3

The emergence of the nation-state in East-Central Europe and the Balkans in historical perspective

RENÉO LUKIC

The "*longue durée*" of political history

The emergence of the nation-state appeared as a political process of "*longue durée*" in the political history of East-Central Europe and the Balkans. Alongside this, the multinational states[1] constituted by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, seem to have taken historical detours, lasting seventy-four years for the Soviet Union (1917–91), seventy-five years for Czechoslovakia (1918–93), and seventy-three years for Yugoslavia (1918–91).[2] Much as the division of politics into two camps (left and right) harkens back to the French Revolution and represents the "*longue durée*" of European political history, the appearance of civic nationalism in France and ethnic nationalism in Germany, more or less at the same time (the nineteenth century), represents the ideological source that nourished the creation of new states of East-Central Europe. In this sense, I consider the formation of these nation-states, spread over several centuries, to be of the "*longue durée*," even if this concept is rarely used in political history.[3]

At this point in time it is somewhat surprising that the emergence of nation-states in East-Central Europe and the Balkans, after the fall of the communist regimes, appeared as both extraordinary and undesirable to Western democracies, despite the fact that the nation-state, as François Furet has justly noted, "is the principal form within which modern societies live and the basis upon which they think they should evolve."[4] Jean-Baptiste Duroselle says the same in writing that, in the twentieth century, "every political entity seeks to become a nation-state."[5] Continent-wide revolution in 1848 signaled the emergence of two universal ideologies – nationalism[6] and proletarian internationalism – accompanied by their respective social movements: the movement of nationalities and the first attempts to federalize the socialist revolutionary groups into a single organization called the "First International." The almost simultaneous entrance of both these ideologies into European history left a lasting mark on the relationship between the governed and governing during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Proletarian internationalism and nationalism, to use the expression of the French historian Pierre Renouvin, belong to "the deep currents of history," and have profoundly shaped the political mentality of West European citizens. It was in the middle of the nineteenth century that

both of these universal ideologies began their political and intellectual migration from Western European politics, where they had been thought out and theorized, to pre-modern Central and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, these politico-ideological transfers to East-Central Europe were made without implementing the rule of law that had been constructed in Western Europe alongside state-building since the advent of the French and English revolutions. The democratic deficit that accompanied these transfers favored the rise of ethnic nationalism in the Balkans which was influenced by its corollary, the "German model" of an ethnic nation, whereas the civic nationalism (or patriotism) of the "French model" of a civic nation had limited influence in Central Europe (being founded chiefly in Hungary). This ideological penetration resulted in the formation of cultural nations in the Balkans where the identifying beacons were ethnic origin, orthodox religion, and language (the famous nineteenth-century Serbian orthographer Vuk Stefanović Karadžić).

The emancipation of nationalities in Europe and their quest for statehood gained momentum with the "Spring of Nations" in 1848. The publication of the brochure, *The Communist Manifesto*, written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, brought to new prominence the revolutionary ideology supposed to liberate the proletariat, the class carrying the torch of universal history. As the proletariat is set free by the advent of the socialist revolution, it should liberate all of humanity at the same time. The establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat on a worldwide scale would make the category of nation obsolete. For a long time it was believed that the advent of socialism and the creation of an international communist movement with global influence would lead to the gradual withering away of the nation.

The French historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle noted, with regards to national claims, that "national sentiment renders all forms of foreign domination unbearable and arouses the will of the dominated people to acquire independence, using all means available, such as subversion, violence and war."[7] European enlightenment and modernity fed national movements in East-Central Europe throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, entering the political scene every time the international state system was transforming itself, such as between 1917 and 1920, 1939 and 1945, and in 1989. However, the implementation of the Yalta System constitutes an exception. The international conferences of Moscow (1944), Yalta (1945), and Potsdam (1945), which formed the bipolar Yalta System, did not give significant momentum to national movements for two reasons: first, a certain number of these national movements (such as in Croatia and Slovakia) were seriously compromised by their past alignment with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy; second, by rapidly establishing its sphere of influence, the USSR – its sphere of influence coincided with the deployment of the Red Army in East-Central Europe (1944–5) – quickly put down all political action aiming to restore national independence. The case of the three Baltic countries, annexed to the USSR in 1940, is particularly instructive here.

Keeping in mind these initial observations, I argue that by observing the evolution of the international system since the nineteenth century in Europe it can be demonstrated that, during the great historical accelerations, the continent found itself profoundly altered on four occasions, to the point where it is preferable to speak of a succession of four distinct European state systems. The international system dominated by European empires and implemented at the Congress of Vienna (1815), was gradually replaced starting in 1917, due to the Bolshevik Revolution and the Versailles System (1919–20).[8] The First World War dismantled and put an end to the multinational empires (Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Empire), which crumbled in 1917–18 under the weight of military defeats and revolutions, such as the February and October Revolutions in Russia. The Bolshevik leader, Vladimir Ilych Lenin, and the American president, Woodrow Wilson, addressing the issue separately, insisted that the right of peoples to decide their own future applied to the nationalities of the empires in ruins. President Wilson, through his "new diplomacy," thus gave explicit legitimacy to the "principle of nationalities," which served as a basis for the creation of numerous new states. Other great powers (France, Great Britain) acquiesced in Wilson's policy of creating national and multinational states in East-Central Europe. The second modification of the European state system occurred between 1933 and 1945 with the formation of the "New Order" (the Nazi System); the third led to the establishment of the Yalta System (1947–89) in which communist systems took hold in Central and Southeastern Europe; and the fourth is the post-communist system that began in 1989 and still continues today. The formation of each one of these international systems was accompanied by the proliferation of new states. If the great wars seem to have created a historical context favorable to new state formation (as in the past, such as in 1914 and 1939), with the exception of Yugoslavia, the emergence of new states since 1989 has been rather peaceful, unlike the twentieth century's past where diplomatic conferences structured the international system alongside the conquerors and the conquered.

From a geopolitical point of view, East-Central Europe found itself, after 1989, in a similar historical situation to that which had prevailed in 1917–18 when the Bolshevik Revolution and the Peace Conference led to the creation of multiple national and multinational states in East-Central Europe. In 1989, the East–West confrontation ended with the "Tocquevillian" revolution – the revolution of civil society – in East-Central Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Union. This context favored the creation of nation-states from the Balkans to the mountains of the Urals. In East-Central Europe in 1989, the European Community (EC) and the United States assumed the role of hegemonic powers charged with establishing the rules and conditions as a basis for the emergence of new states (in 1919–20 this role was played by the Entente, the United States, and the League of Nations). On 16 December 1991, several days after the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht, the EC, under the pressure of the violent breakup of Yugoslavia, outlined the rules for recognizing the successor states of the communist federations.[9]

In the pages that follow, I will attempt to illustrate this process of European political history's "*longue durée*," which consists of nationalism and nation-state formation. My goal here is not to chronologically reconstruct the history of nationalism and the emergence of the nation-state in East-Central Europe, but rather to trace the general lines of this evolution through the five international state systems that have succeeded each other since the nineteenth century.

