HOUSE OF LORDS SESSION 2007–08
[2007] UKHL 58
on appeal from:[2006] EWCA Civ 327
OPINIONS
OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL
FOR JUDGMENT IN THE CAUSE
R (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of
State for Defence (Respondent)
Appellate Committee
Lord Bingham of Cornhill
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry
Baroness Hale of Richmond
Lord Carswell
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
Counsel
Appellants:
Keir Starmer QC
Michael Fordham QC
Vaughan Lowe
Richard Hermer
Felicity Williams
(Instructed by Public Interest Lawyers)
Respondents:
Christopher Greenwood QC
Philip Sales QC
Jonathan Swift
(Instructed by Treasury Solicitor)
Interveners (Liberty and JUSTICE)
James Crawford SC
Shaheed Fatima
(Instructed by Herbert Smith)
Hearing date:
29-31 OCTOBER 2007
ON
WEDNESDAY 12 DECEMBER 2007
HOUSE OF LORDS
OPINIONS OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL FOR JUDGMENT
IN THE CAUSE
R (on the application of Al -Jedda) (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of
State for Defence (Respondent)
[2007] UKHL 58
LORD BINGHAM OF CORNHILL
My Lords,
1. Since October 2004 the appellant, who is a national of both this
country and Iraq, has been held in custody by British troops at detention
facilities in Iraq. He complains that his detention infringes his rights
under article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, a
Convention right protected by the Human Rights Act 1998, and also
founds a good claim in this country under the English common law.
These claims were rejected by the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court
(Moses and Richards JJ: [2005] EWHC 1809 (Admin), HRLR 1355)
and also by the Court of Appeal (Brooke, May and Rix LJJ: [2006]
EWCA Civ 327, [2007] QB 621. Both courts below delivered lengthy
and careful judgments, commensurate with the importance and difficulty
of the issues then raised, but a new issue has (by agreement) been raised
and argued before the House, as explained below.
2. The appellant has not been charged with any offence, and no
charge or trial is in prospect. He was arrested and has since been
detained on the ground that his internment is necessary for imperative
reasons of security in Iraq. He was suspected of being a member of a
terrorist group involved in weapons smuggling and explosive attacks in
Iraq. He was believed by the British authorities to have been personally
responsible for recruiting terrorists outside Iraq with a view to the
commission of atrocities there; for facilitating the travel into Iraq of an
identified terrorist explosives expert; for conspiring with that explosives
expert to conduct attacks with improvised explosive devices against
coalition forces in the areas around Fallujah and Baghdad; and for
conspiring with the explosives expert and members of an Islamist
terrorist cell in the Gulf to smuggle high tech detonation equipment into
2
Iraq for use in attacks against coalition forces. These allegations are
roundly denied by the appellant, and they have not been tested in any
proceedings. Nor is their correctness an issue in these proceedings. The
House must therefore resolve the legal issues falling for decision on the
assumption that the allegations are true, without forming any judgment
whether they are or not.
3. In the courts below the appellant’s Human Rights Act argument
was directed to a single question, turning essentially on the relationship
between article 5(1) of the European Convention on the one hand and
the United Nations Charter, and certain resolutions of the UN Security
Council, on the other. More specifically, this question is agreed to be
whether the provisions of article 5(1) of the Convention are qualified by
the legal regime established pursuant to United Nations Security
Council Resolution (“UNSCR”) 1546 (and subsequent resolutions) by
reason of the operation of articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter, such
that the detention of the appellant has not been in violation of article
5(1). This is the issue which the courts below decided against the
appellant, and it remains an issue dividing the parties. But it is now the
second issue. For the Secretary of State, prompted (it seems) by the
admissibility decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights in Behrami v France, Saramati v France, Germany and
Norway (Application Nos 71412/01 and 78166/01 (unreported), 2 May
2007) has raised an entirely new issue, not ventilated in the courts
below, directed to the attributability in international law of the conduct
of which the appellant complains. As agreed, the issue is “whether, by
reason of the provisions of UNSCR 1511 (2003) and/or UNSCR 1546
(2004), and/or UNSCR 1637 (2005) and/or UNSCR 1723 (2006) and/or
(so far as it may be relevant) UNSCR 1483 (2003), the detention of the
appellant is attributable to the United Nations and thus outside the scope
of the ECHR”. The Secretary of State, relying strongly on Behrami and
Saramati, contends that the appellant’s detention is attributable to the
UN, a contention which (if correct) defeats his claim under article 5.
This has been treated as the first issue in this appeal.
4. What is now the third issue can be more simply expressed:
whether English common law or Iraqi law applies to the appellant’s
detention and, if the former, whether there is any legal basis for his
detention. The appellant would wish to contend that he has a good claim
even if Iraqi law is applicable, but this question was not litigated below,
was not agreed as an issue, has not been the subject of expert evidence
of Iraqi law and has not been considered by the House.
3
The first issue
5. It was common ground between the parties that the governing
principle is that expressed by the International Law Commission in
article 5 of its draft articles on the Responsibility of International
Organizations (adopted in May 2004 and cited by the European Court in
Behrami and Saramati, para 30):
“Conduct of organs or agents placed at the disposal of an
international organization by a state or another
international organization
The conduct of an organ of a state or an organ or agent of
an international organization that is placed at the disposal
of another international organization shall be considered
under international law an act of the latter organization if
the organization exercises effective control over that
conduct.”
The European Court also quoted (para 31) from paras 1 and 6-7 of the
ILC’s authoritative commentary on this article (General Assembly
Official Records 59th
Session, Supp No 10 (A/59/10)):
“1.When an organ of a state is placed at the disposal of an
international organization, the organ may be fully
seconded to that organization. In this case the organ’s
conduct would clearly be attributable only to the receiving
organization…Article 5 deals with the different situation
in which the lent organ or agent still acts to a certain
extent as organ of the lending state or as organ or agent of
the lending organization. This occurs for instance in the
case of military contingents that a state placed at the
disposal of the [UN] for a peacekeeping operation, since
the state retains disciplinary powers and criminal
jurisdiction over the members of the national contingent.
In this situation the problem arises whether a specific
conduct of the lent organ or agent has to be attributed to
the receiving organization or to the lending state or
organization …
6.Practice relating to peacekeeping forces is particularly
significant in the present context because of the control
that the contributing state retains over disciplinary matters
4
and criminal affairs. This may have consequences with
regard to attribution of conduct …
Attribution of conduct to the contributing state is clearly
linked with the retention of some powers by that state over
its national contingent and thus on the control that the state
possesses in the relevant respect.
7.As has been held by several scholars, when an organ or
agent is placed at the disposal of an international
organization, the decisive question in relation to
attribution of a given conduct appears to be who has
effective control over the conduct in question.”
6. Invited by the ILC to comment on the attribution of the conduct
of peacekeeping forces to the UN or to contributing states, the UN
Secretariat responded (A/CN.4/545, 25 June 2004, pp 17-18):
“The question of attribution of the conduct of a
peacekeeping force to the United Nations or to
contributing states is determined by the legal status of the
force, the agreements between the United Nations and
contributing states and their opposability to third states.
A United Nations peacekeeping force established by the
Security Council or the General Assembly is a subsidiary
organ of the United Nations. Members of the military
personnel placed by member states under United Nations
command although remaining in their national service are,
for the duration of their assignment to the force,
considered international personnel under the authority of
the United Nations and subject to the instructions of the
force commander. The functions of the force are
exclusively international and members of the force are
bound to discharge their functions with the interest of the
United Nations only in view. The peacekeeping operation
as a whole is subject to the executive direction and control
of the Secretary-General, under the overall direction of the
Security Council or the General Assembly as the case may
be.
As a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, an act of a
peacekeeping force is, in principle, imputable to the
Organization, and if committed in violation of an
international obligation entails the international
responsibility of the Organization and its liability in
compensation. The fact that any such act may have been
5
performed by members of a national military contingent
forming part of the peacekeeping operation does not affect
the international responsibility of the United Nations vis-àvis
third states or individuals.
Agreements concluded between the United Nations and
states contributing troops to the Organization contain a
standard clause on third-party liability delineating the
respective responsibilities of the Organization and
contributing states for loss, damage, injury or death caused
by the personnel or equipment of the contributing state.
Article 9 of the Model Memorandum of Understanding
between the United Nations and [participating state]
contributing resources to [The United Nations
Peacekeeping Operation] provides in this regard:
‘The United Nations will be responsible for dealing
with any claims by third parties where the loss of or
damage to their property, or death or personal injury,
was caused by the personnel or equipment provided
by the Government in the performance of services or
any other activity or operation under this
memorandum. However if the loss, damage, death or
injury arose from gross negligence or wilful
misconduct of the personnel provided by the
Government, the Government will be liable for such
claims’ (A/51/967.annex).
While the agreements between the United Nations and
contributing states divide the responsibility in the
relationship between them, they are not opposable to third
states. Vis-à-vis third states and individuals, therefore,
where the international responsibility of the Organization
is engaged, liability in compensation is, in the first place,
entailed for the United Nations, which may then revert to
the contributing state concerned and seek recovery on the
basis of the agreement between them.
The principle of attribution of the conduct of a
peacekeeping force to the United Nations is premised on
the assumption that the operation in question is conducted
under United Nations command and control, and thus has
the legal status of a United Nations subsidiary organ. In
authorized chapter VII operations conducted under
national command and control, the conduct of the
operation is imputable to the state or states conducting the
operation. In joint operations, namely, those conducted by
a United Nations peacekeeping operation and an operation
conducted under national or regional command and
6
control, international responsibility lies where effective
command and control is vested and practically exercised
(see paras 17-18 of the Secretary-General’s report
A/51/389).”
The cited paragraphs in the Secretary-General’s report A/51/389
(20 September 1996) read:
“17. The international responsibility of the United
Nations for combat-related activities of the United Nations
forces is premised on the assumption that the operation in
question is under the exclusive command and control of
the United Nations. Where a Chapter VII-authorized
operation is conducted under national command and
control, international responsibility for the activities of the
force is vested in the state or states conducting the
operation. The determination of responsibility becomes
particularly difficult, however, in cases where a state or
states provide the United Nations with forces in support of
a United Nations operation but not necessarily as an
integral part thereof, and where operational command and
control is unified or coordinated. This was the case in
Somalia where the Quick Reaction Force and the US
Rangers were provided in support of the United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), and this was also the
case in the former Yugoslavia where the Rapid Reaction
Force was provided in support of the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR).
18. In joint operations, international responsibility for
the conduct of the troops lies where operational command
and control is vested according to the arrangements
establishing the modalities of cooperation between the
state or states providing the troops and the United Nations.
In the absence of formal arrangements between the United
Nations and the state or states providing troops,
responsibility would be determined in each and every case
according to the degree of effective control exercised by
either party in the conduct of the operation.”
The UN Secretariat was further invited by the ILC to address the
following question (see A/CN.4/556, 12 May 2005, p4):
7
“In the event that a certain conduct, which a member state
takes in compliance with a request on the part of an
international organization, appears to be in breach of an
international obligation both of that state and of that
organization, would the organization also be regarded as
responsible under international law? Would the answer be
the same if the state’s wrongful conduct was not
requested, but only authorized by the organization?
The Secretariat’s answer was (ibid, p 46):
“As for the third question raised by the commission, we
are not aware of any situation where the Organization was
held jointly or residually responsible for an unlawful act
by a state in the conduct of an activity or operation carried
out at the request of the Organization or under its
authorization. In the practice of the Organization,
however, a measure of accountability was nonetheless
introduced in the relationship between the Security
Council and member states conducting an operation under
Security Council authorization, in the form of periodic
reports to the Council on the conduct of the operation.
While the submission of these reports provides the
Council with an important ‘oversight tool’, the Council
itself or the United Nations as a whole cannot be held
responsible for an unlawful act by the state conducting the
operation, for the ultimate test of responsibility remains
‘effective command and control’.”
7. It is necessary to identify the main events occurring between
March 2003 and the present before considering the application of these
principles to the present case.
8. On 20 March 2003 coalition forces invaded Iraq. It is, as Brooke
LJ observed in paragraph 15 of his judgment, “well known that the
Coalition Forces invaded Iraq in the spring of 2003 after the
abandonment of the efforts to obtain a further Security Council
resolution which would give immediate backing to what the coalition
states wished to do if Saddam Hussein did not comply with the
Council’s demands”. On 16 April 2003 General Franks, a US general,
issued a “freedom message” in which he announced the creation of the
Coalition Provisional Authority (“the CPA”), a civilian administration
8
which would exercise powers of government in Iraq for the time being.
Major combat operations were declared to be complete on 1 May 2003,
although hostilities did not end on that date in all parts of the country.
As from that date the US and the UK became occupying powers, within
the meaning of Section III of the Hague Regulations on the Laws and
Customs of War on land (1907) and the Fourth Geneva Convention on
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949) in the areas
which they respectively occupied.
9. On 8 May 2003 the Permanent Representatives of the UK and the
US at the UN addressed a joint letter to the President of the Security
Council. In it they said that the states participating in the coalition would
strictly abide by their obligations under international law, including
those relating to the essential humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people;
that the US, the UK and their coalition partners, acting under existing
command and control arrangements through the commander of coalition
forces, had created the CPA; that the US, the UK and their coalition
partners, working through the CPA, should among other things provide
for security in and for the provisional administration of Iraq; that they
would facilitate the efforts of the Iraqi people to take the first steps
towards forming a representative government based on the rule of law;
and that the UN had a vital role to play in providing humanitarian relief,
in supporting the reconstruction of Iraq and in helping in the formation
of an Iraqi interim authority. On 13 May 2003 the US Secretary for
Defence, Mr Donald Rumsfeld, appointed Mr Paul Bremer to be
administrator of the CPA, which was divided into regions, that in the
south being under British control. The CPA promptly set about the
business of government. By CPA Regulation No 1, dated 16 May 2003,
the CPA assumed “all executive, legislative and judicial authority
necessary to achieve its objectives, to be exercised under relevant UN
Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the
laws and usages of war”. Iraqi laws, unless suspended or replaced by the
CPA, were to continue to apply insofar as they did not prevent the CPA
from exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations, or conflict with
regulations or orders issued by the CPA. CPA Memorandum No 3
(CPA/MEM/27 June 2004/03) addressed issues of criminal procedure.
In section 6(4) it referred to standards “in accordance with...the Fourth
Geneva Convention”, which were to apply to all persons who were
detained by coalition forces when necessary for imperative reasons of
security, providing a right of appeal by an internee to a competent body.
10. Resolution 1483 was adopted by the Security Council on 22 May
2003. The resolution opened, as is usual, with a number of recitals, one
of which referred to the US and UK Permanent Representatives’ letter
9
of 8 May “recognizing the specific authorities, responsibilities, and
obligations under applicable international law of these states as
occupying powers under unified command (‘the Authority’)”. Then,
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council called on the
Authority, consistently with the UN Charter and other relevant
international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people and work
towards the restoration of conditions of stability and security. The
Council called upon all concerned to comply fully with their obligations
under international law, including in particular the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907. The Council further
requested the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative in
Iraq: he was to report regularly to the Council on his activities under the
resolution, which were to co-ordinate the activities of the UN and other
international agencies engaged in post-conflict processes and
humanitarian assistance, in a number of specified ways including the
protection of human rights. The Council decided, as it did consistently
thereafter, to remain seised of the matter. In July 2003 an Iraqi
Governing Council (“IGC”) was established, which the CPA was to
consult on all matters concerning the temporary governance of Iraq.
