PRINCIPLES OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: MECHANISMS FOR SECURING OBLIGATIONS INCUMBENT
TO PUBLIC BODIES

                            NAOMI RENIUTZ-URSOIU^^[1] AND MIHAELA MUSAN

National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania

Abstract in original language

The principles of transparency and accountability are closely interconnected and both of them
related to the concept of ‘rule of law’.  From a broader perspective they are inherent to any legal
system which is protecting the individual from the discretionary powers of the state’s machinery.
An important role in securing (public) obligations, safeguarding and further developing the
principle of accountability is played by the ‘fourth power’ institutions promoters of a good
administration, engaging new standards   of conduct of ethical, institutional and also legal
nature.

Key words in original language

Transparency, Accountability, Public institutions, Ombudsman, Court of Audit.


1. Principles of transparency and accountability

The principles of transparency and accountability are closely interconnected and both of them are
related to the concept of ‘rule of law’.

“Transparency largely promotes the same and similar values as the principle of legality, that is,
the requirement of a legal basis for government action. In its underlying values, transparency is
closely related to legality; therefore it can fulfil a crucial role in law-making and policy making
processes where the principle of legality is out of reach and does not make sense, for instance in
the case of decision-making characterized by a high degree of informality, or where principle of
legality does not prevent the existence of a broad discretion to act or not to act. The principle
of transparency picks up where the principle of legality falls short” and it can be seen as a
functional counterpart of the later.[2]  Without transparency and information there can be no
dialogue between citizens and government, and corruption and abuse of power can occur unchallenged.
Curtin and Meijer in their analytical approach about ‘Does transparency strengthen legitimacy’ they
reach the conclusion  that  principle of transparency is a key element of democratic institutions
and can only be a starting point in building public understanding, participation and involvement,
but in their opinion “naive assumptions about the relation between transparency and legitimacy can
and should be avoided”[3] -  “legitimacy being a mirror  of public perception as to the rightness
of authority.”[4] Thus principle of transparency can be seen as a promoter of legality, a deterrent
to corruption, and therefore as a support to an accountable governance. Public institutions do not
exist for their own sake, but to serve people by maintaining law and order. Therefore public
officials must be held accountable for their actions.

The principle of accountability is linked to the concept of ‘rule of law’ and if one is only
interested in the strictly legal perspective, accountability does not add anything substantial to
the ‘rule of law’. The law defines who is accountable to whom and for what and seen this way
accountable behaviour is simply lawful behaviour.

Government transparency, civic participation, and effective oversight by state actors (including
judiciaries, legislatures, ombudsmen and audit institutions) and non-state actors (such as the
media and civil society watchdogs) are important sources of pressure for better governance.
Accountability is not conceivable without transparency and rules, they are interconnected since
transparency in the public sector inevitably raises issues about the distribution of powers and
resources in the attempt to fulfil public obligations. Their relationship is strongly argued to
foster the political and public accountability which will contribute to a transparent government
that accounts for what it does. Also it refers to the effectiveness with which the governed can
exercise influence over their governors. The adjective ‘public’ is specifically related to the
openness of the policy-making process. The account giving is done in public in the sense that it is
open or at least accessible to citizens.

1.1 Principle of Transparency

Definition and elements of the principle of transparency

“As a term of art, transparency could well win the prize for most increased usage of any word” and
“has been used almost to the saturation point over the past decade.. becoming a pervasive cliché of
modern governance.”[5] “In perhaps its commonest usage, transparency denotes government according
to fixed and published rules, on the basis of information and procedures that are accessible to the
public, and within clearly demarcated fields of activity.”[6] Tomkins[7] had developed a unified
system of institutional arguments as an answer why principle of transparency is so important:

“The first reason is the administrative argument: this is that with greater transparency comes
greater accuracy and objectivity in record keeping generally, and as regards personal files in
particular. Secondly, there is a constitutional argument, which posits that greater  transparency
supports the legal and constitutional roles of national bodies in law-making or in administrative
oversight. Thirdly there is the legal argument : namely reasons and openness in decision-making are
essential if citizens and others are to be able to determine whether and if so on what grounds,
they might have a right to some form of legal redress against an allegedly disproportionate or
procedurally unfair decision. Fourthly there is the policy argument. This supposes that greater
openness somehow leads  inexorably to better decision-making – that mistakes will be fewer or
smaller if decisions and the decision-making process are opened up to a greater public and media
scrutiny, and that fraud will be hard to conceal. Finally, the popular or political argument has it
that greater transparency enhances the ability of informed citizens meaningfully to participate in
a democracy.”[8]