The formation of nation-states in the age of empires: the European concert

In 1814–15, as the Napoleonic Wars drew to a close, the reconstruction of Europe began. Even if the great powers wanted a return to the Europe before 1789, the *national* claims that took off throughout the continent following the French Revolution made this idea difficult if not impossible to achieve. However, when the Congress of Vienna opened on 1 November 1814, the representatives of the diverse monarchies had three goals in mind: restoring the political order that had existed before 1789, assuring the legitimacy of hereditary princes, and developing a monarchical solidarity to counter the revolutionary movements. Even though the majority of states controlling European territory were present in Vienna, with the exception of the Ottoman Empire, the majority of the decisions were made by the Great Powers: the Austrian Empire, the Russian Empire, the British Empire, Prussia, and, to a lesser extent, France. Keeping in mind the way in which the discussions were carried out, the Congress of Vienna can be considered to have been "the first great meeting of European diplomacy, this concert of nations, which from that point on would gather together to put an end to tensions and conflicts each time a serious crisis occurred."[10] Even though the Congress of Vienna can be seen as the meeting of those nostalgic for the Old Order, all understood well that Europe could not really return to the past and completely ignore the aspirations that were being expressed following the French Revolution. This is why territorial division, even though it certainly had the objective of containing France, also aimed to put an end to the nascent national claims. The method of remodeling Europe at the Congress of Vienna rested on the principle of establishing a balance of power between the Great Powers and the confirmation of the legitimacy of princes to the detriment of revolutionary ideals. For the most part, the Congress of Vienna achieved stability. The Great Powers kept the peace for nearly forty years.[11] As for national uprisings, they were not really able to come to any sort of fruition until 1848.

Nevertheless, as the "principle of nationalities"[12] continued to progress and attract national movements in the second half of the nineteenth century, the idea of the nation-state[13] made inroads in East-Central Europe. From that moment on, feelings of regional belonging were transformed into national consciousness by political and cultural elites; the nation-state became the

main force bringing imperial legitimacy into question. The national movements stemming from the revolutions of 1848 erected "the principle of nationalities" in Europe as a political doctrine questioning the cohesion and legitimacy of the Empires. The Habsburg multinational empire was saved *in extremis* during the 1848 Hungarian national revolution by the intervention of the Russian Imperial Army aided by Croatian troops under the command of Colonel Josip Jelačić. Despite this temporary set-back, national claims inside the Austrian Empire continued to be expressed. In 1867, Hungarians were emancipated from Vienna by signing the "Compromise" (*Ausgleich*), yet without becoming completely independent. From that point on, the Habsburgs were at the head of a dual monarchy, the Empire of Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary, each one possessing its own institutions, administrations, and laws (and having only three common ministries). The following year Croats obtained their own autonomy from Budapest, also called the "Compromise" (*Nagodba*). The "Compromise" between Hungary and the Triune Kingdom (Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia) created a new sort of political community. The position of the Triune Kingdom was similar to that of a province within a federal state, for the most part, except that it did not possess the same judiciary functions. The political autonomy of the Triune Kingdom was guaranteed a national autonomous government through the Sabor (Diet), as well as through the recognition of Croatian as an official language and the office of a *ban* (governor). One thing led to another and the Habsburg Empire was dismantled just like the Ottoman Empire. However, the dynamic of the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was quite different from the progressive weakening of the Ottoman Empire through successive military defeats.

By the first half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire's military defeats in southeastern Europe had already allowed the creation of nation-states on territory stretching from the Black Sea in the east and the Adriatic Sea in the west. It is yet again the disintegration caused by nationalism that explains the end of the Ottoman Empire in Europe.[14] By declaring their *secession* from the weakened Ottoman Empire, the people of the Balkans were ready to create new states to the former's detriment. In order to justify the creation of new states, national leaders in the Balkans most often invoked their refusal to be governed by an Empire whose state religion was Islam and their desire to be self-governing because they considered the institution of the *millet* (an autonomous confessional community) to be historically outdated. For the moment, let us note that the type of state formed in southeastern Europe was directly imported from the West, which is particularly true for Greece and Serbia whose state models were inspired by France. The Serbian and Greek national leaders imposed the Jacobin state model upon these ethnically heterogeneous collectives.

The domination of the Ottoman Empire over the Balkans was thus contested by diverse national uprisings at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Since the Ottoman Empire had not been represented at the Congress of Vienna, the

principles drawn from it, that allowed other European empires to arm them-selves in advance against nationalist uprisings, did not apply to the Empire, notably the legitimacy of hereditary monarchs. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire had also been distanced from the Holy Alliance, created on 26 September 1815 on the initiative of Tsar Alexander I. The Holy Alliance brought together the Empires of Austria, Russia, and Prussia. The monarchies of the three empires were joined together through the precepts of the Holy Scriptures and promised mutual solidarity in order to eradicate all nationalist uprisings. If, from the beginning, the Holy Alliance aimed for an "embryonic system of European organization" destined to keep France (still considered the state most likely to upset the European balance of power) in check, it was also a pact among the representatives of Christianity – Catholic emperor, Orthodox tsar, and Lutheran king – aimed at curbing the Muslim Ottoman Empire.[15] France later joined the Holy Alliance in 1818, leaving the Ottoman Empire relatively isolated. The exclusion of the Ottoman Empire from the Holy Alliance explains in part why the Alliance's members did not intervene in the Greek insurrection of 1829–30, which resulted in the creation of the first nation-state in the Balkans – Greece.[16] During the Congress of Vienna, Tsar Alexander I had even encouraged the Greek national movement which at the time was trying to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, at the time of the Hungarian insurrection in 1848, which followed the same objectives as the Greek insurrection of 1829–30, the ideological and political solidarity of the Russian and Austrian Empires was shown. As I have emphasized, the Russian Empire aided Austria in putting down the Hungarian revolution whose credo was the self-determination of its people and national sovereignty.

The ideological solidarity of the founding members of the Holy Alliance, based upon a respect for the principle of the legitimacy of the hereditary right of monarchs, did not, however, have to encroach upon another pillar upon which the stability of the international system of the Congress of Vienna rested, specifically "the balance of power," the only true guarantee, in the eyes of Metternich, for avoiding a new international disorder similar to the one created by Napoleon I. It was in the name of this principle that England opposed the expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from Europe after Greek independence, fearing that Russia and Austria would profit from it by splitting the Balkans and controlling its straits (a Russian ambition). As a maritime power, England considered Russian control of the straits an unacceptable geopolitical alteration encroaching upon its commercial interests as well as its maritime capacities.

