to the truce because they believed it would allow them to regroup and reconstitute their forces before attempting new attacks. Several reports, including by UN experts, indicated that Iranian provision of weaponry to the Houthis continued during the truce. Anti-Houthi forces also used the lull to regroup and prepare for new rounds of fighting but faced conflicted patrons whose interests and risk profile were more limited than during the early years of the intervention. Analysts believe that Saudi Arabia agreed to the ceasefire not only to placate the United States and the rest of the international community but also to reduce its exposure to the conflict, notably in the form of Houthi aerial attacks against the Kingdom's infrastructure. To support the political process, Riyadh also compelled president Hadi to resign in favour of a newly formed presidential council. Saudi-and Emirati-supported factions largely abided by the ceasefire, mostly out of exhaustion but also out of deference to their patrons. The Houthi decision not to extend the ceasefire in October came as the regional security situation worsened. The failure of Saudi-Iranian talks in Iraq over Yemen and large-scale popular unrest in Iran increased concerns over the potential for renewed attacks by the Houthis as well as Iran on Saudi Arabia. It was also largely interpreted as heralding new campaigns in Marib and Ta'izz. Meanwhile, the UAE maintained its support for the STC and other militias, as did Saudi Arabia with its own partners. Libya In Libya, violence resumed in mid-year because of a political stalemate. Long-awaited presidential elections had been scheduled for late 2021, after the formation of a unity government headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. However, the postponement of the Middle East and North Africa 305 elections fuelled political divisions and led to political and militia realignments. In early 2022, two rival governments claimed authority and legitimacy: the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity led by Dbeibah and the Government of National Stability based in eastern Libya and headed by former interior minister Fathi Bashagha. Both entities relied on the support of militias: Dbeibah depended on Tripoli- and Misrata-based factions, while Bashagha could muster some support in Tripoli as well as from militias loyal to the Tobruk parliament. Khalifa Haftar, the country's most powerful warlord, was nominally supportive of Bashagha but did not commit his Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), which had failed to seize the capital in 2019-20. These factions competed over territory, particularly oil-export facilities, and institutions, including the National Oil Corporation and Libyan Central Bank. In August, Bashagha attempted to seize power in Tripoli, mobilising several militias and obtaining political backing in the Gulf as well as Egypt. Having secured the support of Tripoli and Misrata militias, Dbeibah successfully resisted the attack. Both men, however, emerged weaker from this confrontation, unable to muster forces or attract foreign support. Importantly, Egypt, Turkey and the UAE have appeared less willing to deploy forces or provide equipment in this current round but appear ready to back more reliable and effective local partners. Dbeibah was keen to cultivate the support of Turkey, which maintained a small presence in the country, while Egypt backed the speaker of parliament and Bashagha ally Aguileh Saleh. The Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, had been less active since the 2020 Tripoli debacle when it attempted to assault the city. But it maintained a significant presence, estimated to number between 1,500 and 2,000 troops, alongside Haftar's troops and in key locations, including oil facilities. There was no discernible reduction in this presence after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as Libya remained a convenient pressure point for Russia against Turkey and European countries. Some of the combat aircraft previously associated with Wagner seemed to have been transferred to LAAF control. This situation led to relative quiet in the country but presaged violent competition as new contenders, courting foreign support, geared up to replace existing groups. Moreover, there were continued attempts to rearm. Crew from vessels participating in the European Union's Operation lrini, a maritime mission designed to intercept illicit shipments bound for Libya, boarded a number of vessels in 2022 and seized weapons and military vehicles bound for the country. The UN process, which in 2019 and 2021 seemed close to delivering a settlement, was once again under threat in late 2022. Syria The main battlelines in Syria did not change significantly in 2022 despite violence reaching its lowest levels since 2011. The regime of President Bashar al-Assad remained firmly in place in Damascus but remained too weak to consolidate power in the areas in the northwest and northeast that are outside its control. However, Assad's various opponents remained in disarray and heavily dependent on foreign support. Throughout the year, there were assessments that Turkey might conduct a campaign to seize further territory from the Kurdish-dominated administration in northern and eastern Syria, but US lobbying and Russian opposition seemed to forestall any Turkish plans. Instead, the greatest change occurred inside the rebel holdout of Idlib, where the jihadi group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham seized more territory from groups aligned with Ankara. The humanitarian situation remained dire, with international aid agencies securing less than half of the funding required to provide support to the population. In July, the UN Security Council agreed to keep the sole remaining cross-border humanitarian route from Turkey into Idlib open for only six months, down from 12 months in previous years. This was due to Russian opposition. Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine has had some military effect in Syria. Moscow maintains a naval presence in the port of Tartus and an air base in Hmeimim, as well as an operations room and military intelligence group in Damascus that coordinates Russian activity countrywide. In the first months of Russia's invasion, there was no noticeable reduction in the size of the Russian military presence in Syria, estimated to be around 4,000 troops. But reports emerged in the autumn of increased turnover, suggesting a limited but noteworthy Russian readjustment including the relocation of one of Russia's S-300 air-defence units back to Russia. Indeed, as Russian forces began to struggle in Ukraine, this had a direct impact on the Syrian battlefield. Turkey was a prime beneficiary of Russia's isolation and its reliance on Turkish goodwill. The prospects of Russia supporting an 306 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Assad campaign to retake Idlib were considerably reduced. Likewise, Iran benefitted insofar as it could maintain its influence in Syria, with reduced chances of Russian pushback. Israel's reluctance to condemn the Russian invasion was partly determined by the imperative of maintaining military coordination with Russia in Syria to secure air access and avoid accidents. Israel was keen to preserve its air dominance and worried that direct Israeli military support to Ukraine would lead to Russian pushback in Syria. Nonetheless, the IDF was troubled by the increase in defence cooperation between Iran and Russia. It was feared that Iranian provision of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia would allow Tehran to test its capabilities on a contested battlefield, while the increased ties between the two also raised concerns that Russia could reciprocate and provide Iran with defence technologies previously denied to it and align itself with Tehran on critical security issues. Within this environment, there was no real progress in reforming and modernising the Syrian Arab Army and the wider security apparatus. The worsening economic climate in Syria and the continued existence of pro-regime militias keen to preserve their autonomy precluded any prospect of consolidation. This led to sustained violence in many regions across the country: the Islamic State (ISIS) insurgency remained active in the Badiya desert region and in Deir ez-Zor and increasingly in the south. The regime was also unable to stabilise the region bordering Jordan. Moscow had guaranteed the regional deal that led in 2018 to the dismantlement and abandonment by their foreign sponsors of rebel groups operating there. Moscow, however, did not deploy military police units, provide stabilisation funds or encourage reconciliation. This failure caused security to deteriorate. Iraq In contrast to Libya, Syria and Yemen, violence in Iraq increased in 2022. Civil unrest, which peaked in 2019, took a back seat as political competition increased between parties backed by militias. This was notably the case between Moqtada al-Sadr, a prominent and popular Shia cleric with nationalistic appeal, and an array of Iranian-backed militias. This escalated into several armed confrontations in Baghdad and elsewhere, though the violence was ultimately contained. Intensified violence in northern Iraq was perhaps of greater significance. There, Turkey continued to fight Kurdish separatists of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) through ground and aerial operations, which caused civilian casualties as well as protests from Baghdad over the violation of Iraqi sovereignty. Kurdish separatists of the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) in Iraq were also the target of intense Iranian attacks. There were also more attacks by Iranian-aligned groups against US military targets in Iraq and Syria. In parallel with diplomatic paralysis over Iran's nuclear programme and in the context of regional tensions, Iranian-backed groups launched missile and UAV attacks against small US bases in northern Iraq and Syria, including Al-Tanf in August. This precipitated US retaliation against militia leaders. Regional effects of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine Many states in the region have preferred to remain neutral in the war in Ukraine or have only mildly condemned the Russian invasion without taking measures against Moscow or reducing their engagement. Over the past decade, Russia had emerged as a security interlocutor as well as a possible alternative to the US in the eyes of several countries who were unnerved by fluctuations in US policy and appreciative of Vladimir Putin's ostensibly effective statecraft. Several countries - notably Algeria and Syria, but also Egypt, Iraq and other smaller states - have been traditional customers of Russian weaponry as well as defence partners, at times also conducting joint exercises with Russian armed forces. Even US regional allies had evoked the possibility of acquiring Russian weapons systems, such as the S-400 air-defence system. Russian military trainers and private military companies, including the Wagner Group, have operated in several countries in the region, including Libya, Syria and Sudan. However, Russian prestige and credibility diminished in 2022, in comparison with a high point in 2015-16, when Moscow successfully intervened in the Syrian civil war. Russia's operational and military setbacks in Ukraine and the relatively poor performance of its weapons systems have damaged its reputation across the region. It is widely considered that Russia will struggle to innovate in the technological domain and to maintain its export capability given its internal demands and shortages. Concerns about incurring Western sanctions were also thought to be a deterrent for most countries. Importantly, the rapid growth of Russian-Iranian Middle East and North Africa 307 defence relations has caused significant unease, particularly among Gulf governments. In recent years, Iran had hoped that Russia would help it recapitalise its armed forces. But Moscow, then seen as the senior partner, was reluctant and unwilling to upset Israel and Gulf countries and risk Western disapproval. The Ukraine conflict has made Russia more dependent on Iranian goodwill: Moscow has acquired Iranian UAVs and deployed them in Ukraine. Tehran has supplied the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 direct-attack munitions and the Mohajer-6 UAV to Russia as Moscow has attempted to fill gaps in its inventory resulting from the invasion. As of November 2022, the initial batch of the Shahed systems appeared to have almost been exhausted in Russia's attacks. They have been used to supplement Moscow's inventory of land-attack cruise missiles, which has depleted considerably since it launched its 2022 invasion on 24 February. Russia has also sought Iranian assistance to circumvent Western sanctions. Regional competition There was a trend towards regional de-escalation in 2022. In the Gulf region, Iran was engaged in separate diplomatic discussions with two of its main rivals, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. A key motivation for the governments of Saudi Arabia and the UAE was the need to avoid becoming entangled in US-Iran or Israel-Iran escalation, especially as talks over Iran's nuclear programme seemed inconclusive. Additionally, they both sought to reduce aerial attacks from Yemen. The UAE was the target of several waves of UAV and missile strikes in January and February and the Saudi city of Jeddah was hit in March during the Saudi Arabian Grand Prix. The bilateral discussions had limited positive impact, with Iran unwilling to make firm security commitments until an agreement with the US had been reached. More notable detentes occurred between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and between Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Turkey's economic problems were the proximate cause of this rapprochement, which helped alleviate its regional isolation. Ankara obtained Gulf investment pledges and the Gulf boycotts of Turkish goods were lifted. This also opened the way to renewed discussions over defence procurement, notably those concerning Turkish UAVs. Likewise, Turkish-Israeli relations improved markedly. Facing isolation in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey was keen to restore political ties with Israel. This took place within a context of strengthening defence cooperation, including maritime and air exercises, between Cyprus, Egypt and Greece as well as between Greece and the UAE. A maritime agreement between Israel and Lebanon, brokered by the US, also served to reduce tensions. The two countries have not delineated their land borders and there have been regular confrontations. However, the prospect of exploiting offshore energy resources seemed to underpin the agreement in October by both countries to delineate their maritime border. In the months prior to the agreement, Hizbullah had threatened Israeli ships and exploration vessels operating in the hitherto contested area, deploying surveillance UAVs and alluding to the possession of armed UAVs. However, domestic pressure in Lebanon, where the prospect of energy wealth seemed to improve an otherwise dire economic outlook, trumped Hizbullah's scepticism. There was hope that the agreement would reduce tensions between Lebanon and Israel, but Hizbullah as well as other Iran- and Syria-aligned groups rejected this prospect. The breakthrough happened as Lebanon continued to face economic and political turmoil. This put significant pressure on the armed forces to preserve domestic stability, with some help from Western and Arab governments. The rivalry between Algeria and Morocco worsened substantially in 2022. Morocco obtained increased access to defence technology thanks to improving ties with the US, and especially Israel -with whom it signed a normalisation agreement in 2020. It now boasts the most diverse UAV fleet in the region, comprising Chinese, Israeli, Turkish and US equipment. Rabat deployed UAVs against the Polisario Front in the contested Western Sahara region. Morocco reportedly sought to buy the Israeli-made Barak MX air- and missile-defence system in 2022. For Algeria, the prospect of a better-armed Morocco, benefitting from Western alliances, has raised alarms given its dependence on Russian weaponry. To foster conditions for greater regional collective cooperation against Iran, the US has orchestrated initiatives that capitalised on warming relations between Israel and several regional states. In February, US Central Command launched a task force in the Gulf to conduct surveillance by using uninhabited systems. In March, the Negev Summit in Israel brought together the US, Israeli, Egyptian, Moroccan, Bahraini and Emirati foreign ministers. In April, the US announced the creation of CTF-153, a maritime task force in the Red Sea designed to 308 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 monitor the activities of Iran and its proxies in the region. Over the spring and summer, the US organised regional discussions about air-defence cooperation. However, political and operational obstacles hindered an agreement. Perhaps the most significant hurdles were the absence of a peace agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel and political disagreements related to Red Sea issues. Inventories comprising different weapons systems and states having diverse weapons procurement priorities were equally significant factors. DEFENCE ECONOMICS Macroeconomics The region's economies have generally been shielded from the slowdown in global economic activity in 2022. The year before, a tentative economic recovery across the world saw real GDP grow by 6% following the near 3% contraction in 2020 linked to the coronavirus pandemic. In contrast, real GDP growth in 2022 is projected to reach just 3.2%, inhibited by the economic fallout of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine - which contributed to high rates of inflation and a cost-of-living crisis in several regions. The lingering coronavirus pandemic and the negative impact on Chinese economic activity is also weighing heavily on the economic outlook. Amid this challenging context, regional real GDP growth is projected to increase from an average 4.1% in 2021 to an average 5.0% in 2022, excluding Lebanon, Libya and Syria. The Middle East and North Africa is highly exposed to global food prices, particularly the price of wheat, but inflation rates in several regional states are lower than those being experienced in Europe, Russia and Latin America. The most notable exceptions to this are inflation rates in Iran and Yemen, which reached 40.0% and 43.8% in 2022 respectively. Conversely, inflation in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states is expected to be just 3.6% in 2022. Regional trends therefore mask sharp disparities driven by the surge in the oil price over 2022: real GDP growth among oil importers is expected to reach 4.4% in 2022 compared with 5.2% for the region's oil exporters and 6.5% for the GCC. Indeed, higher oil prices are offering these countries a chance to transcend the two policy trade-offs that the war in Ukraine has sharpened for most of the world: 'between tackling inflation and safeguarding the recovery; and between supporting the vulnerable and rebuilding fiscal buffers', as the IMF put it. Brent crude prices jumped to levels in excess of USD120 a barrel in March, but they then stabilised to pre-invasion levels by the end of the year mainly because of a strong dollar, an increase in interest rates and fears of recession impacting oil demand. Throughout 2022, oil prices have stayed at levels beyond the amount needed by some Gulf states to balance their budgets. In 2022, this fiscal breakeven price ranged between USD60 and USD80 a barrel for Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE and was between USD48-55 a barrel for Kuwait and Qatar, with Bahrain being the exception at USD128 a barrel. In late September 2022, days after prices dipped close to USD80 a barrel for the first time since the beginning of the year, OPEC+ (OPEC members plus ten leading non-OPEC oil exporters) announced an agreement for the biggest oil production cut since the start of the coronavirus pandemic in a move likely designed to keep oil prices at elevated levels. Defence spending and procurement Defence spending in the Middle East and North Africa reached USD187 billion in 2022, up from USDi73bn in 2021 (excluding Foreign Military Financing allocations from the US) largely due to a surge in spending in Iran. However, Iran's 40% inflation rate meant that regional spending in real terms continued to contract in line with the trend seen in the region since 2018. The strengthening of the oil price in 2021 was not reflected in the spending decisions for 2022 made by several of the region's oil exporters that continued to pursue a fiscally conservative stance. This subdued regional trend covers significant disparities. The notable real reductions in defence spending between 2021 and 2022 in Saudi Arabia (-12.4%), Israel (-5.6%), Algeria (-3.7%) and Oman (-3.0%) were partially offset by growth in Iran (+30.0%), Qatar (+28.8%), Iraq (10.3%) and Egypt (+2.9%). It has been suggested that Saudi Arabia's reduced share could be linked to the Kingdom's ambition to diversify its economy through the development of local industry and plans to increase domestic weapons procurement and reduce dependence on expensive imports. Other factors should not be overlooked, such as the completion of existing equipment delivery contracts, a possible reduction in the level of spending on military operations in Yemen and a strained diplomatic relationship between Riyadh and Washington, traditionally the Kingdom's main arms supplier. Economic recovery in Saudi Arabia and other oil exporters may, along with the rise in oil prices Lebanon n.k Libya n.k Palestine n.k Syria n.k Yemen n.k Real % Change (2021-22) More than 20% increase Between 10% and 20% increase Between 3% and 10% increase Between 0% and 3% increase Estimate O Ke Between 0% and 3% decrease Between 3% and 10% decrease Between 10% and 20% decrease More than 20% decrease Spending 2% of GDP or above Insufficient data *IISS estimate of Ministry of Defence and National Guards budget using overall government expenditure which dropped significantly in 2022, official spending breakdown not available. **Security expenditure removed from defence budget figure. [1] Map illustrating 2022 planned defence-spending levels (in USDbn at market exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change in planned defence spending between 2021 and 2022 (at constant 2015 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending between 2021 and 2022. Actual spending changes prior to 2021, and projected spending levels post-2022, are not reflected. ©IISS ▲ Map 7 Middle East and North Africa: regional defence spending (USDbn, %ch yoy)1 in 2022, enable increased investment over the next few years. In October 2022, Saudi Arabia announced plans to boost public spending by 18% in 2023. Over the last decade, the upward trend in defence spending in certain regional states can be linked to renewed tensions and associated threat perceptions as well as to major modernisation cycles in certain countries. Real-terms increases in Qatari defence spending averaged 12% annually between 2011 and 2022. They were driven at various points by heightened security concerns amid the diplomatic crisis with its neighbours over the period, and a 310 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Egypt, 3.3% Other North Africa, 0.8% Morocco, 3.4% Algeria, 4.6% Jordan, 1.2% V Israel 11.8% Kuwait, 4.6% / Iraq, 4.8% x United Arab Emirates, 22.8% Iran, 10.6% Note: Analysis excludes Lebanon, Libya, Palestinian Authority, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. ©IISS A Figure 14 Middle East and North Africa: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2022 procurement drive from 2015 that included 108 combat aircraft, such as the F-15 from the United States, and the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Rafale from the UK and France respectively. Qatar*s air force will be one of the most modern and diverse in the region once all three types are in service. However, the volume and speed of these acquisitions raises questions over Qatar* s ability to crew and maintain the aircraft. Modernisation programmes in Kuwait and Egypt have also driven budget growth, while recent defence budget uplifts in Morocco were made against the backdrop of rising tensions with Algeria in 2021. Rabat procured attack helicopters and fighter jets from the US in 2019-2020 and armed uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Turkey in 2021. In Egypt and other regional states, another important recent trend has been a diversification of arms suppliers and defence partners. While Cairo historically procured from Washington, it has increasingly turned to Europe (mainly France but also Germany and Italy). While most of their crewed air platforms still come from these traditional Western suppliers, regional states have increasingly turned to other sources for UAVs and air defence systems. Over the past few years, for armed UAVs, Egypt turned to China (2018), Saudi Arabia to China (2017), the UAE to China (2017 and 2019), and Morocco to Turkey (2021). In January 2022, the UAE and South Korea also inked a preliminary agreement for the acquisition of surface-to-air missile systems a day before Houthi forces launched a UAV and missile attack on Abu Dhabi. Some regional markets remain focused on US and European suppliers. For instance, Kuwait is growing its fleet with US helicopters and F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and Eurofighter Typhoons and also its air defence such as with the notification by the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency in October 2022 of a potential US sale of the NASAMS III air defence system. Several countries may be tempted to branch out to other partners to move towards relative autonomy, which is increasingly supported by the development of regional defence-industrial and technological bases. The outlook for the region will hinge on the response of oil producers to higher oil prices as they make their budgetary decisions. The spike in prices means that fiscal balances in the Gulf have moved from an average deficit of 5% of GDP during 2015-21 to a projected surplus of around 5% of GDP for 2022 and that countries will remain in surplus in 2023 and 2024. However, Gulf states may continue to adopt fiscally cautious behaviour. The volatility in oil prices and vulnerability to global shocks create significant budgetary uncertainty in the major defence-spending states in the Gulf. As a result, countries may prefer to continue improving resilience through economic diversification, reducing fiscal breakeven points, and shoring up reserves in the short term. If countries do implement increases for defence in the short term, these will likely benefit investment spending or enable a resumption of delayed procurement programmes or one-off capital projects that support modernisation and domestic development efforts. The countries spending the most - Saudi Arabia and the UAE - have ambitious defence-industrial ambitions, so higher government revenues 6.00 4.66 4.31 3.79 6.33 5.41 5.42 5.39 I 4.811 J 4.30 | J 4.28 ■■■ ■■■■ 4.41 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Middle East and North Africa ■ GCC A Figure 15 Middle East and North Africa: defence spending as % of GDP (average) Middle East and North Africa 311 may enable much-needed investment in defence R&D to bolster domestic production capabilities. However, governments will likely want to avoid higher recurring costs that result in a sustained increase in the defence budget, for instance changes in force structure. The Middle East and North Africa remains home to most of the world's countries with the highest military burden, including Oman (where spending accounts for 5.9% of GDP), Kuwait (5.0%) and Saudi Arabia (4.5%). The region's average is 3.8% of GDP to defence, which is well above the global average of 1.7% in 2022, meaning that the cost of defence is already higher here compared with other regions. Defence industry Continued initiatives to produce military equipment domestically and increasingly localise arms procurement are notable trends. This is apparent chiefly in Gulf states, led by the UAE and followed by Saudi Arabia, although more recently Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Qatar have followed suit. Rabat, for example, is developing its aircraft maintenance capability. The development of a defence-industrial and technological base is most advanced in the UAE, notably with the EDGE Group. Its success is supported by demanding offset policies and diversification of partners. This has included turning to countries willing to consider technology transfer, such as South Africa, or looking to acquire know-how by acquiring or closely working with foreign firms. The nascent localisation of regional defence procurements is also noteworthy as countries turn to their neighbours to buy military equipment or develop joint projects. The region's only credible arms provider would have been Israel until recently. Prior to 2021, there had already been numerous cases of intra-regional military assistance and arms transfers, and also to African countries, particularly of armoured personnel carriers. Meanwhile, the UAE has started exporting its weapons, such as Al Tariq guided bombs (re-branded Denel-designed Umbani guided bombs) sold to Egypt in 2020. However, the growth in intra-regional defence-industrial cooperation became particularly evident in 2021 with the memorandum of understanding between Saudi Arabia's General Authority for Military Industries and the UAE's Tawazun Economic Council signed at that year's IDEX show. This is designed to boost defence-industrial capability, explore the prospects for joint projects and identify areas of cooperation in defence R&D. It is particularly important to improve in this area, as one of the identified roadblocks to the development of domestic capabilities has been the low regional investment in defence R&D. At the same time, regional states are becoming more willing to showcase their wares as they look to defence sales as a way of boosting local industrial capacity. IDEX has been established since the early 1990s in the UAE; the Egypt Defence Expo is hosted in Cairo; Jordan hosts SOFEX; Morocco the Marrakesh Airshow; and Saudi Arabia joined in early 2022 with its first World Defense Show, held outside Riyadh. 312 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Arms procurements and deliveries - Middle East and North Africa Significant events in 2022 FEBRUARY UAE: TAWAZUN ECONOMIC COUNCIL EXPANDS Tawazun Economic Council (TEC) signed an agreement with L3Harris Technologies to create the Intelligence Software Center (ISC) and the Electro-Optical Center of Excellence (EOCE) in the UAE. This is part of a scheme whereby, since 2018, foreign companies have been encouraged to establish UAE-based regional headquarters, termed a 'landed'company, to increase local defence-industrial capability. Saab launched its UAE-based landed company in December 2017 (officially approved by the TEC in 2019), with both Raytheon Technologies and Thales following in 2019. Airbussigned a memorandum of understanding to set up a landed company in November 2021. TEC had managed UAE offset programmes since it was established in 1992, but from 2021 the organisation oversees the entire military acquisition processes and is able to formulate procurement policies and legislation, authorise procurement budgets and organise defence R&D programmes. MARCH ii.