COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND BOOK THE FIRST COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS O F ENGLAND. BOOK THE FIRST. B It WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, Esq, vinerian professor of law, and solicitor general to her majesty _OXFORD,_ PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS, M. DCC, L X V. 3§ Of the Nature of In t rod, Section the second. Of the NATURE of LAWS in general. LA W, in it's moil general and comprehenfive fenfe, fignifies a rule of action; and is applied indiscriminately to all kinds of adlion, whether animate, or inanimate, rational or irrational. Thus we fay, the laws of motion, of gravitation, of optics, or mechanics, as well as the laws of nature and of nations. And it is that rule of action, which is prefcribed by fome fuperior, and which the inferior is bound to obey. Thus when the fupreme being formed the univerfe, and created matter out of nothing, he impreffed certain principles upon that matter, from which it can never depart, and without which it would ceafe to be. When he put that matter into motion, he eftablifhed certain laws of motion, to which all moveable bodies muft .conform. And, to defcend from the greatefl operations to the fmalleft, when a workman forms a clock, or other piece of mechanifm, he eftablifhes at his own pleafure certain arbitrary Jaws for it's direction; as that the hand mail de-fcribe a given fpace in a given time; to which law as long as the work conforms, fo long it continues in perfection, and anfwers the end of it's formation. If we farther advance, from mere inactive matter to vegetable -and animal life, we mail find them flill governed by laws; more numerous indeed, but equally fixed and invariable. The whole progref of plants, from the feed to the root, and from thence to the ieed again; — the method of animal nutrition, digeftion, fecretion, §. 2. Laws in general. 39- fecretion, and all other branches of vital oeconomy; •— are not* left to chance, or the will of the creature itfelf, but are performed in a wondrous involuntary manner, and guided by unerring; rules laid down by the great creator. This then is the general fignification of law, a rule of action dictated by fome fuperior being; and in thofe creatures that have neither the power to think, nor to will* fuch laws rauft be invariably obeyed, fo long as the creature itfelf fubfifts, for it's exiftence depends on that obedience. But laws, in their more confined fenfe, and in which it is our prefent bufinefs to coniider them,, denote the rules, not of action in general, but of human action or conduct: that is, the precepts by which man, the nóbl eft of all fubtunary beings, a creature endowed with both rea-fon and freewill, is commanded to make ufe. of thofe faculties in the general regulation of his behaviour.. Man, coniidered as a creature, muft neceifarily be fubject to the laws of his creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. A being, independent of any other, has no rule to purfue* but fuch as he prefcribes to himfelf; but a ffcate of dependance will inevitably oblige the inferior to take the will of him,; on whom he depends, as the rule of his conduct: not indeed in every particular* but in all thofe points wherein his dependance con— filts. This principle therefore has more or lefs extent and effect, in proportion as the fuperiority of the one and the dependance of the other is greater or lefs, abfolute or limited. And confe— quently as man depends abfolutely upon his maker for every thing, it is neceffary that he ihould in all points conform to his. maker's will. Th i s will of his maker is called the law of nature.- For as God,, when he created matter,, and endued it with a principle of mobility, eíbbliíhed certain rules for the perpetual direction of that mo,tion; fo, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himfelf in all parts ot hie>, he laid, down certain 4-o Of the Nature of In trod. lain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in fome degree regulated and reftrained, and gave him alfo the faculty of reafon to difcover the purport of .thofe laws. Considering the creator only as a heing of infinite power, he was able unquestionably to have prefcribed whatever laws he pleafed to his creature, man, however unjuft or fevere. But as he is alfo a being of infinite ivifdom, he has laid down only fuch laws as were founded in thofe relations of juftice, that exifted in the nature of things antecedent to any pofitive precept. Thefe are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himfelf in all his difpenfations conforms; and which he has enabled human reafon to difcover, fo far as they are necefiary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are thefe principles : that we mould live honeftly, mould hurt nobody, and mould render to every one it's due; to which three general precepts Juftinian* has reduced the whole doctrine of law. But if the difcovery of thefe firft principles of the law of nature depended only upon the due exertion of right reafon, and could not otherwife be attained than by a chain of metaphyfical difquifitions, mankind would have wanted fome inducement to have quickened their inquiries, and the greater part of the world would have refted content in mental indolence, and ignorance it's jnfeparable companion. As therefore the creator is a being, not only of infinite power, and ivifdom, but alfo of infinite goodnefs, he has been pleafed fo to contrive the conftitution and frame of humanity, that we mould want no other prompter to enquire after and purfue the rule of right, but only our own felf-love, that univerfal principle of action. For he has