

1 The Study of Justice in Social Psychology and Related Fields

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The social psychology of justice and fairness is a topic that lies at the core of our lives as social beings. Perceptions of fairness are quintessentially social because they address judgments of how one is treated by or relative to other people. As will be seen in the various chapters of this book, the social psychology of justice lies at the intersection of two major subdisciplines of our science—social cognition and interpersonal relations/group processes: judgments of fairness are profoundly affected by, and also themselves have profound effects on, a variety of cognitive and group dynamic processes.

Perhaps a good place to begin is with a few comments on terms and distinctions used in the social psychology of justice. First, by and large scholars in this field use the terms “justice” and “fairness” interchangeably, and they generally use both terms to refer to *subjective assessments of fairness*. Occasionally a distinction is made between “justice” as referring to formal allocations or processes and “fairness” as referring to informal or everyday interactions, but most often there is little distinction made between the two words. Thus, it is not unusual to see scholars talk of research on “justice judgments” when these judgments are in fact assessed with survey items asking about “fairness.” As Mikula (2005) notes, we sometimes fail to point out that we are studying what people perceive to be fair, not what is fair in some objective or absolute sense. We are almost always talking about perceptions of fairness.

A distinction that is often used is that between “distributive justice” (or “outcome justice”) and “procedural justice.” I will return to this distinction later in the chapter, but for the moment it is sufficient to note that people can experience fair or unfair treatment both in terms of the outcomes they receive and in terms of the way they are treated by formal procedures or informal social process. Distributive justice was the first aspect of fair treatment to receive substantial attention in social psychology (see, e.g., Adams, 1963, 1965), and the outcome fairness issues that are at the core of distributive justice correspond more closely with the meaning of fairness in everyday language. However, judgments

of the fairness of procedure and process, which engaged the attention of social psychologists a bit later (see, e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Walker, LaTour, Lind, & Thibaut, 1974), have been found to be just as powerful—and often more powerful—in their psychological consequences.

Motivating versus Motivated Justice Processes

Another fundamental distinction in work on the psychology of justice concerns the overall direction of causality between fairness beliefs and other cognitions. Within the social psychology of justice there have been, from the very beginning, two distinct causal patterns that have engaged our attention. Many justice scholars have explored how various experiences affect perceptions of fairness and how those perceptions of fairness then cause changes in subsequent behavior or attitudes. Other scholars have looked at how other psychological factors—especially balance-related desires for a “just world” or the need to protect one’s social identity—cause the perceiver to distort fairness judgments. Consideration of both directions of causality is seen in one of the earliest theoretical works on the psychology of justice, Stacey Adams’ Equity Theory (Adams, 1963, 1965). Equity theory proposed that unfair outcome distributions could cause changes in behavior, but it also suggested that changes in attitudes could be undertaken to make the unfairness more palatable. Equity distress from overpayment, for example, was seen as something that could prompt people to perform better as they attempted to deserve previously unfair positive outcomes, but the perceived inequity could also, according to the theory, be rationalized away by adjusting assessments of the value of one’s work upwards to make the overly positive outcomes seem fair.

On the one hand, some of us have studied how experiences (encounters with outcomes or processes) affect feelings of fair treatment and how these fairness judgments in turn affect things like the acceptance of rules or decisions (see, e.g., Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, & Park, 1993; Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Tyler, 1990; Walker et al., 1974). Others have looked at how fairness-related beliefs are distorted by other cognitions (e.g., Lerner, 1980; Jost & Banaji, 1994, Jost & Kay, 2005). The first of these lines of work could be termed “*motivating* justice processes”; the second could be termed “*motivated* justice processes.” Both lines of work have a great deal of empirical support and both have prompted credible theories, so there is little doubt that justice both affects and is affected by other social psychological dynamics. As I will mention at the end of this chapter, where I will describe my views of what the next frontiers of justice research will be, research and theory that integrates and reconciles these two lines of work seems to me key to the continued advancement of our understanding of the

social psychology of justice. Both lines of work are represented among the chapters in this book, and at least three—the chapters by Jackson and Pósch and by Brockner and Wiesenfeld, and my own chapter on the fairness heuristic—describe work that might well contribute to that reconciliation.