Concepts such as right to information, public access to information, e-government, citizen
participation, consultation of experts or citizens, the need to have reasoned decisions, open
decision-making processes have all in their time been presented as crucial aspects of the principle
of transparency. Some authors view principle of transparency as limited to one or two of these
issues (i.e. access to information and open meetings), others take a broader approach and view for
example the right to be heard before a decision is taken as an important part of the principle of
transparency. It can be concluded that the principle of transparency is an umbrella concept which
covers a variety of (not always particularly closely related) values.

However, at the Community level the principle of transparency in the context of public
administration is contended to rely on some basic elements as they were acknowledged by the
European Ombudsman.[9]

“Transparency involves three elements:

the processes through which public bodies make decisions should be understandable and open;

the decisions themselves should be reasoned;

as far as possible, the information on which the decisions are based should be available to the
public.”

It can be argued that “transparency not only incorporates the rather passive right of every citizen
to have access to information (if they activate that formal legal right) but also the much broader
and more pro-active duty of the administration itself to ensure that information about its policy
and actions is provided in an accessible fashion.”[10]  Therefore, the elements of principle of
transparency can in addition refer to more structural aspects in the sense of maintaining
transparent decision-making processes and judicial protection systems as well as the fact that
legislation must itself be coherent and clear.[11] In this sense a transparent government should
provide optimal public information about its actions through means such as publications, access to
information and transparency in decision-making laws, procedural mechanisms to allow interest
groups and individuals to express their concerns related to matters that directly affect them, and
clear rules on restrictions.

Access to information as an element inherent to the principle of transparency does indeed imply
that public authorities should be proactive in publishing certain kinds of information, in ways
that can be easily understood by the intended audience.[12] In this sense, principle of
transparency overlaps with certain requirements of accountability such as, for example, publication
of annual reports, or of a State budget showing plans and outcomes as regards spending, revenue and
borrowing. Certain rules regarding the access to documents or keeping adequate records[13] should
be written down for the sake of right to information, and non-compliance with any of them should
constitutes an instance of maladministration and therefore should be complemented with rules
imposing sanctions and redress.

In addition, principle of transparency presupposes that public authorities react promptly and
positively to requests from members of the public for access to information and documents which
have not been published.[14] The holders of public office should, in this view, give reasons for
their decisions and restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly so demands.
The main idea of access to information is that everyone, or at least every citizen, has the right
to obtain official information and documents, subject to legally defined exceptions for the
protection of various public interests and private interests.

Most of the exceptions include a “harm test”: that is to say, the exception applies if disclosure
would undermine the protection of the interest concerned. Some exceptions are, in addition, subject
to the possibility of an overriding public interest in disclosure. This is the case for the
protection of: commercial interests; court proceedings and legal advice; and the purpose of
inspections, investigations and audits. If an overriding public interest exists, then there is an
“exception to the exception” and public access must be granted. There is, however, no possibility
of an overriding public interest in disclosure as regards the exceptions for: public security;
defence and military matters; international relations; financial, monetary or economic policy; and
the protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual. A stronger version of the harm test
applies to the exception which is intended to allow the institutions a so-called “space to think”.
The exception applies only if disclosure would seriously undermine the institution's
decision-making process.[15]

Principle of transparency, therefore, does not imply that all official information and documents
must be public. Instead it implies that the burden of proof is on the public authority that refuses
a request for public access,[16] thus reversing the traditional presumption of confidentiality that
existed in many countries (the communist culture of secrecy).[17] In this line public authorities
should be under the ‘duty to give reasons’, to explain and substantiate the justification of an
administrative action or decision. The reasons consist of a reference to the implemented
regulation, the relevant facts, the interests concerned and a report of on the weighing of these
interests. This aspect has several important functions:

adds benefit to the quality of the decision;

 informs and legitimates the decision in concreto - for the benefit of control by the (appeal)
judge and the parties, and in abstracto - to prevent the appearance of bias or arbitrariness;

adds to the development of lawfulness;

may stimulate officials to be more rigorous in their analysis and ensure that they have properly
examined the potentials flows in their arguments

