AQUINAS EXCERPTS ST THOMAS AQUINAS SUMMA THEOLOGIZE Latin text and English translation. Introductions, Notes, Appendices and Glossaries ist consequenter considerandum Principium autem exterius ad tentatione in Primo dictum est.1 bonum est Deus, qui et nos instrujt primo de lege, secundo de gratia de lege de principiis exterioribus actuum. n|ialum inclinans est diabolus, de cujus Principium autem exterius movens ad per legem et juvat per gratiam. Unde ilicendum est. Circa legem autem, primo, oportet secundo, de partibus consicjlerare de ipsa lege in communi; ejus. tria occurrant consideranda, Circa legem autem in communi primo quidem, de essentia ipsius; secundo, de differentia legum; tertio, de effectibup legis. 'ia. 114 "Principle, that from which anything cause when a relationship of dependence translation so as not to suggest an ext ponse to positive law imposed on us law, and the Gospel law of grace shape born in human nature and reborn in the interior or subjective principles Prima Secundce in the treatises on the 17 of this series), their morality ( (la2ae. 22-48, Vols. 19, 20 & 21), the.si in any manner starts. A real principle is a is involved. 'Objective' is inserted in the irnalism not proper to law as such. The res-be 'artificial', but the Eternal Law, natural inner voluntary acts springing from persons Spirit. The text uses exterior in contrast to of human activity hitherto studied in the psychology of human acts (la2as. 6-17, Vol. 18-21, Vol. 18), their emotional texture ■1 rengthening of them through habits, virtues, > m;iy 1 the law we have now to examine the objective principles of human activity.* The devil is among them, and as an influence for evil; how he tempts us has been already discussed in the Prima Pars.n From outside the principle of our going towards good is God, who builds us up by law and supports us by grace. So then we shall speak about law in the first place, and about grace afterwards. About law we look at first, law in general (90-92) second, its types (93-108).° As for law in general there are three headings, first, the nature of law (90) ;d second, the varieties of law (91); three, the effects of law (92). and Gifts of the Holy Ghost (ia2ae. 49-70, Vols. 22, 23 & 24), and weakening through sin (ia2ae. 71-89, Vols. 25, 26 & 27). bAlso ia2ae. 80. There is no organized system of sin; ia2a;. 73, 1. The Devil or Antichrist may be referred to as the Prince of Evil or the Caput Malorum; 3a. 8, 7 & 8. la. 49, 3. Below ia2ae. 96, 4 note d. On the law of sin in our members see ia2Ee. 91,6. "Types; the text reads 'parts'. They are not kinds of law strictly speaking, for law is not divided like a genus into species; for example the Eternal Law is not one sort of law among many. ia2Ee, 91. Introduction, Appendix 2. "Appendix 1. 2 3 QuEestio 90 de essentia legis Question 90. the nature of law Circa primum quEeruntur quatuoj- 1. utrum lex sit aliqjüd rationis; 2. de fine legis; 3. de causa ejus; 4. de promulgatione ipsius. articulus l. utrum lex sit aliquid rationis aliam ad primum sie proceditur.1 i Dicit enim Apostolus, Video quod est rationis est in membris Ergo lex non est aliquid rationis. 2. Praeterea, in ratione non est non est ipsa potentia rationis; nis, quia habitus rationis sunt dictum est;3 nec etiam actus ratilonis cessaret, puta in dormientibus 3. Pratterea, lex movet eos qui movere ad agendum proprie pertiiiet Ergo lex non pertinet ad rationein, quod etiam Jurisperitus dicit,5 sed contra est quod ad legem imperare est rationis, ut supra Vildetur quod lex non sit aliquid rationis. legem in membris meis, etc.2 Sed nihil quia ratio non utitur organo corporali. nisi potentia, habitus, et actus. Sed lex similiter etiam non est aliquis habitus ratio-yirtutes intellectuales, de quibus supra est, quia cessante rationis actu lex ;o lex non est aliquid rationis. subjiciuntur legi ad recte agendum. Sed ad voluntatem, ut patet ex praemissis.4 , sed magis ad voluntatem, secundum Quod placuit principi, legis habet vigorem. Ergc pertinet praecipere et prohibere. Sed ha|bitum est.6 Ergo lex est aliquid rationis. "Romans • > the cf 1 'cf ia2ae. 91,1; 92,1; 94,1 *ia2je. 9, 1 *The opening article sets the key to and domination is obeyed only when break the order of truth: ia. 25, 3, 4 appear later, that it is of the nature 96, 5- The discussion is typical of the Prima to action, and of a period when ideas 'Mind' is here preferred to 'reason laws have to be reasoned out. The are like conclusions from principles these conclusions; ia2as. 95, 2. Appendix ^Jurisperitus, a jurisconsult or jurispiudi (d. 228) who, it is said, provided a thir|d Roman Law, which had grown accepted custom and equity, was set 7, 23 aia2ae. 57 'Digest I, iv, 1. Berlin 1, 35a "ia2a;. 17, 1 treatise: mere force in possession is not law, :harged by reason. Even omnipotence cannot 5. De potentia I, 4-7. One consequence will law to be directive, not compulsive; ia2ae. process of out Secundce which is about thought directed vere being converted into institutions, to translate ratio lest it be thought that all of reasoning applies to those laws that natural law, or like constructions laid upon 6. ent; here in fact the authority of Ulpian of the material for the Digest or Pandects. of the decisions of magistrates, based on cjiut in order by a series of great jurisconsults, Here there are four points of inquiry: 1. whether law is a function of reason; 2. about its purpose; 3. its agent; 4. and its promulgation. article 1. is law a function of mind? the first point :la i. Law apparently is not a function of (mind;, since St Paul says that I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind.2 What is mental does not enter into our members, for thought is not exercised through a physical organ. Hence law is not a function of reason. 2. Besides, in the reason there is but the faculty itself, a disposition it may have, or an activity. Law however, is not the very faculty, nor one of its dispositions, for these, as we have seen,3 are the intellectual virtues, nor an activity, for then it would lapse when reasoning is suspended, as during sleep. Law, therefore, does not belong to the reason. 3. Then also, law motions its subjects to act aright. Yet it has been stated* that setting human activity into motion is properly the work of the will. Therefore law is the office of will rather than of mind; which accords with the words of the Jurist, what has pleased the sovereign has the force of law.5h on the other hand the burden of law is to prescribe or prohibit. Such executive commanding issues from the reason, as already noted.6 Consequently law is a function of reason. notably Gaius (c. 150-180) and Ulpian; their work was incorporated with later edicts, rescripts, and imperial constitutions, which amended the laws or made new ones (cf la2a;. 95, 4, footnotes), in the systematization of the Emperor Justinian. The revised edition of his Code in 534 had been preceded the year before by the Digest, a compression of the writings of the classical jurists which was given the force of law. The Institutes, a professional manual based on Gaius, appeared about the same time. These, together with the Novels, or new legislation, mostly in Greek, form the Corpus Juris Civilis (Vol. I, 15th ed. 1928; Vol. II, 9Ü1 ed. 1915, by P. Krüger & T. Mommsen, Berlin). The Roman Law was overlaid in the West by the barbarian invasions; its recovery began from Bologna at the end of the eleventh century. Irnerius headed the line of Glossators which ended with Accursius, an older contemporary of St Thomas, Gratian the Ľne of Canonists; the old corpus of Justinian was dead, but the Canonists first and the Civilians afterwards, particularly the Post-Glossators, renewed it and made of it a living law adapted to the polities of Church and State. Footnote continued on page 6 summa th eologiä, ia28E. 90, i lex alicuis qiia pra dii dicendum responsio: Dicendum quod secundum quam inducitur Dicitur enim lex a Ugando, mensura humanorum actuum actuum humanorum, ut ex finem, qui est primům principrum unoquoque autem genere id regula illius generis; sicut unitas genere motuum. Unde relincuitur rationem. 1. Ad primum ergo mensura, dicitur dupliciter ess£ et regulante; et quia hoc est est in ratione sola. Alio modo s: in omnibus qua; inclinantur inclinatio proveniens ex aliqus. quasi participative. Et hoc modo cupiscendum 'lex membrorunr 2. Ad secundum dicendum siderare operationem et operátům, operibus rationis est considers re et ratiocinari, et aliquid per in speculativa ratione primo tertio, vero syllogismus vel utitur quodam syllogismo in dum quod Philosophus docet practica quod ita se habeat ratione speculativa ad conclusi^nes the demise of the body in which Canon Law in Medieval Europe Glossators of the Roman Law, Cambridge, 1938. The quotation from the Digest, political writers of the sixteenth alienation in the people's alleged quEedam regula est et mensura actuum, ad agendum vel ab agendo retrahitur. obligát ad agendum. Regula autem et est ratio, qua: est principium primum ictis patet.7 Rationis enim est ordinare ad in agendis secundum Philosophum.8 In est primum principium est mensura et in genere numeri, et motus primus in quod lex sit aliquid pertinens ad quod, cum lex sit regula quaedam et in aliquo. Uno modo sicut in mensurante priům rationis, ideo per hunc modum lex sicut in regulato et mensurato; et sic lex est aliquid ex aliqua lege; ita quod quatlibet lege potest dici 'lex' non essentialiter, sed inclinatio ipsa membrorum ad con-vocatur.8 quod, sicut in actibus exterioribus est con-i, puta sedificationem et atdificatum, ita in ipsum actum rationis, qui est intelligere hujusmodi actum constitutum; quod quidem quidem est definitio; secundo, enuntiatio; argumentatio. Et quia ratio etiam practica perabilibus, ut supra habitům est,10 secun-Ethic.,11 ideo est invenire aliquid in ratione operationes sicut se habet propositio in et hujusmodi propositiones universales tm j id The ghost story', it has been described, 'of the second life of the Roman Law after t first saw the light.' P. VinogradofF, Roman and Oxford, 1929. J. Kantorowicz, Studies in the j which is the famous Lex Regia that exercised the :entury, is part of a text dealing with the act of contract of subjection to the Emperor. For the cognate maxim, of the Princeps Sol utus, the ruler exempt from law, see ia2K. 96,5 ad 3. The mind from itself is an ordaining and ruling power, virtus ordinativa et regitiva;CG ill, 78. De veritate ill, 3. In De anima III, lect. 15. 7ia2se. I, I ad 3; 66, I "Physics 11, 9. 2COa22. Ethics vil, 8 'Peter Lombard, Sentences 11, 30, ioia2a:. 13, 3; 76, i; 77,2 ad 4 H5iai6. St Thomas, lect. 8 8. Quaracchi I, 464 ^Ethics mi, 3. H47a24 "Regula et mensura, a phrase ofte 1 repeated. Rego, to keep or lead straight, guide, nature of law reply: Law is a kind of direction or measure for human activity through which a person is led to do something or held back.0 The word comes from Uganda, because it is binding on how we should act.d Now direction and measure come to human acts from reason, from which, as we have shown,7 they start. It is the function of reason to plan for an end, and this purpose, as Aristotle notes,8 is the original source of what we do.e The originating principle in any class strikes the note for all there comprised, for instance the unit of calculation in a numerical system, or the first motion that sets going a derivative series of motions. We are left with the conclusion, then, that law is something that belongs to reason. Hence: 1. Taken as a rule and measure, law can be present in two manners, first, and this is proper to the reason, as in the ruling and measuring principle, and in this manner it is in the reason alone; second, as in the subject ruled and measured, and in this manner law is present wherever it communicates a tendency to something, which tendency can be called derivatively, though not essentially, a 'law'. The inclination to concupiscence of our physical parts in this sense is called 'the law of members'.91 2. As with outward acts a distinction can be drawn between the doing and the deed, for instance the actual work on a building and the work that is built, so also with the activities of reason the actual thinking, namely understanding and reasoning, and what is thought out, namely first a definition, next a proposition, and finally a syllogism or argument, can be considered apart, s And because the practical reason makes use of a sort of syllogism in settling on a course of action, as already noted10 in accordance with the teaching of Aristotle,11 a proposition can be discerned which is to practice what a premise is to the conclusions the theoretic reason draws.11 General propositions of this type in the practical reason which bears on conduct, direct, draw the boundaries, mark the limits, rule, control. Metior, to measure, mete out, judge one thing by another. The illustrations from number and motion suggest that the notion of law should be at once fixed and dynamic. Hooker speaks of a 'rule or canon whereby actions are framed'; Ecclesiastical Polity I, 3, I. aLigo, to bind, oblige; this etymology comes from Cassiodorus. Isidore's, from lego, to collect, pick out, read aloud, is noted below; art. 4 ad 3. Cicero gives lex from delectus (deligere), which, like the Greek nomos, implies a just apportioning. St Augustine relates the term to diligendo, chosen loving. The end, or final cause: as purposed, in or dine intentionis, the first of the causes; as accomplished, in ordine executionis, the last; ia2x. 1, 1 & 2. 'By Peter Lombard, Sentences 11, 30, 8. cf below ia2ae. 91, 6. ^Apprehension, judgment, reasoning—the three mental operations that make the headings for the classical curriculum of formal logic. hThe theoretical reason and the practical reason are not different psychological faculties; the distinction refers to the double interest of one single mind, namely 6 7 SUMMA THEOLOGIAj ia23E. 90, 2 rationis practica ordinatae ad actiönes propositiones aliquando actualitei aliter a ratione tenentur. 