fo intimately connected, fo infeparably interwoven the laws of eternal juftice with the happinefs of each individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by obferving the former; and, if the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In confequence of which mutual connection of juftice and human felicity, he has not pei> a Juris praecepta funt baec, bomfte [12] Even assuming this made in war or a conquered toward their master, except to do so. In taking an equivile: it: instead of killing him far, then, is he from having ated with his force, that th their relation itself is its war presupposes the absence convention; very well: but state of war, presupposes [13] Thus, from whatevejr slavery is null, not only be absurd and meaningless. TJ dictory; they are mutually another, or between a man always be equally absurd. entirely at your expense and as long as I please, and whi lerrible right to kill all, I say that a slave people is not bound to anything at all to obey him as long as they are forced nt of his life, the victor did not spare u|nprofitably, he killed him usefully. So acquired over him any authority associ-y continue in a state of war as before; ct, and the exercise of the right of of a peace treaty. They have made a ijhat convention, far from destroying the continuation. angle one looks at things, the right to tause it is illegitimate, but because it is lese words slavery and right are contra-xclusive. Either between one man and and a people, the following speech will effec Us make a convention with you which is entirely to my profit, which I shall observe h you shall observe as long as I please. C That One Always C [1] Even if I were to grant abettors of despotism would a great difference between society. When scattered men cessively enslaved to a singl and slaves, I do not see in will, an aggregation, but public good, nor body polit: half the world, still remains interest, separate from that private interest. When this scattered and without a into a heap of ashes on bei^ig Book I, Chapter 6 [359\ IApter Five Has to Go back to a First onvention everything I have thus far refuted, the be no better off. There will always be subjugating a multitude and ruling a regardless of their number, are suc-; man, I see in this nothing but a master it a people and its chief; it is, if you an association; there is here neither :ic. That man, even if he had enslaved nothing but a private individual; his )f the others, still remains nothing but a name man dies, his empire is left behind like an oak dissolves and collapses consumed by fire. not bond. [2] A people, says Grotius, can give itself to a king. So that according to Grotius a people is a people before giving itself to a king. That very gift is a civil act, it presupposes a public deliberation. Hence before examining the act by which a people elects a king, it would be well to examine the act by which a people is a people. For this act, being necessarily prior to the other, is the true foundation of society. [3] Indeed, if there were no prior convention, then, unless the election were unanimous, why would the minority be obliged to submit to the choice of the majority, and why would a hundred who want a master have the right to vote on behalf of ten who do not want one? The law of majority rule is itself something established by convention, and presupposes unanimity at least once. Chapter Six Of the Social Pact [360] [1] I assume men having reached the point where the obstacles that interfere with their preservation in the state of nature prevail by their resistance over the forces which each individual can muster to maintain himself in that state. Then that primitive state can no longer subsist, and humankind would perish if it did not change its way of being. [2] Now, since men cannot engender new forces, but only unite and direct those that exist, they are left with no other means of self-preservation than to form, by aggregation, a sum of forces that might prevail over those obstacles' resistance, to set them in motion by a single impetus, and make them act in concert. [3] This sum of forces can only arise from the cooperation of many: but since each man's force and freedom are his primary instruments of self-preservation, how can he commit them without harming himself, and without neglecting the cares he owes himself? This difficulty, in relation to my subject, can be stated in the following terms. [4] "To find a form of association that will defend and protect the person and goods of each associate with the full common force, and by means of which each, uniting with all, nevertheless obey 48 49 Of the free contract the evir until For. only himself and remain as problem to which the social [5] The clauses of this the nature of the act that them null and void; so tha formally stated, they are admitted and recognized; lated, everyone is thereupoh resumes his natural freedom for which he renounced it. [6] These clauses, rightly namely the total alienation to the whole community: himself entirely, the condition condition is equal for all, no densome to the rest. [7] Moreover, since the the union is as perfect as it further to claim: For if since there would be no between them and the publii some issue, would soon would subsist and the empty. [8] Finally, each, by givifig one, and since there is no " the same right as one grants ent of all one loses, and mo: [9] If, then, one sets asid^ of the social compact, one ing terms: Each of us puts under the supreme direction 4 each member as an indivisible [10] At once, in place of party, this act of association made up of as many member receives by this same act its will. The public person thus