Closely connected with the right to access to information runs the idea of open decision-making, as
another immanent element of principle of transparency. This implies that meetings deciding on
matters that will have a direct impact on the citizens should be open and public, so that citizens
can follow them and listen to the arguments, and proposals on matters that concern citizens should
be presented for public debate in advance of such meetings. Yet principle of transparency is often
considered as not including a right of participation as such but rather more weakly as including
the provision of some consultation mechanisms.[18] The fact that participation in some form can be
considered an important part of transparency is not very surprising. Policy affects citizens, often
in a rather direct fashion, and therefore it is important for them to have the possibility to
participate in policymaking.[19]

For an overall assessment regarding the principle of transparency as developed by any legal system,
it is relevant to look at the legislative framework on which principle of transparency is
conceived. An analysis of diverse aspects such as the right to information, the public authorities
that are complying with the requirements to act as open as possible, the exemptions from the rules
of transparency, the procedures that are engaged in decision-making, the effectiveness of
implementation of freedom of information laws and their flaws would give us a perspective of the
way in which the various elements inherent to the principle of transparency are accommodated and
dealt with by the national legal environments. These are multiple aspects that should foster the
principle of transparency which in turn helps improve governance and reduce corruption, securing
public obligations as assumed by those empowered to fulfil them.

1.2 Principle of Accountability

                         a.  Definitions, elements and mechanisms

Principle of accountability often serves as a conceptual umbrella and “has come to stand as a
general term for any mechanism that makes powerful institutions responsive to their particular
publics”[20] and the most concise description would be “the obligation to explain and justify
conduct.”[21] Accountability can be defined as a “social relationship in which an actor feels an
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct to some significant other.”[22] “This
usually involves not just information about performance, but also the possibility of debate and
judgment and the imposition of formal or informal sanctions in case of mal-performance. This is
what one could call hard accountability. However, over the past decade accountability also has been
used in a much softer sense, as an indication of good governance. In this soft sense it comes close
to a willingness to act in a transparent, fair, and equitable way.”[23]

The academic debates about principle of accountability raise questions about mainly three issues:
Who is accountable? To whom? For what?. These are actually the elements on which the principle of
accountability is framed on.

Public institutions (‘who?’) are frequently required to account for their conduct in fulfilling
public tasks (‘what?’) to various forums( ‘to whom?’) in a variety of ways. There are different
sorts of forums and therefore also different types of potential accountability mechanisms, and
different sets of norms and expectations:[24]

Nevertheless, from a broader perspective, the various mechanisms of accountability are interwoven
and it can be noticed that the state institutions provide forms of ‘horizontal accountability’ in
contrast to ‘vertical accountability’ imposed on governments by voters through periodic elections.
Horizontal accountability is more focused on the institutional organizations and it can be defined
as the capacity of state’s institutions to check abuses by other public agencies and branches of
government. It involves different kinds of accountability: “administrative accountability reviews
the expediency and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts; financial and performance
accountability subjects the use of public money by state officials to norms of austerity,
efficiency, and propriety; legal accountability monitors the observance of legal rules and
constitutional accountability evaluates whether legislative acts are in accordance with
constitutional rules.”[25]

However, next to courts, a whole series of quasi-legal forums, that exercise independent and
external administrative and financial oversight and control, has been established in the past
decades—some even speak of an ‘‘audit explosion’’. These new administrative forums vary from
European, national, or local ombudsmen and audit agencies, to independent supervisory authorities,
inspector generals, anti-fraud agencies, and chartered accountants. Also, the mandates of several
national auditing agencies have been broadened to secure not only the probity and legality of
public spending, but also its efficiency and effectiveness. These administrative forums exercise
regular financial and administrative control, often on the basis of specific statutes and
prescribed norms.”[26]

                        b.  The ‘fourth power’

Although most of these public administrative forums report directly or indirectly to Parliament or
to the minister, they often do not stand in a hierarchical relationship to the public officials,
since most of them do not even have formal powers to coerce public servants or institutions into
compliance. Bovens sees in most of these administrative accountability relations a form of
‘diagonal accountability’, that are meant to foster parliamentary control, but they are not part of
the direct chain of principal-agent relations.[27] “These controlling agencies are auxiliary forums
of accountability that were instituted to help the political principals control the great variety
of administrative agents, but gradually they have acquired a legitimacy of their own and they can
act as independent accountees.”[28]

This is the case of national Ombudsmen and the Courts of Audit. Departing from this point Addink
underline the idea that these institutions  in exercising their constitutional duties, they play
their own role in the system of checks and balances. They combined the control function with that
of ‘lawmaking’, which is actually peculiar to the classic powers - the legislature, the executive
and the judiciary. For instance national Courts of Audit on the one side scrutinise national
incomes and expenditure as well as the effectiveness of policies and on the other side advise
retroactively or can make pressure at a ministerial level for an improper policy measure to be
changed or improved. The Ombudsmen also examine, in retrospect, the conduct of administrative
authorities and then issue reports and make recommendations in the matter.