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod supra dictum est.12 Ex hoc enim his quae sunt ad finem. Sed volun legis rationem habeat, oportet quo I intelligitur quod voluntas principis principis magis esset iniquitas quam habent rationem legis: quae quidem considerantur, aliquando vero habitu- :atio habet vim movendi a voluntate, ut quod aliquis vult finem, ratio imperat de :as de bis qua; imperantur, ad hoc quod sit aliqua ratione regulata; et hoc modo habet vigorem legis: alioquin voluntas lex. articulus 2. utrum lex ord ad secundum sic proceditur.1 bonum commune sicut ad finem prohibere. Sed praecepta ordinantur semper finis legis est bonum com nunc 2. Praeterea, lex dirigit homineri particularibus. Ergo et lex ad alicuod 3. Praeterea, Isidoras dick, S\ ratione constiterit.2 Sed ratione bonum commune, sed etiam quoÜ Ergo* lex non ordinatur solum ad privatum unius. sed contra est quod Isidoras pro communi utilitate avium dicit consci ipta RESPONSio: Dicendum quod, sicui principium humanorum actuum, autem ratio est principium humaiiorum est aliquid quod est principium 1 doing 18 truth for its own sake and truth in ferred to is not an apodictic or demonstrative wide sense, of one proposition followii lg decision; Prior Analytics 1, 1. 24018. 47D20. St Thomas, led. 2-3. cf Vol. *Piana & Faucher leave the rest of thf 1!ia2Ee. 17, r *cf ia2Ee. 95, 4; 96, 1. Ill Sentences 37, 'Etymologies 11, 10, & v, 3. PL 82, 130 "ibid V, 21. PL 82, 203 netur semper ad bonum commune Videtur quod lex non ordinetur semper ad Ad legem enim pertinet praecipere et ad quEedam singularia bona. Non ergo line. ad agendum. Sed actus humani sunt in particulare bonum ordinatur. ratione lex constat, lex erit omne quod cfonsistit non solum quod ordinatur ad ordinatur ad privatum bonum unius. bonum commune, sed etiam ad bonum quod lex est nullo privato commodo, sed 3 dictum est,* lex pertinet ad id quod est ex eo quod est regula et mensura. Sicut actuum, ita etiam in ipsa ratione rjespectu omnium aliorum: unde ad hoc and making; ia. 79, rr. The syllogism re-deduction, but a syllogism in the from another, as when reasoning leads to a Topics, 1, r. iooa5. Ethics vn, 3-5. H45b20-of this series, Appendices 8 & 9. sentence unsaid 2, ii ad 5. In Ethic, v, lect. 2 & 199 4art. i NATURE OF LAW what has to be done have the character of law; sometimes they are actually adverted to, sometimes they are convictions held merely as habits of mind. 3. The reason gets its motive force from the will, as we have shown.121 For it is because a person wills an end that his reason effectively governs arrangements to bring it about. To have the quality of law in what is so commanded the will must be ruled by some reason, and the maxim, the prince's will has the force of law, has to be understood with that proviso, otherwise his will would make fer lawlessness rather than law. J article 2. is law always ordained to the common good ? the second point:1 i. Not always, it would seem, is the common good the shaping purpose of law.a For it is the office of law to prescribe and prohibit. Such precepts are aimed at the individual good. Consequently the purpose of law is not always the common good. 2. Moreover, law directs man in his actions. These, however, are always about particular matters. Hence law also is for the sake of particular benefit. 3. Furthermore, Isidoreb remarks that if law is founded on reason, then law will be all that stands to reason* Now reason stands for what is for the good of the private individual as well as of the community. Therefore law is not only ordered to the common good but to private individual good as well. on the other hand there is Isidore saying, law is enacted for no private benefit, but for the common service of citizens.z reply: To be a principle of human acts, as we have said,4 is part of the nature of law, since it is for them a rule and measure. As their beginning lies in the reason, so also one phase of its activity is the start of what follows; this first and foremost is where law comes in. Now the deeds we 'The influence of reason on will is like that of a formal cause, of will on reason like that of an efficient cause; the result is meaning in motion, which in law is a reasonable ordination for the love of the common good, art. 2. For the interplay of reason and will see ia. 82,4; ia2a;. 9, r. The examination of freedom fastens on their deliberation, not on executive spontaneity; ia. 83, 3 & 4. De malo IV, 1. De veritate XXIV, 4, 5 & 6. For the dialectic of love see Vol. 1 of this series, Appendix 10. 'Lawlessness, iniquitas, from in-cequus, unequal, unfair, unjust. "Common good; Appendix 4. "St Isidore of Seville, d. 636. His twenty books of Etymologies was the main encyclopedia of classical learning for the Middle Ages. 8 9 summa theologize, iů2sě. 90, 2 ordinetur .em oportet quod principaliter et maxi|me pium in operativis, quorum est ultimus finis humanae vita; felicity Unde oportet quod lex maxime Rursus cum omnis pars perfectum, unus autem homo est quod lex proprie respiciat ordini Philosophus, praemissa definitione et communione politica: dicit factiva et conservativa felicitatis et tionef perfecta enim communitas In quolibet autem genere id aliorum, et alia dicuntur secundum maxime calidus, est causa caliditstis dicuntur calida inquantum participant maxime dicatur secundum ordineip que aliud prseceptum de particul; secundum ordinem ad bonum Et ideo omnis lex ad bonum Ad primum ergo dicendum pertineat lex. Primum autem princi-i practica, est finis ultimus. Est autem vel beatitudo, ut supra habitům est.5 respiciat ordinem qui est in beatitudine. ad totum sicut imperfectum ad pars communitatis perfecta;, necesse est ad felicitatem communem. Unde et legahum, mentionem facit de felicitate ii in v Ethic, quod legalia justa dicimus particularium ipsius politica communica-civitas est, ut dicitur in i Politic.1 quod 'maxime' dicitur est principium ordinem ad ipsum: sicut ignis, qui est in corporibus mixtis, qua; intantum de igne. Unde oportet, cum lex ad bonum commune, quod quodcum-ri opere non habeat rationem legis nisi ad ea qua; lege regulantur. Ordo ad legem, est applicabilis ad sin] particularibus quibusdam prazcepia Bia2ae. i, 6 & 7; 2, 5 & 7; 69,1 ^Ethics v, 1. 1129I517. St Thomas, lect. 7Politics 1,1. 125235. St Thomas, lect. "Felicitas, from feo, to produce, when beo, to gladden, enrich. Objective beatitude, the state of happiness. The the theme running throughout St Appendices 1-4. For human happiness, is the theological common good, see aThe thought derives from Plato on When the whole is rendered as an offers is bound to be at some cost isolation. This community-life was than to a Christian theologian, who was prepared to dispute its claims to On this point of the subordination distinction between individuals and sidered as a part of a greater whole, within it he subserves its needs. As a into an association in which there is Quis legem dat amantibus ? The politics 1 cor xtnune. commune ordinatur. c[uod prasceptum importat applicationem autem ad bonum commune, qui pertinet ares fines. Et secundum hoc etiam de dantur. ■gul economic 1 to :e also fecundus and femina. Beatitudo, from beatitude, the cause of our happiness; subjective ordering of all rightful activity to happiness is Thqmas's moral theology: Vol. 18 of this series, see ia2se. 2-5; for God's happiness, which ta. 26. ] ove as the desire and pursuit of the whole, or political group then the full life it the inclinations of the part considered in re comprehensive to a Greek philosopher looked beyond it to the higher city of God and se submitted to. of the individual to the group, Maritain's pSrsons is useful. A human being can be con-i;nd then, considered as a unit or individual p :rson,however, he can rise above it and enter subjection and, properly speaking, no law. community occupies an intermediate posi- nature of law perform, these being the concern of the practical reason, all originate from our last end. We have shown that the last end of human living is happiness or well-being.50 Consequently law is engaged above all with the plan of things for human happiness. Again, since the subordination of part to whole is that of incomplete to rounded-off reality, and since a human individual man is part of the full life of the community, it must needs be that law properly speaking deals with this subordination to a common happiness."1 Thus Aristotle, having explained what he means by 'legal', mentions the happiness of the body politic when he says in the Ethics6 that we call those acts legally just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components for the political community, the perfect community, according to the Politics? being the State.e When we speak of 'a-most-of-all' in any class of things then it is the principle and centre of reference for them all, as fire, for instance, which is the hottest thing of all, is the cause of heat in bodies mixed with ether elements, and they are called hot in so far as they share its nature.1 And since we speak of law most of all in terms of the common good, it follows that any other precept about more particular business will not have the nature of law except in so far as it enters into this plan for the common good. Therefore every law is shaped to the common good. Hence: i. A precept implies a decisive application to the matters which law regulates, s These include individual ends, for the plan for the common good, which is the concern of law, really has to come down to them. That is why precepts are given in certain particular cases. tion between a group which owns us and a circle of friends; our characteristic activity within it is free obedience to lawful commands, cf below, art. 3, note g. T. Gilby, Between Community and Society, A Theology of the State, London & New York, 1953. eThe perfect community, namely possessing autarky, self-sufficient to provide the advantages of life in the main; Ethics vm, 9. n6oa23. St Thomas, lect. 9. The polis or City-State of Aristotle; the Res Publica of the Romans. Typically for St Thomas a regnum, a realm or kingdom: the Regnum in the Middle Ages was his own Kingdom of Sicily. Communitas here includes the whole body of free citizens, just as universitas regni includes all tenants-in-chief of the Crown. 'The example, as in the quarta via (ia. 2, 3) may be taken merely to illustrate the argument; for 'fire' read 'Sun' as the principle of thermal energy in our world. The cosmology of the four elements may be here neglected. *Applicatio, also usus activus, technical terms for that part of a human act which marks the passage from intention to execution. Activity that was previously a judgment and choice within the mind and will now begin to take effect as a deed, cf ia2x. 16,1 & 4. 10 ii summa the 3L0Giffi, iazae. 90, 3 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod operationes quidem sunt in par-ticularibus; sed ilia particularia referri possunt ad bonum commune—non quidem communitate generis vel speciei, sed communitate causae finalis, secundum quod bonum commune dicitur finis communis. 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut nihil constat firmiter secundum rationem speculativam nisi per r:solutionem ad prima principia indemon-strabilia, ita firmiter nihil constat per rationem practicam nisi per ordina-tionem ad ultimum finem, qui est bonum commune. Quod autem hoc modo ratione constat legis rationem habet. articulus 3. Uttum ratio cujuslibet sit factiva legis ad tertium sie proceditur:1 1 legis. Dicit enim Apostolus naturaliter ea quce legis sunt fi niter de omnibus dicit. Ergo 2. Praeterea, sicut Philosoph hominem ad virtutem.3 Sed virtutem. Ergo cujuslibet 3. Praiterea, sicut princeps paterfamilias est gubernátor civitate legem facere. Ergo quilil[>< legem. sed contra est quod Isidorus Lex est constitutio populi, aliquid sanxerunt* Non est ergo RESPONSio: Dicendum quod ordinem ad bonum commune, est vel totius multitudinis vel Videtur quod cujuslibet ratio sit factiva quod cum gentes, quce legem non habent, aciint, ipsi sibi sunt lex.z Hoc autem commu-quilibet potest facere sibi legem. dicit, intentio legislatoris est ut inducat qiilibet homo potest alium inducere ad hominis ratio est factiva legis. civitatis est civitatis gubernator, ita quilibet qomus. Sed princeps civitatis potest in et paterfamilias potest in sua domo facere dicit \ in lib. v Etymol. et habotur in Decretis, secunfyum quam majores natu simul cum plebibus cujuslibet facere legem. lex proprie primo et principaliter respicit dinare autem aliquid in bonum commune alicujus gerentis vicem totius multitudinis. Gra ian. ]cf ia2Ee. 97, 3. 2a2x. 50, 1 ad 3; 60 ^Romans 2,14 etymologies v, 10. PL 82, 200. hThe common good is not a generic which can be treated like a univoca. an analogical concept, variously tion in being as good, and good as Vol. 3 of this series. It will follow cf Appendix 2. "Law, as already noticed, comes doing and making; ia2£e. 57, 3 & 4 reason is factiva legumt cf Append: "Ethics 11, i. H03b3 , Decretum 1, II, I. Leipzig. I, 3 class-heading, like 'common biological benefit' concept with respect to men and animals; it is modulated according to the degrees of participa-cause, that is, as final cause, cf ia. 13, 2 & 5. trjat law as a theological concept is also analogical: fro n the practical reason, the activities of which are Human law, in particular, is 'made up'. Whose 1x5. nature of law 2. Human activities indeed always take place in particular situations; these, however, are relevant to the common good—common here involves acting for a universal final cause, not coming under a general classification according to genus or species.11 Common good spells common end. 3. For the theoretic reason nothing is established unless it can be taken back to indemonstrable first principles, likewise for the practical reason nothing is established unless it can be taken on to our ultimate end, which is the common good. Whatever stands to reason in this manner has an essential quality of law. article 3. can anybody legislate? the third point:la i. It seems that anybody's reason can make law. St Paul says, When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature the things contained in it, these are a law unto themselves.''' He is speaking of everybody without exception. Therefore anybody can make a law for himself. 