Seminární výuka mezinárodního práva veřejného v 8. semestru

   

   V jarním semestru je  výuka obecné části mezinárodního práva veřejného  rozdělena do dílčích
   přednáškových bloků a tří seminářů.  Oproti předchozím akademickým  rokům, bude sjednoceno
   splnění  zápočtového testu. Zápočtový test bude uspořádán ve velkých skupinách, kdy se
   posluchači budou na jednotlivé termíny přihlašovat přes IS. MUNI. Zamýšlený test nebude vázán
   na osobu vyučujícího semináře anebo přednášejícího. Na jeho přípravě a hodnocení se budou
   společně podílet učitelé a studenti doktorského studijního programu v oboru mezinárodního
   práva veřejného.  Sledované změny soustředěně směřují  k  naplňování  hodnot objektivity i
   spravedlivého hodnocení.

   

   Změna zasahuje i do způsobu výuky mezinárodního práva veřejného. Učitelé a studenti
   doktorského studijního programu připravují osobitou výuku v tzv.  argumentačních  seminářích.

   (Předkládaná nabídka má oslovit studenty, kteří mají pronikavější i tvořivý  zájem o
   mezinárodní právo veřejné, např. diplomanty oboru i katedry anebo absolventy právních klinik.)

   

   Strukturovaná představa a cíl:

   V rámci povinných seminářů bude vytvořena jedna seminární skupina, kde výuka bude zaměřena na
   hlubší porozumění mezinárodnímu právu veřejnému. Z hlediska metodologického bude jako základní
   způsob předávání právních formací i informací použita případová metoda.

               Zadání (úkoly) semináře bude obsahovat smyšlený nebo skutečný případ doložený 
   faktografickou a právní dokumentací. Přičemž nejvlastnější smysl semináře utkví v
   argumentačním sváru, jehož protagonisty se mají stát zúčastnění posluchači.

   Zvolený přístup ovšem klade podstatně vyšší nároky na individuální či kolektivní přípravu. 
   Studenti budou rovněž studovat cizojazyčné podklady (ang.) i odbornou literaturu (srov. níže
   uvedený případ).

                Na druhé straně posluchači nebudou podrobeni  jinému  režimu ověřování znalostí
   mezinárodního práva veřejného. Požadavky na zápočet se budou rovnat obecným podmínkám.

   

   Požadavky

   ˙        Vůle (subjektivní požadavek) + schopnost (objektivní požadavek) pracovat
   s cizojazyčnými podklady.

   ˙        Touha zvědět nové a chápat  získané poznatky.

   

   Aby seminář mohl být vzkříšen, musí být známa odezva posluchačů, protože bez Vašeho zájmu je
   myšlenka neuskutečnitelná.

   Argumentační seminář povede profesor Jílek  ve spolupráci s doktorandy.

   

   Posluchači, kteří mají předběžný zájem či nějaký dotaz, ať  v brzké době napíší elektronickou
   zprávu.

   Renata.kleckova@mybox.cz

   

   S přáním hezkých vánoc

   Prof. Dalibor Jílek

   Renata Klečková

   Práci v semináře ilustruje následující případ (tento byl řešen studenty 5. ročníku v rámci
   uprchlického práva).

   Případ:

   Situace:  Pan X, muslim pocházející z Egypta, požádal ihned  po překročení hranic v České
   republice o azyl. USA vede pana X  na seznamu  podezřelých osob, které spolupracují 
   s teroristickou organizací al-Káida. Vzhledem k této skutečnosti vyvíjejí úřady USA velký tlak
   na ČR, aby neudělila panu X azyl a vydala ho bez dalšího do Egypta pro řádné vyšetřování
   (extradice). Organizace zabývající  se  lidskými  právy přitom opakovaně  poukazují  na
   skutečnost,  že  osoby  ve  vazbě jsou  v  Egyptě  často  během výslechů  vystavovány velmi
   špatnému zacházení, které může  být v  některých případech kvalifikováno jako nelidské; 
   nedosahuje však  intenzity mučení. Tato skutečnost platí dvojnásob u  osob

   obviněných z účasti na teroristických aktivitách.