This aside, the principle of nationality in southeastern Europe also benefited from the favorable opinion of Napoleon III who, as we know, gave considerable support to the Italian unification movement. As René Girault explains, due to his cosmopolitan education and his past as a conspirator, Napoleon III under-stood well the "revolutionary" force of the principle of nationality and the usefulness of nationalist sentiment in altering the European order established at the Congress of Vienna, which remained one of his principal objectives.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to explain the nuances of Napoleon III's role in emancipating nationalities in the Balkans since the emperor paid much less attention to Slavic zones than to the Latin and Arabic ones with regard to this question. This is most likely because the latter two corresponded much more to Mediterranean politics, which Napoleon III sought to keep in the French sphere of influence.[17] The Serbian revolt of 1804 and the conquest of Belgrade in 1806 mark the beginning of the construction of the Serbian nation-state and the re-examination of the presence of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Peninsula. The insurrection against Ottoman power had both a national and a religious significance. The Serbian Orthodox Church formed the center of resistance to the Ottoman Empire through its preaching of pan-Serbism, Orthodoxy, and pan-Slavism. In 1832, Serbia obtained complete independence for its church; from that point on the Metropolitan was elected by the Serbian clergy rather than chosen by the patriarch of Constantinople. From one insurrection to another, Serbian independence was recognized in 1878 at the Congress of Berlin.[18] Little Montenegro, a mountainous country bordering the Adriatic Sea, itself managed to resist Ottoman dominion throughout the nineteenth century.[19] Other people of southeastern Europe (Romanians, Bulgarians) followed the Serbs' lead in the nineteenth century so that they themselves could become nation-states. Moreover, Greece had regained its independence after 1830 and its territory continued to grow throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries until its modern state was formed in 1947. As for Romania, the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were able to obtain their autonomy in 1858; in 1862 they united under a single state to form Romania, whose independence was also recognized at the Congress of Berlin. Also, at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Bulgaria was defined as a vassal principality of the Ottoman Empire. At the same meeting, a semi-autonomous Eastern Rumelia was created. The two territories united in 1885, and in 1908 Bulgaria rid itself of the last symbolic links attaching it to the Ottoman Empire, thus obtaining its complete independence. In the following years, during the first war in the Balkans in 1912, Bulgaria was again able to expand its territory at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.

During the same period, Macedonian attempts to create their own nation-state were not achieving success, despite their neighbors' victories. In 1903, the "St. Elie" people's insurrection against the Ottomans was violently suppressed, and following this Macedonia became a battleground of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece which fought to annex its territories. The Balkan regional powers' competition to conquer Macedonia's territory culminated during the Second Balkan War in 1913. Macedonia had to await the creation of communist Yugoslavia, after the Second World War, in order to acquire its own state and for Macedonians to be recognized as a nation in the Yugoslav Federation.

The Balkan Wars of 1912–13 signified the end of Ottoman domination in the peninsula, the Ottomans having been weakened by the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and through the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary

Table 3.1 The age of empires: constitution of nation-states, multinational states, and empires in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, 1800–1918

	Nation-state	Multinational states	Empire
1800–1918: Age of empires	6	0	6
	Greece (1830)		Russian
	Romania (1856)		German
	Serbia (1878)		Ottoman
	Bulgaria (1878 and 1908)		Austro-Hungarian
	Montenegro (1878)		French
	Albania (1912)		British

in 1908. After the end of the First Balkan War in 1912, another nation-state appeared in the region: Albania. The eviction of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans in 1913, consequently, coincided with the end of the first phase of nation-state formation in the Balkans, which had begun with Greek independence. Further north, toward the end of the First World War and the establishment of the Versailles System, the other empires (Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian) were able to maintain their rule over the people of East-Central Europe (table 3.1).

The Versailles State System and the Bolshevik Revolution

The people under the rule of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and German Empires in East-Central Europe had to await the end of the First World War in order to become nation-states and multinational states. The fall of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy led to the creation of the Hungarian and Austrian nation-states. Furthermore, the Peace Conference gave birth to a multinational state – the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes founded in 1918 (renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929). Ruled by the Serbian Karađorđević Dynasty, the Kingdom brought together Serbia (which had acquired Kosovo and part of Macedonian territory in 1912–13) and Montenegro as well as Slovenia and Croatia which, up until that point, had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had been militarily occupied by Austria-Hungary since 1878, before being formally annexed to it in 1908, was also integrated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The same went for Vojvodina in 1918, a province of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The political project of uniting the South Slavs, that had been developed principally in Croatian literary and intellectual circles in the nineteenth century, was taking form under the Serbian state.

However, the Croatian, Slovenian, and Serbian union quickly proved to be difficult. Whereas Croats and Slovenes wanted a union based upon the equality of the Kingdom's people, Serbs ran the state in a manner that favored their interests because they formed the dominant nation. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was thus led by the Karađorđević Dynasty as a unitary Serbian nation-state, and not as a multinational state. Serbs ignored, or did not want to recognize that, by annexing new territories during the creation of the Kingdom, they had also annexed the *peoples* who had developed their own national ideologies and their own corresponding political projects since the nineteenth century. This evolution was already in the works well before the unification of South Slavs occurred. Thus, Croats having experienced a certain form of autonomy in the Austro-Hungarian Empire since the sixteenth century, quickly opposed the Serbian centralized state administration. The refusal of this autonomy in the new Kingdom constituted an incommensurable affront. Relations between Serbs and Croats in the Kingdom reached the point of no return in 1928 after the assassination by Serbian Deputy Puniša Račić who opened fire on Croatian deputies in the National Parliament (Skupština), in the capital of the Kingdom of Belgrade. Stjepan Radić, the most prominent Croatian politician at the time, was mortally wounded and later died. Even though Croats began to dream again of an independent Croatian nation-state[20] after Radić's assassination, King Alexander's proclamation of a royal dictatorship in January 1929 prolonged the forced marriage between Serbs and Croats for several years thereafter. Yet this was itself finished in a bloodbath after the creation of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) in 1941.

Another multinational state, Czechoslovakia, formed by the provinces of Bohemia–Moravia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia, also came into existence through the Versailles System. Much as in Yugoslavia, where the royal government was dominated by Serbs, Czechs reigned over Czechoslovakia's political destiny as the most numerous nation, and imposed their own centralizing policy in the new state, inciting opposition not only from Slovaks, but also from the national minorities that made up the country, such as the German and Hungarian minorities that were concentrated, respectively, in the Sudetenland[21] region and the south of Slovakia. Even though Czechoslovakia was a truly multinational state, Czech politicians considered it to be a nation-state and governed Czechoslovakia as a unitary state between 1918 and 1938.