understood, all come down to just one, of each associate with all of his rights in the first place, since each gives is [361] equal for all, and since the one has any interest in making it bur- Social Contract as before." This is the fundamental contract provides the solution. are so completely determined by slightest modification would render although they may never have been ywhere the same, everywhere tacitly il, the social compact having been vio-restored to his original rights and while losing the conventional freedom ajlienation is made without reservation, can be, and no associate has anything individuals were left some rights, then, superior who might adjudicate , each, being judge in his own case on to be so on all, the state of nature association necessarily become tyrannical or co Timon claim associate 1 : finds himself to all, gives himself to no over whom one does not acquire jiim over oneself, one gains the equival-e force to preserve what one has. everything that is not of the essence that it can be reduced to the follow-person and his full power in common general will; and in a body we receive part of the whole. the private person of each contracting produces a moral and collective body : as the assembly has voices, and which unity, its common self, its life and its formed by the union of all the others his if ',he Book I, Chapter 7 formerly assumed the name City* and now assumes [362] that of Republic or of body politic, which its members call State when it is passive, Sovereign when active, Power when comparing it to similar bodies. As for the associates, they collectively assume the name people and individually call themselves Citizens as participants in the sovereign authority, and Subjects as subjected to the laws of the State. But these terms are often confused and mistaken for one another; it is enough to be able to distinguish them where they are used in their precise sense. Chapter Seven Of the Sovereign [1] This formula shows that the act of association involves a reciprocal engagement between the public and private individuals, and that each individual, by contracting, so to speak, with himself, finds himself engaged in a two-fold relation: namely, as member of the Sovereign toward private individuals, and as a member of the State toward the Sovereign. But here the maxim of civil right, that no one is bound by engagements toward himself, does not apply; for there is a great difference between assuming an obligation toward oneself, and assuming a responsibility toward a whole of which one is a part. [2] It should also be noted that the public deliberation which can obligate all subjects toward the Sovereign because of the two differ- * The true sense of this word is almost entirely effaced among the moderns; most take a city for a City, and a bourgeois for a Citizen. They do not know that houses make the city but Citizens make the City. This same error once cost the Carthaginians dear. I have not read that the subjects of any Prince were ever given the title Gives, not even the Macedonians in ancient times nor, in our days, the English, although they are closer to freedom than all the others. Only the French assume the name Citizen casually, because they have no genuine idea of it, as can be seen in their Dictionaries; otherwise they would be committing the crime of Lese-Majesty in usurping it: for them this name expresses a virtue and not a right. When Bodin wanted to speak of our Citizens and Bourgeois, he committed a bad blunder in taking the one for the other. M. d'Alembert made no mistake about it, and in his article Geneva he correctly distinguished the [362] four orders of men (even five, if simple foreigners are included) there are in our city, and only two of which make up the Republic. No other French author has, to my knowledge, understood the true meaning of the word Citizen. 50 Of the Social Contract Book I, Chapter 8 the itsel7 its elf < social does cf i othing multit ide ent relations in terms of whi the opposite reason, obligate it is therefore contrary to Sovereign to impose on the Sovereign can consider relation, it is then in the samo tracting with himself: which be, any kind of fundamental the people, not even the that this body cannot perfeci others about anything that with regard to foreigners it b [3] But the body politic solely to the sanctity of the toward another, to anything such as to alienate any part Sovereign. To violate the act hilate itself, and what is m [4] As soon as this cannot injure one of the menibi still less can one injure the ted. Thus duty and interest help one another, and the two-fold relation all the [5] Now the Sovereign, sin uals who make it up, has not to theirs; consequently the guarantor toward the subjects to want to harm all of its cannot harm any one of then: mere fact that it is, is always [6] But this is not the case Sovereign, and notwithstanding would have no guarantee of find means to ensure their [7] Indeed each individual contrary to or different from His particular interest may common interest; his absolute :h each subject is viewed cannot, for the Sovereign toward itself, and that nature of the body politic for the a law which it cannot break. Since only in terms of one and the same situation as a private individual con-:;hows that there is not, nor can there law that is obligatory for the body of contract. This does not mean :ly well enter into engagements with not detract from this contract; for comes a simple being, an individual, r Sovereign, since it owes its being contract, can never obligate itself, even that detracts from that original act, itself or to subject itself to another by which it exists would be to