2. In addition, Aristotle says that a lawmaker's wish is to lead men into virtue.3 This anybody can do. Hence any man's reason can pass a law. 3. Then also, as a prince is governor of the State so a head of the family is governor of the household. But a sovereign can legislate for the State. So also can any head of the family do the same for his household. on the other hand Isidore says, and he is repeated in the Decretum?' that law is a constitution of the people in which those of high birth sanction something in conjunction with the commonalty* Consequently to make law is not for anybody. reply: The chief and main concern of law properly so called is the plan for the common good. The planning is the business of the whole people or of their vicegerent.0 Therefore to make law is the office,of the entire "The Decretum, or Concordantia Discordantium Canonum, of Master Gratian, a Camaldolese monk and the Father of Canon Law. The work, published in Bologna, 1141, was not a miscellany of texts, but a systematic distribution of the existing legislation of the Western Church according to the sic et non method of the schools. It enjoyed in Canon Law a prestige equal to that of Peter Lombard's Sentences in theology; piety quickly bred the legend that they were half-brothers. Together with the Decretals of Gregory IX, edited by St Raymond of Pefiafort, it inaugurated the Jus Novum. Edited by E. L. Richter, Corpus Juris Canonici, 2nd ed. Leipzig, 1922. cf Studia Gratiana, J. Forchielli & A. M. Stickler, 2 vols., Bologna, 1953-4. cVicegerent: gero, to bear, support the character, sustain the charge. Gerere vicem, to act on behalf of; also obtinere vicem, to take the place of. Here the public personage, the figure who personifies the community, and is its guardian and, in the fullest sense, its caretaker, qui curam habet. cf Appendices 4 (4) & 5. 12 13 summa thiiologiä, ia2EC. 90, 4 unusqi usque unie Et ideo condere legem vel personam publicam qua: totius aliis ordinäre in finem est ejus 1. Ad primum ergo dicendurji aliquo non solum sicut in re; regulato. Et hoc modo ordinem alicujus regulantis; legis scriptum in cordibus suis.6 2. Ad secundum dicendum efficaciter ad virtutem: potest recipiatur, non habet vim coa efncaciter inducat ad virtutem. coactivam habet multitudo, vel innigere, ut infra dicetur,8 et 3. Ad tertium dicendum quo<|l pars civitatis; civitas autem I Politic.9 Et ideo, sicut bonum commune bonum ordinatur, ita bonum unius civitatis quas est aliquam familiam potest quid tarnen quae proprie habent pertMet ad totam multitudinem, vel pertinet ad multitudis curam habet; quia et in omnibus oujus est proprius ille finis. quod, sicut supra dictum est,5 lex est in :j;ulante, sed etiam participative sicut in sibi est lex inquantum participat et ibidem subditur, Qui ostendunt opus v.t id so : c[uod persona privata non potest inducere solum monere;* sed si sua monitio non ctivam, quam debet habere lex ad hoc quod Philosophus dicit.7 Hanc autem virtutem persona publica, ad quam pertinet poenas solius ejus est leges facere. , sicut homo est pars domus ita domus est :st communitas perfecta, ut dicitur in inius hominis non est ultimus finis sed ad etiam bonum unius domus ordinatur ad ccjmmunitas perfecta. Unde ille qui gubernat facere aliqua praecepta vel statuta, non ratioinem legis. ad quartum sic proceditur:1 ratione legis. Lex enim naturalis naturalis non indiget promulga; promulgetur. *Piana: movere, he can dissuade or pjromote Eart. i ad i ^Romans 2, 15 8ia2£e. 92, 2 ad 3. 2a2Ee. 64, 3 "Politics I, I. I252a5 *cf De veritate xvii, 3. Quodl. 1, IX, 2 dThe text here speaks of a multitude the populace, but the entire people a citizen being a male adult who populus, says St Augustine, is not j welfare united in consent to law: Dt eThe first mention of the enforcen|ient x, 9. n8oa2i. St Thomas, lect. 14. of legal sanction, like that of legal law as such. That law obliges is infringement will be followed by a positive and human law. cf Appen articulus 4. utrum promulgatio sit de ratione legis Videtur quod promulgatio non sit de maxime habet rationem legis. Sed lex lione. Ergo non est de ratione legis quod 1 Ethics Si, 9. n8oa20 ; this does not mean the multitude, the masses, the whole body of citizens, universitas civium, a responsible part in political affairs. The a crowd, but an association for the common civitate Dei n, 21 & xix, 21. of law, the anagkastike dunamis of Ethics ibiscussed below, ia2a. 92, 2; 95, 1. The notion obligation, is not a distinct and specific feature of inplied in its being a just command; that its penalty extrinsic to its content is a quality of 7. Also Vol. 18 of this series, Appendix 18. ti kes ji st: dix ' nature of law people3 or of the public personage who has care of them. For, as elsewhere to plan for an end belongs to the power matching that end. Hence: i. As already observed,5 law is present not only in the ruling principle but derivatively as well in the subject ruled. In this last manner each is a law unto himself, in so far as he enters into the plan of the governing authority. So St Paul goes on to say that people show the work of the law written in their hearts? 2. A private person can persuade, yet he cannot effectively bring another to virtue, for if his advice is not taken he lacks the force, such as a law should possess, to compel good conduct^ this is noted by Aristotle.7 This coercive strength resides in the people or public figure who personifies them; such authority can inflict penalties, as will be shown,8 and to it, therefore, the making of law is reserved. 3. As a human being is part of a household so a household is part of a state, which, according to Aristotle,9 is the complete community.* And as one individual's good is not an ultimate end, since it is subordinate to the common good, so the good of a household is subordinate to the good of a political community.6 Consequently the ruler of a family can issue precepts and standing orders, nevertheless these are not such as to possess the nature of law properly so called.11 article 4. is promulgation essential to law ? the fourth point:1 i. It would seem that promulgation is not essential to law. For natural law, which is law in the fullest sense of the word, needs no promulgation. This, therefore, is not essential to law. 'The domestic and economic community is not the political community in miniature; Politics I, 1. 125237. It is a community of a different kind, with less power and less justice. The power of the father or master is confined to the infliction of light penalties. Full justice, Xhcjustum simpliciter or politicum, which goes with the reception of law in the strict sense of the word, lies between distinct and independent parts, namely free and lawful men in a polity. Within a group constituted by kinship or economic dependence there is a lesser and metaphorical jus, namely the paternum and dominativum. 2&2.x.. 57, 4; 65, 2 ad 3. Ethics v, 6. H34b7-i8. v, 12. Il6ibi6-62a33. Politics I, 3-7. I252b35~55b40. cf also the differences between the virtues of family loyalty, pietas, respect to superiors, observantia, and obedience, obediential 2a2£e. ior, 3; 102, 1; 104, 2. «For the subjection of the individual to the common good, see above art. 2, note d. Note also the observation, 'The common good prevails over any particular good when they are in the same class; it may well be that a private good can be better according to its type;' 2a2a;. 152, 4 ad 3. iAn ordinance serving a sectional interest is not a law in the full sense of the term, though it may be a precept deserving obedience, and like judicial decisions on determinate cases may bind under law, sententialia; 1a2.se. 96, 1 ad 1. 14 15 summa the 2. Praeterea, ad legem pertin vel non faciendum. Sed non sqlum coram quibus promulgatur lex. de ratione legis. 3. Praeterea, obligatio legis extjenditur negoliis necessitatem imponunt praesentes. Ergo promulgatio :t proprie obligare ad aliquid faciendum obligantur ad implendam legem illi sed etiam alii. Ergo promulgatio non est etiam in futurum, quia leges futuris lit Jura dicunt.2 Sed promulgatio fit ad est de necessitate legis. non sed contra est quod dicitur promulgantur.3 Rq ml; RESPONSio: Dicendum quod, modum regulae et mensurae. quod applicatur his quae r< lex virtutem obligandi obtineat applicetur hominibus qui applicatio fit per hoc quod in mulgatione. Unde promulgatio suam virtutem. Et sic ex quatuor praedictis aliud quam quaedam rationis curam communitatis habet, 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum ipso quod Deus eammentibus 2. Ad secundum dicendum q obligantur ad legem observands per alios, vel devenire potest 3. Ad tertium dicendum extenditur per fkmitatem promulgat. Unde Isidorus dicit est.5 si cut OLOGiiE, ia2£e. 90, 4 in Decretis quod leges instituuntur cum dictum est,4 lex imponitur aliis per a autem et mensura imponitur per hoc egulajntur et mensurantur. Unde ad hoc quod quod est proprium legis, oportet quod secundum earn regulari debent. Talis autem notitiam eorum deducitur ex ipsa pro-psa necessaria est ad hoc quod lex habeat potest colligi definitio legis, quae nihil est ördinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui pranulgata. quod promulgatio legis naturae est ex hoc he minum inseruit naturaliter cognoscendam. lod illi coram quibus lex non promulgatur , inquantum in eorum notitiam devenit pilomulgatione facta, quod promulgatio praesens in futurum quae quodammodo semper earn quod lex a legendo vocata est, quia scripta scrpturae, "Codex I, xiv, 7. Berlin I, 68a. Here :alled the 'Jura', the 'Rights'. 3Decretum I, iv, appendix to 3. Leipzig I, 6 4art. 1 ^Etymologies II, 10. PL 82, 130 "This fourth clause, that law needs :o be promulgated, is taken from the Canonists. A summula of Bulgarus, an early Glossator, had started, 'Inasmuch as laws should be known and understood by all,' y:t Gratian seems to have been the first to bring out the importance of promulgation (see Sed contra of the article). The conclusion is that law has to be reasonably receive d as well as reasonably declared. The leading principle is that nobody is bound to what he does not know about; De veritate XVII, 3. Ignorance which is not wilful, either by choice or from negligence nature of law 2. Besides, to render obligatory the doing or not doing of some action is proper to law. Yet not only those in whose presence a law is promulgated are under this obligation but others as well. Therefore promulgation is not of the very nature of law. 3. Moreover, the obligation of law extends even to the future, for, as the Laws declare, they impose a necessity on future transactions,1 Promulgation, however, is to people who are present. Hence it is not an indispensable condition of law. on the other hand the Decretum states that laws are instituted when they are promulgated.* reply: It has been already noted4 that law is laid on subjects to serve as a rule and measure. This means that it has to be brought to bear on them. Hence to have binding force, which is an essential property of a law, it has to be applied to the people it is meant to direct. This application comes about when their attention is drawn to it by the fact of promulgation. Hence this is required for a measure to possess the force of law.a To sum up, from the four foregoing discussions the following definition can be gathered. Law is nought else than an ordinance of reason for the common good made by the authority who has care of the community and promulgated.b Hence: 1. Natural law is promulgated by God's so instilling it into men's minds that they can know it because of what they really are.c 2. Those who are not present when a law is promulgated are obliged to its observance in that, given the fact of promulgation, the law is or can be brought to their attention by others. 3. Promulgation in the present stretches into the future through being perpetuated in a written code, which, as it were, ensure a lasting promulgation. Accordingly Isidore etymologizes, law (lex) gets its name from reading (legendo), because it is written down.5 always excuses; ia2aj. 6, 6. The distinction between ignorantia juris and ignorantia facti, ignorance of the law and practical ignorance that a course of action is covered by a law, was well accepted in the thirteenth century; St Thomas makes it equivalent to Aristotle's distinction between defective moral science and a mistaken judgment in the contingent case; In Ethic, in, lect. 3 & 11. bA resumé of the Question, cf Appendix 1. CA natural right is not created, though it may be supported, by human law, whereas a right according to human law gets its robur auctoritatis from the legislation which contains and creates it; 2a2Ee. 60, 5. 16 17 summa thiologiä, 132X. 91, i varieties of law Qusestio 91. Deinde considerandum est de c^iversitate legum, et circa hoc quseruntur sex: 1. utrum sit aliqua 2. utrum sit aliqua 3. utrum sit aliqua 4. utrum sit aliqua 5. utrum sit una tantum 6. utrum sit aliqua dei ad primům sic proceditur:1 i Omnis enim lex aliquibus i posset imponi: solus enim Deus 2. Prseterea, promulgatio est esse ab aeterno, quia non erat ab potest esse asterna. 3. Praeterea, lex importat ordiliem ordinetur ad finem: solus enim est aeterna. articulus I. utrum sit aliqua lex ceterna Videtur quod non sit aliqua lex asterna. imporitur. Sed non fuit ab aeterno cui aliqua lex fuit ab aeterno. Ergo nulla lex est aeterna. ratione legis. Sed promulgatio nonpotuit aeterno cui promulgaretur. Ergo nulla lex ad finem. Sed nihil est aeternum quod ultimus finis est aeternus. Ergo nulla lex sed contra est quod Augustinus potest cuipiam intelligenti non incpmmutabilis responsio: Dicendum quod, sidut quam dictamen practica; rationi; munitatem perfectam. Manifestjum divina Providentia regatur, ut in Jcf ia2ae. 93, 1 sia2£e. 90,1 ad2; 3 &4 &Appendix 2. Question 91 sets out elsewhere (cf below, Introduction to of law disjunctively opposed by the particular kind of law, but the e: over the basis of the division is not of human law, see ia2Ee, 95, 4 belovs some acts are good and therefore manded; the divine law comes from Old and New Covenants, and of natural and positive law; the on the spirit, the reign of Augustine and others. de legum diversitate lex aeterna; lex naturalis; lex humana; lex divina; vel plures; lex peccati. dicit, Lex qua summa ratio nominatur non ceternaque videri.2 supra dictum est,3 nihil est aliud lex in principe qui gubernat aliquam com-est autem, supposito quod mundus Prima habitum est,4 quod tota communitas 2De lib. arbit. 1, 6. PL 32, 1229 4ia. 22, 1 ad 2 tb|e various laws that are more closely examined ia2£e. 93), but does not propose specific kinds logic of division. The Eternal Law is not a xem|plar transcending yet causing all laws. More-istant—for an attempt at an essential division Natural law and positive law differ because commanded, while others are good because com-God's intervention in history, revealed in the compi ehends laws that operate in the manner both Pauline law of sin issues from the claim of the flesh concupiscence powerfully and sombrely described by l8 Question 91. varieties of law Now let us look at the diversity of laws.a And here there are six points of inquiry: 1. is there an Eternal Law? 2. natural law? 3. human law? 4. a divine law? 5. is the divine law one or several? 6. is there a law of sin? article I. is there an Eternal Law? the first point :* i. There is no Eternal Law it seems. Every law supposes subjects on which it is imposed. Yet there was none such from eternity; God alone is from eternity.b Therefore no law is eternal. 