I compare the two multinational states stemming from the Versailles System – Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes – in order to emphasize that they were governed as unitary states after having been formed. The two dominant nations, Serbs and Czechs, fiercely resisted the federalization of their respective states. Czechoslovakia, unlike the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, responded to pressure from its national communities (Slovaks, Hungarians, and Sudetenland Germans), who sought its decentralization between 1918 and 1938 more effectively, since it was a state with a functioning legal system. In addition, Czechoslovakia was a developed

country between the two world wars, with a quality of life comparable to that of West European states. At that time, Czechoslovakia was the fifth most developed state in Europe, even though its wealth was primarily concentrated in Bohemia–Moravia, whereas Slovakia remained much poorer. On the other hand, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was a semi-dictatorship during the 1920s; the following decade it was transformed into a veritable dictatorship with fascist characteristics. The democratization of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes did not begin until the end of the 1930s. However, it was too late by that time. The Second World War spread to Yugoslav territory in 1941. Also, unlike Czechoslovakia, the Kingdom was an underdeveloped agricultural country, and the poor living conditions only aggravated national conflicts.

The peace treaties signed between 1919 and 1920, which established the international Versailles System, had the goal of creating a "Europe of nationalities." The fundamental criterion present in the West European states – that the political community has to coincide with the cultural community and, if possible, the ethnic community – was introduced at the Peace Conference (which had the capacity to remodel post-imperial territory in East-Central Europe). In other words, the idea that each nation should be endowed with its own state was omnipresent during the Peace Conference. President Woodrow Wilson outlined his conception of a post-war Europe in his Fourteen Points addressed to the United States Congress on 8 January 1918. The architects of the Versailles System – David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, and Wilson – all accepted that the borders of the newly created states should coincide with concentrations of national groups. Points X, XI, and XIII advocated the "autonomous development" of the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the Balkans (Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro), and Poland. In situations where "autonomous development" was impossible to apply, he recommended special status for minorities (the League of Nations). Granting city-state status to Gdańsk and Rijeka responded to the same need. However, the "principle of nationalities" was not applied to the states that had lost the war. For example, a third of the Hungarian population found itself in three different states (Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) after the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. The partiality and the imperfection of the application of the "principle of nationalities" represented one of the great faults of the Versailles System. The poor application of the "principle of nationalities" which was associated with the right of peoples to govern themselves, in the spirit of President Wilson, does not, however, render it invalid. This is why the people that were not able to benefit from it in 1919–20 again referred to it in 1989–90.

In this way, the Versailles System gave birth to numerous multinational states and nation-states at the expense of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and German Empires. Nevertheless, the multinational states created on this occasion, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, quickly met with difficulties

Table 3.2 Political entities constituting the Versailles System[a] 1918–38

	Nation-state	Multinational states	Empire
1918–38: Versailles System	8	2	2
	Bulgaria (1908)	Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918)	French
	Greece (1830)	Czechoslovakia (1918)	British
	Romania (1856)		
	Albania (1912)		
	Austria (1918)		
	Germany (1918)		
	Hungary (1918)		
	Turkey (1923)		

Note:
[a] The United States, by refusing to ratify the Versailles Treaty and join the League of Nations after the First World War, essentially remained outside the international system.

due to their inability to manage the national conflicts that existed within them. In fact, majority rule, a fundamental principle of a nation-state under the rule of law, was only perceived as legitimate by the dominant nations, Serbs and Czechs, in these multinational states. This was the source of the dominant nation's politicians' desire to create the "Czechoslovak" and "Yugoslav" nations (an attempt which was primarily seen in Yugoslavia after 1929 and symbolically represented by the changing of the Kingdom's name).

The "principle of nationalities" that was introduced at the Peace Conference in 1919 allowed for the creation of numerous nation-states and multinational states in Central Europe and the Balkans during the interval between the two world wars, to the detriment of the empires that had been defeated during the First World War. By destroying the Russian Empire, the Bolshevik Revolution also provoked the emergence of a number of nation-states in Eastern Europe, but these were almost all annexed to the Soviet Union by 1922. The political map of Central Europe and the Balkans following from the Versailles System was, however, quickly threatened by the emergence of the Nazi movement in Germany and fascism in Italy (table 3.2).

The "New Order": the Nazi System

Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, carried by widespread protests within the German population over the Treaty of Versailles, and ushering in the ascendancy of the Third Reich over its ruins. The establishment of the Nazi System in Europe initially aimed at getting rid of the multinational states which were, according to Nazi ideologists, without ethnic foundation (*völkisch*), thus

"against nature." From this same logic derived the Third Reich's desire to acquire *Lebensraum* (living space) in the east for the "Aryan race." Not forgetting geopolitical considerations, the Nazi New Order sought to replace the "principle of nationalities" as the foundation of the modern state with that of "racial hierarchy." "Inferior races," like Slavs, could have their state removed from them to allow for the expansion of superior races, particularly the "Aryan race."

Starting from 1938, the Nazi System, already consolidated in Germany, began its expansion into Europe by following this racist ideology and another principle dear to Hitler, the reunification of "all Germans into the same state" (the Third Reich), changing the state borders that followed from the Versailles System. It was in the name of this principle that the Nazi regime sought to discredit and defeat Versailles and that Alsace–Lorraine and Austria were annexed. By March 1938, the *Anschluss* was achieved. One of the first new nation-states, Austria, disappeared from the map of Central Europe through its incorporation into the growing Nazi Empire. The same went for the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia, where approximately 3 million Germans were living. The Sudetenland territories were annexed to the Reich after the Munich Conference on 29 and 30 September 1938; six months later, on 15 March 1939, what was left of Czechoslovakia was dismembered when German troops entered the country; the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia–Moravia and an "independent" Slovakia was announced and a puppet government under Nazi control, while formally independent, in fact, directed this new national state. Next, the German Reich set its sight on Poland which it invaded in September 1939, and in doing so started the Second World War. Already, in August 1939, the Non-Aggression Pact signed between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's USSR had sealed the fate of the Baltic states and Poland; the latter was further divided between the two powers after its military defeat against Germany. Two years later, German forces invaded and carved up of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, creating the "Independent State of Croatia" without a doubt controlled more by the Third Reich than Slovakia was. In the grand scheme, Nazi domination in the Balkans marked, in a way, the return of an empire to the peninsula. Serbia was directly occupied by Germany, Slovenia partially annexed, and the rest of its territory occupied by Italy. Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria adhered to the Tripartite Pact and thus became satellites of Nazi Germany (table 3.3).

The Nazi System, even though it lasted only for a short period of time, nevertheless had a crucial impact on the formation of the nation-state in East-Central Europe and the Balkans. Nation-states with exclusively ethnic foundations were created in Croatia and Slovakia. Even if they corresponded to the Croatian and Slovak peoples' desire for independence – this does not signify at all that Croats and Slovaks gave majority support to the racist policies practised there – the states were however condemned to disappear after the defeat of Nazi Germany, their ally and protector.