11. Pursuant to UNSCR 1483 the Secretary General established a
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), a step welcomed
by the Council in Resolution 1500 of 14 August 2003. This development
was foreshadowed by the Secretary General in a report dated 17 July, in
which he announced the appointment of Mr de Mello as his Special
Representative and outlined the tasks which UNAMI was to undertake.
12. On 16 October 2003 the Security Council adopted Resolution
1511. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council looked
forward to the assumption of governmental powers by the people of Iraq
and resolved that the UN, through the Secretary General, his Special
Representative and UNAMI “should strengthen its vital role in Iraq,
including by providing humanitarian relief, promoting the economic
reconstruction of and conditions for sustainable development in Iraq,
and advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local
institutions for representative government”. The Secretary General was
to report to the Security Council on his responsibilities under the
resolution. In a new departure, the Council determined
“that the provision of security and stability is essential to
the successful completion of the political process…and to
the ability of the United Nations to contribute effectively
to that process and the implementation of resolution 1483
10
(2003), and authorizes a multinational force [“MNF”]
under unified command to take all necessary measures to
contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in
Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring necessary
conditions for the implementation of the timetable and
programme as well as to contribute to the security of
[UNAMI], the Governing Council of Iraq and other
institutions of the Iraqi interim administration, and key
humanitarian and economic infrastructure”.
Member states were urged to contribute assistance under this UN
mandate, including military forces, to the multinational force referred to.
The US, on behalf of the multinational force, was requested to report to
the Council on the efforts and progress of this force.
13. On 8 March 2004 the IGC promulgated a transitional
administrative law, paving the way towards an interim and then an
elected Iraqi government. Reporting to the Security Council on 16 April
2004, the US Permanent Representative said that the multinational force
had conducted “the full spectrum of military operations, which range
from the provision of humanitarian assistance, civil affairs and relief and
reconstruction activities to the detention of those who are threats to
security…” In a submission made by the CPA to the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights on 28 May 2004 it was stated that the
US and UK military forces retained legal responsibility for the prisoners
of war and detainees whom they respectively held in custody. This was
a matter of some significance, since by this time the abuses perpetrated
by US military personnel at the Abu Ghraib prison had become public
knowledge.
14. Chronologically, the next events to be noted are two letters, each
dated 5 June 2004 and written to the President of the Security Council
by the Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq (Dr Allawi)
and the US Secretary of State (Mr Powell). Dr Allawi looked forward to
the establishment of a free and democratic Iraq, but stressed that security
and stability continued to be essential to the country’s political
transition, and asked for the support of the Security Council and the
international community until Iraq could provide its own security. He
sought a new resolution on the multinational force mandate to contribute
to maintaining security in Iraq, “including through the tasks and
arrangements set out in the letter” from Mr Powell to the President of
the Council. Mr Powell in his letter recognised the request of
Dr Allawi’s government for the continued presence of the multinational
11
force in Iraq and confirmed that the force, under unified command, was
prepared to continue to contribute to the maintenance of security in Iraq.
He continued, using language plainly drawn from article 78 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention (although the period of occupation was
about to end):
“Under the agreed arrangement, the MNF stands ready to
continue to undertake a broad range of tasks to contribute
to the maintenance of security and to ensure force
protection. These include activities necessary to counter
ongoing security threats posed by forces seeking to
influence Iraq’s political future through violence. This will
include combat operations against members of these
groups, internment where this is necessary for imperative
reasons of security, and the continued search for and
securing of weapons that threaten Iraq’s security. A further
objective will be to train and equip Iraqi security forces
that will increasingly take responsibility for maintaining
Iraq’s security. The MNF also stands ready as needed to
participate in the provision of humanitarian assistance,
civil affairs support, and relief and reconstruction
assistance requested by the Iraqi Interim Government and
in line with previous Security Council Resolutions.”
He regarded the existing framework governing responsibility for
exercise of jurisdiction by contributing states over their military
personnel as sufficient, and assured the President that “the forces that
make up the MNF are and will remain committed at all times to act
consistently with their obligations under the law of armed conflict,
including the Geneva Conventions”.
15. These letters were the immediate prelude to Resolution 1546,
adopted by the Security Council on 8 June 2004. Little turns on the
opening recitals, save that the Council welcomed the assurances in
Mr Powell’s letter and determined that the situation in Iraq continued to
constitute a threat to international peace and security. Acting under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council described the role of
UNAMI, reaffirmed its authorisation under UNSCR 1511 (2003) for the
multinational force under unified command, having regard to the
annexed letters of Dr Allawi and Mr Powell, and decided
12
“that the multinational force shall have the authority to
take all necessary measures to contribute to the
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance
with the letters annexed to this resolution expressing, inter
alia, the Iraqi request for the continued presence of the
multinational force and setting out its tasks, including by
preventing and deterring terrorism, so that, inter alia, the
United Nations can fulfil its role in assisting the Iraqi
people as outlined in paragraph seven above and the Iraqi
people can implement freely and without intimidation the
timetable and programme for the political process and
benefit from reconstruction and rehabilitation
activities;…”
The Council further decided that the mandate for the multinational force
should be reviewed at the request of the Government of Iraq or 12
months from the date of the resolution and that the mandate should end
on completion of the political process described earlier in the resolution,
but the Council undertook to terminate the mandate earlier if requested
by the Government of Iraq. The US, on behalf of the multinational
force, was again requested to report at stated intervals.
16. On 27 June 2004 the CPA issued a revised order giving members
of the multinational force and the CPA general immunity from Iraqi
process, and providing that they should be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of their sending states. On the following day power was
formally transferred to the Iraqi interim government, the CPA was
dissolved and the occupation of Iraq by coalition forces came to an end.
Such was the position when the appellant was taken into British custody
in October 2004.
17. After this date there were two further resolutions of the Security
Council (Resolution 1637 of 8 November 2005 and Resolution 1723 of
28 November 2006), to which, however, little significance was, rightly,
attached. Their effect was to maintain the status quo. The appellant drew
attention to reports made by the Secretary General to the Security
Council which expressed concern about persons detained by units of the
multinational force in a manner inconsistent, it was said, with any
suggestion that this was, in international law, the responsibility of the
UN. Thus, for instance, on 7 June 2005 (S/2005/373, para 72) the
Secretary General reported that 6000 detainees were in the custody of
the multinational force and despite the release of some detainees
numbers continued to grow. He commented: “Prolonged detention
13
without access to lawyers and courts is prohibited under international
law, including during states of emergency”. Such observations were
echoed in reports by UNAMI which, in its report on the period 1 July –
31 August 2005, para 12, expressed concern about the high number of
persons detained, observing that “Internees should enjoy all the
protections envisaged in all the rights guaranteed by international human
rights conventions”. In its next report (1 September – 31 October 2005)
it repeated this expression of concern (para 6), and advised “There is an
urgent need to provide [a] remedy to lengthy internment for reasons of
security without adequate judicial oversight”. The appellant pointed out
that, according to an answer given by the armed forces minister in the
House of Commons on 10 November 2004, UK forces in Iraq were
operating under UNSCR 1546 and were not engaged on UN operations:
Hansard (HC Debates), 10 November 2004, col 720W. A similar view,
it was suggested, was taken by the Working Group of the UN’s Human
Rights Council (A/HRC/4/40/Add.1) which considered the position of
Mr Tariq Aziz and, in paragraph 25 of its opinion on the case, stated:
“The Working Group concludes that until 1 July 2004,
Mr Tariq Aziz had been detained under the sole
responsibility of the Coalition members as occupying
powers or, to be more precise, under the responsibility of
the United States Government. Since then and as the Iraqi
Criminal Tribunal is a court of the sovereign State of Iraq,
the pre-trial detention of a person charged before the
tribunal is within the responsibility of Iraq. In the light of
the fact that Mr Aziz is in the physical custody of the
United States authorities, any possible conclusion as to the
arbitrary nature of his deprivation of liberty may involve
the international responsibility of the United States
Government.”
18. As already indicated, the Secretary of State founds his nonattributability
argument on the judgment of the European Court, sitting
as a Grand Chamber, in Behrami and Saramati, which related to events
in Kosovo. The case concerned Resolution 1244, adopted by the
Security Council on 10 June 1999. In the recitals to the resolution, the
Council welcomed the statement of principles adopted to resolve the
Kosovo crisis on 6 May 1999, which formed annex 1 to the resolution,
and welcomed also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia of the first nine points in a statement of principles which
formed annex 2 to the resolution. Annex 1 provided, among other
things, for the “Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil
and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations,
14
capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives.”
Annex 2 provided for the “Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations
auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as
may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of
guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives”. The international
security presence with substantial NATO participation was to be
deployed under unified command and control. The international civil
presence was to include an interim administration. Having determined
that the situation in the region continued to constitute a threat to
international peace and security, and acting under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, the Council determined on “the deployment in Kosovo, under
United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences
…” A Special Representative appointed by the Secretary General was to
control the implementation of the international civil presence and
coordinate its activities with those of the international security presence.
Member states and relevant international organisations were authorised
to establish the international security presence whose responsibilities
were to include, among other things, supervising de-mining until the
international civil presence could, as appropriate, take over
responsibility for this task. The responsibilities of the international civil
presence were to include a wide range of tasks of a civilian
administrative nature. Both these presences were to continue for an
initial period of twelve months, and thereafter unless the Security
Council decided otherwise. Both presences were duly established, the
international security presence being known as KFOR and the
international civil presence as UNMIK.
19. The applicants’ claims in Strasbourg were not the same. The
Behramis complained of death and injury caused to two children by the
explosion of an undetonated cluster bomb unit, previously dropped by
NATO. They blamed KFOR for failing to clear these dangerous mines.
Mr Saramati complained of his extra-judicial detention by officers
acting on the orders of KFOR between 13 July 2001 and 26 January
2002.
20. The Grand Chamber gave a lengthy judgment, rehearsing various
articles of the UN Charter to which I refer below in the context of the
second issue, and citing the ILC article and commentary referred to at
para 5 above. Reference was made (para 36) to a Military Technical
Agreement made between KFOR and the governments of Yugoslavia
and Serbia providing for the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and the
deployment in Kosovo “under United Nations auspices of effective
international civil and security presences”. UNSCR 1244 (1999) was
quoted at some length. The court noted (para 69) that the Yugoslav
15
Government did not control Kosovo, which was under the effective
control (para 70) of the international presences which exercised the
public powers normally exercised by that government. The court
considered (para 71) that the question raised by the cases was less
whether the respondent states had exercised extra-territorial jurisdiction
in Kosovo but, far more centrally, whether the court was competent to
examine under the Convention those states’ contribution to the civil and
security presences which did exercise the relevant control of Kosovo.
21. The court summarised (paras 73-120) the submissions of the
applicants, the respondent states, seven third party states and the UN. In
its own assessment it held that the supervision of de-mining at the
relevant time fell within UNMIK’s mandate and that for issuing
detention orders within the mandate of KFOR (paras 123-127). In
considering whether the inaction of UNMIK and the action of KFOR
could be attributed to the UN, the court held (para 129) that the UN had
in Resolution 1244 (1999) “delegated” powers to establish international
security and civil presences, using “delegate” (as it had explained in
para 43) to refer to the empowering by the Security Council of another
entity to exercise its function as opposed to “authorising” an entity to
carry out functions which it could not itself perform. It considered that
the detention of Mr Saramati was in principle attributable to the UN
(para 141). This was because (paras 133-134) the UN had retained
ultimate authority and control and had delegated operational command
only. This was borne out (para 134) by the facts that Chapter VII
allowed the Security Council to delegate, the relevant power was a
delegable power, the delegation was prior and explicit in Resolution
1244, the extent of the delegation was defined, and the leadership of the
security and civil presences were required to report to the Security
Council (as was the Secretary General). Thus (para 135) under
Resolution 1244 the Security Council was to retain ultimate authority
and control over the security mission and it delegated to NATO the
power to establish KFOR. Since UNMIK was a subsidiary organ of the
UN created under Chapter VII of the UN Charter its inaction was in
principle attributable to the UN (paras 129, 142-143). Dealing finally
with its competence ratione personae, the court said (para 149):
“In the present case, chapter VII allowed the UNSC to
adopt coercive measures in reaction to an identified
conflict considered to threaten peace, namely UNSC
Resolution 1244 establishing UNMIK and KFOR.
Since operations established by UNSC Resolutions under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter are fundamental to the
mission of the UN to secure international peace and
16
security and since they rely for their effectiveness on
support from member states, the Convention cannot be
interpreted in a manner which would subject the acts and
omissions of Contracting Parties which are covered by
UNSC Resolutions and occur prior to or in the course of
such missions, to the scrutiny of the Court. To do so would
be to interfere with the fulfilment of the UN’s key mission
in this field including, as argued by certain parties, with
the effective conduct of its operations. It would also be
tantamount to imposing conditions on the implementation
of a UNSC Resolution which were not provided for in the
text of the Resolution itself. This reasoning equally applies
to voluntary acts of the respondent States such as the vote
of a permanent member of the UNSC in favour of the
relevant Chapter VII Resolution and the contribution of
troops to the security mission: such acts may not have
amounted to obligations flowing from membership of the
UN but they remained crucial to the effective fulfilment by
the UNSC of its Chapter VII mandate and, consequently,
by the UN of its imperative peace and security aim.”
The court accordingly concluded (para 151) that, since UNMIK was a
subsidiary organ of the UN created under Chapter VII and KFOR was
exercising powers lawfully delegated under Chapter VII by the Security
Council, their actions were directly attributable to the UN, an
organisation of universal jurisdiction fulfilling its imperative collective
security objective. The applicants’ complaints were accordingly
incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention.
22. Against the factual background described above a number of
questions must be asked in the present case. Were UK forces placed at
the disposal of the UN? Did the UN exercise effective control over the
conduct of UK forces? Is the specific conduct of the UK forces in
detaining the appellant to be attributed to the UN rather than the UK?
Did the UN have effective command and control over the conduct of
UK forces when they detained the appellant? Were the UK forces part of
a UN peacekeeping force in Iraq? In my opinion the answer to all these
questions is in the negative.
23. The UN did not dispatch the coalition forces to Iraq. The CPA
was established by the coalition states, notably the US, not the UN.
When the coalition states became occupying powers in Iraq they had no
UN mandate. Thus when the case of Mr Mousa reached the House as
17
one of those considered in R(Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of State
for Defence) (The Redress Trust intervening) [2007] UKHL 26, [2007] 3
WLR 33 the Secretary of State accepted that the UK was liable under
the European Convention for any ill-treatment Mr Mousa suffered,
while unsuccessfully denying liability under the Human Rights Act
1998. It has not, to my knowledge, been suggested that the treatment of
detainees at Abu Ghraib was attributable to the UN rather than the US.