Motivating justice processes are illustrated well by what is called the “fair process effect” (Folger, 1977). A great many studies show that perceptions of fair treatment lead to greater trust in and perceived legitimacy of authorities (e.g., Tyler, 1990, 1997; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Jackson, 2014; Tyler & Lind, 1992), more acceptance of authorities’ decisions (e.g., Lind et al., 1993; Walker et al., 1974), greater feelings of social identity (e.g., Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003), the expenditure of greater effort in support of the group, and enhanced cooperative behavior (Moorman, 1991; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). Perceptions of unfair treatment have been found to diminish trust and legitimacy and to produce resentment toward, exit from, and even retaliation against the group linked to the unfair treatment (e.g., Lind, Greenberg, Scott, & Welchans, 2000; Van den Bos, 2018).

It is arguable that this capacity to motivate changes in other attitudes and to drive behaviors is one of the reasons that fairness research has spread to a variety of applied disciplines. A great deal of research on the psychology of justice has been and is being done in such areas as organizational behavior and marketing, judicial and police studies, and government policy studies. The interest in these areas in studying the antecedents and consequences of fairness judgments is driven often by findings that perceptions of fairness can have profound effects on the functioning of these areas of social life. While it is certainly desirable in and of itself that people feel fairly treated at their jobs, by those they buy from, and by those who govern them, there is little doubt that the downstream effects of fairness perceptions—the capacity of feelings of fair treatment to make people engage more fully and cooperatively with employers and government—provides a substantial incentive for scholars (and managers and policy makers) to pay attention to the social psychology of justice.

The other direction of causality—the motivated cognition effects that can drive or bias fairness judgments and related beliefs and attitudes, sometimes in unexpected ways—is seen in what are termed “just world” and “system justification” effects. Adams’ (1965) suggestion that “inequity distress” motivates perceptual distortions of inputs or outcomes, distortions to make inequitable situations seem fairer, is an early example of motivated fairness cognition. Lerner and his colleagues (e.g., Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Goldberg, 1999; Lerner & Simmons, 1966) proposed that people become uncomfortable when they observe events or situations that violate their desire to see the world as a fair place and suggested that this discomfort can be alleviated by changing

perceptions of deservingness. Lerner's "just world" hypothesis explains phenomena like "blaming the victim" for his or her misfortunes. Jost and his colleagues (see Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) have described and analyzed motivated justice effects in System Justification Theory. The chapter in this volume by Engstrom, Alic, and Laurin describes our current understanding of these justice processes.


Paradigms in the Social Psychology of Justice

There are at least three very good recent accounts of the history of psychological study of justice-related phenomena. Colquitt, Greenberg, and Zapata-Phelan (2005) traced the development of justice studies from the early studies of Stouffer and his colleagues in the 1940s (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Starr, & Williams, 1949), through second half of the twentieth century, up to the empirical and theoretical work that took place in the first years of the 2000s. Bobocel and Gosse (2015) provide a history of research and theory in procedural justice and Ambrose, Wo, and Griffith (2015) describe research and theory on overall justice judgments; both works include more recent work than that available to Colquitt et al. These three works together give a detailed account and insightful analyses of the development of our field. (The fact that all three of these chapters appear in collections on "organizational justice" should not be a source of concern for readers; all three chapters describe the relevant empirical and theoretical work in core social psychology as well as in organizational psychology per se.) In the following paragraphs I will provide, in broad strokes, a description of what seem to me to be the major directions and conceptual developments in the study of the psychology of fairness over the past six or seven decades.

First, let us consider the development of work on *motivating* justice judgments. Colquitt et al. (2005) organize their history of justice research into "waves," the first of which they term the "distributive justice wave." I think it might be more useful here to employ the terminology of Thomas Kuhn (1962) and to speak of two paradigms that have provided the intellectual infrastructure of scholarship on the social psychology of justice. The first of these paradigms, which I term the "outcome-focused paradigm" in justice studies, was based the assumption that people are mostly driven by their individual outcomes, an assumption underlay both interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) and equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965). In the middle of the twentieth century theory and research in the psychological, social, and economic sciences were for the most part founded on the assumption that self-interest drove almost all actions and indeed most cognition. Early research like that of Stouffer et al. (1949) on relative deprivation might in retrospect be said to involve both outcome and process fairness, but at the time the reactions to unfair treatment they studied were viewed as reactions

to receiving outcomes that did not comport with norms of fair distribution. The justice and equity concepts that were introduced into sociology and psychology by scholars like Homans (1961), Adams (1963), and Blau (1964) focused on distributive justice, on the psychology of what made rewards and costs fair or unfair. Initially, work on the psychology of justice saw fairness as defined by proportional payment or punishment, and reactions to equitable or inequitable distributions in exchange relationships were the primary target of inquiry.