anni-produces nothing, is thus united in one body, one ers without attacking the body, and without the members being affec-obligate the contracting parties to men must strive to combine in this attendant on it. e it is formed entirely of the individ-^nd cannot have any interests contrary Sovereign power has no need of a , because it is impossible for the body members, and we shall see later that it in particular. The Sovereign, by the everything it ought to be. egarding the subjects' relations to the the common interest, the Sovereign the subjects' engagements if it did not body a [ike 1 same advantages fidelity. may, as a man, have a particular will the general will he has as a Citizen. to him quite differently from the and naturally independent existence speak 52 may lead him to look.upon what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which will harm others less than its payment burdens him and, by considering the moral person that constitutes the State as a being of reason because it is not a man, he would enjoy the rights of a citizen without being willing to fulfill the duties of a subject; an injustice, the progress of which would cause the ruin of the body politic. [364] [8] Hence for the social compact not to be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the following engagement which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body: which means nothing other than that he shall be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each Citizen to the Fatherland, guarantees him against all personal dependence; the condition which is the device and makes for the operation of the political machine, and alone renders legitimate civil engagements which would otherwise be absurd, tyrannical, and.liable to the most enormous abuses. Chapter Eight Of the Civil State [1] This transition from the state of nature to the civil state produces a most remarkable change in man by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and endowing his actions with the morality they previously lacked. Only then, when the voice of duty succeeds physical impulsion and right succeeds appetite, does man, who until then had looked only to himself,, see himself forced to act on other principles, and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations. Although in this state he deprives himself of several advantages he has from nature, he gains such great advantages in return, his faculties are exercised and developed, his ideas enlarged, his sentiments ennobled, his entire soul is elevated to such an extent, that if the abuses of this new condition did not often degrade him to beneath the condition he has left, he should ceaselessly bless the happy moment which wrested him from it forever, and out of a stupid and bounded animal made an intelligent being and a man. [2] Let us reduce this entire balance to terms easy to compare. What man loses by the social contract is his natural freedom and 53 Of the Social Contract ryth; cleanly an unlimited right to ever what he gains is civil freedom sesses. In order not to be has [765] to distinguish no other bounds than the which is limited by the gener is merely the effect of force property which can only be [3] To the preceding state moral freedom, which himself; for the impulsion of to the law one has presented already said too much on of the word freedom is not ing that tempts him and he can reach; and property in everything he pos-m}staken about these compensations, one between natural freedom which has individual's forces, and civil freedom ;al will, and between possession which or the right of the first occupant, and founded on a positive title, might add to the credit of the civil alone makes man truly the master of mere appetite is slavery, and obedience to oneself is freedom. But I have topic, and the philosophical meaning subject here. this riy 54 Of the Social Contract Chapter Six Of Law [i] By the social pact we life: the task now is to gi the initial act by which this entirely undetermined [2] What is good and of things and comes from God, he atom receiving it from so high, laws. No doubt there is a alone; but this justice, to be Considering things in among men for want of m the wicked and evil to the one while no one observes are therefore necessary to justice back to its object, is common, I owe nothin1; nothing. I recognize as It is not so in the civil sta [3] But what, then, attaching only metaphysical reasoning without been stated what a law of any closer to knowing what [4] I have already said ticular object. Indeed, this or outside the State. If it if is not general in relation to it is a part of it: Then a its part that makes them is [379] one> and the whole, less a part is not the who] there is no longer a whole follows that neither is the relation to the other, whit independently human j ist1 ]n anc ther'i fina ly. understanding that re.ation mlo have given the body politic existence and re it motion and will by legislation. For body assumes form and unity still leaves it must do to preserve itself, conformable to order is so by the nature of human conventions. All justice : is its source; but if we were capable of we would need neither government nor universal justice emanating from reason admitted among us, has to be reciprocal. terms, the laws of justice are vain tural sanctions; they only bring good to when he observes them toward every-them toward him. Conventions and laws ombine rights with duties and to bring the state of nature, where everything to those to whom I have promised 's only what is of no use to myself. :e where all rights are fixed by law. is a law? So long as one leaves it at ideas to this word, one will continue one