Moving House: Which Court Can Open Insolvency Proceedings?
Bob Wessels1
1. European Insolvency law in motion
In some five years in Europe cross-border insolvency questions are being solved according to
a fully different legal framework than at the end of the 90s of the last century. A cornerstone
is the Council regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings,
which came into effect May 31, 2002.2
It has introduced a legal system for dealing with crossborder
insolvency proceedings, containing provisions on jurisdiction, recognition and
applicable law. A Regulation is a Community law measure, which is binding and directly
applicable in Member States. The goals of the Regulation, with 47 articles, are to enable
cross-border insolvency proceedings to operate efficiently and effectively, to provide for coordination
of the measures to be taken with regard to the debtor's assets and to avoid forum
shopping. The Insolvency Regulation, therefore, provides rules for the international
jurisdiction of a court in a Member State for the opening of insolvency proceedings, the
(automatic) recognition of these proceedings in other Member States and the powers of the
`liquidator' in the other Member States. The Regulation also deals with important choice of
law (or: private international law) provisions. The Regulation is directly applicable in the
Member States for all insolvency proceedings opened after 31 May 2002.3
Art. 1(1) EU Insolvency Regulation (InsReg) excludes from its scope insolvency proceedings
concerning insurance undertakings, credit institutions, investment undertakings, holding funds
or securities for third parties, and collective investment undertakings. `Insurance
undertakings' are defined according to the description, set out in Directive 2001/17 of the
European Parliament and the Council of March 19, 2001, on the reorganization and windingup
of insurance undertaking4
, and `credit institutions' will be covered by the definition of
Directive 2001/24 of the European Parliament and the Council of April 4, 2001, on the
reorganization and winding-up of credit institutions.5
These institutions are excluded from the
Insolvency Regulation since they are subject to special arrangements and, to some degree, the
national supervisory authorities have extremely wide-ranging powers of intervention. Unlike
a Regulation, a Directive will go through a legislative implementation process in each
individual EC Member State. The implementation dates are April 20, 2003 (insurance) and
May 5, 2004 (credit institutions) respectively. The Winding-Up Directive Banks is to be
regarded as to plug a gap left by the Insolvency Regulation.6
It should be noticed that the
Insolvency Regulation itself aims to fill a gap that deliberately was left, over thirty years ago,
in the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
1
Professor Business Law `Vrije' University, Amsterdam; Commerzbank Foundation Visiting Professor Institute
for Law and Finance, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt, Germany. This article is based on a public
lecture at aforementioned institute, which I gave on this topic in Frankfurt, November 25, 2003. See: Wessels,
International Jurisdiction To Open Insolvency Proceedings in Europe, in Particular Against (Groups of)
Companies, Institute for law and Finance, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt, Working Paper No. 17,
2003, available at <<www.ilf-frankfurt.de>>.
2
Official Journal (O.J.) L 160 of 29 May 2000
3
In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Denmark is not participating in the
adoption of the Insolvency Regulation and is therefore not bound by it nor subject to its application.
4
O.J. L 110 of 20 April 2001.
5
O.J. L 125 of 5 May 2001.
6
See Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs (eds.), The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings: A Commentary and
Annotated Guide, Oxfort University Press (2002), nr. 8.11. Also: Hüpkes, The Legal Aspects of Bank Insolvency.
A Comparative Analysis of Western Europe, the United States and Canada, Studies in Comparative Corporate and
Financial law, Volume 10, The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International (2000), p. 7 ff, and Paulus,
Banken und Insolvenz ­ eine internationale Betrachtung (Banks and Insolvency ­ An International Reflection), in:
ZBB (Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaftrecht), 15. December 2002, p. 457 ff.