Table 3.3 Nation-states, multinational states, and empires in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans under the Nazi System, 1933–45

	Nation-state	Multinational states	Empire
1933–45: Nazi System	5 Hungary Bulgaria Romania Independent State of Croatia (1941) Slovakia (1939)	0	3 Third Reich Italy USSR

Analysis of the Nazi system, particularly the annexation of the Sudetenland by the Reich, is particularly meaningful in understanding the policy of Milošević's regime (1991–2000) leading to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The events that led to the Reich's annexation of Sudetenland, provoked by Hitler's goal of bringing "all Germans into the same state," form a surprising historical analogy with the policies carried out in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina by Slobodan Milošević and Serbian politicians, starting at the end of the 1980s, with the goal of uniting "all Serbs into a single state."

In fact, the strategies used by Milošević and Serbian politicians to unite Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina into a "Greater Serbia" call to mind, in several ways, the means employed by Nazis to integrate Sudetenland Germans into the Reich. During the 1930s, Konrad Henlein, the political leader of the Sudetenland Germans, supported the policy of the Nazis aiming to carve up Czechoslovakia. Hitler knew how to exploit the dissatisfaction in this community and used Henlein and his entourage to stir up revolts against the Prague government. The policy of dismembering Czechoslovakia was executed by Nazi Germany in close connection with Sudetenland German leaders. Milošević used the same strategy in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina where he could count on the activism of the Serbian community leaders of these republics. Milošević and his acolytes succeeded in digging up local counterparts of Henlein in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These local Serbian leaders, Milan Babić and Radovan Karadžić, applied the policies decided upon by politicians in Belgrade, in their respective republics.

The strategies used by Nazis in Sudetenland and later by Serbian leaders in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina gave comparable results. The Sudetenland region was incorporated into the Reich in 1938–9, in the same way that the pseudo-state consisting of Serbs in Croatia (Krajina) was *de facto* annexed to Serbia between 1991 and 1995. The Serbian republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Republika Srpska), during the same time, was itself almost transformed into a province of Serbia and even today they share very close relations. The political adventure of the Sudetenland Germans and the Krajina Serbs both ended in a

similar way. After the Second World War, during 1945 and 1947, between 2.5 and 3 million Germans were expelled from the Sudetenland. In the summer of 1995 between 150,000 and 200,000 Serbs fled Croatia following the military defeat of their pseudo-state in Krajina against the Croatian Army. Nazi Germany and Milošević's Serbia both sought to create ethnically pure states whose borders would correspond to the new power relations between them and their neighbours.

The Yalta State System

The Yalta System began with two contradictory diplomatic initiatives in international politics. The first was the restoration of the independence of states in East-Central Europe (though quickly incorporated into the Soviet sphere of influence). The second was the adoption of the Charter of the UN, which for the first time recognized the universal right of a people to self-determination. The Charter of the UN elevated what had simply been a political principle promised by President Wilson during the Peace Conference of 1919 to a norm of international law, which was in time raised to that of *jus cogens*. This defining leap had immense consequences on nation-state formation; first, for the colonies in the Third World and, following this, after 1989, for the states of East-Central Europe, the Soviet Union included.

After the defeat of the Third Reich and the end of the Second World War, several nation-states and multinational states, which had been wiped from the political map in East-Central Europe and the Balkans between 1938 and 1945, reappeared. At the Conferences of Moscow (October 1944), Yalta (February 1945), and Potsdam (July 1945), the new territorial and political reorganization of Europe was decided upon by the three great powers: the United States, the USSR, and Great Britain. The nation-states conquered or dominated by Axis forces during the war quickly regained their independence: Austria (after having been militarily occupied by Allied forces between 1945 and 1955), Poland, and Greece. Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania, allies of Germany and Italy, had to renounce their territorial gains of the Second World War after having been liberated by the Allies. On the other hand, the continuity of their states was not questioned in the passing from one international system (Nazi New Order) to another (Yalta). Elsewhere, the two multinational states that had been carved up, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, were reborn. In Yugoslavia, resistance to Nazi Germany and to the fascist *Ustaša* regime of Ante Pavelić came principally from the Yugoslav Communist Party led by Josip Broz Tito. At the end of the Second World War, after its victory over Axis forces, the Yugoslav Communist Party proposed a new multinational arrangement for South Slavs that would this time be based upon a federal system that would have to ensure the equality of all the nations of communist Yugoslavia. As for Czechoslovakia, at the end of the war it regained almost all of

its past borders in their entirety, losing only Ruthenia, which was annexed by the USSR in 1945. The problem of the German minority in the Sudetenland region was also dealt with in a radical way; this population was brutally expelled to Germany.[22]

But the Yalta System established after the Second World War also allowed the Soviet Empire to exercise its domination over the countries of East-Central Europe and the Balkans: over Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and the GDR for forty years. The Soviet Union's efforts to assert its dominance in Yugoslavia and Albania failed, however, because of the successful resistance by Tito and Enver Hoxha, the respective leaders of these two countries. Even if these states theoretically preserved their independence, they were all integrated into the Soviet sphere of influence after national front governments created between 1944 and 1949 were dissolved.

In 1968, Moscow formulated the "Brezhnev Doctrine," or doctrine of limited sovereignty, which openly violated a people's right to self-determination, in the same way that the colonial powers had refused this right to the people they dominated. The doctrine was illegitimate because it directly infringed on Art. 1, para. 2, of the UN Charter containing the right to self-determination.[23] The irony is that the USSR and Yugoslavia had both insisted that the principle of the self-determination of peoples be included in the UN Charter. However, the reasons for the pressure exercised by the USSR and Yugoslavia were purely ideological. They hoped that they would favor communist-inspired revolutions in the Third World and that the resulting modification of the balance of power would benefit the communist camp to the detriment of the colonial powers.

From the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922 to the consolidation of communist regimes in Yugoslavia in 1945, and Czechoslovakia in 1948, the peoples constituting these three federations (Czechoslovakia was a federal state after 1968) were never able to exercise their right to self-determination. Inside the communist federations, this right was flouted by the communist parties in power, which never authorized free expression through popular consultations (referenda), but rather exercised a constant control over their constituent peoples.

