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TRANSLATION
THE SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
OF EGYPT ON ISLAMIC LAW,
VEILING AND CIVIL RIGHTS:
AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF
SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF
EGYPT CASE NO. 8 OF JUDICIAL YEAR 17
(MAY 18, 1996)∗
NATHAN J. BROWN & CLARK B. LOMBARDI
∗∗
INTRODUCTION
In an article that precedes this translation, we discuss the Article 2
jurisprudence of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt
∗
Editor’s Note: ILR editors typically check citation Bluebook form and verify the
substantive aspects of both the text and footnotes. This article draws upon a
number of foreign language sources, including case law in Arabic. ILR has edited
citation form to the greatest extent possible, but our substantive editing of these
foreign sources is not exhaustive. With respect to the rendering of Arabic words:
following law review custom, Arabic words in this text have not been fully
transliterated. An apostrophe (’) has been used to render the letter “hamzah” and a
reverse apostrophe (‘) has been used to render the letter “‘ain.” Macrons have not
been used nor have dots been put under consonants unique to Arabic. This
translation will be printed in the LEXIS and Westlaw databases, which currently
do not print diacritics.
∗∗
Nathan Brown is a full professor at George Washington University, currently in
residence at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Clark Lombardi is
an assistant professor at the University of Washington School of Law. The authors
wish to thank Justice Adel Omar Sherif for his assistance in acquiring and
interpreting the cases discussed in this article and Rali Badissy for research and
editing assistance. The authors would also like to thank Michael Hanna, Robert
Morrison and David Powers for extremely helpful suggestions on this translation.
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438 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [21:437
(“SCC”).1
To illustrate the way in which the Court applies its new
approach to develop a liberal, rights-protecting interpretation of
shari‘a, we summarized Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, decided on
May 18, 1996.
Although summaries of cases can be very useful, it is important
that scholars, students, policy-makers and practitioners be able to
read unabridged translations of important Article 2 opinions—even if
they are unable either to acquire copies of the opinion2
or read them
in Arabic.3
Of these opinions, Case No. 8 should be of particular
interest.
In this opinion, the SCC argues that a regulation on face-veiling in
public schools is consistent not only with Islamic law, but with the
Egyptian Constitution’s guarantees of freedom of religion and
freedom of expression. Not only does it illustrate the SCC’s
approach to Islamic legal reasoning, but it gives insight into the
Court’s views with respect to a number of important constitutional
areas—particularly in the area of civil and political rights. The case
also provides intriguing opportunities for comparative legal scholars.
Regulations restricting women’s right to veil have been challenged
as unconstitutional in many countries.4
This should thus be of great
interest to scholars of comparative law, comparative
1. Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring
Adherence to Shari‘a Threaten Human Rights? How Egypt’s Constitutional Court
Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 379
(2006).
2. Anyone who has tried to get copies of Article 2 opinions will testify to the
difficulty of acquiring them. Cases are published in the Official Gazette and in a
reporter that is published by the Court. Nevertheless, few reference libraries carry
the Egyptian gazette and none, to the best of our knowledge, stocks a full set of the
reporters. The authors are thus indebted to Justice Adel Omar Sherif who has, over
the years, generously made available to us photocopies of numerous cases from the
Supreme Constitutional Court’s library and has helped us understand their
nuances.
3. Not only are these opinions written in Arabic, but they employ numerous
technical terms and refer regularly both to classical Islamic jurisprudence and to
modern Egyptian constitutional jurisprudence.
4. For an overview and an online interactive map of countries that have seen
litigation concerning governmental regulation of headscarves, see Headscarves in
the Headlines, BBC NEWS, Feb. 10, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
europe/3476163.stm (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).
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2006] TRANSLATION OF SCC CASE NO. 8 OF JUDICIAL YEAR 17 439
constitutionalism and international human rights. By making this
SCC opinion available, we hope to facilitate comparative discussion
about, inter alia, free exercise of religion, freedom of expression,
women’s rights, and children’s rights.
The Arabic text that we used for this translation was published in
the Egyptian Official Gazette (al-jarida al-rasmiyya), No. 21, at
pages 1026 to 1041 (May 20, 1996). The case was also printed in
Volume VIII of the official SCC reporter at pages 657 to 679. In
preparing the translation, we have employed the following
conventions:
(1) When the Court uses technical terms or an Arabic word that is
capable of several plausible meanings in context, we have included
parentheses giving the Arabic word. In transliterating these Arabic
words, we have followed the method used by the International
Journal of Middle East Studies.
(2) As a concession to English style, we have broken some of the
longest sentences into shorter sentences. We have only done so,
however, where the Arabic sentence can easily be divided without
changing its meaning.
(3) Arabic tends to use more pronouns than English writing, and it
is not always clear to which predicate a pronoun refers. In places
where the use of pronouns may be ambiguous or confusing, we have
replaced the pronoun with brackets containing the noun to which we
believe the pronoun refers.
(4) In places where the language remains ambiguous, we have
added explanatory footnotes giving guidance as to our own
interpretation of the passage.
(5) For the reasons discussed in the first starred footnote above, we
have deleted most of the transliteration marks that would be used in
specialized journals for Islamic or Middle East Studies.
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440 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [21:437
TRANSLATION
In the Name of the People
The Supreme Constitutional Court
In public session held 18 May 1996/30 Dhu al-Hijja 1416 A.H.,
under the presidency of Counselor Dr. ‘Awad Muhammad ‘Awad alMurr,
President of the Court;
and [with] the membership of Counselors: Muhammad Wali al-Din
Jalal, Nihad ‘Abd al-Hamid Khilaf, Faruq ‘Abd al-Rahim Ghunaym,
‘Abd al-Rahman Nusayr, Dr. ‘Abd al-Majid Fayyad, and
Muhammad ‘Ali Sayf al-Din;
and [in] the presence of Counselor Dr. Hanafi ‘Ali Jabali . . .
President of the Commissioners Body;
and [in] the presence of Hamadi Anwar Sabir . . . secretary-general.
