

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How to Defend Romania?: Identifying Legacy and Institutional Impediments

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ABSTRACT
Developments in the Black Sea region since 2014 have combined to transform Romania into the Western alliance's linchpin in southeastern Europe. Regrettably, successive Romanian governments have under-funded defense and the modernization of the armed forces, leaving them with incoherent capabilities. This essay examines the Romanian defense institution on four levels. First, outputs of the armed forces are examined in a critical light. Second, key inputs into defense execution are assessed. Third, the paper proposes a different manner by which to examine these challenges with the objective of finding practical solutions. The fourth and final section examines the critical issue of finding the necessary resources to fund increased training, maintenance, and modernization.

The 2014 Russian seizure of the Crimean peninsula and its subsequent militarization have contributed dramatically to shifting the balance of power in the Black Sea region (Flanagan and Chindea 2019). Added to these developments, ambiguities in Turkey's foreign and security policy (Stein 2019), and a Bulgaria that continues to struggle to modernize its armed forces (Dicke, Hendrickson, and Kutz 2014), combine to make NATO's posture in the region problematic. Conversely, there is no small degree of ambivalence among many in the West about this new development. For example, an outcome of the NATO summit in Warsaw in 2016 was the announcement of the policy of Enhanced Forward Presence. However, the alliance has a differentiated policy whereby in the Baltic Sea region there is a collective effort to prepare for combat, while in southern Europe the focus is on training under the Combined Joint Enhanced Training Initiative (NATO 2016). The fact that the alliance has chosen to focus on training in the Black Sea region, while increasing combat forces to the north, has not gone unnoticed by officials in Bucharest (as mentioned to the current writer throughout 2019). Strongly pro-Western Romania has de facto become the alliance's linchpin in the region. It remains firmly supportive of Euro-Atlantic values and objectives and its people retain an historically deep suspicion of Russian objectives and intentions toward the region. Indeed, Iulia-Sabina Joja describes Russia as Romania's "traditional enemy" (Joja 2019, 74). The Russian seizure and subsequent militarization of Crimea, its continued support of the regime in Transdniestria, incursions into Romanian airspace that have intensified since 2018, and provocative activities near territorial waters create a problematic security environment in the Black Sea (Hodges et al. 2019, 20). Notwithstanding this security environment and Romanian government policies, the Romanian armed forces struggle to modernize and their defense planning and acquisition programs are in need of review and reform. Thus, in the face of a deteriorating security environment and a force that remains largely unmodernized, increasing defense spending to 2 percent of GDP under current government policy (NATO 2019, 8), in and of itself, may not automatically improve the ability of the armed forces to develop and maintain modern capabilities that can survive in the contemporary battlespace (Zulean 2018).

The challenges facing Romania are not unique. In relation to Poland, Tomasz Paszewski in 2016 posed a prescient question in an excellent essay titled "Can Poland Defend Itself?" (Paszewski 2016). While this is an intriguing question to ponder, by its very nature it entails the risk that in formulating an answer one engages in speculation that could lead to making subjective judgments. The current essay proposes a different line of inquiry apropos Romania: to identify specific policies and concepts (embodied in law, regulations, and assumptions), as well as programs and structures, that are *impeding* the Romanian armed forces from being capable of defending the country's sovereignty. More specifically, which of these factors need to be identified, assessed, and changed to facilitate a more coherent and rapid path to producing modern defense capabilities, and thereby deterring Russian mischief-making? The current writer, informed by deep study of the Romanian defense institution and benefiting from numerous personal interactions with officials at all levels, will argue that key reforms are immediately needed in the areas of defense planning (particularly related to improving the development of costed priorities and decision-making), budget development and execution, and human resource management (HRM). Addressing these three issues should also be complemented by developing a method to identify which capabilities specifically are needed to defend the country's national sovereignty. In the past, reforms have been modest; now, due to the fact that the modernization requirements of the armed forces are so vast, and resources finite, new planning logic is needed in the immediate term.

This essay is organized in four sections. The first will provide a brief overview of the current "outputs" of the three services in

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the armed forces. This essay offers arguably a unique method of assessing defense institutions by eschewing a traditional top-down approach. Rather, the current author argues that a more accurate picture of the functionality of a defense institution can be obtained by focusing on what the armed forces are capable of doing today and, from that knowledge base, assessing whether policy and planning inputs facilitate, or inhibit, an armed force in realizing its potential. This method will allow one to determine the status of modernization and readiness of the armed forces and where they suffer from underperformance. Like all post-communist European armed forces, the Romanian armed forces suffer from communist "legacies" that impede their modernization.[1] However, they also have a number of critically important modern capabilities and have adopted some Western concepts that need to be protected and reinforced. That said, hard thinking is needed apropos modernization priorities to ensure that the right, affordable solutions are being developed and considered by officials. The second section will identify those "inputs" into the defense system that are impeding the armed forces from modernizing more quickly and deeply. The essay will limit itself to addressing what are the most challenging impediments to improving the management of defense: defense planning in all of its aspects, budgeting methods, and HRM. The third section will identify specific reform proposals for Romanian officials to consider, including a new method for determining modernization priorities by focusing on how best to protect national sovereignty. The fourth and final section will address the issue of how the defense budget should be spent and how to find additional resources to support desperately needed modernization.

Outputs

Armed Forces Systemic Challenges

As a brief overview, the armed forces collectively face three key challenges that will have to be addressed before they can create a more operational and capable force. First, the armed forces have suffered, even during communism, from low rates of readiness due to either an insufficient budget in relation to the size of the armed forces, or the lack of priority for readiness spending. The results of low spending per soldier can be clearly seen in Table 1, where the magnitude of the deficit is obvious when compared with the United Kingdom's figures. Compounding this legacy in thinking and practice was a recent change to the law that applied to the pension system of the armed forces which shifted greater financial obligations onto the defense budget (Romania-Insider.com 2017). The net result of this action can be clearly discerned in Table 2 where the Ministry of National Defense has struggled to fund adequately operations and maintenance (O&M) activities (i.e., training) of the armed forces. In fact, in 2017, Romania suffered the dubious distinction in Central and Eastern Europe of spending the lowest percentage of its defense budget on O&M: 9.9 percent (NATO 2019, 14). As a general rule of thumb, defense budgets should be divided approximately in thirds (personnel, O&M, and investments), if an armed force is to remain balanced with the right number of people, sufficient training, and modern equipment. This dismal trend was reversed in 2019, but its effects on the previous lack of challenging training and professional growth of officers and soldiers will be felt for years to come. The depth of this deficit in funding for training and operations can be seen in another comparison with the United Kingdom in Table 3.