Following UNSCR 1483 in May 2003 the role of the UN was a limited
one focused on humanitarian relief and reconstruction, a role
strengthened but not fundamentally altered by UNSCR 1511 in October
2003. By UNSCR 1511, and again by UNSCR 1546 in June 2004, the
UN gave the multinational force express authority to take steps to
promote security and stability in Iraq, but (adopting the distinction
formulated by the European Court in para 43 of its judgment in Behrami
and Saramati) the Security Council was not delegating its power by
empowering the UK to exercise its function but was authorising the UK
to carry out functions it could not perform itself. At no time did the US
or the UK disclaim responsibility for the conduct of their forces or the
UN accept it. It cannot realistically be said that US and UK forces were
under the effective command and control of the UN, or that UK forces
were under such command and control when they detained the
appellant.
24. The analogy with the situation in Kosovo breaks down, in my
opinion, at almost every point. The international security and civil
presences in Kosovo were established at the express behest of the UN
and operated under its auspices, with UNMIK a subsidiary organ of the
UN. The multinational force in Iraq was not established at the behest of
the UN, was not mandated to operate under UN auspices and was not a
subsidiary organ of the UN. There was no delegation of UN power in
Iraq. It is quite true that duties to report were imposed in Iraq as in
Kosovo. But the UN’s proper concern for the protection of human rights
and observance of humanitarian law called for no less, and it is one
thing to receive reports, another to exercise effective command and
control. It does not seem to me significant that in each case the UN
reserved power to revoke its authority, since it could clearly do so
whether or not it reserved power to do so.
25. I would resolve this first issue in favour of the appellant and
against the Secretary of State.
The second issue
18
26. As already indicated, this issue turns on the relationship between
article 5(1) of the European Convention and article 103 of the UN
Charter. The central questions to be resolved are whether, on the facts of
this case, the UK became subject to an obligation (within the meaning of
article 103) to detain the appellant and, if so, whether and to what extent
such obligation displaced or qualified the appellant’s rights under article
5(1).
27. Article 5(1) protects one of the rights and freedoms which state
parties to the European Convention have bound themselves to secure to
everyone within their jurisdiction. It has been recognised as a right of
paramount importance. It is one to which, by virtue of the Human Rights
Act 1998, UK courts must give effect. Its terms are familiar: “Everyone
has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived
of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law:…” There follows a list of situations in
which a person may, in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law,
be deprived of his liberty. It is unnecessary to recite the details of these
situations, since none of them is said to apply to the appellant. In the
absence of some exonerating condition, the detention of the appellant
would plainly infringe his right under article 5(1).
28. The Charter of the United Nations was signed in June 1945 as the
Second World War, with its horrific consequences in many parts of the
world, was drawing to a close. It is necessary to review its terms in a
little detail. In the preamble the parties expressed their determination to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights. Its objects, expressed in article 1,
were (among others) to maintain international peace and security and, to
that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace; and to promote and encourage respect
for human rights. Member states bound themselves (article 2) to fulfil in
good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the
Charter, and to give the UN every assistance in any action it might take
in accordance with the Charter. By article 24 the Security Council has
primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security and
acts on behalf of member states in discharging that responsibility.
Member states agree (article 25) to accept and carry out the decisions of
the Security Council in accordance with the Charter.
29. Chapter VII governs “Action with respect to threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”. It opens (article 39) by
providing that the Security Council shall determine the existence of any
19
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and decide
what measures should be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42 to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 41 is
directed to measures not involving the use of armed force. More
pertinently, article 42 empowers the Security Council, if it considers that
article 41 powers were or would be inadequate, to take such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. By article 43, member states undertake,
in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and
security, to make available to the Security Council on its call and in
accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces,
assistance and facilities necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security. Such agreements were to govern the
number and types of forces, including their location, readiness and
facilities and were to be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative
of the Security Council. No such agreements have, in practice, ever been
made, and article 43 is a dead letter.
30. It remains to take note of article 103, a miscellaneous provision
contained in Chapter XVI. It provides:
“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter
and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter
shall prevail”.
This provision lies at the heart of the controversy between the parties.
For while the Secretary of State contends that the Charter, and UNSCRs
1511 (2003), 1546 (2004), 1637 (2005) and 1723 (2006), impose an
obligation on the UK to detain the appellant which prevails over the
appellant’s conflicting right under article 5(1) of the European
Convention, the appellant insists that the UNSCRs referred to, read in
the light of the Charter, at most authorise the UK to take action to detain
him but do not oblige it to do so, with the result that no conflict arises
and article 103 is not engaged.
31. There is an obvious attraction in the appellant’s argument since,
as appears from the summaries of UNSCRs 1511 and 1546 given above
in paras 12 and 15, the resolutions use the language of authorisation, not
obligation, and the same usage is found in UNSCRs 1637 (2005) and
1723 (2006). In ordinary speech to authorise is to permit or allow or
20
license, not to require or oblige. I am, however, persuaded that the
appellant’s argument is not sound, for three main reasons.
32. First, it appears to me that during the period when the UK was an
occupying power (from the cessation of hostilities on 1 May 2003 to the
transfer of power to the Iraqi Interim Government on 28 June 2004) it
was obliged, in the area which it effectively occupied, to take necessary
measures to protect the safety of the public and its own safety.
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations 1907 provides, with reference to
occupying powers:
“The authority of the legitimate power having in fact
passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take
all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far
as possible, public order and safety, while respecting,
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country”.
This provision is supplemented by certain provisions of the Fourth
Geneva Convention. Articles 41, 42 and 78 of that convention, so far as
material, provide
“41. Should the Power, in whose hands protected
persons may be, consider the measures of control
mentioned in the present Convention to be inadequate, it
may not have recourse to any other measure of control
more severe than that of assigned residence or internment,
in accordance with the provisions of articles 42 and 43…
42. The internment or placing in assigned residence of
protected persons may be ordered only if the security of
the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary…
78. If the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for
imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures
concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject
them to assigned residence or to internment”.
These three articles are designed to circumscribe the sanctions which
may be applied to protected persons, and they have no direct application
to the appellant, who is not a protected person. But they show plainly
that there is a power to intern persons who are not protected persons,
21
and it would seem to me that if the occupying power considers it
necessary to detain a person who is judged to be a serious threat to the
safety of the public or the occupying power there must be an obligation
to detain such person: see the decision of the International Court of
Justice in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 116, para 178. This is
a matter of some importance, since although the appellant was not
detained during the period of the occupation, both the evidence and the
language of UNSCR 1546 (2004) and the later resolutions strongly
suggest that the intention was to continue the pre-existing security
regime and not to change it. There is not said to have been such an
improvement in local security conditions as would have justified any
relaxation.
33. There are, secondly, some situations in which the Security
Council can adopt resolutions couched in mandatory terms. One
example is UNSCR 820 (1993), considered by the European Court (with
reference to an EC regulation giving effect to it) in Bosphorus Hava
Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland (2005) 42 EHRR 1,
which decided in paragraph 24 that “all states shall impound all vessels,
freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in their territories…”. Such
provisions cause no difficulty in principle, since member states can
comply with them within their own borders and are bound by article 25
of the UN Charter to comply. But language of this kind cannot be used
in relation to military or security operations overseas, since the UN and
the Security Council have no standing forces at their own disposal and
have concluded no agreements under article 43 of the Charter which
entitle them to call on member states to provide them. Thus in practice
the Security Council can do little more than give its authorisation to
member states which are willing to conduct such tasks, and this is what
(as I understand) it has done for some years past. Even in UNSCR 1244
(1999) relating to Kosovo, when (as I have concluded) the operations
were very clearly conducted under UN auspices, the language of
authorisation was used. There is, however, a strong and to my mind
persuasive body of academic opinion which would treat article 103 as
applicable where conduct is authorised by the Security Council as where
it is required: see, for example, Goodrich, Hambro and Simons (eds),
Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 3rd
ed
(1969), pp 615-616; Yearbook of the International Law Commission
(1979), Vol II, Part One, para 14; Sarooshi, The United Nations and the
Development of Collective Security (1999), pp 150-151. The most recent
and perhaps clearest opinion on the subject is that of Frowein and Krisch
in Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary,
2nd
ed (2002), p 729:
22
“Such authorizations, however, create difficulties with
respect to article 103. According to the latter provision, the
Charter–and thus also SC resolutions–override existing
international law only insofar as they create ‘obligations’
(cf. Bernhardt on article 103 MN 27 et seq.). One could
conclude that in case a state is not obliged but merely
authorized to take action, it remains bound by its
conventional obligations. Such a result, however, would
not seem to correspond with state practice at least as
regards authorizations of military action. These
authorizations have not been opposed on the ground of
conflicting treaty obligations, and if they could be opposed
on this basis, the very idea of authorizations as a necessary
substitute for direct action by the SC would be
compromised. Thus, the interpretation of article 103
should be reconciled with that of article 42, and the
prevalence over treaty obligations should be recognized
for the authorization of military action as well (see
Frowein/Krisch on article 42 MN 28). The same
conclusion seems warranted with respect to authorizations
of economic measures under article 41. Otherwise, the
Charter would not reach its goal of allowing the SC to take
the action it deems most appropriate to deal with threats to
the peace–it would force the SC to act either by way of
binding measures or by way of recommendations, but
would not permit intermediate forms of action. This would
deprive the SC of much of the flexibility it is supposed to
enjoy. It seems therefore preferable to apply the rule of
article 103 to all action under articles 41 and 42 and not
only to mandatory measures.”
This approach seems to me to give a purposive interpretation to
article 103 of the Charter, in the context of its other provisions, and to
reflect the practice of the UN and member states as it has developed
over the past 60 years.
34. I am further of the opinion, thirdly, that in a situation such as the
present “obligations” in article 103 should not in any event be given a
narrow, contract-based, meaning. The importance of maintaining peace
and security in the world can scarcely be exaggerated, and that (as
evident from the articles of the Charter quoted above) is the mission of
the UN. Its involvement in Iraq was directed to that end, following
repeated determinations that the situation in Iraq continued to constitute
a threat to international peace and security. As is well known, a large
23
majority of states chose not to contribute to the multinational force, but
those which did (including the UK) became bound by articles 2 and 25
to carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the
Charter so as to achieve its lawful objectives. It is of course true that the
UK did not become specifically bound to detain the appellant in
particular. But it was, I think, bound to exercise its power of detention
where this was necessary for imperative reasons of security. It could not
be said to be giving effect to the decisions of the Security Council if, in
such a situation, it neglected to take steps which were open to it.
35. Emphasis has often been laid on the special character of the
European Convention as a human rights instrument. But the reference
in article 103 to “any other international agreement” leaves no room for
any excepted category, and such appears to be the consensus of learned
opinion. The decisions of the International Court of Justice (Case
Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie
[1992] ICJ Rep 3, para 39; Case Concerning Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
[1993] ICJ Rep 325, per Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht, pp 439-440, paras
99-100) give no warrant for drawing any distinction save where an
obligation is jus cogens and according to Judge Bernhardt it now seems
to be generally recognised in practice that binding Security Council
decisions taken under Chapter VII supersede all other treaty
commitments (Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A
Commentary, 2nd
ed (2002), pp 1299-1300).
36. I do not think that the European Court, if the appellant’s
article 5(1) claim were before it as an application, would ignore the
significance of article 103 of the Charter in international law. The court
has on repeated occasions taken account of provisions of international
law, invoking the interpretative principle laid down in article 31(3)(c) of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, acknowledging that the
Convention cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum and
recognising that the responsibility of states must be determined in
conformity and harmony with the governing principles of international
law: see, for instance, Loizidou v Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 513, paras
42-43, 52; Bankovic v Belgium (2001) 11 BHRC 435, para 57; Fogarty v
United Kingdom (2001) 34 EHRR 302, para 34; Al-Adsani v United
Kingdom (2001) 34 EHRR 273, paras 54-55; Behrami and Saramati,
above, para 122. In the latter case, in para 149, the court made the strong
statement quoted in para 21 above.
24
37. The appellant is, however, entitled to submit, as he does, that
while maintenance of international peace and security is a fundamental
purpose of the UN, so too is the promotion of respect for human rights.
On repeated occasions in recent years the UN and other international
bodies have stressed the need for effective action against the scourge of
terrorism but have, in the same breath, stressed the imperative need for
such action to be consistent with international human rights standards
such as those which the Convention exists to protect. He submits that it
would be anomalous and offensive to principle that the authority of the
UN should itself serve as a defence of human rights abuses. This line of
thinking is reflected in the judgment of the European Court in Waite and
Kennedy v Germany (1999) 30 EHRR 261, para 67, where the court
said:
“67. The court is of the opinion that where states
establish international organisations in order to pursue or
strengthen their co-operation in certain fields of activities,
and where they attribute to these organisations certain
competences and accord them immunities, there may be
implications as to the protection of fundamental rights. It
would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the
Convention, however, if the contracting states were
thereby absolved from their responsibility under the
Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by
such attribution. It should be recalled that the Convention
is intended to guarantee not theoretical or illusory rights,
but rights that are practical and effective …”
The problem in a case such as the present is acute, since it is difficult to
see how any exercise of the power to detain, however necessary for
imperative reasons of security, and however strong the safeguards
afforded to the detainee, could do otherwise than breach the detainee’s
rights under article 5(1).
38. One solution, discussed in argument, is that a state member of the
Council of Europe, facing this dilemma, should exercise its power of
derogation under article 15 of the Convention, which permits derogation
from article 5. However, such power may only be exercised in time of
war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation seeking
to derogate, and only then to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation and provided that the measures taken are not
inconsistent with the state’s other obligations under international law. It
is hard to think that these conditions could ever be met when a state had
25
chosen to conduct an overseas peacekeeping operation, however
dangerous the conditions, from which it could withdraw. The Secretary
of State does not contend that the UK could exercise its power to
derogate in Iraq (although he does not accept that it could not). It has not
been the practice of states to derogate in such situations, and since
subsequent practice in the application of a treaty may (under article
31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention) be taken into account in interpreting
the treaty it seems proper to regard article 15 as inapplicable.
39. Thus there is a clash between on the one hand a power or duty to
detain exercisable on the express authority of the Security Council and,
on the other, a fundamental human right which the UK has undertaken
to secure to those (like the appellant) within its jurisdiction. How are
these to be reconciled? There is in my opinion only one way in which
they can be reconciled: by ruling that the UK may lawfully, where it is
necessary for imperative reasons of security, exercise the power to
detain authorised by UNSCR 1546 and successive resolutions, but must
ensure that the detainee’s rights under article 5 are not infringed to any
greater extent than is inherent in such detention. I would resolve the
second issue in this sense.
The third issue
40. The third issue (whether English common law or Iraqi law
applies to the detention of the appellant and, if the former, whether there
is any lawful basis for his detention) can be addressed more shortly. It is
directed first to the question whether a claim by the appellant in England
against the Secretary of State for damages for false imprisonment is
governed by English or Iraqi law. This claim is not founded on the
Convention or the Human Rights Act but on tort or delict.
41. The general rule, enacted in section 11(1) of the Private
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, is that the
applicable law is the law of the country in which the events constituting
the tort or delict occurred. That country in this case is Iraq, and therefore
Iraqi law would ordinarily apply.