2. Moreover, promulgation is an essential condition of law. Now promulgation from all eternity is out of the question, since because from eternity there was no one to be addressed. Hence no law can be eternal.- 3. Furthermore, law implies a plan for an end. Nothing, however, can be eternal which is planned for an end; only the ultimate end itself is eternal. Consequently no law is eternal. on the other hand Augustine says, That law which is named the supreme reason cannot be otherwise understood than as unchangeable and eternal.-0 reply: As stated above,3 law is nothing but a dictate of practical reason issued by a sovereign who governs a complete community. Granted that the world is ruled by divine Providence, and this we have shown in the Prima Pars,* it is evident that the whole community of the universe is governed by God's mind.d Therefore the ruling idea of things which exists in God as the effective sovereign of them all has the nature of law. As is manifest from this variety, the idea of law is analogical, and does not bear a fixed meaning which can be divided into separate compartments according to genera and species. Neither the Eternal Law nor natural law are proper concepts of positive legal science. 'From eternity: God's eternity; la. 2 & 3. The eternity of creation; ia. 46, I & 2. Depotentia III, 14, 15, 16. De ceternitate mundi. Also Exposition, De causis, led. 11. cGod as eternal knowledge of himself and others; ia. 14, 1-6. The Eternal Ideas, la. 15, 3. Vol. 4 of this series. God the exemplar cause of all things; ia. 44, 3. dProvidence is to the Eternal Law as a practical conclusion is to the theory of practice; Providence is to the divine government as prudence or practical wisdom is to the actual execution of activity; ia. 22, I; 103, 6. 19 Deum existunt, inquantum sum summa THE0L0GIÄ, ia2ae. 91, 2 universi gubernatur ratione divina. Et ideo ipsa ratio gubernationis rerum in Deo sicut in principe universi tatis existens legis habet rationem. Et quia divina ratio nihil concipit ex tempore, sed habet aeternum conceptum, ut dicitur Proverb.,5 inde est quod hujusmodi legem oportet dicere aeternam. i. Ad primum ergo dicendim quod ea quae in seipsis non sunt apud ab ipso cognita et praeordinata, secundum illud Rom., Qui vocat ea qucz non sunt tanquam ea qua sunt.6 Sic igitur aeternus divinse legis conceptus habet rationem legis aeternae, secundum quod a Deo ordinatur ad gube rnationem rerum ab ipso praecognitarum. 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod promulgatio fit et verbo et scripto; et utroque modo lex aeterna habet promulgationemex parte Dei promulganti?, quia et Verbum divinurn est ae:ernum, et scriptura libri vitae est aeterna. Sed ex parte creaturae audienis aut inspicientis non potest esse pro-mulgatio aeterna. 3. Ad tertium dicendum qubd lex importat ordinem ad finem active inquantum scilicet per earn ordi lantur aliqua in finem; non autem passive, idest quod ipsa lex ordinetur id finem, nisi per accidens in gubernante cujus finis est extra ipsum, ad quem etiam necesse est ut lex ejus ordinetur. Sed finis divinae gubernationis est ipse Deus, nec ejus lex est aliud ab ipso: unde lex aeterna non ordinatur in alium finem. articulus 2. utrum sit in nobis aliqua lex naturalis ad secundum sic proceditur:1 ]. Videtur quod non sit in nobis aliqua lex naturalis. Sufficienter enim homo gubernatur per legem aetérnam. Dicit enim Augustinus quod lex ceterna est qua jus turn est ut omnia sint ordinatis-2 Sed natura non abundat :n superfluis, sicut nec deficit in necessariis. naturalis. 2. Praeterea, per legem ordilnatur homo in suis acribus ad finem, ut supra habitům est.3 Sed ordinatio humanorum actuum ad finem non est per náturám, sicut accidit in creaturis irrationalibus, quae solo appetitu naturali agunt propter finem, sed agit homo propter finem per rationem et voluntatem. Ergo non est aliqtia lex homini naturalis. Praeterea, quanto aliquis est liberior tanto minus est sub lege. Sed homo est liberior omnibus aliis animalibus propter liberum arbitrium, ^Proverbs 8, 23 Jcf below ia2a;. 94. rv Sent. 38,1, 1 lDe libero arbitrio I, 6. PL 32, 1229 8ia2ae. 90, 2 eThe Verbum Dei is expressivum c f creatures; la. 34, 3. The liber vitaf. those who are his; 11 Timothy 2,19 'Romans 4, 17 the Father, and expressivum et operativum of a metaphorical expression for God's knowing ia. 24,1. varieties of law Then since God's mind does not conceive in time, but has an eternal concept, according to Proverbs,5 I mas set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was, it follows that this law should be called eternal. Hence: 1. While not as yet existing in themselves things nevertheless exist in God in so far as they are foreseen and preordained by him; so St Paul speaks of God summoning things that are not yet in existence as if they already were.6 Thus the eternal concept of divine law bears the character of a law that is eternal as being God's ordination for the governance of things he foreknows. 2. Promulgation is made by words spoken or written down; in both ways an Eternal Law is proclaimed by God's utterance, since the Divine Word and the Book of Life are eternal.e Admittedly on the side of the creature who hearkens to or reads the promulgation cannot be from all eternity. 3. Take law as actively exerted, then it implies things as entering into a plan for an end. Take it, however, as a plan resting in the mind, then law itself is not ordered to an end, save contingently in the case of a governor who has an end outside himself to which his legislation is subordinate. The end of divine government is God himself, and his law is none other than himself; consequently the Eternal Law is not subordinate to an outside end.' article 2. is there a natural law within us ? the second point:1 i. It would seem there is no natural law within us.3 The Eternal Law is sufficient for the government of mankind; as Augustine observes, by the Eternal Law fair it is that all things be consummately ordered.2 Now nature no more abounds in superfluities than fails in necessities. Therefore there is no natural law for mankind. 2. Moreover, it has been stated that law directs man's activity to his end.3 Now nature does not direct things in that way, as we can tell from non-rational creatures, which act for an end solely through a driving determinism, unlike man who reasons and wills how to act for an end. For him in consequence there is no law of nature. 3. The freer a thing the less it is under a law. Men are freer than the other animals, because their power of deciding for themselves sets them The governing end of the universe lies beyond it in the subsistent goodness of God himself; ia. 103, 2. »Natural law: the fuller meaning will appear later, ia2£e. 94. cf Appendix 3. Notice that the concept is introduced as a theological value, and the appeal is to the Scriptures, not to political philosophy or jurisprudence. 20 21 summa thec L0GIA*,, I32X. 91, 2 quod prse aliis animalibus habet, legi naturali, nec homo alicui legi sed contra est quod super illud, liter ea qua legis sunt faciunt, dicit habent tarnen legem naturalem, quo sit bonum et quid malum* Cum igitur alia animalia non subdantur naturali subdetur. Cum gentes, quce legem non habent, natura-glossa quod si non habent legem scriptam, quilibet intelligit, et sibi conscius est quid responsio: Dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est,5 lex, cum sit regula et mensura, dupliciter potest esse in aliquo: uno modo sicut in regulante et mensurante; alio modo sicut in ::egulato et mensurato, quia inquantum participat aliquid de regula vel measura sic regulatur vel mensuratur. Unde cum omnia quae divinae provident] ae subduntur a lege aeterna regulentur et mensurentur, ut ex dictis patet,6 mariifestum est quod omnia participant aliqualiter legem aeternam, inquantum scilicet ex impressione ejus habent inclinationes in proprios actus et Inter caetera autem rationalis Unde cum Psalmista dixisset,7 busdam quaerentibus quae sunt Nam omnis ratiocinatio derivatur appetitus eorum quae sunt ad fin 'Romans 2, 14. Glossa Lombardi. PL ibi, 1345 Eia2ae. 90, I ad 1 6aft. I 1 Psalms 4, 6 BIn the body of the article Bia2se. 10, i fines. creatura excellentiori quodam modo divinse providentiae subjacet, inqv antum et ipsa fit providentiae particeps, sibi ipsi et aliis providens. Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna per quam habet naturalem inclination em ad debitum actum et finem, et talis participatio legis aeternae in ration ali creatura 'lex naturalis' dicitur. Sacrificate sacrificium justitice, quasi qui-justitiae opera, subjungit, Multi dicunt, Quis ostendit nobis bona? Cui quaestioni respondens, dicit, Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine; quasi lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum et quid malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam impressio luminis divini in nobis. Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura. 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum cbuod ratio ilia procederet si lex naturalis esset aliquid diversum a lege aeterna. Non autem est nisi quaedam partici- irt.s 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod omnis operatio rationis et voluntatis derivatur in nobis ab eo quod est se cundum naturam, ut supra habitům est.9 a principiis naturaliter notis, et omnis m derivatur a naturali appetitu ultimi varieties of law apart. Since the other animals are not subject to natural law, then neither are men. on the other hand, commenting on the text of Romans, When the Gentiles, who have not the Law, bdo by nature those things that are of the Law, a gloss says, Although they have no written law yet they have the natural law, whereby each understands and is aware for himself of what is good and what is bad* reply: Law is a rule and measure, as we have said,6 and therefore can exist in two manners, first as in the thing which is the rule and measure, second as in the thing that is ruled and measured, and the closer the second to the first the more regular and measured it will be. Since all things are regulated and measured by Eternal Law, as we have seen,6 it is evident that all somehow share in it, in that their tendencies to their own proper acts and ends are from its impression. Among them intelligent creatures are ranked under divine Providence the more nobly because they take part in Providence by their own providing for themselves and others. Thus they join in and make their own the Eternal Reason through which they have their natural aptitudes for their due activity and purpose.0 Now this sharing in the Eternal Law by intelligent creatures is what we call 'natural law'. That is why the Psalmist after bidding us, Offer the sacrifice of justice, and, as though anticipating those who ask what are the works of justice, and adding, There be many who say, Who will us any good? makes reply, The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us,7 implying that the light of natural reason by which we discern what is good and what evil, is nothing but the impression of divine light on us. Accordingly it is clear that natural law is nothing other than the sharing in the Eternal Law by intelligent creatures. Hence: i. This fine of reasoning would be all very well were natural law quite separate from the Eternal Law, instead of being, as we have shown,8 a participation in it.d 2. We have stated9 that all activity of reason and will springs from us as being what we are by nature. All reasoning draws on sources we regagruze naturally, and all choosing of objectives subordinate to ends is charged with bWho have not the Law, i.e. the Torah, the Pentateuch. cRational creatures move themselves with reference to the end in view, and therefore can live with God and be associates in his Providence, ia. 18, 3 & 4; 22, 2 ad 4 & 5. This sharing in God's law is the theme of CG in, 111-46. This association is taken into a new dimension by the friendship of charity; ia2ae. 109, 3. 2a2se. 23, r. dNot separate: cf ia2a;. 91, 1, note a. 22 23 summa theologize, ia2Se. 91, 3 finis; et sic etiam oportet quod prima fiat per legem naturalem. 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod pant rationem aeternam suo modo: quia rationalis creatura participat ideo participatio legis aeternas in nam lex est aliquid rationis, ut subra irrationali non participatur rationaliter: per similitudinem. ad tertium sie proceditur:1 1. Vid Lex enim naturalis est participatio naturalis suffkit ad omnia humana quod sit aliqua lex humana. 2. Prasterea, lex habet rationem humana non est mensura rerum, directio actuum nostrorum ad finem etiam animalia irrationalia partici-sicut et rationalis creatura. Sed earn intellectuahter et rationaliter, creatura rationali proprie lex vocatur: dictum est.10 In creatura autem unde non potest did lex nisi articulus 3. utrum lit aliqua lex humana tur quod non sit aliqua lex humana. legis sterna;, ut dictum est.2 Sed per legem seternam omnia sunt ordinatissima, ut Augustinus dicit.3 Ergo lex ordinanda. Non est ergo necessarium mensura;, ut dictum est.4 Sed ratio sed potius e converso, ut in Meta.5 dicitur. Ergo ex ratione humana nulla lex procedere potest. 3. Praeterea, mensura debet esse certissima, ut dicitur in Meta.6 Sed dictamen humana; rationis de rebus gerendis est incertum, secundum illud Sap.,1 Cogitationes mortalium timida.', et incertce providentice nostra. Ergo ex ratione humana nulla lex procedere potest. sed contra est quod Augustinus potait duas leges, unam seternam, et aliam temporalem, quam dicit esse humanam.8 RESPONSio: Dicendum quod, sicui dictamen practica; rationis. Similis practica; et speculative: utraque supra dictum est,9 lex est quoddam lutem processus esse invenitur rationis enjm ex quibusdam principiis ad quasdam 10ia2ae. 90,1 1cf ia2i£. 95,1 2art. 2 3De lib. arbit. I, 6. PL 32,1229 4ia2ae. 90, I ''Metaphysics ix, 9. 1053331 "ibid ''Wisdom 9,14 *De lib. arbit. I, 6 & 15. PL 32, 1229 & 'ia2ie. 90, 1 ad z "The objection has stressed the accepted operate per naturam, and acting through [238 distinction between acting through nature, will, operare per voluntatem: the first im- varieties of law natural appetite for our ultimate end.e Accordingly the original directing of our activity to an end should be through natural law. 3. Even non-rational creatures share in the Eternal Reason in their own way. The way, however, for rational creatures is intelligent and reasonable; that is why their sharing is called law properly speaking, since law, as we have seen,10 belongs to mind. Non-rational creatures do not hold law as perceiving its meaning, and therefore we do not refer to them as keeping the law except by a figure of speech. article 3. is there a human law? the third point:1 i. It would seem that there is no human law. Natural law, it has been stated,2 is a sharing in the Eternal Law, through which, as Augustine remarks, all things are consummately ordered.3 Therefore natural law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs, and any human law is needless. 