The second challenge faced by the defense institution is demography. Like other armed forces, the defense institution faces the challenge of attracting and retaining qualified personnel during a period of economic growth. As such, the force has shortages in key specialties and ranks. However, compounding this problem is the clear trend of lower demographic growth of the population, which will make recruitment even more difficult in future (Obreja and Metea 2018, 41–47). Recruitment

Table 1. Defense Spending per Service Member, 2018.

Countries	Population	Defense budget* (current U.S. dollars)	Military personnel	Key structures	Per soldier (dollars)
Great Britain	64.7 million	$50,700,000,000	150,250	1 Corps HQ, 2 Divisions (-) SOF, 19 warships, 10 submarines, 258 ac, 615 helos	*$337,437*
Romania	21.4 million	$4,630,000,000	69,300	2 Div HQs, elements of 1 Div HQ, 1 SF BDE, 9 BDEs, 2 recce regts, 81 ac, 66 helos, 27 ships, 10 MCM	*$66,811*

*NATO definition. Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 2019*.

Table 2. Romanian Defense Budget by Categories.

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Personnel	50.6	57.0	59.8	72.3	69.1	79.8	79.1	79.1	84.0	79.0	71.2	63.3	65.0	54.7	54.5	54.79
Equipment+	26.7	21.8	26.1	14.4	17.8	10.1	10.6	9.0	5.3	11.9	16.9	20.9	23.2	35.4	35.0	30.16
Other, i.e. O&M	22.8	21.3	14.2	13.3	13.1	10.1	10.3	11.9	10.7	9.1	12.0	15.8	11.8	9.9	10.5	15.06

Source: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_11/20191129_pr-2019-123-en.pdf

Table 3. Readiness and Maintenance Spending per Soldier.

	O&M % of budget	Defense budget in US$	O&M budget in US$	Personnel	O&M per soldier in US$
Great Britain	39.76%	$61,662,000,000.00	$24,516,811,200.00	145,000	$169,081.46
Romania	9.46%	$4,678,000,000.00	$442,538,800.00	69,000	$6,413.61

Estimates of calendar year 2018. Using current prices and exchange rates.
Source: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_03/190314-pr2018-34-eng.pdf

and retention will also be negatively affected should Romania be allowed to join the Schengen Area, which will draw away highly educated and trained individuals.

The third, and final, issue relates to modernization. Given that previous governments have consistently missed opportunities to procure modern, Western-sourced equipment, the armed forces remain largely equipped with aging Soviet-era platforms, systems, and weapons. This has led to the reality that, more or less, most of the three services require substantive and deep investments in essentially all of their inventories. The scale is daunting. If one limits the analysis *only* to modernization programs priced over €100 million, the sixteen major programs (absent the costs of submarines) come to roughly €12,690,000,000 (Visan 2019, 5). And it is not known whether these estimates are simply off-the-shelf costs or include full life-cycle costings (which is doubtful). With an annual procurement budget of some €1,300,000,000 currently, this is not a delta that will be quickly closed using traditional funding policy and assumptions.

Army

At the end of communism, the Romanian army was a conscript-based, territorial defense–focused, and financially neglected force deeply distrusted by the Ceaușescu regime (Watts 2001, 32). In the years since independence, conscription was ended, and the army has made successive and sustained deployments of battalions and special operations forces to Afghanistan and Iraq in addition to deploying a mountain brigade headquarters to the former in 2010.[2] Of critical importance, the Romanian army deployed standing units, as opposed to ad hoc formations, to both areas of operations, thereby insuring a degree of retention of units' collective operational experience. Thus, ostensibly, it has been subjected to the full range of Western concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and modern training methods.

Institutionally, the army has been challenged to implement fully the concept of professionalization in all of its key elements (Zulean 2002, 115–32). Critically, what remains absent is a full institutional appreciation of the need for intensive individual, collective, and leadership training. This is typical in the region whereby hard training is sacrificed for lengthy periods pursuing formal education programs in classrooms. *Res ipsa loquitur*: with the exception of some combat-support formations, combat-arms battalions only go to the field once per year for only 10 days. Collective training and effective command control remain weak, as there is no free play in field exercises (FTXs), and therefore national exercises are scripted. Fortunately, senior army leadership has come to appreciate the need for strengthening operational performance and command and control. In 2019, a series of command-post exercises (CPXs) were organized and the intention is to hold them annually, to include fielding a battalion in support of subsequent brigade headquarters' CPXs. This series of recent exercises demonstrated a number of weaknesses in the army's command and control system. One could speculate that impeding the more systematic use of the Western concept of the military decision-making process is the legacy concept of command whereby command is invested two levels above commanders, thereby leaving second- level commanders controlling subordinated commanders (Janes 2020).

In the critical area of logistics, the army still has legacy classes of supply and infrastructure left over from the communist era that it must store, manage, and secure. In consequence, funding that could be used elsewhere is being spent on maintaining stocks and infrastructure that are tied to legacy platforms and weapon systems that frankly are increasingly ineffectual, let alone survivable, in the modern battlespace. As in many other post-communist armies, attempts to save money were found in retiring organic combat-service support, with the intention of using out-sourcing. However, these efforts floundered during the international financial crisis, thereby leaving the army weak in the area of supply and maintenance. Finally, as the army itself remains largely static, logistics formations equally lack organic mobility and a robust ability to support operations, even within the country (Lapadat 2014, 104–13).

The ability to conduct effective force planning is a capability that is all too often taken for granted in many NATO armed forces that do not suffer from communist legacies. Romanian army officers claim that during communism this was one of the army's strengths. The army was then based on conscription and mobilization, an orientation that requires effective planning and decentralized execution to be successful. With the retirement of both concepts, an organic planning methodology has yet to emerge to provide the army with a coherent method of determining requirements based on the current capabilities of all of its formation. This lack in the ability to conduct effective organic planning within the army could also be symptomatic of the fact that the army's ability to conduct operational planning using Western concepts and assumptions remains immature and possibly not well understood or even accepted. To be sure, army officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) have been exposed extensively to NATO's Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive—COPD (NATO 2013b)—in training courses and while on operations. However, as in other countries (e.g., Hungary), the general staff adopted the document in its entirety, thereby making it national doctrine. The problem with adopting essentially all NATO doctrinal documents is that they are developed to facilitate multinational operations and do not, by definition, address inherently national responsibilities, thereby leading to confusion and frustration. For instance, COPD is not appropriate to use for capability development. As the current writer was told by a Romanian two-star army general in July 2011, "We've adopted all NATO documents, but our system still remains underperforming."