Issued the following judgment
In the case recorded in the registry of the Supreme Constitutional
Court as number 8 of constitutional judicial year 17,
Referred to the Court from the Administrative Court by judgment
issued in Case number 21 of judicial year 49
Undertaken by
Mahmud Sami Muhammad ‘Ali Wasil, in his capacity as natural
guardian of his two daughters, Maryam and Hajir
Against
1-The Minister of Education
2-The director of the Education Directorate of Alexandria
3-The principal of Isis Secondary School for Girls in al-Siyuf
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2006] TRANSLATION OF SCC CASE NO. 8 OF JUDICIAL YEAR 17 441
Procedures
The office of the Clerk of the Court received the file of Case Number
21 of judicial year 49 after the Administrative Court of Alexandria
ruled that the papers should be referred to the Supreme
Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of the Decision
Number 113 of 1994 by the Minister of Education, as explicated by
Decision Number 208 of 1994.5
The State Litigation Authority6
submitted a memorandum defending
it [the ministerial Decision at issue] and requesting rejection of the
case. After preparing the case, the Commissioners Body7
lodged a
report with its opinion. The case was examined, as recorded in the
minutes of the session, and the Court decided to issue its ruling in the
session today.
The Court
After examining the papers and deliberating:
The facts—as appear in the journal of the case and all the papers—
are that Mahmud Sami ‘Ali Wasil, in his capacity as natural guardian
5. Egyptian administrative courts have primary jurisdiction over most cases in
which the state is a party. This case centers on the actions of a school principal
who is acting in accordance with an official administrative directive issued by the
Minister of Education. It thus had to be filed, initially, in an administrative court.
However, administrative courts are not permitted to interpret the Constitution.
Thus, when confronted with a case that requires an interpretation of the
Constitution, an administrative court must refer the case to the Supreme
Constitutional Court. The SCC is then permitted, in the interest of efficiency, to
resolve non-constitutional issues and to issue a final decision in the case.
6. The State Litigation Authority is the entity responsible for representing the
state in litigation. For a brief discussion of its role in constitutional litigation, see
Adel Omar Sherif, Constitutional Law, in EGYPT AND ITS LAWS 315, 319 (Nathalie
Bernard-Maugiron & Baudouin Dupret eds., Arab & Islamic L. Series No. 22,
2002).
7. The Commissioner’s Body is a group of judges attached to the SCC that is
responsible for managing cases before the Court and for issuing an advisory report
detailing the issues raised by the case and proposing a solution to the judges
deciding the case. For discussion of this Body, see Awad Mohammad El-Morr et
al., The Supreme Constitutional Court and Its Role in the Egyptian Legal System,
in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF EGYPT 37, 43-44, 51-53 (Kevin Boyle & Adel Omar
Sherif eds., 1996); and Adel Omar Sherif, Constitutional Adjudication, in EGYPT
AND ITS LAWS, supra note 6, at 325, 329-30.
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442 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [21:437
of two daughters, Maryam and Hajir, filed Case number 21 of
Judicial Year 49 in the Administrative Court of Alexandria against
the Minister of Education. He [the father] demanded a ruling halting
implementation of and canceling the negative decision that had been
issued barring entry by the two girls into one of the secondary
schools. In explaining his claim, he [the father] said that he had gone
with the two girls to the Isis Secondary School for Girls in al-Siyuf.
Moreover, he was surprised when the two girls were expelled from
the school due to the issuance of a Decision by the Minister of
Education8
forbidding female students wearing the niqab from
entering [schools],9
[a Decision which the father asserts is] in
violation of Articles 2 and 41 of the Constitution. The first of these
[constitutional articles] stipulates that Islam is the religion of the
state and that the principles of the Islamic shari‘a are the chief
source of all its legislation. The second of these two [constitutional
articles] guarantees the preservation of personal freedom [and bars]
violation of it.10
During its examination of the summary phase of the
8. Egyptian law establishes a hierarchy of legislative enactments: from the
Constitution through statute, regulation, and down to “Decision.” The “Decision”
being challenged here is therefore a formal administrative enactment.
9. Many “veiled” women in Egypt wear a limited type of veil known as the
hijab, which covers the hair and neck, but leaves the entire face uncovered. Some,
however, wear the niqab, which is a more complete veil (the niqab covers most of
the face, leaving only the eyes uncovered). Wearing the niqab is, for some, a sign
of allegiance to rigid, puritanical forms of Islam and is in some cases taken to be a
sign of allegiance to political Islamism. At the time of this case, some Islamist
groups espousing such interpretations of Islam had been engaged in a violent
struggle seeking to overturn the secularist Egyptian government. Wearing the
niqab (or having one’s girls wear the niqab) was thus an act that was fraught with
potential significance. On types of women’s dress in Egypt, see ANDREA RUGH,
REVEAL AND CONCEAL: DRESS IN CONTEMPORARY EGYPT (1987). For a discussion
of the politics associated with different types of veiling at the time this case was
decided, see GENEIVE ABDO, NO GOD BUT GOD: EGYPT AND THE TRIUMPH OF
ISLAM 143-61 (2000) (arguing that the veil and its symbolism provide the “most
prominent vehicle for debating women’s rights”).
10. Article 41 of the Egyptian Constitution reads:
Personal freedom is a natural right not subject to violation except in cases of
flagrante delicto. No person may be arrested, inspected, detained or have his
freedom restricted in any way or be prevented from free movement except by
an order necessitated by investigations and the preservation of public security.
This order shall be given by the competent judge of the Public Prosecution in
accordance with the provisions of the law.
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2006] TRANSLATION OF SCC CASE NO. 8 OF JUDICIAL YEAR 17 443
case, the administrative court first ruled: to formally accept the
motion; to suspend execution of the defendant’s [ministerial]
Decision including its prohibition on the plaintiff’s two daughters
entering their school wearing the niqab; to require the administration
to bear the costs; and to order execution of the [administrative
court’s] ruling according to its draft without publication.11
Second,
the [administrative] court referred the papers to the Supreme
Constitutional Court to decide the extent of the constitutionality of
the Decision of the Minister of Education Number 113 of 1994 as
explicated by Decision Number 208 of 1994. The Administrative
Court based its judgment on the fact that the [secondary school’s]
decision [to expel the girls] was based on Decision 113 of 1994 by
the Minister of Education, issued on August 17, 1994, defining the
form of the school uniform in its color, shape, and composition, and
explicated by virtue of his [ministerial] Decision Number 208 of
1994, and it is within the sole competence of the Supreme
Constitutional Court to judge whether these two [ministerial]
Decisions—even if they involved only general principles (qawa’id
‘amma)—violate freedom of [religious] creed, which is protected in
the Constitution according to the text of Article 46.12
The Supreme
Constitutional Court’s word as to compatibility or incompatibility
with the Constitution is definitive, thus mandating the referral of the
EGYPT CONST. art. 41.