However, the populations of Croatia, Slovakia, the republics of the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia definitely constituted peoples in the sense of the UN Charter. It was only through the first free elections in 1989–90 that these peoples began to exercise their right to self-determination. These free elections allowed them to elect their own governments. In the same way, the referenda on independence gave these peoples the choice to establish nation-states, to maintain their federations, or to create another type of state (such as the now-defunct multinational federation of Serbia and Montenegro). The peoples of each of these three communist federations possessed territories (republics) and had a political power in place, which qualified them to create sovereign and independent states, enter freely into union with an independent

state, or adopt another political status that they would have chosen of their own free will.[24]

   The form that decolonization took in the Soviet Union and in its external empire (the Warsaw Pact) had three dimensions. The first dimension aimed for the Soviet Union to restore the political sovereignty of the states that it had dominated – as such, the end of the "Brezhnev Doctrine." This dimension's immediate result with regard to decolonization was that the satellite states, members of the Warsaw Pact, regained the freedom to act independently on the international stage. The second aspect of decolonization concerned the trans-feral of political sovereignty from the center to the republics that had formed the Soviet Union.[25] The third dimension concerned restoring the power con-fiscated from the peoples by the respective communist parties during the time of free elections. With regards to this last point, it was the Soviet Union that guaranteed perennial power to the party-states. This capacity to support the party-states globally (from Vietnam to Cuba) gave the USSR the characteristic of an empire (table 3.4).

   As the USSR controlled its sphere of influence militarily and with an iron fist in East-Central Europe and the Balkans, the question of the states' territorial unity was virtually ignored during the Yalta System. The end of the Cold War and national revolts both inside the Soviet Union and on the periphery of its empire (Warsaw Pact) had to occur before a new wave of nation-states came into being (after the decolonization of the Soviet Empire). The end of the Cold War in 1989–90 signified a profound alteration of the balance of power in East–West relations, to the West's advantage. The dis-solution of the bipolar international system in Europe was the most important event in international politics, opening the way for the creation of new states in East-Central Europe.

Table 3.4 Nation-states, multinational states, and empires in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans under the Yalta System, 1945–89

	Nation-State	Multinational States	Empire
1945–89: Yalta System	9 Austria (1955) Albania (1945) GDR (1949) FGR (1949) Hungary Bulgaria Romania Greece (1945) Poland (1945)	2 Yugoslavia (SFRY) (1945) Czechoslovakia (1945)	1 USSR

The end of the communist regimes and the proliferation of new nation-states

This new wave touched the Balkans first. The breakup of communist Yugoslavia was consummated in June 1991, even if it had begun in 1987. During its first wave, it gave birth to three nation-states: Slovenia, Croatia, and the Republic of Macedonia.[26] During the same process, two multinational states were also created: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)[27] and Bosnia-Herzegovina (formed by three constituent nations: Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats).

In Central Europe, Czechoslovakia sought at first to remain a federal state. The national parliament voted to reaffirm the federal character of Czechoslovakia in 1990. Shortly thereafter, Czechoslovakia disappeared completely, giving rise to two new states: the Czech Republic and Republic of Slovakia. It was during the negotiations held in June and August 1992, that the Czech Prime Minister, Václav Klaus, and the Slovak Prime Minister, Vladimír Mečiar, decided to put an end to the Czechoslovak Federation. The "Velvet Divorce" between the two republics became effective on 1 January 1993.

Likewise, in East-Central Europe, the USSR also broke apart into a multitude of multinational states and nation-states, fifteen in total, at the end of 1991. In resigning from his post on 25 December 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev effectively signed the death warrant of the Soviet Union, which had found itself in a terminal phase since the conservatives' putsch in August. From the ashes of the USSR emerged, of course, the Russian Federation, a multinational state, but also, in the European part of the former Soviet Union, the nation-states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldavia, and Ukraine. At the same time, the three Baltic countries, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, also regained the independence that they had lost at the signing of the Nazi–Soviet Pact in 1939, and which had been followed by Soviet occupation in 1940. Other nation-states were also created in the same context in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (table 3.5).

The process of state formation in East-Central Europe and the Balkans after almost two centuries seems to be over. In the Balkans, the FRY, which since February 2003 had been the Union of Serbia–Montenegro, broke up in 2006. Two states emerged: Serbia and Montenegro. Kosovo, formerly an autonomous province of the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), inhabited primarily by Albanians, became an independent state on 17 February 2008.

During the last decade of the twentieth century in the Balkans, the policies of the Clinton administration allowed the creation – and, above all, the preservation – of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Through the 1994 Washington Accords, which created the Croato-Muslim Federation, the United States was able to assure the survival of the multinational state, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was sealed through the Dayton Accords and the Paris Treaty of November and December 1995, where the United States contributed

Table 3.5 Nation-states, multinational states, and empires in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans after the Yalta System, 1989–2008

	Nation-state	Multinational states	Empire
1989–2008: Post-Yalta	25	2	0
	Albania (1945)	Russian Federation (1991–2)	
	Romania	Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992)	
	Hungary		
	Bulgaria		
	Greece		
	Austria		
	Poland		
	Unified Germany (1990)		
	Slovenia (1991)		
	Croatia (1991)		
	Macedonia (1991)		
	Czech Republic (1993)		
	Slovakia (1993)		
	Serbia (2006)		
	Montenegro (2006)		
	Kosovo (2008)		
	Nine successor states in the European part of the USSR (1991–92)		
	Georgia		
	Azerbaijan		
	Armenia		
	Estonia		
	Latvia		
	Lithuania		
	Ukraine		
	Belarus		
	Moldavia		

more than anybody else. By assuring the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its present borders, the Dayton Conference and the Accords that came out of it, played a role similar to the Congress of Berlin in the international system of the post-Cold War era. In fact, the great powers (the United States, the EU), by seeking to put an end to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina while at the same time trying to guarantee the survival of this multinational state, were able to determine rules for the configuration of Yugoslav territory for years to come. The essential rule that came out of the Dayton Accords was that the international community

would not accept any forceful border changes in the Balkans. Consequently, the ideas of a "Greater Serbia," a "Greater Croatia," and a "Greater Albania," which could threaten the territorial integrity of certain states in the region, particularly Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia, were political projects frowned upon by the international community.

During the twentieth century, the United States played a fundamental role in this part of Europe, not limited to resolving the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1999, Kosovo was seized from the hands of the FRY by the international community and transformed into a protectorate under the patronage of the UN Security Council after the decisive intervention of NATO. In 2001, the United States and its European allies again aided the Balkans by saving the Macedonian state from Albanian attempts to partition the country.

The influence of the EC and the EU on state formation in East-Central Europe after 1989

At the beginning of the breakup of states in East-Central Europe, the EC took an active part in diplomatic negotiations aiming to contain the effects of a political crisis occurring right at its front door. In this way, the "European concert" reappeared in European international politics in the twentieth century as an international organization whose principal mission was not to juggle political crises – as in the nineteenth century after the Congress of Vienna – but to promote economic integration into Western Europe. This structural limit of the EC considerably diminished its diplomatic effectiveness and its capacity to control the emergence of new states in East-Central Europe.