Ostensibly, the army enjoys a relatively large order of battle of some 36,000 personnel. However, there are challenges to recruitment and a persistent imbalance in the distribution of personnel and ranks throughout the structure. It is commendable that the army has been able to maintain two divisional headquarters (plus major elements of Multinational Division Southeast), given that, with the exception of Poland (and perhaps in future Lithuania), all other NATO armies in the region do not maintain divisional structures. That said, the limited amount of training time in the field conducting CPXs of divisional and brigade headquarters makes the claim that its

NATO-designed forces (one divisional headquarters, one mechanized brigade, one infantry brigade, one mountain infantry brigade) are 70–90 percent "ready," difficult, if not impossible, to accept (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2020, 39). One might speculate whether the key criteria for assessing readinesss use SACEUR's combat readiness (CREVAL) standards (NATO 2013a, 46). That being the case, one needs to recognize that CREVAL establishes solely the floor of "readiness" and is hardly an accurate measure of a unit's capability, nor does it offer judgments on such an important factor as leadership (Young 2019b, 41). In this light, the recent proposal to stand up a multinational corps headquarters in Sibiu is premature (Romania 2019a, 3). This position puts the current writer at variance with a group of highly regarded American experts (Hodges et al. 2019, 10), but until such time as Romanian brigade and divisional headquarters can exercise CPXs in field conditions and conduct non-scripted FTXs, the creation of this corps will likely have the negative effect of "bleeding" needed staff, resources, and precious few enablers (e.g., CIS), from these tactical commands, which are already less than "ready."

Finally, the government recognizes the need for the long overdue modernization of the army. Space does not allow for an in-depth analysis of its specific requirements (see Visan 2019, *passim*). However, there are some policy issues that senior defense and military leadership must address in their approach to modernizing essentially the army's entire Cold War–vintage inventory. Although the defense budget appears large at €4.55 billion (2020), the government must decide *how* it will modernize the army when it can only be done over time. For instance, should it procure Western equipment (e.g., new armored fighting vehicles) for the entire army, and thereby "mix" Western- and Soviet-designed equipment and possibly create "conceptual spaghetti" in a doctrinal and logistical sense (Young 2017a, 39–40)? Or, would it be more effective to select certain battalions/brigades and modernize them to the fullest extent possible, all the while reinforcing the introduction of modern training techniques and standards? The former option has the attraction of maintaining a degree of standardization across the army, while ensuring that the entire army would continue to feel the pull of legacy concepts, inhibiting units from operating effectively together. The latter option, to be sure, would create "two armies," but at least elements of it would have the potential of being effective on the modern battlefield. What needs to guide decision-making is to eschew any proposals that could distract from creating fully manned and trained combat capabilities (e.g., HIMARS multiple rocket launchers [Hodges et al. 2019, 42]), or enablers (e.g., the recent introduction of TPS-77 tactical air-defense radars), or waste money. Therefore, proposals such as creating an independent army helicopter force, or dividing newly procured Patriot air defense between the air force and army, need to be reviewed very carefully (Visan 2019, 23).

Navy

Any analysis of the Romanian navy must start with the reality that the Russian seizure of, and stationing of naval forces in, Crimea, have combined to change the balance of power in the Black Sea region. In light of Turkey's apparent ambivalence toward the alliance (Hodges et al. 2019, 18), and lagging modernization of the Bulgarian navy (Young 2019a, 26–7), the Black Sea is no longer an undisputed NATO lake. Despite this new geostrategic reality, one analyst argues that, of the services, the navy has suffered the most in terms of delays to modernize (Visan 2019, 30). The result, one could generously observe, has produced incoherent capabilities. Specifically, in 2004 Bucharest purchased two ex–Royal Navy Type-22 frigates. Unfortunately, as the sale preceded Romania's entry into NATO, the agreement did not include surface-to-surface or surface-to-air missiles, active ship defense, or modern electronic warfare systems, nor have any of these essential enablers been subsequently procured. Thus, although the ships have been beneficial in familiarizing a navy cadre with Western ship design and basic technology, without modern weapons and sensors, an important opportunity to become more Western in concepts and training has been lost. Despite possessing a large inventory of legacy vessels of dubious utility and survivability in the Black Sea, the navy has recently been able to improve its rates of days-at-sea for ships and crews, implying greater opportunities to undertake collective training. The former chief of navy, Vice-Admiral Alexandru Mîrşu, claimed in the annual report of the navy's activities for 2019 that the navy was able to spend 59 days-at-sea more than they did in 2018 (Romania 2020). This is a commendable improvement, and may signify the beginning of Bucharest's growing awareness of the need to spend more funding on improving the navy's readiness. However, perspective is in order. It is still not certain that longer days-at-sea have brought particularly the crews of the Type-22 frigates up to minimum standards, given that it was admitted to the current writer in 2017 that the ship crews were only getting approximately one-half the amount of time at sea commanders felt was needed (discussions at Fleet HQ, Constanța, June 2017). Moreover, these warships, which represent the principal capabilities of the navy, remain denuded of essential sensors and electronic warfare systems, let alone missiles (Visan 2017b, 3–4). As currently configured and armed, the reality is that the navy is limited to conducting surveillance and constabulary missions in the Black Sea, as well as supporting international operations further afield (Visan 2017b, 22). Consequently, the Type-22s cannot be employed as a deterrent force throughout the Black Sea.

Whereas trends in improving readiness appear positive, one can identify two challenges to the navy's future. The first relates to the inability of successive governments to see through a modernization program for the navy, while the second is that acquisition objectives need to be more thoroughly vetted. As to the former point, as recent as 2017, the navy's modernization plan to procure needed capabilities for the two frigates faltered due to lack of funds (Visan 2017a). Successive plans for the navy's modernization have a long history of failure due to their formulation (i.e., not fully costed), poor administrative execution, or the lack of government funding (Sanders 2014, 199). Arguably, even if these two frigates were modernized, it is problematic that even then that they would be survivable in light of the deployment of Kalibr anti-surface cruise missiles in Russia's Black Sea fleet. Worse yet, to date, there are no plans to install in any existing, or planned, surface warships, close-in weapon systems (CIWS) for self-defense.