>i^'i.i*mWCM.t:«i>Kimi.M State-owned Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) signed several deals with foreign firms during the first World Defense Show (WDS) exhibition near Riyadh. SAMI announced that it had secured SAR7bn (USD1.87bn) from three Saudi banks to help achieve localisation goals. This will include work on two agreements signed at the show: with MBDA and NIMR Automotive. The former seeks to establish an MRO facility in Saudi Arabia, and there are plans for local production. The deal with NIMR will lead to the production of Jais 4x4 armoured vehicles in the Kingdom. At the show, SAMI and its subsidiaries were also awarded SAR7.65bn (USD2.04bn) worth of contracts for equipment and services for the Saudi armed forces. SAMI was formed in 2017 with ambitions to become a'top25'defence company by 2030 and for Saudi Arabia to localise over 50% of its equipment spending within the country. JULY UIVIHW: I nIML LULLMDUnM Oman signed agreements with Rolls-Royce, Lockheed Martin, FNSS and INDRA.The Royal Air Force of Oman (RAFO) will localise engine maintenance and repair capability for its Hawk aircraft with the assistance of Rolls-Royce, while Lockheed Martin will help the air force operate satellite-based aircraft tracking systems for its C-130J Hercules and F-16C/D Fighting Falcon fleets. Turkey's FNSS will help establish an armoured-vehicle modernisation and maintenance facility, likely as a follow-up to Oman's 2016 order for Pars III 6x6 and 8x8 vehicles. Meanwhile, Spanish firm Indra will set up an Earth observation centre in Oman. No timelines have been released. Oman has long planned to strengthen its defence-industrial base through international collaboration. For instance, in October 2016, the Omani State General Reserve Fund (SGRF) purchased a 32.2% stake in Escribano Mechanical & Engineering (Escribano M&E) for EUR18m (USD19.9m). The plan was that the firm would establish an Oman-based joint venture, Escribano Middle East, as part of Oman's drive to help establish its defence-industrial base through technology transfer. However, in January 2022, Escribano M&E bought back this 32% share for undisclosed reasons, again becoming a 100% Spanish-owned firm. AUuUbT New defence export regulations were put before the legislature. Under these proposals, Israeli defence contractors would undergo a simpler licensing process for 'unclassified' products, with more exports permitted to more countries. Israel is looking to expand the numbers of countries and equipment that are exempt from marketing licence requirements, to 127 countries and 8,200 products from 111 and 5,500 respectively. In April, Israel announced that annual defence exports in 2021 had risen by 30% from 2020, reaching USD11.3bn. The top three sectors were missiles, rockets and air defence systems (20%), training and instruction services (15%) and uninhabited systems (9%). The top three export destinations were Europe (41%), Asia-Pacific (34%) and North America (12%). Israel forecasts that exports will rise in 2022 as Russia's invasion of Ukraine has boosted defence spending in Europe and elsewhere, while the Abraham Accords have opened new markets in the Gulf to all Israeli companies, not just in the defence sector. Middle East and North Africa 313 Table 14 H Qatar: selected procurement since 2010 Contract Date Equipment Type Quantity Contractor Deliveries Apr 2013 Leopard 2M+ Main battle tank 62 Krauss-Maffei Wegmann 2015-20 PzH 2000 155mm self-propelled artillery 24 (KMW) 2015-16 Aug 2014 AH-64E Apache Guardian Attack helicopter 24 Boeing 2019-20 Dec 2014 Patriot Long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system 10 Raytheon 2018-ongoing Jun 2015 C-17A Globemaster'III Heavy transport aircraft 4 Boeing 2016 May 2015 Rafale Fighter ground-attack 24 1 1 Dassault Aviation Feb 2019- aircraft (FGA ac) ongoing C.2016 FJP-12A(CH-SS-14Mod 2) Short-range ballistic missile launcher >8 m China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) c. 2017 Sep 2016 Marte-ER £xocefMM40Blklll Land-based anti-ship missile launcher n.k. MBDA 2022* Feb 2017 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar Ballistic missile early warning radar 1 p Raytheon Technologies 2026* Aug 2017 AlZubarah Frigate 4 1 Fincantieri Oct 2021- Musherib Corvette 2 ongoing LPD Amphibious assault ship 1 Dec 2017 Rafale FGA ac 12 11 Dassault Aviation n.k. Dec 2017 Eurofighter Typhoon FGA ac 24 rain 515 BAE Systems Aug 2022-2024* HawkMkW Training aircraft 9 Sep 2021-ongoing Dec 2017 F-15QA FGA ac 48 Boeing Oct 2021-ongoing Mar2018 BayraktarJB2 Medium combat intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance uninhabited aerial vehicle 6 Baykar est. 2019 Mar2018 Kirpi Protected patrol vehicle 50 BMC est. 2020-21 Amazon 35 Mar2018 NH90 TTH Medium transport 16 11 Leonardo Dec 2021- helicopter (formerly Finmeccanica) 2025* NH90NFH Anti-submarine warfa re helicopter 12 Mar 2022-2025* H125 (AS350) Ecureuiľ* Light transport helicopter 16 est. 2018-21 Jul 2019 MIM-104 Patriot Long-range SAM system n.k. IS Raytheon Technologies n.k. NASAMS II Short-range SAM system c.2020 Fuwairit (TUR Anadolu Shipyard L CT) Landing craft tank 1 Anadolu Shipyard Feb 2022 Broog (Anadolu Shipyard LCM) Landing craft medium 2 16m (Anadolu Shipyard LCVP) Landing craft vehicles and personnel 1 Dec 2020 Gepard 35mm self-propelled air defence artillery 15 Rheinmetall Air Defence (formerly Oerlikon Contraves) 2021-ongoing c.2021 M-346 Training aircraft 6 11 Leonardo (formerly n.k. Finmeccanica) *Planned In training configuration 314 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Map 8 Egypt: defence industry During the Cold War, Egypt's defence industries licence-built foreign equipment but the country did not possess significant indigenous design capacity. Over two decades later Egypt's defence industry has made little progress in this regard despite spending significant sums on acquisition, particularly in the last decade. Egypt's defence industry is mostly grouped under three entities that broadly correspond to the air, land and maritime domains. The Ministry of Military Production is a stand-alone government ministry established in 1954 that today oversees the production of armoured vehicles, artillery, small arms and ammunition. The Fahd APC, based on a German chassis and powerpack, has been exported in small numbers to states in the Middle East and North Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa. A 2022 deal with South Korea for the licensed production of an estimated 200 K9 howitzers will be carried out by the Abu Zaabal Tank Repair Factory (Factory 200) that assembled Ml Abrams tanks from 1992 to 2018. Established in 1975, the Arab Organization for Industrialization (A0I) was originally a joint effort by Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia to develop a pan-Arab defence industry. Following Egypt's peace treaty with Israel in 1979, the other nations withdrew, leaving A0I as a solely Egyptian entity owned by the Ministry of Defense. A0I factories subsequently licence-built French Alpha Jet training aircraft and Gazelle helicopters and Brazilian Tucano turboprop training aircraft, as well as various missiles. The production of 120 Chinese K-8 training aircraft was completed in 2010 in Helwan, with a high level of indigenisation reported, and the site now serves as a maintenance, repair and overhaul (MR0) facility for the aircraft. Established in 2003, the Marine Industry & Services Organisation is the smallest of the three groups and is focused on shipbuilding and maritime services. Alexandria Shipyard is licence-building three of four French Gowindfrigates and in 2020 announced that it was going to build a MEK0 A200 frigate. The navy plans to acquire at least three from Germany. Today many of the factories that had production lines in previous decades have now either switched to MR0 or have diversified their business to produce civil products. Military factories have been active in the civil sector since the 1980s; continued focus and activity in this sector may continue to complicate Cairo's ambitions to further develop indigenous defence production, including the development of complex equipment, without foreign assistance. Egyptian Ship Repair and Building Company Alexandria Shipyard (ASY) Triumph Shipping Company Land % Defence T f Electronics ^ Air ^ Munitions (h Naval I ft Small Arms T Y and Ammunition - River I Urban ; reas I Fertile jreas 1 Desert area Benha Company for Electronic ©IISS Damietta branch (River Nile) Ismailia Canal Abu Zaabal Company for S Industries (Factory 300) Abu Zaabal Engineering Industries Company (Factory 100 Heliopolis Company for Chemical Industries (Factory 81) Arab International Optronics Helwan Diesel Engines Company (Factory 909) New Administrative Capital Helwan Factory for Machinery and Equipment (Factory 999) Helwan Factory for Developed Industires Engines Factory 700 1,400 2,100 Kilometers Middle East and North Africa 315 Algeria ALG Algerian Dinar DZD 2021 2022 GDP DZD 22.0tr 27.2tr USD 163bn 187bn per capita USD 3,660 4,151 Growth % 3.5 4.7 Inflation % 7.2 9.7 Def bdgt DZD 1.23tr 1.30tr USD 9.09bn 8.94bn USD1=DZD 135.34 145.33 2023 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 10.4 4.09 2008 2015- -2022 Population 44,178,884 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 14.9% 3.8% 3.3% 3.9% 21.6% 3.2% Female 14.2% 3.6% 3.1% 3.7% 21.1% 3.5% Capabilities Algeria's armed forces are among the best equipped in North Africa. The armed forces' primary roles relate to securing territorial integrity, internal security and regional stability. The army retains a key political position since its instrumental role in 2019 in ending President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's two decades in power. Algeria is part of the African Union's North African Regional Capability Standby Force, hosting the force's logistics base in Algiers. There are discussions with neighbours about regional security challenges such as counter-terrorism and there is close security cooperation with Tunisia. A November 2020 referendum approved a change to the constitution enabling Algeria to send forces on UN peacekeeping missions. Tensions with Morocco, which increased once more in 2021, have persisted into 2022. The conscript-based force exercises regularly, although standards are difficult to judge from open sources. There is an ongoing attempt to professionalise the armed forces, which was reflected in the reduction of conscript liability from 18 to 12 months in 2014. Military logistics capability appears sufficient to support internal deployments. Army and air force inventories consist of a core of modern, primarily Russian-sourced equipment, though China has also supplied equipment, including self-propelled artillery. The extent to which Russia's invasion of Ukraine has affected the supply of spare parts to Algeria is unclear, though these are likely to become evident the longer that conflict continues. Algiers has recapitalised around half of its fixed-wing combat-aircraft inventory and the navy has invested in its submarine and frigate fleet. Local industry and the services are capable of equipment maintenance. Algeria is largely dependent on foreign suppliers for new equipment, but it has in recent years made investments towards developing a domestic defence industry. This has led to joint ventures with foreign partners, such as Italy's Leonardo and Germany's Rheinmetall. ACTIVE 139,000 (Army 110,000 Navy 15,000 Air 14,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 187,200 Conscript liability 12 months RESERVE 150,000 (Army 150,000) to age 50 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 4 COMMUNICATIONS 1 ALCOMSAT ISR 3 ALSAT Army 35,000; 75,000 conscript (total 110,000) FORCES BY ROLE 6 Mil Regions MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 (1st & 8th) armd div (3 tk regt; 1 mech regt, 1 arty gp) 2 indep armd bde Mechanised 2 (12th & 40th) mech div (1 tk regt; 3 mech regt, 1 arty gp) 4 indep mech bde Light 1 indep mot bde Air Manoeuvre 1 AB div (4 para regt; 1 SF regt) COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bn 1 AT regt 4 engr bn AIR DEFENCE 7 ADbn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 1,485: 270 T-55AMV; 290 T-62; 325 T-72M1/M1M; 600+ T-90SA TSV 26+: 13+ BMPT; 13+ BMPT-62 RECCE 70: 44 AML-60; 26 BRDM-2 IFV 980: £220 BMP-2; 760 BMP-2M with 9M133 Komet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) APC 1,307+ APC (T) VP-6 APC (W) 1,305: 250 BTR-60; 150 BTR-80; 150 OT-64; 55 M3 Panhard; e600 Fuchs 2; 100 Faha PPV 2+: 2 Marauder; some Maxxpro AUV Nimr Ajban; Nimr Ajban LRSOV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV IMR-2 ARV BREM-1 VLB MTU-20 MW M58 MICLIC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE SP 92: 64 9P133 with 9M113 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 28 9P163-3 Kornet-EU (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115-2 Metis-Ml (RS-AT-13); 9K135 Kornet-E (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); Luch Skif; Milan RCL 180: 82mm 120 B-10; 107mm 60 B-ll GUNS 100mm 10 T-12 316 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 ARTILLERY 1,127 SP 224:122mm 140 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 30 2S3 Akatsiya; 155mm £54 PLZ-45 TOWED 393:122mm 345:160 D-30 (ind some truck mounted SP); 25 D-74; 100 M-1931/37; 60 M-30; 130mm 10 M-46; 152mm 20 M-1937 (ML-20); 155mm 18 PLL-01 MRL 180:122mm 48 BM-21 Grad; 140mm 48 BM-14; 220mm 36:18+ SR5; £18 TOS-1A; 240mm 30 BM-24; 300mm 18 9A52 Smerch MOR 330+: 82mm 150 M-37; 120mm 120 M-1943; W86; SP 120mm Nimr Hafeet with SM5; SM4; W86 (SP); 160mm 60 M-1943 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM 12 Iskander-E AIR DEFENCE SAM Point-defence 68+: e48 9K33M Osa (RS-SA-8B Gecko); £20 9K31 Strela-1 (RS-SA-9 Gaskin); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7A/B Gmil)%; QW-2 (CH-SA-8) SPAAGM 30mm 38 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound); Pantsir-SM GUNS £425 SP 23mm £225 ZSU-23-4 TOWED 200:14.5mm 100: 60 ZPU-2; 40 ZPU-4; 23mm 100 ZU-23-2 Navy £15,000_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 6: 2 Paltus (FSU Project 877 (Kilo)) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT 4 Varshavyanka (RUS Project 636.1 (Improved Kilo)) with 6 single 533mm TT with 3M14E Klub-S (RS-SS-N-30B) LACM/3M54E1/E Klub-S (RS-SS-N-27A/B) AShM (Klub-S AShM variant unclear )/TEST-71ME HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 5 FFGHM 5: 3 Adhafer (C-28A) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802A AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with FM-90 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 Type-730B (H/PJ-12) CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 hel) 2 Erradii (MEKO A200AN) with 2 octuple lnchrs with RBS15 Mk3 AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Umkhonto-IR SAM, 2 twin 324mm TT with MU90 LWT, 1127mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx 300) ATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28 CORVETTES • FS 3 Mourad Rais (FSU Project 1159 (Koni)) with 2 twin 533mm TT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun PCGM 3 Rais Hamidou (FSU Project 1234E (Nanuchka II)) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 twin 57mm gun PCG 4: 3 Djebel Chenoua with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun; 1 Rais Hassen Barbiar (Djebel Chenoua mod) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 1 Type-730 (H/PJ-12) CIWS, 1 76mm gun PBFG 9 Project 205 (ex-FSU Osa II) (or which 3t) with 4 single lnchr with P-20U (RS-SS-N-2B Styx) AShM PB 9 Kebir with 1 76mm gun MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2 MCC 2 El-Kasseh (ITA Gaeta mod) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 1 Kalaat Beni Abbes with 1 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 1 76mm gun (capacity 5 med hel; 3 LCVP; 15 MBT; 350 troops) LANDING SHIPS 3: LSM 1 Polnochny B with 1 twin AK230 CIWS (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops) LST 2 Kalaat beni Hammad (capacity 7 MBT; 240 troops) with 1 med hel landing platform LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 3 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 AGS 1 El Idrissi AX 1 Daxin with 2 AK230 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform AXS 1 El Melloh Naval Infantry £7,000_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo bn MANOEUVRE Amphibious 8 naval inf bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC(W) BTR-80 Naval Aviation_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS MRH 9: 3 AW139 (SAR); 6 Super Lynx 300 SAR 9: 5 AW101 SAR; 4 Super Lynx Mkl30 Coastal Defence_ FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 1 AShM regt with 4K51 Rubezh (RS-SSC-3 Styx); CM-302 (YJ-12E) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE AShM 4K51 Rubezh (RS-SSC-3 Styx); CM-302 (YJ-12E) Coast Guard £500_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 74 PBF 6 Baglietto 20 PB 68: 6 Baglietto Mangusta; 12 Jebel Antar; 40 Deneb; 4 El Mounkid; 6 Kebir with 1 76mm gun LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9 AR 1 El Mourafek ARS 3 El Moundjid AXL 5 El Mouderrib (PRC Chui-E) (2 more in reservet) Middle East and North Africa 317 Air Force 14,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 4 sqn with MÍG-29S/UB Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with Su-30MKA Flanker H GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with Su-24M/MK Fencer D ELINT 1 sqn with Beech 1900D MARITIME PATROL 2 sqn with Beech 200T/300 King Air ISR 1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E* TANKER 1 sqn with 11-78 Midas TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100-30 1 sqn with C295M 1 sqn with Gulfstream IV-SP; Gulfstream V 1 sqn with I1-76MD/TD Candid TRAINING 2 sqn with Z-142 1 sqn with Yak-130 Mitten* 2 sqn with L-39C Albatros; L-39ZA Albatros* 1 hel sqn with PZL Mi-2 Hoplite ATTACK HELICOPTER 3 sqn with Mi-24 Hind (one re-equipping with Mi-28NE Havoc) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS355 Ecureuil 5 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H 1 sqn with Ka-27PS Helix D; Ka-32T Helix ISR UAV 1 sqn with Seeker II AIR DEFENCE 3 ADA bde 3 SAM regt with S-125M/M1 Pechora-M/Ml (RS-SA-3 Goa); 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 184 combat capable FTR 23 MiG-29S/UB Fulcrum FGA 73:14 MiG-29M/M2 Fulcrum; 59 Su-30MKA FlankerH ATK 33 Su-24M/MK Fencer D ISR 3 Su-24MR Fencer E* TKR 611-78 Midas TPT 67: Heavy 11: 3 I1-76MD Candid B; 8 I1-76TD Candid; Medium 18: 8 C-130H Hercules; 6 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 C-130J Hercules; 2 L-100-30; Light 32: 3 Beech C90B King Air; 5 Beech 200T King Air; 6 Beech 300 King Air; 12 Beech 1900D (electronic surv); 5 C295M; 1 F-27 Friendship; PAX 6:1 A340; 4 Gulfstream IV-SP; 1 Gulfstream V TRG 99: 36 L-39ZA Albatros*; 7 L-39C Albatros; 16 Yak-130 Mitten*; 40 Z-142 HELICOPTERS ATK 72: 30 Mi-24 Hind; 42+ MÍ-28NE/UB Havoc SAR 3 Ka-27PS Helix D MRH 85: 8 AW139 (SAR); 3 Bell 412EP; 74 Mi-8 Hip (med tpt)/Mi-17 Hip H TPT 62: Heavy 14 MÍ-26T2 Halo; Medium 4 Ka-32T Helix; Light 44: 8 AW119KE Koala; 8 AS355 Ecureuil; 28 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy CH-3; CH-4; Yabhon United-30 ISR • Medium Seeker II; Yabhon Flash-20 AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range 32+ S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) Medium-range 20+ 9K317 Buk-MIE (RS-SA-17 Grizzly) Short-range 36+: 2K12 Kvadrát (RS-SA-6 Gainful); 12 S-125M; Pechora-M (RS-SA-3 Goa); 24 S-125M1 Pechora-Mi (RS-SA-3 Goa) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8,4p/iid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IR/SARH R-40/46 (RS-AA-6 Acrid); R-23/24 (RS-AA-7 Apex); R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); ARH R-77 {RS-AA-V2A Adder) ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge); Kh-59ME (RS-AS-18 Kazoo); ZT-35 Ingwe; 9M120 Atoka (RS-AT-9) AShM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B Krypton) ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A Kegler); Kh-31P (RS-AS- 17A Krypton) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary el 87,200_ Gendarmerie 20,000_ Ministry of Defence control; 6 regions EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE AML-60 APC • APC (W) 210:100 TH-390 Fahd; 110 Panhard M3 HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 12+: 12 AW109; Some PZL Mi-2 Hoplite National Security Forces 16,000_ Directorate of National Security. Equipped with small arms Republican Guard 1,200_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE AML-60 Legitimate Defence Groups el 50,000_ Self-defence militia, communal guards (60,000) DEPLOYMENT_ DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 2 318 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Bahrain BHR Bahraini Dinar BHD 2021 2022 GDP BHD 14.6bn 16.4bn USD 38.9bn 43.5bn per capita USD 26,136 28,692 Growth % 2.2 3.4 Inflation % -0.6 3.5 Def bdgt [a] BHD 526m 526m USD 1.40bn 1.40bn FMA (US) USD 3.0m 4.0m USD1=BHD 0.38 0.38 [a] Excludes funds allocated to the Ministry of the Interior and the National Security Agency Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- ---2022 Population 1,540,558 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 9.2% 3.5% 4.8% 6.3% 34.5% 1.9% Female 9.0% 3.0% 3.4% 3.9% 18.6% 1.8% Capabilities_ Bahrain is a member of the GCC and occupies a key strategic position between regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia. The principal roles of the armed forces are territorial defence and internal-security support. Bahrain's most critical security relationship is with Saudi Arabia, but it also has a strong defence relationship with the US and has been a US major non-NATO ally since 2002. The US 5th Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain, as is the US-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the UK-led International Maritime Security Construct. Bahrain has periodically commanded CMF task forces. The armed forces carried out a limited expeditionary deployment in support of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, notably by the special forces. Bahrain also signed a security cooperation agreement with Israel in February 2022. As part of a major air-force modernisation, Bahrain is in the process of acquiring new F-16V fighters and upgrading its existing F-16s to that configuration, as well as acquiring the Patriot air- and missile-defence system. In recent years there have been modest additions to Bahrain's naval forces in the form of an ex-UK patrol ship and former-US patrol vessels, as well as upgrades to other craft. The armed forces have organic maintenance support, but there is little in the way of a defence-industrial base beyond the limited maintenance support provided by the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard. ACTIVE 8,200 (Army 6,000 Navy 700 Air 1,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 11,260 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 6,000_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1SF bn MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bde(-) (1 recce bn, 2 armd bn) Mechanised 1 inf bde (2 mech bn, 1 mot bn) Light 1 (Amiri) gd bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde (1 hvy arty bty, 2 med arty bty, 1 It arty bfy, 1 MRL bty) 1 engr coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log coy 1 tpt coy 1 med coy AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn (1 ADA bty, 2 SAM bty) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 100 M60A3; (80 more in store) RECCE 22 AML-90 IFV 67: 25 YPR-765 PRI; 42 AIFV-B-C25 APC 303+ APC (T) 303: 300 M113A2; 3 AIFV-B APC (W) Arma 6x6 AUV M-ATV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 53 Fafe? 240 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 5 AIFV-B-M/an; HMMWV with BGM-71A TOW; 9P163-3 Kornet-EU (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) MANPATS BGM-71A TOW; Kornet-EM (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) RCL 31:106mm 25 M40A1; 120mm 6 MOBAT ARTILLERY 175 SP 82:155mm 20 M109A5; 203mm 62 M110A2 TOWED 36:105mm 8 LI 18 Light Gun; 155mm 28 M198 MRL 13: 220mm 4 SR5; 227mm 9 M270 MLRS MOR 44: 81mm 12 L16; SP 81mm 20 VAMTAC with EIMOS; SP 120mm 12 M113A2 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A ATACMS (launched from M270 MLRS) AIR DEFENCE SAM 13+ Medium-range 6 MIM-23B l-Hawk Short-range 7 Crotale Point-defence 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) (reported); FIM-92 Stinger; RBS-70 GUNS 24: 35mm 12 GDF-003/-005; 40mm 12 L/70 Navy 700_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1 FFGHM 1 Sabha (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1 Mk 13 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM/SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block IB CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 hel) Middle East and North Africa 319 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25 PSO 1 Al Zubara (ex-UK River (OPV) Batch 1 (mod)) with 1 hel landing platform PCFG 4 Ahmed el Fateh (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun PCG 2 Al Manama (GER Lurssen 62m) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 2 76mm guns, 1 hel landing platform PCF 5 Al-Gurairiyah (ex-US Cyclone) PB 6: 2 AZ Jarim (US Swift FPB-20); 2 A/ Riff a (GER Lurssen 38m); 2 Mashhoor (US Swiftships 35m) PBF 7 Mk V FPB AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 9 LCM 7:1 Loadmaster; 4 Mashtan; 2 Dinar (ADSB 42m) LCVP 2 Sea Keeper Naval Aviation_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 Bo-105 Air Force 1,500_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II TRANSPORT 1 (Royal) fit with B-737-800; B-767; B-747; BAe-146; Gulfstream II; Gulfstream IV; Gulfstream 450; Gulf stream 550; S-92A TRAINING 1 sqn with Hawk Mkl29* 1 sqn with T-67M Firefly ATTACK HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AH-1E/F Cobra; TAH-1P Cobra TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 212 (AB-212); Bell 412EP Twin Huey 1 sqn with UH-60M Black Hawk 1 (VIP) sqn with Bo-105; S-70A Black Hawk; UH-60L Black Hawk EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 38 combat capable FTR 12: 8 F-5E Tiger II; 4 F-5F Tiger II FGA 20:16 F-16C Block 40 Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16D Block 40 Fighting Falcon MRH 2+ Bell 412EP Twin Huey TPT 14: Medium 2 C-130J Hercules; PAX 12:1 B-737-800 (VIP); 1 B-767 (VIP); 2 B-747 (VIP); 1 Gulfstream II (VIP); 1 Gulfstream IV (VIP); 1 Gulfstream 450 (VIP); 1 Gulfstream 550 (VIP); 2 BAe-146-RJ85 (VIP); 1 BAe-146-RJ100 (VIP); 1 BAe-146-RJ170 (VIP); (1 B-727 in store) TRG 9: 6 Hawk Mkl29*; 3 T-67M Firefly HELICOPTERS ATK 28:10 AH-1E Cobra; 12 AH-1F Cobra; 6 AH-1Z Viper TPT 27: Medium 13: 3 S-70A Black Hawk; 1 S-92A (VIP); I UH-60L Black Hawk; 8 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 14: II Bell 212 (AB-212); 3 Bo-105 TRG 6 TAH-1P Cobra AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES A AM • IR AIM-9P Sidewinder; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AIM-120B/C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick; some TOW BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II Gendarmerie & Paramilitary s11,260_ Police 9,000_ Ministry of Interior EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV Otokar ISV AUV Cobra HELICOPTERS MRH 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey ISR 2 Hughes 500 TPT • Light 1 Bo-105 National Guard £2,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 3 paramilitary bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) Arma 6x6; Cobra Coast Guard £260_ Ministry of Interior PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 55 PBF 26: 2 Ares 18; 3 Response Boat-Medium (RB-M); 4 Jaris; 6 Saham; 6 Fajr; 5 Jarada PB 29: 6 Haris; 1 Al Muharraq; 10 Deraa (of which 4 Halmatic 20, 2 Souter 20,4 Rodman 20); 10 Saifioi which 4 Fairey Sword, 6 Halmatic 160); 2 Hawar AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 1 Load-master II FOREIGN FORCES_ United Kingdom Operation Kipion 1,000; 1 FFGHM; 2 MCO; 2 MHO; 1 LSD; 1 naval facility United States US Central Command 4,700; 1 HQ (5th Fleet); 10 PCFG; 4 MCO; 1 ESB; 1 ASW sqn with 2 P-8A Poseidon; 1 EP-3E Aries II; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE 320 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Egypt EGY Egyptian Pound EGP 2021 2022 GDP EGP 6.66tr 7.74tr USD 423bn 469bn per capita USD 4,144 4,504 Growth % 3.3 6.6 Inflation % 4.5 8.5 Def bdgt EGP 76.2bn 86.0bn USD 4.84bn 5.21 bn FMA (US) USD 1.30bn 1.30bn USD1=EGP 15.74 16.50 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- ---2022 Population 107,770,524 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 17.9% 4.5% 4.2% 3.8% 18.3% 2.6% Female 16.9% 4.3% 4.0% 3.6% 17.3% 2.5% Capabilities_ Egypt's armed forces are the second-largest in the region and are focused principally on maintaining territorial integrity and internal security, including tackling ISIS-affiliated groups in northern Sinai. The armed forces remain deeply involved in the civilian economy and retain a central role in Egyptian politics. Egypt and the US maintain a strong strategic partnership, which has seen significant US equipment deliveries and ongoing foreign military assistance. Defence relations have developed with Russia and other states such as France, particularly regarding procurement. National military training is supplemented by regular bilateral and multinational exercises. Egypt has a developing capacity to deploy independently beyond its borders. It contributes to UN missions, has intervened militarily in Libya and sent some combat aircraft to support the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. The navy's two M/sfra/-class amphibious assault ships have bolstered its regional deployment capacity, although Egypt currently lacks the range of maritime helicopters to fully utilise these vessels' capabilities. The armed forces' inventory primarily comprises obsolete Soviet-era systems and newer Western-origin equipment though an extensive recapitalisation programme has also included the delivery of Russian multi-role fighters, attack helicopters and SAM systems. However, it is possible that the threat of sanctions by the US and others may have led some acquisitions from Russia to stall. Combat aircraft have also been sourced from France and armed UAVs from China. Naval recapitalisation includes submarines (from Germany) and frigates (from France, Germany and Italy). The diversity of the inventory risks complicating military maintenance and sustainment. Egypt has an established domestic defence industry, although it does not have the capability to fully develop platforms. This has resulted in a number of licensed- and co-production agreements with foreign companies, including the local assembly of M1A1 main battle tanks from US-supplied kits, production of Chinese-designed K-8 jet trainers and of frigates with French assistance. ACTIVE 438,500 (Army 310,000 Navy 18,500 Air 30,000 Air Defence Command 80,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 397,000 Conscription liability 12-36 months (followed by refresher training over a period of up to 9 years) RESERVE 479,000 (Army 375,000 Navy 14,000 Air 20,000 Air Defence Command 70,000) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 2 COMMUNICATIONS 1 TIBA-1 ISR 1 Egyptsat-A Army £310,00 (incl £200,00 conscripts)_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 5 cdo gp 1 counter-terrorist unit 1 spec ops unit MANOEUVRE Armoured 4 armd div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 arty bde) 4 indep armd bde 1 Republican Guard bde Mechanised 8 mech div (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 arty bde) 4 indep mech bde Light 1 inf div 2 indep inf bde Air Manoeuvre 2 air mob bde 1 para bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM bde with FROG-7 1 SRBM bde with 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud-B) COMBAT SUPPORT 15 arty bde 6 engr bde (3 engr bn) 2 spec ops engr bn 6 salvage engr bn 24 MP bn 18 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 36 log bn 27 med bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 2,480:1,130 Ml Al Abrains; 300 M60A1; 850 M60A3; 200 T-62 (840 T-54/T-55; 300 T-62 all in store) RECCE 412: 300 BRDM-2; 112 Commando Scout IFV 690: 390 YPR-765 25mm; 300 BMP-1 APC 5,244+ APC (T) 2,700: 2,000 M113A2/YPR-765 (incl variants); 500 BTR-50; 200 OT-62 Middle East and North Africa 321 APC (W) 1,560: 250 BMR-600P; 250 BTR-60; 410 Fahd-30/TH 390 Fahd; 650 Walid PPV 984+: 535 Caiman; some REVA III; some REVA V LWB; 360 RG-33L; 89 RG-33 HAGA (amb); ST-500 AUV 173+: Panthern T6; 173 Sherpa Light Scout; ST-100 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 367+: Fahd 240; BMR 3560.55; 12 Maxxpro ARV; 220 M88A1; 90 M88A2; M113 ARV; 45 M578; T-54/55 ARV VLB KMM; MTU; MTU-20 MW Aardvark JFSU Mk4 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 352+: 52 M901, 300 YPR-765 PRAT; HMMWV with TOW-2 MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) (ind BRDM-2); HJ-73; Luch Corsar (reported); Milan; Stugna-P (reported); TOW-2 ARTILLERY 4,468 SP 492+: 122mm 124+: 124 SP 122; D-30 mod; 130mm M-46 mod; 155mm 368:164 M109A2; 204 M109A5 TOWED 962:122mm 526:190 D-30M; 36 M-1931/37; 300 M-30; 130mm 420 M-46; 155mm 16 GH-52 MRL 450:122mm 356: 96 BM-11; 60 BM-21; 50 Sakr-10; 50 Safcr-18; 100 Sakr-36; 130mm 36 K136 Kooryong; 140mm 32 BM-14; 227mm 26 M270 MLRS; 240mm (48 BM-24 in store) MOR 2,564: 81mm 50 M125A2; 82mm 500; SP 107mm 100:65 M106A1; 35 M106A2; 120mm 1,848:1,800 M-1943; 48 Brandt; SP 120mm 36 M1064A3; 160mm 30 M-160 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 42+: 9 FROG-7; 24 Sakr-80; 9 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud-B) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium R4E-50 Skyeye; ASN-209 AIR DEFENCE SAM 45+ Point-defence 45 Sinai-23 with Ayn al-Saqr; Ayn al-Saqr; FIM-92 Stinger; 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) (reported) GUNS 860 SP 160: 23mm 120 ZSU-23-4; 57mm 40 ZSU-57-2 TOWED 700:14.5mm 300 ZPU-4; 23mm 200 ZU-23-2; 57mm 200 S-60 Navy £8,500 (incl 2,000 Coast Guard); 10,000 conscript (total 18,500)_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 8 4 Type-033 (PRC Romeo) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM/Mk 37 HWT 4 Type-209/1400 with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM/SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 12 FFGHM 8: 1 Al-Aziz (GER MEKO A200) with 4 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 4 8-cell CLA with VL MICA NG SAM, 1127mm gun (capadty 1 med hel) 4 Alexandria (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1 Mk 13 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM/ SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capadty 2 SH-2G Super Seasprite ASW hel) 2 El Fateh (Gowind 2500) with 2 quad lnchrs with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 116-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capadty 1 med hel) 1 TahyaMisr (FRA Aquitaine (FREMM)) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capadty 1 med hel) FFGH 2 Damyat (ex-US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk 16 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM/ASROC, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-2G Super Seasprite ASW hel) FFHM 2 Al-Galala (ITA Bergamini (FREMM)) with 2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15/30 SAM, 2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun, 1 76mm gun (fitted for but not with Otomat (Teseo) Mk2A AShM) (capadty 2 med hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 73 CORVETTES 5 FSGM 2 Abu Qir (ESP Descubierta) (of which It) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Sting Ray LWT, 1 twin 375mm Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor, 1 76mm gun FSG 2 NajimAl Zaffer (PRC Type-053HE (Jianghu I)) with 2 twin lnchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 Safflower) AShM, 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm guns FS 1 Shabab Misr (ex-RoK Po Hang) with 2 76mm guns PCFGM 4 Ezzat (US Ambassador Fast Missile Craft) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 1 21-cell Mk49 lnchr with RIM-116B RAM Block 1A SAM, 1 Mkl5 mod 21 Block IB Phalanx CIWS 1 76mm gun PCFG 8: 1 Project 12418 (RUS Tarantul IV) with 2 twin lnchr with 3M80E Moskit (RS-SS-N-22A Sunburn), 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun 6 Ramadan with 4 single lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 76mm gun 1 Tiger with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 76mm gun PCF 4 Tiger with 1 76mm gun PCC 15: 5 Al-Nour (ex-PRC Hainan) (3 more in reservet) with 2 triple 324mm TT, 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm guns; 1 Lurssen 41m; 9 Omar Ibn El Khattab (GER OPB 40) PBFGM 8 Project 205 (ex-YUG Osa I) (of which 3t) with 4 single lnchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A Styx) AShM, 1 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manual aiming) PBFG 9: 4 Type-024 (PRC Hegu) (2 additional vessels in reserve) with 2 single lnchr with SY-1 (CH-SS-N-1 Scrubbrush) AShM 5 October (FSU Komar) (of which It) with 2 single lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM (1 additional vessel in reserve) PBFM 4 Shershen (FSU) with 1 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manual aiming), 112-tube BM-24 MRL 322 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 PBF 10: 6 Kaon 20 (TUR MRTP 20) 4 Project 205 (ex-FIN Osa II) PB 6: 4 Type-062 (ex-PRC Shanghai II) 2 Shershen (FSU) (of which It) with 4 single 533mm TT, 1 8-tube BM-21 MRL MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 14 MHC 5: 2 Al Siddiq (ex-US Osprey); 3 DatAssawari (US Swiftships) MSI 2 Safaga (US Swiftships) MSO 7: 3Assiout (FSU T'-43); 4 Aswan (FSU Ywrfca) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 2 Gamal Abdel Nasser (FRA Mistral) (capacity 16 med hel; 2 LCT or 4 LCM; 13 MBTs; 50 AFVs; 450 troops) LANDING CRAFT 15: LCT 2 EDA-R LCM 13:4 CTM NG; 9 Vydra (FSU) (capacity either 3 MBT or 200 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 23 AE 1 Halaib (ex-GER Westerwald) AKR 3 Al Hurreya AOT 7 Ayeda (FSU Toplivo) (1 more in reserve) AR 1 Shaledin (ex-GER Luneberg) ARS 2 AlAreesh ATF 5 A/ Mafot (FSU Okhtensky) AX 4:1 El Horriya (also used as the presidential yacht); 1 A/ Kousser; 1 Intishat; 1 other Coastal Defence_ Army tps, Navy control EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE ARTY 100mm; 130mm SM-4-1; 152mm AShM4K87 (RS-SSC-2B Samlet); Otomat Mkll Naval Aviation_ All aircraft operated by Air Force AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4 Beech 1900C (maritime surveillance) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Light 2 S-100 Camcopter Coast Guard 2,000_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 89 PBF 14: 6 Crestitalia; 5 Swift Protector; 3 Peterson PB 75: 5 Nisr; 12 Sea Spectre Mklll; 25 Swiftships; 21 Timsah; 3 Type-83; 9 Peterson Air Force 20,000; 10,000 conscript (total 30,000) FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon 8 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with Mirage 2000B/C FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Mirage 5E2 2 sqn with Rafale DM/EM 3 sqn with MiG-29M/M2 Fulcrum ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with SH-2G Super Seasprite MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with Beech 1900C ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with Beech 1900 (ELINT); Commando Mk2E (ECM) ELECTRONIC WARFARE/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130H/VC-130H Hercules AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING 1 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye SEARCH & RESCUE 1 unit with AW139 TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-74TK-200A 1 sqn with C-130H/C-130H-30 Hercules 1 sqn with C295M 1 sqn with DHC-5D Buffalo 1 sqn with B-707-366C; B-737-100; Beech 200 Super King Air; Falcon 20; Gulf stream III; Gulf stream IV; Gulfstream IV-SP TRAINING 1 sqn with Alpha Jet* 1 sqn with DHC-5 Buffalo 3 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano 1 sqn with Grob 115EG e6 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros; L-59E Albatros* ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24V 2 sqn with AH-64D Apache 1 sqn with Ka-52A Hokum B 2 sqn with SA-342K Gazelle (with HOT) 1 sqn with SA-342L Gazelle TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with CH-47C/D Chinook 1 sqn with Mi-8 1 sqn with Mi-8/Mi-17-Vl Hip 1 sqn with S-70 Black Hawk; UH-60A/L Black