At first, the EC tried to deter Yugoslav and Czechoslovak leaders from dissolving their respective states and prevent them from creating new states in East-Central Europe. Having failed in its attempt to stop the breakups from happening, the EC next sought to contain the destabilizing effects of the disintegration of the three post-communist federations. The most visible aspect of the EC's activities in 1990–1 was the adoption of rules outlining the behavior that successor states would have to adhere to if they wanted to be diplomatically recognized by the EC. The principal document with which the EC desired to influence the constitutions of the new states was called "Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union."[28] In this declaration, dated 16 December 1991, the EC and its member states committed themselves to recognizing "subject to the normal standards of international practice and the political realities in each case, those new States which, following the historic changes in the region, have constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the appropriate international obligations and have committed themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations." The obligations defined by the EC with regards to recognition were the following:

[R]espect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights; guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE; respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement; acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability; commitment to settle by agreement … all questions concerning State succession and regional disputes.[29]

After the EC adopted the "Guidelines," it began to consider diplomatic recognition of the Yugoslav republics which had declared their independence. An evolution in this direction had already begun through the creation of the Badinter Commission (after the name of the French judge who presided over it) in August 1991, an organization parallel to the Peace Conference presided over by former Foreign Secretary Lord Peter Carrington, whose role was to provide legal opinions allowing for a political solution to the Yugoslav conflicts. The Badinter Commission, through its stated opinions, established the rules that could have allowed all those involved to arrive at an understanding if they had been respected by all the Yugoslav republics. At first, the Commission ruled that Yugoslavia had already initiated its dissolution. But above all, it stated that republic's borders were inviolable and that only the republics could benefit from the right to self-determination. The Commission's opinion here refuted Serbia's allegations, notably that the borders between republics were only "administrative" and could be changed at will to bring all Serbs living outside Serbia's borders together into the same state. After this reversal, Serbia refused to accept the rulings of the Badinter Commission, including all those that Serbia itself had submitted to the Commission. The work of the Badinter Commission paved the way to the EC's diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia on 15 January 1992.

The EU returned as a peacemaker in the region only after NATO's military campaign in Kosovo in 1999. After the transformation of Kosovo into an international protectorate governed by the UN, the EU dissuaded Montenegro from separating from Serbia to become an independent state, which would have put an end to the FRY. In 2006, however, Montenegro gained its independence and the EU, which supervised the referendum, had to accept the verdict of Montenegrins, who voted in favor of becoming a completely sovereign state. Soon after, the EU signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Montenegro in 2007, the first step toward full membership in the EU.

After the independence of Montenegro, the EU and the United States coordinated their policies on recognition toward Kosovo. Thus, Kosovo proclaimed its independence on 17 February 2008. In 1991, the EC was hostile to the creation of new states in East-Central Europe and this attitude only reluctantly changed after Montenegro's independence. However, there is no incompatibility between

enlarging the EU and the emergence of new states, provided that human and collective rights are respected (as occurred during the division of Czechoslovakia). Before leaving his position in January 2003, President Havel declared in his last speech of the New Year that "the separation [of the Czech Republic and Slovakia] was probably a good thing despite the bitter aftertaste left over due to the absence of a referendum."[30] The Czech Republic's example accurately shows that there is no incompatibility between a civilized divorce and joining the EU.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate the existence of a long-lasting tendency towards the creation of nation-states in East-Central Europe and the Balkans. It suffices to note that at the beginning of the nineteenth century, no nation-states existed in East-Central Europe, whereas today there are more than twenty. This political process of "*longue durée*," stretching out over approximately three centuries, seemed to come to an end after Kosovo became, in 2008, an independent state. For the time being there is no new candidate in East-Central Europe and the Balkans to claim a status of independent state.

Notes

1. The multinational state is characterized by the existence of two or more nations whose territories are demarcated by internal borders. From a legal standpoint, the multinational state is subject to international law, but not its constituent parts (federal units or provinces).
2. Even if Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were dismantled during the Second World War (between 1939 and 1945 for the former, and between 1941 and 1945 for the latter), the Allies (the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) never recognized their disappearance. As such, these governments continued to treat them in this manner in London during the war.
3. The "*longue durée*" was associated with the social history of the French school: "L'école des Annals."
4. François Furet, *L'atelier de l'histoire* (Paris: Flammarion, 1982), p. 12.
5. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *L'Europe: Histoire de ses peuples* (Paris: Perrin, 1993), p. 382.
6. In this study, the poly-semantic concept of nationalism assumes a triple meaning. It represents a political ideology, a social movement, and a primordial identity, the latter as identified by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz.
7. Duroselle, *L'Europe*, p. 383.
8. Even though the Peace Conference was organized in Paris, beginning in January 1919, in this chapter I have opted for the name "Versailles System" in the interest of simplifying the text. Other treaties were also signed close to the Peace Conference: the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye with Austria on 10 September 1919, the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria on 27 November 1919, and the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary on 4 June 1920.

9. "Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union," can be consulted in *International Legal Materials*, Vol. XXXI, no. 6 (November 1992), pp. 1486–7.

10. Jean-Claude Caren and Michel Vernus, *L'Europe au XIXe siècle: Des nations aux nationalismes 1815–1914* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1996), p. 23.

11. On the role of the European concert and its capacity to manage the continental crises, see Georges Henri-Soutou, "Le Concert européen, de Vienne à Locarno," in Georges-Henri Soutou and Jean Bérenger (eds.), *L'ordre européen du XVIe au XIXe siècle* (Paris: Presses de l'université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1998), pp. 117–36.

12. According to this principle, "people with the same language, culture, and tradition have the right to political independence if they so desire, provided they occupy a territory that is clearly defined." Henry Bogdan, *Histoire des pays de l'Est* (Paris: Perrin, 1991), p. 124.