An experiment by Adams and Rosenbaum (1962; Experiment 2) gives a good feel for the origins of and support for outcome-focused work on the social psychology of justice. In this experiment, the undergraduate participants in all conditions were paid well to conduct interviews, but approximately half of the participants were led to believe that this payment was more than was equitable, while the remainder were led to believe that the payment was equitable. (There was a second manipulation that had to do with whether the payment was hourly or piece-rate. I will only describe the findings for the hourly rate participants; the piece-rate participants behaved differently, though their performance differences also supported Adams' equity theory.) The participants who felt that they were being unfairly overpaid worked harder and produced more than did the control condition participants who received the same hourly payment but who had been convinced that it was fair. Figure 1.1 shows the mean productivity scores for both groups. Adams (1963, 1965) argued that the increased performance of those who thought they were being overpaid was the result of their effort to make their inputs proportional to their rewards by raising the overall level of input.



From Adams and Rosenbaum, 1962, Experiment 2, hourly rate participants

Figure 1.1 Average productivity—hourly wage participants

From the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s, the outcome-focused paradigm was the background for most theorizing and research on the social psychology of justice. Adams' work on inequity distress was a departure from "pure" exchange or interdependence theories because it posited that people would act in ways that were not in their strict objective self-interest—for example by working harder—in order to avoid the uncomfortable feeling that would result from inequitable outcomes, but the relevant psychology still focused on reactions to immediate outcomes. During the next decade scholars elaborated the concept of distributive justice to include other norms of allocation, especially norms that mandated distributing outcomes equally or in terms of need (see, e.g., Deutsch, 1975). Research and theory on justice in this outcome-focused paradigm was so influential that in 1976 Berkowitz and Walster (1976; see also, Walster, Berscheid, and Walster, 1973; Walster, Walster, and Berscheid, 1978) entitled an edition of *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* that they edited, "Equity Theory: Toward a General Theory of Social Interaction."


But even as Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1973) and Berkowitz and Walster (1976) advanced the argument that distributive justice could supply a unifying construct for much of social psychology, research was underway that would shift the paradigm of justice research. One experiment in particular, conducted in the early 1970s, marks a turning point. This study showed the impact that non-outcome factors have on fairness judgments and in doing so it began some lines of research that ultimately undermined the view of fairness in the outcome-focused paradigm. By introducing the concept of "procedural justice," this work and later studies would upend our understanding of what fairness means and how fairness impacts behavior and attitudes. Productive, indeed exciting, work on outcome distribution topics has continued—as evidenced by the chapter in this volume by MacCoun and Polcz, which looks at different outcome distributions and their links to different forms of interpersonal relationships—but by the 1980s the attention of justice scholars had widened to include both experienced outcomes and experienced social process as key issues in fairness and to consider the implications of fairness for relationship status as important reasons for why fairness matters. (In fact, Deutsch (1975) anticipated the change in paradigms when he proposed that different relational goals might be best served by different allocations rules.)

This widening of interest in the social antecedents and consequences of fairness judgments almost by necessity gave greater attention to what fairness meant in terms of experienced relationships with other people, organizations, and social institutions. For this reason, I term this new approach to the psychology of justice the "relationship-focused paradigm." Work on outcome distribution fairness would devote more and

more attention to the relationships within which the distribution occurs—again the MacCoun and Polcz chapter is a good example—and explanations of the newly-discovered procedural justice effects would focus on what fair or unfair treatment told people about their relationship with other individuals, organizations, institutions, and governments. The new paradigm ultimately gave rise to theories of the psychology of justice that blend both outcome interdependence and social identity processes in order to explain how fairness works (e.g., Lind, 1995, 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992).