The current modernization program is ambitious. Declaring 2018 to be the year of the navy, then–minister of defense Mihai Fifor declared that the government would move forward to procure three submarines (SSKs) and four new surface warships, in addition to modernizing the Type-22 frigates (Adamowski 2018). There is also an ongoing program to procure shore-based surface-to-surface missiles for the naval coastal defense force (CIDA Strategic Intelligence 2018). In July 2019, the government announced that it would procure four Gowind 2500 multi-mission corvettes (102 meters length). The four ships are priced at €1.2 billion, which includes the provision of new maintenance and training facilities but minus the weapons, which have an estimated cost of €200–400 million (La France en Romanie (2019).

No matter how commendable it is for the previous government to have pushed ahead with modernization, one could question whether all relevant factors have been fully considered. Most importantly, in light of the threat environment in the Black Sea, hard analysis is needed to determine whether emphasis should be placed on acquiring *any* new surface combatants, even with CIWS. Conversely, the announcement to move forward on procuring SSKs (Mîrşu 2017) would change the maritime threat calculus in the Black Sea more in the West's favor, as they would be a more convincing deterrent to Russia than the currently envisaged corvettes, even if their number were increased to six (Visan 2018, 112–13). One fears that the current modernization program is using conventional thinking in an era when such ideas and assumptions could well prove to be outdated and cost more to procure and maintain than their operational value delivers, and thus inevitably will not deter Russia. The current writer has argued elsewhere (Young 2019a, 33) that NATO nations need to "re-think" all planning assumption regarding the Black Sea in order to focus attention on ensuring that all modernization programs create envisaged effects. This effort needs to be complemented by a program of ruthlessly "culling" legacy platforms and infrastructure that are currently "eating money" in order to find funds to invest in new capabilities and O&M. Current commendable efforts at experimentation should be reinforced and expanded to ensure that they, in the words of a former U.S. defense official, " … stress payload over platforms" (Hicks et al. 2016, vi). A hard analysis of the threat environment could well conclude that procuring surface warships should be eschewed in favor of expanding the navy's recognizable maritime (and maritime air) picture, a sufficiently robust coastal surface-to-surface missile network, and drones, all supported by a force of SSKs (Visan 2018, 14). After all, " … the Defense Ministry acknowledges that the safest place for a ship in the Black Sea is, ironically, beneath the waves" (Visan 2019, 21). But if SSKs are to be procured and even envisaged to enter the force after 2032, crew training with allied SSKs needs to start immediately, given how long it takes to "grow" a submarine commander, let alone a cadre of experienced officers, NCOs, and seamen.

Air Force

Arguably, the air force has been the beneficiary of most of the modernization efforts and funding of the three services. Even before the end of the Cold War, the air force had procured from the domestic aerospace industry French-designed Puma and Alouette helicopters, thereby introducing concepts of operating and maintaining Western aircraft. After the Cold War the air force procured C-130 and more recently C-27J tactical transport aircraft. After years of delay and prevarication, the government in 2012 finally approved the purchase of 12F-16AM/BM multi-role fighter aircraft (MRFA) with a mid-life upgrade package from Portugal, which reached initial operating capability (IOC) in 2019, later than expected (Barreira 2013). The air force is currently procuring an additional five aircraft from Portugal, also with mid-life updates, at a cost of €130 million (Donald 2020). One report suggests that the current small number of F-16s lacks critical mass to move the aircrafts' readiness from IOC to full operational capability (Visan 2019, 24–25). Another report cited challenges to the training system and the lack of funding to fully support needed training on these aircraft (Mihai and Balos 2019). As for the air-defense radar network, the air force maintains five fixed air-surveillance radar sites (i.e., Lockheed Martin FPS-117) and five mobile sites (i.e., TTS-77) (Pană 2019). Air defense missile systems consist of legacy Soviet surface-to-air systems, two battalions equipped with Hawk MIM-23 systems, as well as seven recently procured Patriot PAC-3 systems acquired at a cost of 4 billion USD (Visan 2019, 27). There are also plans for new transport helicopters and attack helicopters. In terms of additional MRFAs, the previous government announced in March 2019 its intention to procure an additional 36 F-16s, either the new F-16 Vipers or refurbished C/D-models, from USAF stocks (Bozinovski 2019).

Although indeed ambitious, like many modernization plans, the air force's plans have been subject to delays. Regarding the deferment on procuring additional F-16s, the former chief of defense, General Stefan Danila, writes that, "Unfortunately, the whole process generated by [the] budget's increase for defence is defined through [a] lack of consistency, irresponsibility and political opportunism, even the lack of responsibility regarding national security." Delays only limit Romania's options, which could have a deleterious effect on expanding the fleet of MRFA. According to Danila, it is becoming increasingly challenging to identify F-16s with the same configuration as the existing fleet, leaving the option of procuring F-16 Vipers, which are a generation beyond what is currently in inventory (Danila 2019, 94). It is critically important to expand the fleet to three operational squadrons, which would create a critical mass of MRFA in the air force, and thereby enable retirement of the MiG-21 LanceR "C" fighter fleet (which have only 50 minutes flying time) and switching quick reaction alert (QRA) missions (i.e., air policing) from the latter to the former (Romanian Air Force 2019, 8).

From an operational perspective, it is of critical importance that Romanian pilots are getting a high number of flying hours by regional standards (approximately 150 hours per year for F-16 pilots), albeit this is short of NATO norms (180 hours per year). This could well be a conscious decision by leadership to train as many new pilots on the aircraft as possible. Factors that are impeding the creation of greater operational effectiveness of the air force are numerous. As is the case for other air forces, the attraction and retention of trained personnel has proven difficult, particularly as domestic economic conditions have improved. Moreover, given the size of the country and Russia's more aggressive challenges to Romania's sovereignty,

improvements are also needed in the air force's current recognizable radar picture, particularly at lower altitudes. Finally, the air force faces the dilemma of not having sufficient numbers of F-16s to maintain two QRAs (a total of eight aircraft at 24/7 short notice) to support air policing while continuing to train sufficient pilots to obtain and *retain* needed certifications and attain instructor-pilot status. In consequence, it is necessary to keep in the inventory its remaining fleet of 19 operational LanceR "C" MiG-21 fighters. While relatively inexpensive to operate, in light of the ability to maintain them in Romania up to and including depot level ("Romanian Air Force LanceR's to Falcons" 2015), they still represent a lost opportunity for the air force to shed its remaining Soviet-era aircraft along with all the accompanying infrastructure and legacy concepts. Obviously, the factor that is inhibiting such an action is finances and planning, problems faced by all three services, to which we will now turn.