In fulfilling their role they “dedicate themselves to aspects of lawfulness, effectiveness, as well
as other aspects of properness” and their advice is aimed at promoting good administration.[29]
Therefore their role is of an advisory nature and the results of performing this role- the reports
and recommendations- have in their turn direct effect on the lawmaking process deployed by the
other institutions. Performing this role as well as their constitutional duties these two types of
institutions wield an important power which can be distinguished substantively from the other three
powers. Further on, Addink concludes that in the view of the classic theory of Montesquieu that
refers to ‘distribution’ rather then separation of powers, these institutions have become “the
cornerstone in the edifice of checks and balances” and thus they form the ‘fourth power’.[30]
This  constitutional innovation is undoubtedly of extreme importance for the principle of
accountability since it is contended that the evolution and the growing influence of such
institutions as Court of Audit and Ombudsman express “a solution inspired by the demands of
practice, which counteract the danger of concentration of power.”[31]

The legitimacy of such institutions and hence their capacity to be net providers of legitimacy to
the overall system of governance through the accountability mechanisms they deploy, depends on
fulfilling their functions in a way that is demonstrably impartial and non-partisan. In this sense,
relevant is to analyze the extent of their powers vis-à-vis other authorities, their criteria used
for assessment, and the compliance with their recommendations/advices. For the examination of their
powers it is useful to look at the nature and the extent of the competences under which the
national Audit Courts and the Ombudsmen are authorised to render an opinion, to a certain degree
these determining the relation between them and the authorities that are subjected to their
control.[32]

The grounds on the basis of which these institutions assess the administrative conducts in
fulfilling the public tasks are important too, since the criteria used for such assessments are
exerted in rendering their opinions. As already discussed in the above section, their opinions are
given not just to secure an efficient ‘checks and balances’ system, but also in a view to promote
good administration. Here I would like to make some preliminary remarks regarding the  criteria
developed and used by the Courts Of Audit and the Ombudsmen.

In the first case, Bovens noticed that the role of Court of Audit in fostering  the accountability
mechanisms, and thus the principles of good governance, became more prominent  once with the
development of the performance audit . He remarks that the most important transformation has been
the shift from traditional financial control to what the British have called ‘value for money
auditing’.

“This is indeed a genuine shift from accounting to accountability. Value for money auditing is not
concerned so much with the legality and procedural correctness of public spending, but foremost
with its efficiency and effectiveness. The numerical, quantifiable criteria of financial accounting
are substituted for much more output oriented, qualitative performance indicators. Thus, good
governance is not measured only in terms of compliance with prescribed financial rules and
procedures, but also in terms of actual performance. The attention has shifted from inputs and
throughputs to outputs and, most importantly, outcomes.”

In the case of the Ombudsman the major realm of his activity and concern is to ensure the promotion
of good administration and the avoidance of maladministration. Maladministration, is the main
criteria used for the assessment of an administrative conduct complained about, and is defined as
an open-ended concept describing a situation where a public body fails to act in accordance with a
rule or principle that is binding on it. Maladministration extends beyond legality and also
encompasses the assumption that, in their daily dealings with the public, public administrations
need to observe norms and rules of behaviour designed to ensure that citizens (and, more generally,
users) are properly treated and enjoy their rights fully. Put otherwise, while illegality it is a
narrow criteria for assessment and necessarily implies maladministration, maladministration does
not automatically entail illegality and therefore it is a broader criteria. The difference is
essential: the opinions/ recommendations rendered on the basis of  maladministration criteria draw
attention to the administrative irregularities, omissions, sequential mistakes that, although
lawfully, they  have to be improved or removed in the interest of citizens. Thus the
recommendations are aimed to promote and to develop legislation governing good administration.