 International Insolvency Institute ­ www.iiiglobal.org
and Commercial Matters. Art. 1(1) of this Convention excluded from its scope insolvency
proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial
arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings. The EU Insolvency Regulation has
now filled this gap, while the Brussels Convention has been transformed into a Regulation as
of 1 March 2002.7
Art. 1(2) Brussels Regulation 2002 contains the same exclusion. Art. 25
Insolvency Regulation aligns the recognition and enforceability of insolvency related
judgments (concerning the course and the closure of insolvency proceedings and court
approved compositions) with the Brussels Regulation 2002. Systematically judgments, not
covered by the Winding-Up Directives, fall within the scope of the Brussels Regulation 2002.
2. Opening insolvency proceedings against insolvent debtors
In Europe, in the first year after its entry into force, the Insolvency Regulation produced some
twenty courtdecisions. It seems that especially in the UK, the Netherlands and in Germany the
Regulation has caused interesting decisions.8
More than half of these cases are concerned with
a courts competence to initiate insolvency proceedings. Art. 3(1) InsReg provides that the
courts of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of a debtor's main
interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings. If the debtor is a
company or legal person9
art. 3(1), first sentence InsReg, contains a presumption: the place of
the registered office shall be presumed to be the centre of its main interests, in the absence of
proof to the contrary. In cases of natural persons, the `centre of main interesť is the sole
criterion to decide whether a court can exercise its international jurisdiction.
When a court has opened insolvency proceedings based on the debtor's center of main
interest (COMI) the proceedings opened are the main proceedings, which in principle have
universal scope and encompass all of the debtor's assets wherever located within the EU
(with the exception of Denmark). By giving an interpretation to term in the Insolvency
Regulation regard is to be had at the 33 recitals preceding the Regulation, which serve as a
preamble or statement of reasons, see art. 253 EC Treaty. With regard to these recitals the
High Court of Justice (Ch D) (Justice Lloyd) 7 February 2003 (Re BRAC Rent-A-Car
International Inc)10
holds:
`The context of the Regulation is described in its 33 recitals. These .... help to cast
light on some of the substantive provisions'.11
Another source is formed by the Report Virgós/Schmit (1996)12
. To the Report Virgós/Schmit
Lloyd J in the Brac Inc.-case considers:
7
Council Regulation No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000, O.J. 2001 L 12/1.
8
See Fletcher, The Challenges of Change: First Experiences of Life under the EC Regulation in the UK,
International Insolvency Review (forthcoming) and Wessels, Anticipation and Application of the EU Insolvency
Regulation in the Netherlands, in: Insolvency Law & Practice (forthcoming).
9
Not being a financial institution as meant in art. 1(2) InsReg.
10
[2003] EWHC (Ch) 128, [2003] 2 All E.R. 201; [2003] BCC, Lloyd J. See for comments among others:
Wessels, Rechtspersonen met zetel buiten de EU kunnen onderworpen zijn aan een insolventieprocedure in de EU
(Legal persons outside the EU can be subjected to an insolvency proceeding in the EU), WPNR 6534 (2003), the
`Commenť in; The Company Lawyer 2003, p. 97 and the `Kurzcommentar' (Short Commentary) of Sabel and
Schlegel in (German) EWiR 2003/8, p. 367.
11
See para. 10, adding in para 26 that in cases of inconsistence the text of articles prevails over that of recitals in
Community legislation.
12
This report has been issued by Professor Miguel Virgós and Mr Etienne Schmit, to serve as an interpretative
guide to the Insolvency Convention of 1995, which five years later has been altered to the Insolvency Regulation,
with nearly the same content as the Convention. Although the Report Virgós/Schmit never has been finalized or
approved by the EC Ministers of Justice, both in literature as in court decisions it is seen as an unofficial guide te
interpretation. The Recitals, preceeding the Regulation, contain an unsystematical selection of several parts of the
Report Virgós/Schmit, in several cases (quite) literary, which seems to affirm the interpretative value of the
Report. It should be mentioned that in the Netherlands already in 1996 a court made references to the report, see
Court of Haarlem 17 September 1996, Netherlands International Private law (NIPR) 1996, 438.
 International Insolvency Institute ­ www.iiiglobal.org
`I am not altogether clear as to the status of the Report ..... However it seemed to
me that I ought to take some account of its contents'.