Inputs

This section focuses on two central "inputs" managed by the defense institution that need thorough review in Romania. First, the defense institution shares with its regional counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe a common inability to produce viable national-level defense plans that clearly lay out *costed* priorities and attainable objectives (Young 2018a, 1031–57). *En bref*, all have experienced difficulty identifying priorities, developing accurate costings of capability options, ascertaining performance parameters, and managing better readiness levels of their forces. Three aspects of planning need to be examined in the near term: the current defense planning method as outlined by law, the use of programming in developing and executing the defense budget, and finally decision-making fora. Second, like many of its regional counterparts, the Romanian defense institution has struggled to adopt fully the concept of professionalization of the armed forces. As such, too many concepts and planning assumptions that remain active in the management system are based on conscription. In consequence, personnel are not seen as constituting the most valuable asset in an armed force.

Shortcomings in the Law on Defense Planning

At its apex, the entire defense planning process is outlined, if not *needlessly restricted*, by its own stand-alone law (Romania 2015a). It is noted that defining defense planning in its own law is emulated in countries with profound legacy planning influences, which also inhibits their ability to think sensibly about priorities and spending and thus to plan effectively (e.g., Georgia (2006), Serbia (2018), Ukraine (2005). It is not possible to analyze in depth the precise strengths and weakness of the current system within the Ministry of National Defense as, inexplicably, the ministerial order that defines the contents of plans is classified (Romania, n.d.b.). However, an analysis of the law itself reveals a number of problematic assumptions. The drafters of the legislation assumed that planning is linear and predictable, if not indeed scientific (Young 2018b, 79), and therefore the law is structured in a very rigid fashion. In the strictest sense of civil code (i.e., positive law), the law allows planning, but it also highly defines it by restricting how planning is to be conducted. Absent from this legislation is any acknowledgment that planning in a government institution is, by definition, inherently political as it is addressing the expenditure of public funds. As such, it cannot be linear or predictable, let alone scientific. As the late Colin Gray sagely observed, "the higher reaches of policy and strategy do not lend themselves to conclusive scientific analysis metrically verifiable by testing. Human political judgment, individual and collective, friendly and hostile, can make a mockery of rational process with its frequent domination by all too subjectively unreasonable intent" (Gray 2014, 3). Determination of the need for four different national-level policy documents to inform defense planning (i.e., defense white paper, national defense strategy, military strategy, and defense planning guidance) is excessively and needlessly complex.[4] One can posit: what value does each one add to informing defense officials how to determine *costed priorities* based on policy? Frankly, the titles of the documents seem to be a direct lift from U.S. and U.K. practices, models that have not proven themselves effective under Romania's governance structure, which is based on semi-presidentialism. Indeed, a review of Charts 1 and 2 demonstrates that, in the case of the United States, these documents are not published in accordance with the law, and arguably have only tangential influence on defense policy, let alone budgeting. There is also no evidence in the current law that money is addressed at all in any of these documents, much less factoring in life-cycle costs of capabilities, which are essential in order to *drive* planning (Young 2019c, 61–62).[5] Again, to cite Gray, "The lingua franca of defence planning has to be money, not strategy" (Gray 2014, 150). Finally, plans cannot be drawn up in isolation from a nation's current force structure. Plans *have to be* predicated upon the liabilities and activities of the structure today and into the planning timeframe before other planning decisions are made. All new ideas and changes must be met by equal cost reductions in this structure. Without this, additional organizational "modernization" costs simply reduce the effectiveness of the overall system by pulling money from other existing activities.

Determining defense policy, therefore, is dependent upon a politically predictable and hierarchically dependent system to

'Strategy documents'	National Security Strategy	National Military Strategy	Defense Strategy
Legal authority:	50 USC § 404A	10 US Code, Section 153	Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 118 states that the QDR produce 'delineate a national defense strategy'
Frequency:	Annually	Semi-annually	Quadrennial, following a QDR

Chart 1.

	NSS	NMS	DS		NSS	NMS	DS
1987	√			2003			
1988	√			2004		√	
1989				2005		√	√
1990	√			2006	√		
1991	√			2007			
1992		√		2008		√	√
1993	√			2009			
1994	√			2010	√		
1995	√	√		2011			
1996	√			2012			√
1997	√	√		2013			
1998	√			2014			
1999				2015	√	√	
2000	√			2016			
2001	√			2017	√		
2002	√			2018			√

Chart 2.

produce and receive approval of all documents in quick order, to allow sufficient time for planners to execute guidance within a normal planning cycle. The obvious challenge faced by the drafters of the legislation is ascertaining how the head of state (president) can direct/influence defense policy (and the defense budget) of the head of government (prime minister). Regrettably, the historical record is clear: of the national-level strategic documents drafted by the presidency, only four have achieved full legal status by being adopted by the parliament (Joja 2019, 103–4). One feels sympathy for the officials in the defense policy and planning process, since if they are found to be in violation of the law's provisions, they can be held criminally liable (*vide*: Article 18).

Spending the Defense Budget: Programming/Budgeting

Like most of its counterparts in the region, Romania was an enthusiastic adopter of the U.S.-supplied planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) method in the 1990s. And, just like the other countries that saw this integrated and seemingly scientific system as the answer to managing the armed forces, Bucharest has struggled to make the system functional.[6] There are a number of explanations for this. Whereas there are eight major programs (Land Forces, Air Forces, Naval Forces, Logistic Support, General Staff/Strategic Command, Central Administration, Defense Intelligence, and International Representation), they are tied to organizations and not to functions, as they should be in the method's theory (Rabin 1997, 490). The existence of thirteen planning domains adds a needless degree of complexity to the process. In an unclassified briefing provided by the Ministry of National Defense to the current writer, the policy and plans directorate acknowledges a series of challenges impeding the full implementation of PPBS (Romania 2019b, Programming phase challenges, slide 28). Aside from the simple reality that the defense institution has been incapable of dedicating sufficient numbers of trained officials and officers to operate this complex method,[7] and yet some 4,000 personnel have been "trained" within the overly large professional military education system (Zulean and Şercan 2018, 377), methodological challenges include the lack of clear priorities (one assumes from the four legally required policy/strategy documents) and financial parameters needed to guide the planning process. Arguably, the lack of timely expression of policy priorities in the Defense Planning Guidance document, expressed in financial limits, confuses resource allocation. Without having seen this classified document, one wonders if in its ten-year future orientation, it takes into account the ministry's future-year financial liabilities, that is, money that is already obligated in future. It is little wonder, therefore, that the ministry has struggled to find a balance between objectives and the realities of a finite defense budget.