42. Section 12 of the 1995 Act provides that the general rule may be
displaced if, on comparison of the factors connecting a tort or delict with
the country where it occurred with factors connecting it with another
country, it is “substantially more appropriate” for the applicable law for
26
determining the issues to be the law of the latter country rather than the
former. Making that comparison, and relying on a number of factors
connecting the alleged tort with this country, the appellant submits that
English law is shown to be substantially more appropriate than Iraqi law
to determine the issues raised by his claim.
43. This submission was made by the appellant to the Court of
Appeal, which rejected it for reasons given by Brooke LJ in paragraph
106 of his judgment. It is unnecessary to rehearse those reasons. The
Court of Appeal made no error of law, and there is no ground for
disturbing its assessment, with which in any event I wholly agree. I
would resolve this issue against the appellant. The appellant’s claim in
tort is governed by the law of Iraq.
44. For these reasons the appeal must be dismissed. The parties
(other than the intervener) are invited to make submissions on costs
within 14 days.
LORD RODGER OF EARLSFERRY
My Lords,
45. The appellant, Mr Al-Jedda, has been detained since October
2004 by British forces serving as part of the multinational force
(“MNF”) in Iraq. The basis of his detention is that his internment is
necessary for imperative reasons of security in Iraq. Although the
appellant does not accept that his internment is actually necessary, it is
common ground that, for the purposes of this appeal, the House should
proceed on the assumption that his internment is indeed necessary for
the reasons given by the Secretary of State.
46. Similarly, it is common ground that the present appeal concerns
only the alleged violation of the appellant’s rights under article 5(1) of
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“the Convention”). The House is not concerned with any issue relating
to the provisions for the review of his continued detention – or indeed
with any issue relating to article 5(4) of the Convention.
27
47. In short, the appellant complains that, since detention on the
ground that it is necessary for imperative reasons of security is not
permissible under article 5(1) of the Convention, his detention is
unlawful under section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”).
He seeks, inter alia, a declaration to that effect and a mandatory order
that the Secretary of State should release him.
48. The fact that the appellant is detained in Iraq is not in itself a bar
to such proceedings under the HRA. Although, for the most part, the Act
applies only to acts of public authorities within the United Kingdom, it
will also usually apply to acts of United Kingdom public authorities
outside the United Kingdom where the victim is within the jurisdiction
of the United Kingdom for purposes of article 1 of the Convention: R
(Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence (The Redress Trust
intervening) [2007] 3 WLR 33. In the present case, counsel for the
Secretary of State argued, however, that there are two distinct reasons
why the appellant cannot rely on his article 5(1) Convention rights in
these proceedings.
49. First, and more fundamentally, counsel submitted that the acts of
the British forces in detaining the appellant were to be attributed to the
United Nations in international law. The European Court of Human
Rights would accordingly be incompetent ratione personae to consider
any application by him in respect of those acts. The point was not, and
could not have been, argued in the courts below since it is based on the
subsequent decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights in Behrami v France, Saramati v France, Germany and
Norway (Application Nos 71412/10 and 78166/01) (unreported), 2 May
2007.
50. Secondly, counsel submitted that, in any event, by virtue of
Security Council Resolution 1546, and articles 25 and 103 of the United
Nations Charter (“the Charter”), the British forces were under an
obligation to intern the appellant which superseded any obligation of the
United Kingdom under article 5(1) of the Convention.
51. It is now well established, of course, that the Convention rights in
Schedule 1 to the HRA are distinct obligations in the domestic legal
systems of the United Kingdom. The Act does not incorporate into our
domestic law the international law obligations under the Convention as
such. See, for instance, In re McKerr [2004] 1 WLR 807. In the courts
below, the appellant ran an argument based on that line of authority, to
28
the effect that, even if the international law obligations of the United
Kingdom under article 5(1) had been superseded by the terms of
Resolution 1546, that made no difference to the Secretary of State’s
domestic law obligation not to act incompatibly with the appellant’s
article 5 Convention rights as set out in Schedule 1 to the HRA. By
virtue of section 1(2) of the HRA, that position could be changed only
by the United Kingdom derogating from article 5(1).
52. In section 21(1) of the HRA the term “Convention” in the Act is
defined, however, as meaning the European Convention “as it has effect
for the time being in relation to the United Kingdom”. On that basis, in
the courts below the Secretary of State argued that, to the extent that
article 5(1) was trumped by the terms of Resolution 1546 and articles 25
and 103 of the Charter, it did not have “effect...in relation to the United
Kingdom” for purposes of the HRA.
53. At para 74 of its judgment, the Divisional Court accepted the
Secretary of State’s submission to that effect. Under reference to R
(Quark Fishing Ltd) v Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs [2006] 1 AC 529, the Court of Appeal did so
also: [2007] QB 621, 652-654, paras 88-99, per Brooke LJ. The
appellant did not challenge the decision of the Court of Appeal on that
point before the House.
54. While the effect of Quark Fishing was not explored by counsel in
relation to the Secretary of State’s (new) first argument, the position
must be the same as with his other argument. If the European Court
would hold, as it held in relation to the defendant states in Behrami, that
the action of the British forces in detaining Mr Al-Jedda was attributable
to the United Nations, then it would also declare his complaint to be
incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention:
Behrami, para 153. In other words, the Convention would not have
“effect...in relation to the United Kingdom” in respect of Mr Al-Jedda’s
detention. So, in accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeal, he
could not bring proceedings in the English courts under the HRA
alleging that his detention was unlawful because it was incompatible
with his article 5(1) Convention rights.
55. I emphasise the point since it explains why the House, a domestic
court, finds itself deep inside the realm of international law – indeed
inside the very chamber of the United Nations Security Council itself.
The House is confronted by these issues precisely because it is called
29
upon to assess how a claim by the appellant, that his international law
rights under article 5(1) of the Convention had been violated by the
United Kingdom, would fare before the European Court in Strasbourg.
How would that court resolve the two issues of international law?
Would the European Court hold that the appellant’s complaint was
incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention? If
not, would it hold that, by reason of articles 25 and 103 of the Charter,
in so far as there was a conflict, the obligations of the British forces
under Security Council Resolution 1546 prevailed over the United
Kingdom’s obligations under article 5(1) of the European Convention?
In answering these questions, the House must, of course, have regard to
the way that the European Court has approached similar questions in the
past. The interpretation and application of the decision of the European
Court in Behrami are accordingly central to any consideration of the
first question.
56. That decision arose out of events in Kosovo. One child, Gadaf
Behrami, had been killed and another, Bekim Behrami, had been very
seriously injured by an undetonated cluster bomb that had not been
cleared. Mr Saramati had been detained by French forces. The applicant,
Mr Agim Behrami, claimed that, in the case of his children, there had
been a breach of article 2 of the Convention. Mr Saramati claimed that
there had been a violation of article 5 of the Convention. The case of the
Behrami children was complicated by a factual dispute as to which
organisation was responsible for the failure to clear the mines. For
present purposes, however, it is enough to concentrate on Mr Saramati’s
application, alleging that his rights under article 5 of the Convention had
been violated by France.
57. France argued that Mr Saramati’s detention had been carried out
by her forces when acting as part of the international Kosovo Force
(“KFOR”), in accordance with its mandate in Security Council
Resolution 1244. Hence the impugned detention was attributable to the
United Nations. As the European Court explained in Behrami, at para
121, it therefore had, first, to determine whether the detention was
indeed “attributable” to the United Nations, “attributable” being
understood in the same way as in article 3 of the draft Articles on the
Responsibility of International Organisations. If the court found that the
detention was indeed attributable to the United Nations, it had then to go
on to consider whether the court was competent to review the detention.
In the event, the court held, at para 140, that the United Nations retained
ultimate authority and control and hence, at para 141, that the detention
of Mr Saramati was in principle “attributable” to the United Nations.
The court went on to conclude that, in these circumstances, the
30
Convention could not be interpreted in a manner which would subject
the action of the French forces in detaining Mr Saramati to the scrutiny
of the court: para 149. So his application to the European Court was
inadmissible.
58. In deciding that the detention of Mr Saramati was attributable to
the United Nations, the court paid particular attention to the legal basis
on which the members of KFOR were operating. For present purposes
the legal basis on which British forces in the MNF have been operating
during the period of the appellant’s detention must similarly be
important.
59. There is an obvious difference between the factual position in
Kosovo that lay behind the Behrami case and the factual position in Iraq
that lies behind the present case. The forces making up KFOR went into
Kosovo, for the first time, as members of KFOR and in terms of
Security Council Resolution 1244. By contrast, the Coalition forces
were in Iraq and, indeed, in occupation of Iraq, for about six months
before the Security Council adopted Resolution 1511, authorising the
creation of the MNF, on 16 October 2003.
60. While Resolution 1511 provided the authority for establishing the
MNF, the legal position of the British forces in Iraq changed
significantly at the end of June 2004. From May 2003 until the end of
June 2004, the British forces had been the forces of a power which was
in occupation of the relevant area of Iraq. But on 28 June the occupation
ended. The interim constitution of Iraq, the Transitional Administrative
Law, came into effect and sovereignty was transferred to the Iraqi
Interim Government. Since the United States and the United Kingdom
were no longer occupying powers, a new legal basis for their actions had
to be established. This is to be found in Resolution 1546 which was cosponsored
by the United States and the United Kingdom and which the
Security Council adopted on 8 June 2004. That Resolution regulated the
position of the MNF when Mr Al-Jedda was detained in October 2004.
By virtue of later resolutions, which do not need to be examined in
detail, the core provisions of that Resolution have continued to regulate
the position throughout the period of his detention.
61. It respectfully appears to me that the mere fact that Resolution
1244 was adopted before the forces making up KFOR entered Kosovo
was legally irrelevant to the issue in Behrami. What mattered was that
Resolution 1244 had been adopted before the French members of KFOR
31
detained Mr Saramati So the Resolution regulated the legal position at
the time of his detention. Equally, in the present case, the fact that the
British and other Coalition forces were in Iraq long before Resolution
1546 was adopted is legally irrelevant for present purposes. What
matters is that Resolution 1546 was adopted before the British forces
detained the appellant and so it regulated the legal position at that time.
As renewed, the provisions of that Resolution have continued to do so
ever since.
62. Moreover, if there were ever any questions as to the exact
interplay between the rights and duties of the British forces as the forces
of an occupying power and as members of the MNF under Resolution
1511, those questions no longer arose after the end of June 2004. From
that point onwards the legal position of the members of the MNF set up
under Resolution 1511 was governed by Resolution 1546.
63. Another factual difference between the situations in Kosovo and
Iraq is, in my view, equally irrelevant to the legal position of the
members of the military forces. In Kosovo the United Nations itself was
in charge of the civil administration of the country through the United
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In Iraq,
after the end of June 2004, the civil government of the country was in
the hands of the Iraqi Interim Government and the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) was there simply to provide
humanitarian and other assistance. The fact that the civilian
administration in Kosovo was in the hands of UNMIK played no part in
the European Court’s decision that the actions of members of KFOR
were attributable to the United Nations. Similarly, the fact that the civil
government of Iraq was in the hands of the Iraqi Interim Government at
the relevant time must be irrelevant for purposes of deciding whether the
actions of members of the MNF in detaining the appellant were
attributable to the United Nations.
64. Another point requires to be cleared out of the way. As already
mentioned, in R (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] 3
WLR 33 the House held that proceedings could be brought under the
HRA in United Kingdom courts in respect of violations of Convention
rights by a United Kingdom public authority acting within the
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom in terms of article 1 of the
Convention. For purposes of the first issue in this appeal, however, the
House is not concerned with whether or not Mr Al-Jedda, while detained
by British forces, has been within the jurisdiction of the United
32
Kingdom in terms of article 1. The decision of the European Court in
Behrami makes that quite clear. At para 71, the court said:
“The court therefore considers that the question raised by
the present cases is, less whether the respondent states
exercised extra-territorial jurisdiction in Kosovo but far
more centrally [‘fondamentalement’], whether this court is
competent to examine under the Convention those states’
contribution to the civil and security presences [‘le rôle
joué par ces Etats au sein des présences civile et de
sécurité’] which did exercise the relevant control of
Kosovo.”
Having concluded that it was not competent, ratione personae, for the
court to scrutinise the role played by the states in the civil and security
presences in Kosovo, the court found it unnecessary to consider whether
the court would have been competent ratione loci to examine complaints
against the respondent states about extraterritorial acts or omissions:
para 153. Equally, for purposes of the first issue in this appeal, the
crucial point is whether the European Court would be competent, ratione
personae, to scrutinise the role played by the British members of the
MNF in detaining the appellant. If the court would not be competent for
that reason, then the issue of whether it would be competent, ratione
loci, does not arise.
65. My Lords, it may seem tempting to begin and end any discussion
of the position by focusing on the appellant’s detention and by asking –
using the language in article 5 of the International Law Commission’s
draft articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations (2004)
- whether the United Nations organisation was in “effective control” of
the British forces as they were detaining him. Obviously, the answer is
that what the British forces did by way of detaining the appellant, they
did as members of the MNF under unified command. No one would
suggest that the Security Council either was, or could have been,
involved in the particular decision to detain the appellant or in the
practical steps taken to carry out that decision. But that was equally
obviously the case with the detention of Mr Saramati in the Behrami
case. The Grand Chamber held, at para 140, that the Security Council
“retained ultimate authority and control and that effective command of
the relevant operational matters was retained by NATO” (emphasis
added). On this basis - and despite the fact that the “effective command”
of the relevant operational matters was retained by NATO - the Grand
33
Chamber held that the detention of Mr Saramati was attributable to the
United Nations.
66. The first step in the chain of reasoning which led the Grand
Chamber to that conclusion was a consideration of what the Security
Council was doing when it adopted the relevant provisions of Resolution
1244 under Chapter VII of the Charter. Similarly, in the present case,
the correct starting point is with the Security Council’s adoption of
Resolution 1546.
67. As the Grand Chamber recalled in paras 18 to 20 of its judgment
in Behrami, the provisions of Chapter VII were an innovation by
comparison with the older public international law and the Covenant of
the League of Nations. The League was not designed itself to take
military action to preserve peace. It was envisaged that such action
would continue to be taken by individual states. By contrast, the Charter
centralises responsibility for international peace: article 24(1) gives the
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security. Under article 39 in Chapter VII, it is for
the Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to the
peace and to make recommendations, or to decide what measures shall
be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
68. In Resolution 1546 the Security Council duly determined, in
terms of article 39 of the Charter, that the situation in Iraq continued to
constitute a threat to international peace and security. The Council then
went on, under Chapter VII, to decide what measures were to be taken
to deal with the threat.
69. In terms of article 42 of the Charter, where lesser measures would
be inadequate, the Security Council:
“may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces
of Members of the United Nations.”
34
Articles 43 to 45 of the Charter envisaged that agreements would be
made between the Security Council and member states for the member
states to provide forces for the purpose of taking the action necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. In terms of such
agreements member states could be obliged to provide forces. But no
such agreements have in fact ever been concluded and there is no other
mechanism by which the Security Council can actually require member
states to provide such forces.
