Democracy and Democratic Backsliding Post-Communist Politics PMCb1109 Autumn 2024 Doc. Marek Rybář, PhD. Results of the Third Wave of Democratization (1974-2017) 1/2 •enormous differences in the quality of democracy •Mainwaring and Bizzaro (2018): indicators of democracy taken from the V-Dem index •91 countries embarked upon democratic transition •depending on the transition path they identify five categories: •collapse, erosion, stagnation, improvement and a consistently high quality of democracy •they compare the scores at the beginning of each country’s transition and in 2017 Results of the Third Way of Democratization (1974-2017) 1/2 •more than a third new democracies collapsed (34), typically within a short time period •they noticed 2 cases of democratic erosion (when democratic score was significantly higher at the outset of transition than in 2017) •28 cases of stagnation, i.e., situations with a relatively low score of democracy both in the early period of transition and in 2017 •improvement was recorded in 23 cases •only 4 cases where a relatively well-developed democracy persisted until 2017 Collapse •collapse typically comes gradually with not clear point of break: •Russia, Turkey or Nicaragua •military coups rare (Mali) •a case of usurpation of power by a single individual (Fujimori v Peru) • Erosion •the cases of Ecuador and Poland •the level of liberal democracy decreased, however, due to free elections the regime basically remains democratic •in contrast to the early periods of transition, levels of democracy in 2017 declined Stagnation •the cases of regimes that still remain democratic (not competitive autocracies) •elections matter for who rules but the rights of the opposition are sometimes violated, and the electoral game is tilted in favor of the incumbents •civic rights are not available to all groups of citizens in an equally consistent manner •some regimes (e.g. Lebanon) stagnated at a very low level •other, e.g. Greece, stagnated at a considerably higher level • Improvement •is a logical opposite to erosion (e.g. Latvia, Slovakia, Romania, Mongolia) •the rights are more respected, the system of checks and balances is stronger, and the elections are more competitive, free and fair •some democracies with low score improved in this way (El Salvador, Romania) •other have become more robust over time (Spain, Uruguay) • Consistently strong democracies •the originally high score of democracy remained intact over time: Lithuania, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia Broader Context of Democratization •the countries where democracy levels increased or remained consistently high (groups 4 and 5) systematically differ from the other groups in their high levels of economic growth •democracy tended to improve in the richer countries •democratic collapse was less likely in the countries surrounded by other democracies •the higher the initial levels of democracy, the more likely it is that democracy will survive Political Tranformation 1/2 (BTI data 2022) Consolidating Democracies (10-8) Defective Democracies (<8-6) Highly Defective Democracies (<6) Moderate Autocracies (>=4) Hard-Line Autocracies (<4) Estonia North Macedonia BiH Russia Belarus Lithuania Poland Bulgaria Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan Czech Republic Mongolia, Albania, Ukraine Uzbekistan Latvia Montenegro Azerbaijan Slovakia Kosovo Tajikistan Slovenia Hungary Turkmenistan Croatia Serbia Romania Armenia Moldova, Georgia Political Tranformation 2/2 •North Macedonia and Romania were the only two countries in the region that recorded significant improvements in their political transformation scores •The slide toward autocracy continued in Hungary, Poland and Serbia, which were joined by Bulgaria and Slovenia •only moderate changes in the FSU Countries: Moldova’s improvement, Georgia’s slow decline, •a pronounced reliance on leadership figures and the personality-centered networks associated with them, especially in autocracies Economic Transformation (BTI data 2022) (economic growth, fiscal and monetary situation, national debt, etc.) Highly Advanced Advanced Limited Very Limited Rudimentary Czech Republic Croatia Hungary, Montenegro Uzbekistan Turkmenistan Estonia Bulgaria Serbia, Romania Tajikistan Slovenia Romania BiH, Kosovo, Ukraine Lithuania North Macedonia Russia, Armenia Slovakia Kazakhstan, Georgia Latvia Moldova Poland Mongolia Kyrgyzstan Azerbaijan Belarus Autocratization •We should distinguish between democratic breakdown, democratic backsliding and autocratization (Lührmann & Lindberg 2019) •democratic breakdown refers to an outright demise of democracy •democratic backsliding refers to reversion of a previously democratic regime •autocratization is seen as a mirror opposite to democratization, meaning "the decline of democratic regime attributes" •such a decline may occur in any regime Waves of autocratization •three waves of autocratization between 1900 and 2017 (Lührmann & Lindberg 2019) •some two-thirds of the autocratization episodes (N = 142, 65%) took place in already authoritarian states •about a third of all autocratization episodes (N = 75) started in democratic regimes •almost all of them (80%) led to the country turning into an autocracy The third wave of autocratization •started in 1994 and by 2017, it dominated with the reversals outnumbering the countries