2. Besides, it has been stated that law is a measure.4 The human reason, however, is not the measure of things; rather the converse is true, as noted in the Metaphysics.5 Therefore it can issue no law. 3. Again, as also noted in the Metaphysics,6 a measuring rule should be quite dependable. In matters of conduct the dictates of reason are unreliable; according to Wisdom,1 The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain. Hence no law can proceed from human reason. on the other hand there is Augustine postulating two kinds of law, one eternal, the other temporal, which last he calls human.8 reply: As we have seen,9 law is a kind of dictate of the practical reason. Now the processes of the theoretic and practical reasons are parallel; both, we have held, start from certain principles and come to certain plies an unconscious determinism, the second awareness and, when subordinate goods are engaged, choice (ia2a;. 10, 1 ad 1). Here as elsewhere St Thomas is careful not to dissociate morality and legality from their physical and instinctive sources. Our knowledge starts from assents we have not reasoned out, our love from wants we have not chosen, cf Vol. 18 of this series, Appendices 1-4. His regard for the biological basis of law, that is the preconscious and premoral forces of social cohesion, will reappear, notably in relating law to the natural appetite for self-preservation (ia2ae. 94, 2), in finding place for Ulpian's definition of natural law in terms of what we share in common with animals (2a2ae. 57, 3), and in treating the political or 'civilized' in its Greek and Aristotelean sense as an expansion of the 'natural', rather than in its Latin and juristic sense of an order imposed on it (ia2ae. 95,1 & 2. In Ethic, v, lect. 12. H34bl8). 24 25 summa theo LOGIJEj ia2SE. 91, 3 i etiim sujra conclusiones procedit, ut superius dicendum est quod sicut in ratiqne strabilibus naturaliter cognitis scientiarum, quarum cognitio non industriam rationis inventa, ita quibusdam principiis communibus ratio humana procedat ad aliqua Et istx particulares dispositi humanam, dicuntur 'leges humaiW pertinent ad rationem legis, ut sua Rhet., quod initium juris est consuetudinem ex utilitatis ratione z consuetudine probatas legum metus 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum ad plenum dictamen rationis divinjse, sicut ex parte rationis speculativa: sapientiae inest nobis cognitio autem cujuslibet veritatis propria tinetur, ita etiam ex parte rationfs legem atternam secundum secundum particulares directiones continentur. Et ideo necesse est particulares quasdam legum 2. Ad secundum dicendum regula rerum, sed principia ei generales et mensura; omnium quorum ratio naturalis est regula qua; sunt a natura. 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod sunt singularia et contingentia, speculativa. Et ideo leges humana; quam habent conclusiones omnis mensura sit omnino possibile in genere suo. quod 1 quorumdam i habitům est.10 Secundum hoc ergo speculativa ex principiis indemon-^roducuntur conclusiones diversarum est nobis naturaliter indita sed per ex praeceptis legis naturalis, quasi ex et indemonstrabilibus, necesse est quod i|nagis particulariter disponenda. ones adinventae secundum rationem observatis aliis conditionibus quae dictum est.11 Unde Tullius dicit in a natura profectum; deinde qucedam in 'enerunt; postea res a natura profectas, et et religio sanxit.12 ratio humana non potest participare , sed suo modo et imperfecte. Et ideo, per naturalem participationem divinae communium principiorum, non cognitio, sicut in divina sapientia con-practicae naturaliter homo participat am communia principia, non autem singulorum, quae tarnen in aeterna lege tilterius quod ratio humana procedat ad sanct tones. quod ratio humana secundum se non est naturahter indita sunt regula; quaedam eorum qua; sunt per hominem agenda, eus dimisit hominem in manu consilii sui.4 ut supra habitům est.5 Ergo homo Sed dictamen rationis humanae est ;o non oportet quod homo aliqua lege sufncientior irrationalibus creaturis. Sed aliquam legem divinam praeter incli-Ergo multo minus creatura rationalis praeter naturalem legem. legem a Deo sibi poni, dicens Psalm.'1 tificationum tuarum. praeter legem naturalem et legem humanam, humanae vitae habere legem divinam. Et ;em dirigitur homo ad actus proprios in qu :dem homo ordinaretur tantum ad finem nituralis facultatis hominis, non oporteret directivum ex parte rationis supra legem pDsitam, quae ab ea derivatur. Sed quia beatudnis aeternae, quae excedit proportionem svpra habitum est,8 ideo necessarium fuit humajnam dirigetur etiam ad suum fmem lege ad 3. CG I, 4 & 5. Ill Sent. 38, I. In Gal. 3, is about an historical fact, namely the This law is properly supernatural, and varieties of law article 4. was a divine law necessary ? the fourth point:1 i. There seems no need for a divine law,a for, as remarked,2 natural law is our sharing in the Eternal Law. This, however, is the divine law, as also remarked.3 A divine law besides natural law and the human laws deriving from it would therefore seem to be needless. 2. Besides, Ecclesiasticus tells us that God left man in the hand of his own counsel.* Taking counsel, as we have seen,6 is an act of reason. Therefore man was left free to be governed by his own reason. Now it has been held that the dictate of reason is human law.6 Consequently there is no need for man to be governed by a divine law as well. 3. Also, by nature men are more self-contained than non-rational creatures.b Now these have no divine law over and above the natural tendencies imparted to them. Much less, then, should rational creatures be given a divine law over and above their natural law. on the other hand David besought God to appoint a law for him, Set before me for a law the way of thy justification.1 reply: The guidance of human conduct required a divine law besides natural law and human law. And for four reasons. First, because law directs men to the actions matching what they are made for. Were they destined only to an end not beyond their natural abilities they would need no directive of reason over and above natural law and human law built on it. Yet they are set towards an eternal happiness out of proportion to their natural resources, as we have shown,8 and therefore must needs be directed by a divinely given law above natural and human law. therefore above natural law when 'natural' refers to all that is involved in man's specific constitution; it does not follow, however, that it is thereby a kind of positive law. (Positive here means posited by will, not the opposite of negative.) For positive law is contrasted with natural law when 'natural' is taken to mean all that wells up from within a subject. For the two senses of 'natural', cf Appendix 3; also Vol. 1 of this series, Appendix 8. In fact the divine law is based on laws that are natural in their content, thus the elementary rational decencies, and furthermore its main laws are natural rather than positive in their style. Such are the moral precepts of the Old Law(ia2ae. 99,2; 100, 1) which support its ceremonial and judicial precepts (ia2K. 102-5). And the heart of the New Law of charity—than which nothing is more intrinsic in its motion (2a2ae. 23, 2; 26, 3 & 7)—is a spirit, not a code (ia2ae. 106, I & 2; 107, 4), though the Christian dispensation also contains much positive law in the way of sacramental, liturgical, and disciplinary enactments. bia. 18, 3 describes the ascending scale of life as a more and more self-containedness. 28 29 SUMMA THEOLO Jiff., Ia232. 91, 4 Secundo, quia propter incertitudinem humani judicii, praecipue de rebus contingentibus et particularibus, contngit de acribus humanis diversorum esse diversa judicia, ex quibus etiam civersa; et contraria; leges procedunt. Ut ergo homo absque omni dubitatione scire possit quid ei sit agendum et quid vitandum, necessarium fuit ut in acribus propriis dirigetur per legem divinitus datam, de qua constat quod non potest errare. Tertio, quia de his potest homo legem facere de quibus potest judicare. Judicium autem hominis esse non pot:st de interioribus acribus qui latent, sed solum de exterioribus motibus qu: apparent; et tarnen ad perfectionem virtutis requiritur quod in utrisque acribus homo rectus existat. Et ideo lex humana non potuit cohibere et ordir are sufficienter interiores actus, sed necessarium fuit quod ad hoc'superv(:niret lex divina. Quarto, quia, sicut Augustinus dicii ,9 lex humana non potest omnia qua; male fiunt punire vel prohibere; quia, dum auferre vellet omnia mala, sequeretur quod etiam multa bona tollerentur, et impediretur utilitas boni communis, quod est necessarium ad conversationem humanam. Ut ergo nullum malum improhibitum et imrurntum remaneat, necessarium fuit supervenire legem divinam, per quam omnia peccata prohibentur. Et istse quatuor causa; tanguntur :n Psalm, ubi dicitur,10 Lex Domini Immaculata, idest nullam peccati tiirpitudinem permittens, convertens animas, quia non solum exteriores actus sed etiam interiores dirigit, testimonium Domini fidele, propter airtittidinem veritatis et rectituclinis, sapientiam prcestans parvulis, inquantum ordinat horninem ad supernaturalem finem et divinum. 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum qucid per naturalem legem participatur lex aeterna secundum proportionem capacitatis humana; natura;. Sed oportet ut altiori modo dirigatur homo in ultimum finem supernaturalem. Et ideo superadditur lex divinitus da :a, per quam lex aeterna participatur altiori modo. 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod cdnsilium est inquisitio quatdam, unde oportet quod procedat ex aUquibus principiis. Nec sufficit quod procedat ex principiis naturaliter inditis, qua; sunt praecepta legis naturae, propter praedicta in corp. art.;11 sed oportei: quod superaddantur quaedam aha principia, scilicet praecepta legis divir as. 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod creiiturae irrationales non ordinantur ad °De lib. orbit. I, 5. PL 32, 1228 10Psalms 18, 8 "In the body of the article "This second passage argues the need of a observe purely rational commands for th: need of grace in order to know truth and qo special divine reinforcement if we are to good life; cf ia. 1, 1. CG I, 4. For the good, cf ia2Ee. 109, 1-4. VARIETIES OF LAW I .,. / Second, because of the (u^ustwortiriness of human judgment, notably on contingent and particular issues, different people come to differing decisions about human conduct, with the result that diverse and conflicting laws are passed. That men may know without any doubt what should or should not be done there was required a divinely given law carrying the assurance that it cannot be mistaken.0 Third, men can make laws on matters on which they are competent to judge. They cannot pronounce on inward motions which are hidden, but only on outward and observable behaviour.3 Nevertheless full virtue means that a man is right in both. Since human law is not enough, the complement of divine law is needed to check and guide what goes on within us. Fourth, Augustine remarks that human law cannot forbid or punish all wrongdoing,9 for were it to try to do away with all evils it would also take away much that was good, and so hinder what the common good requires in civilized intercourse. Hence the need of a divine law which misses nothing and leaves no evil unforbidden or unpunished.e These four reasons are touched on in the Psalm10 which declares, The law of the Lord is unspotted, that is allowing no filth of sin, converting hearts, that is, directing us within and without, the testimony of the Lord is sure, that is, reliably truthful and right, giving wisdom to little ones, that is, lifting humanity to a divine and supernatural end. Hence: I. Although through natural law the Eternal Law is shared in according to the capacity of human nature, nevertheless in order to be directed to their ultimate supernatural end men have to be lifted up, and through the divine grant of an additional law which heightens their sharing in the Eternal Law.1 2. Taking counsel is a sort of investigation, and therefore should progress from some principles. Those imparted to us by nature are not enough, for the reasons given above,11 and therefore over and above the precepts of natural law some other principles are needed, namely precepts of divine law. 3. The comparison breaks down, because non-rational creatures are The restriction of human law to outward behaviour will be discussed later, ia2a;. 96, 2 & 3. Appendix 8. This fourth argument, like the third, opens the way for the distinction between crime and sin; the first a punishable offence against the public order, the second against the ultimate common good; ia2se. 21, 3 & 4. For the Last Judgment as the summing up of justice, cf CG IV, 96. Supplementum 88,1. 'See note a above. The law of grace is not a code of positive law, though it is given to us by a free decree of God's saving will, and in this sense is additional to the law of man's specific nature, which also as a contingently existing derivation of the Eternal Law is an effect of divine freedom (ia2ae. 91, 1 & 2). 31 SUMMA THEOLOGIAN, Ia2a£. 91, 5 altiorem finem quam sit finis qu est proportionatus naturali virtuti ipsarum. Et ideo non est similis ratio. articulus 5. utrum le. AD QUiNTUM sic proceditur:1 i. Vicetur Unius enim regis in uno regno est comparatur ad Deum sicut ad unurti omnis terrce Deus. Ergo est una tantjum 2. Praeterea, lex omnis ordinatur quibus legem fert. Sed unurn et i hominibus, secundum illud 1 ad agnitionem veritatis venire.3 Ergo 3. Praeterea, lex divina propinqvfior una, quam lex naturalis, quanto naturae. Sed lex naturalis est una lex divina. sed contra est quod Apostolus did i est ut legis translatio fiat. Sed scilicet sacerdotium leviticum et s est lex divina, scilicet Lex Vetus el divina sit una tantutn quod lex divina sit una tantum. una lex. Sed totum humanum genus regem, secundum illud Psalm.,2, Rex lex divina. £d finem quern legislator intendit in eis est quod Deus intendit in omnibus , Vult omnes homines salvos fieri, et ad tantum est lex divina. esse videtur legi sternae, quae est est revelatio gratiae quam cognitio omnium hominum. Ergo multo magis idem Tim. allior :, ad Heb.f Translato sacerdotio, necesse saceMotium est duplex, ut ibidem dicitur, acerdotium Christi. Ergo etiam duplex Lex Nova. 11 responsio: Dicendum quod, sicut numeri. Duphciter autem inveniun|tur quae sunt omnino specie diversa, fectum et imperfectum in eadem specie, divina distinguitur in legem veteran Gal.,e comparat statum veteris legis statum autem novae legis comparat paedagago. Attenditur autem perfectio et tria quas ad legem pertinent, ut supra Prirno enim ad legem pertinet ad finem, ut supra dictum est. Primo dictum est,6 distinctio est causa aliqua distingui: uno modo, sicut ea it equus et bos; alio modo, sicut per-sicut puer et vir. Et hoc modo lex et legem novam. Unde Apostolus, ad statui pueri existentis sub paedagogo; statui viri perfecti, qui jam non est sub imperfectio utriusque* legis secundum dictum est.7 ut ordinetur ad bonum commune sicut quidem potest esse duplex, scilicet Quod *Piana: omits utriusque 1cf iaxse. 