Likewise, the existing financial management system would appear to lack accurate financial data to enable forecasting of long-term financial liabilities. All too often in ministries of defense in the region, financial management is dominated by accounting, which is oriented to look "backwards." To be sure, this is an essential function in any organization; however, for effective planning, policy officials and planners need to be aware of *all* the costs of operating, maintaining, and improving "today's" existing capabilities as well as all the life-cycle costs of proposed new capabilities.

Decision-Making: Defense Planning Council

In no other area of defense management can legacy practices be so clearly observed than in how decisions are made. At the national level there is the Supreme Council of National Defense (Consiliul Suprem de Apărare a Ţării—CSAT), which is a reflection of the government's semi-presidential structure. The CSAT could well be a necessity to build consensus and unity, particularly in periods of political cohabitation. What is less clear is why the Defense Planning Council shares a similar

structure. The ministerial order that governs the body is fortunately unclassified, which enables analysis and commentary (Romania n.d.b.). The responsibilities and structure of the body, laid out in the law on defense planning (Romania 2015a),[8] have all of the hallmarks of a collective decision-making body as practiced in communist regimes. These *collegia* enable "collective responsibility" in decision-making, while also allowing for lower-level technical issues to be pulled upwards and adjudicated in an opaque manner (Young 2017b). What immediately strikes an outside observer is that, for a body that is charged with responsibility for all key resource decision-making, it is made up of an unwieldly 19 members. While there is a laudatory value that such standing bodies can be used for consensus-building, it would seem either to act simply as a rubber-stamp of problematic value, or as a forum where priorities are watered down. Moreover, both in the law on defense planning and in this ministerial order, there is no explicit mention of the role played by the chief of defense (CHOD) in planning. This is surprising, given that he has veto power in the CSAT, and remarkably has not become a point of domestic political contention (Joja 2019, 172, 174).

Human Capital

The challenges to improving the armed forces' ability to exploit better its human capital are quite similar to those that impede more dynamic defense planning. In effect, the entire HRM system is based on the concept of centralized control, as opposed to empowering the leadership of the armed forces to employ personnel effectively. As the system is based on centralized control, there is little focus on, or attention given to, what should be the inherent nature of personnel in armed forces: defining HRM as an *operational*, rather than administrative, responsibility. Administration has been allowed to drive the system, which has had the predictable effect of focusing on control. As a result of this administrative orientation, key elements of a functional HRM system have yet to be fully developed. For instance, at present there is no functional career-management system. For a force of some 70,000 personnel, there are some 55,000 *different* HRM functions in the armed forces (Haralambie 2016, 68–71). It is little wonder in such a constricted system that the Ministry of National Defense has struggled to create a rational system of careers. Basic incentives are misaligned, as salary is not tied to rank, but rather to position, which incentivizes individuals to stay in positions for higher pay, thereby stunting the professional progression and development of the entire armed forces. Finally, there is no policy pressure to push the system to evaluate positions to see if they can be done by lower officer ranks, or even NCOs. As a result, there are shortages of key specialists, gaps in ranks, and units not up to full strength.

To summarize this section on inputs: Urgent attention is needed to address the existing legal backbone of the planning system. As currently structured, the system impedes, as opposed to facilitates, the creation of costed defense plans based on policy priorities. The budgeting system needs an urgent upgrade in a number of areas to enable planning and budgeting officials to tie policy priorities together with the budget more closely. Decision-making needs to be streamlined and key officials in defense—the minister of defense and the CHOD—need clearly stated authorities to make decisions, or recommendations to government, on defense. And lastly, human capital needs to be treated as the most important and valuable asset of the defense institution. The reason these challenges need to be addressed can be posited simply: Is there any indication that the current system, sub-optimally operating as it currently is in peacetime, could possible function in crisis, let alone war?

Thinking about Problems Differently

In the previous analysis of outputs and inputs in defense, the essay has suggested a number of changes/reforms to the current system where appropriate. What follows are recommendations envisaged to serve as a catalyst for putting the armed forces on a more direct path to creating modern, reliable, and predictable capabilities that can deliver what the government needs most: capabilities that can deter Russia.

Empowering Defense Planning

Since a highly structured and rigid method of defense planning has proven itself unworkable, the Romanian government and defense officials should review *all* defense legislation with the view to simplify processes (particularly defense planning) and allow officials greater latitude to make it less document-heavy and more outcome-oriented—a point argued in an earlier policy document (Romania 2015b, 23, point 83), but evidently ignored. Simple common sense should rule the process at all levels, not dogmatic documentation and rules. The result of the review should define authorities that allow the minister and other defense officials flexibility to experiment to find a method that works for Romania's requirements and conditions and that facilitates timely and informed decision-making. One fears that without such flexibility and greater transparency in both the content and the process of planning, officials will continue to struggle to develop needed costed priorities. Without this data, the system runs the risk of purchasing new capabilities absent associated operational, training, and support costs, and failing to provide the needed specificity to the long underperforming procurement and acquisition process (Visan 2019, 32).

Absent the government's willingness to review the planning process *tabula rasa*, then defense officials are left to investigate what could be changed within the general framework of the law. This being the case, then, the emphasis should be placed on removing the requirement for as many of the current documents stipulated in the law as possible. As argued *supra*, this family of documents acts to restrict the actions of defense officials, as opposed to empowering them to make decisions in accordance with policy, all the while *slowing down* decision-making. If it is determined that the national defense strategy document is essential (in order to link the government's policy to the presidency), one can question the need for the remaining three (white paper, military strategy, and defense planning guidance). As long as the document expresses priorities and broad financial

parameters (supplied by the government), it should be able to provide guidance for the development of major programs. Concepts of operation (CONOPs) can be contained in a classified annex to provide guidance for operational planning. Contingency planning guidance could also be contained in an annex, or simply a stand-alone classified document. That said, caution needs to be exercised when using contingency plans to determine "requirements." If planners are only using war plans to determine current needs, they will always be looking backward. After all, threats/risks change and this needs to be controlled (Gleckler 2015, 71–76).