The experiment that began the paradigm shift deserves some consideration here, because it illustrates how factors other than outcomes can influence justice judgments. In 1974, Walker et al. (1974) published a study revealing that fairness judgments were profoundly affected not just by the outcome of a social interaction but also by the processes experienced by those involved. The Walker et al. experiment was undertaken not to test any point of social psychological theory but instead to see if research methods from experimental social psychology could productively address psychological assumptions in law (see generally Thibaut and Walker, 1975). Laurens Walker, a law professor, and John Thibaut, a social psychologist, along with two graduate students working with Thibaut (including the author of this chapter) conducted the experiment to examine the psychological underpinnings of the legal concept of procedural justice—the idea that fairness exists not just in the outcome of legal trials and hearings but also in the process used to arrive at the verdict.

In the context of an elaborate business simulation, participants in the Walker et al. study were informed that their team had been accused of violating a rule. Their teammate (who was actually a confederate of the experimenter) was accused by another team of stealing ideas for a creative task on which the teams were competing. The rules of the simulation provided for a brief trial to resolve such accusations, with the case to be adjudicated by a law student from the university where the study was being conducted. The trial procedure, the participant's knowledge about whether his or her team was guilty of the transgression, and the outcome of the trial were all manipulated as between-subjects factors. The procedure manipulation is of particular interest here: it involved high or low levels of what Thibaut and Walker (1975) termed "process control," a procedural variable similar to what is termed "voice" (Folger, 1977) in later justice work. In the high process control conditions, a representative of the participant's team presented evidence directly to the adjudicator; in the low process control conditions, an independent investigator was said to decide what evidence would be presented. In fact, the content of the evidence presentations was identical in all conditions.



From Walker, LaTour, Lind, and Thibaut, 1974, Participant role data

Figure 1.2 Ratings of fairness of procedure and satisfaction with verdict

The experiment produced a remarkable finding. The trial procedure did matter, and it mattered a great deal, both as a driver of fairness judgments and as a determinant of satisfaction with the outcome of the trial. Figure 1.2 shows the average fairness and satisfaction ratings of participants in the trials. Whether the verdict was favorable or unfavorable, the participants who had received high process control thought the procedure was fairer than did those who received low process control procedures. This difference carried over to reactions to the verdict itself and to the judge: Participants who experienced high process control rated themselves as more satisfied with the verdict and as trusting the judge more than did those who experienced low process control procedures.

Thibaut, Walker, and their colleagues replicated and extended the key findings of this first procedural justice experiment (see, e.g., Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker, & Thibaut, 1980; Thibaut and Walker, 1975), and others soon demonstrated procedure effects on perceived fairness and on acceptance of outcomes in other contexts, such as work settings (e.g., Folger, 1977). The impact of procedural and process variations on perceptions of fairness, which is termed a “procedural justice effect,” and the impact of differences in perceived procedural fairness on various downstream beliefs and behaviors, termed the “fair process effect” (Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 1979), were replicated both in the laboratory and in the field. Many of the chapters in this book describe fair process effects of one type or another.

The relationship-focused paradigm gathered a great deal of momentum from the work of Tom Tyler and his colleagues (e.g., Tyler, 1990;

Tyler & Caine, 1981; Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985). This research demonstrated in real-world settings that people did indeed form coherent and measurable impressions of procedural fairness in these contexts and that there were substantial psychological consequences of feeling that one had been treated fairly or unfairly. This body of research showed that acceptance of and obedience to political authorities were much more likely if the authority or state entity in question was thought to have made decisions following fair procedures. The effects seen by Tyler and his colleagues were very strong indeed, stronger in most cases than were the procedural fairness and fair process effects seen in laboratory studies. It was not unusual to find process and procedure effects that were stronger than the impact of outcome or expected outcomes, even when the outcomes involved were quite substantial. Tyler's work is reviewed in part in his chapter in this book.

I will provide an example of a strong fair process effect from one of my own papers. Lind et al. (1993) report a series of field studies on the role of outcome and process perceptions on decisions to accept arbitrated judgments in civil lawsuits in several U.S. Federal District Courts. The lawsuits, which involved tort and contract cases, were required to undergo a nonbinding arbitration before the litigants could go to trial. The program (see Lind, 1990, Lind & Shapard, 1981, for details about the program) offered an interesting opportunity to examine procedural justice and fair process effects in the context of real-world decisions. Each litigant had the right to accept the arbitrator's decision as the final outcome of his or her lawsuit or to reject the award and demand a trial, and this provided a behavioral measure of acceptance of the decision. Because we surveyed the litigants about their perceptions of the process and outcome and because we had objective data on the arbitrators' decisions, litigants' perceptions of the fairness of the process and their real and relative outcomes could be correlated with their decisions to accept or reject the arbitrators' rulings.