11. Under Egyptian law, one can make a claim for the costs of bringing a case
to rectify an administrative wrong or, in some cases, the costs incurred as a result
of the wrong. On this point, see M. Rady, Administrative Justice, in EGYPT AND
ITS LAWS, supra note 6, at 271, 286. It is unclear which costs are being referred to
in this passage.
12. The SCC has said that the father raised challenges only under Articles 2
and 41 of the Constitution. The SCC, through its ex-officio jurisdiction, however,
has determined that Article 46 issues are indirectly implicated in the case. Article
46 of the Egyptian Constitution reads: “The State shall guarantee the freedom of
belief and the freedom to practice religious rites.” EGYPT CONST. art. 46. In the
sentence above, the Court defines the freedom created in Article 46 as freedom of
creed (‘aqida) rather than freedom of religion (din). On the ability of the SCC to
consider issues not raised specifically by the parties to the case, see the comments
of Chief Justice Awad el-Morr in El Morr et al., supra note 7, at 48-50; and Sherif,
supra note 7, at 334-35 (explaining that Article 27 provides more opportunities to
challenge the constitutionality of legislation because it expands the scope of the
Court’s review to include any legislative provision linked to a dispute before the
Court).
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444 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [21:437
papers to the Court, in accordance with clause (a) of Article 29 of the
law [of the Supreme Constitutional Court] for decision as to the
constitutionality of these two [ministerial] Decisions.
And whereas: It is clear from the aforementioned Decision 113 of
1994 that its first article stipulates that male and female pupils in
government and private schools are required to wear a single uniform
in accordance with the following characteristics:
First, primary stage, boys and girls:
A linen apron in the color designated by the educational
directorate—it is permitted to wear pants in winter so long as
they are uniform and appropriate according to what the
educational directorate has decided. It is permitted for girls to
substitute for the apron a blouse and skirt of appropriate
length and for boys to substitute a shirt and pants, wearing a
sweater or jacket in the winter, in accordance with what the
educational directorate decides—[along with] appropriate
school shoes and socks in the color chosen for the uniform.
Second, preparatory stage:
1. Boy pupils: Long pants—shirt in appropriate color—in the
winter a sweater or jacket may be worn in accordance with
what the educational directorate decides.
2. Girl pupils: White blouse—linen apron with suspenders in the
color chosen by the educational directorate—in the winter it
is permitted [for the students] to wear a wool apron or for the
student to wear a sweater or jacket in the color of the apron.
The apron may be substituted with a long blouse of
appropriate length—school shoes and socks in a color
appropriate for the color chosen for the uniform. Upon
written request from the guardian, the pupil may wear a
covering for the hair in a color selected by the educational
directorate, so long as it does not obscure the face.13
13. Such a rule permits schoolgirls to wear the hijab veil, but not the niqab.
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Third: the secondary stage and its equivalent:
1. Boy pupils: Long pants—shirt in an appropriate color. [I]n
winter it is permitted to wear a sweater or jacket according to
what the educational directorate decides.
2. Girl pupils: White blouse—skirt of appropriate length in a
color designated by the educational directorate. [I]n the
winter it is permitted to wear a wool apron and for the pupil
to wear a sweater or jacket in the color of the apron— upon
written request from the guardian, the pupil may wear a
covering for the hair in a color selected by the educational
directorate, so long as it does not obscure the face.
The second and third articles of the [ministerial] Decision provide
that the designated school uniform for the boy and girl pupils in
every school will be posted in a visible place prior to the beginning
of the school year by at least two months. Pupils who violate the first
article of the [ministerial] Decision may not enter their school or be
affiliated with it. Care should be taken that their uniforms are
appropriate in all cases both in appearance and in manner of wearing.
And whereas: The Minister of Education, following the first
Decision—and in the face of the ambiguity obscuring its meaning—
issued a second Decision explaining the earlier [ministerial] Decision
and specifying its substance. The subsequent Decision—and this
was—Decision Number 208 of 1994, stipulated that in applying the
provisions of Decision 112 of 1994, the following expressions would
carry these clarifying meanings:
First, in relation to the girl pupils of the preparatory and
secondary stages:
1. “Upon written request from the guardian”: The guardian must
be aware of the pupil’s choice to wear hair covering, and
[must be aware that the choice] comes from her own desire
without pressure or compulsion from a person or party other
than the guardian. The pupil shall not be forbidden from
entering her school if she wears a covering for her hair. Her
entrance shall take place pending investigation of the
guardian’s knowledge.
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446 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [21:437
2. “Covering for the hair”: The covering which the pupil chooses
according to her wish may not cover the face. No examples or
clarifying sketches for covering the hair shall be prepared that
contradict this.
Second, in relation to pupils in all three educational stages:
The uniform shall be appropriate in appearance and the
manner in which it is worn, preserving the uniform by means
of what guards modesty and [what] accords with the
teachings and morals of their society. Each uniform that
infringes on this modesty is a violation of the school uniform;
and it is not permitted for the female pupil wearing one to
enter her school.
And whereas: The judiciary of the Supreme Constitutional Court
has been consistent regarding what the Constitution stipulates in its
second article—ever since [that article’s] amendment in 1980—
namely that the principles of the Islamic shari‘a are the chief source
of legislation. And it has been devoted to a requirement binding both
of the two branches, the legislative and executive, to observe it and
defer to it with respect to legislation issued after the amendment.