Hawk UAV Some sqn with R4E-50 Skyeye; Wing Loong I EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 509 combat capable FTR 32: 26 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 6 F-16B Fighting Falcon EGA 274:138 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 37 F-16D Fighting Falcon; 2 Mirage 2000B; 15 Mirage 2000C; 12 Mirage 5E2; £46 MiG-29M/M2 Fulcrum; 16 Rafale DM; 8 Rafale EM ELINT 2 VC-130H Hercules ISR 12: e6 AT-802 Air Tractor*; 6 Mirage 5R (5SDR)* AEW&C 7 E-2C Hawkeye TPT 82: Heavy 2 I1-76MF Candid; Medium 24: 21 C-130H Hercules; 3 C-130H-30 Hercules; Light 45: 3 An-74TK-200A; 1 Beech 200 King Air; 4 Beech 1900 (ELINT); 4 Beech 1900C; 24 C295M; 9 DHC-5D Buffalo (being withdrawn) PAX 11:1 B-707-366C; 3 Falcon 20; 2 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream IV; 4 Gulfstream IV-SP TRG 329: 36 Alpha Jet*; 54 EMB-312 Tucano; 74 Grob 115EG; 120 K-8 Karakorum*; 10 L-39 Albatros; 35 L-59E* HELICOPTERS ATK 104:45 AH-64D Apache; up to 46 Ka-52A Hokum B; £13Mi-24VHmdE ASW10 SH-2G Super Seasprite (opcon Navy) ELINT 4 Commando Mk2E (ECM) Middle East and North Africa 323 MRH 77: 2 AW139 (SAR); 5 AW149; 65 SA342K Gazelle (some with HOT); 5 SA342L Gazelle (opcon Navy) TPT 96: Heavy 19: 3 CH-47C Chinook; 16 CH-47D Chinook; Medium 77: 2 AS-61; 24 Commando (of which 3 VIP); 40 Mi-8T Hip; 3 Mi-17-lV Hip; 4 S-70 BZaefc Hawfc (VIP); 4 UH-60L BZaefc Hawfc (VIP) TRG 17 UH-12E UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 4+ Wing Loong I ISR • Medium R4E-50 Skyeye AIR LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AM-9M/P Sidewinder; R-73 (RS-A A-ll A Archer); R-550 Magic; 9M39 Igla-V; IIR Mica IR; ARH Mica RF; R-77 (RS-AA-12 Adder); SARH AIM-7F/M Sparrow; R-530 ASM AASM; AGM-65A/D/F/G Maverick; AGM-114F/K Hellfire; AS-30L; HOT; LJ-7 (AKD-10); 9M120 Atoka (RS-AT-9) LACM SCALP EG AShM AGM-84L Harpoon Block II; AM39 Exocet; Kh-35U (RS-AS-20 Kayak) ARM Armat; Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A Kegler) BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II INS/SAT-guidedAZ Tariq Air Defence Command 80,000 conscript; 70,000 reservists (total 150,000)_ FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 5 AD div HQ (geographically based) 3 SAM bty with S-300V4 (RS-SA-23) 4 SAM bty with 9K37M1-2/9K317 Buk-Ml-2/M2E (RS-SA-11 GadfZy/RS-SA-17 Grizzly) 11 SAM bty with MIM-23B l-Hawk 38 SAM bty with S-75M Volkhov (RS-SA-2 Guideline) 10 SAM bty with S-125-2M Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26) Some SAM bty with 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) 2 SAM bty with 9K331/9K331ME Tbr-Ml/M2E (RS- SA-15 Gauntlet) 14 SAM bty with Crotale 12 SAM bty with M48 Chaparral 30 SAM bty with S-125M Pechora-M (RS-SA-3 Goa) 18 AD bn with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow with Skyguard/GDF-003 with Skyguard 12 ADA bde (total: 100 ADA bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM 777 Long-range e18 S-300V4 (RS-SA-23) Medium-range 323+: 40+ 9K37M1-2/9K317 Buk-Ml-2/ M2E (RS-SA-11 Gadfly/RS-SA-17 Grizzly); £33 MIM-23B l-Hawk; £210 S-75M Volkhov (RS-SA-2 Guideline); £40 S-125-2M Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26) Short-range 300+: 56+ 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); 10 9K331 Tor-Ul (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet); 10+ 9K331ME Tor-M2E (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet); 24+ Crotale; 80 RIM-7M Sea Sparrow with Skyguard; e120 S-125M Pechora-M (RS-SA-3 Goa) Point-defence 136+: 50 Ml097 Avenger; 50+ M48 Chaparral; 36+ Sinai-23 with Ayn al-Saqr GUNS 910 SP • 23mm 230 ZSU-23-4 Shilka TOWED 680: 35mm 80 GDF-005 with Skyguard; 57mm 600 S-60 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary £397,000 active Central Security Forces £325,000_ Ministry of Interior; includes conscripts ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) Walid AUV Sherpa Light Scout National Guard £60,000_ Lt wpns only FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 8 paramilitary bde (cadre) (3 paramilitary bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 250 Walid Border Guard Forces £12,000_ Ministry of Interior; lt wpns only FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 18 Border Guard regt DEPLOYMENT_ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1,025; 1 inf bn; 1 tpt coy DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 11 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1,052; 1 spec ops coy; 1 sy bn; 1 MP coy SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 5 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 3 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 22 FOREIGN FORCES_ Australia MFO (Operation Mazurka) 27 Canada MFO 55 Colombia MFO 275; 1 inf bn Czech Republic MFO 18; 1 C295M Fiji MFO 170; elm 1 inf bn France MFO 1 Italy MFO 75; 3 PB New Zealand MFO 26; 1 trg unit; 1 tpt unit Norway MFO 3 United Arab Emirates e300: 12 F-16E/F Fighting Falcon; Wing Loong IUAV; Wing Loong IIUAV (status uncertain) United Kingdom MFO 2 United States MFO 426; elm 1ARNG inf bn; 1ARNG spt bn (1 EOD coy, 1 medical coy, 1 hel coy) Uruguay MFO 411 engr/tpt unit 324 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Iran IRN Iranian Rial IRR 2021 2022 GDP IRR 66775tr 99764tr USD 1.59tr 1.97tr per capita USD 18,739 23,034 Growth % 4.7 3.0 Inflation % 40.1 40.0 Def bdgt [a] IRR 1180tr 2225tr USD 28.1 bn 44.0bn USD1=IRR 42000.00 50545.67 [a] Excludes Law Enforcement Forces (NAJA) Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008 ---2015--- ---2022 Population 86,758,304 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 12.1% 3.6% 3.3% 3.8% 25.0% 3.0% Female 11.6% 3.4% 3.1% 3.6% 24.2% 3.4% Capabilities_ Iran is a major regional military power, with a military doctrine that combines territorial defence, through national mobilisation and a substantial missile arsenal, with an asymmetric defence strategy. To achieve the last objective, Iran exerts military pressure using a range of regional allies and proxies, mainly via their relationship with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, as well as by the supply of weapons. During the fourth quarter of 2022, state security forces were struggling to control widespread protests, following the death of a 22-year-old woman in police custody. Tehran has also emerged as a weapons supplier to Russia, with the provision of armed uninhabited aerial vehicles and direct attack munitions for use in the latter's war with Ukraine. Iran initially denied any transfers, then in early November 2022 said what it claimed were a small number of systems had been provided prior to Russia's full-scale invasion. Iran has a key relationship with Syria and has developed influence in weaker regional states like Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen through a network of non-state groups, such as Hizbullah and Houthi forces. Tehran retains the region's largest short- and medium-range ballistic-missile inventory, has developed land-attack cruise missiles, and has a substantial inventory of a variety of UAVs. The rest of the conventional armed forces, although large by regional standards, struggle with an increasingly obsolescent equipment inventory that ingenuity and asymmetric-warfare techniques can only partially offset. Tehran's support for Russia in Ukraine, however, has the potential to offer a conduit to access more modern weaponry. The division of capability between the regular military services and the IRGC hampers effective command and control. The IRGC's operational primacy, coupled with the regular armed forces' dependence on conscript personnel, has also focused combat experience in IRGC formations. In regional terms, Iran has a well-developed defence-industrial base, which has displayed the capacity to support and sustain equipment. While unable to meet national needs for all major weapons, the domestic industry continues to produce equipment, including surface-to-air missile systems and an array of ISR- and armed-UAVs. ACTIVE 610,000 (Army 350,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 190,000 Navy 18,000 Air 37,000 Air Defence 15,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000 Armed Forces General Staff coordinates two parallel organisations: the regular armed forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Conscript liability 18-21 months (reported, with variations depending on location in which service is performed) RESERVE 350,000 (Army 350,000, ex-service volunteers) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 130,000; 220,000 conscript (total 350,000)_ FORCES BY ROLE 5 corps-level regional HQ COMMAND 1 cdo div HQ 4 armd div HQ 2 mech div HQ 4 inf div HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo div (3 cdo bde) 6 cdo bde 1 SF bde MANOEUVRE Armoured 8 armd bde Mechanised 14 mech bde Light 12 inf bde Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bde Aviation Some avn gp COMBAT SUPPORT 5 arty gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Totals ind those held by IRGC Ground Forces. Some equipment serviceability in doubt ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 1,513+: 480 T-72S; 150 M60A1; 75+ T-62; 100 Chieftain Mk3/Mk5; 540 T-54/T-55/Type-59/Sa/i>-74; 168 M47/M48 LT TK 80+: 80 Scorpion RECCE 35 EE-9 Cascavel IFV 610+: 210 BMP-1; 400 BMP-2 with 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); BMT-2 Cobra APC 640+ APC (T) 340: 140 Boragh with 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 200 M113 APC (W) 300+: 300 BTR-50/BTR-60; Rakhsh PPV Toofan ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 20+: BREM-1 reported; 20 Chieftain ARV; M578; T-54/55 ARV reported VLB 15 Chieftain AVLB MW Taftan 1 Middle East and North Africa 325 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 SpandrellTowsan-1); Almaz; Dehleavieh (Kornet); l-Raad; Saeqhe 1; Saeqhe 2; Toophan; Toophan 2 RCL 200+: 75mm M20; 82mm B-10; 106mm e200 M40; 107mm B-ll ARTILLERY 6,798+ SP 292+: 122mm 60+: 60 2S1 Gvozdika; Raad-l (Thunder 1); 155mm 150+: 150 M109A1; Raad-2 (Thunder 2); 170mm 30 M-1978; 175mm 22 M107; 203mm 30 MHO TOWED 2,030+; 105mm 150:130 M101A1; 20 M-56; 122mm 640: 540 D-30; 100 Type-54 (M-30); 130mm 985 M-46; 152mm 30 D-20; 155mm 205:120 GHN-45; 70 M114; 15 Type-88 WAC-21; 203mm 20 M115 MRL 1,476+: 107mm 1,300: 700 Type-63; 600 HASEB Fadjr 1; 122mm 157: 7 BM-11; 100 BM-21 Grad; 50 Arash/Hadid/ Noor; 240mm 19+: eIO Fadjr 3; 9 M-1985; 330mm Fadjr 5 MOR 3,000: 81mm; 82mm; 107mm M30; 120mm HM-15; HM-16; M-65 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional e30 CH-SS-8 (175 msl); Shahin-V Shahin-2; Nazeat; Oghab AIRCRAFT • TPT 17 Light 16:10 Cessna 185; 2 F-27 Friendship; 4 Turbo Commander 690; PAX 1 Falcon 20 HELICOPTERS ATK 50 AH-1J Cobra TPT 167: Heavy e20 CH-47C Chinook; Medium 69:49 Bell 214; 20 Mi-171; Light 78: 68 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 10 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Medium Mohajer 6; Raman 12 ISR • Medium Ababil 2;Ababil 3; Mohajer 3; Mohajer 4; Li^hi Mohajer 2 AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range FM-80 (CH-SA-4) Point-defence 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)%; Misaq 1 (QW-1); Misaq 2 (QW-18); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) (reported); HN-5A (CH-SA-3) GUNS 1,122 SP 180: 23mm 100 ZSU-23-4; 57mm 80 ZSU-57-2 TOWED 942+: 14.5mm ZPU-2; ZPU-4; 23mm 300 ZU-23-2; 35mm 92 GDF-002; 37mm M-1939; 40mm 50 L/70; 57mm 200 S-60; 85mm 300 M-1939 BOMBS Laser-guided Qaem Electro-optical guided Qaem Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 190,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces 150,000_ Controls Basij paramilitary forces. Lightly staffed in peacetime. Primary role: internal security; secondary role: external defence, in conjunction with regular armed forces FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 31 provincial corps HQ (2 in Tehran) SPECIAL FORCES 3 spec ops div 1 AB bde MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 armd div 3 armd bde Light 8+ inf div 5+ inf bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOITERING & DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS Shahed 131; Shotted 136 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Naval Forces 20,000+ (incl 5,000 Marines)_ FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT Some arty bty Some AShM bty with HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 Seersucker) AShM EQUIPMENT BY TYPE In addition to the vessels listed, the IRGC operates a substantial number of patrol boats with a full-load displacement below 10 tonnes, including Boghammar-dass vessels and small Booar-dass wing-in-ground effect air vehicles PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 129 PCGM 1 Shohid Soleimani with 2 twin lnchr with Ghader AShM, 2 single lnchr with C-704 (Nasr) AShM, 2 3-cell VLS & 4 single cell VLS (likely fitted with SAM), 1 hel landing platform PBFG 56: 5 C14 with 2 twin lnchr with C-701 (Kosar)/C-70A (Nasr) AShM 10 Mkl3 with 2 single lnchr with C-704 (Nasr) AShM, 2 single 324mm TT 10 Thondor (PRC Houdong) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802A (Ghader) AShM, 2 AK230 CIWS 25 Peykaap II (IPS-16 mod) with 2 single lnchr with C-701 (Kosar) AShM/C-704 (Nasr), 2 single 324mm TT 6 Zolfaghar (Peykaap III/IPS-16 mod) with 2 single lnchr with C-701 (Kosar)/C-704: (Nasr) AShM PBG 1 Shohid Rouhi with 2 twin lnchr with C-704 (Nasr) AShM PBFT 15 Peykaap I (IPS -16) with 2 single 324mm TT PBF 35:15 Kashdom II; 10 Tir (IPS-18); £10 Pashe (MIG-G-1900) PB 21: £20 Ghaem; 1 Shohid Nazeri AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 3 Hormuz 24 (Hejaz design for commercial use) LANDING CRAFT • LCT 2 Hormuz 21 (minelaying capacity) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AP 3 Noser COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM C-701 (Kosar); C-704 (Nasr); C-802 (Noor); HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 Seersucker) HELICOPTERS MRH 5 Mi-171 Hip TPT • Light some Bell 206 (AB-206) Jet Ranger 326 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Medium Mohajer 6 BOMBS Laser-guided Qaem Electro-optical guided Qaem Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Marines 5,000+_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bde Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force 15,000_ Controls Iran's strategic-missile force FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Su-22M4 Fitter K; Su-22UM-3K Fitter G TRAINING 1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano* EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS MRBM • Conventional up to 50: Emad-1 (Shahab-3 mod); Ghadr-l/-2 (Shahab-3 mod); Sajjil-2; Shahab-3 (IR-SS-7) (mobile & silo); Khorramshahr (in devt) SRBM • Conventional up to 100: Fateh-lW; Fateh-313; Khalij Fars (Fateh-lW mod ASBM); Qiam-V-1 mod; Shahab-l/-2 (Scud variants; service status uncertain); Zelzal; Zolfaghar (IR-SS-1) GLCM • Conventional some Ya'ali (Quds-1) AIRCRAFT 23 combat capable EGA 8: up to 7 Su-22M4 Fitter K; 1+ Su-22UM-3K Fitter G TRG 15 EMB-312 Tucano* UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy Shahed 129; Medium Shahed 181; Shahed 191 ISR • Medium Ababil 3; Mohajer 4; Shahed 123 AIR DEFENCE SAM Medium-range Ra'ad/3rd Khordad; Talash/15th Khordad Point-defence Misaq I (QW-1); Misaq 2 (QW-18) BOMBS Laser-guided Sadid Electro-optical guided Sadid Islamic Revolutionary Quds Force 5,000 Navy 18,000_ HQ at Bandar Abbas EQUIPMENT BY TYPE In addition to the vessels listed, the Iranian Navy operates a substantial number of patrol boats with a full-load displacement below 10 tonnes SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 17 SSK 1 Taregh (RUS Paltus (Project 877EKM (Kilo))) (2 more non-operational) with 6 single 533mm TT SSC 1 Fateh with 4 single 533mm TT with C-704 (Nasr-1) AShM/Valfajr HWT SSW 15:14 Ghadir (Yono) with 2 single 533mm TT with /flsfc-2 (C-704 (Nasr)) AShM/Valfajr HWT (additional vessels in build); 1 Nahang PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 68 CORVETTES 7 FSGM 3 Jamaran (UK Vosper Mk 5 derivative - 1 more undergoing sea trials) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (Noor) (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 single lnchr with SM-1 SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FSG 4: 2 Alvand (UK Vosper Mk 5) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1114mm gun 1 Alvand (UK Vosper Mk 5) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1 AK630M CIWS, 1114mm gun 1 Bayandor (US PF-103) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1 76mm gun PCFG 15: up to 10 Kaman (FRA Combattante II) with 1 twin lnchr with C-802 (Noor) (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 1 76mm gun; 5+ Sina with 1 twin lnchr with C-802 (Noor) (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 1 76mm gun PBG9: 3 Hendijan with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (Noor) (CH-SS-N-6) AShM 3 Kayvan with 2 single lnchr with C-704 (Nasr) AShM 3 Parvin with 2 single lnchr with C-704 (Nasr) AShM PBFT 3 Kajami (semi-submersible) with 2 324mm TT PBF 1 MIL55 PB 33: 9 C14; 8 Hendijan; 6 Mkll; 10 Mklll MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES • MCC 1 Shahin AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS 12 LST 3 Hengam with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 9 tanks; 225 troops) LSM 3 Tarsi (ROK) (capacity 9 tanks; 140 troops) LSL 6 Fouaue LANDING CRAFT 11 LCT2 LCUlLiyanllO UCAC 8: 2 Wellington Mk 4; 4 Wellington Mk 5; 2 Tondar (UK Winchester) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18 AE 2 Delvar AFD 2 Dolphin AG 1 Hamzah with 2 single lnchr with C-802 (Noor) (CH-SS-N-6) AShM AK 3 Delvar AKR 1 Mukran AORH 2 Bandar Abbas AWT 5: 4 Kangan; 1 Delvar AX 2 Kialas COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM C-701 (Kosar); C-704 (Nasr); C-802 (Noor); C-802A (Ghader); Ra'ad (reported) Middle East and North Africa 327 Marines 2,600_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 mne bde Naval Aviation 2,600_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT 16: Light 13: 5 Do-228; 4 F-27 Friendship; 4 Turbo Commander 680; PAX 3 Falcon 20 (ELINT) HELICOPTERS ASW£10SH-3D Sea King MCM 3 RH-53D Sea Stallion TPT • Light 17: 5 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 2 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206); 10 Bell 212 (AB-212) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy Shahed 129 BOMBS Laser-guided Sadid Electro-optical guided Sadid Air Force 37,000_ FORCES BY ROLE Serviceability probably about 60% for US ac types and about 80% for PRC/Russian ac. Includes IRGC AF equipment FIGHTER 1 sqn with F-7M Ait-guard; JJ-7* 2 sqn with F-14 Tomcat 2 sqn with MÍG-29A/UB Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Mirage F-1B/E 1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II 5 sqn with F-4D/E Phantom II 3 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Su-24MK Fencer D MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with P-3F Orion ISR 1 (det) sqn with RF-4E Phantom II* SEARCH & RESCUE Some fit with Bell 214C (AB-214C) TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with B-707; B-747; B-747F TRANSPORT 1 sqn with B-707; Falcon 50; L-1329 Jetstar; Bell 412 2 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules 1 sqn with F-27 Friendship; Falcon 20 1 sqn with 11-76 Candid; An-140 (Iran-140 Faraz) TRAINING 1 sqn with Beech F33A/C Bonanza 1 sqn with F-5B Freedom Fighter 1 sqn with PC-6 1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer Some units with MFI-17 Mushshak; TB-21 Trinidad; TB-200 Tobago TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with CH-47 Chinook Some units with Bell 206A Jet Ranger (AB-206A); Shabaviz 2-75; Shabaviz 2061 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 312 combat capable FTR 180+: 20 F-5B Freedom Fighter; 54+ F-5E/F Tiger II; 24 F-7MAirguard; up to 41 F-14 Tomcat; 35 MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum; up to 6 Azarakhsh (reported) EGA 80: 62 F-4D/E Phantom II; 2 Mirage F-1BQ; 10 Mirage F-1EQ; up to 6 Saegheh (reported) ATK 29 Su-24MK Fencer D ASW 3 P-3F Orion ISR: 6+ RF-4E Phantom II* TKR/TPT 3: el B-707; t2 B-747 TPT 116: Heavy 1211-76 Candid; Medium £19 C-130E/H Hercules; Light 75:11 An-74TK-200; 5 An-140 (Iran-140 Faraz); 10 F-27 Friendship; 1 L-1329 Jetstar; 10 PC-6B Turbo Porter; 8 TB-21 Trinidad; 4 TB-200 Tobago; 3 Turbo Commander 680; 14 Y-7; 9 Y-12; PAX 10: el B-707; 1 B-747; 4 B-747F; 1 Falcon 20; 3 Falcon 50 TRG 126: 25 Beech F33A/C Bonanza; 14 JJ-7*; 25 MFI-17 Mushshak; 12 Parastu; 15 PC-6; 35 PC-7 Turbo Trainer HELICOPTERS MRH 2 Bell 412 TPT 34+: Heavy 2+ CH-47 Chinook; Medium 30 Bell 214C (AB-214C); Light 2+: 2 Bell 206A Jet Ranger (AB-206A); some Shabaviz 2-75 (indigenous versions in production); some Shabaviz 2061 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR PL-2AJ;; PL-7; R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); AIM-9J Sidewinder; IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); SARH AIM-7E-2 Sparrow; ARH AIM-54 Phoenix^ ASM AGM-65A Maverick; Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-25ML (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29L/T (RS-AS-14A/B Kedge) AShM C-801K ARM Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 Kilter) BOMBS Electro-optical guided GBU-87/B Qassed Air Defence Force 15,000_ FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 16 bn with MIM-23B l-Hawk/Shahin 4 bn with S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) 5 sqn with FM-80 (CH-SA-4); Rapier; HQ-2 (CH-SA-1); S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); 9K331 Tor-Ul (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM 410 Long-range 42+: 10 S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); 32 S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); Bavar-373 Medium-range 59+: e50 MIM-23B l-Hawk/Shahin; 9 HQ-2 (CH-SA-1); Talash/15th Khordad Short-range 279: 250 FM-80 (CH-SA-4); 29 9K331 Tor-Mi (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) Point-defence 30+: 30 Rapier; Misaq 1 (QW-1); Misaq 2 (QW-18) GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 35mm GDF-002 328 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000-60,000 Law-Enforcement Forces 40,000-60,000 (border and security troops); 450,000 on mobilisation (incl conscripts)_ Part of armed forces in wartime EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB £90 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2+: 2 An-140; some Cessna 185/Cessna 310 HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light e24 AB-205 (Bell 205)/ AB-206 (Bell 206) Jet Ranger Basij Resistance Force £600,000 on mobilisation Paramilitary militia with claimed membership of 12.6 million; £600,000 combat capable DEPLOYMENT_ GULF OF ADEN AND SOMALI BASIN: Navy: 1FSGM; 1AKR MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2 SYRIA: 1,500 Iraq IRQ Iraqi Dinar IQD 2021 2022 GDP IQD 300tr 410tr USD 207bn 283bn per capita USD 5,021 6,696 Growth % 7.7 9.3 Inflation % 6.0 6.5 Def bdgt [a] IQD 10.8tr 12.6tr USD 7.4bn 8.7bn FMA (US) USD 250m 250m USD1=IQD 1450.00 1450.00 [a] Excludes Ministry of the Interior and National Security Council budget Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008 ---2015--- ---2022 Population 40,462,701 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 18.3% 5.4% 4.7% 4.0% 16.3% 1.6% Female 17.5% 5.2% 4.6% 3.9% 16.4% 2.0% Capabilities_ The armed forces'capabilities and morale have generally improved since the collapse of several divisions in the face of the ISIS advance in the north in 2014, but there remains concern about Baghdad's ability to independently sustain this level of operational effectiveness. The continuing reliance on a relatively small number of key formations for offensive operations, particularly the well-regarded Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), resulted in these forces suffering disproportionately high levels of attrition. An organic aviation capability for the CTS has been mooted. Meanwhile, the nature of the relationship between the official government forces, Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the Popular Mobilisation Units militias remains uncertain. The government's most critical security relationship has been with the US, on whom Iraqi forces remain largely dependent for training and ISR support, as well as contractor maintenance. Political pressure from nationalist and Iran-aligned political parties, and continuing attacks on US forces by Iranian-supported militia units have strained this relationship in recent years. The US-led combat mission designed to help Iraqi forces tackle ISIS ended in December 2021 with troops under Combined Joint Task Force - Inherent Resolve moving to an 'advise, assist and enable'role. The NATO Mission Iraq is focused on training and capacity building. The armed forces' inventory comprises a heterogenous mix of Soviet-era and Russian equipment combined with newer European- and US-sourced platforms, but significant shortcomings remain in logistics support. Barring military maintenance facilities, Iraq's defence industry has only limited capacity, focusing on the manufacture of light weapons and ammunition. ACTIVE 193,000 (Army 180,000 Navy 3,000 Air 5,000 Air Defence 5,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 266,000 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army £180,000_ Includes Counter Terrorism Service FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 3 SF bde 1 ranger bde (3 ranger bn) MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (9th) armd div (2 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) Mechanised 3 (5th, 8th & 10th) mech div (4 mech inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) 1 (7th) mech div (2 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) Light 1 (6th) mot div (3 mot inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) 1 (14th) mot div (2 mot inf bde, 3 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) 1 (1st) inf div (2 inf bde) 1 (11th) inf div (3 It inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) 1 (15th) inf div (5 inf bde) 1 (16th) inf div (2 inf bde) 1 (17th Cdo) inf div (4 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) 1 inf bde Other l(PMSF) sydiv (3 inf bde) HELICOPTER 1 atk hel sqn with Mi-28NE Havoc 1 atk hel sqn with Mi-35M Hind 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) 3 atk hel sqn with Bell T407; H135M 3 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171Sh 1 ISR sqn with SA342M Gazelle 2 trg sqn with Bell 206; OH-58C Kiowa 1 trg sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) 1 trg sqn with Mi-17 Hip Middle East and North Africa 329 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 391+: £100 M1A1 Abrains; 168+ T-72M/M1; £50 T-55; 73 T-90S RECCE 53:18 BRDM 2; 35 EE-9 Cascaoel; IFV 650: £400 BMP-1; e90 BMP-3M; e60 BTR-4 (inc variants); 100 BTR-80A APC 1,592+ APC (T) 900: £500 M113A2/Talha; e400 MT-LB PPV 692+: 12 Barracuda; 250 Caiman; Gorets-M; e400 ILAV Badger; Mamba; 30 Maxxpro AUV 420+: £400 Akrep; 20 Commando; M-ATV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 222+: 180 BREM; 35+ M88A1/2; 7 Maxxpro ARV; T-54/55 ARV; Type-653; VT-55A NBC VEHICLES 20 Fuchs NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) (reported) ARTILLERY 1,064+ SP 48+: 152mm 18+ Type-83; 155mm 30: 6 M109A1; 24 M109A5 TOWED 60+: 130mm M-46/Type-59; 152mm D-20; Type-83; 155mm e60 M198 MRL 6+: 122mm some BM-21 Grad; 220mm 6+ TOS-1A MOR 950+: 81mm £500 M252; 120mm e450 M120; 240mm M-240 HELICOPTERS ATK 35:11 Mi-28NE Havoc; 4 Mi-28UB Havoc; 20+ Mi-35M Hind MRH 63+: 4+ SA342 Gazelle; 17 Bell IA407; 23 H135M; £19 Mi-17 Hip H/Mi-171Sh ISR 10 OH-58C Kiowa TPT • Light 44:16 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 10 Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger; e\8 Bell T407 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 12 CH-4 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM 9K114 Shturm (RS-AT-6 Spiral); AGR-20A APKWS; AR-1; Ingwe BOMBS INS/GPS-guided FT-9 Navy 3,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32 PCF (2 Musa ibn Nusayr (ITA Assad) with 1 76mm gun non-operational) PCO 2 Al Basra (US River Hawk) PCC 4 Fateh (ITA Diciotti) PB 20:12 Swiftships 35; 5 Predator (PRC 27m); 3AI Faw PBR 6: 2 Type-200; 4 Type-2010 Marines 1,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 mne bn Air Force £5,000_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25K/Su-25UBK Frogfoot 1 sqn with L-159A; L-159T1 ISR 1 sqn with CH-2000 Soma; SB7L-360 Seeker 1 sqn with Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; Cessna AC-208B Combat Caravan* 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-32B Cline 1 sqn with C-130E/J-30 Hercules TRAINING 1 sqn with Cessna 172, Cessna 208B 1 sqn with Lasta-95 1 sqn with T-6A 1 sqn with T-50IQ Golden Eagle* EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 90 combat capable EGA 34: 26 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 8 F-16D Fighting Falcon; ATK 30:10 L-159A; 1 L-159T1; e19 Su-25/Su-25K/Su- 25UBK Frogfoott ISR 10: 2 Cessna AC-208B Combat Caravan*; 2 SB7L-360 Seeker; 6 Beech 350ER King Air TPT 29: Medium 15: 3 C-130E Hercules; 6 C-130J-30 Hercules; 6 An-32B Cline (of which 2 combat capable); Light 14:1 Beech 350 King Air; 5 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 8 Cessna 172 TRG 57+: 8 CH-2000 Soma; 10+ Lasta-95; 15 T-6A; 24 T-50IQ Golden Eagle* AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L/M Sidewinder; SARH AIM-7M Sparrow ASM AGM-114 Hellfire BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10 Paveway II; GBU-12 Paveway II Air Defence Command £5,000_ FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM bn with 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) 1 SAM bn with M1097 Avenger 1 SAM bn with 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) 1 ADA bn with ZU-23-2; S-60 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM Point-defence Ml097 Avenger; 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) SPAAGM 30mm 24 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60 330 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary £266,000_ Iraqi Federal Police £36,000_ Territorial Interdiction Force £50,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 4 sy bde 11 sy bde (forming) Popular Mobilisation Forces £l 80,000_ Includes Badr Organisation; Kataib Hizbullah; Kataib Imam Ali; Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-55; T-72B; T-72 Rakhsh IFV BMP-1 mod (23mm gun); BMP-2 APC • PPV Toophan ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MANPATS Dehlavieh (Komet); Toophcm ARTILLERY TOWED • 130mm M-46; 152mm D-20 MRL • 122mm HM-20 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Short-range Saqr-1 (358) (reported) GUNS • SP 23mm BMP-1 mod (ZU-23-2 on BMP-1 chassis) FOREIGN FORCES_ Australia Operation Inherent Resolve (Okra) 110 • NATO Mission Iraq 2 Belgium Operation Inherent Resolve (Valiant Phoenix) 6 • NATO Mission Iraq 7 Canada NATO Mission Iraq 16 Croatia Operation Inherent Resolve 3 • NATO Mission Iraq 8 Czech Republic Operation Inherent Resolve 60 Denmark Operation Inherent Resolve 39 • NATO Mission Iraq 125 Estonia Operation Inherent Resolve 10 • NATO Mission Iraq 40 Fiji UNAMI174; 2 sy unit Finland Operation Inherent Resolve 75; 1 trg unit • NATO Mission Iraq 5 France Operation Inherent Resolve 6 • NATO Mission Iraq 3 Germany Operation Inherent Resolve 70 • NATO Mission Iraq 15 Greece NATO Mission Iraq 2 Hungary Operation Inherent Resolve 133 • NATO Mission Iraq 3 Italy Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 650; 1 inf regt; 1 trg unit; 1 hel sqn with 4 NH90 • NATO Mission Iraq 610 Latvia Operation Inherent Resolve 6 • NATO Mission Iraq 1 Lithuania Operation Inherent Resolve 6 • NATO Mission Iraq 34 Luxembourg NATO Mission Iraq 1 Nepal UNAMI 77; 1 sy unit Netherlands Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 2 trg units • NATO Mission Iraq 2 New Zealand Operation Inherent Resolve 9 Norway Operation Inherent Resolve 60; 1 trg unit • NATO Mission Iraq 2 Poland Operation Inherent Resolve 150 • NATO Mission Iraq 30 Portugal Operation Inherent Resolve 30 Romania Operation Inherent Resolve 30 • NATO Mission Iraq 170 Slovakia NATO Mission Iraq 5 Slovenia Operation Inherent Resolve 3 Spain Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 1 trg units; 1 hel unit • NATO Mission Iraq 130 Sweden Operation Inherent Resolve 2 • NATO Mission Iraq 1 Turkey Army 1,000; 1 cdo unit • NATO Mission Iraq 86 United Kingdom Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader) 100 • NATO Mission Iraq 12 United States Operation Inherent Resolve 2,000; 1 mechbde(-); 1 atk hel bn with AH-64E Apache; MQ-1C Gray Eagle; 1 spec ops hel bn with MH-47G Chinook; MH-60M Black Hawk; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper • NATO Mission Iraq 12 Israel ISR 2023 New Israeli Shekel ILS 2021 2022 GDP ILS 1.58tr 1.74tr USD 489bn 527bn per capita USD 52,152 55,359 Growth % 8.6 6.1 Inflation % 1.5 4.5 Def bdgt ILS 65.9bn 63.9bn USD 20.4bn 19.4bn FMA (US) USD 3.30bn 3.30bn USD1=ILS 3.23 3.30 3.30bn Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 19.3 16.9 2008- -2015- 2022 Population 8,914,885 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 13.4% 4.2% 3.9% 3.6% 19.7% 5.5% Female 12.8% 4.0% 3.7% 3.4% 19.1% 6.7% Capabilities The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are organised for territorial defence, short-term interventions in neighbouring states and limited regional power projection. In recent years this has included air-to-ground missions in Syria, while the navy is tasked with interdicting illicit shipments and delivering maritime security as Israel's littoral becomes more economically important to the country. Israel is widely believed to possess a nuclear-weapons capability. Following the 2015 Plan Gideon, the IDF adopted a new five-year Tnufa (Momentum) programme in 2020. It seeks to improve areas of relative superiority, such as technology and intelligence, to ensure swifter and more decisive operations against future threats. The new government approved a defence budget in mid-2021, following two years without a new budget, which has enabled the plan to progress. The US remains Israel's key defence partner, as well as a significant source of funding, and is instrumental in several of the IDF's equipment programmes, particularly in missile defence and combat aviation. Israel also maintains discreet ties with a number of Arab states, has recently normalised relations with several Gulf states and has even started selling defence and security equipment to the region. Personnel quality and training are generally at a high standard, despite the IDF's continuing reliance on national service. A task force tasked with examining the number of combat roles open to women reported to service chiefs in 2022; additional roles will be opened to women, including some additional special forces positions. Ground-forces training is being overhauled, with new training centres under construction. Edge of Tomorrow, a new MOD and industry technology-driven project, is designed to improve situational awareness and networking. Given its mission-set, the IDF's logistics capabilities are likely limited to sustaining operations within Israel itself or in immediately neighbouring territories. The largely asymmetric nature of the threats the IDF has faced in recent years has focused modernisation efforts on force-protection, missile-defence and precision-strike capabilities. Israel maintains a broad defence-industrial base, with world-class capabilities in armoured vehicles, uninhabited systems, guided-weapons, radars and sensors, and cyber security. ACTIVE 169,500 (Army 126,000 Navy 9,500 Air 34,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 8,000 Conscript liability Officers 48 months, other ranks 32 months, women 24 months (Jews and Druze only; Christians, Circassians and Muslims may volunteer) RESERVE 465,000 (Army 400,000 Navy 10,000 Air 55,000) Annual trg as cbt reservists to age 40 (some specialists to age 54) for male other ranks, 38 (or marriage/pregnancy) for women ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Strategic Forces_ Israel is widely believed