Regarding the last aspect of compliance with the recommendations/ advices made by the Courts of
Audit and Ombudsmen, the relevant issue is whether the content of their opinions is adopted by
administrative authorities and if not whether there is an effective mechanism to enforce them, this
last issue depending to a great extent by their relation with the national parliaments. It has to
be mentioned that the Courts of Audit as well the Ombudsmen, can only issue non-binding
recommendations/opinions to the institutions of the state falling within their remit and therefore
their effectiveness depends by the quality of their work in connection with the their power to
persuade public authorities.

Synthesis:

Principle of transparency is the new counterpart of the principle of legality, therefore it  is one
of the principles underpinning the rule of law. The principle of transparency means that :

                         a.  the administrative processes by which decisions are made should be
clear and understandable,

                        b.  the decisions themselves should be reasoned,

                         c.  the information on which reasons are based should be available to the
public,

                        d.  meetings deciding on matters that will have a direct impact on the
citizens should be open and public, ensuring that the interests of those affected are not
overlooked.

The above discussed framework enables us to understand that “the principle of transparency becomes
meaningful in a social relationship between actors which discuss (expected) performance and (plan
to) evaluate performance according to certain criteria. To control the different steps in the
policy making process and the way different actors act, transparency is a necessary condition and a
first step. It is but a first step within a much broader architecture of accountability.”[33]

The principle of accountability through its inherent mechanisms is one of steering wheels in the
broader system of ‘checks and balance’ process fostering the legitimacy of the public
administration and so enhancing the democracy of a particular state. It is structured around three
elements that can be expressed by questioning who is accountable to whom and for what? In finding
the answer, one must observe the public administrative authorities that will be held accountable to
various forums for their conduct in fulfilling the public tasks.

Seen this way accountable behaviour is simply lawful behaviour. An important role in safeguarding
public obligations is played by the ‘fourth power’ institutions .It seems that on the one side
while the constitutional accountability acknowledges a decrease in efficiency and importance, due
to the problem posed by the delegation of responsibilities and tasks to a variety of new forms of
independent administrative agencies, on the other side the ‘fourth power’ institutions become (more
or less) better guardians and promoters of a good administration, engaging new standards of conduct
of ethical, institutional and also legal nature.


Literature:

-    G.H.Addink, "The Ombudsman as the fourth power. On the foundations of Ombudsman Law from a
comparative perspective", Utrecht University, 2004.

-    S. van Bijsterveld, "A crucial link in shaping the new Social contract between the citizen and
the EU", in Transparency in Europe II, 2004.

-    M.Bovens, "Analysing and assessing public accountability",in European governance papers,
no.C-06-01.

-    D. Curtin and A. Meijer, "Does transparency strengthen legitimacy",in Information Polity 11,
IOS Press, 2006.

-    D. Curtin and A. Meijer , "Five Myths of European Union Transparency: Deliberation through the
Looking Glass?", Paper presented at Special Workshop Deliberative Democracy and Its Discontents,
IVR World Congress in Legal Philosophy, Granada, 24-29 May 2005.

-    C. Hood, "Transparency in historical perspective‖, in Transparency: the key to a better
governance?" by C. Hood and D. Heald , published for The British Academy by Oxford University
Press, 2006, p.3.

-    M. Klijnstra, "Het transparantie toegespit.", 2000 in : D.Curtin and A. Meijer , “Five Myths
of European Union Transparency: Deliberation through the Looking Glass?”.

-    A. Meijer and M. Bovens,"Public accountability in the information age", in E-Government.
Workshop in conjunction with JURIX 2003, M. Palmirani, T. van Engers & M.A. Wimmer (eds.),
International Federation for Information Processing, Laxenburg (Austria), 2003, pp. 16 – 28.

-    N. P. Musar, "The acces to public information and its development", in "Transparency in
Europe", Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koningrelaties, 2004, pp.69-80.

-    Van der Pot / Donner, "Handboek Staatrecht", 2001, p.536 cited in G.H.Addink, "The Ombudsman
as the fourth power. On the foundations of Ombudsman Law from a comparative perspective", Utrecht
University, 2004.

-    A.Schedler, "Conceptualizing accountability", in "Democratic accountability and good
governance", Reader Good Governance p7.17, Utrecht University 2007.

-    A. Tomkins, Transparency and the emergence of European administrative law‖,in Yearbook of
European Law, 1999-2000, Vol.19, Oxford University Press, 2000.