We will see that the Netherlands Supreme Court too supports its most recent decision of 9
January 2004 with references to the recitals and the Report Virgós/Schmit (see par. 6).
3. `Centre of main interests' as a standard on the go
Report Virgós/Schmit (1996), nr. 75, provides that the concept of `centre of main interests'
must be interpreted `..... as the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his
interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties'. This description
carries a `law and economics' dimension, in that the reporters argue that `..... insolvency is a
foreseeable risk. It is therefore important that international jurisdiction (which ..... entails the
application of the insolvency laws of that ..... State) be based on a place known to the
debtor's potential creditors. This enables the legal risks which would have to be assumed in
the case of insolvency to be calculated.'13
In the recitals, preceding the Insolvency Regulation,
too the point of view of third parties is prevailing. Recital 13 says: `The `centre of main
interests' should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his
interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties.' These words mirror
the words, just quoted from the Report Virgós/Schmit.
Although it seems that the accent lies on interests of an economic nature, conducted out of a
place (`centre') which is ascertainable by third parties (especially potential creditors), it is
important to stress that the use of the term `interests' is intended to express a wide spread of
activities. Report Virgós/Schmit (1996), nr. 75, says: `By using the term `interests', the
intention was to encompass not only commercial, industrial or professional activities, but also
general economic activities, so as to include the activities of private individuals (e.g.
consumers).' The concept of a debtor's centre of main interests therefore applies equally to
private individuals who do not engage in an economic or commercial activity as it does to
corporate entities engaged in trade. The Report Virgós/Schmit (1996), nr. 75, ends its
elaboration with: `In principle, the centre of main interests will in the case of professionals be
the place of their professional domicile and for natural persons in general, the place of their
habitual residence'.
The determination of a debtor's COMI is based on the interpretation of the facts in any given
case. The outcome is not only of importance with regard to the question which country's
court is competent. When the centre of main interest of a debtor cannot be located in the
territory of a Member State, the Insolvency Regulation does not provide a base for
international jurisdiction of courts in a Member State to open main insolvency proceedings.
Art. 3(1) InsReg presupposes that this centre is within the EC Community. Recital 13, too, is
clear: `This Regulation applies only to proceedings where the centre of the debtor's main
interests is located in the Community.' In a case like this, it is up to the national law
(including its private international law) to determine the international jurisdiction of its own
domestic courts. The legal consequences of an opening judgment therefore are not
determinated by the Insolvency Regulation, but by the contents of each Member State's
domestic laws. In the Netherlands for instance a company or legal person with registered
office outside the Member States is subjected to an insolvency opening in this country when
in the Netherlands there is a commercial activity or it keeps offices. This is the outcome of a
proceeding, on appeal, called Geveran Trading Co. Ltd v. Kjell Tore Skjevesland14
regarding
13
See too Virgós, The 1995 European Community Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: an Insider's View, in:
Forum Internationale, no. 25, March 1998, p. 13, referring to `..... the place where the debtor conducts the
effective administration of his interests on a regular basis'.
14
First instance: [2002] EWHC 2898 (Ch), [2003] BCC 209 (Registrar Jacques); on appeal High Court 11
November 2002 [2003] BCC 391 (Judge Howard).
 International Insolvency Institute ­ www.iiiglobal.org
a debtor (referring to himself as a Swiss banker), who is a Norwegian citizen, domiciled in
England during a period of three years prior to his petitioning, and domiciled too in Spain and
in Switzerland. The debtor tried to defend himself against a creditor that petitioned for his
insolvency in the UK. The debtor tried to proof that all his relevant connections were with
Switzerland or Spain, but not the UK. The High Court did not locate his COMI in Spain (what
would have resulted in applying the Regulation, but only through the international jurisdiction
of a Spanish court), but in Switzerland. Therefore the Insolvency Regulation does not apply
(Switzerland is not an EU Member State) and, by consequence, the English court could apply
its domestic jurisdiction rule (section 265 Insolvency Act 1986), leading to its jurisdictional
authority based on the debtor's previous residence in England for a period within the
preceding three years.