70. During the Cold War era the political situation meant that, in
practice, the Security Council virtually never did decide to take action
by force to maintain or restore international peace and security. When
the political situation changed, still being unable to require member
states to provide forces, the Security Council began to adopt resolutions
which “authorised” member states to take the necessary action. The
adoption of such resolutions has become settled practice in appropriate
cases, though the details of the practice have evolved in the light of
experience. Resolution 1546 is a resolution of this kind.
71. Resolution 1244, dealing with Kosovo, was an earlier resolution
of the same kind, which proceeded on the basis of authorisation being
given by the Security Council to the security force. Paragraph 7 was in
these terms:
“Authorizes member states and relevant international
organisations to establish the international security
presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with
all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under
paragraph 9 below.”
Annex 2 provided that agreement should be reached on a number of
principles, in order to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis.
Among these principles was point 4:
“The international security presence with substantial North
Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be
deployed under unified command and control and
authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in
Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of
all displaced persons and refugees.”
35
Paragraph 9 of the Resolution indicated what the responsibilities of the
international security presence were to include. In view of the terms of
paragraph 9 and point 4 of Annex 2, as well as some other factors, in
Behrami the Grand Chamber considered that it was evident that KFOR’s
security mandate included issuing detention orders: para 124.
72. As I have explained, the original authorisation for the setting up
of the MNF in Iraq goes back to Resolution 1511, but Resolution 1546
was adopted in order to regulate the position when the occupation of
Iraq came to an end. In Resolution 1546, having determined that the
situation in Iraq continued to constitute a threat to international peace
and security, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security
Council accordingly welcomed:
“the willingness of the multinational force to continue
efforts to contribute to the maintenance of security and
stability in Iraq in support of the political transition,
especially for upcoming elections, and to provide security
for the United Nations presence in Iraq, as described in the
letter of 5 June 2004 from the United States Secretary of
State to the President of the Council, which is annexed to
this resolution.”
The Council also noted the commitment of all forces, promoting the
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, to act in accordance with
international law, including obligations under international humanitarian
law, and to co-operate with relevant international organisations.
73. The heart of the Resolution is to be found in paras 10-12, where
the Security Council:
“10. Decides that the multinational force shall have the
authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to
the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in
accordance with the letters annexed to this resolution
expressing, inter alia, the Iraqi request for the continued
presence of the multinational force and setting out its
tasks, including by preventing and deterring terrorism, so
that, inter alia, the United Nations can fulfil its role in
assisting the Iraqi people as outlined in paragraph seven
above and the Iraqi people can implement freely and
36
without intimidation the timetable and programme for the
political process and benefit from reconstruction and
rehabilitation activities;
11. Welcomes, in this regard, the letters annexed to this
resolution stating, inter alia, that arrangements are being
put in place to establish a security partnership between the
sovereign Government of Iraq and the multinational force
and to ensure coordination between the two....
12. Decides further that the mandate for the
multinational force shall be reviewed at the request of the
Government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of this
resolution, and that this mandate shall expire upon the
completion of the political process set out in paragraph
four above, and declares that it will terminate this mandate
earlier if requested by the Government of Iraq....”
74. The letters mentioned in paragraph 10 of the Resolution include a
letter from the American Secretary of State dated 5 June 2004. The
Secretary of State began his letter in this way:
“Recognizing the request of the government of Iraq for the
continued presence of the Multi-National Force (MNF) in
Iraq, and following consultations with Prime Minister
Ayad Allawi of the Iraqi Interim Government, I am
writing to confirm that the MNF under unified command
is prepared to continue to contribute to the maintenance of
security in Iraq, including by preventing and deterring
terrorism and protecting the territory of Iraq. The goal of
the MNF will be to help the Iraqi people to complete the
political transition and will permit the United Nations and
the international community to work to facilitate Iraq’s
reconstruction.”
Mr Powell went on to refer to the continuing problems with security in
Iraq and to recognise that “Development of an effective and cooperative
security partnership between the MNF and the sovereign Government of
Iraq is critical to the stability of Iraq.” After describing the arrangements
in more detail, he continued:
“Under the agreed arrangement, the MNF stands ready to
continue to undertake a broad range of tasks to contribute
37
to the maintenance of security and to ensure force
protection. These include activities necessary to counter
ongoing security threats posed by forces seeking to
influence Iraq’s political future through violence. This will
include combat operations against members of these
groups, internment where this is necessary for imperative
reasons of security, and the continued search for and
securing of weapons that threaten Iraq’s security. A further
objective will be to train and equip Iraqi security forces
that will increasingly take responsibility for maintaining
Iraq’s security. The MNF also stands ready as needed to
participate in the provision of humanitarian assistance,
civil affairs support, and relief and reconstruction
assistance requested by the Iraqi Interim Government and
in line with previous Security Council Resolutions.”
75. Mr Powell then recorded that the MNF would establish or
support a force to provide for the security of personnel and facilities of
the United Nations in relation to its security effort. He went on to say
that “the forces that make up the MNF are and will remain committed at
all times to act consistently with their obligations under the law of
armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions.”
76. In paragraph 31 of the Resolution, the Security Council requested
the United States, on behalf of the multinational force, to report within
three months from the date of the Resolution on the efforts and progress
of the force, and on a quarterly basis thereafter. In paragraph 32 the
Council decided to remain actively seised of the matter.
77. Paragraph 10 of Resolution 1546 therefore gave the MNF the
authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance
of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to
the Resolution. This authorisation was essentially similar to the
authorisation given to KFOR in Resolution 1244. Notably, for present
purposes, it gave specific authorisation for the MNF to undertake the
task of “internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of
security.”
78. I now turn to see how the Grand Chamber analysed the
provisions of Resolution 1244 and how that analysis would apply to any
corresponding provisions of Resolution 1546.
38
79. The key to the Grand Chamber’s analysis is its recognition that in
international law, by virtue of the terms of the Charter, the responsibility
for preserving the peace and for taking the necessary military measures
to achieve that end rests squarely on the Security Council. To what
extent, therefore, is it lawful for the Security Council to delegate its
responsibility to another body? Quite clearly, it could never delegate to
any other body its duty under article 39 of the Charter to determine the
existence of any threat to the peace. But can it delegate to another body
its power to take the necessary military action to maintain or restore
international peace and security? The Grand Chamber’s answer to that
question (Yes, within limits) and the ramifications of that answer are
critical elements in the court’s decision that it would not be competent to
scrutinise the actions of members of KFOR acting in terms of their
mandate from the Security Council.
80. The Grand Chamber explains, in para 43, that:
“Use of the term ‘delegation’ in the present decision refers
to the empowering by the UNSC of another entity to
exercise its function as opposed to ‘authorising’ an entity
to carry out functions which it could not itself perform.”
In this passage the court is not drawing a distinction between the
Security Council empowering another entity to exercise a function
which the Council itself would have the practical capability to perform
and authorising an entity to carry out functions which the Council could
not, as a practical matter, perform. On the contrary, it is drawing a
distinction between the Council empowering another entity to exercise
the Council’s own function under the Charter (“delegation”) and
“authorising” an entity to carry out functions which the Council itself
would have no legal power under the Charter to perform.
81. In a United Nations context, this distinction appears to go back to
the decision of the International Court of Justice in Application for
Review of Judgment No 158 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, Advisory Opinion [1973] ICJ Rep 166. The General
Assembly, which did not itself have power under the Charter to review
decisions of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, had set up a
committee to carry out this function. The question for the International
Court of Justice was whether the committee had the competence to ask
the International Court for advisory opinions, arising out of the exercise
of its power to review Tribunal decisions. The General Assembly itself
39
had the competence to request advisory opinions. The International
Court held that the committee did indeed have the competence to
request advisory opinions for its own purposes, but not because the
General Assembly had impliedly delegated its own competence to the
committee. That could not be the basis, because the General Assembly
could not have delegated to the committee the legal power, which it did
not itself possess, to review Tribunal decisions. The court said, at p 174:
“This is not a delegation by the General Assembly of its
own power to request an advisory opinion; it is the
creation of a subsidiary organ having a particular task and
invested with the power to request advisory opinions in the
performance of that task.”
The distinction between delegation and this kind of authorisation is
discussed, in relation to Security Council authorisations under Chapter
VII of the Charter, for example, in D Sarooshi, The United Nations and
the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN
Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers (1999), pp 11-13, and E de
Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council
(2004), pp 258-260. The Grand Chamber referred to these works, among
others, in para 130 of its judgment, when deciding that Chapter VII
provided the framework for the Security Council’s delegation of its
security powers to KFOR in Resolution 1244.
82. What therefore has to be considered is whether, in Resolution
1546, the Security Council was lawfully delegating its Chapter VII legal
powers to take the necessary military measures to restore and maintain
peace and security in Iraq to the MNF. As the Grand Chamber pointed
out in Behrami, at para 132, under reference to, inter alia, Meroni v High
Authority (Case 9/56) [1958] ECR 133:
“[the] delegation must be sufficiently limited so as to
remain compatible with the degree of centralisation of
UNSC collective security constitutionally necessary under
the Charter and, more specifically, for the acts of the
delegate entity to be attributable to the UN.”
In other words, the delegation would be unlawful if it amounted to the
Security Council transferring the responsibility which is vested in it
under the Charter to the delegate. More specifically, the delegation
40
would be unlawful if the acts of the delegate entity were not attributable
to the Security Council. As Blokker puts it, these principles “indicate a
preference for control by the Council over operations by ‘coalitions of
the able and willing’ so as not to abdicate the authority and
responsibility bestowed on it by the Charter”: N Blokker, “Is the
Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security
Council to Authorize the Use of Force by ‘Coalitions of the Able and
Willing’” (2000) 11 EJIL 541, 554. The article is cited by the Grand
Chamber at para 132. In the words of de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers
of the United Nations Security Council, pp 265-266:
“What is important, however, is that overall control of the
operation remains with the Security Council. The
centralisation of control over military action embodies the
centralisation of the collective use of force, which forms
the corner stone of the Charter. A complete delegation of
command and control of a military operation to a member
state or a group of states, without any accountability to the
Security Council, would lack that degree of centralisation
constitutionally necessary to designate a particular military
action as a United Nations operation. It would undermine
the unique decision-making process within an organ which
was the very reason states conferred to it the very power
which that organ would now seek to delegate. This
concern is encapsulated in the maxim delegatus non potest
delegare: a delegate cannot delegate.”
83. Referring to the limits to any permissible delegation by the
Security Council, the Grand Chamber added, at the end of para 132:
“Those limits strike a balance between the central security
role of the UNSC and two realities of its implementation.
In the first place, the absence of article 43 agreements
which means that the UNSC relies on states (notably its
permanent members) and groups of states to provide the
necessary military means to fulfil its collective security
role. Secondly, the multilateral and complex nature of
such security missions renders necessary some delegation
of command.”
84. The Grand Chamber accordingly proceeded, at para 133, to
identify the key question as being:
41
“whether the UNSC retained ultimate authority and
control so that operational command only was delegated.
This delegation model is now an established substitute for
the article 43 agreements never concluded.”
At para 134, the court identified aspects of Resolution 1244 which, in its
judgment, did indeed show that the Security Council retained such
ultimate authority and control, while delegating its security powers to
KFOR.
85. Before looking in detail at those aspects and how they compare
with any equivalent aspects of Resolution 1546, it is necessary to deal
with the suggestion that the terms of the Resolutions relating to KFOR
and the MNF were so different that, while, in setting up KFOR, the
Security Council was delegating the execution of its responsibility under
Chapter VII to KFOR, it had not delegated anything to the MNF.
86. It will be recalled that the origin of the MNF is Security Council
Resolution 1511 of 16 October 2003. Having determined that the
situation in Iraq continued to constitute a threat to international peace
and security, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council took
various steps. Paragraphs 13 to 15 deal with the MNF:
“13. Determines that the provision of security and
stability is essential to the successful completion of the
political process as outlined in paragraph 7 above and to
the ability of the United Nations to contribute effectively
to that process and the implementation of resolution 1483
(2003), and authorizes a multinational force under unified
command to take all necessary measures to contribute to
the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including
for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for the
implementation of the timetable and programme as well as
to contribute to the security of the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Iraq, the Governing Council of Iraq
and other institutions of the Iraqi interim administration,
and key humanitarian and economic infrastructure;
14. Urges Member States to contribute assistance under
this United Nations mandate, including military forces, to
the multinational force referred to in paragraph 13 above;
15. Decides that the Council shall review the
requirements and mission of the multinational force
42
referred to in paragraph 13 above not later than one year
from the date of this resolution, and that in any case the
mandate of the force shall expire upon the completion of
the political process as described in paragraphs 4 through
7 and 10 above, and expresses readiness to consider on
that occasion any future need for the continuation of the
multinational force, taking into account the views of an
internationally recognized, representative government of
Iraq.”
In paragraph 25 the Security Council requested:
“that the United States, on behalf of the multinational
force as outlined in paragraph 13 above, report to the
Security Council on the efforts and progress of this force
as appropriate and not less than every six months.”
87. If one compares the terms of Resolution 1244 and Resolution
1511, for present purposes there appears to be no relevant legal
difference between the two forces. Of course, in the case of Kosovo,
there was no civil administration and there were no bodies of troops
already assembled in Kosovo whom the Security Council could
authorise to assume the necessary responsibilities. In paragraph 5 of
Resolution 1244 the Security Council accordingly decided “on the
deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international
civil and security presences.” Because there were no suitable troops on
the ground, in paragraph 7 of Resolution 1244 the Council had actually
to authorise the establishing of the international security presence and
then to authorise it to carry out various responsibilities.
88. By contrast, in October 2003, in Iraq there were already forces in
place, especially American and British forces, whom the Security
Council could authorise to assume the necessary responsibilities. So it
did not need to authorise the establishment of the MNF. In paragraph 13
the Council simply authorised “a multinational force under unified
command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq” – thereby proceeding on
the basis that there would indeed be a multinational force under unified
command. In paragraph 14 the Council urged member states to
contribute forces to the MNF. Absolutely crucially, however, in
paragraph 13 it spelled out the mandate which it was giving to the MNF.
By “authorising” the MNF to take the measures required to fulfil its
43
“mandate”, the Council was asserting and exercising control over the
MNF and was prescribing the mission that it was to carry out. The
authorisation and mandate were to apply to all members of the MNF the
British and American, of course, but also those from member states
who responded to the Council’s call to contribute forces to the MNF.
The intention must have been that all would be in the same legal
position. This confirms that – as I have already held, at para 61 – the
fact that the British forces were in Iraq before Resolution 1511 was
adopted is irrelevant to their legal position under that Resolution and,
indeed, under Resolution 1546.
89. Allowing for the different situations on the ground, the terms of
that mandate to the MNF are comparable with the terms of the mandate
given to KFOR in Resolution 1244. The terms of the mandate to the
MNF were, of course, subsequently altered by Resolution 1546 in June
2004, but the changes had the effect of making the mandate more
specific. Just as Resolution 1244 defined the responsibilities which
KFOR was to carry out in terms of its mandate from the Security
Council, so, equally, Resolution 1546 defined the tasks which the MNF
was to carry out in terms of its mandate from the Security Council. The
two Resolutions were essentially similar in these respects.
