


# MUNI

## Disinformation & conspiracy beliefs

Pmcb1013: Citizens, media and public opinion

Karolína Bielíková

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# Today's agenda

- Definitions and reasons
- Looking at the supply side
- Looking at the audience
- What can be done?



# Definitions

- Often terms disinformation, misinformation, fake news and other used interchangeably
- Why should we care?
  - Clear concepts allow better research
  - Misuse of the terms by political actors in their favour, results in delegitimization of legacy media




# Definitions

## Misinformation

- Incorrect or misleading information
- Created and disseminated unintentionally
  - Misunderstanding the information
  - Sloppy journalism

## Disinformation

- Incorrect or misleading information
- Created and/or disseminated deliberately



*Figure 4.2* The Supply Chain of Falsehoods.

# Definitions

## Fake news

- Difficult to conceptualize
- Consists of similar structural components as “real news”
- Mimics the result of journalistic research that follows certain professional standards
  
- ALSO used as label to discredit and delegitimize journalism and news media
- Often used by populist actors – anti-elitist rhetoric

# Definitions

## Conspiracies and conspiracy theories

- “**Conspiracy**” = secret plot by two or more powerful actors
- typically attempt to usurp political or economic power, violate rights, infringe upon established agreements, withhold vital secrets, or alter bedrock institutions
  
- “**Conspiracy theories**” = attempts to explain the ultimate causes of significant social and political events and circumstances with claims of secret plots by two or more powerful actors
- Typically address governments but can accuse any group perceived as powerful and malevolent





Figure 4.1 Relevant Concepts of Falsehood.


Note. This overview was originally published in Egelhofer and Lecheler (2019).



## How did we get here?




Current information environment



Breakdown of institutional trust



Politicians becoming more disruptive to the system



Polarization

# How did we get here?

## Current information environment

- People **consume more information** from variety of sources
- The information supply chain is **more prone to mis/disinformation** (Benner & Livingston, 2020)
- Important role of social media – creation and dissemination


### Further:

- New technologies allowing **more trustworthy fake content** (e.g. deepfakes)

# How did we get here?

## Role of trust

- Growing distrust in mainstream media, which can lead to



- Alternative sources often build on the distrust and further fuel anti-establishment narratives
- Creating “the spiral of distrust”

# How did we get here?

## Role of trust


- Distrust towards mainstream media can be also connected with distrust towards government and political actors (one elite)
- This distrust is often embedded in not being heard by the political elite and the perception of us vs. them
- Populist communication than can be used by both political actors and alternative sources, providing solutions
- This further fuels the distrust spiral

# How did we get here?

Role of trust

Distrust towards  
media

Alternative sources/  
Disinformation



# How did we get here?

## Role of political interest

- Connected to growing **avoidance of news**
- The abundance of information available and inability to tell what is right can lead to overall disinterest
- On the other hand people who seek out alternative sources have higher levels of political interest (specifically conspiracy theorists)
- They are **willing to look through variety of sources**

# How did we get here?

## Role polarized topics

- Disinformation and conspiracy theories thrive in topics that are already polarized (Van Aelst et al., 2017), e.g.:
  - Climate change
  - Immigration
  - Vaccination
  - Rights of marginalized communities
- Accented also by populist communication



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**Looking at the  
supply side**





# What is the motivation?

## Political

- Disruption of election campaigns (e.g. favouring one candidate)
- Disruption of foreign relations
- Party politics
- Destabilization of specific region
- Targeting press freedom or freedom of speech

## Financial

- Connected to digital advertising (more clicks = more revenue)
- "clickbait" articles relying on sensational and emotional headlines

# Supply side – Political actors (domestic)

- Used to gain political points
- Used as a communication tactic
- Can be intentional or unintentional (e.g. when taking false information from media)



# Supply side – Political actors (foreign)

- Foreign state actors and intelligence services
  - create and spread disinformation without taking credit for doing so
- Example: Russian (state) actors, e.g. Internet Research Agency
  - operated Twitter and Facebook accounts for foreign interference in the 2016 US presidential elections (Bastos & Farkas, 2019; Guess & Lyons, 2020)
- BUT they are **aided by citizen efforts**, in the sense that citizens often participate in the sharing of false information on social media (Golovchenko et al., 2018)