Upgrading the Budgetary System

Until such time that the Ministry of National Defense has confidence in its costing databases, it will continue to struggle to execute approved defense plans. It is therefore little wonder that the current method underperforms, as shown by the fact that the ministry has struggled over the years to spend the entire defense budget by the end of the financial year (Visan 2019, 33). Compounding this problem is that it is not clear that there are any systematic performance evaluations, as opposed to basic reports, of individual programs. Any planning/budget system that cannot execute the entire budget, as well as assess performance, must be reviewed and reoriented. Thus, the immediate development of costing databases should be made a major priority. Once there is trust in the financial databases and the plans they support, only then will officials feel confident in making informed capability trade-off decisions, as the full costs of the options being analyzed will be known. Financial realities must be scrupulously used throughout the entire planning process, so that, when approving plans and individual capabilities, officials know on what, why, and how much, they are spending. Costed plans would relieve the current burden placed on officials in the PPBS directorate who are tasked with finding the money for what could oftentimes be unclear priorities and uncosted capabilities, units, and infrastructure. Finally, all future year financial liabilities need to be captured in one database, an essential planning tool that constitutes the *actual* long-term plan of the institution.[9]

Unleashing Human Potential

Space does not allow for a more detailed assessment of the current HRM system, which is attempting to make significant changes to address these many shortcomings. To ensure that current efforts do not share the same fate as previous attempts at reform, which were considered by some analysts to be successful at the time (Sanders 2014, 161–62), defense officials should insist on some basic principles that need to be adopted and implemented deeply within the armed forces. Foremost among these should be to insist that the existing system create a short-term plan to *empower* commanders at all levels throughout the armed forces. They should rate their subordinates annually (as opposed to every four years currently), for both their performance in their current post and their future potential for higher staff and command assignments. They should also sit on selection boards for promotion and command assignments. In short, their judgment (which is either validated, or invalidated, in time) must be seen as the most important factor in driving the HRM system to become more operationally focused. Assignments should be based on the principle of giving officers and NCOs progressively more challenging assignments, to demonstrate growth and to see how they handle stress and uncertainties—qualities that are essential to commanders in war. Finally, current reform efforts also need to develop demanding, but predictable, career paths. These initiatives would support a greater effort to encourage the development of more training-focused armed forces.

Ways and Means to Fund Defense

Whether governments will move to reform the existing planning, budgeting, and HRM systems to improve their effectiveness remains to be seen. What cannot be avoided is deciding on what to spend the defense budget and how to create capabilities that will deter Russia. The first issue can be addressed by specifying how priorities should be determined. The second can be best addressed in two different ways: how the money is currently being spent and what other national-level policy options should be considered to accelerate modernization.

Determine Priorities

In deciding on priorities, all defense officials and planners face the same dilemma. Resource decision-making, by definition, is zero-sum. But in making rational decisions, defense officials face a challenge that is two-dimensional. On one level, capabilities are required by the armed forces *in extremis* when deterrence fails and the country needs a robust defense. However, on another, less prosaic level, the government requires certain capabilities in order to carry-out 24/7 operations that directly underwrite the country's sovereignty. These missions and tasks simply must be done as a manifestation of state sovereignty, and indeed many of them were a precondition for joining NATO. These include: a recognizable radar picture of national airspace, a recognizable maritime picture creating maritime domain awareness, *redundant* strategic communications, cryptography, intelligence, a national command center, a joint operations command, an air (sovereignty) operations center, and QRA aircraft (2×4 QRAs = 8 aircraft needed 24/7 given the size of Romania) for conducting air policing. There are in every country multiple other national priorities managed by defense, such as explosive ordnance disposal, or search and rescue, that also must be funded 100 percent in any plan and thus must be prioritized appropriately.

One solution to defining priorities is by building on a country's strategic culture, which makes identity and territorial integrity a priority, as in the case of Romania (Joja 2019, 123), and therefore adopting a differentiating process to define priorities in three levels of categories:

(1) Must be funded to fulfill sovereignty operations;
(2) Funded military capabilities in national priority to the extent that the budget allows (above the "red line"); and,
(3) Unfunded capabilities, facilities, infrastructure, which, if allowed to go unfunded for more than two years, should

be retired/closed (below the "red line"), as has been attempted by the U.S Department of the Navy (2016).

It needs to be stressed that the inherent logic of the argument for making sovereignty operations the priority in the budget is that they *must always be fully funded*. This provides the minister of defense with a strong argument in budget negotiations with the minister of finance. As a further refinement, for those capabilities needed for sovereignty operations, only their O&M costs should be covered while in support of these missions, unless they are declared national assets. The logic in this approach is that the CHOD and armed forces have institutional *incentives* to conduct these operations as efficiently as possible to direct as much funding as possible to procuring and maintaining war-fighting capabilities. And if the defense institution can manage without a capability, institution, or infrastructure for one year, it is unlikely to be needed and can be disposed of.

Funding

There is no question that the modernization requirements of the Romanian armed forces exceed the country's current ability to pay for all of them in both the short and long term. As argued at the beginning of this essay, modernization requirements likely exceed the current annual acquisition budget by a factor of some 15 to 20 times. The practice of successive governments of not forcing the armed forces to "fit" inside the existing budget has produced empty units and "incomplete" capabilities, such as Type-22 frigates without weapons and a sub-optimal number of F-16 MRFA. Upon examination, this is a three-dimensional problem that requires three different solutions. First, defense policy needs to establish a priority list of capabilities that fulfills sovereignty and defense tasks. For example, it makes little sense to have a small force of MRFA as it limits the ability of the force to obtain all the necessary certifications and expertise in order to create a critical mass to conduct current operations, while also training sufficient numbers of fully rated-pilots and instructor-pilots. Adopting this logic would dictate that the force should be more than doubled as quickly as possible to provide air policing and a larger degree of air defense of the country's airspace, and drawing funding away from the current MiG-21 LanceR "C" fighter aircraft fleet and its supporting infrastructure.