90. It is true, of course, that the words “under United Nations
auspices” appear in paragraph 5 of Resolution 1244 and do not appear in
Resolution 1511 or Resolution 1546. But the only point in its reasoning
where the Grand Chamber attaches significance to the words “under
United Nations auspices” is at para 131, where it is concerned with the
phrase as it appears in the Military Technical Agreement. There is
nothing in the judgment to suggest that the inclusion of those words in
Resolution 1244 played any part in the reasoning (from para 132
onwards) which led the court to hold that the Security Council had
delegated effective command of the relevant operational matters to
NATO, while retaining ultimate authority and control. Indeed the court
does not mention the phrase in that context.
91. I therefore conclude that, when the Security Council, acting under
Chapter VII, authorised the MNF to carry out its various tasks in terms
of Resolution 1546, it was purporting to delegate these functions to the
MNF, just as it had delegated functions to KFOR in Resolution 1244.
Certainly, I can see no reason in the circumstances of the present case
why, in the light of the decision of the Grand Chamber in Behrami, the
European Court would hold otherwise. I should add that any other
conclusion would be surprising since the lawyers who draft Security
44
Council resolutions on this “authorisation” model build on the practice
of the Council. One would therefore expect to find that the, later,
Resolution 1546 was based on the same principles as Resolution 1244.
The Security Council will always be concerned, of course, to avoid the
danger that a force, though nominally acting on behalf of the Council, is
truly just made up of the forces of member states pursuing their own
ends by military means in contravention of both article 2(4) of the
Charter and the ius contra bellum of modern international law. Hence
the insertion into the Resolutions, first, of a clear mandate for the force,
of an indication of the date when the mandate will expire, of a
mechanism for reports to be made to the Council and, finally, of an
indication that the Council will remain seised of the matter. Again, the
need for all these matters to be spelled out will be well known to the
experts who draft the Resolutions.
92. With this in mind, I now turn to see how the Grand Chamber
approached Resolution 1244 and how the position under Resolution
1546 compares.
93. The Grand Chamber first noted, at para 134, that Chapter VII
allows the Security Council to delegate a power to “Member States and
relevant international organisations”. Secondly, the relevant power was
one of those that could be delegated. Both of these points apply in the
present case.
94. Thirdly, the Grand Chamber held that, in Resolution 1244 the
delegation was neither presumed nor implicit, but rather prior and
explicit. In fact, the delegation of the power to detain was not spelled
out in that Resolution. By contrast, Mr Powell’s letter, annexed to, and
referred to in, Resolution 1546, listed internment as one of the tasks of
the MNF. The Security Council therefore expressly authorised the MNF,
in advance, to carry out internment, where this is necessary for
imperative reasons of security.
95. Next, the Grand Chamber found that Resolution 1244 put
sufficiently defined limits on the delegation by fixing the mandate with
adequate precision: it set out the objectives to be attained, the roles and
responsibilities accorded, as well as the means to be employed. The
court noted that the broad nature of certain provisions could not be
avoided, given the constituent nature of such an instrument whose role
was to fix broad objectives and goals and not to describe or interfere in
the detail of operational implementation and choices. Mutatis mutandis,
45
exactly the same can be said of Resolution 1546. In paragraph 10, and
further by reference to the letters of the Iraqi Prime Minister and of the
United States Secretary of State, the resolution identifies the mandate of
the MNF and specifies the objectives which it is to pursue. The
Secretary of State’s letter includes an undertaking that “the forces that
make up the MNF are and will remain committed at all times to act
consistently with their obligations under the law of armed conflict,
including the Geneva Conventions.” Again, as with Resolution 1244, the
relatively broad nature of the decisions could not be avoided since the
purpose of the Resolution was to fix broad objectives and goals and not
to describe, or interfere in the detail of, operational implementation and
choices.
96. Fifthly, the court noted that Resolution 1244 required the
leadership of KFOR to report to the Security Council so as to allow the
Council to exercise its overall authority and control. In fact, paragraph
20 of that Resolution requested the Secretary-General to report to the
Council at regular intervals on the implementation of the resolution,
“including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and
security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the
adoption of this resolution.”
97. Paragraph 31 of Resolution 1546 was different but, if anything,
the difference was designed to give the Council more, not less, control
of the MNF. In terms of paragraph 31 the Security Council requested the
United States, on behalf of the MNF, to report within three months from
the date of the Resolution on the efforts and progress of the force, and
on a quarterly basis thereafter. This was a tightening of the system of
six-monthly reports under Resolution 1511 and must represent the
considered view of the Council as to the frequency and type of reporting
which were necessary to allow it to maintain its ultimate authority and
control over the MNF. So, unlike in Resolution 1244, there was
provision for the United States, the member state with the lead in the
MNF, to report directly to the Security Council within three months and
on a quarterly basis after that. This actually involves an open meeting of
the Security Council at which the United States briefs the Council on the
progress of the efforts of the MNF. This is done alongside the Special
Representative of the Secretary General who briefs the Council on other
aspects of the United Nations mandate in Iraq. In practice, a member of
the Iraqi Government is also present. The details are given by Linda
Dann, a Deputy Legal Adviser in the Ministry of Defence, in her witness
statement dated 17 August 2007.
46
98. Finally, the court noted that paragraph 19 of Resolution 1244
provided that the mandate was for an initial period of 12 months and
was to continue thereafter, “unless the Security Council decides
otherwise.” Adverting to the familiar problem of the possibility of a veto
by a permanent member preventing the Council from deciding to
terminate the delegation, the Grand Chamber did not consider that this
factor alone was sufficient for it to conclude that the Security Council
did not retain ultimate authority and control.
99. Again, the provision in paragraph 12 of Resolution 1546 is
different and must have been tailored to the realities of the situation in
Iraq. It provided for the mandate of the MNF to be reviewe d after 12
months or at the request of the Government of Iraq. So the Security
Council could terminate the mandate after 12 months or alter it if
experience showed that this was desirable. This is a further element
which is designed to ensure that the Council retains ultimate control of
the MNF. In addition, the mandate was to expire on the completion of
the political process for the development of democratic civil government
in Iraq set out in paragraph 4 of the Resolution. So there was no
question of the MNF having an indefinite open-ended mandate.
Moreover, the Security Council declared that it would terminate the
mandate earlier if requested by the Government of Iraq. This provision,
too, is designed to make sure that the forces whose actions are
authorised by the mandate cannot stay on beyond the time when their
presence and assistance are required.
100. Arguably, in this respect also, Resolution 1546 gave more control
to the Security council than Resolution 1244. Under paragraph 19 of
Resolution 1244, the mandate to KFOR was to continue, unless the
Security Council decided otherwise. The risk, identified by the Grand
Chamber, was that by using its veto, a permanent member could prevent
the Council from deciding to bring the mandate to an end. By contrast,
under paragraph 12 of Resolution 1546, the mandate to the MNF was to
terminate automatically on the completion of the political process
described in paragraph 4. This meant that a permanent member could
not prolong the MNF’s mandate by using its veto. Admittedly, the veto
could be used against any proposal to alter the terms of the mandate
after a review. But, if the provision in Resolution 1244 was not
sufficient for the Grand Chamber to conclude that the Security Council
did not retain ultimate authority and control over the actions of the
members of KFOR, I can see no reason why the court would decide
differently in respect of Resolution 1546.
47
101. Having completed its examination of the terms of Resolution
1244, the Grand Chamber then went into the detail of the chain of
command from the Security Council down through KFOR. In the
present case, the relevant chain of command was explained by Linda
Dann in her witness statement dated 17 August 2007. The legal
authority for MNF-I (i e the multinational force in Iraq) came from the
decisions taken by the Security Council in the exercise of its Chapter
VII powers. At the relevant time, the MNF-I was commanded by a
United States 4-star General, with a United Kingdom 3-star Lieutenant
General as his deputy. Among the forces which were subordinate to
MNF-I and reported to it was the Multi National Corps-Iraq (“MNC-I”),
which was based in Baghdad and commanded by a United States 3-star
Lieutenant General with a United Kingdom 2-star Major General as his
deputy. MNC-I exercised a unified operational control over the Multi
National Divisions, including the Multi National Division (South East)
(“MND(SE)”), of which the United Kingdom forces who detained Mr
Al-Jedda formed part. The MND(SE) was commanded by a United
Kingdom 2-star Major General, the GOC, who reported to MNC-I and
was subject to the operational control of MNC-I and, ultimately, MNF-I.
In September 2004 MND(SE) comprised forces from 11 countries
besides the United Kingdom. The GOC commanding MND(SE)
exercised operational control over the forces of all these national
contingents. Again, I see no material difference between the chain of
command in the present case and the chain of command for KFOR
which the Grand Chamber was considering in Behrami.
102. In para 136, the court concluded that the delegation model
demonstrated that direct operational command from the Security
Council was not a requirement of Chapter VII collective security
missions. In other words, it was possible, within the ambit of Chapter
VII, for the Security Council to devise a system of delegation which was
legally valid but did not involve the Council being in direct operational
command.
103. The court then went on to reject submissions to the effect that, in
the case of KFOR, the level of control by the individual States had been
such as, in effect, to detach them from the international mandate and to
undermine the unity of operational command. No such submissions are
made about the British forces in the MNF in this case.
104. At para 140 of Behrami, the Grand Chamber found that, even if
the United Nations might accept that there was room for improvement in
the co-operation and command structures between the Security Council,
48
the troop contributing nations and the contributing organisations, the
Council “retained ultimate authority and control and...effective
command of the relevant operational matters was retained by NATO.”
The court continued, at para 141:
“In such circumstances, the court observes that KFOR was
exercising lawfully delegated Chapter VII powers of the
UNSC so that the impugned action was, in principle,
‘attributable’ to the UN within the meaning of the word
outlined at paras 28 and 121 above.”
This concluding paragraph is the culmination of the first part of the
scheme set out in para 121 of the judgment. The court has been
concerned to see that Resolution 1244 involved a delegation of the
Security Council’s powers to KFOR. More importantly, it has checked
to see that the terms of the delegation were sufficiently precise – due
allowance being made for the inevitable limitations on what could be
prescribed in advance - and that the mechanisms for the Security
Council retaining ultimate control were also sufficient, for that
delegation to be lawful. Having concluded that this was indeed the
position, it followed that, when the French troops detained Mr Saramati,
they were exercising the powers which the Security Council had
delegated to them. Since that delegation had not, unlawfully, deprived
the Council of its responsibility for the exercise of those powers, the
action of the French troops in detaining Mr Saramati was in principle
attributable to the United Nations in terms of article 3 of the draft
articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations.
105. My Lords, if that was the conclusion reached by the Grand
Chamber in the case of the detention of Mr Saramati, I am bound to
conclude that the court would reach the same conclusion in the case of
Mr Al-Jedda. Just as the members of KFOR were exercising powers of
the Security Council lawfully delegated to them by the Council, so also
the members of the MNF were exercising powers of the Security
Council lawfully delegated to them by the Council under Resolution
1546. That being so, the court would hold, first, that the Council
retained ultimate authority and control and so remained responsible in
law for the exercise of those powers and, secondly, that the action of the
British troops, as members of the MNF, in detaining Mr Al-Jedda was in
principle attributable to the United Nations in terms of article 3 of the
draft articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations.
49
106. In Behrami, at para 144, the Grand Chamber proceeded to
consider the effect of its conclusion that the detention of Mr Saramati
was in principle attributable to the United Nations. It noted that the
United Nations is an organisation having a legal personality separate
from that of its member states and that it is not a Contracting Party to
the Convention. In particular, at para 146, the court began to consider
whether it was competent ratione personae to review the acts of the
respondent states carried out on behalf of the United Nations. It also
went on to consider, more generally, the relationship between the
Convention and the United Nations acting [“les actes de l’ONU”] under
Chapter VII of the Charter.
107. I need not examine the Grand Chamber’s reasoning in detail
since the court would plainly adopt the same approach in any case where
it had concluded that the actions of the respondent state in question had
been carried out on behalf of the United Nations. I note, however, that,
in reaching its conclusion, the court had regard, at para 147, to articles
25 and 103 of the Charter, as interpreted by the International Court of
Justice. In para 148, the court attached “even greater significance” to the
imperative nature of the principal aim of the United Nations and of the
Security Council’s powers under Chapter VII. While ensuring respect
for human rights represents an important contribution to achieving
international peace:
“the fact remains that the UNSC has primary
responsibility, as well as extensive means under Chapter
VII, to fulfil this objective, notably through the use of
coercive measures. The responsibility of the UNSC in this
respect is unique and has evolved as a counterpart to the
prohibition, now customary international law, on the
unilateral use of force….”
108. This leads to the court’s conclusion, at para 149, that:
“the Convention cannot be interpreted in a manner which
would subject the acts and omissions of Contracting
Parties which are covered by UNSC Resolutions and occur
prior to or in the course of such missions, to the scrutiny of
the court. To do so would be to interfere with the
fulfilment of the UN’s key mission in this field, including,
as argued by certain parties, with the effective conduct of
its operations. It would also be tantamount to imposing
50
conditions on the implementation of a UNSC Resolution
which were not provided for in the text of the Resolution
itself.”
109. Finally, in para 151, the Grand Chamber rejected an argument
based on its decision in Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret
Anonim Sirketi v Ireland (2005) 42 EHRR 1 where the competence of
the court had been upheld. The court noted that, in that case, the
impugned act had been carried out by the respondent state authorities on
its territory and following a decision by one of its Ministers. By contrast,
the impugned acts of KFOR could not be attributed to the respondent
states and, moreover, did not take place on the territory of those states or
by virtue of a decision of their authorities. The same reasoning would
apply to the action of the British forces, as members of the MNF, in
detaining the appellant in Iraq, without there being any decision of the
United Kingdom government ordering his detention.
110. The court finished up, at para 151, by repeating that:
“UNMIK was a subsidiary organ of the UN created under
Chapter VII and KFOR was exercising powers lawfully
delegated under Chapter VII of the Charter by the UNSC.
As such, their actions were directly attributable to the UN,
an organisation of universal jurisdiction fulfilling its
imperative collective security objective.”
111. I am accordingly satisfied that, since the detention of the
appellant by British forces taking part in the MNF was an action which
was covered by Security Council Resolution 1546 and occurred in the
course of the mission of the MNF, the European Court would hold that
the Convention could not be interpreted in a manner that would subject
that action to its scrutiny. A complaint by Mr Al-Jedda, based on the
same allegations of a violation of article 5(1) as in the present case,
would accordingly be held to be incompatible ratione personae with the
provisions of the Convention. In consequence, the court would hold an
application based on that complaint to be inadmissible.
112. Since article 5(1) of the Convention would therefore not have
“effect...in relation to the United Kingdom” in respect of Mr Al-Jedda’s
detention in international law before the European Court in Strasbourg,
in accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeal, which he does
51
not challenge, I conclude that Mr Al-Jedda cannot bring proceedings in
the English courts under the HRA, alleging that his detention was
unlawful because it was incompatible with his article 5(1) Convention
right.
