THE BIG CHILL: The Battle for Central Europe
Author(s): Peter Pomerantsev
Source: World Affairs , JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2015, Vol. 177, No. 5 (JANUARY /
FEBRUARY 2015), pp. 37-43
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43555422
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THE BIG CHILL
The Battle for Central Europe
Peter Pomerantsev
After most Central European states joined the EU and NATO, it
seemed that the last page of Cold War history had been turned. But
reports of the death of conflict in the region turned out to have been
gready exaggerated. Russia is on the move again, aiming to show the world
that NATO has feet of clay, that the EU is a geopolitical weak sister and
the transadantic alliance a myth. The US might be slowly waking up to
the challenge of Vladimir Putin's evermore expansionist Russia, but it still
considers the issue a "regional" problem. The Kremlin's objective is not
to send tanks into Tallinn, however, but to compromise the White House.
The Kremlin knows it is weak and must rely on the jujitsu of an "asymmetric"
approach in which it uses the West's own openness as a weapon.
Nowhere is the new approach felt more keenly than the Baltic states,
where large ethnic Russian populations are courted by Kremlin-funded
compatriot NGOs while being fed a diet of propaganda by Russian television.
In Estonia, for instance, the "Russian" part of the population lives in
a different reality from the rest of the nation - a reality manufactured by
Moscow and filled with hostility. While most ethnic Estonians (and all historians)
recognize that Estonia was occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940,
Peter Pomerantsev is the author of Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Surreal
Heart of the New Russia.
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2015 37
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THE BIG CHILL
Russian media and NGOs claim Estonia "voluntarily" join
a thesis that fifty-six percent of the Russian population in
with. In April 2007, when a Soviet memorial statue, the Bron
"The Kremlin knows it is
weak and must rely on the
jujitsu of an 'asymmetric'
approach in which it uses
the West's own openness as
a weapon. Nowhere is the new
approach felt more keenly than
the Baltic states, where large
ethnic Russian populations
are courted by Kremlin-funded
compatriot NGOs while being
fed a diet of propaganda
by Russian television."
relocated from a city square to
a cemetery, there were street
riots by local Russians who
were organized, according to
Estonian officials, by Russian
compatriot NGOs run by the
Russian secret services. It's
not an unlikely thesis. Back
in 2004, Konstantin Kosachev,
then chairman of the Russian
Duma Foreign Affairs
Committee, stated: "[Russia]
cannot explain the purpose
of its presence in the postSoviet
Union . . . The West is
doing this under the banner
of democratization, and one
gets the impression we are
doing it only for the sake of
ourselves ... Our activeness is
following too openly Russian
interests. This is patriotic but
not competitive." Soon after,
the Kremlin began creating its own "banners," such as Russkiy Mir - an
organization "aimed at forming the Russian World" for Russians in the
near abroad. According to Alexander Chepurin, then head of the Russian
Foreign Ministry's Department for Compatriots Abroad, "the Russian dias
pora abroad provides social and humanitarian support for the implementation
of the interests of the Russian Federation in post-Soviet countries.
If the Western conception of "soft power" is based on making democrat
societies attractive, the Russian vision sees it, in Putin's own description, a
"a matrix of tools and methods to reach foreign policy goals without th
use of arms but by exerting information and other levers of influence."
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Peter Pomerantsev
«T
It is hard to guess what Russia is trying to achieve when it publicly
threatens us or violates our air and sea space," said Iivi Anna Masso,
an adviser to Estonian President Toomas Hendrik lives, at an October
meeting on "The Kremlin's Challenge" convened in Tallinn by the World
Affairs Institute (publisher of this journal). "Does it really plan to invade?
