CoverOverlay.png Post-Communist Politics Autumn 2024 Doc. Marek Rybář, PhD.  ™Origins of parties: ™Historical parties (a continuity with pre-Communist time subjects) ™Parties emerging as a result of transition to democracy and regime change ™parties with a continuity with the communist-time subjects ™parties originating from the dynamics of the post-Communist development Political Parties after 1989  ™a strategy of pre-communist ideology and identity (ethnic, Christian-Democratic) ™a strategy of a left-right competition ™radicalism of the extreme right (and left) ™what accounts for differentiated party development in the region? ™structural, interactional and other explanations Party Mobilization Strategies after1989  ™H. Kitschelt: ™incomplete modernization before communism AND forced modernization of the Communist period led to preservation of various populist, rural and conservative elements in society (POL and HUN) ™initially a division of the right into the liberal and conservative streams (the left, the liberal right and the conservative right) Historical Structural Explanations  ™in contrast, a completed pre-Communist modernization AND an effective bureaucratic-authoritarian Communism led to creation of a dominant liberal-conservative right in the Czech case ™a low degree of pre-communist modernization AND clientelist type of Communism and, after 1989, to a merger of nationalism and economic populism (Communist-successor parties) Historical Structural Explanations  ™Vachudova: nature of the political right after 1989 depended on the character of the anti-Communist opposition before 1989 ™a weak opposition (SVK, RUM, BUL, CRO) resulted in weak and moderate right ™domination of parties that combined nationalism and economic populism (post-communists or nationalists) Strategic Interactions  ™macrostructural explanations cannot explain the strength, success and unity/cohesion of political parties; deterministic and static ™the key parties went through far-reaching transformations and adaptations (transformation of Fidesz and the collapse of the left in POL and HUN, gradual fragmentation of the party-political scene) ™post-Communist dynamics increasingly important The New Issues  ™Culture: respect for norms of religion and moral authority (abortion, LGBT+ rights, a free choice of lifestyle and morals), taken up by the far right ™Democracy: authoritarian vs. prodemocratic forces, support for a “firm political hand” ™Corruption: The use of state resources for private gain – a host of antiestablishment anticorruption parties ™Populism: rejection of elites on behalf of “virtuous people”, often (but not necessarily) far right parties, e.g. (technocratic) populism The New Issues  ™the communist party either existed as the sole party (USSR, GDR, BUL, ...) ™or as a hegemonic party, a small number of other parties permitted (POL, CS) ™the party controlled the state apparatus by the so-called nomenclature system ™the party controlled the state but also the economy and society (state-owned companies, positive sanctions of a pro-regime organizations) Party and State before 1989  ™ strong links and potential for exploitation remain: ™a degree of dependence of parties on the state funding ™ a degree of control the state has over parties (legal regulations, constitutionalization etc.) ™ a degree of party control over the state (patronage, clientelism, corruption) Party and State before 1989  Interest Organizations before 1989 ™the party used the state to control society ™Communist societies were highly organized (several exclusive “societal organizations” with a de facto compulsory membership) ™independent associational activities were prohibited and sanctioned ™umbrella-type of organizing principle (“the front”) containing the communist party, other parties, trade unions, cultural and sport organizations etc.  Trade Unions in Communism ™an important part of ideological legitimacy of the regime ™served as transmission belts in transferring and implementing party decisions onto society ™anti-regime opposition in the 1980s often used the trade union strategy as an organizing principle: ™Solidarity (POL), Podkrepa (BUL) and Independent Trade Unions (HUN)  Tripartite structures ™tripartite structures emerged in many countries in the early 1990s ™a mechanism to coordinate industrial policy making (the government, trade unions, the employers) ™largely a symbolic access to decision making ™some argue tripartite arrangements served as a formal tool to provide legitimacy to the governments pursuing large-scale transformations  The weakness of trade unions ™governments (left and right) sought to minimize the impact of the tripartite deals and negotiations ™frequent interruptions of the “social dialogue” ™weak social identification of the employees? ™pro-capitalist atmosphere of the 1990s? ™low interest of trade union members, defeatism  Civil Society in CEE ™comparative data indicate a low degree of membership in voluntary (non-profit) and protest activities in the region ™it is lower compared to Western European averages but also when compared to other countries of the third wave of democratization (Southern Europe, Latin America) ™does not mean that civil society emerged in the CEE only after 1989 nor it means it is politically and socially irrelevant  Civil Society in CEE ™behind the facade of a single communist regime, one could see enormous differences between the countries ™the existence of an institutionalized sphere of associations and organizations controlled by the regime (not just trade unions but also professional and interest associations etc. ™during communism it was a strongly centralized, bureaucratized and politicized field ™over time, clear differences between POL and HUN vs. CS, ROM and GDR  Differences before 1989 ™POL: frequent protests and resistance of society (workers, students, peasants, the Catholic church ™culminated in 1980 – the Solidarity Movement, resurfaced in 1988-89 ™influential and relatively autonomous Catholic Church ™HUN – a similar vibrant protest initiatives, a strategy of co-optation somewhat more successful  Differences before 1989 ™lower number of dissidents in CS, Slovenia and the Baltics – smaller political, religious and cultural initiatives ™after 1989, many of the pro-regime organizations lost members, changed their leadership and names but kept some of their resources ™the fall of communism brought about an organizational revolution – many charities, non-governmental organizations and foundations emerged  Differences after 1989 ™enormous differences between democratic regimes and hybrid/autocratic regimes in: ™the number of organizations ™their legal regulations ™in the latter, organizations inherited from the communist era often dominate ™“new” civil society often based on a “dissent principle” – protests and social movements emerge as a reaction to the regime breaking violating the norms  Differences after 1989 ™strong autocratic regimes (BEL, TUR, UZB, RUS) attempts to eliminate any activities of autonomous organizations ™less authorit/hybrid regimes: marginalization of some types of organizations, strong restrictions on the NGOs, subsidies for pro-regime organizations (some of them inherited from Communism) ™ democracies: legal framework and activities similar to Western Europe  Differences after 1989 ™the real indicators of the strength of civil society are not the membership numbers but the influence such organizations have on policy making ™there are differences in attitudes civil society organizations have toward the state institutions: cooperation or protests? ™a growth of a new ideological type of civil society organizations: uncivil society  Two types of activism ™participatory activism: potential and actual participation in civic activities (interest organization activities, election participation) ™transactional activism: semi-permanent links among various non-state organized actors, and their interactions with political and institutional actors ™when we look at the latter, we find richer and more numerous mixture of activities  Transactional activism ™based on coalition-building among small professional organizations, aimed at gaining strategic positions vis-a-vis the state power ™it is well equipped to put checks on the state power and does not attest to a society of isolated, passive and alienated citizens ™however, it cannot support its claims by claiming legitimacy derived from citizens, the fact that weakens its leverage