113. In my view, the result is accordingly that, like Mr Saramati,
following the decision of the Grand Chamber in Behrami, Mr Al-Jedda
must find his protection from arbitrary detention in the commitment,
given by Mr Powell to the Security Council, that members of the MNF
would at all times act consistently with their obligations under the law of
armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions. It is for the Security
Council, exerting its ultimate authority and exercising its ultimate right
of control, to ensure that this commitment is fulfilled.
114. That being my conclusion on the first issue, the second issue does
not arise for determination. On that matter I am, however, in substantial
agreement with what my noble and learned friend, Lord Bingham, has
said. I add only these short observations.
115. As Lord Bingham has shown, both state practice and the weight
of academic authority support the view that articles 25 and 103 apply
where the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, adopts a
resolution, such as Resolution 1546, which “authorises” rather than
requires member states to take military action to meet a threat to
international peace. Counsel for the appellant nevertheless submitted
that the European Court might well not follow that approach and might,
instead, insist on enforcing the obligations of the Contracting States
under the Convention. In particular, the court might hold that, in a case
such as the present, “the interest of international co-operation would be
outweighed by the Convention’s role as a ‘constitutional instrument of
European public order’” in the field of human rights: Behrami, at para
145, quoting the decision in Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret
Anonim Sirketi v Ireland (2005) 42 EHRR 1, 45, para 156.
116. I would reject that submission. As the entire judgment of the
Grand Chamber in Behrami shows, the court is very concerned, in the
context of the operations of forces under a United Nations mandate, to
ensure that its position fits into the whole scheme of international law
and, in particular, that it does not undermine the work of the Security
Council in maintaining international peace and security. At para 122, the
court:
52
“recalls that the principles underlying the Convention
cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum. It must also
take into account relevant rules of international law when
examining questions concerning its jurisdiction and,
consequently, determine state responsibility in conformity
and harmony with the governing principles of international
law of which it forms part, although it must remain
mindful of the Convention’s special character as a human
rights treaty…..”
It is hard to imagine that, having made that declaration, the court would
readily fail to give effect to articles 25 and 103 of the Charter.
117. In fact, there is no need to speculate on the point, since in para
147 of its judgment, in setting out its reasons, the court recalled:
“as noted at paragraph 122 above, that the Convention has
to be interpreted in the light of any relevant rules and
principles of international law applicable in relations
between its Contracting Parties. The court has therefore
had regard to two complementary provisions of the
Charter, articles 25 and 103, as interpreted by the
International Court of Justice….”
The court referred back to para 27 of its judgment where it had cited the
judgment of the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v United
States of America [1984] ICJ Rep 392, para 107, to the effect that
article 103 means that the Charter obligations of member states prevail
over conflicting obligations from another international treaty, regardless
of whether the latter treaty was concluded before or after the Charter or
was only a regional arrangement. The court had also recalled that the
International Court had found that article 25 means that United Nations
member states’ obligations under a Security Council Resolution prevail
over obligations arising under any other international agreement: Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya v United States of America and Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v United Kingdom [1992] ICJ Rep 1, p 16, at para 42, and p
113, at para 39 respectively. These judgments deal, of course, with the
effect of member states’ “obligations” under the Charter and under a
Security Council resolution. Nevertheless, the Grand Chamber would
not have referred to those decisions in para 147 of its judgment, if it had
not considered that they explained the effect of articles 25 and 103 on
the position of a member state whose forces were acting in terms of the
53
authorisation given to KFOR by Resolution 1422. The same would
apply to the British forces acting as part of the MNF in terms of
Resolution 1546.
118. Had it been necessary to decide the point, I would accordingly
have held that, by virtue of articles 25 and 103 of the Charter, the
obligation of the United Kingdom forces in the MNF to detain the
appellant under Resolution 1546 prevailed over the obligations of the
United Kingdom under article 5(1) of the Convention.
119. Finally, so far as the third issue is concerned, I also agree with
Lord Bingham that, for the reasons which he gives, the appellant’s claim
in tort is governed by the law of Iraq.
120. For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal.
BARONESS HALE OF RICHMOND
My Lords,
121. On 28 September 2004, more than three years ago now, a British
citizen who is resident in this country arrived in Baghdad (where he has
relatives) with his children. On 10 October he was arrested (by whom is
disputed) and flown from Baghdad to a British detention facility in
Basra. He has remained in the custody of British forces in Basra ever
since. He has not been charged with, still less tried for, any criminal
offence. Instead, his detention has been periodically reviewed and
authorised by senior officers in the British army. He began these
proceedings in June 2005, seeking a declaration that his detention is and
has always been unlawful and a mandatory order either for his release or
for his transfer to the United Kingdom if he is to be further detained. He
has also begun separate proceedings to challenge the factual basis of his
detention but these have not yet been heard.
122. If he were to be returned to this country, he might face detention
for up to 28 days under the Terrorism Act 2000 or be made subject to a
control order under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. Otherwise he
could only be detained if charged with a criminal offence. There is no
54
doubt that prolonged detention in the hands of the military is not
permitted by the laws of the United Kingdom. Nor could it be permitted
without derogation from our obligations under the European Convention
on Human Rights. Article 5(1) of the Convention provides that
deprivation of liberty is only lawful in defined circumstances which do
not include these. The drafters of the Convention had a choice between a
general prohibition of “arbitrary” detention, as provided in article 9 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a list of permitted
grounds for detention. They deliberately chose the latter. They were well
aware of Churchill’s view that the internment even of enemy aliens in
war time was “in the highest degree odious”. They would not have
contemplated the indefinite detention without trial of British citizens in
peace time. I do not accept that this is less of a problem if people are
suspected of very grave crimes. The graver the crime of which a person
is suspected, the more difficult it will be for him to secure his release on
the grounds that he is not a risk. The longer therefore he is likely to be
incarcerated and the less substantial the evidence which will be relied
upon to prove suspicion. These are the people most in need of the
protection of the rule of law, rather than the small fry in whom the
authorities will soon lose interest.
123. Furthermore, this House has held that our obligations under the
Convention are owed to people detained by the United Kingdom
military in Iraq: see R (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence (The
Redress Trust intervening) [2007] UKHL 26, [2007] 3 WLR 33. Why
should this case be different from that? The difference is that no-one
suggests that it is lawful for British soldiers so to maltreat a person in
their custody, even in Iraq, that he dies of his injuries. But it is suggested
that it is lawful to intern a person in Iraq. The source of that authority is
said to be the United Nations Security Council resolutions dealing with
the activities of US, UK and other forces making up the multi-national
force (“MNF”) after the transfer of power to the Iraqi Interim
Government on 28 June 2004. It is said that either (i) those resolutions
make the acts of the MNF attributable to the United Nations in
international law, thus relieving the UK of responsibility for them; or (ii)
those resolutions qualify or displace the obligations in the ECHR so that
internment may in certain circumstances be lawful.
124. I would reject the first argument, for the reasons given by my
noble and learned friend, Lord Bingham of Cornhill. I agree with him
that the analogy with the situation in Kosovo breaks down at almost
every point. The United Nations made submissions to the European
Court of Human Rights in Behrami v France, Saramati v France,
Germany and Norway (Application Nos 71412/01 and 78166/01)
55
(unreported, 2 May 2007), concerning the respective roles of UNMIK
and KFOR in clearing mines, which was the subject of the Behrami
case. It did not deny that these were UN operations for which the UN
might be responsible. It seems to me unlikely in the extreme that the
United Nations would accept that the acts of the MNF were in any way
attributable to the UN. My noble and learned friend, Lord Brown of
Eaton-under-Heywood, has put his finger on the essential distinction.
The UN’s own role in Iraq was completely different from its role in
Kosovo. Its concern in Iraq was for the protection of human rights and
the observance of humanitarian law as well to protect its own
humanitarian operations there. It looked to others to restore the peace
and security which had broken down in the aftermath of events for
which those others were responsible.
125. I also have difficulty with the second argument. It would be so
much simpler if the European Convention on Human Rights had
contained a general provision to the effect that the rights guaranteed are
qualified to the extent required or authorised by United Nations
resolutions. This may not be surprising: by then the European nations
who had vowed “never again” would they tolerate the abuses they had
suffered before and during the Second World War had become
disillusioned with the United Nations as a reliable source of human
rights protection. As Brian Simpson has put it, “Europe must go it
alone” (The European Convention on Human Rights: The First Half
Century, University of Chicago Law School). But now that the United
Nations has to some extent emerged from its cold war paralysis, some
way has to be found of reconciling our competing commitments under
the United Nations Charter and the European Convention. I agree with
Lord Bingham, for the reasons he gives, that the only way is by adopting
such a qualification of the Convention rights.
126. That is, however, as far as I would go. The right is qualified but
not displaced. This is an important distinction, insufficiently explored in
the all or nothing arguments with which we were presented. We can go
no further than the UN has implicitly required us to go in restoring
peace and security to a troubled land. The right is qualified only to the
extent required or authorised by the resolution. What remains of it
thereafter must be observed. This may have both substantive and
procedural consequences.
127. It is not clear to me how far UNSC resolution 1546 went when it
authorised the MNF to “take all necessary measures to contribute to the
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, in accordance with the
56
letters annexed to this resolution expressing, inter alia, the Iraqi request
for the continued presence of the multinational force and setting out its
tasks” (para 10). The “broad range of tasks” were listed by Secretary of
State Powell as including “combat operations against members of these
groups [seeking to influence Iraq’s political future through violence],
internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security,
and the continued search for and securing of weapons that threaten
Iraq’s security”. At the same time, the Secretary of State made clear the
commitment of the forces which made up the MNF to “act consistently
with their obligations under the law of armed conflict, including the
Geneva Conventions”.
128. On what basis is it said that the detention of this particular
appellant is consistent with our obligations under the law of armed
conflict? He is not a “protected person” under the fourth Geneva
Convention because he is one of our own citizens. Nor is the UK any
longer in belligerent occupation of any part of Iraq. So resort must be
had to some sort of post conflict, post occupation, analogous power to
intern anyone where this is thought “necessary for imperative reasons of
security”. Even if the UNSC resolution can be read in this way, it is not
immediately obvious why the prolonged detention of this person in Iraq
is necessary, given that any problem he presents in Iraq could be solved
by repatriating him to this country and dealing with him here. If we
stand back a little from the particular circumstances of this case, this is
the response which is so often urged when British people are in trouble
with the law in foreign countries, and in this case it is within the power
of the British authorities to achieve it.
129. But that is not the way in which the argument has been conducted
before us. Why else could Lord Bingham and Lord Brown speak of
“displacing or qualifying” in one breath when clearly they mean very
different things? We have been concerned at a more abstract level with
attribution to or authorisation by the United Nations. We have devoted
little attention to the precise scope of the authorisation. There must still
be room for argument about what precisely is covered by the resolution
and whether it applies on the facts of this case. Quite how that is to be
done remains for decision in the other proceedings. With that caveat,
therefore, but otherwise in agreement with Lord Bingham, Lord
Carswell and Lord Brown, I would dismiss this appeal.
57
LORD CARSWELL
My Lords,
130. Internment without trial is so antithetical to the rule of law as
understood in a democratic society that recourse to it requires to be
carefully scrutinised by the courts of that society. There are, regrettably,
circumstances in which the threat to the necessary stability of the state is
so great that in order to maintain that stability the use of internment is
unavoidable. The Secretary of State’s contention is that such
circumstances exist now in Iraq and have existed there since the
conclusion of hostilities in 2003. If the intelligence concerning the
danger posed by such persons is correct, - as to which your Lordships
are not in a position to make any judgment and do not do so – they pose
a real danger to stability and progress in Iraq. If sufficient evidence
cannot be produced in criminal proceedings – which again the House
has not been asked to and cannot judge—such persons may have to be
detained without trial. Article 42 of the 4th
Geneva Convention permits
the ordering of internment of protected persons “only if the security of
the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary”, and under article
78 the Occupying Power must consider that step necessary “for
imperative reasons of security.” Neither of these provisions applies
directly to the appellant, who is not a protected person, but the degree of
necessity which should exist before the Secretary of State detains
persons in his position – if he has power to do so, as in my opinion he
has – is substantially the same. I would only express the opinion that
where a state can lawfully intern people, it is important that it adopt
certain safeguards: the compilation of intelligence about such persons
which is as accurate and reliable as possible, the regular review of the
continuing need to detain each person and a system whereby that need
and the underlying evidence can be checked and challenged by
representatives on behalf of the detained persons, so far as is practicable
and consistent with the needs of national security and the safety of other
persons.
131. The issues argued in this appeal have been set out in the opinion
of my noble and learned friend Lord Bingham of Cornhill, which I have
had the advantage of reading in draft. I agree entirely with his reasoning
and conclusions on the first and third issues and cannot usefully add
anything to what he has said. On the second issue, the application of
article 103 of the United Nations Charter, I also agree with his reasons
and would only add a few observations of my own.
58
132. The detention of the appellant would be in breach of article 5(1)
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”), if it applies, for it does not
fall within any of the cases in which it may be justified. Nor would it
appear possible, as Lord Bingham has set out in paragraph 38 of his
opinion, for the United Kingdom to exercise its power of derogation
from article 5(1) in the circumstances of this case. The decision of the
appeal on the second issue must therefore turn on the effect of article
103 of the Charter, which formed the main subject of the argument
before your Lordships.
133. Article 103 provides:
“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter
and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter
shall prevail.”
The Secretary of State’s case was therefore that the United Kingdom
was under an obligation imposed by the United Nations under Chapter
VII of the Charter to take such steps as are necessary to restore and
maintain peace and security following the armed insurrection
consequent upon the invasion of Iraq. This obligation overrode the
United Kingdom’s obligations under article 5(1) of the Convention.
134. Resolution 1546 of the Security Council, the material terms of
which are set out in para 15 of Lord Bingham’s opinion, provides that:
“the multinational forces shall have the authority to take
all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of
security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters
annexed to this resolution …”
One of the annexed letters, dated 5 June 2004 and sent by the US
Secretary of State General Colin Powell to the President of the Security
Council, stated that the Multi-National Force stood ready:
59
“to continue to undertake a broad range of tasks to
contribute to the maintenance of security and to ensure
force protection. These include activities necessary to
counter ongoing security threats posed by forces seeking
to influence Iraq’s political future through violence. This
will include combat operations against members of these
groups, internment where this is necessary for imperative
reasons of security …” (my emphasis).
It was accordingly contemplated by the Resolution that the MNF could
resort to internment where necessary.
135. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the Resolution did
not go further than authorising the measures described in it, as distinct
from imposing an obligation to carry them out, with the consequence
that article 103 of the Charter did not apply to relieve the United
Kingdom from observing the terms of article 5(1) of the Convention.
This was an attractive and persuasively presented argument, but I am
satisfied that it cannot succeed. For the reasons set out in paragraphs 32
to 39 of Lord Bingham’s opinion I consider that Resolution 1546 did
operate to impose an obligation upon the United Kingdom to carry out
those measures. In particular, I am persuaded by State practice and the
clear statements of authoritative academic opinion – recognised sources
of international law – that expressions in Security Council Resolutions
which appear on their face to confer no more than authority or power to
carry out measures may take effect as imposing obligations, because of
the fact that the United Nations have no standing forces at their own
disposal and have concluded no agreements under article 43 of the
Charter which would entitle them to call on member states to provide
them.