13. The nation-state that I refer to here does not correspond to the "French" model. In France, the state was actually created towards the end of the Middle Ages, whereas the French nation appeared much later with the revolution. In this context, the nation includes all those living inside the borders of the state, such that citizenship and nationality coincide. In this specific case, as indicated by Paul Garde, "The nation is based upon the pre-existing borders of the state and every citizen of the state is *ipso facto* a member of the nation … [The] relation between citizenship and nationality is thus innate and given by definition, such that citizens [of national states of the "French" type] have trouble understanding the distinction between these notions. Minorities did not as such exist since every citizen of the state was a member of the nation." On the other hand, in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Balkans, the "German" model of the nation was found; that is to say that the example of Germany in forming nations in these European regions preceded the creation of modern states. This context that resulted in the national state does not always coincide with what is understood by nation; as such members of nations could live outside the borders of the national state which itself encompassed national minorities. In the national states of the "German" type, the concepts of citizenship and nationality were thus distinct, nationality being "a quality inherent in the individual and independent of political vicissitudes [such as citizenship], including language, religion and skin colour, etc." Paul Garde, "National State and Multinational State," in Marie-Françoise Allain *et al.*, *L'ex-Yougoslavie en Europe: De la faillite des démocraties au processus de paix* (Paris and Montreal: L'Harmattan, 1997), pp. 250–1. Here, I understand "nation-state" to be a state that had an identifiable ethnic majority. This does not mean at all that these states are homogenous with regards to their ethnic or national composition, with the exception of Iceland and Portugal. Quite the opposite, the European nation-state is characterized by the presence of national minorities. For example, Latvia is a nation-state even though it possesses a Slavic minority (Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian) that totals 42% of the state's population. I make a distinction between nation-state and national state. The national state, or nation-state that I consider a subset of nation-states, is an *ethnic* state that does not recognize, either constitutionally or symbolically, the presence of the Other on its "national" territory. The national state is the product of ethnic nationalism in its racist variant. The independent state of Croatia, formed during the Second World War between 1941

and 1945, and Slovakia, which existed between 1939 and 1945, can be considered to be national states.

14. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Tout empire périra* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1992), p. 306.

15. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *L'Europe de 1815 à nos jours*, 7th edn. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), p. 105.

16. Jean-Charles Asselain *et al.*, *Précis d'histoire européenne, 19ᵉ-20ᵉ siècle* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2000), p. 37.

17. René Girault, *Peuples et nations d'Europe au XIXᵉ siècle* (Paris: Hachette supérieur, 1996), pp. 152–3.

18. In the first half of the nineteenth century Russia tried to increase its influence in the Balkans to the detriment of the Ottoman Empire. Austria-Hungary and England attentively watched over its actions in the region. In 1875, two revolts broke out in the territory of the Ottoman Empire, one in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the other in Bulgaria. The Turks severely crushed both these revolts, but they were quickly followed by uprisings in Montenegro and Serbia beginning in July 1876. Soon after, Russia entered into the game and declared war with the Ottoman Empire on 24 April 1877. Russia left this war victorious and signed the Treaty of San Stefano with the Ottoman Empire on 3 March 1878, which foresaw, amongst other things, the creation of a Greater Bulgaria obviously under Russian influence. Austria-Hungary and England worried about Russia's interference in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary demanded a revision of the Treaty of San Stefano and claimed that it was ready to go to war with Russia to obtain it. Russia, whose armed forces and finances were exhausted by the war, ceded, and the Congress of Berlin met from 15 June to 15 July 1878, to redefine the Balkan map. Greater Bulgaria was dismembered, Austria-Hungary obtained the right to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other states such as Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania gained their independence. See *ibid.*, pp. 140–3; Bogdan, *Histoire des pays de l'Est*, pp. 199–202.

19. Between 1878 (Congress of Berlin) and 1918, Montenegro was recognized as an independent country by the international community. Petar Petrović Njegoš (1813–51), poet and Prince of Montenegro, released a book in 1847 entitled *Gorski vjenac* (Garland of the Mountains) which, due to its anti-Ottoman and anti-Islamic opinions, became the veritable Bible of Slav (Orthodox) nationalists during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in their fight against the Ottoman Empire until its expulsion from southeastern Europe.

20. See Renéo Lukic and Allen Lynch, *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), principally chapter 4, "Constants in the Yugoslav Polity, 1918–54," pp. 57–78.

21. According to the census of 1921, Sudetenland Germans numbered 3,124,000 and counted for 22% of Czechoslovakia's population. With the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Sudetenland Germans, after being incorporated into Czechoslovakia, passed from the status of an imperial nation to a simple national minority, which is why they initially rejected a Czechoslovakian state dominated by Slavs.

22. During the war, the exiled Czechoslovak government often made reference to a forced expulsion of Sudetenland Germans as necessary to deal with the problem that this national minority was raising. It used the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 as support,

which allowed the transferal of Greek and Turkish populations. The Allies approved this solution, so much so that during the Potsdam Conference in 1945 they sanctioned this population transferral as long as it was "legitímate and appropriate." The expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia, as well as Hungarians, began towards the end of the war following the Czechoslovakian government's decrees ("the Beneš Decrees"). In the fall of 1947, the quasi-totality of Sudetenland Germans had been transferred to Germany (around 3 million people). It has been estimated that between 20,000 and 30,000 Germans perished due to their expulsion from Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, around 200,000 Germans remained in Czechoslovakia and integrated themselves into Czech society. See Norman M. Nairmark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 117–20.

23. Art. 1, para. 2 of the UN Charter defines one of the goals of the organization as: "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." Another reference to self-determination is found in Art. 55 of the Charter. The UN Charter is available on-line at: www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.

24. "Déclaration relative aux principes de droit international touchant les relations amicales et la coopération entre États conformément à la Charte des nations unies," Annexed to Resolution 2625 (XXV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, adopted 24 October 1970, as cited in Nicolas Levrat, "D'une exigence de légalité dans les relations internationales contemporaines," in Charles-Albert Morand (ed.), *La Crise des Balkans de 1999: Les dimensions historiques, politiques et juridiques du conflit du Kosovo* (Brussels and Paris: Bruylant/Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 2000), pp. 263–4.

25. This transfer resulted in the creation of fifteen successor states to the Soviet Union. For a good analysis of the breakup of the Soviet Union along a comparative analysis of the "end of empires," see Robert Strayer, "Decolonization, Democratization, and Communist Reform: The Soviet Collapse in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of World History*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Fall, 2001), particularly pp. 376–83.

26. The Republic of Macedonia was able to avoid the war with Serbia when it gained its independence, contrary to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was, however, confronted by Greece's hostility, which opposed its name under the pretext that Macedonia was a Greek province and that the name of the new state implied territorial claims on its national territory. Yet it is certain that Macedonia did not carry any territorial claims against Greece and the new state was much too weak to represent any threat to its stability. Nevertheless, due to unjustified incriminations on Greece's part, Macedonia had to wait until 8 April 1993, before obtaining its own seat at the UN under the name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

27. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), formed by the republics of Serbia and Montenegro, was a multinational state, since it was composed of two titular nations and numerous national minorities such as Roms, Turks, Bosniaks, and others. Serbs form the titular nation in Serbia, and Montenegrins in Montenegro. As such, Serbs in Serbia and Montenegrins in Montenegro form the majority in their respective republics.

28. "Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union," can be consulted in *International Legal Materials*, Vol. XXXI, No. 6 (November 1992), pp. 1486–7.
29. "Declaration on the Guidelines," *ibid*.
30. Martin Plichta, "Václav Havel met en scène son départ de la présidence tchèque," *Le Monde* (Paris), 1 February 2003, at www.lemonde.fr.

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