to have a nuclear capability -delivery means include F-15I and F-16I ac, Jericho 2 IRBM and, reportedly, Dolphin ITanin-d&ss SSKs with LACM FORCES BY ROLE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 3 IRBM sqn with Jericho 2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS IRBM • Nuclear: e24 Jericho 2 Strategic Defences_ FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 3 bty with Arrow 2 ATBM with Green Pine/Super Green Pine radar and Citrus Tree command post 10 bty with Iron Dome (ind reserve bty) 4 bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2 2 bty with David's Sling Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 10 COMMUNICATIONS 3 Amos ISR 7:1 EROS; 5 Ofeq (5, 7,9,10 & 16); 1 TecSAR-1 (Polaris) Middle East and North Africa 331 Army 26,000; 100,000 conscript (total 126,000) Organisation and structure of formations may vary according to op situations. Equipment includes that required for reserve forces on mobilisation FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 (regional comd) corps HQ 2 armd div HQ 1 (Multidimensional) div HQ 5 (territorial) inf div HQ 1 (home defence) comd HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bde (3 spec ops unit) MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 indep recce bn Armoured 3 armd bde (1 recce coy, 3 a rmd bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt engr bn) 1 (Multidimensional) armd inf/ISR bn Mechanised 3 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 sigs coy) 1 mech inf bde (1 recce bn, 4 mech inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn) 1 indep mech inf bn Light 2 indep inf bn Air Manoeuvre 1 para bde (3 para bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 sigs coy) Other 1 armd trg bde (3 armd bn) 1 (Border Protection) sy bde (5 ISR bn; 4 sy bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty bde 1 engr bde (3 engr bn, 3 EOD coy) 1 CBRN bn lint bde (3 intbn) 1 int unit 1 SIGINT unit 2MPbn Reserves 400,000+ on mobilisation_ FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 armd div HQ 1 AB div HQ MANOEUVRE Armoured 9 armd bde Mechanised 8 mech inf bde Light 16 (territorial/regional) inf bde Air Manoeuvre 4 para bde Mountain 1 mtn inf bde 1 mtn inf bn 332 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 COMBAT SUPPORT 5 arty bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 6 log unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT £400 Merkava MkIV (e700 Merkava Mklll; e200 Merkava MklV all in store) APC 1,190+ APC (T) 1,190: £290 Namer; 500 M113A2; e400 Nagmachon (Centurion chassis); Nakpadon (5,100: zWOAchzarit (modified T-55 chassis); 5,000 M113A1/A2 all in store) APC (W) some Eitan AUV Ze'ev ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV D9R; Namer, Puma ARV Nemmera; M88A1; M113 ARV VLB Alligator MAB; M48/60; MTU NBC VEHICLES e8 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP M113 with Spike; Tamuz (Spike NLOS) MANPATS IMIMAPATS; Spike SR/MR/LR/ER ARTILLERY 530 SP 250:155mm 250 M109A5 (155mm 30 M109A2; 175mm 36 M107; 203mm 36 MHO all in store) TOWED (155mm 171: 40 M-46 mod; 50 M-68/M-71; 81 M-839P/M-845P all in store) MRL 30: 227mm 30 M270 MLRS; 306mm IMI Lynx (160mm 50 LAR-160; 227mm 18 M270 MLRS; 290mm 20 LAR-290 all in store) MOR 250: 81mm 250 (81mm 1,100; 120mm 650; 160mm 18 Soltam M-66 all in store) AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Machbet; FIM-92 Stinger Navy 7,000; 2,500 conscript (total 9,500)_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 5 SSK 5: 3 Dolphin (GER HDW design) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM/SeaHake (DM2A3) HWT/SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT/ Kaoed HWT, 4 single 650mm TT with dual-capable LACM (reported) 2 Tanin (GER HDW design) (fitted with AIP) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM/SeaHake (DM2A3) HWT/SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT/Kaved HWT, 4 single 650mm TT with dual-capable LACM (reported) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 49 CORVETTES • FSGHM 7: 2 Eilat (Sa'ar 5) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM/Gabriel V AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM (being upgraded to Barak-8), 2 triple 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 1AS565SA Panther ASW hel) 1 Eilat (Sa'ar 5) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM/Gabriel V AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-8 SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther ASW hel) 4 Magen (Sa'ar 6) with 2 quad lnchr with Gabriel V AShM, 2 20-cell VLS with Tamir (C-Dome) SAM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak LRAD, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 54 LWT (capacity 1AS565SA Panther ASW hel) PCGM 8 Hetz (Sa'ar 4.5) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM (can also be fitted with up to 6 single lnchr with Gabriel II AShM), 2 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, (can be fitted with 2 triple 324mm Mk32 TT with Mk46 LWT), 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CWIS, 1 76mm gun PBF 34: 5 Shaldag; 3 Stingray; 9 Super Dvora Mk I (SSM & TT may be fitted); 4 Super Dvora Mk II (SSM & TT may be fitted); 6 Super Dvora Mk II-I (SSM & TT may be fitted); 4 Super Dvora Mk III (SSM & TT may be fitted); 3 Super Dvora Mk III (SSM may be fitted) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 3 Manta LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 1 Bat Yam (ex-GER Type-745) Naval Commandos £300_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo unit Air Force 34,000_ Responsible for Air and Space Coordination FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER & FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-15A/B/D Eagle (Baz) 1 sqn with F-15B/C/D Eagle (Baz) 1 sqn with F-15I Ra'am 5 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (Barak) 4 sqn with F-16I Fighting Falcon (Sufa) 2 sqn with F-35I Adir ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with AS565SA Panther (missions flown by IAF but with non-rated aircrew) ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with RC-12D Guardrail; Beech A36 Bonanza (Hofit); Beech 200/200T/200CT King Air AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with Gulfstream G550 Eitam; Gulfstream G550 Shavit TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules; KC-130H Hercules 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules 1 sqn with KC-707 TRAINING 1 OPFOR sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (Barak) 1 sqn with F-35lAdir 1 sqn with M-346 Master (Lavi) ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AH-64A Apache (Peteri) 1 sqn with AH-64D Apache (Sarat) Middle East and North Africa 333 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with CH-53D Sea Stallion 2 sqn with S-70A Black Hawk; UH-60A Black Hawk 1 medevac unit with CH-53D Sea Stallion UAV 2 ISR sqn with Hermes 450 1 ISR sqn with Heron (Shoval); Heron TP (Eitan) 1 ISR sqn with Heron (Shoval) (MP role) 1 ISR sqn with Orbiter 4 (Nitzotz) AIR DEFENCE 3 bty with A now 2/3 10 bty with Iron Dome 4 bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2 2 bty with David's Sling SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF wg (2 SF unit, 1 CSAR unit, 1 int unit) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 3 IRBM sqn with Jericho 2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 345 combat capable EGA 315:16 F-15A Eagle (Baz); 6 F-15B Eagle (Baz); 17 F-15C Eagle (Baz); 19 F-15D Eagle (Baz); 25 F-15I Ra'am; e50 F-16C Fighting Falcon (Barak); 49 F-16D Fighting Falcon (Barak); 97 F-161 Fighting Falcon (Sufa); 36 F-35I Adir ISR 7: 6 RC-12D Guardrail; 1 Gulfstream G550 Oron ELINT 3 Gulfstream G550 Shavit AEW 2 Gulfstream G550 Eitam TKR/TPT 10:4 KC-130H Hercules; 6 KC-707 TPT 65: Medium 18: 5 C-130E Hercules; 6 C-130H Hercules; 7 C-130I-30 Hercules; Light 47: 3 AT-802 Air Tractor; 9 Beech 200 King Air; 8 Beech 200T King Air; 5 Beech 200CT King Air; 22 Beech A36 Bonanza (Hofit) TRG 66:16 Grob G-120; 30 M-346 Master (Law)*; 20 T-6A HELICOPTERS ATK 43: 26 AH-64A Apache (Peten); 17 AH-64D Apache (Sarat) ASW 7 AS565SA Panther (missions flown by IAF but with non-rated aircrew) ISR 12 OH-58B Kiowa TPT 80: Heavy 25 CH-53D Sea Stallion; Medium 49: 39 S-70A Black Hawk; 10 UH-60A Black Hawk; Light 6 Bell 206 Jet Ranger UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR 3+: Heavy 3+: Heron (Shoval); 3 Heron TP (Eitan); RQ-5A Hunter; Medium Hermes 450; Hermes 900 (22+ Searcher Mkll in store); Light Orbiter 4 (Nitzotz); (an unknown number of ISR UAVs are combat capable) LOITERING & DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS Harop; Harpy SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS IRBM • Nuclear £24 Jericho 2 AIR DEFENCE SAM 40+: Long-range M901 Patriot PAC-2 Medium-range some David's Sling Short-range up to 40 Iron Dome Point-defence Machbet GUNS • TOWED 20mm M167 Vulcan MISSILE DEFENCE • SAM 24 Arrow 2/Arrow 3; AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES A AM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; Python 4; IIR Python 5; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; AGM-62B Walleye; AGM-65 Maverick; Delilah AL; Popeye I/II; Spike NLOS BOMBS IIR guided Opher Laser-guided Griffin; Lizard; Paveway II INS/GPS-guided GBU-31JDAM; GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb (Barad Had); Spice Airfield Defence 3,000 active (15,000 reservists) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary £8,000_ Border Police £8,000 FOREIGN FORCES_ UNTSO unless specified. UNTSO figures represent total numbers for mission Argentina 3 Australia 11 Austria 4 Belgium 1 Bhutan 5 • UNDOF 3 Canada 4 Chile 3 China 5 Czech Republic UNDOF 4 Denmark 10 Estonia 3 Fiji 2 • UNDOF 150; 1 inf coy Finland 14 Ghana UNDOF 6 India 2 • UNDOF 198; 1 inf pi; 1 MP pi; 1 log coy(-) Ireland 12 • UNDOF 130; 1 inf coy Latvia 1 Nepal 3 • UNDOF 412; 1 mech inf coy; 1 inf coy; 1 log coy(-) Netherlands 12 • UNDOF 1 New Zealand 8 Norway 13 Poland 4 Russia 4 Serbia 1 Slovakia 2 Slovenia 3 Sweden 7 Switzerland 11 United States 2 • US Strategic Command; 100; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Mount Keren Uruguay UNDOF 212; 1 mech inf coy Zambia 1 334 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Jordan JOR Jordanian Dinar JOD 2021 2022 GDP JOD 32.1 bn 34.1 bn USD 45.3bn 48.1 bn per capita USD 4,412 4,666 Growth % 2.2 2.4 Inflation % 1.3 3.8 Def bdgt [a] JOD 1.28bn 1.37bn USD 1.80bn 1.93bn FMA (US) USD 425 m 350m USD1=JOD 0.71 0.71 2023 400m [a] Exdudes expenditure on public order and safety Population 10,998,531 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 16.4% 5.1% 5.0% 4.7% 19.4% 1.9% Female 15.5% 4.9% 4.4% 4.0% 16.6% 2.0% Capabilities The Jordanian Armed Forces are structured to provide border security and an armoured response to conventional threats, and they have recently focused on tackling narcotics- and weapons-smuggling from Syria. Efforts to restructure, review modernisation requirements and increase efficiency are ongoing. In recent years, Jordan has withdrawn some equipment from service, particularly aircraft, likely due to budgetary pressure. There has been no recent public statement of defence policy, but regional instability remains a key concern, principally the ongoing war in Syria. Jordan is a major non-NATO ally of the US and there is a close bilateral defence relationship. The country has developed a bespoke special-forces training centre and has hosted training for numerous state and non-state military forces. A training centre for female personnel was inaugurated in mid-2021 and aims to boost the number of women in the armed forces to 3% of the total by the end of 2024. Personnel are relatively well trained, particularly aircrew and special forces, who are highly regarded internationally. Jordanian forces are able to independently deploy regionally and have participated in ISAF operations in Afghanistan and in coalition air operations over Syria and Yemen; additional secondhand transport aircraft were recently acquired. Jordan's inventory largely comprises older systems and procurements have typically been in small numbers, second-hand or donations. Although the state-owned Jordan Design and Development Bureau (JODDB, formerly KADDB) has demonstrated the capacity to upgrade vehicles, the army has largely recapitalised its armoured-vehicle fleet with second-hand armour from European countries. JODDB has produced some light-armoured vehicles for domestic use through agreements with foreign suppliers, but the company currently has little export profile. ACTIVE 100,500 (Army 86,000 Navy 500 Air 14,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 15,000 RESERVE 65,000 (Army 60,000 Joint 5,000) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE_ Army 86,000_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (Royal Guard) SF gp (1 SF regt, 1 SF bn, 1 CT bn) 1 spec ops bde (3 spec ops bn) MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 armd bde Mechanised 8 mech bde Light 2 (Border Gd) inf bde 1 (Border Gd) inf gp Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bde (3 AB bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 4 arty bde 4 AD bde 1 MRL bn 1 engr bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 266: e80 FV4034 Challenger 1 (Al Hussein); 4+ Leclerc; 182 M60A3 (£300 FV4034 Challenger 1 (Al Hussein) in store) ASLT 80 Bl Centauro (61 more in store) IFV 399:13 AIFV-B-C25; 50 Marder 1 A3; 336 YPR-765 PRI APC 968+ APC (T) 729: 370 M113A1/A2 MklJ; 269 M577A2 (CP); 87 YPR-765 PRCO (CP); 3 AIFV-B PPV 239: some Al-Wahsh; 45 Caiman; 25 Marauder; 25 Matador; 100 MaxxPro; 44 Nomad/Thunder AUV 35 Cougar ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 85+: Al Monjed; 5 BPz-1; FV4204 Chieftain ARV; 32 M88A1; 30 M578; 18 YPR-806 MW12 AardvarkUk2 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 115: 70 M901; 45 AWV-B-Milan MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; TOW/TOW-2A; 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); Luch Corsar; Stugna-P ARTILLERY 1,397 SP 506:155mm 358 M109A1/A2; 203mm 148 M110A2 TOWED 84:105mm 66: 54 M102; 12 M119A2; 155mm 18 M114 MRL 30: 227mm 12 M142 HIMARS; 273mm 18 WM-80 MOR 777: 81mm 359; SP 81mm 50; 107mm 50 M30; 120mm 300 Brandt SP 120mm 18 Agrab Mk2 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 92+: 92 9K35 Strela-W (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) GUNS • SP 108: 23mm 48 ZSU-23-4 Shilka; 35mm 60 Gepard Middle East and North Africa 335 Navy £500_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9 PBF 2 Response Boat-Medium (RB-M) PB 7: 4 Abdullah (US Dauntless); 3 Al Hussein (UK Vosper 30m) Marines_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne unit Air Force 14,000_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon ISR 1 sqn with AT-802U Air Tractor 1 sqn with Cessna 208B TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130E Hercules TRAINING 1 OCU with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with PC-21 1 sqn with Grob 120TP 1 hel sqn with R-44 Raven II ATTACK HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AH-1F Cobra (with TOW) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS332M Super Puma; UH-60A Black Hawk 1 sqn with UH-60A Black Hawk 1 sqn with UH-60M Black Hawk 1 sqn with Mi-26T2 Halo 1 (Royal) fit with VH-60M Black Hawk; AW139 ISR UAV 1 sqn with S-100 Camcopter AIR DEFENCE 2 bde with MIM-23B Phase III l-Hawk EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 57 combat capable FGA 47: 33 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 14 F-16BM Fighting Falcon ATK (2 AC235 in store, offered for sale) ISR 10 AT-802U Air Tractor* TPT 11: Medium 3 C-130E Hercules (1 C-130B Hercules; 4 C-130H Hercules in store); Light 7: 5 Cessna 208B; 2 M-28 Skytruck (2 C295M in store, offered for sale); PAX 1 CL-604 Challenger TRG 26:14 Grob 120TP; 12 PC-21; (12 Hawk Mk63* in store, offered for sale) HELICOPTERS ATK 12 AH-1F Cobra (17 more in store, offered for sale) MRH 14: 3 AW139; 11 H135M (Tpt/SAR) (6 MD-530F in store, offered for sale) TPT 49: Heavy 4 Mi-26T2 Halo; Medium 33:10 AS332M Super Puma (being WFU); 8 UH-60A Black Hawk; 12 UH-60M Black Hawk; 3 VH-60M Black Hawk; (8 UH-60L in store, offered for sale); Light 12 R-44 Raven II; (13 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) in store, offered for sale) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy (some CH-4B in store, offered for sale) ISR • Light up to 10 S-100 Camcopter AIR DEFENCE SAM • Medium-range 24 MIM-23B Phase III l-Hawk GUNS • TOWED 40mm 22 L/70 (with Flycatcher radar) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9J/N/P Sidewinder; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick; BGM-71 TOW BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II Gendarmerie & Paramilitary s15,000 active Gendarmerie £l 5,000 active_ 3 regional comd FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF unit MANOEUVRE Other 10 sy bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 25+: AT105 Saxon (reported); 25+ EE-11 Urutu AUV AB2Al-Jawad DEPLOYMENT_ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 10 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 11 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 322; 1 mech inf coy(+) SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 5 FOREIGN FORCES_ France Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 300; 4 Rafale F3 Germany Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 1 A400M United States Central Command: Operation Inherent Resolve 3,000; 1 FGA sqn with 18 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 CISR sqn with 12 MQ-9A Reaper 336 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Kuwait KWT Kuwaiti Dinar KWD 2021 2022 GDP KWD 41.2bn 55.7bn USD 136bn 184bn per capita USD 28,665 38,123 Growth % 1.3 8.7 Inflation % 3.4 4.3 Def bdgt [a] KWD 2.93bn £2.78bn USD 9.64bn £9.17bn USD1=KWD 0.30 0.30 [a] Indudes National Guard Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- ---2022 Population 3,068,155 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 12.3% 3.3% 4.8% 7.1% 28.8% 1.4% Female 11.3% 3.1% 3.7% 4.3% 17.8% 1.8% Capabilities_ Kuwait's armed forces are postured to provide territorial defence through a strategy of holding out against any superior aggressor until allied forces can be mobilised to assist. Kuwait is a member of the GCC, but its key defence relationship has been with the US since 1991. Washington designated Kuwait a major non-NATO ally in 2004, and a bilateral defence-cooperation agreement provides for a range of joint activities and mentoring, and the stationing and pre-positioning of US personnel and equipment. The US drawdown offerees from CENTCOM in 2021 means that, in future, greater emphasis for Kuwait's defence may be placed upon the country's own capabilities, as well as those of its regional GCC allies. The planned new defence ministry headquarters complex could presage improved command and control capacity. The focus on national defence means that Kuwait has little expeditionary sustainment capacity, although it did make a small air contribution to the Saudi-led coalition at the beginning of the Yemen conflict. Improvements in air and missile defence continue to receive priority, given Kuwait's proximity to Iran, and the Emirate has begun to receive new air combat platforms and is modernising its land forces armour component, although COVID-19 has delayed these plans. There is some organic maintenance capacity, though this is bolstered by contractor support. Kuwait lacks a domestic defence-industrial base and is reliant on imports, albeit with offset requirements to help stimulate the country's wider industrial sector. ACTIVE 17,500 (Army 11,500 Navy 2,000 Air 2,500 Emiri Guard 1,500) Gendarmeries Paramilitary 7,100 Conscript liability 12 months, males 18-35 years RESERVE 23,700 (Joint 23,700) Reserve obligation to age 40; 1 month annual trg ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 11,500_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit 1 cdo bde MANOEUVRE Armoured 3 armd bde Mechanised 2 mech inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 engr bde IMP bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log gp 1 fd hospital Reserve_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised lbde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 293: 218 M1A2/A2K Abrains; 75 M-84AB (75 more in store) IFV 537: 76 BMP-2; 122 BMP-3; 103 BMP-3M; 236 Desert Warriorf (incl variants) APC 260 APC (T) 260: 230 M113A2; 30 M577 (CP) APC (W) (40 TH 390 Faha in store) AUV 300 Sherpa Light Scout ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 19+: 19 M88A1/2; Type-653A; Warrior MW AardvarkMkl NBC VEHICLES 12 Fuchs-2 NBC ARTY 193 SP 155mm 88: 37 M109A3; 51 PLZ-45 MRL 300mm 27 9A52 Smerch MOR 78: 81mm 60; 107mm 6 M30; 120mm til RT-F1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 74: 66 HMMWV TOW; 8 M901 MANPATS 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); TOW-2 RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Starburst; FIM-92 Stinger Navy £2,000 (incl 500 Coast Guard)_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 PCFG 2: 1 Al Sanbouk (GER Lurssen TNC 45m) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun 1 Istiqlal (GER Lurssen TNC 57m) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun Middle East and North Africa 337 PBF 10 Al Nokatha (US Mk V PBF) PBG 8 Um Almaradim (FRA Combattante 1 derivative) with 2 twin lnchr with Sea Skua AShM AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8 LCT 2 Assafar (ADSB 64m) LCM 1 Abhan (ADSB 42m) LCVP 5 ADSB 16m LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 1 Sawah.il with 1 hel landing platform Air Force 2,500_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III; KC-130J Hercules; L-100-30 TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet 1 OCU sqn (forming) with Eurofighter Typhoon 1 unit with EMB-312 Tucano*; Hawk Mk64* ATTACK HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AH-64D Apache 1 atk/trg sqn with SA342 Gazelle with HOT TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS532 Cougar; H225M; SA330 Puma 1 (VIP) sqn with S-92A EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 53 combat capable EGA 39: 6 Eurofighter Typhoon; 26 F/A-18C Hornet; 7 F/A-18D Hornet TKR/TPT 3 KC-130J Hercules TPT 5: Heavy 2 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 3 L-100-30 TRG 14: 6 EMB-312 Tucano*; 8 Hawk Mk64* (10 EMB-312 Tucano* in store) HELICOPTERS ATK 16 AH-64D Apache MRH 13 SA342 Gazelle with HOT TPT 19: Heavy 6+ H225M; Medium 13: 3 AS532 Cougar; 7 SA330 Puma; 3 S-92A (SAR/VIP) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; SARH AIM-7F Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM ASM AGM-65G Maverick; AGM-114K Hellfire; HOT AShM AGM-84D Harpoon Block IC Air Defence Command_ FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM bde (7 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3) 1 SAM bde (6 SAM bty with Skyguard/Aspide) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM 47 Long-range 35 M902 Patriot PAC-3 Short-range 12 Aspide with Skyguard GUNS • TOWED 35mm 12+ Oerlikon GDF Emiri Guard 1,500_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 (Emiri) gd bde Gendarmerie & Paramilitary £7,100 active National Guard £6,600 active_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bn MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd car bn Other 3 security bn COMBAT SUPPORT IMPbn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 20 VBL IF V e150 Pandur (ind variants) APC 67+ APC (W) 27+: 5+ Desert Chameleon; 22 S600 (ind variants) PPV 40 Otokar ISV AUV 120 Sherpa Light Scout ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV Pandur HELICOPTERS TPT • Heavy 3 H225M Coast Guard 500_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32 PBF YIManta PB 20: 3 Al Shaheed; 4 Inttisar (Austal 31.5m); 3 Kassir (Austal 22m); 10 Subahi AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT LCU 4: 2 Al Tahaddy; 1 Sogar; 1 other LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 1 Sawahil FOREIGN FORCES_ Canada Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact) 200 Italy Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 300; 4 Typhoon; 1 MQ-9A Reaper; 1 C-27J Spartan; 1 KC-767A; 1 SAM bty with SAMP/T United Kingdom Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader) 50; 1 CISR UAV sqn with 8 MQ-9A Reaper United States Central Command: 10,000; 1ARNG armd bn; 1 ARNG (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 spt bde; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set; 1 (APS) inf bde eqpt set 338 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Lebanon LBN Lebanese Pound LBP 2021 2022 GDP [a] LBP n.k n.k USD n.k n.k per capita USD n.k n.k Growth % n.k n.k Inflation % n.k n.k Def bdgt [b] LBP n.k n.k USD n.k n.k FMA (US) USD 120m 160m USD1=LBP n.k n.k [a] No IMF economic data available for Lebanon from 2021 [b] No defence budget published since 2020 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- 2022 Population 5,296,814 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 10.0% 3.7% 3.6% 3.8% 25.1% 3.7% Female 9.5% 3.6% 3.5% 3.6% 24.9% 5.0% Capabilities_ The ability of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to fulfil its missions remains under strain from Hizbullah's position in national politics, from the spillover effects of the Syrian conflict, the severe and prolonged economic depression and crisis in governance. The latter was highlighted and indeed exacerbated by the port explosion in Beirut on 4 August 2020. The LAF is reliant on outside assistance to continue its operations. In August 2021, the UN Security Council ordered the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission to provide the LAF with food, fuel and medicine, and a number of governments have provided other assistance. The economic crisis has left the government struggling to pay wages to troops without foreign assistance, while inflation has eroded the value of salaries. This has likely hampered plans, since 2017, for the LAF to gradually boost its presence in the south of the country and has led to fears that troops may have to supplement their wages with other employment. Training and operational assistance have traditionally been provided by the US, as well as by France, Germany, Italy and the UK. Reconstruction has started at the Beirut naval base with German funding. The base was damaged in the 2020 port explosion. LAF operations several years ago against ISIS demonstrated an improved capability, but how much of this remains is unclear. The LAF has no requirement and minimal capability for extraterritorial deployment. It remains dependent on foreign support to replace and modernise its ageing equipment inventory. Barring limited organic maintenance facilities, Lebanon has no significant domestic defence industry. ACTIVE 60,000 (Army 56,600 Navy 1,800 Air 1,600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 56,600_ FORCES BY ROLE 5 regional comd (Beirut, Bekaa Valley, Mount Lebanon, North, South) SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo regt MANOEUVRE Armoured I armd regt Mechanised II mech inf bde Air Manoeuvre 1 AB regt Amphibious 1 mne cdo regt Other 1 Presidential Guard bde 6 intervention regt 4 border sy regt COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty regt 1 cbt spt bde (1 engr regt, 1 AT regt, 1 sigs regt; 1 log bn) IMP gp COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde 1 med gp 1 construction regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MBT 334: 92 M48A1/A5; 10 M60A2; 185 T-54; 47 T-55 RECCE 55 AML IFV 56: 24 AIFV-B-C25; 32 M2A2 Bradley APC 1,378 APC (T) 1,274 M113A1/A2 (ind variants) APC (W) 96: 86 VAB VCT; 10 VBPT-MR Guarani PPV 8 Maxxpro ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 3 M88A1; M113 ARV; T-54/55 ARV (reported) VLB MTU-72 reported MW Bozena ARTILLERY 641 SP 155mm 12 M109A2 TOWED 313:105mm 13 M101A1; 122mm 35: 9 D-30; 26 M-30; 130mm 15 M-46; 155mm 250:18 M114A1; 218 M198; 14 Model-50 MRL 122mm 11 BM-21 MOR 305: 81mm 134; 82mm 112; 120mm 59: 29 Brandt; 30 M120 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 35 VAB with HOT MANPATS Milan; TOW RCL 106mm 113 M40A1 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 8 Mohajer 4 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2U (RS-SA-7B Grail)% GUNS • TOWED 77: 20mm 20; 23mm 57 ZU-23-2 Middle East and North Africa 339 Navy 1,800_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13 PCC 1 Trablous PBF 1 PB 11: 1 Aamchit (ex-GER Bremen); 1 Al Kalamoun (ex-FRA Avel Gwarlarn); 7 Tripoli (ex-UK Attacker/Tracker Mk 2); 1 Naquora (ex-GER Bremen); 1 Tabarja (ex-GER Bergen) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT LCT 2 Sour (ex-FRA EDIC - capacity 8 APC; 96 troops) Air Force 1,600_ 4 air bases FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Cessna AC-208 Combat Caravan* 1 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano* ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with SA342L Gazelle TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 4 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois/Huey II) 1 sqn with SA330/IAR330SM Puma 1 trg sqn with R-44 Raven II EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 9 combat capable ISR 3 Cessna AC-208 Combat Caravan* TRG 9: 3 Bulldog; 6 EMB-314 Super Tucano* HELICOPTERS MRH 14:1AW139; 5 MD530F+; 8 SA342L Gazelle (5 SA342L Gazelle; 5 SA316 Alouette III; 1 SA318 Alouette II all non-operational) TPT 41: Medium 13: 3 S-61N (fire-fighting); 10 SA330/ IAR330 Puma; Light 28:18 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 6 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 4 R-44 Raven II (basic trg) (11 Bell 205; 7 Bell 212 all non-operational) AIR LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; AGR-20A APKWS Gendarmerie & Paramilitary £20,000 active Internal Security Force £20,000_ Ministry of Interior FORCES BY ROLE Other Combat Forces 1 (police) judicial unit 1 regional sy coy 1 (Beirut Gendarmerie) sy coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 60 V-200 Chaimite Customs_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 PB 7: 5 Aztec; 2 Tracker FOREIGN FORCES_ Unless specified, figures refer to UNTSO and represent total numbers for the mission Argentina 3 • UNIFIL 2 Armenia UNIFIL 31 Australia 11 Austria 4 • UNIFIL 171:1 log coy Bangladesh UNIFIL 118:1 FSGM Belarus UNIFIL 5 Belgium 1 Bhutan 5 Brazil UNIFIL 9 Brunei UNIFIL 30 Cambodia UNIFIL 180:1 EOD coy Canada 4 (Operation Jade) Chile 3 China, People's Republic of 5 • UNIFIL 419: 2 engr coy; 1 med coy Colombia UNIFIL 1 Croatia UNIFIL 1 Cyprus UNIFIL 2 Denmark 10 El Salvador UNIFIL 52:1 inf pi Estonia 3 • UNIFIL 1 Fiji 2 • UNIFIL 1 Finland 14 • UNIFIL 161; 1 inf coy France UNIFIL 571:1 mech inf bn(-); VBL; VBCI; VAB; Mistral Germany UNIFIL 82:1 FSGM Ghana UNIFIL 874:1 recce coy; 1 mech inf bn Greece UNIFIL 109:1 FFGHM Guatemala UNIFIL 2 Hungary UNIFIL 16 India 2 • UNIFIL 895:1 inf bn; 1 med coy Indonesia UNIFIL 1,106:1 mech inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 FSGM Ireland 12 • UNIFIL 338:1 mech inf bn(-) Italy MIBIL 160 • UNIFIL 868:1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 hel bn Kazakhstan UNIFIL 9 Kenya UNIFIL 3 Korea, Republic of UNIFIL 254:1 mech inf BG HQ; 1 mech inf coy; 1 inf coy; 1 log coy Latvia 1 Macedonia, North UNIFIL 3 Malaysia UNIFIL 830:1 mech inf bn(-); 1 sigs coy; 1 log coy; 1 maint coy; 1 med coy Malta UNIFIL 9 Moldova UNIFIL 4 Nepal 3 • UNIFIL 872:1 mech inf bn Netherlands 12 • UNIFIL 1 New Zealand 8 Nigeria UNIFIL 2 Norway 13 Peru UNIFIL 1 Poland 4 • UNIFIL 193; 1 mech inf coy Qatar UNIFIL 1 Russia 4 Serbia 1 • UNIFIL 177; 1 mech inf coy Sierra Leone UNIFIL 3 340 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Slovakia 2 Slovenia 3 • UNIFIL 1 Spain UNIFIL 669:1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn(-); 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 log coy Sri Lanka UNIFIL 126:1 inf coy Sweden 7 Switzerland 11 Tanzania UNIFIL 124:1 MP coy Turkey UNIFIL 110:1 FFGHM United States 2 Uruguay UNIFIL 1 Zambia 1 • UNIFIL 2 Libya LBY Libyan Dinar LYD 2021 2022 GDP LYD 176bn 195bn USD 39.0bn 40.8bn per capita USD 5,813 6,026 Growth % 28.3 -18.5 Inflation % 2.8 5.5 Def bdgt LYD n.k. n.k. USD n.k. n.k. USD1=LYD 4.51 4.78 Population 7,137,931 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 17.0% 4.2% 3.7% 3.4% 20.9% 1.9% Female 16.3% 4.0% 3.5% 3.3% 19.5% 2.3% Capabilities_ The formation of a new Government of National Unity, in March 2021, unified the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives. A UN-backed ceasefire, agreed in October 2020, is intended to see the deployment of monitors, while a follow-up resolution agreed in April 2021 called for all foreign forces and mercenaries to withdraw. Libyan elections, originally scheduled for December 2021, have been postponed due to the lack of consensus between the two factions on an electoral constitutional framework. Despite President Mohamed Al-Menfi's efforts to unify government institutions and the military forces of the GNA and the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), controlled by General Khalifa Haftar, the situation on the ground remains unstable. Forces affiliated to both have relatively low levels of training though the presence in these formations of units from the former Gadhafi-era army has over the years bolstered their military capability. The GNA-affiliated forces have since 2016 benefited from several military advisory and training programmes, including EUNAVFOR-MED maritime-security training for the Libyan Navy and Coast Guard. EUNAVFOR Operation Irini continues to monitor the implementation of the UN arms embargo, and in 2022 again seized military materiel bound for Libya. Foreign-military involvement increased in 2020. Both the GNA and the LAAF continue to be supported by foreign military forces, private military contractors and mercenaries. There are also reports of Syrian combatants paid to fight for both sides and of continued activity by Russia's Wagner Group. LAAF troops have combat experience from fighting ISIS in the eastern coastal region and have allegedly received training and combat support from external actors in the region. Equipment is mainly of Russian or Soviet origin, including items from the former Libyan armed forces, and suffers from varying degrees of obsolescence. The country has no domestic defence-industrial capability. Forces loyal to the Government of National Unity (Tripoli-based) ACTIVE n.k. ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Ground Forces n.k._ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-55; T-72 IFV BMP-2 APC APC (T) ACV-AAPC; Steyr 4K-7FA APC (W) Mbombe-6 PPV Al-Wahsh; Kirpi-2; Vuran AUV Lenco Bearcat G3; Nimr Ajban ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV Centurion 105 AVRE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 9P157-2 Khrizantema-S (RS-AT-15 Springer) MANPATS 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn) ARTILLERY SP 155mm Palmaria TOWED 122mm D-30 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence QW-18 (CH-SA-11) GUNS • SP 14.5mm ZPU-2 (on tch); 23mm ZU-23-2 (on tch) Navy n.k._ A number of intact naval vessels remain in Tripoli, although serviceability is questionable EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3+ CORVETTES • FSGM (1 Al Hani (ex-FSU Project 1159 (Koni)) in Malta for refit since 2013 with 2 twin lnchr with P-22 (RS-SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with 4K33 Osfl-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 406mm ASTT, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK230 CIWS, 2 twin 76mm gun) PBFG 1 Sharaba (FRA Combattante II) with 4 single lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 76mm gunt PB 2+ PV30 AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 1 Ibn Harissa (capacity 1 hel; 11 MBT; 240 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 AFD1 ARS 1 Al Munjed (YUG Spasilac)\ Middle East and North Africa 341 Air Force n.k._ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 3+ combat capable FGA 2 MiG-23BN ATK 1 J-21 Jastrebf TRG 9+: 3 G-2 Galeb*; e5 L-39ZO*; 1+ SF-260ML* HELICOPTERS ATK Mi-24 Hind TPT • Medium Mi-17 Hip AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 Atoll)%; R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-24 (RS-AA-7 Apex) Paramilitary n.k._ Coast Guard n.k._ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 PCC 1 Damen Stan 2909 with 1 sextuple 122mm MRL PBF 6:4 Bigliani; 2 Fezzan (ex-ITA Corrubia) PB 3:1 Burdi (Damen Stan 1605); 1 Hamelin; 1 Ikrimah (FRA RPB 20) FOREIGN FORCES_ Italy MIASIT 90 Nepal UNSMIL 235; 2 sy coy Turkey £500; ACV-AAPC; Kirpi; 1 arty unit with T-155 Firtina; 1 AD unit with MIM-23B Hawk; Korkut; GDF-003; 1 CISR UAV unit with Bayraktar TB2 United Kingdom UNSMIL 1 United States UNSMIL 1 TERRITORY WHERE THE RECOGNISED AUTHORITY DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL_ Data here represents the de facto situation. This does not imply international recognition ACTIVE n.k. ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Libyan Arab Armed Forces n.k._ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-55; T-62; T-72 RECCE BRDM-2; EE-9 Cascaoel IFV BMP-1; Ratel-20 APC APC (T) M113 APC (W) Al-Mared; BTR-60PB; Mbombe-6; Nimr Jais; Puma PPV Al-Wahsh; Caiman; Streit Spartan; Streit Typhoon; Vuran; Titan-DS AUV Panthera T6; Panthera F9; Terrier LT-79 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 9P157-2 Khrizantema-S (status unknown) MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); Milan RCL: 106mm M40A1; 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY SP 122mm 2S1 Gvodzika; 155mm G5 TOWED 122mm D-30 MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad MOR M106 AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 2K12 Kvadrát (RS-SA-6 Gainful) Point-defence 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) GUNS • SP 14.5mm ZPU-2 (on tch); 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka; ZU-23-2 (on tch) Navy n.k._ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7+ PB: 7+: 2 Burdi (Damen Stan 1605); 1 Burdi (Damen Stan 1605) with 1 73mm gun; 2 Ikrimah (FRA RPB20); 1 Hamelin; 1+ PV30 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AFD 1 Air Force n.k._ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 49 combat capable FTR 14: 2 MiG-23ML Flogger G; up to 12 MiG-29 Fulcrum (operator uncertain) FGA 13: £10 MiG-21MF Fishbed; 1 Mirage F-1AD; 1 Mirage F-1ED; 1 Su-22UM3 Fitter G ATK up to 4 Su-24M Fencer D (operator uncertain) TRG 19: £10 L-39ZO Albatros*; 1+ MiG-21UM Mongol B; 8 SF-260ML* HELICOPTERS ATK Mi-24/35 Hind TPT • Medium 3: up to 3 H215 (AS332L) Super Puma; Mi-8/Mi-17 Hip AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 AtolT)%; R-27T (RS-AA-10B Alamo); R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer) FOREIGN FORCES Wagner Group 2,000 342 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Mauritania MRT Mauritanian Ouguiya MRU 2021 2022 GDP MRU 360bn 366bn USD 9.89bn 10.1bn per capita USD 2,333 2,328 Growth % 2.4 4.0 Inflation % 3.8 7.1 Def bdgt MRU 7.77bn 8.33bn USD 213m 229m USD1=MRU 36.44 36.30 2023 Population 4,161,925 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 18.3% 5.1% 4.5% 3.9% 14.5% 1.8% Female 18.2% 5.2% 4.7% 4.3% 17.0% 2.4% Capabilities The country's small and modestly equipped armed forces are tasked with maintaining territorial integrity and internal security. In light of the regional threat from extremist Islamist groups, border security is also a key role for the armed forces, which are accustomed to counter-insurgency operations in the desert. In early 2021, the cabinet approved a draft decree establishing a defence area along the northern border to counter incursions by the Polisario Front. This followed the group's closure of a border crossing for several weeks in late 2020. The country is a member of the G5 Sahel group and in late 2021 the armed forces of Mauritania and Senegal signed an agreement to jointly patrol offshore gas fields. Both countries have also conducted joint riverine patrols along their border. Mauritania's armed forces take part in the Flintlock US-led special-operations exercise and also train with France's armed forces. Deployment capabilities are limited, but the armed forces have demonstrated mobility and sustainment in desert regions. A new naval base has been constructed by a Chinese firm in the south, possibly designed to enable improved protection of offshore gas fields. Mauritania has a limited and ageing equipment inventory, but the navy has recently received some new patrol vessels from China. Despite recent acquisitions, including small ISR aircraft, aviation resources are insufficient considering the country's size. Naval equipment is geared toward coastal-surveillance missions and China's donation of a landing ship has helped establish a basic sealift capability.There is no domestic defence industry. ACTIVE 15,850 (Army 15,000 Navy 600 Air 250) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,000 Conscript liability 24 months ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 15,000 FORCES BY ROLE 6 mil regions MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd recce bn Armoured 1 armd bn Light 7 mot inf bn 8 (garrison) inf bn Air Manoeuvre 1 cdo/para bn Other 2 (camel corps) bn 1 gd bn COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty bn 4 ADA bty 1 engr coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 35 T-54/T-55 RECCE 70: 20 AML-60; 40 AML-90; 10 Saladin APC • APC (W) 32: 5 FV603 Saracen; 7 Bastion APC; e20 Panhard M3 AUV 12 Cobra ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV T-54/55 ARV reported ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan RCL • 106mm £90 M40A1 ARTILLERY 180 TOWED 80:105mm 36 HM-2/M101A1; 122mm 44: 20 D-30; 24 D-74 MRL 10:107mm 4 Type-63; 122mm 6 Type-81 MOR 90: 81mm 60; 120mm 30 Brandt AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence £4 9K31 Strela-l (RS-SA-9 Gaskin) (reported); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)% GUNS • TOWED 82:14.5mm 28:16 ZPU-2; 12 ZPU-4; 23mm 20 ZU-23-2; 37mm 10 M-1939; 57mm 12 S-60; 100mm 12 KS-19 Navy £600_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17 PCO 1 Voum-Legleita PCC 7:1 Abourbekr Ben Amer (FRA OPV 54); 1 Arguin; 2 Conejera; 1 Limam El Hidrami (PRC); 2 Timbedra (PRC Huangpu mod) PB 9:1 El Nasrt (FRA Patra); AMandovi; 2 Saeta-12; 2 Megsem Bakkar (FRA RPB20 - for SAR duties) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS 1 LSM 1 Nimlane (PRC) Fusiliers Marins_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne unit Middle East and North Africa 343 Air Force 250 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable ISR 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan TPT 14: Light 13:1 Beech 350 King Air, 2 BN-2 Defender, 1 C-212; 2 CN235; 3 Gl; 2 PA-31T Cheyenne II; 2 Y-12(II); PAX 1 BT-67 (with sensor turret) TRG 9: 3 EMB-312 Tmcaho; 2 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 4 SF-260E HELICOPTERS MRH 3:1 SA313B Alouette II; 2 Z-9 TPT • Light 2 AW109 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary £5,000 active Gendarmerie e3,000_ Ministry of Interior FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 6 regional sy coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2 Rodman 55M National Guard 2,000 Ministry of Interior Customs EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2: 1 Dah OuldBah (FRA Amgram 14); 1 Yaboub OuldRajel (FRA RPB18) DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN bn(-) MALI: UN • MINUSMA 7 SOMALIA: UN • UNSOS 1 MINUSCA 464; 1 inf Morocco MOR Moroccan Dirham MAD 2021 2022 2023 GDP MAD 1.28tr 1.37tr USD 143bn 143bn per capita USD 3,934 3,896 Growth % 7.9 0.8 Inflation % 1.4 6.2 Def bdgt [a] MAD 58.6bn 61.7bn 63.5bn USD 6.52bn 6.41 bn FMA (US) USD 10m 10m 10m USD1=MAD 8.99 9.62 [a] Includes autonomous defence spending (SEGMA) and Treasury funding for "Acquisitions and Repair of Equipment for Royal Armed Forces" Population 36,738,229 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 13.4% 4.3% 3.9% 3.8% 20.8% 3.8% Female 12.9% 4.2% 3.9% 3.8% 21.3% 4.0% Capabilities Regional security challenges are a key concern for Morocco's armed forces. A 30-year ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario Front ended in late 2020 and the UN has reported that hostilities have resumed, albeit at a low-level. Morocco maintains defence ties with France and the US, receiving military training and equipment from both. However, although the US Trump administration recognised Moroccan claims to Western Sahara, the Biden administration has come under pressure in Congress to reverse the policy and to find an alternative location for the African Lion exercises, which in 2022 saw exercise activity in Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. There is also close cooperation with NATO, and in 2016 Morocco was granted access to the Alliance's Interoperability Platform in order to strengthen the defence and security sectors and bring the armed forces up to NATO standards. Defence ties have developed with Israel, and Morocco is reportedly procuring an Israeli-developed air defence system. In 2017, Morocco rejoined the African Union. The armed forces have gained experience from UN peacekeeping deployments and from multinational exercises. Conscription was reintroduced in early 2019. The armed forces have some capacity to deploy independently within the region and on UN peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa, although they lack heavy sealift and airlift capabilities. Morocco has also deployed overseas in a combat role, contributing F-16 aircraft to the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen from 2015 to early 2019. The inventory primarily comprises ageing French and US equipment, though there are plans to re-equip all the services and to invest significantly in the navy. Morocco operates two Earth-observation satellites, meeting some surveillance requirements. Morocco relies on imports and donations for major defence equipment. However, its relative stability has attracted Western defence companies, such as Airbus, Safran and Thales, to establish aerospace manufacturing and servicing facilities in the country. 344 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 ACTIVE 195,800 (Army 175,000 Navy 7,800 Air 13,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 50,000 Conscript liability 12 months for men aged 19-25 RESERVE 150,000 (Army 150,000) Reserve obligation to age 50 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • ISR 2 Mohammed VI Army 175,000_ FORCES BY ROLE 2 comd (Northern Zone, Southern Zone) MANOEUVRE Armoured I armd bde II armd bn Mechanised 3 mech inf bde Mechanised/Light 8 mech/mot inf regt (2-3 bn) Light 1 It sy bde 3 (camel corps) mot inf bn 35 It infbn 4 cdo unit Air Manoeuvre 2 para bde 2ABbn Mountain 1 mtn inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 11 arty bn 7 engr bn AIR DEFENCE 2 AD gp Royal Guard 1,500_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 gdbn 2 cav sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 656: 222 MlA1SA Abrams; 220 M60A1 Patton; 120 M60A3 Patton; 40 T-72B; 54 Type-90-II (MBT-2000); (e200 M48A5 Patton & e60 T-72B in store) LT TK 116: 5 AMX-13; 111 SK-105 Kuerassier ASLT 80 AMX-10RC RECCE 284:38 AML-60-7; 190 AML-90; 40 EBR-75; 16 Eland IFV 238:10 AMX-10P; 30 Ratel Mk3-20; 30 Ratel Mk3-90; 45 VAB VCI; 123 YPR-765 APC 1,225 APC (T) 905: 400 M113A1/A2; 419 M113A3; 86 M577A2 (CP) APC (W) 320 VAB VTT AUV 36 Sherpa Light Scout ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 85+: 10 Greif; 55 M88A1; M578; 20 VAB-ECH ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 80 M901 MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); HJ-8L; M47 Dragon; Milan; TOW RCL 106mm 350 M40A1 GUNS • SP 36: 90mm 28 M56; 100mm 8 SU-100 ARTILLERY 2,321 SP 359:105mm 5 AMX Mk 61; 155mm 294: £4 CAESAR; £130 M109A1/A1B/A2/A3/A4; 70 M109A5; 90 Mk F3; 203mm 60 MHO TOWED 118:105mm 50: 30 L118 Light Gun; 20 M101; 130mm 18 M-46; 155mm 50: 30 FH-70; 20 M114 MRL 47:122mm 35 BM-21 Grad; 300mm 12+ PHL-03 MOR 1,797: 81mm 1,100 Expal model LN; SP 107mm 36 M106A2; 120mm 550 Brandt; SP 120mm 110: 20 (VAB APC); 91 M1064A3 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium R4E-50 Skyeye AIR DEFENCE SAM 55+ Medium-range 18 Tianlong-50 Short-range 6+: DK-9 (CH-SA-5); e6 VL-MICA (reported) Point-defence 37+: 37 M48 Chaparral; 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse) SPAAGM 30mm 12 2K22M Tunguska-U (RS-SA-19 Grison) GUNS 390 SP 20mm 60 M163 Vulcan TOWED 330:14.5mm 200:150-180 ZPU-2; 20 ZPU-4; 20mm 40 M167 Vulcan; 23mm 75-90 ZU-23-2; 35mm some PG-99 Navy 7,800 (incl 1,500 Marines)_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 4 FFGHM 2: 1 Mohammed VI (FRA FREMM) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1AS565SA Panther) 1 Tarik ben Ziyad (NLD SIGMA 10513) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 112-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther) FFGH 2 Mohammed V (FRA Floreal) with 2 single lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun (fitted for but not with Simbad SAM) (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 52 CORVETTES 3 Middle East and North Africa 345 FSGHM 2 Sultan Moulay Ismail (NLD SIGMA 9813) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2/3 AShM, 112-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1AS565SA Panther) FSM1 Lt Col Errhamani (ESP Descubierto) with 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun PSO 1 Bin an Zaran (OPV 70) with 1 76mm gun PCG 4 Cdt fi KfiatfaW (ESP Lazaga 58m) with 4 single lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun PCO 5 Rais Bargach (under control of fisheries dept) PCC 12: 4 El Hahiq (DNK Osprey 55, incl 2 with customs) 6 LVRabhi (ESP 58m B-200D) 2 Ofcfca (FRA PR-72) each with 1 76mm gun PB 27: 6 fi Wacö (FRA P-32); 10 VCSM (RPB 20); 10 Rodman 101; 1 other (UK Bird) AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 3 Ben Aicha (FRA Champlain BATRAL) with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 7 tanks; 140 troops) LANDING CRAFT 2: LCT 1 Sidi Ifni LCM 1 CTM (FRA CTM-5) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9 AG 1 Damen 3011 AGHS 1 DoM/ Beida (FRA BH02M) AGOR 1 Abou BarakatAlbarbarit (ex-US Robert D. Conrad) AGS 1 Damen Stan Tender 1504 AK2 AX 1 Essaouira AXS2 Marines 1,500_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 naval inf bn Naval Aviation_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • MP 2 Beech 350ER King Air HELICOPTERS • ASW/ASUW 3 AS565SA Panther Air Force 13,000_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-5E/F-5F Tiger II 3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with Mirage F-1C (F-1CH) 1 sqn with Mirage F-1E (F-1EH) ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with EC-130H Hercules; Falcon 20 (ELINT) MARITIME PATROL 1 fit with Do-28 TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130/KC-130H Hercules TRANSPORT 1 sqn with CN235 1 VIP sqn with B-737BBJ; Beech 200/300 King Air; Falcon 50; Gulfstream II/III/V-SP/G550 TRAINING 1 sqn with Alpha Jet* 1 sqn T-6C ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with SA342L Gazelle (some with HOT) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 205A (AB-205A); Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB- 206); Bell 212 (AB-212) 1 sqn with CH-47D Chinook 1 sqn with SA330 Puma EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 90 combat capable FTR 22:19 F-5E Tiger II; 3 F-5F Tiger II FGA 49:15 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 8 F-16D Fighting Falcon; 15 Mirage F-1C (F-1CH); 11 Mirage F-1E (F-1EH) ELINT 1 EC-130H Hercules TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H Hercules TPT 47: Medium 17:4 C-27J Spartan; 13 C-130H Hercules; Light 19:4 Beech 100 King Air; 2 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Beech 200C King Air; 2 Beech 300 King Air; 3 Beech 350 King Air; 5 CN235; 2 Do-28; PAX 11: 1 B-737BBJ; 2 Falcon 20; 2 Fa/eon 20 (ELINT); 1 Fa/eon 50 (VIP); 1 Gulfstream II (VIP); 1 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream V-SP; 2 Gulfstream G550 TRG 80:12 AS-202 Bravo; 19 A/p/ia Jet*; 2 CAP-10; 24 T-6C Texan; 9 T-34C Türk) Mentor; 14 T-37B Tweet HELICOPTERS MRH 19 SA342L Gazelle (7 with HOT, 12 with cannon) TPT 76: Heavy 10 CH-47D Chinook; Medium 24 SA330 Puma; Light 42: 24 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 11 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206); 3 Bell 212 (AB-212); 4 Bell 429 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR Heavy Wing Loong (reported) Medium Bayraktar TB2 (reported) ISR • Heavy Heron AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9J Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; Mica IR; HR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM; Mica RF ASM AASM; AGM-65 Maverick; HOT ARM AGM-88B HARM BOMBS Laser-guided Paveway II Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-54 Laser JDAM INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 50,000 active Gendarmerie Royale 20,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 1 para sqn Other 1 paramilitary bde 4 (mobile) paramilitary gp 1 coast guard unit 346 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 15 Arcor 53 AIRCRAFT • TRG 2 R-235 Guerrier HELICOPTERS MRH 14: 3 SA315B Lama; 2 SA316 Alouette III; 3 SA318 Alouette II; 6 SA342K Gazelle TPT 8: Medium 6 SA330 Puma; Light 2 SA360 Dauphin Force Auxiliaire 30,000 (incl 5,000 Mobile Intervention Corps)_ Customs/Coast Guard_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS PB 36: 4 Erraid; 18 Arcor 46; 14 (other SAR craft) DEPLOYMENT_ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 777; 1 inf bn DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 926; 1 inf bn; 1 f d hospital SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA3 Oman OMN Omani Rial OMR 2021 2022 GDP OMR 33.0bn 41.9bn USD 85.9bn 109bn per capita USD 18,966 23,542 Growth % 3.0 4.4 Inflation % 1.5 3.1 Def bdgt [a] OMR 2.47bn 2.47bn USD 6.43bn 6.43bn USD1=OMR 0.38 0.38 [a] Excludes security funding Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- ---2022 Population 3,764,348 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 15.3% 4.0% 4.7% 5.6% 22.4% 1.8% Female 14.6% 3.8% 4.1% 4.4% 17.2% 2.1% Capabilities_ The principal task for Oman's armed forces is ensuring territorial integrity, with a particular focus on maritime security, given the country's long coastline. Oman maintains important but carefully calibrated relations with the US while it continues to develop its defence agreements with the UK, a country with which Muscat has a close and long-standing defence and security relationship. Oman does not host a significant permanent presence of US or other foreign forces, in contrast to other GCC states, but UK forces are frequently deployed to the country for training and Oman has been developing its naval exercises with these and other partner countries. In addition, both the US and the UK make use of Omani air- and naval-logistics facilities, most notably the port at Duqm, where the UK has a Joint Logistics Support Base. Oman has also been seeking to strengthen ties with Asian states; there was another joint exercise with India and also a meeting with senior Chinese defence officials. Whilst Oman is a member of the GCC, it has not participated in the Saudi-led coalition's operations in Yemen and has largely followed a semi-independent regional policy. Although Muscat has recently maintained the highest level of defence spending as a percentage of GDP in the GCC, the defence budget was reduced in 2021. Nonetheless, Oman has recently recapitalised its core air- and naval-systems inventory, including combat aircraft and patrol and high-speed support vessels, and is now looking to do the same in the land domain. Oman has very limited indigenous defence-industrial capacity, but it has begun local production of various types of ammunition and is looking to boost organic support capability, particularly in the air and land sectors. ACTIVE 42,600 (Army 25,000 Navy 4,200 Air 5,000 Foreign Forces 2,000 Royal Household 6,400) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,400 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 25,000_ FORCES BY ROLE (Regt are bn size) MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bde (2 armd regt, 1 recce regt) Light 1 inf bde (5 inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 f d engr regt, 1 engr regt, 1 sigs regt) 1 inf bde (3 inf regt, 2 arty regt) 1 indep inf coy (Musandam Security Force) Air Manoeuvre 1 AB regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 tpt regt AIR DEFENCE 1 ADA regt (2 ADA bty) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT117:38 Challenger 2; 6 M60A1 Potion; 73 M60A3 Potion LT TK 37 FV101 Scorpion RECCE 12 Pars III 6x6 (Recce) IFV 72 Pars III 8x8 IFV APC 262 APC (T) 10 FV4333 Stormer APC (W) 252:15 AT-105 Saxon; 15 Pars III 6x6 (incl 10 CP; 1 trg); 47 Pars III 8x8 (38 CP; 8 amb; 1 trg); 175 Piranha (incl variants); AUV 143: 6 FV103 Spartan; 13 FV105 Sultan (CP); 124 VBL ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 6 Pars III AEV Middle East and North Africa 347 ARV 19:4 Challenger ARV; 2 M88A1; 8 Pars III ARV; 2 Piranha ARV; 3 Samson ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 8 VBL with TOW MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; BGM-71 TOW/ TOW-2A ARTILLERY 245 SP 155mm 24 G-6 TOWED 108:105mm 42 L118 Light Gun; 122mm 30 D-30; 130mm 24:12 M-46; 12 Type-59-I; 155mm 12 FH-70 MOR 113: 81mm 69; SP 81mm VAMTAC with A3MS; 107mm 20 M30; 120mm 12 Brandt; SP 120mm 12 Pars III AMV AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Mistral 2; Javelin; 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)X GUNS 26: 23mm 4 ZU-23-2; 35mm 10 GDF-005 (with Skyguard); 40mm 12 L/60 (Towed) Navy 4,200_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 3 FFGHM 3 Al-Shamikh with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 6-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 1 76mm gun PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11 CORVETTES • FSGM 2: 2 Qahir Al Amwaj with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCFG 1 Dhofar with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun PCO 4 Al Ofouq with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCC 3 Al Bushra (FRA P-400) with 1 76mm gun PBF 11400 FIC AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 1 Nasr el Bahri with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 7 tanks; 240 troops) (in refit since 2017) LANDING CRAFT 5:1 LCU; 1 LCT; 3 LCM LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 AGS 1 Al Makhirah AK 1 Al Sultana AP 2 Shinas (commercial tpt - auxiliary military role only) (capacity 56 veh; 200 tps) AX 1 Al-Mabrukah AXS 1 Shabab Oman II EPF 2 Al Mubshir (High Speed Support Vessel 72) with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 260 troops) Air Force 5,000_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-16C/D Block 50 Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with Hawk Mkl03; Hawk Mk203; Hawk Mkl66 1 sqn with Typhoon MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with C295MPA TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130H/J/J-30 Hercules 1 sqn with C295M TRAINING 1 sqn with MFI-17B Mushshak; PC-9*; Bell 206 (AB-206) Jet Ranger TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 4 (med) sqn; Bell 212 (AB-212); NH-90; Super Lynx Mk300 (maritime/SAR) AIR DEFENCE 2 sqn with NASAMS EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 63 combat capable EGA 35:17 F-16C Block 50 Fighting Falcon; 6 F-16D Block 50 Fighting Falcon; 12 Typhoon MP 4 C295MPA TPT 12: Medium 6: 3 C-130H Hercules; 2 C-130J Hercules; 1 C-130J-30 Hercules (VIP); Light 4 C295M; PAX 2 A320-300 TRG 43:4 Hawk Mkl03*; 7 Hawk Mkl66; 12 Hawk Mk203*; 8 MFI-17B Mushshak; 12 PC-9* HELICOPTERS MRH 15 Super Lynx Mk300 (maritime/SAR) TPT 26+ Medium 20 NH90 TTH; Light 6: 3 Bell 206 (AB-206) Jet Ranger; 3 Bell 212 (AB-212) AIR DEFENCE • SAM Short-range NASAMS MSL AAM • IR AIM-9/M/P Sidewinder; HR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick AShM AGM-84D Harpoon BOMBS Laser-guided EGBU-10 Paveway II; EGBU-12 Paveway II INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM Royal Household 6,400_ (ind HQ staff) FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF regt Royal Guard Brigade 5,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 gd bde (1 armd sqn, 2 gd regt, 1 cbt spt bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ASLT 9 Centauro MGS (9 VBC-90 in store) IFV 14 VAB VCI APC • APC (W) £50 Type-92 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 6 Type-90A AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Javelin GUNS • SP 9: 20mm 9 VAB VDAA 348 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Royal Yacht Squadron 150_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 AP1 FulkAl Salomon (also veh tpt) with up to 2 AS332 Super Puma hel Royal Flight 250_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • PAX 7:1 747-400; 1 747-8; 1 B-747SP; 1A319; 1 A320; 2 Gulfstream IV HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 6 EC225LP Super Puma Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,400 active Tribal Home Guard 4,000_ org in teams of e100 Police Coast Guard 400_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32 PCO 2 Haras PBF 3 Haras (US Mk V PBF) PB 27: 3 Rodman 101; 1 Haras (SWE CG27); 3 Haras (SWE CG29); 14 Rodman 58; 1 D59116; 5 Zahra Police Air Wing_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4:1BN-2T Turbine Islander, 2 CN235M; 1 Do-228 HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 5: 2 Bell 205A; 3 Bell 214ST (AB-214ST) FOREIGN FORCES United Kingdom 90 Palestinian Territories PT New Israeli Shekel ILS 2021 2022 2023 GDP USD per capita USD Growth % Inflation % USD1=ILS Population 4,997,349 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 19.0% 5.7% 5.0% 4.4% 14.9% 1.7% Female 18.0% 5.5% 4.9% 4.4% 14.9% 1.8% Capabilities The Palestinian Territories remain effectively divided between the Palestinian Authority-run West Bank and Hamas-run Gaza. Each organisation controls its own security forces, principally the National Security Forces (NSF) in the West Bank and the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza. Both have generally proved effective at maintaining internal security in their respective territories. The Palestinian Authority has received support from the EU, Jordan and the US. Israel claims that a small number of Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades personnel have received military training in Iran and Syria. None of the Palestinian security organisations conduct external military deployments, and they lack a formal military-logistics structure. Both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority lack heavy military equipment, although the former has retained a substantial arsenal of improvised rocket and mortar capabilities, as well as some portable guided weapons. During renewed conflict in mid-2021, Hamas demonstrated a loitering-munition capability as well as new missiles with a claimed range of 250 km. No formal defence industry exists, although Hamas can acquire light or improvised weapons, either smuggled into Gaza or of local construction or assembly. ACTIVE 0 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary n.k. Precise personnel-strength figures for the various Palestinian groups are not known ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE_ There is little available data on the status of the organisations mentioned below. Following internal fighting in June 2007, Gaza has been under the de facto control of Hamas, while the West Bank is controlled by the Palestinian Authority. In October 2017, both sides agreed a preliminary reconciliation deal on control of Gaza. Gendarmerie & Paramilitary_ Palestinian Authority n.k._ Presidential Security £3,000 Special Forces el,200 Police £9,000 National Security Force £10,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 9 paramilitary bn Preventative Security £4,000 Civil Defence £ 1,000 The al-Aqsa Brigades n.k. Profess loyalty to the Fatah group that dominates the Palestinian Authority Hamas n.k._ Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades el 5,000-20,000 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 6 bde HQ (regional) MANOEUVRE Other 1 cdo unit (Nukhba) 27 paramilitary bn 100 paramilitary coy COMBAT SUPPORT Some engr units COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Some log units Middle East and North Africa 349 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) (reported); Dehlavieh (Kornet) (reported) ARTILLERY MRL • Qassam rockets (multiple calibres); 122mm some; 240mm some Fadjr 3 (reported); 330mm some Fadjr 5 (reported) MOR some (multiple calibres) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional some Ayyash-250 Martime Police £600 Qatar QTR Qatari Riyal QAR 2021 2022 GDP QAR 654bn 806bn USD 180bn 221bn per capita USD 68,622 82,887 Growth % 1.6 3.4 Inflation % 2.3 4.5 Def bdgt [a] QAR £22.8bn £30.6bn USD £6.26bn £8.42bn USD1=QAR 3.64 3.64 [a] Defence budget estimate derived from Defence and Security allocation in the 'Public Budget Statement' Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015-- ---2022 Population 2,508,182 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 6.6% 2.3% 5.7% 10.0% 51.5% 0.9% Female 6.5% 1.7% 1.8% 2.6% 10.0% 0.5% Capabilities_ Qatar is attempting to transform its military capabilities and regional defence standing based on significant equipment acquisitions, including platforms with power-projection capability. The scale of the equipment plan is increasing personnel requirements and suggests that Qatar will need significant assistance to integrate and operate its new capabilities. Combat-aircraft procurements are dramatically increasing the size of the air force, where Qatar faces most questions about its ability to develop and sustain the necessary personnel, infrastructure and maintenance capacity. The diplomatic crisis with several of its GCC neighbours brought Qatar and Turkey closer together in their limited but significant defence cooperation, which includes a small Turkish military presence in-country. The crisis appears not to have affected the significant Qatar-US military relationship, including the presence of forces from the US and other Western states at Al-Udeid airbase and the key US-run coalition air-operations centre. Qatar has begun deploying its own Patriot air- and missile-defence systems and an AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar. The Italian Navy is supporting training for new Italian-built vessels among other naval enhancements. A joint Qatar-UK Eurofighter Typhoon squadron, which is helping to build Qatari capabilities on the aircraft, deployed to Qatar in October 2022 to support Doha's staging of the FIFA World Cup. Qatar currently has a limited indigenous defence-industrial capability, including in ship repair. ACTIVE 16,500 (Army 12,000 Navy 2,500 Air 2,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary up to 5,000 Conscript liability 12 months, males 18-35 years. Voluntary national service for women ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 Es'haü-2 Army 12,000 (including Emiri Guard)_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF coy MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bde (1 tk bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 mor sqn, 1 AT bn) Mechanised 3 mech inf bn 1 (Emiri Guard) bde (3 mech regt) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 SP arty bn 1 fd arty bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 62 Leopard 2A7+ ASLT 48:12 AMX-10RC; 36 Piranha II 90mm RECCE 32 Fennek IFV 40 AMX-10P APC 418 APC (T) 30 AMX-VCI APC (W) 168: 8 V-150 Chaimite; 160 VAB PPV 220+: 170+ Ejder Yalcin; 50 Kirpi-2; RG-31 AUV 30+: 14 Dingo 2; NMS; 16 VBL ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 6 Wisent 2 ARV 3:1 AMX-30D; 2 Piranha ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 24 VAB VCAC HOT; Ejder Yalcin with Stugna-P; NMS with Stugna-P MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; Kornet-EM RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 89+ SP 155mm 24 PzH 2000 TOWED 155mm 12 G-5 MRL 8+: 107mm PH-63; 122mm 2+ (30-tube); 127mm 6 ASTROS II Mk3 MOR 45: 81mm 26 L16; SP 81mm 4 VAB VPM 81; 120mm 15 Brandt 350 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 8+ BP-12A (CH-SS-14 mod 2) AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence NMS with Igla GUNS • SP 35mm 15 Gepard Navy 2,500 (incl Coast Guard)_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1 FFGHM 1 Al Zubarah with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 30 SAM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13 CORVETTES • FSGM 2 Musherib with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 8-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 1 76mm gun PCFGM 4 Barzan (UK Vita) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCFG 3 Damsah (FRA Combattante III) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun PBF 3 MRTP 16 PB 1 MRTP 34 AMPHIBIOUS 4 LCT 1 Fuwairit (TUR Anadolu Shipyard LCT) LCM 2 Broog (TUR Anadolu Shipyard LCM) LCVP 1 Anadolu 16m LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 2 Al Doha with 1 hel landing platform Coast Guard_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 PBF 4 DV15 PB 8:4 Crestitalia MV-45; 3 Halmatic M160; 1 other Coastal Defence_ FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 1 bty with 3 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 12 MM40 Exocet AShM Air Force 2,000_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon 1 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon (personnel only) (joint QTR-UK unit) 1 sqn with F-15QA 1 sqn with Rafale DQ/EQ ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with NH90 NFH (forming) TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III; C-130T-30 Hercules 1 sqn with A340; B-707; B-727; Falcon 900 TRAINING 1 sqn with Hawk Mkl67 1 sqn with M-346 1 sqn with PC-21; Super Mushshak ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with SA341 Gazelle; SA342L Gazelle with HOT TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AW139 1 sqn with NH90 TTH (forming) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 62 combat capable EGA 62:4 Eurofighter Typhoon; 22 F-15QA; 9 Rafale DQ; 27 Rafale EQ; (9 Mirage 2000ED; 3 Mirage 2000D in store) TPT 18: Heavy 8 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 4 C-130T-30 Hercules; PAX 6:1 A340; 2 B-707; 1 B-727; 2 FflZcon 900 TRG 37: 5 Hawk Mkl67; 3 M-346; 21 PC-21; 8 Super Mushshak; (6 Alpha Jet in store) HELICOPTERS ATK 24 AH-64E Apacfe ASW 3 NH90 NFH MRH 34: 21 AW139 (incl 3 for medevac); 2 SA341 Gazelle; 11 SA342L Gazelle TPT 3: Medium 2 NH90 TTH; Light 1 H125 Ecureuil (trg config) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Medium 6 Bayraktar TB2 AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range 34 M903 Patriot PAC-3 MSE Medium-range NASAMS III Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; FN-6 (CH-SA-10); Mistral RADAR 1AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-550 Magic 2; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ASMRAAM; ARH AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM; Meteor; Mica RF ASM Apache; AGM-114R Hellfire; AGR-20A APKWS; HOT AShM AM39 Exocet Gendarmerie & Paramilitary up to 5,000 Internal Security Force up to 5,000_ DEPLOYMENT LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1 FOREIGN FORCES_ Turkey 300 (trg team); 1 mech coy; 1 arty unit United Kingdom 200; 1 FGA sqn with 12 Typhoon FGR4 United States US Central Command: 10,000; CAOC; 1 ISR sqn with 4 RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1ISR sqn with 4 E-8C ISTARS; 2 tkr sqn with 12 KC-135R/T Stratotanker; 1 tpt sqn with 4 C-17A Globemaster; 4 C-130H/T-30 Hercules; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE • US Strategic Command: 1AN/TPY-2 X-band radar Middle East and North Africa 351 Saudi Arabia SAU ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Saudi Riyal SAR 2021 2022 GDP SAR 3.13tr 3.79tr USD 834bn 1.01tr per capita USD 23,507 27,941 Growth % 3.2 7.6 Inflation % 3.1 