another, and even once it has rjature is, one will not have been brought a law of the State is. there is no general will about a par-particular object is either within the State outside the State, a will that is foreign it; and if this object is inside the State, is formed between the whole and two separate beings, of which the part less that part, the other. But the whole and as long as this relation persists but two unequal parts; from which it will of one of these parts general in Book II, Chapter 6 [5] But when the whole people enacts statutes for the whole people it considers only itself, and if a relation is then formed, it is between the entire object from one point of view and the entire object from another point of view, with no division of the whole. Then the matter with regard to which the statute is being enacted is general, as is the enacting will. It is this act which I call law. [6] When I say that the object of the laws is always general, I mean that the law considers the subjects in a body and their actions in the abstract, never any man as an individual or a particular action. Thus the law can very well state that there will be privileges, but it cannot confer them on any one by name; the law can create several Classes of Citizens, it can even specify the qualifications that entitle to membership in these classes, but it cannot nominate this person or that for admission to them; it can establish a royal government and hereditary succession, but it cannot elect a king or name a royal family; in a word, any function that relates to an individual does not fall within the province of the legislative power. [7] On this idea one immediately sees that one need no longer ask whose province it is to make laws, since they are acts of the general will; nor whether the Prince is above the laws, since it is a member of the State; nor whether the law can be unjust, since no man can be unjust toward himself; nor how one is both free and subject to the laws, since they are merely records of our wills. [8] One also sees that since the law combines the universality of the will and that of the object, what any man, regardless of who he may be, orders on his own authority is not a law; what even the Sovereign orders regarding a particular object is not a law either, but a decree, nor is it an act of sovereignty but of magistracy. [9] I therefore call Republic any State ruled by laws, whatever may be the form of administration: for then the public interest alone governs, and the [380] public thing counts for something. Every legitimate Government is republican:* I shall explain in the sequel what Government is. By this word I understand not only an Aristocracy or a Democracy, but in general any government guided by the general will, which is the law. To be legitimate, the Government must not be confused with the Sovereign, but be its minister: Then monarchy itself is a republic. This will become clearer in the following book. 66 67 Of the Social Contract speak; PeopI v ills [ undert iking people [10] Laws are, properly the civil association. The their author; only those who ditions of the society; but how by common agreement, by a s tic an organ to state its wills? sary to form its acts and to it declare them in time of need? often does not know what it good for it, carry out an of legislation? By itself the itself it does not always see it. but the judgment which guides be made to see objects as they to it, shown the good path Wi seduction by particular wills, its purview, weigh the appeal against the danger of remote good they reject, the public wi equally in need of guides: The their wills to their reason; the it wills. Then public enlight standing and will in the social smooth cooperation of the the whole. Hence arises the are, bring i and parls Chap Of the [i] To discover the best rules of require a superior intelligence experienced none of them, who knew it thoroughly, whose happiness who was nevertheless willing preparing his distant glory in to ths ing, nothing but the conditions of e subject to the laws ought to be e associating may regulate the con-will they regulate them? Will it be udden inspiration? Has the body poli-A^ho will give it the foresight neces-publish them in advance, or how will How will a blind multitude, which because it rarely knows what is as great, as difficult as a system e always wills the good, but by The general will is always upright, it is not always enlightened. It must sometimes as they should appear hich it is seeking, secured against together places and times within of present, perceptible advantages hidden evils. Individuals see the Is the good it does not see. All are first must be obligated to conform (jtther must be taught to know what enrpent results in the union of under-body, from this union results the and finally the greatest force of necessity of a Lawgiver. t|er Seven Lawgiver [381] society suited to each Nation would who saw all of man's passions and had no relation to our nature yet was independent of us and care for ours; finally, one who, progress of times, could work in 58 Book 11, Chapter 7 one century and enjoy the reward in another.