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<http://globalpolicy.igc.org/security/reform/oewg/2003/ga57.pdf>

II. Principal elements of proposals made with reference to “Decision-making in the Security Council, including the veto”

A. The veto as a voting instrument in the Council

1. Proposals not necessarily requiring Charter amendment

(a) Proposals to leave the veto in its present form

The veto in its present form should be maintained.

(b) Proposals to preclude use of the veto or to curtail use of the veto

(1) Permanent members of the Council should exercise restraint in resorting to the veto.

(2) Every endeavour should be made to arrive at consensus decisions in the Council so that the veto need not be used.

(3) A veto should only be exercised when the question is of vital importance to the United Nations as a whole.

(4) If a veto is used, a written explanation of the reason for the veto should be given and also provided to the General Assembly.

(5) Permanent members should commit themselves not to use the veto except for matters under Chapter VII of the Charter.

(6) The General Assembly should urge permanent members not to use the veto except for matters under Chapter VII of the Charter.

* Previously issued as document A/AC.247/2003/CRP.2.

(7) What constitutes “procedural” matters, in terms of Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Charter, should be established by an updating of the annex to General Assembly resolution 267 (III) and should be applied by the Council.

(8) Permanent members of the Council should make unilateral or collective commitments not to use the veto.

2. Proposals requiring Charter amendment

(a) Proposals to eliminate the veto

The veto should be eliminated.

(b) Proposals to curtail the veto

(1) Article 27 of the Charter should define more clearly where a veto is permissible.

(2) The veto should be initially curtailed with a view to eventual elimination.

(3) Limitation of the veto to actions under Chapter VII of the Charter — relevant Articles of the Charter to be appropriately amended.

(4) More than one negative vote (of permanent members) to be required for exercise of a veto.

(5) Exercise of a veto to be subject to General Assembly action.

B. Number of affirmative votes required for decisions in an enlarged Council

(1) The number of affirmative votes required for decisions in the Council should remain, as at present, around 60 per cent.

(2) If 60 per cent of affirmative votes is required for decision, then the number of

votes required in an enlarged Security Council would be as follows:

In a Council of 20, it would be 12;

In a Council of 21, it would be 13;

In a Council of 24, it would be 14;

In a Council of 25, it would be 15;

In a Council of 26, it would be 16.

(3) The relative number of non-permanent-member votes required for decisions in an enlarged Security Council should be increased.

(4) In considering the issue of number of affirmative votes required for a decision in an enlarged Council, there should be no distinction between the votes of permanent members and those of non-permanent members.

III. Principal elements of proposals made with reference to “Expansion of the Security Council”

A. Proposals of a general nature

1. Proposals for enlargement of Council in permanent and non-permanent membership

(1) Enlargement of the Council should enable inclusion of both new permanent members and new non-permanent members from developed/industrialized and developing countries.

(2) The concepts “industrialized countries”, “developed countries” and “developing countries” should be clearly defined.

(3) Enlargement in permanent and non-permanent membership should be considered together.

(4) The current ratio of permanent and non-permanent seats should not be altered to the detriment of the non-permanent seats.

(5) A reasonable balance between the number of permanent and non-permanent seats should be maintained and would enhance the representativity and equitable geographical distribution of the Council.

2. Proposals for enlargement of Council in non-permanent membership only, for the time being

If there is no agreement on enlargement of other categories of membership, there should only be, for the time being, enlargement of the non-permanent membership.

3. Proposals for enlargement of Council in non-permanent membership only

(1) There should be enlargement only in non-permanent membership.

(2) An enlarged Council should only include additional non-permanent members based on the principle of sovereign equality of States, and equitable geographical distribution.

B. Proposals of specific numbers for enlargement of Council

1. Specific numbers proposed

The enlarged Council should consist of:

20 members

21 members

22 members

23 members

24 members

25 members

26 members

30 members

2. Range of numbers proposed

The enlarged Council should consist of:

From 15 to 24 members

From 24 to 26 members

No more than 25 members

At least 26 members

C. Increase in the permanent membership of the Council

1. Proposals for permanent seats for: a particular region, a particular group of States or particular countries

- (1) Africa should be allocated no less than two permanent seats according to decisions of the Group of African States.
- (2) A permanent seat should be allocated for the Group of Arab States, the seat to rotate among Arab States in accordance with the practice of the League of Arab States.
- (3) One permanent seat should be allocated for the European Union.
- (4) There should be two new permanent seats created for Germany and Japan as industrialized States.