Summary findings across all of the studies reported in the Lind et al. (1993) paper are presented in Figure 1.3, which shows the results of a path analysis of the strength of direct and indirect factors affecting acceptance of the arbitrator's decision. Three points are especially noteworthy. First, the impact of judgments of the fairness of the process on acceptance of the decision was very strong indeed, more than twice as strong as the impact of the objective outcomes the litigant received. Second, the impact of impressions of the process on perceived procedural justice (i.e., the link between process impressions and procedural justice judgments) was twice as strong as the impact of subjective outcome judgments on the procedural justice judgments. And third, the total effect of process impressions (via their impact on procedural justice judgments) on decision acceptance was approximately the same as the total effect of both objective and subjective outcomes. Clearly the




Figure 1.3 Fairness judgments, outcomes, and the acceptance of arbitration awards

fair process effect in these cases was very strong indeed—if litigants thought the process was fair, they were much more likely to accept the outcome than if they thought the process was unfair.

The shift from the outcome-focused to the relationship-focused paradigm had a number of other effects. Given that a hitherto unsuspected cause of variation in fairness (voice) had been demonstrated, researchers started looking for other new antecedents of fairness judgments. Once the idea that fairness judgments could address social behavior other than allocating outcomes, some fascinating research was done using open-ended questions to ask people what they found to be fair or unfair about their behavior or experiences (e.g., Adler, Hensler, Nelson, & Rest, 1983; Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Mikula, 1993, 2005; Mikula, Petri, & Tanzer, 1990). Mikula, Petri, and Tanzer (1990) mapped out examples of situations that prompted felt injustice, using examples offered by various student participant groups. Their work, and that of Messick et al. (1985) and Alder et al. (1983), showed that perceptions of fair or unfair treatment could indeed arise from a variety of experiences, including not only allocations of outcomes as seen in distributive justice research or the provision or denial of voice as seen in the Thibaut and Walker and Folger studies, but also rule-breaking behavior (lying and cheating), obvious bias in treatment or decision-making, arbitrary or corrupt use of power, disloyalty in friendships, impolite and undignified treatment, and lack of adequate explanations or information to guide behavior.

Within social psychology (e.g., Crosby, 1976; Folger & Martin, 1986; Lind, 2001; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003; Van den Bos, 2003; in

press; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002; Van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 2001; see also Ambrose et al., 2015; Lind & Tyler, 1988, Chapter 10; Mikula, 2005), these factors have been viewed as antecedents of either procedural justice or general fairness judgments. Organizational scholars (e.g., Bies, 2015; Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 1993) have tended to label these factors as independent forms of justice, speaking of undignified treatment and other informal violations of norms as “interactional injustice,” and lack of information or explanations as “informational injustice.” The difference in whether one speaks of a justice consideration as an antecedent or a peculiar form of justice probably reflects one’s scholarly context. Psychologists generally seek to explain cognitions and behavior with relatively few constructs and processes, and parsimony is valued in our field; organizational scholars seek clear connections between organizational practices and organizational behaviors and are often more concerned with clear empirical connections than with the psychological dynamics that might exist between the connections.

The discovery that fairness is affected by process as well as outcomes also opened the door for work on how process fairness effects might be affected by different levels of outcomes. Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) began the exploration of how and when fairness \times outcome interactions might occur, a moderation effect that has generated a great deal of subsequent research, both basic and applied. Their chapter in this book explores the way justice studies have entered organizational behavior scholarship and spread out to address new topics.

We may well be on the verge of another paradigm shift in the study of motivating justice processes. Work in biology (e.g., Brosnan, 2006, 2011; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003, 2003, 2014) and social neuroscience (e.g., Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008) suggest that fairness reactions are not just questions of cognitive balancing processes (as Adams suggested) nor are they prompted solely by human allocation or interaction norms. As can be seen from Brosnan’s chapter in this volume, other social mammals and birds show reactions that are very similar to human reactions to distributive and procedural injustice. The work of Eisenberger, Lieberman, and others points to close connections between the human brain’s responses to fair or unfair treatment and its response to physical pleasure and pain.