Among those [acts of legislation that were issued after the
amendment] are the provisions of the challenged [ministerial]
Decision Number 113 of 1994, as explicated by [ministerial]
Decision Number 208 of 1994. It is not permitted for a legislative
text to contradict those shar‘i rulings that are absolutely certain with
respect to their authenticity and meaning (al-ahkam al-shar‘iyya alqat‘iyya
fi thubutiha wa dalalatiha), considering that these rulings
alone are those for which ijtihad is forbidden,14
because they signify
14. As noted in the accompanying article, Lombardi & Brown, supra note 1, at
398-402, some classical jurists used the term “ijtihad” broadly to refer to the
process of developing an understanding of God’s law through either of two means:
(a) by finding unambiguous text of unimpeachable authenticity and, thus, coming
up with an interpretation about which one could be absolutely certain, or (b) using
human reason to interpret or supplement scriptures that are ambiguous or of
dubious authenticity and thereby to come up with rules that (unless they are
ratified by scholarly consensus) are only “presumptive” rules of shari‘a. The SCC
here is adopting an alternative approach. Following some jurists, it is limiting the
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the Islamic shari‘a’s universal principles (mabadu’ha al-kulliyya)
and its fixed roots (‘usuluha al-thabita), which accept neither
interpretation nor substitution.15
And accordingly, it is unimaginable
that the understanding of [such rulings] would change with a change
of time and place. They cannot be amended. It is forbidden to
contravene them or twist their meaning. The Supreme Constitutional
Court has been charged with the duty to watch out for violation of
these [shari‘a rulings that are absolutely certain with respect to both
their authenticity and meaning] and to overturn any [statutory] rule
(qa’ida) that contradicts them. This is inasmuch as the second article
of the Constitution places the rulings of the Islamic shari‘a in its
roots and universal principles (ahkam al-shari‘a al-Islamiyya fi
usuliha wa mabadi’ha al-kulliyya) in a position of precedence over
these [statutory] rules (qawa’id). These [rulings] are [the shari‘a’s]
general framework and foundational pillars, whose demands impose
themselves permanently and prevent establishment of any legal rule
that violates them. This is not to be considered undesirable or a
negation of what is known by necessity of religion (‘alim min al-din
bi al-darura); presumptive rulings (al-ahkam al-zanniyya) are not
absolutely certain with respect to their authenticity, their meaning, or
both.16
They fall within the realm to which ijtihad is limited and
beyond which ijtihad does not extend. They develop by their
meaning of the term “ijtihad,” using it to refer only to the second process—namely
the process of developing presumptive rules through the act of interpreting
ambiguous and/or impeachable scriptures.
15. The Court is saying that once Muslims have identified with certainty a
universal principle of shari‘a or a fixed rule that has been revealed in an
indubitably authentic scriptural text with an unambiguous meaning, they must
respect this principle or rule “as is,” and they may not try to explain it away or
reason out another rule.
16. This passage refers to an epistemological distinction drawn by the classical
jurists between knowledge that was “necessary” (daruri) and knowledge that was
“acquired” (muktasab). The former was known through a priori knowledge or
sense perception or, in a question of textual interpretation, through finding an
univocal statement in an unimpeachable scriptural source. Such knowledge was
considered absolutely certain (qat’i). Something known by “necessity” knowledge
was thus indisputable. In contrast, “acquired” knowledge was obtained—at least in
part—through the operation of human reason. Conclusions derived with the
assistance of reason were at best presumptive (zanni). For a discussion of this
distinction in classical thought, see WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC
LEGAL THEORIES 37-39 (1997).
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nature—changing according to time and place, in order to guarantee
their [own] flexibility and vitality, and to confront different events.
They organize the affairs of the people (al-‘ibad) with an eye to
protecting those interests of [the people] that are legally appropriate
(masalihhim al-mu‘tabira shar‘ªⁿ) and should not interfere with their
activities in life.17
Ijtihad must always fall within the framework of
the shari‘a’s universal roots (al-‘usul al-kulliyya li al-shari’a) . . .
adhering to [the shari‘a’s] fixed controls (dawabitiha al-thabita). It
[ijtihad] must pursue methods of reasoning out the rulings (alahkam)
and binding supports (al-qawa’id al-dabita) for the branches
of shari‘a (furu‘iha),18
guarding the general goals of the shari‘a
(maqasid al-’amma li al-shari‘a) so that religion, life, reason,
honor/modesty, and worldly goods are protected.19
17. This sentence and the subsequent sentences implicitly make reference to
the theory of the “goals of the shari‘a”—a theory that was first developed in the
classical theory and adopted, in modified form, by Islamic modernists such as
Rashid Rida. On the classical theory and modernist theories, see Lombardi &
Brown, supra note 1, at 394-414. The Court has stated in the preceding passages
that in cases where one can find no unambiguous rule of absolutely certain
authenticity to resolve the case, a person seeking an Islamic ruling should use
ijtihad to come up with a “presumptive” ruling. Here and in subsequent sentences,
when reasoning out such presumptive rules, the interpreter must bear in mind at all
times the human “interests” that we know are “goals” (maqasid) of the shari‘a.
These interests/goals represent the practical results that God wants societies to
promote whenever possible.
18. This sentence draws upon classical Islamic terminology, which described
various Islamic norms through the metaphor of a tree. The “roots” of Islamic law
(usul al-fiqh) were the rules governing how to derive and interpret Islamic legal
rulings—i.e. the rules for performing ijtihad. The “branches” of Islamic law (furu‘)
were the rulings that had been emerged through proper ijtihad. See Lombardi &
Brown, supra note 1, at 395 & n.37; see also BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF
ISLAMIC LAW 22-23 (1998) (building on the arboreal metaphor to include the
“fruit” (thamara) or the rules produced by jurists, and the “harvesting” (istithmar),
or the extraction of rules from the sources, both of which require husbandry by the
jurist to facilitate the growth of law out of its roots).