2. Proposals for enlargement of permanent membership of the Council

- (1) Five additional permanent seats: designated by two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly — preferably on a regional basis, taking account of equitable geographical distribution and capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations.
- (2) Five additional permanent seats:
 - One to developing States of Africa;
 - One to developing States of Asia;
 - One to developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean;
 - Two to industrialized States.
- (3) Each developing region to be allocated two (regional) seats. Regional mechanism to determine allocation of seats within region.

As regards permanent regional representation, it is not precluded that a region may determine its own selection, prior to election by the General Assembly.

- (4) One additional permanent seat to five regional groups (except Western European and other) — present five permanent members unchanged. Two additional financial permanent members.
- (5) Each of five regional groups would have two permanent seats — present five permanent members (except United States) to be included in their regional groups. Three additional financial permanent members (including United States).

D. Extension of the veto to new permanent members

1. Question whether the veto should be extended

- (1) New permanent members should have the same prerogative and powers as current permanent members.
- (2) The veto should not be extended to new permanent members.
- (3) New permanent members should:
 - (a) Indicate willingness to be permanent members without the veto;
 - (b) Agree not to exercise the veto until a periodic review of the enlarged Security Council has taken place.

2. When should question of extension of the veto to new permanent members be considered?

- (1) Extension of the veto to new permanent members should be considered at the end of agreement on the reform package.
- (2) Extension of the veto to new permanent members should be considered only in the context of curtailment of veto use by the current permanent members.
- (3) A decision on the extension of the veto to new permanent members should be taken once they have been elected.
- (4) A high-level Working Group should consider the question of the extension of the veto to new permanent members. During the interim period, new permanent members will not individually exercise the veto and the concurring vote of a specified number (e.g. four out of five) will be required for Security Council decision on matters not procedural under Chapter VII of the Charter.

E. Increase in non-permanent membership

1. Reference in proposals to general criteria for enlargement of non-permanent membership

- (1) Increase in non-permanent membership should take into account candidates from developing countries and industrialized States.
- (2) When additional non-permanent seats are distributed, no national or regional group should be discriminated against.
- (3) Every regional group should be allocated at least one additional non-permanent seat in the enlarged Council.
- (4) Retiring non-permanent members of the Council should be eligible for immediate re-election.

2. Allocation of non-permanent seats among regions

- (1) Every regional group should be allocated at least one additional non-permanent seat.
- (2) There should be an increase in both permanent and non-permanent categories. There should be four additional non-permanent seats as follows:
 - One for Africa;
 - One for Asia;
 - One for Latin America and the Caribbean;
 - One for Eastern Europe.
- (3) Four new non-permanent members should be elected as follows:
 - One for Africa;
 - One for Asia;
 - One for Eastern Europe;
 - One for Latin America and the Caribbean.

3. Allocation of non-permanent seats to one particular region or to one group of States

- There should be five non-permanent seats for Africa.
- There should be one additional seat for Eastern Europe.
- There should be two non-permanent seats for the Group of Arab States.

4. Some States to participate more frequently as non-permanent members

- (1) There should be five additional (long-term, 6 to 12 years) non-permanent seats to be chosen by the General Assembly, with retiring members eligible for reelection. The other 10 non-permanent seats would continue as at present.
- (2) If two additional seats for permanent members are created, the number of non-permanent members should be increased by eight as follows:
 - Two seats for Africa;
 - Two seats for Asia;
 - Two seats for Latin America and the Caribbean;
 - One seat for Western Europe and other;
 - One seat for Eastern Europe.

If there are eight new non-permanent seats (additional to the present 10 non-permanent seats), each seat could “rotate” among three or four States, enabling (24 to 32) countries that make a substantial contribution to peacekeeping activities and United Nations financing and represent the majority of the world’s population to assume greater responsibility in implementing the Charter.

- (3) Ten new non-permanent seats should be added. For each of those seats, three States would be rotating, making a total of 30 States. Consequently, each of them would remain two years on, and four consecutive years off, the Council. Those 30 States, which therefore would rotate more frequently and regularly than others, should be selected on the basis of objective criteria to be determined by the General Assembly.
- (4) The number of non-permanent members should be increased from 10 to 15. The additional five non-permanent members could have a long term (from 6 to 12 years, for example) and be chosen by the General Assembly by a simple majority. Retiring members would be eligible for immediate re-election. The

other 10 non-permanent members would continue to be elected by the General Assembly for a period of two years. They would not be eligible for immediate re-election at the end of their terms.

(5) States with strength and influence in international relations and the capacity and the will to make a significant contribution to the purposes of the United Nations should participate more frequently in the Council.