Contact – email

naomireniutz@yahoo.com, mihaelapantea@yahoo.com
________________________________

[1] Beneficiary of the project “Doctoral scholarships for the development of the knowledge-based
society”, co-funded by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectorial Operational
Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013


[2] S. van Bijsterveld , “A crucial link in shaping the new Social contract between the citizen and
the EU”, in Transparency in EuropeII, 2004

[3] D. Curtin and A. Meijer, “Does transparency strengthen legitimacy”,in  Information Polity 11,
IOS Press, 2006

[4]Idem

[5] C. Hood, “Transparency  in historical perspective”, in Transparency: the key to a better
governance? by  C. Hood and D. Heald , published for The British Academy by Oxford University
Press, 2006, p.3

[6]Idem

[7] A.  Tomkins, “Transparency and the emergence of European administrative law”,in  Yearbook of
European Law ,1999-2000, Vol.19, Oxford University Press, 2000

[8] Idem

[9] European  Ombudsman, “Transparency as a Fundamental Principle of the European Union”, 2001
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/speeches/en/2001-06-19.htm

[10] D. Curtin and A. Meijer, ‘Does transparency strengthen legitimacy’, Information Polity 11, IOS
Press, 2006

[11] M. Klijnstra, “Het transparantie toegespit.”,  2000  in : D.Curtin and A. Meijer , “Five Myths
of European Union Transparency: Deliberation through the Looking Glass?”, Paper presented at
Special Workshop Deliberative Democracy and Its Discontents, IVR World Congress in Legal
Philosophy, Granada, 24-29 May 2005

[12] Code of Good Administrative Behaviour,  Article 22, can be summarised as demanding from the
official to provide  the right to information in a clear and understandable manner; further
provisions  state that when he is  not competent, he is supposed to state reasons for his rejection
and direct the requester to the competent person , institution or body

[13] Ibid, article 24 of Code of Good Administrative Behaviour

[14] Ibid, article 22

[15] European Ombudsman, “Transparency, Accountability, and Democracy in the EU”, 2006
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/speeches/en/2006-10-17b.htm

[16] Idem

[17] Natasa Pirc  Musar, ”The acces to public information and its development”, in Transparency in
Europe, Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koningrelaties, 2004, pp.69-80

[18] D. Curtin and A. Meijer , “Five Myths of European Union Transparency: Deliberation through the
Looking Glass?”, Paper presented at Special Workshop Deliberative Democracy and Its Discontents,
IVR World Congress in Legal Philosophy, Granada, 24-29 May 2005

[19] Idem.

[20] Mulgan, 2003  as cited  by M.Bovens , “Analysing and assessing public accountability”, p.8

[21] M.Bovens, “Analysing and assessing public accountability”,in  European governance papers,
no.C-06-01

[22] A. Meijer  and M. Bovens ,”Public accountability in the information age”, in E-Government.
Workshop in conjunction with JURIX 2003, M. Palmirani, T. van Engers & M.A. Wimmer (eds.),
International Federation for Information Processing, Laxenburg (Austria), 2003, pp. 16 – 28

[23] Idem.

[24] M. Bovens, ‘”Analysing and assessing public accountability”,in  European governance papers,
no.C-06-01

[25] A. Schedler , “Conceptualizing accountability”, in  Democratic accountability and good
governance,        Reader 7.17

[26] M. Bovens, ‘”Analysing and assessing public accountability”,in European governance papers,
no.C-06-01

[27] Idem.

[28] Idem.

[29] G.H.Addink, “The Ombudsman as the fourth power. On the foundations of Ombudsman Law from a
comparative perspective”, Utrecht University, 2004

[30] Prof. Addink  acknowledges   that the concept of  ‘fourth power’ was propagated by  R. Crince
Le Roy since 1969

[31] Van der Pot / Donner, “Handboek Staatrecht”, 2001, p.536 cited in G.H.Addink, The Ombudsman as
the fourth power. On the foundations of Ombudsman Law from a comparative perspective, Utrecht
University, 2004

[32] G.H.Addink, op. cit .

[33] Deirdre Curtin and Albert Meijer , “Five Myths of European Union Transparency: Deliberation
through the Looking Glass?”, Paper presented at Special Workshop Deliberative Democracy and Its
Discontents, IVR World Congress in Legal Philosophy, Granada, 24-29 May 2005