* It would require gods to give men laws. [2] The same reasoning Caligula made as to fact, Plato made as to right in defining the civil or royal man he seeks in his book on ruling; but if it is true that a great Prince is a rare man, what of a great Lawgiver? The first need only follow the model which the other must propose. He is the mechanic who invents the machine, the first is nothing but the workman who assembles and operates it. At the birth of societies, says Montesquieu, it is the chiefs of republics who make the institution, and after that it is the institutions that form the chiefs of republics. [3] Anyone who dares to institute a people must feel capable of, so to speak, changing human nature; of transforming each individual who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole into part of a larger whole from which that individual would as it were receive his life and his being; of weakening man's constitution in order to strengthen it; of substituting a partial and moral existence for the independent and physical existence we have all received from nature. In a word, he must take from man his own forces in order to give him forces which [382] are foreign to him and of which he cannot make use without the help of others. The more these natural forces are dead and destroyed, the greater and more lasting are the acquired ones, and the more solid and lasting also is the institution: So that when each Citizen is nothing and can do nothing except with all the others, and the force acquired by the whole is equal or superior to the sum of the natural forces of all the individuals, the legislation may be said to be at the highest pitch of perfection it can reach. [4] The Lawgiver is in every respect an extraordinary man in the State. While he must be so by his genius, he is no less so by his office. It is not magistracy, it is not sovereignty. This office which gives the republic its constitution has no place in its constitution: It is a singular and superior function that has nothing in common with human empire; for just as he who has command over men ought not to have command over the laws, so neither should he who has command over the laws have command over men; otherwise the A people becomes famous only once its legislation begins to decline. No one knows how many centuries the institution of Lycurgus made for the Spartans' happiness before the rest of Greece took notice of them. 69 Of the Social Contract w;ts to • o: laws, as ministers to his injustices, and he could the sanctity of his work. [5] When Lycurgus gav^ eating the Kingship. It entrust the establishment Republics of Italy often Geneva did so as well and witnessed the rebirth of all found itself on the verge lative authority and the so^ [6] Yet the Decemvirs the right to have any law we propose, they used to sa; your consent. Romans, [383] are to make for your happin [7] Thus he who drafts legislative right, and the p non-transferable right, even to the fundamental pact and there can never be any to the general will until it the people: I have said this [8] So that one finds at incompatible things in the beyond human force, and [9] A further difficulty would speak to the vulgar language will not be kinds of ideas which it is of the people. Views that remote are equally beyond no other scheme of passions, would often only perpetuate his avoid having particular views vitiate never his fatherland laws, he began by abdi-the custom of most Greek cities to f their laws to foreigners. The modern ijnitated this practice: the Republic of good effect.* Rome in its finest period the crimes of Tyranny in its midst, and perishing, for having united the legis-ereign power in the same hands, themselves never arrogated to themselves pissed solely on their authority. Nothing ' to the people, can become law without be yourselves the authors of the laws that only his to understood government Those who look upon Calvin as his genius. The framing of our v him as much honor as his institu in our rites as long as love of fatjierland us, the memory of that great: the laws has, then, or should have no ;ople itself cannot divest itself of this if it wanted to do so; because according the general will obligates particulars, a ssurance that a particular will conforms been submitted to the free suffrage of lready, but it is not useless to repeat it. i))ne and the same time two apparently work of legislation: an undertaking execute it an authority that is nil. which deserves attention. The wise who in their own rather than in the vulgar by them. Yet there are a thousand inkpossible to translate into the language :re too general and aims that are too its reach; each individual, appreciating than that which bears directly on anly a theologian fail to appreciate the range of Edicts, in which he played a large part, does Whatever revolutions time may bring about and freedom is not extinguished among will never cease to be honored in it. Book II, Chapter 7 his particular interest, has difficulty perceiving the advantages he is supposed to derive from the constant privations required by good laws. For a nascent people to be capable of appreciating sound maxims of politics and of following the fundamental rules of reason of State, the effect would have to become the cause, the social spirit which is to be the work of the institution would have to preside over the institution itself, and men would have to be prior to laws what they ought to become by means of them. Thus, since the Lawgiver can use neither force nor reasoning, he must of necessity have recourse to an authority of a different order, which might be able to rally without violence and to persuade without convincing. [10] This is what has at all times forced the fathers of nations to resort to the intervention of heaven and to honor the Gods with their own wisdom, so that peoples, subject to the laws of the State as to those of nature, and recognizing the same power in the formation of man and in that of the city, freely obey the yoke of public felicity, and bear it with docility. [11] This sublime reason which rises beyond the reach [384] of vulgar men it is whose decisions the Lawgiver places in the mouth of the immortals, in order to