   

   Otázky:

     1)   Může  Česká republika podle Ženevské úmluvy z roku  1951 libovolně rozhodnout, zda-li
   použít vylučující klauzuli, tj. zamítnout na tomto základě žádost o azyl?

     2)  Předpokládejme, že OAMP MV ČR neshledá vylučující klauzuli aplikovatelnou.  Může  být
   pan X po  následném  negativním meritorním rozhodnutí vrácen do Egypta?

     3)   Jak  by  se  změnila situace, kdyby pan X po  překročení hranic ČR pobýval na jejím
   území 3 měsíce a žádost o azyl podal až poté, co ho bez platných dokladů zadržela cizinecká
   policie?

     4)  Lze na daný případ aplikovat i jiné mezinárodní smlouvy o lidských právech?

          a.  Pokud ano, tak které?

          b.  Poskytuje nějaká mezinárodní smlouva o lidských právech širší ochranu než Ženevská
   úmluva z roku 1951?

     5)   Pokud by jste zastupovali pana X před OAMP MV ČR,  který z  důvodů  pronásledování by
   jste zvolili za  základ  Vaší argumentace?

   

   Povinná literatura:

   1)  Příručka  UNHCR, čl. 140-163.

        (http://www.unhcr.cz/publ_guides.htm)

   2) ČEPELKA, C., JÍLEK, D., ŠTURMA, P.: Azyl a uprchlictví v mezinárodním právu. Brno,
   Masarykova univerzita, 1997, str. 122-128.

   

   Doporučená literatura:

     1)   UNHCR:  Summary of Conclusion -- Exclusion  from  Refugee  Status, 2001.         
   (http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-

        bin/texis/vtx/protect/+FwwBmef0dP_wwwwAwwwwwwwxFqzvxsqnwWx6mFqA

        72ZR0gRfZNhFqA72ZR0gRfZNtFqrpGdBnqBzFqmRbZAFqA72ZR0gRfZNDzmxwww

        wwww1FqmRbZ/opendoc.htm)

   2)  GILBERT, G.: Exclusion (Article 1F). In FELLER, E., TURK,

   V., NICHOLSON, F.: Refugee Protection in International Law,Cambridge, 2003, str. 425-490

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   Podklady pro studium

   Obsah:

   I. výňatky ze zprávy U.S.A o situaci v Egyptě

   II. vzorový případ z rozhodovací praxe v Kanadě

   III.odkaz na protiteroristické rezoluce

   

   I.

   U.S. Department of State - 25 February 2004
   U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003 - Egypt

   Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor>February 25, 2004

   The Ministry of Interior controls the State Security Investigations Sector (SSIS), which
   conducts investigations and interrogates detainees, and the Central Security Force (CSF),
   which enforces curfews and bans on public demonstrations. Security forces continued to arrest
   and detain suspected members of terrorist groups. The President is the commander-in-chief of
   the military and the Government maintains effective control of the security forces. The
   security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.

   The Government's human rights record remained poor and many serious problems remain; however,
   there were improvements in a few areas. Citizens did not have the meaningful ability to change
   their government. The use of military courts and State Security Courts to try civilians
   continued to infringe on a defendant's Constitutional right to a fair trial before an
   independent judiciary. The 1981 Emergency law, extended in February for an additional 3 years,
   continued to restrict many basic rights. The security forces continued to mistreat and torture
   prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, hold detainees in prolonged pretrial
   detention, and occasionally engaged in mass arrests. Local police killed, tortured, and
   otherwise abused both criminal suspects and other persons.

   During the year, the Government prosecuted 13 police officers for abuse and torture of
   prisoners. The Government abolished State Security Courts but continued to use of State
   Security Emergency Courts. The Government enacted a law to abolish the hard labor penalty, and
   passed legislation establishing a National Council for Human Rights. The Government generally
   permitted human rights groups to operate openly.

   RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

   1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:

   a. Arbitrary and Unlawful Deprivation of Life

   There were no reports of political killings; however, during the year, human rights
   organizations and the press reported that at least 8 persons died in custody at police
   stations or prisons.