# Supply side – Media actors

- Misinformation may be created and disseminated also by legacy media and honest journalism (personal misperception, lack of time, limited verification skills (Lecheler & Kruike-meier, 2016))
- Audience mostly consume mis/disinformation from mainstream news media not social or partisan media (Tsfati et al., 2020)
- **Journalistic standards vs. Newsworthiness**
- Question of fact-checking, where false information is spread further

# Supply side – Media actors

- BUT some journalists **deliberately distort facts** and may have a personal or organizational intention to deceive
- **Hyper-partisan media** may cover fake news content when it fits their agendas (Vargo et al., 2018)
- Creation and dissemination can be motivated equally by political and financial motivation (clickbait)



# Supply side – Media actors

- Social media often further disseminate false information
- **Algorithms** prefer false or intolerant, which makes it more visible to users (e.g. comment section)




# Supply side – Citizens

- Citizens are now not only audience but also **active producers of information**
- Online environment (social media) is a place where opinion leaders/influencers can become a credible source of information for some users
- They can work **in line with the mainstream media** and act as a support (citizen journalist) or share narratives that **different or actively countering them**

# Supply side – Citizens

- Primarily role is in dissemination of false information either by purpose or accidentally
- Only minimal percentage of social media users creates content
- But activities such as sharing, commenting or reacting can increase its reach





*Table 4.1* Motives of Actors in the Supply Chain of Falsehoods

	<i>Creators</i>		<i>Disseminators</i>	
	<i>Disinformation (intentional)</i>	<i>Misinformation (unintentional)</i>	<i>Disinformation (intentional)</i>	<i>Misinformation (unintentional)</i>
<b>Political</b>	Political	Believe true	Political	Believe true
<b>Media</b>	Political	Believe true	Political	Believe true
	Financial		Financial	To correct
<b>Private</b>	Political	Believe true	Political	Believe true
	Financial			To correct

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## Looking at the audience



# Audience

## Why people believe in disinformation?

- **Confirmation bias** = *“individuals tend to seek out reasons to dismiss or avoid engagement with information that is disconfirming of prior beliefs, while seeking out emotionally soothing truths that confirm convictions”*
  - Consuming only sources that **confirm our beliefs**
- **Frustration with the information environment** (e.g. abundance of information) --> hard to navigate what is correct/false

# Audience

Why people believe in conspiracies?


- Can be embedded in distrust towards political actors and mainstream media = elite
- Citizens are seeking answers to the question, why are their needs not fulfilled
- Sensationalism and appel on emotions (feeling of fear, insecurity) e.g. your grandparents are worried about you

# Audience

Why people believe in conspiracies?

- People who already believe in particular conspiracy theories are likely to believe in others
- They can be often interconnected without an obvious path, e.g. How essential oils lead to pastel Qanon?
- Forming conspiracy thinking = any information is consumed through conspiracy lense

# Road to participation




Independent  
media



Informed  
citizen



Political  
participation



Independent  
media



Informed  
citizen



Political  
participation


Conspiracies



Mis/disinformatio  
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
# Who is motivated to participate?

- Motivation for participation is highly connected to political interest



Political interest

=



Motivation for participation



# Who is motivated to participate?

- Distrustful people often rely only on the most traditional forms of participation = **voting**
  - motivated by their perceived duty as a citizen
- **Other forms of participation can be seen as useless**, producing no results
  - In Czechia this is a typical perception of demonstration

# Who is motivated to participate?

- People consuming alternative sources often have high levels of political interest
- This can lead to high motivation to participate, specifically anti systematic forms of participation (demonstrations, petitions etc.)
- Connected to emotionality of disinformation



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## Available solutions



# Is there a way out?

## Media literacy

= ability to use, understand, and create media content in a variety of contexts

- Considered an umbrella term for other literacies e.g.: news literacy and health media literacy
- Often targeted towards youth and adolescent (as part of school curriculum) or seniors
- Dependent on understanding the fastpace technology change

# Is there a way out?

## Pre-bunking

- Using different tool to notify audience that information may be false --> getting ahead of the false information
- Useful for audiences without set opinions on sources and news  
find me strategy
- BUT people who tend to believe disinformation more are immune to the alerts (further proving their view)

# Is there a way out?

## De-bunking

- Fact-checking as an option to correct false information after it has been consumed
- Important role of trust in the debunking sources
- Can have different effectiveness based on the disinformation being debunked as well as the communication style
- Generally considered the last resort and more focus on the other two solutions