19. Here the SCC again draws on classical Islamic legal writing, which
discusses the importance of considering the human interests (masalih) that seem to
be the “goals” (maqasid) of the shari‘a. Many classical jurists, such as al-Ghazali
and Shatibi, and many Islamic modernists, such as Rashid Rida, believed that a
jurist could not accurately derive Islamic legal rulings without considering whether
they advance the universal goals of shari‘a. The SCC here goes beyond the
assertion that there are such things as “goals of the shari‘a” and identifies five of
them—which is intriguing. Most classical and modern jurists agreed with the Court
that there were five universal goals—though some said six. See Aron Zysow, The
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And whereas: Use of the rule of reason, where there is no
[scriptural] text, develops practical rules (qawa’id ‘amliyya) that are,
in their ramifications, gentler for the people and more concerned
with their affairs and [that] better protect their true interests
(masalihhim al-haqiqiyya). Legislative provisions seek to realize
[such true interests] in a manner that is appropriate for [the people],
affirming that the essence of God’s shari‘a is truth and justice, that
being limited by the shari‘a is better than widespread depravity, and
that closing it [i.e. barring the further re-interpretation of the shari‘a]
once and for all is neither acceptable nor necessary. The statements
of the classical Islamic jurists (fuqaha’) on a matter related to the
shari‘a are not granted any sanctity or placed beyond review or
reexamination. Rather, they can be replaced by other [interpretations
of Islamic law]. Opinions based on ijtihad in debated questions do
not in themselves have any force applying to those who do not hold
them. It is not permitted to hold [such opinions] to be firm, settled
shari‘a law that cannot be contravened. To do so would be to end
contemplation of and reflection over Almighty God’s religion; it
would deny the truth that error is possible in all ijtihad. Even among
the companions of the Prophet (sahaba),20
there were those who
hesitated to give legal opinions out of fear! It is therefore correct to
say that the ijtihad of one of the classical Islamic jurists (fuqaha’) is
not more authoritative (ahaqq bi al-itiba’) than the ijtihad of another.
Perhaps the opinion with weaker support is the most appropriate of
all [the competing opinions] for the changing circumstances, even if
it [this weaker opinion] violates the settled and established opinions
of the past! This is the Islamic shari‘a in its roots and its sources (fi
usuliha wa-manabitiha), developing by necessity, rejecting rigidity.
In matters where there is no [clear scriptural] text [on point], ijtihad
is only restricted by [the shari‘a’s] universal controls (dawabituha
al-kulliyya). [And in such matters,] so long as [the shari‘a’s] goals
Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory
343-44, 435 n.259 (Jan. 16, 1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University). The SCC’s list here is idiosyncratic in that it drops from the list of
universal goals the goal of progeny (which all classical and modernist jurists
accepted as a universal goal), but includes honor/modesty (‘ird) (which only a
minority of jurists accepted).
20. The companions of the prophet Muhammad and thus those closest to the
messenger of divine revelation.
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are not obstructed, it is not allowed to require the wali al-amr21
to
[follow mere] opinions in matters of the practical Islamic legal
rulings (ahkam al-fara’iyya) that respond by their nature to
development, or, with respect to these to [require him to] follow
them.22
Nor [is it permitted] to rest upon ijtihad belonging to a
specific [earlier] moment in time, as if [through this past ijtihad] the
appropriate legal interests had already been established.23
And whereas: it is established—in light of the preceding—that it is
left to the wali al-amr to legislate in a disputed matter,24
referring to
God and his prophet, praying in regard to that [matter] that the
interests (masalih) that are being considered are those [interests]
which are appropriate (munasib) to the goals of the shari‘a (maqasid
al-shari’a), and match them, being, therefore, interests whose
applications neither expire nor are limited, but are limited—in
content and extent—in light of their changing circumstances.
Supporting this, is [the fact] that the Prophet’s companions (alsahaba),
those of the generation born after the death of the prophet
Muhammad (al-tabi’in) and the imams who used ijtihad (a’imat al-
mujtahidin)25
[each] often made rulings26
striving absolutely for the
interests (masalih) of the people—seeking their welfare, keeping
them from harm (darar), and rescuing them from distress, bearing in
mind that these interests develop in light of the circumstances of
their society—provided, however, that there was no shar’i indicator
21. The term “wali al-amr” (lit. “holder of power”) is a term used regularly by
classical jurists, including Ibn Taymiyya and other champions of the theory of
siyasa shar‘iyya. It refers to the ruler. See Lombardi & Brown, supra note 1, at
404. In modern Islamic political philosopy it is often used to refer to the political
branches of a government—particularly the executive.
22. lit: “to not depart from them.”
23. In other words, it is not permitted to simply assume that past jurists had
performed ijtihad correctly and, thus, rely on the rulings that they had derived.
24. Here reading “yusharri’a” (form II subjunctive) for “yusharra’u” (form II
passive). Many thanks to Professor Robert Morrison for suggesting this solution to
a perplexing passage in the published opinion.
25. In other words, the great early jurists, including those who founded the four
Sunni schools of law. See Lombardi & Brown, supra note 1, at 402 & n.62, for a
discussion of the history of the early jurists.
26. Disregarding here the accusative ending on the word “qararu” in the
printed text.
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2006] TRANSLATION OF SCC CASE NO. 8 OF JUDICIAL YEAR 17 451
[that required either] taking them [the rulings] into account or
precluding them [the rulings].27
And whereas: The root of the authority of the legislator in the field
of organizing rights (huquq) necessarily entails judging within the
limits imposed by the Constitution. One cannot violate the
[constitutional] limits by exceeding, transgressing, or undermining
them [these limits]. Ignoring or minimizing the rights that are
guaranteed by the Constitution attacks fields of vitality that are
needed in order to breathe. It is likewise forbidden to organize these
rights in a way that contradicts their meaning; it [the organization of
rights] must be equitable and justified.28
And whereas: It is clear that the claims that the court hearing the
case related to the contested Decision, as well as those made by
plaintiff, in his capacity as father of the two students who were
expelled from their school for wearing the niqab, are not connected
with boys’ uniforms in the primary, preparatory, secondary or
equivalent stages. Rather, [these constitutional claims] deal
essentially with the uniforms demanded of female students, the
appearance [of these uniforms], their characteristics, and the manner
of wearing them. Furthermore, they deal specifically with the means
of covering [female students].29
One may not transgress the
constitutional provisions in this sphere (nitaq).
And whereas: The contested [ministerial] Decision ordered that
each girl associated with one of the stipulated educational stages
have a prescribed form of uniform that safeguards her overall
characteristics, that is appropriate for her and that does not reveal
27. In other words, according to the SCC, exemplary figures and great jurists
often made legal rulings entirely on the basis of an analysis of people’s interests—
but would not do so if there was a scriptural indicator that dictated what the ruling
should be.
28. In many constitutional systems (especially those operating in the civil law
tradition), the constitution explicitly mentions rights but leaves the matter of their
definition and organization to legislation. This is a potential loophole in that
defining or organizing a right can rob it of much of its meaning. In this paragraph,
the Court states its general approach to legislating rights. According to the Court, it
is unacceptable for legislation to undermine a freedom in the guise of organizing
its exercise.