Or is it just trying to demoralize us? The scare tactics could have economic
consequences - it might affect our investment climate when international
journalists constandy write about how Russia is threatening to invade,
or how 'Narva is next.'" One of Tallinn's fears is a small-scale Russian
"encroachment" to "protect" Russian-language groups in Estonia:
incursion small enough to have NATO members bickering about wheth
it deserves to be called an "invasion" requiring a response. If NATO
discredited in such a way, then why should anyone in the world take
West, and the US in particular, seriously? Since the crisis in Ukraine st
ed, NATO has somewhat ramped up its rhetoric vis-à-vis Russia and ev
held some military exercises in the Baltics. But as long as the counterm
sures are as halfhearted as they have been, the Kremlin will be happy. I
win-win for Moscow: its actions reveal NATO's weakness, yet when N
postures in response, it helps the Kremlin sell a story to the Russian pu
that the motherland is under attack from an aggressive US-EU allianc
Of all the Baltic republics, Latvia has the highest percentage of Russ
diaspora, and faces many similar problems to those Estonia now tries to
with. The Russian-language PBK network, which is sold programs and n
by Russia at low rates, is the second most watched channel in the coun
Latvia's role as a center for money laundering also makes it highly dep
dent on financial flows from Russia: half of the country's investment com
from foreign depositors, largely from former Soviet states. In the words o
the Guardian's Luke Harding, Latvia has become "a playground for Ru
sian interests: business, political and, above all, criminal
agenda in Latvia is to slowly reverse the country
pro-west to pro-Moscow." And in this it has had s
all this Russian capital," Valeri Belokon, an impor
Harding. "Capital is influence
become dependent on Russia. We definitely have
In Estonia, the Kremlin uses the openness of
information as part of its subversive techniques; in
ness of markets to achieve the same goals.
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THE BIG CHILL
Further south, in Bulgaria, which the former Russian
to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov, has referred to as Russia's "
inside the EU, Russian influence grows steadily. The Germa
vices have expressed concern about the fact that Moscow co
one-third of Bulgaria's output, and that the country's rulin
closely aligned with Moscow and contains, in the words of on
report, "former Communist Party members, intelligence ser
and Bulgarian oligarchs who do business with . . . Putin's m
in the Czech Republic, parties on both the left and the righ
by Russian state companies, while Czech shell companies for
Russian energy giant Gazprom control large portions of the
The Kremlin is "undermining the last twenty years of hardmunist
history," as Gregory Feifer and Brian Whitmore have
New Republic, and, "more than twenty years after the end o
over four decades after the Red Army extinguished the Pra
the Czech Republic is again in danger of falling under Mosc
Gazprom's South Stream pipeline project, designed to
sian energy directly with the Balkans and Central Europe,
key theater of struggle for securing influence in the sou
Eastern Europe. South Stream would disrupt the EU's prefe
line, running through Turkey and Austria, which is designe
Russian energy blackmail in Europe. In opposing South Stre
pean Union argued that it countered the EU's stated aim
energy dependence on Russia, following Russia's annexation
Denied by Brussels, Russia circumvented the EU by making
with the countries through which South Stream will pas
South Stream is not just economic, it's a political 'divide
mechanism that rewards pliant states in the region and puni
ones," argued Katarzyna Pisarska, director of the Europ
of Diplomacy in Warsaw, at the October meeting in Tallinn
Stream also dovetails with the Kremlin's new courting of rig
cal movements in the region. As Anton Shekhovtsov of Univ
London has shown, countries involved in South Stream "have either a
pro-Russian government or a far-right party represented in parliament and
openly pro-Kremlin: Bulgaria (pro-Russian government), Serbia (pro-Russian
government), Hungary (Jobbik), Austria (FPO, BZO), Greece (Golden
Dawn), Italy (Lega Nord). Given the cooperation between the Kremlin
and the European extreme right, it is no wonder that, for example,
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Peter Pomerantsev
Jobbik prefers the South Stream pipeline to Nabucco, another plan
gas pipeline aimed at reducing the EU's dependence on Russian energy
In June 2014, Putin arrived in Vienna for the triumphant fin
approval on South Stream, praising Austria as a "reliable and stable pa
ner," and leaving the US Embassy there to comment that transatla
unity "has been essential in discouraging further Russian aggress
and that the Austrians "should consider carefully whether today's ev
contribute to that effort." In December, the Kremlin suddenly sa
wouldn't pursue the project after all. The economic downturn has ma
it unaffordable, but Putin will surely keep looking for ways to spin So
ern and Central Europe.