2.7 Def bdgt [a] SAR 190bn 171bn USD 50.7bn 45.6bn USD1=SAR 3.75 3.75 2023 Army 75,000 [a] Military budget only - excludes security budget Population 35,354,380 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 12.2% 4.0% 3.9% 4.3% 30.0% 2.1% Female 11.8% 3.8% 3.6% 3.6% 18.8% 1.9% Capabilities Saudi Arabia is the leading member of the GCC, with the largest and best equipped armed forces in the group. In addition to traditional objectives relating to territorial integrity and internal security, the Kingdom has displayed an increasing willingness to use the armed forces as part of a more assertive regional foreign policy, most notably in Yemen. Whilst operations in Yemen have allowed the armed forces to gain combat experience, they have also exposed areas of comparative weakness and capability gaps, especially in the application of precision airpower, air-ground coordination and logistics support. Meanwhile, cruise-missile and UAV attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure have exposed capability weaknesses with the Kingdom's air- and missile-defence capabilities. Saudi Arabia's most critical defence relationship continues to be with the US, although recent frictions including over the Ukraine war, related particularly to oil production, led to a review of that relationship in Washington. Issues including aspects of Saudi Arabia's military campaign in Yemen have also sharpened focus in the US over defence sales to the country more generally. Riyadh has over the years sought to mitigate any dependence on Washington by also maintaining security relationships with other states such as France and the UK, while relationships with China -including equipment sales - as well as India and others have been strengthened. Equipment recapitalisation continues, with orders for combat aircraft, corvettes and multi-mission surface combatants, despite concerns about austerity. There is currently only a modest domestic defence-industrial base, mainly in the assembly and overhaul of land systems. However, Riyadh continues to reaffirm and pursue an intention to spend 50% of its defence outlays locally as part of its Vision 2030 initiative and established the state-owned Saudi Arabian Military Industries to oversee local defence production. ACTIVE 257,000 (Army 75,000 Navy 13,500 Air 20,000 Air Defence 16,000 Strategic Missile Forces 2,500 National Guard 130,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 24,500 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 4 armd bde (1 recce coy, 3 tk bn, 1 mech bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 AT bn, 1 engr coy, 1 log bn, 1 maint coy, 1 med coy) Mechanised 5 mech bde (1 recce coy, 1 tk bn, 3 mech bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 AT bn, 1 engr coy, 1 log bn, 1 maint coy, 1 med coy) Light 2 It inf bde Other 1 (Al-Saif Al-Ajrab) gdbde 1 (Royal Guard) gd regt (3 It inf bn) Air Manoeuvre 1AB bde (2 AB bn, 3 SF coy) Aviation 1 comd (3 hel gp) COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MBT 1,010:140 AMX-30; £500 MlA2/A2S Abrams; £370 M60A3 Pattern RECCE 300 AML-60/AML-90 IFV 860: 380 AMX-10P; 380 M2A2 Bradley; 100 VAB Mk3 APC 1,340 APC (T) 1,190 M113A4 (incl variants) APC (W) 150 Panhard M3; (£40 AF-40-8-1 Al-Fahd in store) AUV 1,200+: 100 Didgori (amb); 1,000+ M-ATV; Al-Shibl 2; 100 Sherpa Light Scout; Terradyne Gurkha ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 15 M728 ARV 275+: 8 ACV ARV; AMX-10EHC; 55 AMX-30D; Leclerc ARV; 122 M88A1; 90 M578 VLB 10 AMX-30 MW Aardvark Mk2 NBC VEHICLES 10 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 290+: 90+ AMX-10P (HOT); 200 VCC-1ITOW; M-ATV with Milan MANPATS Hyeongung; Luch Corsar (reported); Luch Skif (reported); Stugna-P (reported); TOW-2A RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY 833 SP 155mm 224:60 AU-F-1; 110 M109A1B/A2; 54 PLZ-45 TOWED 172:105mm 62 LG1; (100 M101/M102 in store); 155mm 110: 50 M114; 60 M198; 203mm (8 M115 in store) MRL 70:127mm 60 ASTROS II Mk3; 220mm 10 TOS-1A MOR 367: SP 81mm 70; 107mm 150 M30; 120mm 147: 110 Brandt; 37 M12-1535; SP 120mm M113A4 with 2R2M HELICOPTERS ATK 35:11 AH-64D Apache; 24 AH-64E Apache 352 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 MRH 21: 6 AS365N Dauphin 2 (medevac); 15 Bell 406CS Combat Scout TPT 90: Heavy 4+ CH-47F Chinook; Medium 67: 22 UH-60A Black Hawk (4 medevac); 36 UH-60L Black Hawk; 9 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 19 Schweizer 333 AIR DEFENCE • SAM Short-range Crotale Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger Navy 13,500_ Navy HQ at Riyadh; Eastern Fleet HQ at Jubail; Western Fleet HQ atjeddah EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 8 FFGHM 8: 2 Al-Jubaä (ESP Avante 2200) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 2 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) 3 Al Riyadh (FRA La Fayette mod) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS wim Aster 15 SAM, 4 single 533mm TT with F17P HWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1AS365N Dauphin 2 hel) 3 Madina (FRA F-2000) (1 more damaged in 2017 and non-operational) with 2 quad lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 4 single 533mm TT with F17P HWT, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1AS365N Dauphin 2 hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 53 CORVETTES • FSG 4 Badr (US Tacoma) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CMS, 176mm gun PCFG 9 Al Siddiq (US 58m) with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block IB AShM, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CMS, 1 76mm gun PBF 21 HSI32 PB 19:17 (US) Halter Marine 24m; 2 Plascoa 2200 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3 MHC 3 Al Jawf (UK Sandown) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 5 LCU £2 Al Qiaq (US LCU 1610) (capacity 120 troops) LCM 3 LCM 6 (capacity 80 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1 AORH 1 Boraida (mod FRA Durance) (1 more non-operational and in dry dock since 2017) (capacity either 2 AS365F Dauphin 2 hel or 1 AS332C Super Puma) Naval Aviation_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS MRH 34: 6 AS365N Dauphin 2; 15 AS565; 13 Bell 406CS Combat Scout TPT • Medium 12 AS332B/F Super Puma AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AShM AM39 Exocet; AS-15TT Marines 3,000_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops regt with (2 spec ops bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE Bastion Patsas APC • APC (W) 135 BMR-600P Air Force 20,000_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 4 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with F-15S/SA Eagle 3 sqn with Typhoon GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with Tornado IDS; Tornado GR1A AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with E-3A Sentry 1 sqn with Saab 2000 Erieye ELINT 1 sqn with RE-3A/B; Beech 350ER King Air TANKER 1 sqn with KE-3A TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with KC-130H/J Hercules 1 sqn with A330 MRTT TRANSPORT 3 sqn with C-130H Hercules; C-130H-30 Hercules; CN-235; L-100-30HS (hospital ac) 2 sqn with Beech 350 King Air (forming) TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with F-15SA Eagle 3 sqn with Hawk Mk65*; Hawk Mk65A*; Hawk Mkl65* 1 sqn with Jetstream Mk31 1 sqn with MFI-17 Mushshak; SR22T 2 sqn with PC-9; PC-21 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 4 sqn with AS532 Cougar (CSAR); Bell 212 (AB-212); Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey (SAR) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 455 combat capable FTR 81: 56 F-15C Eagle; 25 F-15D Eagle FGA 221: up to 66 F-15S Eagle (being upgraded to F-15SA configuration); 84 F-15SA Eagle; 71 Typhoon ATK 66 Tornado IDS ISR 14+: 12 Tornado GR1A*; 2+ Beech 350ER King Air AEW&C 7: 5 E-3A Sentry; 2 Saab 2000 Erieye ELINT 2:1 RE-3A; 1 RE-3B TKR/TPT 15: 6 A330 MRTT; 7 KC-130H Hercules; 2 KC-130J Hercules TKR 7 KE-3A TPT 47+: Medium 36: 30 C-130H Hercules; 3 C-130H-30 Hercules; 3 L-100-30; Light 11+: 10+ Beech 350 King Air; 1 Jetstream Mk31 TRG 194: 24 Hawk Mk65* (incl aerobatic team); 16 Hawk Mk65A*; 35 Hawk Mkl65*; 20 MFI-17 Mushshak; 20 PC-9; 55 PC-21; 24 SR22T HELICOPTERS MRH 15 Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey (SAR) TPT 30: Medium 10 AS532 Cougar (CSAR); Light 20 Bell 212 (AB-212) Middle East and North Africa 353 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy some Wing Loong I (reported); some CH-4 ISR • Medium some Falco AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9P/L Sidewinder, HR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; IRIS-T; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; AIM-7M Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65 Maverick; AR-1; Brimstone AShM AGM-84L Harpoon Block II ARM ALARM ALCM Storm Shadow BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II; Paveway IV Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-54 Laser JDAM INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM; FT-9 Royal Fit_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT 24: Medium 8: 5 C-130H Hercules; 3 L-100-30; Light 3: 1 Cessna 310; 2 Learjet 35; PAX 13: 1 A340; 1B-737-200; 2 B-737BBJ; 2 B-747SP; 4 BAe-125-800; 2 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream IV HELICOPTERS • TPT 3+: Medium 3: 2 AS-61; 1 S-70 Black Hawk; Light some Bell 212 (AB-212) Air Defence Forces 16,000_ FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 6 bn with M902 Patriot PAC-3 17 bty with ShahinelAMX-30SA 16 bty with MIM-23B l-Hawk EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM 817+ Long-range 108 M902 Patriot PAC-3 Medium-range 128 MIM-23B l-Hawk Short-range 181: 40 Crotale; 141 Shahine Point-defence 400+: LMM; 400 M1097 Avenger; Mistral GUNS 218 SP • 20mm 90 M163 Vulcan TOWED 128: 35mm 128 GDF Oerlikon; 40mm (150 L/70 in store) DE • Laser Silent Hunter Strategic Missile Forces 2,500_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MSL • TACTICAL IRBM 10+ DF-3 (CH-SS-2) (service status unclear) MRBM Some DF-21 (CH-SS-5 - variant unclear) (reported) National Guard 130,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 5 mech bde (1 recce coy, 3 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) Light 5 inf bde (3 combined arms bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn) 3 indep It inf bn Other 1 (Special Security) sy bde (3 sy bn) 1 (ceremonial) cav sqn COMBAT SUPPORT IMPbn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ASLT 239: 204 LAV-AG (90mm); 35 LAV 700 (105mm) IFV 1,235: £635 LAV-25; £600 LAV 700 (ind variants) APC 778 APC (W) 514: 116 LAV-A (amb); 30 LAV-AC (ammo carrier); 296 LAV-CC (CP); 72 LAV-PC PPV 264 Aravis; some Arive ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 58 LAV-E ARV 111 LAV-R; V-150 ARV MW MV5; MV10 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 182 LAV-AT MANPATS TOW-2A; M47 Dragon RCL • 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY 363+ SP 155mm up to 136 CAESAR TOWED 108:105mm 50 M102; 155mm 58 M198 MOR 119+: 81mm some; SP 120mm 119:107 LAV-M; 12 LAV-M with NEMO HELICOPTERS ATK 12 AH-64E Apache MRH 35: 23 AH-6i Little Bird; 12 MD530F (trg role) TPT • Medium e50 UH-60M Black Hawk AIR DEFENCE SAM 73 Short-range 5 VL MICA Point-defence 68 MPCV GUNS • TOWED • 20mm 30 M167 Vulcan AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114R Hellfire II Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 24,500+ active Border Guard 15,000_ FORCES BY ROLE Subordinate to Ministry of Interior. HQ in Riyadh. 9 subordinate regional commands MANOEUVRE Other Some mobile def (long-range patrol/spt) units 2 border def (patrol) units 12 infrastructure def units 18 harbour def units Some coastal def units COMBAT SUPPORT Some MP units EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV Caprivi Mkl/Mk3 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 106 PCC 13+ OPB 40 PBF 85:4 Al Jouf; 2 Sea Guard; 79 Plascoa FIC 1650 354 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 PB 8: 6 Damen Stan Patrol 2606; 2 Al Jubatel AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 8: 5 Griffon 8000; 3 other LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4:1 AXL; 3 AO Facilities Security Force 9,000+_ Subordinate to Ministry of Interior General Civil Defence Administration Units EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 10 Boeing Vertol 107 Special Security Force 500_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) UR-416 AUV 60+: Gurkha LAPV; 60 Kozak-5 DEPLOYMENT_ YEMEN: Operation Restoring Hope 2,500; 2 armd BG; M60A3; M2A2 Bradley; M113A4; M-ATV; 2+ M902 Patriot PAC-3 FOREIGN FORCES_ France 50 (radar det) Greece 100:1 SAM bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2 United Kingdom 50 (radar det) United States US Central Command: 2,000; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-16C Fighting Falcon Syria SYR Syrian Pound SYP 2021 2022 2023 GDP SYP USD per capita USD Growth % Inflation % Def exp SYP USD USD1=SYP Definitive economic data not available Population 21,563,800 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 17.0% 4.9% 4.7% 4.1% 17.2% 2.0% Female 16.2% 4.7% 4.7% 4.3% 17.8% 2.3% Capabilities_ The protracted civil war has significantly depleted the combat capabilities of the Syrian armed forces and transformed them into an irregularly structured militia-style organisation focused on internal security. Various nominally pro-government militias, often formed around local or religious identity, are reportedly funded by local businessmen or foreign powers, raising questions over capability and morale as well as loyalty. There are allegations that some elements of the Syrian Arab Army are involved in the production and distribution of illegal narcotics to other countries in the region, the Gulf and Europe. There is no published defence doctrine or White Paper with the conflict instead dictating ad hoc requirements. Opposition groups maintain control over parts of the country. Most formal pre-war structures and formations exist in name only, as resources have been channelled into the irregular network of military organisations that form the regime's most effective military capabilities. Russia has been the regime's principal ally and has provided essential combat support and assistance, as well as replacement equipment. Russia is also involved in efforts to reconstitute the army's pre-war divisions, although some Russian equipment has been withdrawn following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Iran and Hizbullah also continue to assist in the provision and training of militias and other ground forces but reports allege a lack of coordination, with Russia supporting some formations and Iran/Hizbullah others. Overall levels of training remain poor but combat experience has improved proficiency in select regular and irregular military formations. The armed forces lack the requisite capabilities for external deployment, although they remain able to redeploy moderate numbers of formations and capabilities within the country. Logistics support for major internal operations away from established bases remains a challenge. Before the civil war, Syria did not have a major domestic defence industry, although it possessed facilities to overhaul and maintain its existing systems. It did, however, possess some capacity in focused areas, such as ballistic missiles and chemical weapons. International efforts continue to verify destruction of chemical-weapons stockpiles and production facilities. ACTIVE 169,000 (Army 130,000 Navy 4,000 Air 15,000 Air Defence 20,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 100,000 Conscript liability 30 months (there is widespread avoidance of military service) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army £130,000_ FORCES BY ROLE The Syrian Arab Army combines conventional formations, special forces and auxiliary militias. The main fighting units are the 4th Division, the Republican Guard, the Special Forces (including the former Tiger Forces) and the brigades assigned to the 5th Assault Corps; they receive the most attention and training. Most other formations are under-strength, at an estimated 500-1,000 personnel in brigades and regiments, but Russia has been assisting in the reconstruction and re-equipment of some divisions. COMMAND 5 corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 3 SF div(-) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 2 (4th & Republican Guard) mech div 1 (1st) mech div (being reconstituted) 10 mech div(-) 7 mech bde (assigned to 5th Assault Corps) 1 (16th) indep mech bde 2 indep inf bde(-) Amphibious 1 mne unit COMBAT SUPPORT 2 SSM bde Middle East and North Africa 355 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Attrition during the civil war has severely reduced equipment numbers for almost all types. It is unclear how much remains available for operations ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-55A; T-55AM; T-55AMV; T-62; T-62M; T-72; T-72AV; T-72B; T-72B3; T-72M1; T-90; T-90A RECCE BRDM-2 IFV BMP-1; BMP-2; BTR-82A APC APC (T) BTR-50 APC (W) BTR-152; BTR-60; BTR-70; BTR-80 APC IVECO LMV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV BREM-1 reported; T-54/55 VLB MTU; MTU-20 MWUR-77 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 9P133 Malyutka-P (BRDM-2 with RS-AT-3C Sagger); 9P148 Konkurs (BRDM-2 with RS-AT-5 Spandrel) MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115-2 Metis-U (RS-AT-13); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); Milan ARTILLERY SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya TOWED 122mm D-30; M-30 (M1938); 130mm M-46; 152mm D-20; ML-20 (M-1937); 180mm S-23 GUN/MOR 120mm 2S9 NONA-S MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad; 140mm BM-14; 220mm 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 9A52 Smerch; 330mm some (also improvised systems of various calibres) MOR 82mm some; 120mm M-1943; 160mm M-160; 240mm M-240 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 8K14 (RS-SS-1C Scud-B); 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1D Scud C) 9K72-1 (RS-SS-1E ScudD); Scud lookalike; 9K79 Tochka (RS-SS-21 Scarab); Fateh-110/M-600 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium Mohajer 3/4; Light Ababil AIR DEFENCE SAM Medium-range 9K37 Buk (RS-SA-11 Gadfly); 9K317 Buk-Wl (RS-SA-17 Grizzly) Point-defence 9K31 Strela-1 (RS-SA-9 Gaskin); 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 Strela-W (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 GraiT)%; 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 9K36 Strela-2, (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) SPAAGM 30mm 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4; 57mm ZSU-57-2 TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60; 100mm KS-19 Navy £4,000_ Some personnel are likely to have been drafted into other services EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 31: CORVETTES • FS 1 Project 159AE (Petya III)t with 1 triple 533mm ASTT with SAET-60 HWT, 4 RBU 2500 Smerch 1 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun PBFG 22: 16 Project 205 (Osa I/II)t with 4 single lnchr with P-22 (RS-SS-N-2C Styx) AShM 6 Fir with 2 single lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM PB 8 Zhukt MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7 MHC 1 Project 1265 (Sonya) with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail)$ SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS MSO 1 Akvamaren-M (FSU Project 266M (Natya)) with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 GraiV)% SAM MSI 5 Korund (Project 1258 (Yevgenya)) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS • LSM 3 Polnochny B (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 Al Assad Coastal Defence_ FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 1 AShM bde with P-35 (RS-SSC-1B Sepal); P-15M Termit-R (RS-SSC-3 Styx); C-802; K-300P Bastion (RS-SSC-5 Stooge) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM P-35 (RS-SSC-1B Sepal); P-15M Termit-R (RS-SSC-3 Styx); C-802; K-300P Bastion (RS-SSC-5 Stooge) Naval Aviation_ All possibly non-operational after vacating base for Russian deployment EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS • ASW 9:4 Ka-28 Helix A; 5 Mi-14 Haze Air Force £15,000(-)_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with Mig-23MF/ML/MLD/UM Flogger 2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB/SM Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with MiG-21MF/bis Fishbed; MiG-21U Mongol A 2 sqn with MiG-23BN/UB Flogger GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with Su-22M3/M4 Fitter J/K 1 sqn with Su-24MK Fencer D 1 sqn with L-39ZA/ZO Albatros* TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; 11-76 Candid 1 sqn with Falcon 20; Falcon 900 1 sqn with Tu-134B-3 1 sqn with Yak-40 Codling ATTACK HELICOPTER 3 sqn with Mi-24D/P Hind D/F 2 sqn with SA342L Gazelle 356 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 6 sqn with Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17 Hip H EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Heavy use of both fixed- and rotary-wing assets has likely reduced readiness and availability to very low levels. It is estimated that no more than 30-40% of the inventory is operational AIRCRAFT 184 combat capable FTR 55: £25 MiG-23MF/ML/MLD/UM Flogger; £30 MiG-29A/SM/UB Fulcrum EGA 79: £50 MiG-21MF/bis Fishbed J/L; 9 MiG-21U Mongol A; £20 MiG-23BN/UB Flogger ATK 30: 20 Su-22M3/M4 Fitter J/K; £10 Su-24MK Fencer D TPT 23: Heavy 3 11-76 Candid; Light 13:1 An-24 Coke; 6 An-26 Curl; 2 PA-31 Navajo; 4 Yak-40 Codling; PAX 7: 2 Falcon 20; 1 Falcon 900; 4 Tu-134B-3 TRG 20+: £20 L-39ZA/ZO Albatros*; some MBB-223 Flamingoi HELICOPTERS ATK 20+: £20 M1-24D Hind D; some Mi-24P Hind F MRH 40: £20 Mi-17 Hip H; £20 SA342L Gazelle TPT • Medium £10 Mi-8 Hip AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH; R-23/24 (RS-AA-7 Apex); R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); ARH; R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder) ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29T/L (RS-AS-14 Kedge); HOT ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton) Air Defence Command s20,000(-)_ FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 4 AD div with S-125M/M1 Pechora-M/Ml (RS-SA-3 Goa); S-125-2M Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26); 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline) 3 AD regt with S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); 20 S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) Medium-range 36+: S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline); £36 S-125-2M Pechora-2U (RS-SA-26) Short-range 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); S-125M/M1 Pechora-U/Ul (RS-SA-3 Goa) Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2/2M (RS-SA-7A/B Grail)% Gendarmerie & Paramilitary s100,000_ National Defence Force £50,000_ An umbrella of disparate regime militias performing a variety of roles, including territorial control Other Militias £50,000_ Numerous military groups fighting for the Assad regime, including Afghan, Iraqi, Pakistani and sectarian organisations. Some receive significant Iranian support FOREIGN FORCES_ Hizbullah 7,000-8,000 Iran 1,500 Russia 4,000:1 inf BG; 3 MP bn; 1 engr unit; £10 T-72B3; £20 BTR-82A; BPM-97; 12 2A65; 4 9A52 Smerch; 10 Su-24M Fencer; 6 Su-34; 6 Su-35S; 1 A-50U; 111-20M; 12 Mi-24P/ Mi-35M Hind; 4 Mi-8AMTSh Hip; 1 AShM bfy with 3K55 Bastion (RS-SSC-5 Stooge); 1 SAM bfy with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 1 SAM bfy with Pantsir-Sl/S2; air base at Latakia; naval facility at Tartus TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL Data here represents the de facto situation for selected armed opposition groups and their observed equipment Syrian Democratic Forces c50,000_ A coalition of predominantly Kurdish rebel groups in de facto control of much of northeastern Syria. Kurdish forces from the YPG/J (People's Protection Units/ Women's Protection Units) provide military leadership and main combat power, supplemented by Arab militias and tribal groups. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-55; T-72 (reported) IFV BMP-1 APC • PPV Guardian AUV M-ATV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-SA-5 Spandrel) RCL 73mm SPG-9; 90mm M-79 Osa ARTILLERY MRL 122mm BM-21 Grad; 9K132 Grad-P MOR 82mm 82-BM-37; M-1938; 120mm M-1943; improvised mortars of varying calibre AIR DEFENCE • GUNS SP 14.5mm ZPU-4 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-1 (tch); 1 ZPU-2 (tch/on T-55); 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka; ZU-23-2 (tch); 57mm S-60 TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2; ZPU-1; 23mm ZU-23-2 Syrian National Army & National Front for Liberation £70,000_ In late 2019 the Syrian National Army (SNA) and the National Front for Liberation (NLF) began to merge under the SNA umbrella. The SNA formed in late 2017 from Syrian Arab and Turkmen rebel factions operating under Turkish command in the Aleppo governate and northwestern Syria, including Afrin province. The NLF is a coalition of surviving Islamist and nationalist rebel factions formed in 2018 operating in northwestern Syria, particularly in and around Idlib. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-54; T-55; T-62 IFV BMP-1 Middle East and North Africa 357 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (RS-T-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7); 9K115-2 Metis-M (RS-AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); BGM-71 TOW; Milan RCL 73mm SPG-9; 82mm B-10 ARTILLERY TOWED 122mm D-30 MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm 9K132 Grad-?; BM-21 Grad; Grad (6-tube tech) MOR 82mm 2B9 Vasilek; improvised mortars of varying calibre AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence MANPADS some GUNS SP 14.5mm ZPU-4 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-1 (tch); 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch); ZSU-23-4 Shilka; 57mm AZP S-60 TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2; ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23-2 Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) s10,000_ HTS was formed by Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra) in January 2017 by absorbing other hardline groups. It is designated a terrorist organisation by the US government. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K113 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115-2 Metis-M (RS-AT-13); 9K135 Komet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) RCL 73mm SPG-9; 106mm M-40 ARTILLERY MRL 107mm Type-63 MOR 120mm some; improvised mortars of varying calibres AIR DEFENCE SAM Point-defence 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-7B Grail)% GUNS SP 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2; 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60 Guardians of Religion (Huras al-Din) £2,500 An al-Qaeda-affiliated group operating in Idlib province. It is designated a terrorist organisation by the US government. FOREIGN FORCES_ Turkey e3,000; 3 armd BG; some cdo units; 1 gendarmerie unit United States Operation Inherent Resolve 900; 1 armd inf coy; 1 mne bn(-) Tunisia TUN Tunisian DinarTND 2021 2022 GDP TND 131bn 144bn USD 46.8bn 46.3bn per capita USD 3,897 3,816 Growth % 3.3 2.2 Inflation % 5.7 8.1 Def bgt TND 3.44bn 4.00bn USD 1.23bn 1.28bn FMA (US) USD 85m 85m USD1=TND 2.79 3.11 2023 45 m Population 11,896,972 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 12.9% 3.4% 3.0% 3.4% 22.4% 4.5% Female 12.1% 3.2% 3.0% 3.5% 23.5% 5.0% Capabilities The armed forces' main tasks are to ensure territorial sovereignty and internal security and, while they have limited capacities, a modernisation process is underway. Instability in Libya and Islamist terrorist groups operating from there continue to pose a security concern. In the light of terrorist attacks, the armed forces are engaged in counter-terrorism operations and have been tasked with securing sensitive industrial sites. Designated a major non-NATO ally by the US in 2015, Tunisia benefits from defence and security cooperation with US AFRICOM and also with France and NATO. A ten-year military-cooperation agreement signed with the US in 2020 will provide more training and after-sales support. In 2019, Tunisia sent a C-130 transport aircraft to support the UN's MINUSMA peacekeeping mission in Mali and maintains a deployment to the mission. A helicopter unit was deployed to the Central African Republic in 2021 to join the UN MINUSCA mission there, followed by a battalion of troops in 2022. Tunisia is a member of the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition. The armed forces are involved in multinational exercises, notably those led by the US, and was one of the hosts for the 2022 African Lion exercise. Overall military capability is limited by the ageing equipment inventory, although Tunisia has been the recipient of surplus US systems, including armed utility helicopters. The country has limited defence-industrial capabilities but has recently manufactured a small number of patrol boats for the navy. ACTIVE 35,800 (Army 27,000 Navy 4,800 Air 4,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,000 Conscript liability 12 months selective ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE_ Army 5,000; 22,000 conscript (total 27,000) 358 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde 1 (Sahara) SF bde MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce regt Mechanised 3 mech bde (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt, 1 engr regt, 1 sigs regt, 1 log gp) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 84: 30 M60A1; 54 M60A3 LT TK 48 SK-105 Kuerassier RECCE 60: 40 AML-90; 20 FV601 Saladin APC 480 APC (T) 140 M113A1/A2 APC (W) 110 Fiat 6614 PPV 230:4 Bastion APC: 71 Ejder Yalcin; 146 Kirpi; 9 Vuran ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 11: 5 Greif; 6 M88A1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 35 M901ITV TOW MANPATS Milan; TOW ARTILLERY 276 TOWED 115:105mm 48 M101A1/A2; 155mm 67: 12 M114A1; 55 M198 MOR 161: 81mm 95; SP 107mm 48 M106; 120mm 18 Brandt AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 26 M48 Chaparral; RBS-70 GUNS 112 SP 40mm 12 M42 TOWED • 20mm 100 M-55 Navy £4,800_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 37 PSO 4 Jugurtha (Damen Stan MSOPV1400) (of which 2 with 1 hel landing platform) PCFG 3 La Galite (FRA Combattante III) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun PCC 3 Bizerte (FRA PR 48) PCFT 6 Albatros (GER Type-143B) with 2 single 533mm TT, 2 76mm guns PBF 2 20m Fast Patrol Boat PB 19: 5 Istiklal; 3 Utique (ex-PRC Type-062 (Haizhui II) mod); 5 Joumhouria; 6 V Series LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7: ABU 3: 2 Tabarka (ex-US White Sumac); 1 Sisi Bou Said AGE 1 Hannibal AGS 1 Khaireddine (ex-US Wilkes) AWT 1 Ain Zaghouan (ex-ITA Simeto) AX 1 Salambo (ex-US Conrad, survey) Air Force 4,000_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-5E/F-5F Tiger II TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130B/H/J-30 Hercules; G.222; L-410 Turbolet 1 liaison unit with S-208A TRAINING 2 sqn with L-59 Albatros*; MB-326B; SF-260 1 sqn with MB-326K; MB-326L TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AS350B Ecureuil; AS365 Dauphin 2; AB-205 (Bell 205); SA313; SA316 Alouette III; UH-1H Iroquois; UH-1N Iroquois 1 sqn with HH-3E EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 23 combat capable FTR 11: 9 F-5E Tiger II; 2 F-5F Tiger II ATK 3 MB-326K ISR 12 Maule MX-7-180B TPT 18: Medium 13: 5 C-130B Hercules; 1 C-130H Hercules; 2 C-130J-30 Hercules; 5 G.222; Light 5: 3 L-410 Turbolet; 2 S-208A TRG 32: 9 L-59 Albatros*; 4 MB-326B; 3 MB-326L; 14 SF-260; 2 T-6C Texan II HELICOPTERS MRH 34:1AS365 Dauphin 2; 6 SA313; 3 SA316 Alouette III; 24 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior SAR 11 HH-3E TPT 39: Medium 8 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 31: 6 AS350B Ecureuil; 15 Bell 205 (AB-205); 8 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 2 Bell 212 (UH-1N Iroquois) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9P Sidewinder ASM AGM-114R Hellfire Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,000_ National Guard 12,000_ Ministry of Interior EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ASLT 2 EE-11 Urutu FSV APC 29+ APC (W) 16 EE-11 Urutu (anti-riot); VAB Mk3 PPV 13 Streit Typhoon AUVIVECO LMV PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24 PCC 6 Rais el Blais (ex-GDR Kondor I) PBF 7:4 Gabes; 3 Patrouiller PB 11: 5 Breitla (ex-GDR Bremse); 4 Rodman 38; 2 Socomena HELICOPTERS MRH 8 SA318 Alouette II/SA319 Alouette III TPT • Light 3 Bell 429 Middle East and North Africa 359 DEPLOYMENT_ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 324; 1 inf coy; 1 hel fit with 3 Bell 205 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 10 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 88; 1 tpt fit with C-130J-30 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2 United Arab Emirates UAE Emirati Dirham AED 2021 2022 GDP AED 1.54tr 1.85tr USD 420bn 504bn per capita USD 41,205 47,793 Growth % 3.8 5.1 Inflation % 0.2 5.2 Def bdgt [a] AED £70.4bn £74.8bn USD £l9.2bn £20.4bn USD1=AED 3.67 3.67 [a] Defence budget estimate derived from central MoD expenditure and a proportion of the Federal Services section of the Abu Dhabi budget Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2008--- ---2015--- ---2022 Population 9,915,803 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 8.3% 2.8% 2.8% 4.8% 48.8% 1.4% Female 7.9% 2.4% 2.3% 3.1% 15.1% 0.4% Capabilities_ The UAE's armed forces are arguably the best trained and most capable of all GCC states. Iran remains a key defence concern, for reasons including the continuing dispute with Tehran over ownership of islands in the Strait of Hormuz, as well as attacks both on tankers off the UAE coast and on oil infrastructure. However, the UAE has shown a growing willingness to take part in operations and project power and influence further abroad, including by sending an F-16 detachment to Afghanistan in the early-to-mid 2010s, and involvement in the conflict in Libya. The UAE also continues to be involved in the Yemen conflict as part of the Saudi-led coalition. In 2022 it was the target of missile and UAV attacks, and the UAE continues to seek to enhance its air defences against such threats. Experience gained in Yemen-related operations has offered combat lessons, not least in limited amphibious operations, and has demonstrated the country's developing approach to both the use of force and the acceptance of military risk. The UAE hosts a French base and is diversifying its security relationships, including with China, although these are complicating ties with the US, which remains the country's key extra-regional defence partner. A new defence agreement with Washington came into force in May 2019 and the US Air Force continues to maintain a substantial force at the Al Dhafra airbase. The armed forces have an advanced inventory of modern equipment across the domains, including its air and missile defences, and are taking steps to upgrade their airborne ISR capabilities. An enhanced defence relationship with Israel reportedly includes the supply of an advanced Israeli air defence system. The UAE continues to develop its domestic defence-industrial base, having consolidated its leading defence firms into the state-owned EDGE Group in 2019, but the country remains reliant on external providers for many major weapons systems. ACTIVE 63,000 (Army 44,000 Navy 2,500 Air 4,500 Presidential Guard 12,000) Conscript liability 16-24 months, males 18-30 years dependent on education level. Voluntary service enrolment for women ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 4 COMMUNICATIONS 3 Yahsat ISR 1 FalconEye Army 44,000_ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 armd bde Mechanised 2 mech bde Light 1 inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde (3 SP arty regt) 1 engr gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 303:45 AMX-30; 258 Ledere LT TK 76 FV101 Scorpion RECCE 49 AML-90 IFV 