Work using traditional social psychological methods also suggests that we might be moving into a “fundamental-justice” paradigm, with fairness-related processes seen as a basic aspect of being a social animal. Van den Bos’ work on uncertainty management and disinhibition effects on fairness judgments (e.g., Van den Bos, 2001; 2010; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002; see also Hulst, Van den Bos, Akkermans, & Lind, 2017), in particular, demonstrates the connection between justice

processes and basic psychological dynamics such as the human alarm system (e.g., Murray, 2005; Murray, Holmes, MacDonald, & Ellsworth, 1998) and the behavioral inhibition system (e.g., Carver & White, 1994). As I note in my chapter later in this volume, we may well have been too cognitive in our theorizing about the psychology of fairness. Reactions to injustice appear to be far more visceral than we have thought.

Turning to research and theory on *motivated* justice cognitions, there has also arguably been a paradigm shift in that part of social justice studies. Much of the research on motivated justice processes during the twentieth century, with the exception of Adams' (1963, 1965) equity theory work, focused on person perception in one form or another. Lerner's Belief in a Just World theory (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Goldberg, 1999; Lerner & Simmons, 1966) and the research that it prompted focused on issues like blame and reactions to victims of crime or poverty. One might term this the "person-perception paradigm" in motivated justice research.

Later Jost and his colleagues (e.g., Jost et al., 2004; Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002) pointed out that motivated justice processes might exist in beliefs about social systems, introducing System Justification Theory. System Justification Theory applied the idea of motivated cognition not just to person perceptions but also to perceptions of qualities, including justice-related qualities, of systems such as governments and organizations (see the chapter by Engstrom et al. in this volume; see also, Kay et al., 2009). Work on motivated justice processes might now be said to be in a new "system-perception paradigm."

Applications of the Social Psychology of Justice

The application of social psychological work on justice and fairness to real-world problems has been remarkable from the very outset of research in our area. Stouffer et al. conducted their research to understand not abstract issues but the specific psychology of reactions among American soldiers in the 1940s. Adams developed his ideas about inequity distress in the context his work at General Electric, asking how psychology might inform the ways organizations pay and motivate workers. Thibaut and Walker began the study of procedural justice with a study of reactions to judicial procedures and the legal concepts that drive them. Lerner's work often addressed questions of judicial and policy blaming, and Jost's work has quite frequently looked at policy and political beliefs. It would be difficult to identify another area of social psychology where basic science and application are so intertwined.

In disciplinary terms, to date the most numerous applications of the social psychology of justice and fairness are in organizational psychology, political psychology, and psychology and law. There are other relatively new applications to professional relationships—for example,

the chapter in this volume by Pérez-Arechaederra describes how fairness judgments are affected by experiences with doctors and other healthcare providers and how these judgments in turn affect important attitudes and behaviors.

The chapters in this volume on organizational justice (those by Brockner and Wiesenfeld and by Cropanzano, Ambrose, and Van Wagoner) give a good overview of the very substantial literature on fairness and fairness-related effects in the workplace. It may well be the case that there are more studies on organizational justice than on any other justice context. The interplay of basic social psychological research and research on organizational justice has benefited both types of work and has improved theory on the psychology of fairness. One example among many is seen in the way organizational researchers picked up on the concept of procedural justice and the way their research in organizations in turn informed the development of justice theories within social psychology. Early work on the effects of procedural justice in organizations, including the finding that fairness judgments appeared to affect such things as trust in management and harmony in the workplace (Alexander & Ruderman, 1987) as well as organizational citizenship behavior (Moorman, 1991; Organ, 1990; Organ & Moorman, 1993) served as inputs to the development of relationship-centered theories (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992) of fairness.