   In April, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) released a report called "Torture
   Should be Stopped." It documented five cases of alleged death due to torture which occurred in
   police stations and detention centers in 2002. The report also included 31 cases of torture, 9
   of which the report states "are expected to end in death."

   c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

   The Constitution prohibits the infliction of "physical or moral harm" upon persons who have
   been arrested or detained; however, torture and abuse of detainees by police, security
   personnel, and prison guards remained common and persistent. The November, 2002 session of the
   U.N. Committee Against Torture noted a systematic pattern of torture by the security forces.

   Police torture resulted in deaths during the year (see Section 1.a.).

   Under the Penal Code, torture or giving orders to torture are felonies punishable by 3 to 10
   years' imprisonment. In June, the Government abolished hard labor as a punishment; however,
   prior to June, some hard labor sentences were imposed.

   If the victim dies under torture, the crime is one of intentional murder punishable by a life
   sentence. Arrest without due cause, threatening death, or using physical torture is punishable
   by imprisonment. Abuse of power to inflict cruelty against persons is punishable by
   imprisonment and fines. Victims may also bring a criminal or civil action for compensation
   against the responsible government agency. There is no statute of limitations in such cases.
   For example, on January 13, an Administrative Court in Alexandria ruled that the Ministry or
   Interior should pay $25,975 (120,000 LE) in compensation to citizen Ramadan Mohammed, who was
   detained illegally for 9 days and tortured in 1996.

   Despite these legal safeguards, there were numerous, credible reports that security forces
   tortured and mistreated detainees. Human rights groups believed that the SSIS, police, and
   other Government entities continued to employ torture. Torture was used to extract
   information, coerce the victims to end their oppositionist activities, and to deter others
   from similar activities. Reports of torture and mistreatment at police stations remained
   frequent. While the Government investigated torture complaints in criminal cases and punished
   some offending officers, the punishments generally have not conformed to the seriousness of
   the offense.

   Principal methods of torture reportedly employed by the police and the SSIS included victims
   being: stripped and blindfolded; suspended from a ceiling or doorframe with feet just touching
   the floor; beaten with fists, whips, metal rods, or other objects; subjected to electrical
   shocks; and doused with cold water. Victims frequently reported being subjected to threats and
   forced to sign blank papers for use against the victim or the victim's family in the future
   should the victim complain of abuse. Some victims, including male and female detainees and
   children reported that they were sexually assaulted or threatened with rape themselves or
   family members. The Emergency Law authorizes incommunicado detention for prolonged periods.
   Detentions under this law were frequently accompanied by allegations of torture (see Section
   1.d.). While the law requires security authorities to keep written records of detentions,
   human rights groups reported that the lack of such records often effectively blocked
   investigation of complaints.

   The Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners (HRCAP), in an October 2002, report
   entitled "The Truth," commended judicial efforts to try security officers for torture, but
   outlined current obstacles, including a vague legal definition of torture, and the inability
   of victims to sue perpetrators directly.

   In November 2002, three domestic human rights associations, as well as two international
   organizations, presented their allegations and findings to the Committee Against Torture
   (CAT), a subcommittee of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. The CAT report expressed
   concerns about: the continued implementation of the state of emergency; consistent reports of
   torture and ill treatment; abuse of juveniles and homosexuals; the continued use of
   administrative detention; the lack of access by victims of torture to the courts and lengthy
   proceedings; and disparities in the awarding of compensation.

   The report included several recommendations: ending the state of emergency; the adoption of a
   clear legal definition of torture; the abolition of incommunicado detention; the review of
   military court decisions by a higher tribunal; the removal of ambiguities in the law that
   allow the prosecution of individuals for their sexual orientation; the acceptance of a visit
   by a U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture; the establishment of rules and standards for victims;
   and to allow human rights organizations to pursue their activities unhindered. The Government
   maintained that the CAT's recommendations were under review at year's end.

   Actions cited by the Government at the hearing include: the 2001 abolition of flogging in
   prisons; unannounced inspections of places of detention; court decisions that disregarded
   confessions obtained under duress; increased human rights training for police officials; and
   the establishment of several human rights committees and departments within government
   ministries.

   The Government did not permit a visit to the country by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture
   during the year; however, while the Government declined requests for such a visit in the past,
   it asserted during the year that it "welcomes, in principle," such a visit.