In cases of personal insolvency to which the Regulation applies I mentioned earlier that the
Regulation does not contain a presumption with regard to (fixing) a centre to a certain place,
(which presumption might or might not be rebutted). For a private individual a court solely
can give interpretation to relevant facts that would or would not lead to COMI. In theory a
court may have to decide e.g. where a natural person has his COMI when he lives in
Amsterdam and works for 2, sometimes 3, and once in a while 4 days a week in London.
Some authors prefer a choice for the place of residence,15
where I ­ with others16
­ would try
to apply the norm provided in recital (13) (`..... as the place where the debtor conducts the
administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third
parties'), leading to the place of living or professional/business domicile (`woonplaats') to be
the aforementioned centre of main interest.
4. A Norwegian-born Swiss banker in London
In the UK case I mentioned earlier, with regard to the Norwegian-born `Swiss banker' living
in England, Spain and Switzerland (Geveran Trading Co. Ltd v. Kjell Tore Skjevesland), the
High Court considered that in a case of a non-professional usually his COMI is where the
debtor habitually resides, but in the case of a professional the decisive factor would be the
place of his `professional domicile', as this location constitutes `.....somewhere were he can
be located, the centre which is ascertainable by third parties'. The court, although implicitly,
denies the possibility of having, under the application of the Insolvency Regulation, two or
more `centres' of main interests, which I hold as correct.
The reference date for a `centre' to be `centre' enough for a court to base its international
jurisdiction is not the date of presenting the petitioning, according to the judgment in appeal
in the aformentioned case of Geveran Trading Co. Ltd v. Kjell Tore Skjevesland.17
The
`centre' should be there at the moment the court decides to open (or not) the main
proceedings. In case the court has determined its international jurisdiction (by opening main
proceedings), then the legal effect of this decision (universal effect within the Community;
application of the lex concursus elsewhere; universal power of the liquidator) can not be
influenced by ­ taken it would be legally possible ­ a decision of the debtor to close down all
activities, to `transfer' the centre to another Member State or a country outside of the EU
15
Taupitz, Das (zukünftige) Europäische Internationale Insolvenzrecht ­ insbesondere aus internationalprivatrechtlicher
Sicht (The (future) European International Insolvency Law ­ especially within the private
international law context), in: ZZP 1998, p. 315; Berends (1999), p. 117.
16
See for instance Balz, Das neue Europäische Insolvenzübereinkommen (The New European Insolvency
Convention), in: Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 1996, p. 949; Lücke (1998), p. 287, und Kolmann,
Kooperationsmodelle im Internationalen Insolvenzrecht. Empfielt sich für das Deutsche internationale
Insolvenzrecht eine Neuorientierung? (Models of Cooperation in International Insolvency Law. Is A New
Orientation Recommanded?) Schriften zum Deutschen und Europäischen Zivil-, Handels- und Prozessrecht,
Bielefeld: Verlag Ernst und Werner Gieseking (2001), p. 286.
17
First instance: [2002] EWHC 2898 (Ch), [2003] BCC 209 (Registrar Jacques); on appeal High Court 11
November 2002 [2003] BCC 391 (Judge Howard). In this regard too: Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (2002), p.
839; Dicey and Morris on Conflicts of Law (Third Cumulative Supplement to the thirteenth edition, 2003), nr. 31-
090.
 International Insolvency Institute ­ www.iiiglobal.org
and/or to limit `centre' activities to a level that would qualify as a place of operations
(`establishmenť).18
The Regulation should be interpreted so as to prevent any easy evasion of
jurisdiction under the Regulation, see recital 4 (avoid `forum shopping'). I agree with Moss,
who submits: `The courts should, in a case of undesirable forum shopping of that kind, ignore
the steps taken purely to avoid the appropriate jurisdiction'.19
This view can be supported by
Community principles like (i) the principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination (between
insolvent debtors), and (ii) the principle of legal certainty for creditors (the fixed or `frozen'
facts at a certain time ­ reference date ­ that includes the perspective of ascertainability by
potential creditors).