"The world order post 1989, and the resultant international streng
of the US, is based on the supposed successful transition of Cent
Europe," argues Pisarska. "If Central Europe's transition can be revers
then the US is left discredited globally."
But instead of becoming more aware of this challenge, the US
been drifting away from the region. A defining point came in 2008, w
President Obama decided to suddenly reverse his predecessor's dec
to place a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Repub
Whether the missile defense system was a good idea was less importa
than the brusque way the reversal happened. Eastern European intelle
als and leaders like Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel saw the meaning of
cancellation and in 2009 authored a letter appealing to the US to re-ig
its interest in Central Europe: "As the new Obama administration set
foreign-policy priorities, our region is one part of the world that Am
cans have largely stopped worrying about
not well either in our region or in the transatlant
The letter, whose description of Russia as pursu
goals with twenty-first-century means, seems pr
was delivered to Washington it was ignored. The
among elites in the region that they have been
Russia on their own. Some, like Poland, retreat into a confrontational
pose; others, like Hungary, seek accommodation. But overall the damage
was clear when a host of countries in Central Europe opposed sanctions
against Russia in the conflict over Ukraine.
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THE BIG CHILL
So, how to go about strengthening the Euro-Atlantic
region, while addressing the other vulnerabilities the Kremlin
Clearly, the Central and Eastern European states themselv
the lead. Pisarska, for example, proposes creating a regional
foreign policy bloc that would examine border control issue
a common energy strategy. Though functioning inside EU r
for enhanced cooperation within the framework of commo
policy, such a bloc would be strengthened by a show of US
and support. "The US was strong in supporting shale gas de
Poland," Pisarska says. "It could also put its weight behind d
LNG [liquefied natural gas] infrastructure network for the
bolism is important."
In addition, engaging Russian-language diasporas in th
beyond (there is a 3.5 million-strong population in Germ
be seen as a priority not just for regional states but also
Washington. The role of media in the current dilemma s
acknowledged. If the creation of a channel to directly co
isn't possible, investment should be made in production c
can win ratings by delivering cutting-edge programs via exis
that direcdy appeal to and engage the Russian-speaking pop
People-to-people contact needs to be strengthened too: It
sion to think that Central Europe was filled with young
against the psychological legacy of decades of accommodatio
cow. To strengthen transadantic communication, exchange
students and young professionals are needed between C
and the US, while the expert community needs to re-engage
answers for questions about Russia's geopolitical ambitions a
about the erosion of national cultures and traditions. Russia has successfully
created the Valdai International Discussion Club to present its side
of things. A Central European anti-Valdai forum could expose the reality
of Russia's involvement in the politics, culture, and economy of Europe.
But the most important, most sensitive question has to do with greater
military engagement.
As President lives noted at the October meeting in Tallinn, the text of
the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations promised that
the Atlantic Alliance would not have "additional permanent stationing
of substantial combat forces" in the region, but only in "the current and
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Peter Pomerantsev
foreseeable security environment." Indeed, there are many explicit p
conditions, assumptions, and expectations with regard to domestic
international behavior incorporated in the act, and virtually all of th
have been defied by the Putin regime. The environment in Central Eu
has been changed fundamentally by the Kremlin's invasion of Ukrain
and the stationing of a permanent NATO force in Central and Eas
Europe should at least be put on the table. But even as this happen
would be vitally important to appreciate that the Kremlin's aim is unl
to be an overt invasion, but the sort of limited but symbolically powe
provocation that would show NATO's Article 5 is impossible to enfor
and that any American promise of defense is therefore meaningless.
are not dealing with a new Cold War but rather an info-centric strugg
feints and symbols - more House of Cards than James Bond - and we
new institutions to monitor and rapidly respond to the Kremlin's wea
ization of money, culture, and information. O
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2015 43
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