107, I. In Gal. 1, led. 2 ^Psalms 46, 8 3i Timothy 2, 4 Hebrews 7, 12 »13.30,3 'Galatians 3, 24 varieties of law not destined to an end higher than that one matching their natural constitution. article 5. is there but one divine law? the fifth point i11. It would seem that there is but one divine law.1 Where there is one king in one kingdom there is but a single body of law. Now the whole of mankind is subject to God as to one king, For God is the king of all the earth* Therefore there is but one divine law. 2. Moreover, all law is directed to the purpose the legislator has in making matters of law. Now God has one and the same purpose for all men, according to the text, Who will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.3 Therefore there is a single body of divine law. 3. Then also, divine law seems closer than natural law to the Eternal Law, and so much the more because the revelation of grace is higher than the knowledge of nature. Now natural law is the same for all men. So, then, and with all the more reason is divine law. on the other hand St Paul says,* For the priesthood being changed, there is made of necessity a change also of the law. The priesthood is twofold, as the same chapter brings out, namely the Levitical priesthood and the priesthood of Christ. Correspondingly the divine law is twofold, namely the Old Law and the New Law. reply: We saw in the Prima Pars5 that distinction is the cause of number. Now things may be distinct in two manners. First, as being quite different in kind, for instance a horse and an ox. Second, as being fully developed or undeveloped things of the same kind, for instance a grown-up and a child. It is in this second manner that the divine law is divided into the Old Lawb and the New Law. Accordingly St Paul in Galatians6 compares the Old Law to the condition of a schoolboy under a tutor and the New Law to the condition of an adult who is no longer subject to one. Their differences of development appear according to three elements in law already observed.7 First, we have stated3 that the purpose of law is to be ordained to the common good, and this can be twofold. The one is material and earthly 7ia2a:. 90, 1, 2, 3; 91, 1 ad 3; 3 8ia2ae. 90, 2 aia2x. 107 discusses the continuity between the Old Law (Vol. 29) and the New Law (Vol. 30). The whole body of Mosaic legislation, not merely the Decalogue, comprising moral, liturgical, and political precepts; iaas. 99, 2, 3, 4 & 5. 32 33 summa THEOLOGIffi., ia23E. 91, 5 bonum sensibile et terrenum. Et ad tale bonum ordinabat directe lex vetus: unde statim, Exod.,9 in principio legis invitatur populus ad regnum ter-renum Chananaeorum. Et iterum bor um intelligibile et coeleste; et ad hoc ordinat lex nova: unde statim Christus ad regnum coelorum in suae praídicationis principio invitavit, dicens, Pcenitentiam agite, appropinquabit enim regnum ccelorum.10 Et ideo Augustinus dicit quod temporalium rerum promissiones in Testamento veteri continentur, et ideo 'vetus' appellatur; sed aeternae vitas promissio ad novum pertinet Testamentům.11 Secundo, ad legem pertinet dirigei e humanos actus secundum ordinem justitise, in quo etiam superabundat lex nova legi veteri, interiores actus animi ordinando, secundum illud Matt.,12 Nisi abundaverit justitia vestra plus quam Scribarum et Pharisceorum, non intrabitis in regnum coelorum; et ideo dicitur quod lex vetus cohibet manum, lex nova animum.13 Tertio, ad legem pertinet inducer i homines ad observantias mandato-rum, et hoc quidem lex vetus faciebat timore poenarum; lex autem nova facit hoc per amorem, qui in cordibus nostris infunditur per gratiam Christi, quae in lege nova confertur, i;ed in lege veteri figurabatur. Et ideo dicit Augustinus quod brevis differentia est legis et Evangelii, timor et amor.1* 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut paterfamilias in domo alia mandata proponit pueris et aha adult s, ita etiam unus rex Deus in uno suo regno aliam legem dedit hominibus adhuc imperfectis existentibus,etaliam perfectiorem jam manuductis per priorem legem ad majorem capacitatem divinorum. 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod salus hominum non poterat esse nisi per Christum, secundum illud Act.,11 Non est aliud nomen datum hominibus in quo opor teat nos salvos fieri. Et : deo lex perfecte omneš ad salutem inducens dari non potuit nisi post Christi adventům; antea vero dari oportuit populo ex quo Christus era: nasciturus legem praeparatoriam ad Christi susceptionem, in qua quedam rudimenta salutaris justitia; continentur. 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod lex naturalis dirigit hominem secundum quaedam prsecepta communia, in qiiibus conveniunt tarn perfecti quam imperfecti; et ideo est una omnium. Sed lex divina dirigit hominem etiam in particularibus quibusdam, ad qui e non similiter se habent perfecti et imperfecti; et ideo oportuit legem dictum est in corp. "Exodus 3, 8-17 10Matthew 4, 17 ^Contra Faustum iv, 2. PL 42, 217 "Matthew 5, 20 "Peter Lombard, Sentences III, 40, 1. Qvlaracchi II, 734 divinám esse duplicem, sicut jam varieties of law benefit; this was directly envisaged by the Old Law, which from the start invited the chosen people to the promised land of Chanaan.9 The other is spiritual and heavenly good; to this we are directed by the New Law. At the opening of his ministry our Lord invited us to the kingdom of heaven; Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand10 Accordingly Augustine says that the Old Testament contains the promise of temporal things, which is why it is called 'old', whereas the New Testament offers the promise of eternal life.11 Second, it is the role of law to guide human acts according to the plan of justice, and here also the New Law is much fuller than the old Law by governing also the inner acts of heart and soul; Unless your righteousness shall exceed that of the Scribes and Pharisees you shall in no case enter the kingdom of heaven.12 Hence the saying that the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law the spirit.13 Third, it is the office of law to lead men into keeping its commandments. This the Old Law did through fear of penalty, but the New Law through love shed in our hearts by the grace of Christ. This is imparted by the New Law, but only prefigured in the Old. So Augustine remarks, fear and love0 —the difference in brief between the Law and the Gospel.1* Hence: 1. As the head of the family proposes different commands for children and for adults in the household, so also God, sole king in his single kingdom, gives one law to people who are still backward, and another and ampler law to those who have been led by the first to a fuller receptiveness of divine things. 2. Man's ultimate well-being cannot be achieved save through Christ, according to Acts,15 There is no other name under heaven given among men whereby we must be saved. That is why the law bringing all to salvation could not have been given until after Christ's coming. Before then it was fitting that the people from whom Christ was to be born should have been given a law which prepared them to welcome him, a law containing the rudiments of saving justice. 3. Natural law guides man with certain general precepts which all should commonly observe, whether they be advanced in virtue or not. It is the same for all, whereas the divine law is a guide in certain determinate matters, which are not equally on the map for people at different stages of development. This accounts, as we have argued in the article, for the doubling of the divine law. ^Contra Adimantum Manichcei discipulum 17. PL 42, 159 "Acts 4, 12 CA play on ti-mor and a-mor. 34 35 summa theol OGIAL, IS2X. 91, 6 articulus 6. utrum ad sextum sic proceditur:1 1. enim Isidorus quod lex in ratione ratione, sed magis a ratione deviat 2. Praeterea, omnis lex obligate transgressores dicuntur. Sed fomes ex hoc quod ipsum non sequitur; ipsum sequatur. Ergo fomes non 3. Praeterea, lex ordinatur ad Sed fomes non inclinat ad bonum Ergo fomes non habet rationem leg is tor a Videtir quod non sit aliqua lex fomitis. Dicit istit.2 Fomes autem non consistit in Ergo fomes non habet rationem legis. est, ita quod qui earn non servant non constituit aliquem transgressorem magis transgressor redditur si quis hibet rationem legis, boi.um commune, ut supra habitům est.3 coipmune, sed magis ad bonum privatum. sed contra est quod Apostolus repugnantem legi mentis mece.4 responsio: Dicendum quod, sicu invenitur in regulante et mensurinte mensuratur et regulatur; ita quod invenitur in his qua; subjecta sun: supra dictis patet.6 Potest autem in his quae subdunlur citer a legislatore. Uno modo in quuitum aliquid, et interdum diversos* ad d.versos potest dici quod alia est lex milium indirecte, inquantum scilicet per subditum aliqua dignitate sequitu|r quasi in aliam legem: puta si miles rusticorum vel mercatorum. Sic igitur sub Deo legislatore div inclinationes, ita ut quod uni est hoc sit aliqua lex fomitis dicit, Video aliam legem in membris tneis supra dictum est,5 lex essentialiter participative autem in eo quod omnis inclinatio vel ordinatio qua; legi participative dictur 'lex', ut ex legi aliqua inclinatio inveniri dupli-directe suos inclinat subditos ad actus: secundum quem modum , et alia est lex mercatorum. Alio modo quod legislator destituit aliquem sibi quod transeat in alium ordinem, et ex militia destituatur transibit in legem :rsa: creaturae diversas habent naturales quodammodo lex, alteri sit contra legem; *Piana: omits diversos Jcf ia2ae. 93, 3. In Rom. 7, lect. 4 ^Etymologies v, 3. PL 82, 199 3ia2Ee. 90, 2 6ia28E. 90, i ad i; 91, 2 aThe law of lust. The article does not has a sense less shady than for his 2 & 3; 59, i & 2. De veritate xxxv. 1, concupiscence reigning in man's phy original sin (cf ia2ae. 82, 3, Vol. 26), my members', which is equivalent to wood, signifies the readiness of our 'Romans 7, 23 6art. 2 peak of concupiscentia, which for St Thomas predecessors: cf ia. 81, I, 2 & 3. ia2a;. 30, I, 2 & 4. The Augustinian concept of a law of deal and fallen nature, indeed constituting i be related to the Pauline 'another law in tlie lex fomitis. Fomes, kindling, tinder, touch-sepsual nature to catch alight or flare up with varieties of law article 6. is there a law of lust? the sixth point:1 i. It seems there is no law of lust.3 For, as Isidore says, law consists in reason.1 Lust, however, far from keeping with reason, strays away from it, and consequently does not bear the character of law. 2. Besides, all law is obligatory, and the consequence is that those who do not keep it are spoken of as transgressors. Yet a person becomes a transgressor by following concupiscence, rather than by not following it. Therefore it does not possess the quality of law. 3. In addition, the purpose of law is the common good, as noted above.3 Lust, however, tends towards private satisfaction, not the common good. Hence it does not share the nature of law. on the other hand there is the Apostle saying, / see another law in my members fighting against the law in my mind.* reply: We have already observed5 that the essence of law lies in the ruler and measurer, and that thence it is imparted to the tilings which are ruled and measured, and we have concluded that every ordered tendency in such subjects may be called law in a derivative sense.6 Now we find that these tendencies in subjects are ruled by the lawmaker in two ways, directly and indirectly. Directly when he sways them in accordance with their proper purpose and as needs be appoints different men to their appropriate duties: in this way we can say that there is one kind of law for the military and another for men of commerce. Indirectly, when a subject is dismissed from his rank by the ruler he falls into another station of life and, as it were, under another law; for instance as when a soldier is discharged and comes under the law affecting manual workers or tradesmen.1* Let us apply the analogy. Under God their lawgiver all created things have various natural tendencies, in such wise that what is a sort of law for inordinate passion. The term comes from Peter Lombard {Sentences n, 30, 8. Quaracchi 1,564. cf Damascene, Defide orthodoxa IV, 22. PG 94,1200), and was used by Trent about the effects of original sin. The law of animal desire includes the jungle law, the predatory pattern of consuming and being eventually consumed. The reply to the third objection sees this as part of the balance of nature. bPerhaps a reference to the conditions of knightly service and land work under late feudalism, perhaps also a hint of lofty looking down on 'trade': cf 2a2se. 77, 4 & 78,1 on money transactions. 'Directly' and 'indirectly': here the first means taking a subject according to what it is and is meant to be; the second according to what has befallen it. The main line of argument is clearer than the details. 36 37 summa THEOLoqiJE, ia2ae. 91, 6 ut si dicam quod furibundum esse est quodammodo lex canis, est autem contra legem ovis vel alterius mansucti animalis. Est ergo hominis lex, quam sortitur ex ordinatione divina, secundum propriam conditionem ut secundum rationem operetur. Quae quidem lex fuit tarn valida in primo statu ut nihil vel praeter rationem vel contra rationem posset subrepere homini. Sed dum homo a Deo recessit, incurrit in hoc quod feratur secundum impetum sensualitatis. Et unicuique etiam particulariter hoc contingit quanto magis a ratione reasserit: ut sic quodammodo bestiis assimiletur quae sensualitatis impetu Homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit; et similis factus est Ulis. Sic igitur ipsa sensualitatis inclinatio animalibus simpliciter habet rationem legis, illo tarnen modo quo in talibus lex did potest secundum directam incliaationem legis. In hominibus autem secundum hoc non habet rationem lfgis, sed magis est deviatio a lege rationis. Sed inquantum per divinam justitia et vigore rationis, ipse impetus rationem legis inquantum est poena is, et ex lege divina consequens hominem destitutum* propria dignitale i. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio ilia procedit de fomite secundum se considerato, prout inclinat ad malum: sic enim non habet rationem legis, ut dictum est in corp. art.,8 sed secundum quod sequitur ex divinae legis justitia: tanquam si diceretur lex esse quod aliquis nobilis propter suam culpam ad servilia open 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod ob feruntur, secundum illud Psalm.1 comparatus estjumentis insipientibus, quae Tomes' dicitur, in aliis quidem justitiam homo destituitur originali sensuaHtatis, qui eum ducit, habet induci permitteretur. ectio ilia procedit de eo quod est lex quasi regula et mensura; sic enim deviantes a lege transgressores consti tuuntur. Sic autem fomes non est lex, sed per quamdam participationem, ut supra dictum est.9 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio ilia procedit de fomite quantum ad inclinationem propriam, non autem quantum ad suam originem. Et tamen si consideretur inclinatio sensualitatii; prout est in aliis animalibus, sic ordinatur ad bonum commune, idest vel individuo; et hoc est etiam in rationi: sed fomes dicitur secundum id conservationem naturae in specie homine prout sensualitas subditur quod exit rationis ordinem. * Leonine: destituente, depriving him of his rightful rank ''Psalms 48, 21 8In the body of the article "ibid cOriginal justice: not a state of pure naturje and supernatural Tightness of which hun)ian ia2Ee. 81-5, Vol. 26 of this series. Also ia. aAt the beginning of the discussion. or natural innocence, but the gracious nature is deprived by original sin; :oo, 1. varieties of law one is against the law for another, as when I say that hunting a quarry is for hounds according to law, but for sheep and suchlike animals contrary to law. Now by divine ordinance there is a law apportioned to man in accordance with his rightful condition, namely that he should act according to reason. So valid was this law in his original state0 that nothing non-reasonable nor unreasonable could then take him unawares. But when he turned from God he fell into a condition where he could be carried away by sensuality. This befalls each particular individual to the extent that he falls from reason; in effect he becomes like the beasts who are borne along by their sense-appetites, according to the Psalm,7 Man when he was in honour did not understand; he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them. So therefore the urge of sensuality (called '/ ]cf rv Sent. 33, 1, 1 dcf ia2a:. 91, 6; 93, 3 ad ij 93, 6. est did esse habitus dupliciter: uno lex naturalis non est habitus. Dictum est aliquid per rationem constitutum, opus rationis. Non est autem idem uis enim per habitum grammatical agit habitus sit quod quis agit, non potest et essentialiter. quod habitu tenetur, sicut dicitur Fides quia praecepta legis naturalis quandoque ue autem sunt in ea habitualiter p otest did quod lex naturalis sit habitus: in speculativis non sunt ipsi habitus* quorum est habitus. Philosophus intendit ibi investigate sit quod virtus sit quoddam principium prindpia humanorum actuum, sdlicet haec autem tria sunt quaedam alia in est in volente, et etiam cognita sunt in animae insunt ei, ut immortalitas synderesis dicitur lex intellectus nostri éraecepta legis naturalis, quae sunt prima ratio ilia concludit quod lex naturalis objidtur, dicendum quod eo quod is uti non potest propter aliquod impe-uti habitu scientiae propter somnum, et intellectus principiorum, vel etiam lege propter defectum aetatis. articulus 2. utrum lex naturalis ccntineat plura prcecepta vel unum tantum Videtur quod lex naturalis non contineat Lex enim continetur in genere praecepti, natural law present in babies, and also in the damned, who cannot act through it.a Therefore natural law is not a habit. reply: You may call something a 'habit' in two senses, to refer, first, to what is properly in the category of habit; second, to what may be called a habit in a derivative sense. Properly and essentially natural law is not a habit. We have said7 that it is something constituted by the reason, after the fashion that a proposition is a piece of work done by the reason. Now that which you do and that whereby you do it are not identical, as when you compose a correct speech by using the habit of good grammar. Since a habit is a quality whereby you act, it follows that a law cannot be a habit in the proper and essential sense of the term. Yet in a derivative sense we speak of habit to refer to what is steadily held, thus the Faith means what is held by faith. In this manner, because the commandments of natural law sometimes are actually adverted to by the reason and sometimes are just setded convictions there, we may speak of natural law as a habit. So also the first indemonstrable principles of thought are not themselves the mental habits of holding them, but are the objective principles which engage them. Hence: 1. Aristotle is there exploring the category to which virtue belongs, and since virtue is among the principles of human activity he limits himself to these, namely powers of activity, habits of activity, and capacities for being acted on. Besides these three there are other psychological realities, for instance certain acts, such as actual willing in the person who wills, and objects also, such as things known in the person who knows, and inner qualities as well, such as immortality and the like. 2. Synderesis is called the law of our understanding inasmuch as it is the habit of keeping the precepts of natural law, which are the first principles of human activity. 3. This argument is to the effect that natural law is held by habit, and this we grant. As to the argument advanced to the contrary, observe that a settled active disposition which is part of one's constitution may not operate because of some hindrance, for instance a scientist does not think scientifically when he is asleep, or a child, because of his lack of years, does not use insight into first principles, or employ the natural law, though by settled dispositions both are within him. article 2. does natural law contain many precepts or only one? the second point:1 i. Apparently natural law does not contain several precepts, but only one. For it has been noted that a law is classified as a 76 77 summa the0l03ije, i£l2£e. 94, 2 natural law essent ut supra habitům est.2 Si igitur sequeretur quod etiam essent multae 2. Praeterea, lex naturahs consequitur natura est una secundum totum, heel ergo est unum praeeeptum tantum legi sunt multa secundum multirudinem tebit quod etiam ea quae sunt de incli|natione legem naturalem. 3. Praeterea, lex est aliquid ad ratiqnem Sed ratio in hornine est una tantum, naturalis. multa praecepta legis naturalis eges naturales. hominis náturám. Sed hum ana sit multiplex secundum partes. Aut is naturae propter unitatem totius, aut partium naturae humanae; et sic opor-concupiscibiUs pertineant ad Ergo sed contra est quia sic se habent praejeepta tum ad operabiüa sicut se habent prima prima principia indemonstrabilia supt naturae sunt plura. responsio: Dicendum quod, sicut pertinens, ut supra dictum est.3 solum unum praeceptum est legis legis naturalis in hornine quan-principia in demonstrativis. Sed plura. Ergo etiam praecepta legis supra dictum est,4 praecepta legis naturae hoc modo se habent ad ratio tiem practicam sicut principia prima demonstrationum se habent ad ratiorem speculativam: utraque enim sunt quaedam principia per se nota. Dicitur autem aliquid per se noturh dupliciter: uno modo secundum se, alio modo quoad nos. Secundum se quidem quaelibet propositio dicitur per se nota cujus praedicatum est de raiione subjecti: contingit tamen quod ignoranti definitionem subjecti talis propositio non erit per se nota, sicut ista propositio, 'Homo est rationale', est per se nota secundum sui naturam, quia qui dicit 'hominem' dicit 'rationale'; et tamen ignoranti quid sit homo, haec propositio non est per se nota. ]it inde est quod, sicut dicit Boětius,5 quaedam sunt dignitates vel propositivnes per se notce communiter omnibus; et hujusmodi sunt illae propositiones juarum termini sunt omnibus noti, ut 'Omne totum est majus sua parte' el 'Quae uni et eidem sunt aequalia sibi invicem sunt aequalia'. Quaedam vero propositiones sunt 3er se notae solis sapientibus, qui ter-minos propositionum intelligunt quid significent; sicut intelligenti quod angelus non est corpus per se notuni est quod non est circumscriptive in loco J quod non est manifestum rudibus, qui hoc non capiunt. Jia2ae. 92, 2 3ia2ae. 90, 1 *iazx. 91, 3 lDe hebdomadibus. PL 64, 1311 »This is the key-discussion on natural thought and of action is only an analogy; law . The parallel drawn between the 'laws' of the first are ruled by necessity, the second 78 precept.2 Were there several precepts of natural law it would follow that there were several natural laws. 2. Again, natural law is a corollary to human nature, which is one because man is a single whole and manifold because he has many parts. Either there is one precept of the law of nature on account of the first or there are many precepts on account of the second. If the last alternative be true then what relates to the urges of sense desire come into natural law. 3. In addition, it has been said that law is from reason.3 For all humanity this is one and the same. Therefore there is but one single precept of natural law. on the other hand the precepts of natural law are to human conduct what the first principles of thought are to demonstration. There are several first principles of thought, and so, also, several precepts of natural law. reply: We have drawn a parallel between the precepts of natural law for the practical reason and the axioms of science for the theoretical reason :** both are kinds of self-evident beginnings. Now a truth is self-evident at two stages, one, in itself, two, in our minds.b A proposition is self-evident in itself when the Predicate is of the essence of the Subject. At the same time the proposition may not be self-evident to a man who does not know the definition of the Subject. For instance, 'Man is a rational animal', is a self-evident proposition of its nature, since to say 'man' is to say 'rational'. Yet to somebody who does not grasp what man really is, the proposition is not self-evident. That is why Boethius says,5 there are some axioms or self-evident propositions generally known to all; such are the terms of which everybody recognizes, such as, 'The whole is greater than the part,' or, 'Things equal to a third thing are equal to one another'. Sometimes, however, propositions are self-evident only to the well-informed, who know what the terms of the proposition mean. Thus to one who appreciates that an angel is not a bodily substance it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscribed in place.0 This, however, is not manifest to those who are uninstructed and do not grasp what is meant. operate in the field of contingency. Neither here nor later will a quasi-geometrical articulation of natural-law precepts be proposed, cf ia2Ee. 94, 4. •■Immediately evident in itself and to us: the distinction first appears in the inquiry whether God exists, la. 2, 1 & 2. CG I, II. ia2se. 51, I applies it to the psychology of virtue, cf Posterior Analytics I, 2 & 3. 7ib34 & 72bl8. St Thomas, lect. 4, 5, & 7. In Physic. I, led. I. In Meta. IV, led. 6. The evidence of the Eternal Law, cf above, ia2ae. 93, 2. cia. 52, 1-3, the relation of pure spirits to place. 79 SUMMA THEOLOGIE, Ia23e. 94, 2 NATURAL LAW lensi jne In his autem quae in appreb invenitur. Nam illud quod prrmo cujus intellectus includitur in Et ideo primům principium affirmare et negare, quod fundatur et super hoc principio omnia alia Meta.6 Sicut autem ens est primum quod bonum est primum quod cadit in í ordinatur ad opus. Omne enim aj rationem boni. Et ideo primum fundatur supra rationem boni; qux Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum prosequendum, et malum vitandum pratcepta legis naturae, ut scilicet neant ad praecepta legis naturae quae esse bona humana. Quia vero bonum habet rationem inde est quod omnia ilia ad quae hoirjo naturaUter apprehendit ut bona, et et contraria eorum ut mala et vitanda Secundum igitur ordinem toram legis naturae. Inest enim prrnio dum naturam in qua communicat quadibet substantia appetit naturam; et secundum hanc i per quae vita hominis conservatur, Secundo inest hornini inclinatio hominum cadunt quidam ordo cadit sub apprehensione est ens, orrrdibus quaecumque quis apprehendit. indenjionstrabile est quod non est simul supra rationem entis et non entis; fjundantur, ut dick Philosophus in IV cadit in apprehensione simpliciter, ita ipprehensione practica; rationis, quae ;ens agit propter finem, qui habet pnbcipium in ratione practica est quod :st, bonum est quod omnia appetunt. legis, quod 'bonum est faciendum et et super hoc fundantur omnia aha cjimnia ilia facienda vel vitanda perti-ratio pactica naturaUter apprehendit ipis, malum autem rationem contrarii, habet naturalem inclinationem ratio rfer consequens ut opere prosequenda, 'Metaphysics IV, 3. 1005029. St Thomas "Ens, or a thing having reality. eThe principle of contradiction: 'simultaneously' 'under the same respect'. Indemonstrable Metaphysics IV, 3. 1005320-035. St Thonas. the Beginning of knowledge, yet conclusi >ns analogy is applied from theory to practice specific precepts can be extracted from corresponds to the first principle of thought conclusions and commands are based 'What all seek after: cf Ethics I, 1. 