making progress •the first reversed wave affected both democracies and autocracies, and the second reversal period almost only worsened electoral autocracies, •almost all contemporary autocratization episodes affect democracies •the share of democracies remains close to its highest ever – 53% Alternatives to Institutional Indices of Democracy •the democratic scores depend on our definition and operationalization of democratic regime •comparative indicators (e.g. by Freedom House or V-Dem project) emphasize institutions and their stability (elections, courts, constitutions, etc.) •however, contemporary debates about democratic governance revolved around issues such as deliberation and internalization of liberal democratic values •institutional indicators do not include questions of economic equality and those of capacities to effectively exercise civil rights and freedoms Alternatives to Institutional Indices of Democracy •a culturalist critique points out the low level of acceptance of liberal democratic norms in the post-communist region •a political-economic critique: focuses on the relations between state and society, points out the uneven access to wealth and power of different groups of citizens/inhabitants •it also emphasizes the risk of state capture, a situation the state institutions are captured by powerful economic interests who use them to enrich themselves Alternatives to Institutional Indices of Democracy •both types of criticism reject the notion of democratic backsliding as misleading: •most post-communist countries have never been liberal democracies in the first place, i.e. there is logically no process of sliding back •some authors claim that Serbia, Macedonia or Montenegro (the Western Balkans) have never been consolidated democracies embedded in a democratic political culture •in all these (and other) countries illiberal norms prevail (not true that a majority of citizens would support and practice them) • Alternatives to Institutional Indices of Democracy •state capture is the fact of the day in several countries of the region •three decades of post-communist development may be too short a period to definitively evaluate the end results of democratic transition: •historically, stable democracies emerged as a result of mobilization effort of, and struggles between, political movements – affecting the patterns of party competition •illiberal populist movements: democratic regress should not be surprising; they may even be signs of positive political development •as attempts to calibrate mobilization mechanisms seeking control of political elites who should be accountable to their voters Hollowing out and Backsliding of Democracy •thus, Hungary and Poland may not be typical cases of a troubled democratic development of the CEE region •a victory of previously opposition parties that misuse their newly acquired governmental status to bend the rules (Fidesz, PiS) are quite exceptional in the region •B. Greskovits (2015) identified two mechanisms of democratic decay: hollowing out and backsliding •hollowing out is a general trend in many democracies and signifies a decline of public participation in political decision-making • Hollowing out and Backsliding of Democracy •backsliding signifies radicalization of a large segment of politically active society that supports the illiberal political elites •democratic regimes in central and eastern Europe emerged in the early 1990s as “hollowed out” •they were weakly rooted in political and civil society and displayed low levels of participation of socio-economically defined groups (trade unions etc.) Stability of Hollowed-Out Democracies •Estonia and Latvia: ethnically exclusivist political elites are obstacles to democratic improvement without threatening stability of the existing political institutions •as a result, we have a stable democracy (institutionally defined) where ethnonational minorities are excluded from political participation, and other groups of citizens are pacified (manual workers, pensioners) – hollowing out without democratic decay •stability of institutions does not mean a good democracy, because stability may be achieved by exclusion, public apathy, and by elite control Predatorial Economic Elites •in hybrid regimes, stability often results from an equilibrium between a (small) public demanding more democracy, and the intransigence of political elites who, among themselves, compete over who will control the state and its institutions •oligarchs in Moldova, Ukraine or Latvia managed to take control of political parties that essentially became the political wing of their business interests (pocket parties) •private economic interests’ embeddedness in the state and in political parties is an alternative way of democratic decay, e.g. in Slovenia, Czech Republic and Slovakia Predatorial Economic Elites •the Czech case is a good illustration of the phenomenon of cyclical emergence of new anti-establishment parties led to their replacement of the previously dominant political players •anti-establishment parties often pursue an anti-corruption agenda, however, the case of Andrej Babiš and the ANO indicate that such parties may serve as agents of other economic interests •a direct participation of oligarchs in political competition is rare, however, and Babiš/ANO case also show the risks and limits of such a strategy