29. I.e., the challenge to the law deals only with the question of whether the
Egyptian government can restrict girls’ right to wear a hijab or niqab.
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452 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [21:437
what must be concealed, and it even [ordered] that, the manner of
wearing [the uniform] must protect her modesty, following the
traditions and morals of her society.
And whereas: The Islamic shari‘a—in refining the human soul
and shaping the individual personality—establishes only the essence
of the rulings [jawhar al-ahkam] through which it builds a
framework for defending the creed. With respect to the actions of
those entrusted,30
which are appropriate for their considered interests,
[those entrusted] shall not seek perversion, and they shall never stray
from the path to their Lord most high. Within the framework [for
defending the creed], their actions must be most pure of heart and
most summoned to piety. Islam raised the share of the woman. It
inspired her to safeguard her chastity (afafiha). It commanded her to
protect herself from shame and degradation so that woman would
raise herself above those things that could sully her or dishonor her,
especially through her attire, tenderness in speech, refinement in
walking, bringing her allurements into view, tempting others, or
revealing “adornments” that were concealed. [The woman] does not
have the right to freely choose her dress as she desires, select it
according to her fancy, or claim that her dress is only her personal
concern. Rather, her nature must be upright and her clothing must
support her in undertaking her responsibilities in the world. The form
of her clothes and appearance are not [however] fixed by scriptural
texts that have been determined to be certain either with respect to
their authenticity or with respect to their meaning (nusus maqta’a
biha sawa’ fi thubutiha aw dalalatiha). These [i.e. the form of
clothes and appearance] are matters of debate on which ijtihad never
stops. They remain open within a fixed, general framework defined
by Qur’anic texts (itar dabit ‘amm hadadatihi al-nusus alQur’aniyya).
The Exalted One has said: “Let them draw their veils
(khumur) over their bosoms;”31
“Let them not reveal their
30. It is unclear from the context of this passage exactly who these “people
entrusted” are.
31. Qur’an 24:31. This and subsequent citations to the Qur’an are based upon
the translations in THE MEANING OF THE GLORIOUS KORAN 255 (Mohammed
Marmaduke Pickthall trans., 1954) [hereinafter MEANING OF THE GLORIOUS
KORAN]. Translations have been modified by the authors (primarily in grammatical
structure) to reflect the way that they are used in this case.
REVISED LOMBARDI AND BROWN PART II.DOC 1/21/2006 2:02:12 PM
2006] TRANSLATION OF SCC CASE NO. 8 OF JUDICIAL YEAR 17 453
adornments except what is outward[ly apparent];”32
“Let them draw
close their cloaks;”33
and “Nor let them stamp their feet so that their
hidden adornments may be known.”34
It cannot be concluded from
this that a woman’s dress falls among those matters of piety that
cannot be altered.35
Rather, so long as they do not contradict an
absolutely certain [scriptural] text, the wali al-amr has absolute
authority to legislate practical rules within its/their boundaries,
limiting the form of [a woman’s] attire or dress in light of what
prevails in her society among the people so that it is appropriate with
their traditions and customs. Indeed, its content changes according to
time and place. As long as the covering realizes the conception, the
dress of the woman shall be considered an expression of her belief.
And whereas: the classical Islamic jurists (fuqaha’) disagreed
among themselves in the subject of the interpretation of Qur’anic
texts and of what has been transmitted from the Prophet in the form
of strong and weak hadiths.36
Their opinions were similar with regard
to the dress of a woman and with regard to what she must cover of
her body. The Islamic shari‘a—in the essence of its rulings and in
respect of its goals—requires regulation of her clothing. If her
32. Qur’an 24:31; cf. MEANING OF THE GLORIOUS KORAN, supra note 31, at
255.
33. Qur’an 33:59; cf. MEANING OF THE GLORIOUS KORAN, supra note 31, at
306.
34. Qur’an 24:31; cf. MEANING OF THE GLORIOUS KORAN, supra note 31, at
255.
35. In other words, the question of whether a woman’s face and hands must be
covered is not resolved by texts that are absolutely certain with respect to both
their authenticity and meaning. Accordingly, each generation may use ijtihad to
answer this question for themselves. While the jurists of the past may have reached
one conclusion, Muslims of later generations may reach contrary ones.
36. Hadiths (sing. hadith, pl. ahadith) are formal reports of the statements and
actions of Muhammad that are collected and presented along with a “chain of
transmission” of the people who witnessed the report and those who have heard it
related. As prophet and transmitter of the divine revelations in the Qur’an, the
Prophet is considered to have insight into the correct practice for Muslims, and
thus Islamic legal scholars have turned to hadiths in developing Islamic law. While
there is a large body of hadith literature, not all is considered reliably authentic.
Classical Islamic scholars devised techniques for assessing the reliability of a
hadith, and the Court’s reference to “strong and weak” hadiths refers to the
necessity that a legal specialists consider not only a hadith’s meaning, but also its
trustworthiness.
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position [in society] is to be elevated and she is not to be defined
primarily by her animality, then her behavior must be refined, neither
vulgar nor haughty. It must not place her in embarrassing situations,
as would be the case if her whole body were considered ‘awra,37
with
all the requirements [that the concept of ‘awra imposes] with respect
to knowledge of what makes her different [from men]. She must
perform tasks that will involve her mixing with others. It is therefore
unimaginable that life in all its aspects would surge around her while
she would be specifically required to be an apparition clad only in
black or the like. Rather, her clothing should be in accordance with
the shari‘a, displaying her piety in a way that does not inhibit her
movement in life nor is limited to beautifying her and that is not an
obstacle without her awareness. Nor [should her clothing inhibit] her
performance of various activities that her needs or the good of her
society impose on her. Rather, [her clothing] shall balance between
the two [requirements], defined in light of necessity and safeguarding
what are considered to be the appropriate customs and traditions.
