Governments and Bureaucracies Post-Communist Politics PMCb1109, Doc. Marek Rybář, PhD. The executive branch of power lhistorically the oldest branch of power lfollowing the breakdown of communism, the executive power was the most experimented with in the region lbefore 1989, only Czechoslovakia and Romania had a presidential office lPOL – a collective head of state (the State Council) lafter 1989: strong powers of the presidents especially in the post-Soviet space Presidential regimes and democracy lpresidential regimes less likely than parliamentarism to sustain democratic government (Linz, Stepan, Mainwaring) because l1. Presidential elections become “zero-sum games”, they exclude minorities l2. Produce competing claims of political legitimacy l3. Presidential democracies foster personalism of the executive l4. An outsider demagogue can capture the system and ignore the existing division of powers Types of political systems lparliamentary (a system of dependency between the executive and legislative branches of powers) lpresidential (a system of mutual independence of the executive and legislative branches) lsemipresidential (directly elected president and a prime minister accountable to the parliament) Duverger: semipresidential systems lPresident is directly elected by voters lNot accountable to parliament lPrime Minister is the head of government accountable to parliament lPrime Minister and President share some executive powers lpresident has “quite considerable powers” lsystem is open to “cohabitation” Two types of semipresidentialism 1/3 lA premier-presidential subtype lthe prime minister and cabinet are formally accountable only to the assembly, not to the president lpresident appoints the prime minister who heads the governments lonly the parliament can remove the PM/government from office Two types of semipresidentialism 2/3 la president-parliamentary subtype lthe prime minister and cabinet are dually accountable to the president and the assembly majority lpresident appoints and recalls the PM and government ministers lthe PM and ministers are accountable to both the president and the parliament Two types of semipresidentialism 3/3 lpresident-parliamentary systems tend to be less democratic than premier-presidential ones lthe key variable is a dependent and uncertain position of the PM and the cabinet between president and the parliament lif president does not have support of a parliamentary majority, conflicts abund l Executive systems in an early phase of post-communism l8 pure parliamentary systems (ALB, BOS, YUG, LAT, CZE, EST, HUN, SVK) l6 pure presidential systems (AZE, BLR, GEO, TAJ, TURK, UZB) lother countries were semipresidential la few countries switched from one system to another lsemipresidentialism is a prevailing form of government in the CEE region Regional variation of executive systems in CEE lCentral Europe and the Baltics lthe Balkans lCaucasus and Central Asia lthe rest of the former Soviet Union Central Europe and the Baltics lno pure presidentialism, no presidential-parliamentary systems lpremier-presidential systems: BUL, LIT, POL, ROM, SVK 1999-, CZE 2012- lparliamentarism: LAT, pre-1999 SVK, pre-2012 CZE, EST, HUN l Map Description automatically generated The Balkans lno pure presidentialism lpres-parl: CRO 1990-2000, lpremier-presidential : CRO 2000-, MAC, SRB 2007-2008, YUG 2000-2003, SLO lparliamentarism: ALB, BOS 1995-, MONT 2007- YUG -2000, SRB-MONT (2003-2007) l Map Description automatically generated Caucasus and Central Asia lpure presidential: AZE, GEO 1995-2004, UZB, TUR, TAJ, lpresident-parliamentary: ARM 1991-2005, GEO 2004-, KAZ lpremier-presidential: ARM 2005-2015, MONG 1992- lpure parliamentary: ARM 2015-, Map Description automatically generated The rest of the frmr Soviet Union lpure presidentialism: BLR 1994-1996 lpresidential-parliamentary: BLR 1996, RUS 1993-, UKR 1996-2004, 2010-2014 lPremier-Presidential ones: MOLD 1994-2000, 2016- UKR 2004-, 2014- lpure parliamentarism: MOLD 2000-2016 Map Description automatically generated Semipresidencialism and democracy in CEE lpremier-presidential systems no worse than pure parliamentarism in democratic performance lpresident-parliamentary systems far worse in democratic performance than parliamentarism AND premier-presidential systems lpresidential systems linked to worst levels of democracy (they have often never been democratic in the first place) How do president-parliamentary system undermine democracy? l1. Presidents often misuse decree powers in order to monopolize executive authority l2. Presidents consciously undermine the creation of stable parties and stable party systems lconstitutionally strong presidents AND weak parties sustain/reproduce authoritarian government Creating the Presidency: Poland lan outcome of the roundtable negotiations lelected for 6 years, the right to dissolve the parliament and veto the legislature llater (in 1990) reduced to 5-year term lthe Little Constitution of 1992 – presidential prerogatives lthe new constitution of 1997 – further reduction of presidential powers and the strengthening of the PM (a constructive vote of no confidence) Creating the Presidency: Hungary lthe roundtable negotiations failed to agree on presidency – a referendum in 11/1989 lthe Communists – a strong president elected before the parliamentary elections lthe opposition – a weak president elected by a democratically newly elected parliament lweak presidency, the Constitutional Court further reduced its powers in a few landmark rulings The presidency: other countries lRomania and Serbia/Yugoslavia: examples of how the political context and the personal factors may influence the functioning of intra-executive relations lSlovenia – weak & directly elected president lLithuania – semipresidential system as a compromise, as both presidentialism and parliamentary governments existed in the pre-1940 history of the country la formally strong role of the directly elected president but the system works as a de facto parliamentarism (the only impeached president in Europe) Russia lextremely strong role of the president had pacified the PM and the government even without a parliamentary majority backing the president lsome conflicts (Yeltsin vs. Primakov, Stepashin &Putin vs. Medvedev) lPutin in presidency = a consolidation of the parliamentary support of the president, his PMs as administrators (Zubkov, Mishustin) Russia & Ukraine lRUS: tandem Putin-Medvedev, the level of conflicts depended on who held the presidency, constitutional changes in 2020 lUkraine: extreme intra-executive conflicts, manipulation of the constitutional norms lconstitutional amendments tailored to put the office holders into an advantageous position lPresident Kuchma – preferred strong presidency while in office l Ukraine l2004 – constitutional amendments to weaken the presidency (in anticipation of Yushtchenko’s victory) lPresident Yushchenko – could not/did not prevent further weakening of presidency President Yanukovich (2010) – after taking control of the presidency, he objected the reduction of presidential powers that he himself had advocated before Ukraine lthe Constitutional Court ruled in 2010 that the 2004 weakening of the presidency was unconstitutional (i.e. the return to the 1996 Kuchma’s strong presidency) l2014: the parliament passed a constitutional amendment reinstalling the 2004 reforms (a weaker presidency) lZelenskyy: strengthening the powers of presidency due to the state of war Models of parliamentarism lparliamentary systems do not function in a uniform manner: loften a de facto fusion of parliament and government, because of: lthe compatibility of the parliamentary and ministerial posts (ministers also hold parliamentary seats lPM is usually an MP la strong and disciplined political parties Prime Ministers in CEE la comparatively weak position – given their short tenure la link between party system instability and low durability of the PMs lmajor exceptions: Drnovšek (1992-2002), Orbán (1998-2002, 2010-), Klaus, Dzurinda (1998-2006), Fico (2006-2010, 2012-2018, 2023-), Tusk (2007-2014, 2023-) lHowever: PMs have a strong leader effect in elections – they shape voters’ electoral choices l