rally by divine authority those whom human prudence could not move* But it is not up to just anyone to make the Gods speak or to have them believe him when he proclaims himself their interpreter. The great soul of the Lawgiver is the true miracle which must prove his mission. Any man can carve tablets of stone, bribe an oracle, feign secret dealings with some divinity, train a bird to speak in his ear, or find other crude ways to impress the people. Someone who can do only that much might even by chance succeed in assembling a flock of fools, but he will never found an empire, and his extravagant work will soon perish together with him. Empty tricks form a passing bond, only wisdom can make it lasting. The Jewish law which still endures, that of IshmaeFs child which has ruled half the world for ten centuries, still proclaim today the great men who dictated them; and while prideful philosophy or blind party spirit regards them as * "The truth is, says Machiavelli, that there has never been in any country a lawgiver who has not invoked the deity; for otherwise his laws would not have been accepted. A wise man knows many useful truths which cannot be demonstrated in a way that will convince other people." Discourses on Livy, Bk. i, ch. 11. 70 71 Of the Social Contract nothing but lucky impostors institutions the great and enduring establishments [12] One should not fro|m among us politics and relig: at the origin of nations the the true politician admires in their powerful genius which presides over all this conclude with Warburton that on have a common object, but rather that one serves as the instrument of the other. C O ha bef Dre [1] Just as an architect, and tests the ground to se the wise institutor does in themselves, but first intends them is fit to bear laws to the Arcadians anttl peoples were rich and could were good laws and wickec. more than to discipline a [2] A thousand nations never have tolerated good tolerated them could have the course of their entire lif in their youth, with age established and prejudices taking to try to reform them1: evils touched even if only cowardly patients who tren [3] This is not to say that, minds and deprive them of . also sometimes occur periO' when revolutions do to peo when horror of the past State aflame with civil wars recovers the vigor of youth Sparta at the time of Lycurg and such, among us, were sion of the Tyrants. net examines pi takes pter Eight the People putting up a large building, observes whether it can support the weight, so begin by [385] drawing up laws good whether the people for whom he them. That is why Plato refused to give Cyrenians, since he knew that both not tolerate equality: that is why there men in Crete, for Minos had done no ;-ridden people. earth have been brilliant which could aws, and even those which could have done so only for a very brief period in time. Peoples, like men, are docile only grow incorrigible; once customs are rioted, it is a dangerous and futile under-; the people cannot tolerate having their to destroy them, like those stupid and ble at the sight of a doctor, just as some illnesses overwhelm men's the memory of the past, there may not ds of violence in the lifetime of States es what certain crises do to individuals, the place of forgetting, and when the is so to speak reborn from its ashes and us it escapes death's embrace. Such was us, such was Rome after the Tarquins; Holland and Switzerland after the expul- v ice-on they Book 11, Chapter g [4] But such events are rare; they are exceptions the reason for which is always found in the particular constitution of the State in question. They could not even happen twice with the same people, for a people can free itself as long as it is merely barbarous, but it can no longer do so once the civil mainspring is worn out. Then troubles may destroy it while revolutions may not be able to restore it, and as soon as its chains are broken, it falls apart and ceases to exist: From then on it needs a master, not a liberator. Free peoples, remember this maxim: Freedom can be gained; but it is never recovered. \j86] [5] For Nations as for men there is a time of maturity for which one has to wait before subjecting them to laws; but the maturity of a people is not always easy to recognize, and if one acts too soon the work is ruined. One people is amenable to discipline at birth, another is not amenable to it after ten centuries. The Russians will never be truly politically organized because they were politically organized too early. Peter's genius was imitative; he did not have true genius, the kind that creates and makes everything out of nothing. Some of the things he did were good, most were misguided. He saw that his people was barbarous, he did not see that it lacked the maturity for political order; he wanted to civilize it when all it needed was to be made warlike. He wanted from the first to make Germans, Englishmen, whereas he should have begun by making Russians; he prevented his subjects from ever becoming what they could be by persuading them that they are what they are not. In the same way a French Tutor forms his pupil for a moment's brilliance in childhood, and to be nothing after that. The Russian Empire will try to subjugate Europe, and will itself be subjugated. The Tartars, its subjects or neighbors, will become its masters and ours: This revolution seems to me inevitable. All the Kings of Europe are working in concert to hasten it. Chapter Nine Continued [1] Just as nature has set limits to the stature of a well-formed man, beyond which it makes only Giants and Dwarfs, so, too, with regard to the best constitution of a State, there are bounds to the size it 72 73