The second part of this equation is how to find the necessary funding. Defense policy officials must examine with a more exacting eye what the current defense institution is doing and what it could do less expensively, or maybe decide not to do at all. Albeit rarely a cost-savings in the immediate term, one would think that the army's fifty bases, the navy's seven naval bases, and the air force's nine air bases should come under close scrutiny (Janes 2020), as should the large complex of defense educational institutions, for either closings or consolidation. Policy's guiding principle should be that every *leu* spent on non-combat capabilities is depriving a soldier, sailor, or airman of the equipment and training needed to prevail in the modern battlespace.

The third and final element has a chance of success only if the first two stages are conducted in a serious and disciplined manner. What is proposed is that, if the needed capabilities are ruthlessly vetted and fully costed, accompanied by a systematic effort to find savings in the current defense budget, only then will the minister of defense have the gravitas needed to convince a skeptical minister of finance and parliament of the need to float a national loan to fund needed elements of modernization. The current writer claims no originality in this proposal, as it has been suggested by former Estonian defense official Sven Sakkov as a means to procure needed capabilities for Estonia—in particular, medium-altitude radars and air-defense and coastal defense assets (Sakkov 2019). However, before asking the nation to take on the obligation of foreign debt to finance defense modernization, strong arguments will be needed to demonstrate that the capabilities identified are essential and that economies have been found and funding has been shifted to identified, *costed* defense priorities.

Conclusion

The Romanian defense institution faces considerable challenges. As this analysis has argued, despite some notable reforms and successes, considerable progress remains to be achieved before the armed forces can conclusively deter Russian provocations in the region. Romania is particularly exposed, yet allied assistance and solidarity have not matched the efforts being made in the Baltic region. Despite support from some allies, particularly the United States (Joja 2018), Romanian officials have a clear incentive to remove lingering incoherence in the country's defense policy and endeavor to field modern capabilities, in accordance with NATO operational concepts.

The challenges faced by the armed forces are prodigious. Readiness has long suffered in budgetary allocations, there are shortages in key personnel specialties throughout the armed forces, and estimates of modernization cannot be funded using current means of determining priorities and funding practices. Apropos the individual services, despite recent changes, the army has traditionally not made collective training a priority and national FTXs continued to be scripted rather than free-play. One fears that brigades and divisions will struggle to create improved command and control without a significant increase in commanding FTXs. Given these challenges, which must be addressed in the immediate term, it makes little sense to divert resources to creating a multinational corps headquarters, which would bleed the personnel and funding required at tactical levels. The navy has long been neglected by Bucharest and its modernization requirements are extensive. Given the expense of naval platforms, serious consideration should be given to creating a program of experimentation to determine the right mixture of weapons and sensors (and not necessarily traditional platforms) needed to deter Russia in the Black Sea. Hard and ruthless analysis should produce an unconventional admixture of non-traditional sensors, drones, reconnaissance, cyber, and combat capabilities. Finally, despite being arguably the most modernized service, the air force struggles to obtain the necessary funding to transition fully to fielding a fleet of MRFA with enough critical mass to be relatively self-sufficient in providing air policing and creating a greater capacity to defend the country's airspace.

A larger defense budget alone cannot address the challenges facing the Romanian armed forces. The adage often attributed

to Albert Einstein, to the effect that "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them," is apropos. To date, the existing law on defense planning has not produced a costed defense plan that the government has been able to execute. If it is determined that a law on defense planning is needed, then it must be redrafted with the view of allowing defense and military officials to experiment with different methods to determine what works best for Romania. The PPBS method struggles to execute the defense budget due to, among other things, the lack of costed plans. What is essential and should be considered a *sine qua non* is the reality that defense plans must be costed to include all long-term financial liabilities. Defense planning decision-making fora suggest legacy influence. Decision-making responsibilities for the minister of defense and the CHOD should be reviewed to ensure that the government has the best policy and military advice provided to it. Finally, HRM has been defined as an administrative function of the Ministry of National Defense, rather than being operational in nature and best managed by the armed forces themselves. HRM needs to be redefined as operational, not administrative in nature, and a key move in this direction would be to empower commanders to assess their subordinates for both performance and potential.

Finally, the financial reality of modernization of the armed forces is beyond being a challenge, but solutions must be found, and as quickly as possible. A first step relates to the need for costed defense plans. The second step involves a policy determination of which capabilities in the current force contribute directly to protecting state sovereignty. Their O&M costs need to fall in a tier-one budget line. Tier two can consist of capabilities listed in priority order and funded to the extent funding is available. Tier three consists of overall activities, institutions, and platforms that are not funded, and if they remain so after one year they should be removed from the inventory. Prior to suggesting a national loan to fund essential capabilities needed for modernization, the defense institution should conduct a ruthless analysis of what it can do without, and begin shifting funding and personnel to those capabilities that are essential to ensuring the state's defense.

To be sure, the changes this analysis has identified as being needed in existing institutional concepts and current business practices will undoubtedly require the expenditure of considerable political capital and cause no small amount of disruption throughout the entire defense institution. Arguably, however, time is of the essence, and a new logic to solve long-standing problems is needed. To put off making these fundamental changes to the defense institution only delays the inevitable and will embolden a resurgent Russia in the Black Sea region.

Notes

1. "Legacy" is defined as consisting of conceptual and physical artifacts from the Communist period that continue to ramify throughout the defense institution. I argue this point extensively in Young 2017a, *passim*.
2. See various years of *The Military Balance* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies), annual publication.
3. Ostensibly, the navy possesses missiles, but they are of Soviet origin and outdated (e.g., SS-N-2C/D Styx).
4. Most of these documents can be found at http://www.zulean.com/strategiile-de-securitate-nationala/langsw/ro/
5. I argue this point in Young 2019c, 61–62.
6. I argue that there is *no* evidence to support the assertion that it has functioned in any country in Central and Eastern Europe that has adopted it. On the contrary, it has impeded the development of a strong policy framework that ties priorities to the execution of budgets (Young 2016).
7. Cezar Vasilescu argues that despite some 20 years of efforts, the ministry remains incapable of implementing PPBS. This is because of the lack of a large number of trained and educated personnel needed to operate the system. See his insightful essay (Vasilescu 2010, 116).
8. Article 8 (3): "[The] Defense planning council is empowered to decide major objectives and actions to fulfil the tasks of the MoND and on the quantity, structure, and allocation of resources."
9. I argue this point at length in Young 2018c, 357–73.

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