Accordingly, it is not permitted for [a woman’s] clothing to exceed
the bounds of moderation. It should not cover her entire body so as to
restrict her. With respect to the statement of the Exalted One: “Let
them draw their veils (khumur) over their bosoms;”38
and the
connected statement “Let them draw close their cloaks;”39
her
covering should not be lowered behind her back but rather should be
37. The term ‘awra here is almost impossible to translate. It refers to those
parts of the body that are inherently sexual and must be covered. Some dictionaries
translate the term as “genitals” or “pudenda.” See, e.g., HANS WEHR, A
DICTIONARY OF MODERN WRITTEN ARABIC (Milton Cowan, ed., 1974). Others
translate it as “private part” which, though accurate, may leave the misimpression
that it corresponds to those areas that are considered “private parts” in the West. In
the Islamic world, classical jurists believed that other parts of the body are also
inherently sexual and thus should be covered from public view. Modern Muslims
disagree about what parts of the body are inherently sexual. The whole point of the
next few lines is to determine exactly which parts of the body were explicitly
declared ‘awra in the Qur’an and which parts were considered ‘awra by the
different classical jurists and, based on the results of the analysis, to determine
which parts of the body the Egyptian government is constitutionally required to
consider ‘awra.
38. Qur’an, 24:31; cf. MEANING OF THE GLORIOUS KORAN, supra note 31, at
255.
39. Qur’an 33:59; cf. MEANING OF THE GLORIOUS KORAN, supra note 31, at
306.
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2006] TRANSLATION OF SCC CASE NO. 8 OF JUDICIAL YEAR 17 455
attached to her chest and neck so that they will not be uncovered.
Nothing should appear of their beauty except what is not (‘awra),
namely her face and palms. Some of the classical Islamic jurists held
that her feet are, in the words of the Hanafis,40
“tempting by their
exposure,” and they should not be stamped “lest their hidden
adornments become known.” God Most High called all the people to
accept their beauty but not be ostentatious, and this is what is met by
maintaining moderation. It is necessary that a woman’s clothing not
reveal her or display the femininity underneath. Total veiling [of a
woman] is not known by necessity to be shar‘i,41
and neither is
concealing her beauty so as to totally obscure it. Instead, her
appearance must manifest her modesty, [must] facilitate her
legitimate contribution to what the affairs of her life require and
[must] protect her from debasement. And men should not rush to
make advances towards her because of the appearances of her body,
leading her to sin and corruption, and causing damage to her lot and
position.
And whereas: in light of the foregoing, when dealing with the
prohibition of a thing or a concern, it is [i.e. the prohibition must be]
related not to something [merely] probable, but rather to something
known through an absolutely certain scriptural text (nass qat’i). If
not [connected to an absolutely certain scriptural text], it becomes
probable according to the basis of the principle of permissibility.
There is no indicator (dalil) in the Qur’anic texts or in our honorable
sunna42
that legally conforming women’s clothing, to be approved by
the shari‘a, must veil totally; [that it must] include a niqab draped
over her so that nothing appears except her eyes and two eye sockets;
and [that it] must require the covering of her face, palms, (and,
according to some, feet). This is not an acceptable interpretation, nor
40. The Hanafis are the classical jurists who were members of the hanafi guild
of law and who developed the hanafi school of Islamic legal interpretation—one of
the four classical, orthodox “schools” of Sunni Islamic legal interpretation. See
Lombardi & Brown, supra note 1, at 402 & n.62, for more background on the
guilds of jurists, including the Hanafis.
41. Necessary knowledge is knowledge about which we can be absolutely
certain. Thus, this sentence means that the rule in question is not known with
absolute certainty to be a rule of shari‘a.
42. The practice of the prophet and the early community, which can be
recovered through study of the hadiths.
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is it known by necessity of religion.43
The agreed-upon meaning of
‘awra does not extend to these parts of her body. Instead, [a woman]
revealing her face allows her to mix with people who know her and
[thus] imposes a type of oversight over her behavior. Likewise it
protects her, [by] leading her to avert her gaze, protecting a modest
mentality, and keeping her out of sin. What some opine about this—
that everything about a woman is private, even her fingernails—is
refuted by the fact that Malik, Abu Hanifa, Ahmad ibn Hanbal (in
one opinion attributed to him),44
and the majority of the Shafi’i
jurists (al-mashhurin al-shafi’in) did not hold such [an opinion].45
The Prophet, peace be upon him, explained that when a woman
reaches puberty, it is necessary that her robe cover her body except
her face and palms.
And whereas: Examination of the provisions that occur in the
contested decision indicates that each student [may] wear a covering
that does not hide the face and that she has chosen according to her
wish, provided that her guardian certifies that her covering her head
is not the result of the meddling of others in her affairs but instead
arises from her free will, [a certification] which may be given after
she begins her studies. Likewise, the [ministerial] Decision here
indicates that [a schoolgirl’s] uniform must be appropriate in
appearance and tailoring—not [appropriate] according to her
personal standards but rather [appropriate] in a way that guards her
modesty and accords with the traditions and morals of her society. It
is also not permitted for her way of wearing of this uniform to
indicate lewdness.
The contested Decision does not contradict, in light of the
foregoing, the text of Article 2 of the Constitution. The wali al-amr
has—in disputed questions—the right [to perform his own] ijtihad to
facilitate the affairs of the people and reflect what is correct from
among their customs and traditions, so long as they do not contradict
the universal goals of their shari‘a (al-maqasid al-kulliyya li
43. On the concept of “necessary” knowledge, see supra note 16.
44. These are the eponymous “founders” of three of the orthodox classical
“schools” of Islamic jurisprudence.
45. The Shafi’i school is the remaining orthodox classical school of Islamic
jurisprudence.
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2006] TRANSLATION OF SCC CASE NO. 8 OF JUDICIAL YEAR 17 457
shari‘atihim). [These universal goals] are not violated by the wali alamr—acting
in the sphere of his capacities—in regulating girls’
dress. For there should be no revealing of her ‘awra or legs, nor any
informing about her body. There should be no showing her features
in a way that repudiates modesty. And the Decision aims at this
[result] when it obliges each female pupil associated with one of the
stipulated educational stages to wear an appropriate uniform, which
screens her without revealing her and which covers her nakedness
and display of charms. Her manner of wearing the uniform must
avoid this and be suitable to religious values, which connect her by
necessity to the morals of her society and to its traditions. Likewise,
[a proper schoolgirl’s] covering according to this Decision only
conceals her head and does not hide her face or palms. If it is to fall
to her chest and neck, it would not be enough to drape it behind her
back.