395:160 BMP-3; 235 Rabdan APC 1,656 APC (T) 136 AAPC (ind 53 engr plus other variants) APC (W) 185:45 AMV 8x8 (one with BMP-3 turret); 120 EE-11 Urutu; 20 VAB PPV 1,335: £460 Caiman; e680 Maxxpro LWB; 150 Nimr Hafeet 630A (CP); 45 Nimr Haftet (Amb) AUV 674+: MCAV-20; 650 M-ATV; Nimr Ajban; Nimr Jais; 24 VBL ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 53+: 53 ACV-AESV; Wisent-2 ARV 158: 8 ACV-AESV Recovery; 4 AMX-30D; 85 BREM-L; 46 Ledere ARV; 15 Maxxpro ARV NBC VEHICLES 32: 8 Fuchs 2 BIO-RS; 16 Fuchs 2 NBC-RS; 8 Fuchs 2 NBC-CPS (CP) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 135: 20 HOT; 115 Nimr Ajban 440A with Kornet-E (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; TOW RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf 360 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 ARTILLERY 649 SP 155mm 181: 78 G-6; 85 M109A3; 18 Mk F3 TOWED 99:105mm 73 L118 Light Gun; 130mm 20 Type-59-I; 155mm 6 AH-4 MRL 124:122mm 74:48 Firos-25 (est 24 op); 2 Jobaria; 220mm 24 SR5; 227mm 32 M142 HIM ARS; 239mm 12 K239 Chunmoo; 300mm 6 9A52 Smerch MOR 251: 81mm 134: 20 Brandt; 114 L16; 120mm 21 Brandt; SP 120mm 96 RG-31 MMP Agrab Mk2 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 6 Hwasong-5 (up to 20 msl); MGM-168 ATACMS (launched from M142 HIMARS) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium Seeker II AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Mistral Navy 2,500_ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 43 CORVETTES 7 FSGHM 6 Baynunah with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 8-cell Mk 56 VLS with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RTM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 1 76mm gun FSGM 1 Abu Dhabi with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 76mm gun PCFGM 2 Mubarraz (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 76mm gun PCGM 4: 2 Muray Jib (GER Lurssen 62m) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 2 Ghantut (Falaj 2) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 3-cell VLS with VL-MICA SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCFG 6 Ban Yas (GER Lurssen TNC-45) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 76mm gun PBFG 12 Butinah (Ghannatha mod) with 4 single lncher with Marte Mk2/N AShM PBF 12: 6 Ghannatha with 1120mm NEMO mor (capacity 42 troops); 6 Ghannatha (capacity 42 troops) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1 MHO 1 Al Murjan (ex-GER Frankenthal Type-332) AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST ZAlquwaisat with 1 hel landing platform LANDING CRAFT 18 LCM 5: 3 Al Feyi (capacity 56 troops); 2 (capacity 40 troops and additional vehicles) LCP 4 Fast Supply Vessel (multi-purpose) LCT 9: 7 ADSB 64m; 1 Al-Saadiyat with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Al Shareeah (LSV 75m) with 1 hel landing platform LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3: AFS 2 Rmah with 4 single 533mm TT AX 1 Al Semeih with 1 hel landing platform Air Force 4,500_ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with F-16E/F Block 60 Fighting Falcon 3 sqn with Mirage 2000-9DAD/EAD/RAD AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL 1 fit with GlobalEye SEARCH & RESCUE 2 fit with AW109K2; AW139 TANKER 1 fit with A330MRTT TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100-30 1 sqn with CN235M-100 TRAINING 1 sqn with Grob 115TA 1 sqn with Hawk Mkl02* 1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer 1 sqn with PC-21 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 156 combat capable EGA 137: 54 F-16E Block 60 Fighting Falcon (Desert Eagle); 24 F-16F Block 60 Fighting Falcon (13 to remain in US for trg); 15 Mirage 2000-9DAD; 44 Mirage 2000-9EAD MP 2 DHC-8 Dash 8 MPA ISR 7 Mirage 2000 RAD* SIGINT 1 Global 6000 AEW&C 3 GlobalEye TPT/TKR 3 A330 MRTT TPT 26: Heavy 8 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 6: 3 C-130H Hercules; 1 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 L-100-30; Light 16: 5 C295W; 5 CN235; 2 P.180 Avanti (MEDEVAC) TRG 79:12 Grob 115TA; 12 Hawk Mkl02*; 30 PC-7 Turbo Trainer; 25 PC-21 HELICOPTERS MRH 21:12 AW139; 9 Bell 412 Twin Huey TPT • Light 4: 3 AW109K2; 1 Bell 407 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy Wing Loong I; Wing Loong II ISR • Heavy RQ-1E Predator XP AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; HR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; IIR/ARH Mica; ARH AIM-120B/C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65G Maverick; LJ-7; Hakeem 1/2/3 (A/B) ARM AGM-88C HARM AL CM Black Shaheen (Storm Shadow/SCALP EG variant) BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-12/-58 Paveway II Laser & INS/GPS-guided GBU-54 Laser JDAM INS/SAT-guidedAZ Tariq Middle East and North Africa 361 Air Defence_ FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 2 AD bde (3 bn with Barak LR AD: M902 Patriot PAC-3) 3 (short range) AD bn with Crotale; Mistral; Rapier; RBS-70; Javelin; 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22) 2 SAM bty with THAAD EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM 81+ Long-range 39+: 2+ Barak LR AD: 37 M902 Patriot PAC-3 Short-range Crotale Point-defence 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); RBS-70; Rapier; Mistral SPAAGM 30mm 42 96K6 Pantsir-Sl (RS-SA-22) GUNS • Towed 35mm GDF-005 MISSILE DEFENCE 12 THAAD Presidential Guard Command 12,000_ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1SF bn 1 spec ops bn MANOEUVRE Reconaissance 1 recce sqn Mechanised 1 mech bde (1 tk bn, 4 mech inf bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 CSS bn) Amphibious 1 mne bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 50 Leclerc IFV 290: 200 BMP-3; 90 BTR-3U Guardian ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • SP HMMWV with 9M133 Komet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) Joint Aviation Command_ FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Archangel; AT802 Air Tractor ANTI-SURFACE/ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with AS332F Super Puma; AS565 Panther TRANSPORT 1 (Spec Ops) gp with AS365F Dauphin 2; H125M Fennec; AW139; Bell 407MRH; Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; CH-47C/F Chinook; DHC-6-300/400 Twin Otter; UH-60L/M Black Hawk ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 gp with AH-64D Apache EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 37 combat capable ATK 23 Archangel ISR e6 AT802 Air Tractor* TPT • Light 14: 2 Beech 350 King Air; 7 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan*; 1 DHC-6-300 Twin Otter; 4 DHC-6-400 Twin Otter HELICOPTERS ATK 28 AH-64D Apache ASW 7 AS332F Super Puma (5 in ASuW role) MRH 53+: 4 AS365F Dauphin 2 (VIP); 9 H125M Fennec; 7 AS565 Panther; 3 AW139 (VIP); 20 Bell 407MRH; 4 SA316 Alouette III; 6+ UH-60M Black Hawk (ABH) TPT 66: Heavy 22 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 44:11 UH-60L Black Hawk; up to 33 UH-60M Black Hawk AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; Cirit; Hydra-70; HOT AShM AS-15TT; AM39 Exocet Gendarmerie & Paramilitary_ Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Protection Agency (CICPA)_ Ministry of Interior EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 115 PSO 1 Al Wtaid PCM 2 Arialah (Damen Sea Axe 6711) with 111-cell Mk 15 SeaRAM GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCC 1 Shujaa (Damen Stan Patrol 5009) PBF 58: 6 Baglietto GC23; 3 Baglietto 59; 15 DV-15; 34 MRTP 16 PB 53: 2 Protector; 16 (US Camcraft 65); 5 (US Camcraft 77); 6 Watercraft 45; 12 Halmatic Work; 12 Al Saber DEPLOYMENT_ EGYPT: £300 12 F-16E/F Fighting Falcon; Wing Loong I UAV; Wing Loong II UAV (status uncertain) SOMALIA: 180 FOREIGN FORCES_ Australia 400; 1 tpt det with 2 C-130f-30 Hercules France 650:1 armd BG (1 tk coy, 1 armd inf coy; 1 aty bty); Leclerc; VBCI; CAESAR; 7 Rafale F3; • EMASOH; 1 Atlantique-2 Korea, Republic of 170 (trg activities at UAE Spec Ops School) United Kingdom 200; 1 tkr/tpt fit with C-17A Globemaster; C-130I Hercules; A330 MRTT Voyager United States 5,000; 1 ISR sqn with 4 U-2S; 1 AEW&C sqn with 4 E-3B/G Sentry; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-10A; 1 ISR UAV sqn with RQ-4 Global Hawk; 2 SAM bty with M902/ M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE 362 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Yemen, Republic of YEM Yemeni Rial YER 2021 2022 2023 GDP YER 20.6tr 30.2tr USD 19.9bn 27.6bn per capita USD 644 874 Growth % -1.0 2.0 Inflation % 45.7 43.8 Def bdgt YER n.k n.k USD n.k n.k USD1=YER 1035.48 1092.84 Population 30,984,689 Age 0-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-64 65 plus Male 18.3% 5.8% 5.1% 4.5% 15.4% 1.4% Female 17.6% 5.6% 5.0% 4.4% 15.1% 1.8% Capabilities There appears to be little prospect that any of the competing forces in Yemen's civil war will be able to gain a decisive upper hand in the near term, with successive offensives by various factions failing to significantly alter the situation on the ground. After President Hadi resigned in April 2022, a Saudi-brokered deal agreed a ceasefire and established the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) under new President al-Alimi that has included the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The new unity government only appears to exercise limited control over the forces nominally allied together against the Houthis, and the end of the ceasefire in October meant a resumption of open hostilities. Irregular forces, such as Tareq Saleh's National Resistance and those of the UAE-backed STC are reportedly better paid and equipped than government forces. The UAE has largely drawn down its own forces and focused its support on the STC and other non-government forces fighting the Houthis, while the remaining members of the Saudi-led coalition continue to provide air support for the PLC administration. The conflict appears to have been sustained by a combination of large existing stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, and external supplies, despite UN embargoes. There is no domestic defence industry, barring some limited maintenance and workshop facilities. ACTIVE 40,000 (Government forces 40,000) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Government forces £40,000 (incl militia)_ Despite the establishment of the Presidential Leadership Council, central government control over the forces nominally allied together against the Houthis remains limited. FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised up to 20 bde(-) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT Some M60A1; T-34t; T-54/55; T-62; T-72 RECCE some BRDM-2 IFV BMP-2; BTR-80A; Ratel-20 APC APC (W) BTR-60 PPV Streit Cougar; Streit Spartan AUV M-ATV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); M47 Dragon; TOW GUNS • SP 100mm SU-100t ARTILLERY • SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika AIRCRAFT • ISR 6 AT-802 Air Tractor* AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23-2 DEPLOYMENT MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2 FOREIGN FORCES_ All Operation Restoring Hope unless stated Saudi Arabia 2,500: 2 armd BG; M60A3; M2A2 Bradley; M113A4; M-ATV; AH-64 Apache; M902 Patriot PAC-3 Sudan 650; 1 mech BG; T-72AV; BTR-70M Kobra 2 TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL Insurgent forces 20,000 (incl Houthi and tribes) The Houthi-run de facto administration has controlled northern Yemen since 2015 and is supported by a combination of Houthi tribal militias and elements of the Yemeni armed forces that had been loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Following a break between the Houthis and Saleh in late 2017 that resulted in the latter's death, Saleh's former forces have become further split between those that remained affiliated with the Houthis and those who have joined his son and nephew to fight against them. Houthi forces receive material support from Iran, with several clandestine weapons shipments of Iranian origin intercepted in recent years. As well as fighting within Yemen, Houthi forces have launched missile and UAV attacks on targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised up to 20 bde(-) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-55; T-72 IFV BMP-2; BTR-80A APC • APC (W) Some BTR-40; BTR-60 AUV M-ATV ARTILLERY MRL • 122mm BM-21 Grad; 210mm Badr ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5B Spandrel/ Towsan-1); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); Dehlavieh (Kornet); Toophan RCL 82mm B-10 Middle East and North Africa 363 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS MRBM • Conventional Kheibar Shekan (reported) SRBM • Conventional Borkan-2H (Qiam-1); Borkan-3; Falaq; Fateh-110; Khali] Fars GLCM • Conventional Quds-1; Quds-2; Quds-3 COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM C-801; C-802 HELICOPTERS MRH 1 Mi-17 Hip H TPT • Light 1 Mi-8 Hip UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium Sammad-1 LOITERING & DIRECT ATTACK MUNITIONS Qasef-1; Qasef-2K; Sammad-2; Sammad-3; Waed (Shahed-136) AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range Saqr-1 (358) Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)%; 9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); Misaq-1 (QW-1); Misaq-2 (QW-18) GUNS • TOWED 20mm M167 Vulcan; 23mm ZU-23-2 490 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Explanatory notes The Military Balance provides an assessment of the armed forces and defence economics of 173 countries and territories. Each edition contributes to the provision of a unique compilation of data and information, enabling the reader to discern trends by studying editions as far back as 1959. The data in the current edition is accurate according to IISS assessments as of November 2022, unless specified. Inclusion of a territory, country or state in The Military Balance, or terminology or boundaries used in graphics or mapping, does not imply legal recognition or indicate support for any government or administration. General arrangement and contents The introduction is an assessment of key themes and content in the 2023 edition. An opening analytical essay examines important defence topics in 2022, such as issues around military capability assessment in light of the ongoing war in Ukraine and the performance of the armed forces of both Russia and Ukraine, and the effect of military asssistance to both from abroad. Regional chapters begin with analysis of the military and security issues that drive national defence-policy developments, and key trends in regional defence economics. In some cases there is focused text content in the form of textboxes or longer articles relating to important defence policy and capability issues, and defence economics, and then a section assessing important regional arms procurements and deliveries. Next, detailed data on regional states' military forces and equipment, and defence economics, is presented in alphabetical order. The book closes with a reference section containing comparisons of defence economics and personnel statistics. The Military Balance wall chart The Military Balance 2023 wall chart is an assessment of important military space assets operated by China, Russia and the US. Using text, data and graphics, the chart assesses key military and military-related spacecraft for these nations. Moreover, it includes information on the military relevance of select orbits. It also contains assessments of developments in military space technology and counterspace capabilities and includes data on selected launch vehicles, map based information on selected space launch locations, and a timeline of recent international developments related to the military use of space. Abbreviations and definitions Qualifier 'Up to' Total is at most the number given, but could be lower 'Some' Precise inventory is unavailable at time of press 'In store' Equipment held away from front-line units; readiness and maintenance varies Billion (bn) 1,000 million (m) Trillion (tr) 1,000 billion $ US dollars unless otherwise stated £ Estimated Aircraft counted by the IISS as combat capable (-) Unit understrength or detached + Unit reinforced/total is no less than the number given t IISS assesses that the serviceability of equipment is in doubt" 4= Missiles whose basic design is more than four decades old and which have not been significantly upgraded within the past decade)" w Not to be taken to imply that such equipment cannot be used Using The Military Balance The country entries assess personnel strengths, organisation and equipment holdings of the world's armed forces. Force-strength and equipment-inventory data is based on the most accurate data available, or on the best estimate that can be made. In estimating a country's total capabilities, old equipment may be counted where it is considered that it may still be deployable. The data presented reflects judgements based on information available to the IISS at the time the book is compiled. Where information differs from previous editions, it is mainly because of changes in national forces, but it is sometimes because the IISS has reassessed the evidence supporting past entries. Country entries Information on each country is shown in a standard format, although the differing availability of information and differences in nomenclature result in some variations. Country entries include economic, demographic and military data. Population figures are based on demographic statistics taken from the US Census Bureau. Military data includes personnel numbers, conscript Explanatory Notes 491 liability where relevant, outline organisation, number of formations and units, and an inventory of the major equipment of each service. Details of national forces stationed abroad and of foreign forces stationed within the given country are also provided. Arms procurements and deliveries A series of thematic tables, graphics and text follow the regional data. These are designed to illustrate key trends, principal programmes and significant events in regional defence procurements. More detailed information on defence procurements, organised by country, equipment type and manufacturing company, can be found on the IISS Military Balanced database (https://www.iiss.org/mili-tarybalanceplus). The information in this section meets the threshold for a Military Balance country entry and as such does not feature information on sales of small arms and light weapons. Defence economics Country entries include annual defence budgets (and expenditure where applicable), selected economic-performance indicators and demographic aggregates. All country entries are subject to revision each year as new information, particularly regarding actual defence expenditure, becomes available. On p. 500, there are also international comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel, giving expenditure figures for the past three years in per capita terms and as a % of gross domestic product (GDP). The aim is to provide a measure of military expenditure and the allocation of economic resources to defence. Individual country entries show economic performance over the past two years and current demographic data. Where this data is unavailable, information from the last available year is provided. All financial data in the country entries is shown in both national currency and US dollars at current - not constant - prices. US-dollar conversions are calculated from the exchange rates listed in the entry. The use of market exchange rates has limitations, particularly because it does not consider the varying levels of development or the differing cost of inputs (principally personnel, equipment and investment, factors that help determine a country's military capability) specific to each country's national context. An alternative approach is to make conversions using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, which at least partially takes these cost differentials into account. However, the suitability of PPP conversions depends on the extent to which a country is self-sufficient in developing and producing the armaments required by its armed forces. For Russia and China they are appropriate, as imported systems play almost no role in Russia's case and only a small and decreasing one in that of China. However, PPP conversions are less suitable when assessing the spending of countries such as India and Saudi Arabia, which rely heavily on imports of military equipment from relatively high-cost producers. For those countries it would be necessary to adopt a hybrid approach to determine defence expenditure in dollars, with the market exchange rate used for converting defence procurement and the PPP conversion rate applied to all other defence expenditure (personnel, operations, etc.). As such, to produce standardised international comparisons, PPP conversions would have to be applied to all countries. In the absence of defence-based PPP rates, analysts would have to use the GDP-based PPP rates that are available for all countries. However, these are also statistical estimates and, as such, difficult to apply to military expenditure because they reflect the purchasing power of the wider economy, primarily civilian goods and services. Definitions of terms Despite efforts by NATO and the UN to develop a standardised definition of military expenditure, many countries prefer to use their own definitions (which are often not made public). In order to present a comprehensive picture, The Military Balance lists three different measures of military-related spending data. • For most countries, an official defence-budget figure is provided. • For those countries where other military-related outlays, over and above the defence budget, are known or can be reasonably estimated, an additional measurement referred to as defence expenditure is also provided. Defence-expenditure figures will naturally be higher than official budget figures, depending on the range of additional factors included. • For NATO countries, a defence-budget figure, as well as defence expenditure reported by NATO in local-currency terms and converted using IMF exchange rates, is quoted. NATO's military-expenditure definition (the most comprehensive) is cash outlays of central or federal governments to meet the costs of national armed forces. The term 'armed forces' includes strategic, land, naval, air, command, administration and support forces. It also includes other forces if they are trained, structured and equipped to support defence forces and are realistically deployable. Defence expenditures are reported in four categories: Operating Costs, Procurement and Construction, Research and Development (R&D) and Other Expenditure. Operating Costs include salaries and pensions for military and civilian personnel; the cost of maintaining and training units, service organisations, headquarters and support elements; and the 492 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 cost of servicing and repairing military equipment and infrastructure. Procurement and Construction expenditure covers national equipment and infrastructure spending, as well as common infrastructure programmes. R&D is defence expenditure up to the point at which new equipment can be put in service, regardless of whether new equipment is actually procured. Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) contributions are also noted - primarily the IISS tracks Foreign Military Financing (FMF) allocations from the US. For many non-NATO countries the issue of transparency in reporting military budgets is fundamental. Not every UN member state reports defence-budget data (even fewer report real defence expenditures) to their electorates, the UN, the IMF or other multinational organisations. In the case of governments with a proven record of transparency, official figures generally conform to the standardised definition of defence budgeting, as adopted by the UN, and consistency problems are not usually a major issue. The IISS cites official defence budgets as reported by either national governments, the UN, the OSCE or the IMF. For those countries where the official defence-budget figure is considered to be an incomplete measure of total military-related spending, and appropriate additional data is available, the IISS will use data from a variety of sources to arrive at a more accurate estimate of true defence expenditure. The most frequent instances of budgetary manipulation or falsification typically involve equipment procurement, R&D, defence-industrial investment, covert weapons programmes, pensions for retired military and civilian personnel, paramilitary forces and non-budgetary sources of revenue for the military arising from ownership of industrial, property and land assets. There will be several countries listed in The Military Balance for which only an official defence-budget figure is provided but where, in reality, true defence-related expenditure is almost certainly higher. Percentage changes in defence spending are referred to in either nominal or real terms. Nominal terms relate to the percentage change in numerical spending figures, and do not account for the impact of price changes (i.e., inflation) on defence spending. By contrast, real terms account for inflationary effects, and may therefore be considered a more accurate representation of change over time. The principal sources for national economic statistics cited in the country entries are the IMF, the OECD, the World Bank and three regional banks (the Inter-American, Asian and African Development banks). For some countries, basic economic data is difficult to obtain. GDP figures are nominal (current) values at market prices. GDP growth is real, not nominal growth, and inflation is the year-on-year change in consumer prices. When real-terms defence-spending figures are mentioned, these are measured in constant 2015 US dollars. Units and formation strength Company Battalion Brigade Division Corps or Army 100-200 500-1,000 3,000-5,000 1 5,000-20,000 50,000-100,000 General defence data Personnel The Active' total comprises all servicemen and women on full-time duty (including conscripts and long-term assignments from the Reserves). When a gendarmerie or equivalent is under control of the defence ministry, they may be included in the active total. Only the length of conscript liability is shown; where service is voluntary there is no entry. 'Reserve' describes formations and units not fully manned or operational in peacetime, but which can be mobilised by recalling reservists in an emergency. Some countries have more than one category of reserves, often kept at varying degrees of readiness. Where possible, these differences are denoted using the national descriptive title, but always under the heading of 'Reserves' to distinguish them from full-time active forces. All personnel figures are rounded to the nearest 50, except for organisations with under 500 personnel, where figures are rounded to the nearest ten. Other forces Many countries maintain forces whose training, organisation, equipment and control suggest that they may be used to support or replace regular military forces or be used more broadly by states to deliver militarily relevant effect. They include some forces that may have a constabulary role or are classed as gendarmerie forces, with more formal law-enforcement responsibilities. These are called 'Gendarmerie & Paramilitary' and are detailed after the military forces of each country. Their personnel numbers are not normally included in the totals at the start of each entry. Forces by role and equipment by type Quantities are shown by function (according to each nation's employment) and type, and represent what are believed to be total holdings, including active and reserve operational and training units. Inventory totals for missile systems relate to launchers and not to missiles. Equipment held 'in store' is not counted in the main inventory totals. The IISS Military Balanced assesses the relative level of capability of certain equipment platform types based on their technical characteristics. For land domain equipment, these characteristics include the level of protection, Explanatory Notes 493 main armament, and fire control and optics. For maritime domain equipment, they include crew-to-displacement ratio, primary missile armament, sensor suites, signature reduction, and propulsion. For air domain equipment, they include avionics, weapons, signature management, and upgrades. Platform types assessed in this fashion are described as having either an 'obsolete', 'obsolescent', 'ageing', 'modern' or 'advanced' level of capability when compared with other designs within the same category of equipment. This should not be taken as an assessment of the physical age or remaining service life of a given platform or whether it can actually be employed offensively. Examples of these assessments appear in certain graphics within The Military Balance. Deployments The Military Balance mainly lists permanent bases and operational deployments abroad, including peacekeeping operations. Domestic deployments are not included, with the exception of overseas territories. Information in the country-data sections details troop deployments and, where available, the role and equipment of deployed units. Personnel figures are not generally included for embassy staff or standing multinational headquarters. Land forces To make international comparison easier and more consistent, The Military Balance categorises forces by role and translates national military terminology for unit and formation sizes. Typical personnel strength, equipment holdings and organisation of formations such as brigades and divisions vary from country to country. In addition, some unit terms, such as 'regiment', 'squadron', 'battery' and 'troop', can refer to significantly different unit sizes in different countries. Unless otherwise stated, these terms should be assumed to reflect standard British usage where they occur. Naval forces Classifying naval vessels according to role is complex. A post-war consensus on primary surface combatants revolved around a distinction between independently operating cruisers, air-defence escorts (destroyers) and antisubmarine-warfare escorts (frigates). However, ships are increasingly performing a range of roles. Also, modern ship design has meant that the full-load displacement (FLD) of different warship types has evolved and in some cases overlaps. For these reasons, The Military Balance now classifies vessels by an assessed combination of role, equipment fit and displacement. Air forces Aircraft listed as combat capable are assessed as being equipped to deliver air-to-air or air-to-surface ordnance. The definition includes aircraft designated by type as bomber, fighter, fighter/ground attack, ground attack and anti-submarine warfare. Other aircraft considered to be combat capable are marked with an asterisk (*). Operational groupings of air forces are shown where known. Typical squadron aircraft strengths can vary both between aircraft types and from country to country. When assessing missile ranges, The Military Balance uses the following range indicators: • Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM): less than 1,000 km; • Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM): 1,000-3,000 km; • Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM): 3,000-5,000 km; • Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM): over 5,000 km. Other IISS defence data The Military Balanced database is integrating information on military-owned cyber capacities. The research taxonomy focuses on enablers, including indicators of capability from the armed forces. The Military Balance+ also contains data on bilateral, multilateral and notable large or important military exercises held on a national basis. More broadly, the Military Balanced enables subscribers to view multiple years of Military Balance data, and conduct searches for complex queries more rapidly than is possible by consulting the print book. Attribution and acknowledgements The International Institute for Strategic Studies owes no allegiance to any government, group of governments, or any political or other organisation. Its assessments are its own, based on the material available to it from a wide variety of sources. The cooperation of governments of all listed countries has been sought and, in many cases, received. However, some data in The Military Balance is estimated. Care is taken to ensure that this data is as accurate and free from bias as possible. The Institute owes a considerable debt to a number of its own members, consultants and all those who help compile and check material. The Director-General and Chief Executive and staff of the Institute assume full responsibility for the data and judgements in this book. Comments and suggestions on the data and textual material contained within the book, as well as on the style and presentation of data, are welcomed and should be communicated to the Editor of The Military Balance at: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Arundel House, 6 Temple Place, London, WC2R 2PG, UK, email: milbal@iiss.org. Copyright on all information in The Military Balance belongs strictly to the IISS. Application to reproduce limited amounts of data may be made to the publisher: Taylor & Francis, 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN. Email: society .-permissions® tandf.co.uk. Unauthorised use of data from The Military Balance will be subject to legal action. 