   Prison conditions remained poor and tuberculosis was widespread. Prisoners suffered from
   overcrowding of cells, the lack of proper hygiene, food, clean water, proper ventilation, and
   recreational activities, and medical care. Some prisons continued to be closed to the public.

   The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other domestic and international human
   rights monitors did not have access to prisons or to other places of detention.

   d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

   The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, during the year, security
   forces conducted large-scale arrests and detained hundreds of individuals without charge.
   Police also at times arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The Emergency Law provides
   that police may obtain an arrest warrant from the Ministry of Interior upon showing that an
   individual poses a danger to security and public order. This procedure nullified the
   constitutional requirement of showing that an individual likely has committed a specific crime
   to obtain a warrant from a judge or prosecutor.

   The Emergency Law allows authorities to detain an individual without charge. After 30 days, a
   detainee has the right to demand a court hearing to challenge the legality of the detention
   order and may resubmit his motion for a hearing at 1-month intervals thereafter. There is no
   maximum limit to the length of detention if the judge continues to uphold the legality of the
   detention order or if the detainee fails to exercise his right to a hearing. Incommunicado
   detention is authorized for prolonged periods by internal prison regulations. Human rights
   groups and the CAT both expressed concern over the application of measures of solitary
   confinement.

   In addition to the Emergency Law, the Penal Code also gives the State broad detention powers.
   Under the Penal Code, prosecutors must bring charges within 48 hours following detention or
   release the suspect. However, they may detain a suspect for a maximum of 6 months pending
   investigation. Arrests under the Penal Code occurred openly and with warrants issued by a
   district prosecutor or judge. There is a system of bail. The Penal Code contains several
   provisions to combat extremist violence, which broadly define terrorism to include the acts of
   "spreading panic" and "obstructing the work of authorities."

   Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of persons have been detained administratively in recent years
   under the Emergency Law on suspicion of terrorist or political activity. Several thousand
   others have been convicted and serving sentences on similar charges (see Section 1.e.). The
   Human Rights Association for the Assistance of Prisoners estimated that the total figure of
   persons held in administrative detention was approximately 15,000.

   On September 3, the Minister of Interior issued a decree ordering the release of 1,000
   political detainees affiliated with the terrorist Islamic Group (IG) after they reportedly
   renounced violence. Most prominent among those released was former Islamic Group leader Karim
   Zohdy. HRAAP called the move "an effective and positive step," but called for the Ministry of
   Interior to release all political prisoners, especially those suffering from health problems,
   and urged that prisoners be moved to prisons in their home governorates to facilitate family
   visitation.

   e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

   The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and the Government generally respected
   this provision in practice; however, under the Emergency Law, cases involving terrorism and
   national security may be tried in military, or State Security Emergency Courts, in which the
   accused does not receive all the normal constitutional protections of the civilian judicial
   system. The authorities ignored judicial orders in some cases. The Government has used the
   Emergency Law, which was established to combat terrorism and grave threats to national
   security, to try cases with no obvious security angle.

   In May, the Government formally abolished State Security Courts. The courts had been
   criticized for restricting the rights of defendants, particularly the right to appeal. A
   number of cases referred to the State Security Courts were transferred to regular criminal
   courts. However, skeptical observers of the legal system argued that as long as the Government
   retained and used Emergency Courts, the abolition of State Security Courts did not constitute
   a fundamental improvement.

   In 1992, following a rise in extremist violence, the Government began trying cases of
   defendants accused of terrorism and membership in terrorist groups before military tribunals.
   In 1993, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the President may invoke the Emergency
   Law to refer any crime to a military court. The 1993 ruling in effect removed hundreds of
   civilian defendants from the normal process of trial by a civilian judge. The Government
   defended the use of military courts as necessary to try terrorism cases, maintaining that
   trials in the civilian courts were protracted and that civilian judges and their families were
   vulnerable to terrorist threats. One case involving civilian defendants was referred to a
   military court during the year. On January 23, the Government referred 43 suspected members of
   the outlawed terrorist organization the Islamic Group to a military court on charges of
   planning to conduct terrorist operations against foreign interests.

