Influences on East European Politics: The European Union
Post-Communist Politics, PMCb1109
Doc. Marek Rybář, PhD.

How does the EU influence outside regimes?
lEU is the most effective international organization in spreading democracy and the rule of law
lthe EU‘s leverage rests in motivating the outside countries by prospect of EU membership, AND in
its political conditionality
lactive and passive leverage against the third countries

The framework for EU-CEE relations
lconditionality as a key tool – “governance by enlargement”
lconditionality spells an asymmetric relationship, in which the EU offered help and privileges
after the candidate countries’ meeting the set criteria/conditions
lfirst formulated in 1993
l
l

The Copenhagen Criteria (1993)
l1) economic – a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and
market forces within the EU
l2) political – stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for and protection of minorities
l3) administrative – ability to take on the obligations of membership (implement the rules and
adhere to the goals of the Union)

The Scope of EU Conditionality
limpact on CEE stronger than on the domestic policies of the EU-15
lconditionality included the acquis but also broadly conceived political and macroeconomic themes
lpolitical criteria included a judiciary and prisons reform (BUL), economic criteria involved
pension and welfare state reforms (SLO)

Conditionality and its limits
lless effective in the countries with a history of (violent) ethnic conflicts
lhigh political costs for the national governments
lCRO and SER – (lack of) cooperation with the ICTY
lTurkey‘s recognition of the Greek-Cypriot state
lStatus of ethnic minorities in LAT and EST

EU and democracy
in the member states
lthe ability to sanction an EU member state is considerably weaker than an EU candidate country
lautonomy of EU institutions in such sanctions is limited
lif there is no compliance with the EU law, the Commission can turn to the CJEU
llimited and complicated procedures to deal with democratic backsliding

Procedure 1:Sanctions
lproposed by 1/3 of EU member states or the Commission
lassent by 2/3 of MEPs (representing a simple majority in the EP)
lunanimity in the European Council (excluding the country under consideration and the abstentions)
lthe Council by a qualified majority agrees on sanctions:
lvoting rights suspension in the Council

Procedure 2: Concern
l“a preventive (political) procedure”: states the existence of a clear threat to liberal democratic
norms in a member state:
lInitiated by 1/3 of EU members, or by the Commission, or by the parliament
lrequires parliamentary assent and a 4/5 majority in the Council ((excluding the country under
consideration and the abstentions)

Procedure 3:
A new rule of law mechanism
lthe argument that countries whose governments interfere with the rule of law do not deserve
transfers from the EU budget; however:
lthe EU can only cut the funding to if there is a concrete Treaty-based procedure to do so
lThe only legal base is “the need to protect the financial interests of the Union”
lthe regulation states sanctions can only be imposed if there is a clear link to the financial
interests of the Union

Other Possible Measures
la threat of sanctions
lsocial pressures
lissue linkages
l

Problems in Central Europe
lAustria 2000: entry into government of the far right FPÖ
lHungary after 2010: new constitution and a series of constitutional laws – the central bank,
media, NGOs, universities, electoral rules
lRomania 2012: attacks on the Constitutional Court, limiting presidential powers
lPoland 2015: weakening of the Constitutional Court and independence of judiciary, media, rights of
the opposition

Why democratic backsliding?
lhow did the early frontrunners like HUN (and POL) become the most problematic EU members?
ldemocratic consolidation understood as a process of adaptation of political elites
llow levels of civic participation and weakly anchored political institutions were considered a
minor problem

Why democratic backsliding?
lthey may represent the missing content of democratic political institutions, leading to the
current wave of autocratization in CEE
ladoption of institutions and EU legal templates (minority protection, antidiscrimination norms)
were adopted without being backed by coalitions of politicians, civic groups and voters
l

Missing Liberal Consensus?
lDawson&Hanley (2016): cohabitation of liberal and illiberal norms (the latter may even be
stronger) led to corruption and a failure of EU conditionality) over time
lBUL: economic & technocratic version of liberalism adapted to existing illiberal norms
(nationalism and social conservativism)
lCZE: an early coalition of liberal dissidents and economic technocrats was joined by economic
elites of the old regime

The “Other” Democratic Deficit
lParadox: more democracy at the EU level (a stronger role of Parliament and parties, politicization
of the Commission) may lead to authoritarianism at the lower (i.e. state) level
la parallel with other federations (India, USA before 1950, Brazil, etc.): in some democratic
federations, a sub-national authoritarianism may prosper

Can an EU member state be an autocracy?
lthe importance of 1. party politics and 2. fiscal policies:
lin federations, autocratic leaders at the sub-federal level may be an important part of governing
coalitions at the federal level
lconsequently, democrats at the federal level may overlook authoritarian policies of their allies
l

Can an EU member state be an autocracy?
lfiscal policies: local autocrats may use federal financial transfers to support their clientelist
networks to stay in power
lOrbán’s Fidesz and Hungary as a model case
lFidesz was, until early 2021, an important part of the EPP group in the EP, protected and defended
by its powerful allies
l

Hungary (and Poland) in the EU
lEPP leaders rejected criticism from other political factions as politically motivated
l(“a liberal-socialist conspiracy”)
lFidesz has misused the EU funds to sustain its clientelist networks – people close to Orbán are
the major beneficiaries of EU subsidies in HUN
lOrbán has also cultivated his own “clients” in other countries, e.g. Slovenia’s Janez Janša,
Serbian leaders in Bosnia
la mutual cooperation HUN-POL

Recent development
lUkraine as an EU candidate country (2022)
la split in  HUN-POL partnership, HUN as a Trojan horse? lNATO enlargement (HUN and TUR link it to
EU politics) l2023: EU Commission proposed to freeze some €7.5 billion from the regular EU budget
earmarked for Hungary + €5.8 billion in grants (Recovery plan) – some of it released in 2024

Official and Potential EU Candidate Countries
lAlbania (2014, negotiations since 2020)
lMoldova (2022, referendum in 2024)
lRepublic of North Macedonia (2005, negotiations since 2020)
lMontenegro (2010, neg. since 2018)
lSerbia (2012, neg. since 2014, halted)
lTurkey (1999, neg. since 2009, halted)
lUkraine (2022)
lGeorgia (U-turn in 2024), BiH, Kosovo
l