And whereas: The plaintiff’s complaint that the contested Decision
violates the freedom of creed stipulated in Article 46 of the
Constitution is rejected. This freedom—at root—means that an
individual is not to be compelled to accept a creed that he does not
share or to renounce a creed that he has entered into or that he has
proclaimed. One creed should not be discriminated against in favor
of others through denunciation, contempt, or disdain. Rather, the
religions (al-adyan) should tolerate each other; there must be mutual
respect.
Likewise: The concept of the right to freedom of creed does not
grant the protection to someone practicing [his creed] in a manner
that harms other creeds. Nor is the state to encourage—secretly or
publicly—conversion to a creed under its protection, pressuring
others to embrace it. It may not intervene by penalizing (as
punishment) those who practice a faith that it has not designated. In
particular, it is not for [the state] to kindle strife among religions by
discriminating in favor of some [creeds] at the expense of others. Nor
may the freedom of creed be separated from the freedom to practice
the rites of a creed. This is what the Constitution imposed when it
connected these two freedoms in a single sentence in the forty-sixth
article, stipulating that freedom of creed and freedom to practice
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religious rites are guaranteed.46
This indicates their complementarity;
indeed, they are two parts that are not to be separated. The second
represents the manifestation of the first, considering that it
transforms creed from mere faith and vital inspiration into a practical
expression of its [the faith’s] content so that it may be practically
applied and not hidden inside. This makes it possible to say that the
first freedom [i.e. freedom of creed] is unlimited. The second
freedom [to practice religious rites] may be limited by ordering it,
affirming some of the higher interests connected with it—in
particular, what connects it with the protection of the public order
and ethical values and the defense of the rights of others and their
freedoms.
And whereas: In view of this, the contested [ministerial] Decision
does not infringe on freedom of creed, destroy its foundations, or
obstruct the rites of [religious] practice. It does not defy the essence
of religion (din) in the universal roots (al-usul al-kulliyya) upon
which the shari‘a is founded. Rather it expresses the legitimate,
acceptable exercise of ijtihad aiming only to regulate girls’ dress—
within the realm of educational institutions in the various educational
stages that it stipulates—so as not to impair her life, violate her
modesty, or betray her ‘awra. The Decision is within the realm of
permitted regulation and cannot be considered a weakening of the
freedom of creed.
And whereas: The plaintiff complains that the contested decree
violates personal freedom, claiming that the mainstay of that freedom
is the self independence of each person in all matters in questions
that are most closely connected to his fate and that are having the
most impact on his life conditions, according to the model chosen to
complete the features of his personality.47
This [argument] is rejected
as even if it were possible to say that the appearance of a person
46. EGYPT CONST. art. 46.
47. The Court of Administrative Justice in the 1950s overturned a decision
made by the director of a secondary school to ban the girls wearing the niqab from
his school. In reaching its decision, the Court of Administrative Justice held that
the director’s decision violated an, as of that time uncodified, right to “personal
freedom.” See Rady, supra note 11, at 309. The plaintiff’s decision here to press an
Article 46 claim apparently reflects an attempt to argue that the right to wear the
veil was recognized even before the enactment and amendment of Article 2.
REVISED LOMBARDI AND BROWN PART II.DOC 1/21/2006 2:02:12 PM
2006] TRANSLATION OF SCC CASE NO. 8 OF JUDICIAL YEAR 17 459
through his or her clothing crystallizes the will of choice that
represents a layer of individual freedom, caring for its foundations
and maintaining its core characteristics. This will of choice should
nevertheless restrict the sphere of its implementation to what is
closely connected to human personality, [i.e. is] connected to the
identity of the person in a sphere that reveals the personal features of
his life in its most precise proclivities and most noble purposes, like
the right to choose a spouse, to create a family and to have a child. It
is furthermore not permitted to expand it [the personal sphere] to a
specified regulation (tanzim) confined to a specific circle within
which public welfare48
is represented ordering the affairs of those
who fall within its domain, and among [those who fall within its
domain] are male and female students of the primary, secondary and
intermediate levels. This means that individual freedom (hurriyya
shaksiyya) does not bar the legislator “acting within the sphere of his
affairs” from placing limits on the clothes that some people wear “in
their place within this sphere” so that [their clothes] have a distinct
identity. Their [the student’s] clothes will not be mixed with other
than them [i.e. other types of clothing]. Rather, with respect to their
appearance, they [the students] will be distinguished from others in
such a way that their apparel is uniform, is of one type and is
suitable, indicating them and making them known, facilitating the
manner of dealing with them. Therefore, this sphere of theirs is not a
looting (nahb) by others who would invade it out of acquisitiveness
and enmity, while those who truly and credibly belong to it, mistake
the matter with respect to this issue.49
And whereas: Even if education is a right guaranteed by the
state—according to what is stipulated by Article 18 of the
Constitution—education in its entirety is subject to the supervision of
the state, and according to the foregoing, it is incumbent upon the
state to watch over the entire educational process in all its
components and [to watch over] the ties between education and
48. “Al-salih al-‘amm.” See WEHR, supra note 39, at 523.
49. The meaning of the Arabic in this paragraph is obscure. The SCC seems to
be asserting that the ministerial Decision regulating veiling in schools was not
decreed for malevolent reasons, and does not touch upon issues in which Egyptian
citizens have a constitutionally protected “right of personal freedom” (a right to
express themselves as they see fit).
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society’s needs. [The state’s] regulation of the affairs of male and
female students in some institutions is justified through the logical
relationship and connection between [the content] of the object
insured [by the regulation] and the goals that are its [the regulation’s]
purpose and are connected to [the regulation]. This is fulfilled in the
current dispute, which is occurring over the terms which the
contested Decision established for the uniforms of the three
stipulated educational stages. This Decision did not release the
clothing of the male and female students from all restrictions. Rather,
it made their [the student’s] clothing modest, uniform, and
appropriate, so that they [the students] would not amalgamate with
others or associate intimately with those other than themselves.
Instead, [the students’] clothing in the institutions of these
[educational] stages makes them known [as students], indicating
them as such, protecting their psychological and mental health, not
upsetting their religious values and not dividing them.
And whereas: the contested Decision does not contradict the
provisions of the Constitution in any way:
For these reasons
The court rules against the plaintiff.
Hamdi Anwar Sabir, Secretary,
‘Awad al-Murr, President of the Court.