1094^3 good, see la. 4,1-4. Good, which all by cognition, not appetition. I desire, inclinajtionum naturaUum est ordo praecep-incUnatio hornini ad bonum secun-omnibus substantiis, prout scüicet conseilvationem sui esse secundum suam incUnatipnem pertinent ad legem naturalem ea contrarium impeditur. ad aliqua magis speciaha secundum cum i et naturam in qua communicat cum ctaeteris animaUbus; et secundum hoc lect. 4 & 6 includes 'at the same time' and because used in every demonstration. , lect. 6. cf In Anal. Post., lect. 20. It is are not there latent. Similarly when the , it is not contended that later and more the first precept of natural law which . Both are axioms, on which secondary from which they can be elucidated. For the metaphysics of being and the is validated as true good, bonum verum, Now we discover that the things which enter into our apprehension are ranged in a certain order. That which first appears is the real,11 and some insight into this is included in whatsoever is apprehended. This first indemonstrable principle, 'There is no affirming and denying the same simultaneously', is based on the very nature of the real and the non-real: on this principle, as Aristotle notes,6 all other propositions are based.e To apply the analogy: as to be real first enters into human apprehending as such, so to be good first enters the practical reason's apprehending when it is bent on doing something. For every agent acts on account of an end, and to be an end carries the meaning of to be good. Consequently the first principle for the practical reason is based on the meaning of good, namely that it is what all things seek after.1 And so this is the first command of law, 'that good is to be sought and done, evil to be avoided'; all other commands of natural law are based on this. Accordingly, then, natural-law commands extend to all doing or avoiding of things recognized by the practical reason of itself as being human goods.8 Now since being good has the meaning of being an end, while being an evil has the contrary meaning, it follows that reason of its nature apprehends the things towards which man has a natural tendency as good objectives, and therefore to be actively pursued, whereas it apprehends their contraries as bad, and therefore to be shunned. Let us continue. The order in which commands of the law of nature11 are ranged corresponds to that of our natural tendencies. Here there are three stages. There is in man, first, a tendency towards the good of the nature he has in common with all substances; each has an appetite to preserve its own natural being.1 Natural law here plays a corresponding part, and is engaged at this stage to maintain and defend the elementary requirements of human life. Secondly, there is in man a bent towards things which accord with his nature considered more specifically, that is in terms of what he has in common with other animals; correspondingly those matters are said to be ^Recognized by the practical reason of itself: naturaUter apprehendit, apprehends of its nature, not just because it is told. The argument is putting forward natural law as part of the spring of moral activity, not as an inventory of acts to be done or avoided. hThe text here reads 'lex natures', not the more usual 'lex naturalis'; the terms are used synonymously, nevertheless the former, 'the law of nature', more strongly suggests, though the point is not to be laboured, the non-moral and biological drives, here noticed, which underlie man's moral activity according to 'natural law' in the proper sense of the term: ia2ae. 90, 1 ad r. 'ia. 104,1 & 2, conservatio in esse. 'Appetite' is an analogical term, and the desire for self-preservation is not necessarily conscious in its subject; cf. ia. 78, 1 ad 3. 8l STJMMA THEOLOGIAN,, ia2E. 94, 3 . quae Di:o dicuntur ea esse de lege naturali cornmixtio maris et feminae, et Tertio modo inest horriini incl rationis quae est sibi propria: sicut hoc quod veritatem cognoscat de secundum hoc ad legem naturalenji clinationem spectant, utpote quod offendat cum quibus debet spectant. 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum inquantum referuntur ad unum unius legis naturalis. 2. Ad secundum dicendum quoc umcumque partium naturae secundum quod regulantur ration e. reducuntur ad unum primum sunt multa praecepta legis naturae una radice. 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod tiva omnium quae ad homines continentur omnia et quae ratione ; spectant natura omnia animalia docuit, ut est eduitatio liberorum, et similia.7 atio ad bonum secundum naturam Homo habet naturalem incUnationem ad 1, et ad hoc quod in societate vivat; et pertinent ea quae ad hujusmodi in-hbmo ignorantiam vitet, quod alios non conversari, et caetera hujusmodi quae ad hoc quod omnia ista praecepta legis naturae primum praeceptum habent rationem omnes hujusmodi inclinationes quar-humahae, puta concupiscibilis et irascibilis, pertinent ad legem naturalem, et praecelptum, ut dictum est,8 et secundum hoc i|n seipsis, quae tamen communicant in ratio, etsi in se una sit, tamen est ordina-; et secundum hoc sub lege rationis gulari possunt. ree articulus 3. utrum omnes ac 'us virtutum sint de lege natures ad tertium sic proceditur:1 1. ViÜetur sint de lege naturae, quia, ut supra ordinetur ad bonum commune. Se bonum privatum alicujus, ut patet ergo omnes actus virtutum legi subduntur 2. Praeterea, omnia peccata aliquibus igitur omnes actus virtutum sint quod omnia peccata sint contra quibusdam peccatis dicitur. c e quod non omnes actus virtutum dictum est,2 de ratione legis est ut quidam virtutum actus ordinantur ad praecipue in actibus temperantiae. Non naturali. virtuosis actibus opponuntur. Si lege naturae, videtur ex consequenti naturam; quod tamen specialiter de 7Digest i, i, 1. Berlin i, 29a "In the body of the article ]cf rv Sent. 13, 1, 3 2ia2se. 90, 2 iUlpian's authority is not acknowledged sentiment more embarrassing to a lawj text was not felicitous to a Stoic and an interpolation. St Thomas, however, an animal level; 2a2ae. 57, 3, before here, though his sentiment is adopted, a er than to an Aristotelean theologian. The tradition, and some have regarded it as returns later to this notion of natural law at examining Ulpian's classical definition of legal 82 natural law of natural law which nature teaches all animals,' for instance the coupling of male and female, the bringing up of the young, and so forth.7 Thirdly, there is in man an appetite for the good of his nature as rational,k and this is proper to him, for instance, that he should know truths about God and about living in society. Correspondingly whatever this involves is a matter of natural law, for instance that a man should shun ignorance, not offend others with whom he ought to live in civility, and other such related requirements. Hence: 1. As converging on one common primary precept these various precepts of natural law all take on the nature of one natural law. 2. All drives of human nature, to whatever part they belong, for example our emotional responsiveness to pain-pleasure objects and emergencies, all come under natural law so far as they can be charged with intelligence, and all come back, as we have submitted,8 to one primary precept. Accordingly the precepts of natural law, though manifold when considered in themselves alone, all have one single root. 3. While single in itself,1 the reason has to direct all the many matters affecting human life; consequently all that can be controlled fall under the kw of reason, article 3. is every act of virtue of natural lain? the third point:1 i. It would seem that every act of virtue does not belong to natural law, for, as already observed,2 it is of the nature of law that its commands are for the common good. Some acts of virtue are for private good—acts of temperance spring to mind as cases in point.a Therefore not every act of virtue falls under natural law. 2. Again, any sin is the opposite of some virtuous act. Were all virtuous acts of natural law apparently all sins would then be against nature. Only some sins, however, are termed unnatural. justice; 2a2Ee. 58, 1. Here he is making his own the thought that natural law rules instinctive as well as thoughtful adaptations to environment. k'Natural' has two main and cognate senses; Appendix 3. First to refer to the source of a thing's motion from within towards its proper end or good; in this way natural law is a natural principle, and remains natural even when taken up into the life of grace. The second refers to a thing's status in the hierarchy of being: here man is regarded at the three levels outlined in the article, namely as a substance, and especially a material substance, as an animal, and as rational—'rational' here means intelligent, and need not be confined to 'intelligent through reasoning'. Natural law enters at all three levels, but specifically and properly at the third, where natural law is rational law, and kata phusin is kata logon. Jia. 76, 4 & 8; 79, 8: the singleness of reason in the human composite. •The direct effect of temperance is to produce a well-balanced personality in the emotions regarding pleasure: cf ia2a;. 56, 4. 2a2je. 141, 2 & 3. 83 SUMMA THEO LOGIÄ, ia23E. 94, 3 3. Praeterea, in his qua; sunt in acribus virtutum non omnes quod est alteri vitiosum. Ergo naturae. seciindum naturam omnes conveniunt. Sed con veniunt: aüquid enim est virtuosům uni nn omnes actus virtutum sunt de lege sed contra est quod Damascenus et actus virtuosi subjacent legi dicit quod virtutes sunt naturales.* Ergo nat irae. propria: secuncum :natuialiter 1 responsio : Dicendum quod de uno modo inquantum sunt virtuos i in propriis speciebus considerati. Si igitur loquamur de actibus omnes actus virtuosi pertinent ai naturae pertinet omne ülud ad quoc^ ram.* Inclinatur autem convenientem secundum suam Unde cum anima rationahs sit inest cuilibet hornini ad hoc quod secundum virtutem. Unde lege naturali: dictat enim hoc agat. Sed si loquamur de actibus propriis speciebus considerantur, sj: naturae. Multa enim secundum inclinat; sed per rationis utiHa ad bene vivendum. 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum tias naturales cibi et potus, et bonum commune naturae, sicut et mune morale. 2. Ad secundum dicendum quae est propria hominis, et contra rationem sunt etiam contra vel ilia quae est communis homini quaedam specialia peccata dicuntu: mixtionem maris et foeminae, qua: concubitus masculorum, quod s; 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod actilbus virtuosis dupliciter loqui possumus: ; alio modo inquantum sunt tales actus virtutum inquantum sunt virtuosi, sic d legem naturae. Dictum est quod ad legem homo inclinatur secundum suam natu-unumqu'odque naturaliter ad operationem sibi formam, sicut ignis ad calefaciendum. forma hominis, naturalis inclinatio gat secundum rationem; et hoc est agere hoc omnes actus virtutum sunt de unicuique propria ratio ut virtuose 'De fide orthodoxa II, 14. PG 94, 1045 4art. 2 "Defide orthodoxa Ii, 4 & IV, 20. PG s; ia2ae. 4, 4 ad 2; 5 & 7; 19, 3 ad 2. Present argument goes on to treat 'truthfulness' (of t notes. case from Socrates. For the prudence or which are required, see 2a2ae. 51, 4; i ad 2), the natural law develops somewhat ..on. This development cannot be fitted into from art. 2 until art. 6 is working with four t(iat are like moral principles; 2. those that are by reason as safeguarding additions; 4. those ig a particular course of action. The first • activity, the fourth is mainly the 'situation no abrupt division between the first and the ordered variety of precepts. The distinction 88 NATURAL LAW to principles and to conclusions, though admittedly all do not recognize truth in the conclusions, but only in those principles which are called 'common conceptions'.10 In questions of action, however, practical truth and goodwill0 are not the same for everybody with respect to particular decisions, but only with respect to common principles; and even those who are equally in the right on some particular course of action are not equally aware of how right they are. So then it is evident that with respect to general principles of both theory and practice what is true or right is the same for all and is equally recognized. With respect to specific conclusions of theory the truth is the same for all, though all do not equally recognize it, for instance some are not aware that the angles of a triangle together equal two right angles. With respect to particular conclusions come to by the practical reason there is no general unanimity about what is true or right, and even when there is agreement there is not the same degree of recognition. All hold that it is true and right that we should act intelligently. From this starting point it is possible to advance the specific conclusion, that goods held in trust are to be restored to their owners. This is true in the majority of cases, yet a case can crop up when to return the deposit would be injurious, and consequently unreasonable, as for instance were it to be required in order to attack one's country.d The more you descend into the detail the more it appears how the general rule admits of exceptions, so that you have to hedge it with cautions and qualifications. The greater the number of conditions accumulated the greater the number of ways in which the principle is seen to fall short, so that all by itself it cannot tell you whether it be right to return a deposit or not.e To sum up: as for its first common principles, here natural law is the same for all in requiring a right attitude towards it as well as recognition.1 As for particular specific points, which are like conclusions drawn from common principles, here also natural law is the same for most people in between primary and secondary precepts of natural law according to their closeness to the first principles of morality seems to derive from an early Dominican master, Roland of Cremona (d. 1259). On the first and second Tables of the Law, see Ia2at. 100, 8. The third type of precept is treated under human law (see especially ia2ae. 95, 2). The fourth type of precept belongs to prudence, and is elicited by the judgment of conscience, not law; the example in the discussion, about returning a deposit, comes under this heading, but is introduced to show that laws, as the Summa is considering them, should not be reduced to hard and fast regulations. For example, drunkenness takes on a different aspect in the Middle Ages when men depended on fruit, honey, and wine for their sugar-intake, cf also In Ethic. V, lect. 12. 'Secundum rectitudinem, secundum notitiam, cf note c above. 89 summa theologie, ia2£e. 94, 5 notitiam general iles ta—et depravatam habitudine miquum i qucd 1:1 supra Unde dum rectitudinem et secundum deficere et quantum ad rectitudinerr menta—sicut etiam naturae paucioribus propter impediment; propter hoc quod aliqui habent mala consuetudine, seu ex mala olim latrocinium non reputabatur i legem naturae, ut refert Julius Caesar 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum dum quasi omnia quae in Lege et naturae, cum multa tradantur ibi naturae plenarie ibi traduntur. naturale est quod in Lege et in Evangeli junxit, Quo quisque jubetur alii facer\i facere quod sibinolitfieri.12 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod de his quae sunt naturahter justa quaedam conclusiones ex his derivata dinem, et ut in paucioribus deficiun:. 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod, si