494 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Principal land definitions FORCES BY ROLE Command: free-standing, deployable formation headquarters (HQs). Special Forces (SF): elite units specially trained and equipped for unconventional warfare and operations in enemy-controlled territory. Many are employed in counter-terrorist roles. Manoeuvre: combat units and formations capable of manoeuvring. These are subdivided as follows: Reconnaissance: combat units and formations whose primary purpose is to gain information. Armoured: units and formations principally equipped with main battle tanks (MBTs) and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) to provide heavy mounted close-combat capability. Units and formations intended to provide mounted close-combat capability with lighter armoured vehicles, such as light tanks or wheeled assault guns, are classified as light armoured. Mechanised: units and formations primarily equipped with lighter armoured vehicles such as armoured personnel carriers (APCs).They have less mounted firepower and protection than their armoured equivalents, but can usually deploy more infantry. Light: units and formations whose principal combat capability is dismounted infantry, with few, if any, organic armoured vehicles. Some may be motorised and equipped with soft- skinned vehicles. Air Manoeuvre: units and formations trained and equipped for delivery by transport aircraft and/ or helicopters. Amphibious: amphibious forces are trained and equipped to project force from the sea. Other Forces: includes security units such as Presidential Guards, paramilitary units such as border guards and combat formations permanently employed in training or demonstration tasks. Combat Support: combat support units and formations not integral to manoeuvre formations. Includes artillery, engineers, military intelligence, nuclear, biological and chemical defence, signals and information operations. Combat Service includes logistics, maintenance, medical, supply and transport units and formations. Support (CSS): EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Light Weapons: small arms, machine guns, grenades and grenade launchers and unguided man-portable anti-armour and support weapons have proliferated so much and are sufficiently easy to manufacture or copy that listing them would be impractical. Crew-Served crew-served recoilless rifles, man-portable ATGW, MANPADs and mortars of greater than Weapons: 8omm calibre are listed, but the high degree of proliferation and local manufacture of many of these weapons means that estimates of numbers held may not be reliable. Armoured Fighting armoured combat vehicles with a combat weight of at least six metric tonnes, further Vehicles (AFVs): subdivided as below: Main Battle Tank armoured, tracked combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 100mm (MBT): calibre and with a combat weight of between 35 and 75 metric tonnes. LightTank(LTTK): armoured, tracked combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 75mm calibre and with a combat weight of between 15 and 40 metric tonnes. Wheeled Assault armoured, wheeled combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 75mm Gun (ASLT): calibre and with a combat weight of at least 15 metric tonnes. Armoured armoured vehicles primarily designed for reconnaissance tasks with no significant Reconnaissance transport capability and either a main gun of less than 75mm calibre or a combat weight (RECCE): of less than 15 metric tonnes, or both. Infantry Fighting armoured combat vehicles designed and equipped to transport an infantry squad and Vehicle (IFV): armed with a cannon of at least 20mm calibre. Explanatory Notes 495 Armoured lightly armoured combat vehicles designed and equipped to transport an infantry squad Personnel Carrier but either unarmed or armed with a cannon of less than 20mm calibre. (APC): Airborne Combat armoured vehicles designed to be deployable by parachute alongside airborne forces. Vehicle (ABCV): Amphibious Assault armoured vehicles designed to have an amphibious ship-to-shore capability. Vehicle (AAV): Armoured Utility armoured vehicles not designed to transport an infantry squad, but capable of Vehicle (AUV): undertaking a variety of other utility battlefield tasks, including light reconnaissance and light transport. Specialist Variants: variants of armoured vehicles listed above that are designed to fill a specialised role, such as command posts (CP), artillery observation posts (OP), signals (sigs) and ambulances (amb), are categorised with their parent vehicles. Engineering and includes armoured engineer vehicles (AEV), armoured repair and recovery vehicles (ARV), Maintenance Vehicles: assault bridging (VLB) and mine-warfare vehicles (MW). Nuclear, Biological armoured vehicles principally designed to operate in potentially contaminated terrain, and Chemical Defence Vehicles (NBC): Anti-Tank/Anti- guns, guided weapons and recoilless rifles designed to engage armoured vehicles and Infrastructure (AT): battlefield hardened targets. Surface-to-Surface launch vehicles for transporting and firing surface-to-surface ballistic and cruise missiles. Missile Launchers (SSM): Artillery: weapons (including guns, howitzers, gun/howitzers, multiple-rocket launchers, mortars and gun/mortars) with a calibre greater than 100mm for artillery pieces and 80mm and above for mortars, capable of engaging ground targets with indirect fire. Coastal Defence: land-based coastal artillery pieces and anti-ship-missile launchers. Air Defence (AD): guns, directed-energy (DE) weapons and surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers designed to engage fixed-wing, rotary-wing and uninhabited aircraft. Missiles are further classified by maximum notional engagement range: point-defence (up to 10 km); short-range (10-30 km); medium-range (30-75 km); and long-range (75 km+). Systems primarily intended to intercept missiles rather than aircraft are categorised separately as Missile Defence. Principal naval definitions To aid comparison between fleets, the following definitions, which do not always conform to national definitions, are used as guidance: Submarines: all vessels designed to operate primarily under water. Submarines with a dived displacement below 250 tonnes are classified as midget submarines (SSW); those below 500 tonnes are coastal submarines (SSC). all surface ships designed for combat operations on the high seas, with an FLD above 2,200 tonnes. Aircraft carriers (CV), including smaller support carriers (CVS) embarking STOVL aircraft and helicopter carriers (CVH), are vessels with a flat deck primarily designed to carry fixed-and/or rotary-wing aircraft, without specialised amphibious capability. Other principal surface combatants include cruisers (C) (FLD above 9,750 tonnes), destroyers (DD) (FLD 4,500-9,749 tonnes with a primary area air-defence weapons fit and role) and frigates (FF) (FLD 2,200-9,000 tonnes and a primary anti-submarine/general-purpose weapons fit and role). surface vessels designed for coastal or inshore operations. These include corvettes (FS), which usually have an FLD between 500 and 2,199 tonnes and are distinguished from other patrol vessels by their heavier armaments. Also included in this category are offshore-patrol ships (PSO), with an FLD greater than 1,500 tonnes; patrol craft (PC), which have an FLD between 250 and 1,499 tonnes; and patrol boats (PB) with an FLD between ten and 250 tonnes. Vessels with a top speed greater than 35 knots are designated as'fast'. Principal Surface Combatants: Patrol and Coastal Combatants: 496 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Mine warfare vessels: all surface vessels configured primarily for mine laying (ML) or countermeasures. Countermeasures vessels are either: sweepers (MS), which are designed to locate and destroy mines in an area; hunters (MH), which are designed to locate and destroy individual mines; or countermeasures vessels (MC), which combine both roles. Amphibious vessels: vessels designed to transport combat personnel and/or equipment onto shore. These include aviation-capable amphibious assault ships (LHA), which can embark rotary-wing or STOVL air assets and may have a well deck for LCACs and landing craft; aviation-capable amphibious assault ships with a well dock for LCACs and landing craft (LHD), which can embark rotary-wing or STOVL assets; landing platform helicopters (LPH), which have a primary role of launch and recovery platform for rotary-wing or STOVL assets; landing platform docks (LPD), which do not have a through deck but do have a well dock and carry both combat personnel and equipment; and land ships docks (LSD) with a well dock but focused more on equipment transport. Landing ships (LS) are amphibious vessels capable of ocean passage and landing craft (LC) are smaller vessels designed to transport personnel and equipment from a larger vessel to land or across small stretches of water. Landing ships have a hold; landing craft are open vessels. Landing craft air cushioned (LCAC) are differentiated from utility craft air cushioned (UCAC) in that the former have a bow ramp for the disembarkation of vehicles and personnel. Auxiliary vessels: ocean-going surface vessels performing an auxiliary military role, supporting combat ships or operations. These generally fulfil five roles: replenishment (such as oilers (AO) and solid stores (AKS)); logistics (such as cargo ships (AK) and logistics ships (AFS)); maintenance (such as cable-repair ships (ARC) or buoy tenders (ABU)); research (such as survey ships (AFS)); and special purpose (such as intelligence-collection ships (AGI) and ocean-going tugs (ATF)). Weapons systems: weapons are listed in the following order: land-attack cruise missiles (LACM), anti-ship missiles (AShM), surface-to-air missiles (SAM), heavy (HWT) and lightweight (LWT) torpedoes, anti-submarine weapons (A/S), CIWS, guns and aircraft. Missiles with a range less than 5 km and guns with a calibre less than 57mm are generally not included. Organisations: naval groupings such as fleets and squadrons frequently change and are shown only where doing so would aid qualitative judgements. Legacy platforms: legacy-generation platforms, unless specifically modified for a new role, may be listed with their original designations although they may not conform fully with current guidance criteria. Principal aviation definitions Bomber (Bbr): comparatively large platforms intended for the delivery of air-to-surface ordnance. Bbr units are units equipped with bomber aircraft for the air-to-surface role. Fighter (Ftr): aircraft designed primarily for air-to-air combat, which may also have a limited air-to-surface capability. Ftr units are equipped with aircraft intended to provide air superiority, which may have a secondary and limited air-to-surface capability. Fighter/Ground multi-role fighter-size platforms with significant air-to-surface capability, potentially Attack (FGA): including maritime attack, and at least some air-to-air capacity. FGA units are multi-role units equipped with aircraft capable of air-to-air and air-to-surface attack. Ground Attack (Atk): aircraft designed solely for the air-to-surface task, with limited or no air-to-air capability. Atk units are equipped with fixed-wing aircraft. Attack Helicopter rotary-wing platforms designed for delivery of air-to-surface weapons, and fitted with an (Atk hel): integrated fire-control system. Anti-Submarine fixed- and rotary-wing platforms designed to locate and engage submarines, many Warfare (ASW): with a secondary anti-surface-warfare capability. ASW units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft. Explanatory Notes 497 Anti-Surface Warfare ASuW units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft intended for (ASuW): anti-surface-warfare missions. Maritime Patrol (MP): fixed-wing aircraft and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) intended for maritime surface surveillance, which may possess an anti-surface-warfare capability. MP units are equipped with fixed-wing aircraft or UAVs. Electronic Warfare fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs intended for electronic warfare. EW units are (EW): equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs. Intelligence/ fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs intended to provide radar, visible-light or Surveillance/ infrared imagery, or a mix thereof. ISR units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing Reconnaissance (ISR): aircraft or UAVs. Combat/Intelligence/ aircraft and UAVs that have the capability to deliver air-to-surface weapons, as well as Surveillance/ undertake ISR tasks. CISR units are equipped with armed aircraft and/or UAVs for ISR and Reconnaissance (GSR): air-to-surface missions. COMINT/ELINT/ fixed- and rotary-wing platforms and UAVs capable of gathering electronic (ELINT), SIGINT: communications (COMINT) or signals intelligence (SIGINT). COMINT units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs intended for the communications-intelligence task. ELINT units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs used for gathering electronic intelligence. SIGINT units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs used to collect signals intelligence. Airborne Early fixed- and rotary-wing platforms capable of providing airborne early warning, with a Warning (& Control) varying degree of onboard command and control depending on the (AEW (&C)): platform. AEW(&C) units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft. Search and Rescue units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft used to recover military personnel (SAR): or civilians. Combat Search and units are equipped with armed fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft for recovery of personnel Rescue (CSAR): from hostile territory. Tanker (Tkr): fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft designed for air-to-air refuelling.Tkr units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft used for air-to-air refuelling. Tanker Transport platforms capable of both air-to-air refuelling and military airlift. (Tkr/Tpt): Transport (Tpt): fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft intended for military airlift. Light transport aircraft are categorised as having a maximum payload of up to 11,340 kg; medium up to 27,215 kg; and heavy above 27,215 kg. Light transport helicopters have an internal payload of up to 2,000 kg; medium transport helicopters up to 4,535 kg; heavy transport helicopters greater than 4,535 kg. PAX aircraft are platforms generally unsuited for transporting cargo on the main deck. Tpt units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing platforms to transport personnel or cargo. Trainer (Trg): fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft designed primarily for the training role; some also have the capacity to carry light to medium ordnance. Trg units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing training aircraft intended for pilot or other aircrew training. Multi-Role Helicopter rotary-wing platforms designed to carry out a variety of military tasks including light (MRH): transport, armed reconnaissance and battlefield support. Uninhabited Aerial remotely piloted or controlled uninhabited fixed- or rotary-wing systems. Light UAVs are Vehicles (UAVs): those weighing 20-150 kg; medium: 150-600 kg; and large: more than 600 kg. Loitering & Direct air vehicles with an integral warhead that share some characteristics with both UAVs and Attack Munitions: cruise missiles. They are designed to either fly directly to their target (Direct Attack), or in a search or holding pattern (Loitering). Defence spending Defence spending Defence spending Active armed Estimated Active (current USDm) per capita (current USD) % of GDP forces (000) reservists (000) paramilitary (000) 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2022 2022 2022 Canada 20,144 23,178 24,617 534 611 644 1.22 1.17 1.12 67 34 _5 United States 774,527 759,645 766,606 2,328 2,268 2,272 3.71 3.30 3.06 _U60_817 _0 Total_794,671 782,823 791,223 1,431 1,439 1,458_2.47 2.24 2.09_M2B_852_5 Albania 222 245 286 72 79 92 1.47 1.34 1.57 _ 8 0 _0 Austria 3,466 4,200 3,643 391 473 409 0.80 0.88 0.78 23 112 _0 Belgium 5,323 5,520 5,663 454 469 478 1.02 0.92 0.96 _23_6_ _0 Bosnia-Herzegovina 168 192 169 44 50 44 0.84 0.82 0.71 _11_6_ _0 Bulgaria 1,249 1,270 1,341 179 184 195 1.79 1.58 1.58 37_3_ 0 Croatia 997 1,413 1,273 236 336 304 1.74 2.09 1.84 17_21__0 Cyprus 419 571 497 331 445 384 1.70 2.06 1.86 _12_50__0 Czech Republic 3,253 3,938 3,826 304 368 357 1.32 1.40 1.29 _27_0_ _0 Denmark 4,919 5,371 5,064 838 911 855 1.38 1.35 1.31 _15_44 _0 Estonia 716 779 830 583 638 685 2.31 2.12 2.15 _7_18_ _0 Finland 4,153 5,913 5,819 745 1,058 1,039 1.53 1.99 2.07 _19_238 _3 France 54,943 58,812 54,417 810 864 797 2.08 1.99 1.96 _203_4j_ _101_ Germany 52,094 55,543 53,371 650 695 633 1.34 1.30 1.32 _183_33 _0 Greece 4,976 7,688 7,869 469 727 747 2.64 3.55 3.54 _132_289_4 Hungary 2,175 2,620 2,992 223 269 308 1.39 1.44 1.62 _32_20_ _0 Iceland 52 44 42 149 123 117 0.24 0.17 0.15 _0_0_0 Ireland 1,187 1,269 1,170 229 243 222 0.28 0.25 0.23 fi_2__0 Italy 29,696 33,479 31,120 476 537 509 1.57 1.59 1.56 161 18 176 Latvia 757 824 852 402 442 462 2.27 2.14 2.12 _7_16__0 Lithuania 1,161 1,308 1,585 425 482 590 2.07 2.01 2.34 _23_7_ _14_ Luxembourg 390 412 444 620 644 683 0.53 0.47 0J54 _0_0_ _1_ Macedonia, North 188 207 229 88 97 108 1.59 1.49 1.63 _8_5_ _8 Malta 81 85 87 177 184 188 0.54 0.49 0.51 _2_0_ _0^ Montenegro 74 91 100 121 150 166 1.65 1.55 1.63 _2_3_ _4 Netherlands 12,594 13,883 15,228 729 801 875 1.39 1.37 1.54 _34_6_ _1 Norway 6,476 7,503 7,433 1,184 1,362 1,338 1.79 1.56 1.47 _25_40_ _0 Poland 12,780 13,424 13,396 334 352 352 2.13 1.98 1.87 _114_0_ _14 Portugal 2,853 2,932 2,591 277 286 253 1.25 1.17 1.01 27_24_ 25 Romania 5,182 5,557 5,188 243 262 280 2.08 1.96 1.73 _72_55 _57 Serbia 896 1,032 1,221 128 148 181 1.68 1.64 1.95 28 50 4 Defence spending (current USDm) Defence spending per capita (current USD) Defence spending % of GDP Active armed forces (000) Estimated reservists (000) Active paramilitary (000) 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2022 2022 2022 Slovakia 1,847 1,992 2,008 339 366 370 1.76 1.73 1.79 18 0 0 Slovenia 605 836 883 288 397 420 1.13 1.35 1.42 6 1 0 Spain 13,744 15,126 14,669 275 320 311 1.07 1.06 1.06 124 15 76 Sweden 7,036 8,296 8,074 690 808 770 1.29 1.31 1.34 15 10 0 Switzerland 5,723 5,689 5,554 681 673 653 0.77 0.71 0.69 20 123 0 Turkey 10,885 9,547 6,188 133 116 75 1.51 1.17 0.73 355 379 157 United Kingdom* 61,473 70,870 70,029 935 1,073 1,033 2.23 2.22 2.19 150 72 0 Total 314,753 348,476 335,152 412 471 467 1.46 1.47 1.46 1,948 1,705 649 Russia and Eurasia Armenia 628 622 749 208 206 250 4.97 4.46 4.23 43 210 4 Azerbaijan 2,267 2,698 2,641 222 262 255 5.31 4.94 3.77 64 300 15 Belarus 601 640 818 63 68 87 0.98 0.94 1.03 48 290 110 Georgia 283 279 314 57 57 64 2.04 1.68 1.35 21 0 5 Kazakhstan 1,430 1,538 1,876 75 80 97 0.84 0.78 0.84 39 0 32 Kyrgyzstan n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 11 0 10 Moldova 44 52 46 13 16 14 0.39 0.38 0.32 5 58 1 Russia [a] 42,671 48,531 66,857 301 341 471 2.87 2.73 3.13 1,190 1,500 559 Tajikistan 89 94 107 10 10 12 1.09 1.07 1.07 9 0 8 Turkmenistan* n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 37 0 20 Ukraine [b] 4,353 4,298 3,547 99 98 81 2.86 2.21 n.k. 688 400 250 Uzbekistan n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 48 0 20 Total** 52,367 58,751 76,955 117 126 148 2.37 2.13 1.97 2,202 2,758 1,033 Asia Afghanistan 2,014 n.k. n.k. 55 n.k. n.k. 10.00 n.k. n.k. 100 0 0 Australia 31,418 34,185 33,841 1,234 1,324 1,295 2.31 2.09 1.96 60 30 0 Bangladesh 3,786 4,059 4,320 23 25 26 1.01 0.98 0.94 163 0 64 Brunei 439 454 435 946 964 910 3.66 3.24 2.36 7 1 1 Cambodia* 1,032 1,024 1,003 61 59 60 4.10 3.89 3.54 124 0 67 China 187,208 213,923 242,409 134 152 171 1.26 1.21 1.20 2,035 510 500 Fiji 52 46 44 55 49 46 1.16 1.07 0.90 4 6 0 India 65,307 67,498 66,645 49 50 48 2.45 2.13 1.92 1,468 1,155 1,608 Indonesia 8,116 8,407 9,059 30 31 33 0.77 0.71 0.70 396 400 280 0) ■3 Reference Defence spending (current USDm) Defence spending per capita (current USD) Defence spending % of GDP Active armed forces (000) Estimated reservists (000) Active paramilitary (000) 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2022 2022 2022 Japan 53,758 52,198 48,079 428 419 387 1.07 1.06 1.12 247 56 14 Korea, DPR of n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 1,280 600 189 Korea, Republic of 40,999 46,258 42,991 791 894 829 2.49 2.55 2.48 Laos Malaysia n.k. 3,709 n.k. 3,829 n.k. 4,148 n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 114 114 122 1.10 1.03 0.96 555 29 113 3,100 52 14 100 23 Maldives 82 92 101 210 236 258 2.20 1.78 1.71 4 0 0 Mongolia 105 100 90 33 31 28 0.81 0.67 0.59 10 137 8 Myanmar 2,390 3,409 1,876 42 60 33 2.94 5.23 3.15 356 0 107 Nepal 435 413 421 14 14 14 1.29 1.15 1.08 97 0 15 New Zealand 3,287 3,269 3,353 667 655 664 1.56 1.32 1.38 9 3 0 Pakistan 9,363 10,300 9,768 40 43 40 3.12 2.96 2.59 652 0 291 Papua New Guinea 95 88 99 13 12 10 0.39 0.32 0.32 4 0 0 Philippines 5,269 5,660 5,462 48 51 48 1.47 1.45 1.37 145 131 12 Singapore 9,879 11,433 11,919 1,591 1,949 2,013 2.86 2.88 2.81 51 253 7 Sri Lanka 1,683 1,548 1,154 74 67 50 1.97 1.74 1.56 255 6 62 Taiwan 13,903 16,179 16,164 589 686 685 2.08 2.09 1.95 169 1,657 12 Thailand 6,839 6,708 6,171 99 97 89 1.37 1.33 1.16 361 200 94 Timor-Leste 42 39 44 30 28 31 2.19 1.66 1.80 2 0 0 Tonga 10 5 8 94 48 77 2.04 1.08 1.63 1 0 0 Vietnam* 5,724 6,308 6,030 58 61 58 1.67 1.73 1.46 482 5,000 40 Total ** 456,944 497,432 515.635 279 312 309 2.20 1.82 1 64 9.178 13,295 3.507 1 Middle East and North Africa 1 Algeria 9,699 9,088 8,945 226 209 202 6.69 5.59 4.78 139 150 187 Bahrain 1,405 1,399 1,399 934 916 908 4.05 3.61 3.22 8 0 11 Egypt 4,106 4,839 5,211 39 45 48 1.41 1.45 1.39 439 479 397 Iran 16,549 28,102 44,011 195 327 507 1.70 1.77 2.23 610 350 40 Iraq 10,191 7,423 8,690 262 187 215 6.01 3.71 3.16 193 0 266 Israel 17,234 20,408 19,350 1,987 2,323 2,171 4.97 4.85 4.30 170 465 8 Jordan 1,719 1,801 1,933 159 165 176 4.90 4.91 4.75 101 65 15 Kuwait 6,823 9,635 9,172 2,279 3,178 2,989 6.44 7.10 5.00 18 24 7 Lebanon 741 n.k. n.k. 136 n.k. n.k. 3.03 n.k. n.k. 60 0 20 Li bya n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. Mauritania 207 213 229 52 52 55 2.41 2.15 2.27 16 0 5 Morocco 5,961 6,521 6,413 168 182 175 4.92 4.57 4.50 196 150 50 Oman 7,483 6,431 6,431 2,059 1,741 1,709 10.12 7.49 5.90 43 0 4 Defence spending (current USDm) Defence spending per capita (current USD) Defence spending % of GDP Active armed forces (000) Estimated reservists (000) Active paramilitary (000) 1 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2022 2022 2022 Palestinian Territories n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 0 0 n.k. Qatar 6,466 6,258 8,419 2,645 2,523 3,357 4.48 3.48 3.80 17 0 5 Saudi Arabia 52,000 50,667 45,600 1,522 1,457 1,290 7.39 6.08 4.51 257 0 25 Syria n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 169 0 100 Tunisia 1,153 1,231 1,283 98 104 108 2.91 2.81 2.95 36 0 12 United Arab Emirates 19,826 19,159 20,356 1,984 1,944 2,053 5.52 4.56 4.04 63 0 0 Yemen n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 40 0 0 Total** 161,564 173,176 187,442 921 1024 1064 4.81 4.28 3.79 2,572 1,683 1,152 1 Latin America and the Caribbean 1 Antigua and Barbuda 8 7 8 80 75 76 0.57 0.50 0.45 0 0 0 Argentina 2,904 2,588 3,380 64 56 73 0.75 0.53 0.54 72 0 31 Bahamas 86 95 95 254 270 266 0.88 0.85 0.74 2 0 0 Barbados 41 40 42 138 132 140 0.87 0.82 0.73 1 0 0 Belize 25 20 23 61 49 57 1.26 0.86 0.87 2 1 0 Bolivia 479 476 481 41 40 40 1.30 1.17 1.11 34 0 37 Brazil 22,234 21,293 22,951 105 100 106 1.53 1.32 1.21 367 1,340 395 Chile 4,049 4,041 3,758 223 221 204 1.60 1.28 1.21 69 19 45 Colombia 5,480 6,078 6,307 112 121 129 2.04 1.95 1.85 256 35 172 Costa Rica 457 430 423 90 84 81 0.75 0.68 0.62 0 0 10 Cuba n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 49 39 27 Dominican Republic 589 582 761 56 55 71 0.75 0.61 0.68 56 0 15 Ecuador 1,545 1,593 1,581 91 93 91 1.56 1.51 1.37 41 118 1 El Salvador 172 248 257 27 38 39 0.71 0.86 0.80 25 10 26 Guatemala 366 340 400 21 20 23 0.47 0.40 0.44 18 64 25 Guyana 66 71 85 88 90 107 1.20 0.92 0.57 3 1 0 Haiti 10 37 14 1 3 1 0.07 0.18 0.07 1 0 0 Honduras 345 352 371 37 38 39 1.45 1.24 1.21 15 60 8 Jamaica 238 207 204 85 73 72 1.71 1.34 1.27 6 3 0 Mexico 5,352 6,713 5,743 42 52 44 0.49 0.52 0.40 216 82 137 Nicaragua 79 81 85 13 13 13 0.63 0.58 0.54 12 0 0 Panama 753 830 870 193 211 201 1.40 1.31 1.22 0 0 28 Paraguay 278 278 276 39 38 37 0.78 0.72 0.66 14 165 15 Reference Defe (cu 2020 Defence spending (current USDm) 2021 Defence spending per capita (current USD) Defence spending % of GDP Active armed Estimated Active farces (000) reservists (000) paramilitary (000) 2022 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2022 2022 2022 Peru 2,132 1,818 1,746 67 56 54 1.04 0.80 0.73 81 188 77 Suriname n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 2 0 0 Trinidad and Tobago 954 773 838 789 633 596 4.46 3.22 2.86 5 1 0 Uruguay 509 516 546 150 152 160 0.95 0.87 0.77 21 0 1 Venezuela n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 123 8 220 Total** 49,150 49,508 51,245 115 109 109 1.17 1.00 0.92 1.488 2,132 1.269 1 Sub-Saharan Africa 1 Angola 1,014 993 1,760 31 30 51 1.74 1.32 1.41 107 0 10 Benin 56 226 394 4 17 29 0.36 1.27 2.24 12 0 5 Botswana 560 520 495 242 221 208 3.75 2.95 2.75 9 0 0 Burkina Faso 388 459 469 19 21 21 2.23 2.40 2.57 7 0 4 Burundi 62 65 67 5 5 5 2.02 1.95 1.81 30 0 1 Cabo Verde 12 12 12 20 20 19 0.62 0.57 0.56 1 0 0 Cameroon 407 444 419 15 16 14 1.00 0.98 0.95 25 0 9 Central African Rep 41 43 39 7 8 7 1.73 1.67 1.56 9 0 1 Chad 274 286 259 16 16 14 2.55 2.43 2.00 33 0 12 Congo 311 313 264 59 58 48 3.01 2.48 1.82 10 0 2 Cote d'lvoire 608 638 610 22 23 6 0.99 0.91 0.89 27 0 n.k. Dem Republic of the Congo 346 291 372 3 3 13 0.71 0.52 0.58 134 0 0 Djibouti n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 8 0 5 Equatorial Guinea n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 1 0 0 Eritrea n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 302 n.k. 0 Ethiopia 429 377 1,576 4 3 14 0.44 0.38 1.42 503 0 0 Gabon 272 312 280 122 136 119 1.77 1.54 1.26 5 0 2 Gambia 15 16 14 7 7 6 0.82 0.79 0.65 4 0 0 Ghana 276 362 262 9 11 8 0.39 0.46 0.34 16 0 0 Guinea 211 247 327 17 19 25 1.49 1.53 1.66 10 0 3 Guinea-Bissau n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 4 0 0 Kenya 1,102 1,099 1,346 21 20 24 1.09 0.99 1.17 24 0 5 Lesotho 38 35 40 19 16 18 1.84 1.42 1.58 2 0 0 Liberia 12 20 19 2 4 3 0.40 0.56 0.48 2 0 0 Madagascar 107 102 102 4 4 4 0.82 0.71 0.68 14 0 8 Malawi 69 82 75 3 4 4 0.58 0.69 0.65 11 0 4 Mali 787 855 831 40 42 40 4.50 4.47 4.51 21 0 20 Mauritius 225 202 230 163 146 176 2.06 1.81 2.00 0 0 3 Defence spending (current USDm) Defence spending per capita (current USD) Defence spending % of GDP 1 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 Mozambique 131 143 145 4 5 5 0.93 0.91 0.81 Namibia 378 367 363 144 137 133 3.58 2.98 2.91 Niger 211 203 244 9 9 10 1.53 1.35 1.66 Nigeria 2,505 2,423 2,778 12 11 12 0.58 0.55 0.55 Rwanda 128 152 169 10 12 13 1.26 1.38 1.40 Senegal 346 474 423 22 29 24 1.41 1.72 1.54 Seychelles n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. Sierra Leone 24 33 26 4 5 3 0.58 0.79 0.63 Somalia n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. South Africa 3,321 3,342 3,090 59 59 54 0.98 0.80 0.75 South Sudan 92 43 64 9 4 6 1.37 0.84 1.33 Sudan n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. Tanzania 803 903 943 14 15 15 1.25 1.28 1.23 Togo 116 118 173 13 14 20 1.53 1.40 2.07 Uganda 960 1,222 1,091 22 27 24 2.56 2.84 2.26 Zambia 358 282 444 21 15 23 1.98 1.32 1.64 Zimbabwe 39 287 751 3 19 50 0.17 0.87 1.96 Total** 17,034 17,992 20,965 32 32 33 1.49 1.42 1.48 Summary North America 794,671 782,823 791,223 1,431 1,439 1,458 2.47 2.24 2.09 Europe 314,753 348,476 335,152 412 471 467 1.46 1.47 1.46 Russia and Eurasia 52,367 58,751 76,955 117 126 148 2.37 2.13 1.97 Asia 456,944 497,432 515,635 279 312 309 2.20 1.82 1.64 Middle East and North Africa 161,564 173,176 187,442 921 1,024 1,064 4.81 4.28 3.79 Latin America and the Caribbean 49,150 49,508 51,245 115 109 109 1.17 1.00 0.92 Sub-Saharan Africa 17,034 17,992 20,965 32 32 33 1.49 1.42 1.48 Global totals 1,846,484 1,928,158 1,978,617 295 321 326 1.96 1.76 1.67 Active armed forces (000) Estimated reservists (000) Active paramilitary (000) 2022 2022 2022 11 0 0 10 0 6 33 0 25 143 0 80 33 0 2 14 0 5 0 0 0 9 0 0 14 0 0 74 0 15 53 0 0 104 0 40 27 80 1 13 0 3 45 10 1 15 3 1 29 0 22 1,960 93 295 1,426 852 5 1,948 1,705 649 2,202 2,758 1,033 9,178 13,295 3,507 2,572 1,683 1,152 1,488 2,132 1,269 1,960 93 295 20,774 22,51/ 7,911 ■3 Totals may not sum precisely due to rounding. * Estimates. **Totals exclude defence-spending estimates for states where insufficient official information is available in order to enable approximate comparisons of regional defence-spending between years. Defence Spending per capita (current USS) and Defence Spending % of GDP totals are regional averages, [a] 'National Defence' budget chapter. Excludes other defence-related expenditures included under other budget lines (e.g. pensions) - see Table 5, p.191 [b] Official budget (including military pensions). Actual spending expected to be much higher in 2022 following Russian invasion in February. Significant depreciation of the Ukrainian hryvnia against the US dollar in 2022. Defence Spending as % of GDP includes US foreign military financing programmes - other figures do not. Reference 498 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2023 Reference Table 17 List of abbreviations for data sections AAM air-to-air missile AAR search-and-rescue vessel AAV amphibious assault vehicle AB airborne ABM anti-ballistic missile ABU/H sea-going buoy tender/with hangar ABCV airborne combat vehicle ac aircraft ACS crane ship AD air defence ADA air-defence artillery adj adjusted AE auxiliary, ammunition carrier AEM missile support ship AEV armoured engineer vehicle AEWI&C) airborne early warning (and control) AFD/L auxiliaryfloating dry dock/small AFS/H logistics ship/with hangar AFSB afloat forward staging base AFV armoured fighting vehicle AG misc auxiliary AGB/H icebreaker/with hangar AGE/H experimental auxiliary ship/with hangar AGF/H command ship/with hangar AGHS hydrographic survey vessel AGI intelligence collection vessel AGM space tracking vessel AGOR oceanographic research vessel AGOS oceanographic surveillance vessel AGS/H survey ship/with hangar AH hospital ship AIP air-independent propulsion AK/L cargo ship/light aka also known as AKEH dry cargo/ammunition ship AKR/H roll-on/roll-off cargo ship/with hangar AKS/L stores ship/light ALBM air-launched ballistic missile ALCM air-launched cruise missile amb ambulance amph amphibious/amphibian AO/S oiler/small AOE fast combat support ship AOR/L/H fleet replenishment oiler with RAS capability/light/with hangar AOT/L oiler transport/light AP transport ship APB barracks ship APC armoured personnel carrier AR/C/D/L repair ship/cable/dry dock/light ARG amphibious ready group ARH active radar homing ARM anti-radiation missile armd armoured ARS/H rescue and salvage ship/with hangar arty artillery ARV armoured recovery vehicle AS anti-submarine/submarine tender ASAT anti-satellite ASBM anti-ship ballistic missile ASCM anti-ship cruise missile AShM anti-ship missile aslt assault ASM air-to-surface missile ASR submarine rescue craft ASTT anti-submarine torpedo tube ASW anti-submarine warfare ASuW anti-surface warfare AT anti-tank ATF ocean going tug ATGW anti-tank guided weapon Atk attack/ground attack ATS tug, salvage and rescue ship AUV armoured utility vehicle avn aviation AWT water tanker AX/L/S training craft/light/sail BA Budget Authority (US) Bbr bomber BCT brigade combat team bde brigade bdgt budget BG battlegroup BMD ballistic-missile defence bn battalion/billion bty battery C2 command and control C4 command, control, communications, and computers casevac casualty evacuation cav cavalry cbt combat CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive cdo commando C/G/H/M/N cruiser/with surface-to-surface missile/with hangar/with SAM/ nuclear-powered CISR combat ISR CIMIC civil-military cooperation CIWS close-in weapons system COIN counter-insurgency comd command COMINT communications intelligence comms communications coy company CP command post CS combat support CSAR combat search and rescue CSS combat service support CT counter-terrorism CV/H/L/N/S aircraft carrier/helicopter/light/ nuclear powered/STOVL CW chemical warfare/weapons DD/G/H/M destroyer/with surface-to-surface missile/with hangar/with SAM DDR disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration DE directed energy def defence det detachment div division ECM electronic countermeasures ELINT electronic intelligence elm element/s engr engineer EOD explosive ordnance disposal EPF expeditionary fast transport vessel eqpt equipment ESB expeditionary sea base ESD expeditionary transport dock EW electronic warfare excl excludes/excluding exp expenditure/expeditionary FAC forward air control fd field FF/G/H/M frigate/with surface-to-surface missile/with hangar/with SAM FGA fighter/ground attack FLD full-load displacement fit flight FMA Foreign Military Assistance FRS fleet replacement squadron FS/G/H/M corvette/with surface-to-surface missile/with hangar/with SAM Ftr fighter FTX field training exercise FY fiscal year gd guard GDP gross domestic product GLCM ground-launched cruise missile GMLS Guided Missile Launching System gp group GPS Global Positioning System HA/DR humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief hel helicopter HQ headquarters HUMINT human intelligence HWT heavyweight torpedo hy heavy ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile IFV infantry fighting vehicle MR imaging infrared IMINT imagery intelligence imp improved indep independent inf infantry info ops information operations INS inertial navigation system int intelligence IOC Initial operating capability Reference 499 IR infrared IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile ISD in-service date ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ISTAR intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance LACM land-attack cruise missile LC/A/AC/H/M/P/T/UA/P landing craft/assault/air cushion/ heavy/medium/personnel/tank/ utility/vehicles and personnel LCC amphibious command ship LGB laser-guided bomb LHA aviation-capable amphibious assault ship LHD aviation-capable amphibious assault ship with well dock LIFT lead-in ftr trainer LKA amphibious cargo ship lnchr launcher LoA letter of offer and acceptance log logistic Lol letter of intent LP/D/H landing platform/dock/helicopter LRIP low-rate initial production LS/D/L/H/M/T landing ship/dock/logistic/with hangar/medium/tank It light LWT lightweight torpedo maint maintenance MAN PAD man-portable air-defence system MANPATS man-portable anti-tank system MBT main battle tank MC/C/CS/D/I/O mine countermeasure coastal/ command and support/diving support/inshore/ocean MCM mine countermeasures MCMV mine countermeasures vessel MD military district mech mechanised med medium/medical medevac medical evacuation MH/C/D/I/O mine hunter/coastal/drone/ inshore/ocean mil military MIRV multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle mk mark (model number) ML minelayer MLU mid-life update mne marine mnvenh manoeuvre enhancement mod modified/modification mor mortar mot motorised/motor Moll memorandum of understanding MP maritime patrol/military police MR motor rifle MRBM medium-range ballistic missile MRH multi-role helicopter MRL multiple rocket launcher MS/C/D/I/O/R mine sweeper/coastal/drone/ inshore/ocean/river msl missile mtn mountain MW mine warfare n.a. not applicable n.k. not known NBC nuclear, biological, chemical NCO non-commissioned officer O & M operations and maintenance obs observation/observer OCU operational conversion unit OP observation post op/ops operational/operations OPFOR opposition training force org organised/organisation OPV offshore patrol vessel para paratroop/parachute PAX passenger/passenger transport aircraft PB/F/G/I/M/R/T patrol boat/fast/with surface-to-surface missile/inshore/with SAM/ riverine/with torpedo PC/C/F/G/H/I/M/O/R/T patrol craft/coastal/fast/with surface-to-surface missile/with hangar/inshore/with CIWS missile or SAM/offshore/riverine/with torpedo pdr pounder PGM precision-guided munitions PH/G/M/T patrol hydrofoil/with surface-to-surface missile/with SAM/with torpedo pi platoon PKO peacekeeping operations PNT positioning, navigation, timing PoR programme of record PPP purchasing-power parity PPV protected patrol vehicle PRH passive radar-homing PSO/H peace support operations or offshore patrol ship/with hangar psyops psychological operations ptn br pontoon bridging quad quadruple R&D research and development RCL recoilless launcher RDT&E research, development, test and evaluation recce reconnaissance regt regiment RFI request for information RFP request for proposals RL rocket launcher ro-ro roll-on, roll-off RPO rendezvous and proximity operations RV re-entry vehicle rvn riverine SAM surface-to-air missile SAR search and rescue/synthetic aperture radar SARH semi-active radar homing sat satellite SATCOM satellite communications SEAD suppression of enemy air defence SF special forces SHORAD short-range air defence SIGINT signals intelligence sigs signals SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile SLCM submarine-launched cruise missile SLEP service-life-extension programme SP self-propelled Spec Ops special operations SPAAGM self-propelled anti-aircraft gun and missile system spt support sqn squadron SRBM short-range ballistic missile SS submarine SSA/N auxiliary support submarine/ nuclear-powered SSB/N ballistic missile submarine/ nuclear-powered SSC coastal submarine SSG conventionally-powered attack submarine with dedicated launch tubes for guided missiles SSGN nuclear-powered submarine with dedicated launch tubes for guided missiles SSK conventionally-powered attack submarine SSM surface-to-surface missile SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine SSR security-sector reform SSW midget submarine strat strategic STOVL short take-off and vertical landing surv surveillance sy security t tonnes tac tactical tch technical tk tank tkr tanker TMD theatre missile defence torp torpedo tpt transport tr trillion trg training TSV tank support vehicle TT torpedo tube UAV uninhabited aerial vehicle UCAC utility craft air cushioned UCAV uninhabited combat air vehicle UGV uninhabited ground vehicle utl utility UUV uninhabited underwater vehicle veh vehicle VLB vehicle launched bridge VLS vertical launch system VSHORADvery short-range air defence WFU withdrawn from use wg wing