   Military verdicts were subject to a review by other military judges and confirmation by the
   President, who in practice usually delegated the review function to a senior military officer.
   Defense attorneys claimed that they were not given sufficient time to prepare defenses and
   that judges tended to rush cases involving a large number of defendants. Judges had guidelines
   for sentencing, defendants had the right to counsel, and statements of the charges against
   defendants were made public. Observers needed government permission to attend. Diplomats
   attended some military trials during the year. Human rights activists have attended, but only
   when acting as lawyers for one of the defendants.

   According to local human rights organizations, there were approximately 13,000 to 16,000
   persons detained without charge on suspicion of illegal terrorist or political activity (see
   Section 1.d.). In addition to several thousand others were convicted and were serving
   sentences on similar charges.

   The Government did not permit access by international humanitarian organizations to political
   prisoners (see Section 1.c.). In 2002, an AI delegation was permitted to visit the country,
   but authorities denied the group's request to visit detainees. There were no prison visits
   during the year.

   II.

   reálný případ z Kanady, který částečně osvětluje některé aspekty problému:

   

   SURESH v. CANADA

   

   Facts: The appellant, a Convention refugee from Sri Lanka, applied for landed immigrant
   status. He was detained by the Canadian government in 1995 and deportation proceedings were
   begun based on security grounds. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service ("CSIS"), believed
   that he was a member and fundraiser of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE"), a
   terrorist

   organization in Sri Lanka. Its members are also subject to torture in Sri Lanka. The Federal
   Court, Trial Division upheld as reasonable the s. 40.1 deportation certificate and, after a
   deportation hearing, an adjudicator held that the appellant should be deported. The Minister
   of Citizenship and

   Immigration issued an opinion on the basis of an immigration officer's memorandum that the
   appellant was a danger to the security of Canada under s. 53(1)(b) of the Immigration Act,
   R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, and concluded he should be deported.

   

   Reasons: The trial judge found that  the appellant had not shown that he personally would risk
   torture according to the "substantial grounds" test. This conflicts with the immigration
   officer's finding that "there is a risk to Mr. Suresh on his return to Sri Lanka". The officer
   concluded, however, that the risk was "counterbalanced by the serious terrorist activities to
   which he has been a party" and, on this basis, the Minister ordered the appellant deported.
   The question is whether deportation "to a country where the person's life or freedom would be
   threatened" under s. 53 of the Act violates s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
   Freedoms.

   ........The provisions of the Act, however, must also be considered in [*4] their international
   context: ....There are three compelling indicia that the prohibition of torture by the
   international community is a peremptory norm: the great number of multilateral instruments
   that explicitly prohibit torture; no state has ever legalized torture or admitted to its
   deliberate practice; and a number of international authorities state that the prohibition on
   torture is an established peremptory norm. International law rejects deportation to torture,
   even where national security interests are at stake.

    Barring extraordinary circumstances, then, deportation

   to torture will generally violate the principles of fundamental justice protected by s. 7 of
   the

   Charter. Whether the risk to national security is sufficient to justify the appellant's
   deportation is a question of evaluation and judgment. It is necessary to take into account the
   degree of probability of prejudice to national security, the importance of the security
   interest at stake and the serious consequences of deportation for the deportee. The Minister
   should generally decline to deport [*5] refugees where, on the evidence, there is a
   substantial risk of torture. ......The terms "Danger to the Security of Canada" and "Terrorism",
   while

   difficult to define, are not unconstitutionally vague. Section 19, which permits Canada to
   refuse entry to persons who are or have been engaged in terrorism or who are or have been
   members of terrorist organizations is used in s. 53(1) to define the class of Convention
   refugees who may be deported because they constitute a danger to the security of Canada. The
   provisions fail to attract constitutional protection because it would be conduct associated
   with violent activity which is not protected by the Charter.

   

   

   III.

     Při řešení případu by jste měli zvážit i existenci rezolucí Rady bezpečnosti OSN k boji
   proti mezinárodnímu terorismu. A to:

   

      2.1.  Security Council resolution 1368 (2001)

   

   http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement

   

      2.2.  Security Council resolution 1373 (2001)

   

   http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement

   Tato rezoluce je přeložena i do češtiny. Naleznete jí:

   Šturma, Nováková, Bílková: Mezinárodní a evropské instrumenty proti terorismu a organizovanému
   zločinu, C.H. Beck, Praha, 2003, str. 205-207

   (tato kniha je ve studovně)