The application of psychology of justice concepts in the judicial and political realms is also remarkable. The example above of procedural fairness effects on decisions to accept nonbinding arbitration decisions is only one of many examples of applications of fairness research to issues in law. The chapter in this volume by Jackson and Pósch is the latest in a long line of work, dating back to Tyler's early studies of reactions to the perceived fairness of law-making processes (Tyler, 1988, 1990; Tyler & Caine, 1981; Tyler, Rasinski, & Griffin, 1986) through recent work showing that fairness-enhancing procedures and policies improve citizen perceptions of the legitimacy of governments (Jackson, 2018; Lind and Arndt, 2016; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Tyler's chapter here addresses the application of fairness-enhancing measures to the problems of enhancing legitimacy and trust and increasing cooperation with the police, clearly a critical area for the development of new policies and practices (Tyler, Goff, & MacCoun, 2015).

Among the newest application of the psychology of justice is that seen in Van den Bos' work on radicalization and the development of extremist behavior (Van den Bos, 2018, in press), described in his chapter in this book. This work makes clear that feelings of unfair treatment can have profound effects on the lives of individuals and on the fabric of the state. It would be hard to find an application of social psychological knowledge that is more relevant to the state of the world today.

The Next Frontiers

Writing an introduction for a volume in a series entitled *Frontiers of Social Psychology* invites one to offer some thoughts not only about where we are on the frontier of our knowledge of the topic but also to think about what the next frontier might be. Where might we hope to be in our understanding of the psychology of fairness and justice in five, ten, or 20 years? What are the most intriguing unresolved issues in our science?

I will not pretend to be able to answer these questions in any definitive fashion, but there do seem to me to be two emerging issues or challenges that our field will face. I suspect that each has the capacity to create changes as important as the paradigm shifts described above. I have hinted at both challenges in the text above, but both deserve some more discussion.

The first of these “next frontier” issues has to do with the challenging of integrating and expanding what has previously been a very cognitive analysis of the psychology of justice as we seek to include the biological and social neuroscience findings on justice and fairness. Without a doubt we humans rely a great deal on our learned understandings and on cultural norms and abstract symbols when we process fairness-relevant information. But it is equally clear from work in biology and neuroscience that we have some “hard-wiring,” shared with other social animals, that drives justice- and fairness-related behavior. The traditional model of human fairness reactions as being rather malleable in terms of which stimuli provoke feelings of fair or unfair treatment, and the belief that fairness reactions are quite susceptible to cognitive balancing processes is difficult to reconcile with findings of similar response patterns in other species. While the work of Eisenberger, Lieberman, and others show quite clear activation of parts of the brain associated with damping down resentment and explaining away apparent unfairness, the impression one receives is that these cognitive processes are intervening to control a more fundamental reaction to unfairness or inclusion, not driving the initial brain reaction. Both of these literatures are outside my area of expertise; indeed, I suspect they are outside the areas of expertise of many social psychologists who study justice. But then, it is arguable that the substantial literature on the social psychology of justice is outside the area of expertise of many biologists and neuroscientists who do research on fairness and inclusion processes. Justice has come to be a topic that lies not just deep inside psychology, but one that clearly has roots in biology—I suspect that this frontier will be most profitably explored by teams of scholars with training in, and perspectives from, more than one discipline.

The second “next frontier” is the potential for integrating the two lines of scholarship—*motivating* and *motivated* justice processes—that

are described above. Each line of scholarship has a great deal of research support and theoretical development. There is no doubt that people do in fact respond to some experiences by labeling them unfair and by reacting very strongly indeed. In fact, as Van den Bos (2018) has documented, sometimes perceptions of unfair treatment drive people not only to leave a social system but even to oppose it in word and deed. That said, it is also clear from work such as that described in the Engstrom et al. chapter in this volume that sometimes people distort their judgments to try to make their world or their system seem fair, even when there is substantial objective evidence to the contrary. Each of these lines of work is undeniably valid, yet both cannot be always valid. We have empirical findings and theoretical analyses that identify situations where motivating fairness effects will be relatively stronger and weaker (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Hulst et al., 2017; Van den Bos, 2001), and research on System Justification Theory (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Kay et al., 2009) has examined factors that increase or decrease the distortion of justice-related cognitions. But there is no real match in these moderating effects—there is no pattern that would allow us to conclude that justice judgments are motivating in these situations but become motivated cognitions in those other situations. If we could find the mechanisms that switch from one modality of the psychology of justice to the other, we would have an integrated theory of the psychology of social justice. That would certainly be an accomplishment!

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