136. I accordingly am of opinion that the United Kingdom may
lawfully, where it is necessary for imperative reasons of security,
exercise the power to intern conferred by Resolution 1546. I would
emphasise, however, that that power has to be exercised in such a way
as to minimise the infringements of the detainee’s rights under article
5(1) of the Convention, in particular by adopting and operating to the
fullest practicable extent safeguards of the nature of those to which I
referred in paragraph 130 above.
137. I would dismiss the appeal.
60
LORD BROWN OF EATON-UNDER-HEYWOOD
My Lords,
138. Detention without trial (internment) is anathema to most people.
Its use in wartime Britain was later described by Winston Churchill as
“in the highest degree odious”— see Brian Simpson’s Clarendon Press
work under that title, 1994. But the internment condemned in wartime
Britain was mostly of enemy aliens, many of them refugees from Nazi
Germany, posing at most the scantiest of risks to the community. The
appellant, by contrast, assuming he is responsible for even a fraction of
what he is suspected of (see para 2 of my noble and learned friend Lord
Bingham of Cornhill’s opinion), represents an acute danger to all those
striving for peace in Iraq. Internment is nonetheless proscribed
absolutely by the European Convention on Human Rights and there can
be no question but that, if article 5(1) applies to the appellant’s
internment in Iraq, he has been unlawfully detained ever since October
2004.
139. So far as article 5 is concerned, your Lordships are concerned
exclusively with paragraph 1: the absolute bar on deprivation of liberty
save in certain specified circumstances, none of which encompass
internment. Issues as to the appellant’s entitlement to the protections
enshrined in article 5(4) and, if so, whether such protections have been
provided, do not arise for determination on this appeal; rather they are
the subject of other outstanding proceedings.
140. In these proceedings the appellant contends, first, that his
detention from the outset has been in violation of article 5(1); secondly,
that it is actionable at common law as the tort of wrongful
imprisonment. The respondent meets the first contention by submitting,
first, that the appellant’s detention is attributable not to the United
Kingdom but rather to the United Nations and is, therefore, outside the
scope of the Convention (a contention prompted by the European Court
of Human Rights’ (“ECtHR”) recent admissibility decision in Behrami v
France, Saramati v France, German and Norway (Application Nos
71412/01 and 78166/01 (unreported), 2 May 2007) (“Behrami”), and
thus first advanced after the Court of Appeal decision now under
appeal); secondly, as was held by both courts below, that article 5(1) is
“qualified” or “displaced” by the legal regime established by a series of
United Nations Security Council resolutions which expressly authorise
internment where that is “necessary for imperative reasons of security in
61
Iraq.” As for the appellant’s claim in tort, the respondent submits that it
is the law of Iraq which governs the claim and there is no reason to
suppose the detention to be unlawful under Iraqi law (as to which, in any
event, no evidence has been adduced).
Issue One – Attributability
141. I have found this altogether the most difficult of the three issues
now before your Lordships. The obvious starting point is the ECtHR’s
recent decision in Behrami, in particular with regard to Mr Saramati’s
preventive detention (internment) by KFOR, a detention which the court
(para 127) accepted “fell within the security mandate of KFOR” under
UNSCR 1244. The court then reasoned essentially as follows:
(i) The UN had delegated to KFOR (through NATO in consultation
with non-NATO Member States) “operational command only”, retaining
for itself “ultimate authority and control” (paras 135 and 140).
(ii) Accordingly KFOR was exercising lawfully delegated Ch VII
powers of the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) so that the
impugned action (Mr Saramati’s detention) was, in principle, directly
attributable to the UN (paras 141 and 151).
(iii) Although it did not automatically follow that the court was
incompetent ratione personae to review the acts of the respondent states
carried out on behalf of the UN (the question posed at para 146), the
court decided that in fact that was so (para 152) because, unlike the
position in the Bosphorus case (Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve
Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland (2005) 42 EHRR 1), (a) KFOR’s
impugned acts could not be attributed to the respondent states, and in
any event (b) KFOR’s actions “were directly attributable to the UN, an
organisation of universal jurisdiction fulfilling its imperative collective
security objective.” (para 151).
142. The respondent submits that there are no distinctions of principle
to be found between Mr Saramati’s detention by KFOR under UNSCR
1244 and the appellant’s detention by the multinational force (“MNF”)
under UNSCR 1546. And since, if that be right, the appellant could not
succeed in an application under the Convention in Strasbourg, he cannot
succeed either in a claim domestically under the Human Rights Act
1998.
143. Lord Bingham (para 24) concludes that the analogy with Kosovo
breaks down at almost every point. I wish I found it so easy. My
difficulty is not least with my Lord’s view that “there was no delegation
62
of UN power in Iraq.” By that I understand him to mean (paras 21 and
23) that, in contrast to the position in Kosovo, the UN in Iraq was
merely authorising the USA and the UK to carry out functions which it
could not perform itself as opposed to empowering them to exercise its
own function. It seems to me, however, that in this respect the situation
in Kosovo and Iraq was the same: in neither country could the UN as a
matter of fact carry out its central security role so that in both it was
necessary to authorise states to perform the role. As the court in
Behrami explained in paras 132 and 133, that necessarily follows from
the absence of article 43 agreements. When the court posed “the key
question whether the UNSC retained ultimate authority and control so
that operational command only was delegated”, it noted (para133):
“This delegation model is now an established substitute for the article 43
agreements never concluded”. And this seems to me entirely consistent
with para 43 of the court’s judgment: the mention there of “functions
which it could not itself perform” I understand to refer to functions
which the Security Council cannot itself perform as a matter of law and
which accordingly can only be done by a different body properly
authorised under the UN Charter – see Sarooshi, “The United Nations
and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN
Security Council of its Chapter VII powers” (1999).
144. I turn, therefore, to “the key question” and in particular to the five
factors which led the court in Behrami (para134) to conclude that the
UN in Kosovo had retained ultimate authority and control. The first, that
Chapter VII of the Charter allows the UNSC to delegate to member
states, applies equally here. So too the second, the power to provide for
security being a legally delegable power. The third I shall leave over for
the moment. It is difficult to find any relevant distinction with regard to
the fourth: UNSCR 1511 (which authorised the formation of the MNF)
fixed its mandate no less precisely than UNSCR 1244 defined KFOR’s
mandate. Indeed, so far as the power of internment was concerned,
resolution 1546 was altogether more specific (see paras 14 and 15 of
Lord Bingham’s opinion), resolution 1244 having entrusted KFOR
merely with such general responsibilities as “ensuring public safety and
order”. Nor could the fifth factor, the reporting requirements, reasonably
lead to a different conclusion about ultimate authority and control here.
True, this case lacks the additional safeguard noted in Behrami that
KFOR’s report had to be presented by the UN Secretary General, but
that surely is counterbalanced by the fact that the MNF’s mandate
ceases unless renewed by the SC whereas KFOR’s mandate was to
continue until the SC decided otherwise (a decision which, at least
theoretically, a permanent member could have vetoed).
63
145. To my mind it follows that any material distinction between the
two cases must be found in the third factor, or rather in the very
circumstances in which the MNF came to be authorised and mandated in
the first place. The delegation to KFOR of the UN’s function of
maintaining security was, the court observed, “neither presumed nor
implicit but rather prior and explicit in the resolution itself”. Resolution
1244 decided (para 5) “on the deployment in Kosovo, under United
Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences” – the
civil presence being UNMIK, recognised by the court in Behrami (para
142) as “a subsidiary organ of the UN”; the security presence being
KFOR. KFOR was, therefore, expressly formed under UN auspices.
Para 7 of the resolution “[a]uthorise[d] member states and relevant
international organisations to establish the international security
presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of Annex 2...”. Point 4 of
Annex 2 stated: “The international security presence with substantial
NATO participation must be deployed under unified command and
control and authorised to establish a safe environment for all people in
Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced
persons and refugees.”
146. Resolution 1511, by contrast, was adopted on 16 October 2003
during the USA’s and UK’s post-combat occupation of Iraq and in
effect gave recognition to those occupying forces as an existing security
presence. Para 13 of the resolution is instructive:
“Determines that the provision of security and stability is
essential to the successful completion of the political
process as outlined in paragraph 7 above and to the ability
of the United Nations to contribute effectively to that
process and the implementation of resolution 1483 (2003),
and authorises a multinational force under unified
command to take all necessary measures to contribute to
the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including
for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for the
implementation of the timetable and programme as well as
to contribute to the security of the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Iraq [“UNAMI”], the Governing
Council of Iraq and other institutions of the Iraqi interim
administration, and key humanitarian and economic
infrastructure.”
147. By resolution 1483, adopted on 22 May 2003, the SC had
“[r]esolved that the United Nations should play a vital role in
64
humanitarian relief, for reconstruction of Iraq, and the restoration and
establishment of national and local institutions for representative
governance” and, pursuant to it, the Secretary General had established
UNAMI, an essentially humanitarian and civil aid mission. As para 13
of resolution 1511 indicated, it was that mission which was the UN’s
contribution to the situation in Iraq. The MNF under unified command
which para13 was authorising was to contribute to the security of,
amongst others, UNAMI. Unlike KFOR, however, it was not itself being
deployed “under UN auspices”. UNAMI alone represented the UN’s
presence in Iraq.
148. Nor did the position change when resolution 1546 was adopted
on 8 June 2004, three weeks before the end of the occupation and the
transfer of authority from the CPA to the interim government of Iraq on
28 June 2004. UNAMI was to continue with its work (para 7). So too
was the MNF, both of them acting at the request of the incoming interim
government of Iraq. Resolution 1546 accordingly reaffirmed the
authorisation of the MNF under unified command (this time “in
accordance with the letters annexed”, described by Lord Bingham at
para14). And, as para10 noted, consistently with the previous position,
the MNF’s tasks, including the prevention and deterrence of terrorism,
were imposed so that, amongst other things, “the United Nations can
fulfil its role in assisting the Iraqi people as outlined in para 7 above” –
namely UNAMI’s humanitarian and civil aid work. Nothing either in the
resolution itself or in the letters annexed suggested for a moment that the
MNF had been under or was now being transferred to United Nations
authority and control. True, the SC was acting throughout under Chapter
VII of the Charter. But it does not follow that the UN is therefore to be
regarded as having assumed ultimate authority or control over the force.
The precise meaning of the term “ultimate authority and control” I have
found somewhat elusive. But it cannot automatically vest or remain in
the UN every time there is an authorisation of UN powers under Chapter
VII, else much of the analysis in Behrami would be mere surplusage.
149. It is essentially upon this basis, therefore, that I regard the present
case as materially different from Behrami and am led to conclude that
the appellant’s internment is to be attributed, not to the UN acting
through the MNF, but rather directly to the UK forces.
Issue 2 – did the UN resolutions qualify or displace article 5(1)?
65
150. The UN resolutions expressly authorised “internment where this
is necessary for imperative reasons of security”. For the purposes of
these proceedings it has to be assumed that security considerations have
indeed demanded the appellant’s internment. Even so, submits Mr
Starmer QC for the appellant, his internment nevertheless remains
unlawful unless and until the UK exercises its article 15 right to
derogate from article 5. I would reject this argument. In the first place it
is highly doubtful whether article 15 could be invoked with regard to
action taken outside the member state’s own territory – see, for example,
the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Bankovic v Belgium (2001) 11 BHRC
435, para 62.
“… the court does not find any basis upon which to accept
the applicants’ suggestion that article15 covers all ‘war’
and ‘public emergency’ situations generally, whether
obtaining inside or outside the territory of the contracting
state.”
151. But the sounder and more fundamental reason for holding the
article 5(1) proscription on internment to be qualified or displaced here
is that article 25 of the Charter requires member states to accept and
carry out security council decisions and article 103 provides that in the
event of a conflict between that obligation and the member state’s
obligations under any other international agreement, the former are to
prevail. The SC’s decision here (see para 10 of UNSCR 1546) was “that
the multinational force shall have the authority to take all necessary
measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in
Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed…” (which included amongst
the MNF’s “tasks” “internment where this is necessary for imperative
reasons of security”).
152. I find it quite impossible to regard that “task” as anything other
than an article 25 (Charter) obligation which is to prevail over the article
5(ECHR) obligation not to intern. Mr Starmer argues that the UK could
decline to intern a prisoner just as it could decline to execute him. As,
however, Lord Bingham points out (at para 34) if, as is here to be
assumed, internment is indeed necessary for imperative reasons of
security, a decision not to intern would be a refusal to carry out the
UK’s allotted task. No such reasoning, of course, would apply in the
case of capital punishment. In short, on this issue I agree with all that
Lord Bingham has said.
66
Issue 3 – whether English common law or Iraqi law applies to the
appellant’s detention
153. Unless the appellant can show that it is “substantially more
appropriate” (section 12 of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1995) to apply English law than Iraqi law to the
circumstances of his detention, then, under section 11 of the Act, Iraqi
law applies. For my part I cannot see why English law should sensibly
be the appropriate law to apply here. Not only has the appellant’s
detention taken place in Iraq but all the circumstances occasioning and
surrounding it are circumstances entirely particular to the situation in
that country.
154. I add a paragraph about Bici v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWHC
786 (QB) because Mr Starmer has sought to place some reliance upon it.
Bici was a claim in negligence and trespass to the person brought by two
Kosovan Albanians against British soldiers arising out of a shooting
incident during peacekeeping operations in Pristina. It had there been
agreed (rather than decided) that English law should apply. In argument
in R (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence (The Redress Trust
intervening) [2007] UK HL 26; [2007] 3 WLR 33, Mr Greenwood QC
referred the House to Bici to demonstrate that tort law applies to the acts
of British forces abroad so that “claims may be brought for personal
injury, damage to property or wrongful killing committed by British
forces in Iraq, in the same way as claims brought in respect of acts
committed in the UK.” Given that English law had been applied by
agreement in Bici, Mr Starmer suggests that Mr Greenwood was
implying that English law would apply similarly to all claims against
British forces in Iraq. Mr Greenwood disputes this, submitting that his
argument in Al-Skeini said nothing as to what substantive law would
apply to any tort action brought here. That seems to me correct. No one
was focusing there on the applicable law and, indeed, in Al-Skeini it
plainly mattered nothing whose substantive law applied: under neither
English nor Iraqi law could it be lawful to ill-treat a detainee so
violently that he died. Here, however, it does matter and in my judgment
both courts below were plainly right in the conclusion they reached:
Iraqi law applies.
155. It follows from all this that, despite the appellant’s success on the
first issue, his appeal nevertheless fails and must be dismissed.
67
Post Script
Since writing this judgment I have had the advantage of reading in draft
the speech to be delivered by my noble and learned friend Lord Rodger
of Earlsferry. I confess to having found it sufficiently persuasive to
cause me to doubt the correctness of my own conclusion on the difficult
issue of attribution. Given, however, that a majority of your Lordships
are for the appellant on this issue and that in any event, having regard to
the unanimity of view on issue two, it cannot decide the outcome of this
appeal, I prefer to leave over for another day my final conclusion on the
point. I just wish to indicate that I may change my mind.