5. On the move: from Germany to Spain and from The Netherlands to France
In a German case and a Dutch case the facts seem quite similar, but the courts hand down
different judgments.
The Country Court of Wuppertal 14 August 200220
determines that the COMI of a German
debtor-natural person is Spain:
`..... because the debtor, according to her own statement, has moved to Spain on
April 1, 2002, and considers herself that her Spanish domicile is her centre of main
interest, because she want to live and work there'.21
The Court of Appeal Amsterdam 17 June 200322
had to decide in a similar case where the
Dutch debtor obviously has finished her professional activities and moved to Longueville,
France, a year prior to her insolvency. The sole fact of moving to another country, according
to the court:
`.... does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that main proceedings solely can be
opened in France. It too does not lead to the conclusion that the debtor's COMI is
not anymore in the Netherlands. By giving the answer to the question where the
debtor's COMI is, the court holds as important that she has exercised her
(professional) activities in the Netherlands, from which activities the claims derive.
These claims are connected with a Dutch BV (in which the debtor owned shares)
and with the husband of the debtor, and both the BV and the husband are subject to
Dutch insolvency proceedings. Given these facts and in the absence of a decisive
point of departure with France, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal decides that the
debtor's COMI (still) is located in the Netherlands.'
I disagree with the Amsterdam Court of Appeal decision as the court denies putting weight on
the circumstances at the time of its decision of (non-)opening of the proceedings. Moreover,
the court seems to overlook the norm that the COMI is the place where the debtor conducts
the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third
parties, by merely looking at the origin and the nature of these debts. The Wuppertal court
excites sympathy, the COMI-facts in a certain case however should be of an objective, rather
18
In this way too with regard to the jurisdiction ex art. 3(2) InsReg Justice Lightman, in: Moss et al, p. 173.
19
See Moss, in: Moss, Fletcher, Isaacs (eds.), The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings: A Commentary and
Annotated Guide, 2002, p. 171.
20
ZinsO-Rechtsprechungsreport 22/2002, p. 1099.
21
It should be noted that the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) with its decision of 27 November 2003
with a reference to this case has required to give a preliminary decision to the question whether a court in a
Member State, where a petition to open main proceedings has been filed, remains to have international jurisdiction,
when the debtor after having filed the petition, but prior to the opening of insolvency proceedings moves his centre
of main interest to another Member State or whether the courts in the latter Member State shall have international
jurisdiction. See ZIP 2/2004, p. 94 ff.
22
Court of Appeal Amsterdam 17 June 2003, JOR 2003/186, commented by Spinath.
 International Insolvency Institute ­ www.iiiglobal.org
that of a subjective nature. Nevertheless the outcome of the Wuppertal judgment seems
correct.
6. Moving about: a round-trip from the Netherlands, Dutch Antilles, British Virgin
Islands, Belgium to the Nehterlands
The first Supreme Court case on COMI is from the: Netherlands Supreme Court 9 January
2004. The Supreme Court23
has to decide in a case where a bank (Fortis) in March 2003 filed
for opening of main insolvency proceedings at the Court of Alkmaar agains its debtor EvertJan
Vennink, living in Deurle, Belgium. The Court opens the proceedings, and Vennink
appeals.
The Court of Appeal Amsterdam 7 August 2003 (unreported) ex officio assessed its
international jurisdiction and decided that according to art. 3(1) InsReg the courts of the
Member State within the territory of which the centre of a debtor's main interests is situated
shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings, and follows:
`From the documents it can be derived satisfactorily that V's centre of main interest
­ among which substantial interests in a large number of companies, established in
the Netherlands ­ is the Netherlands'.
From the considerations of the Supreme Court it can be taken that the fact that V argues that
he does not administer any interest or trade activity in the Netherlands since 1994 can not be
taken into account as these facts have not been presented in an earlier stage. The fact that V
claims that he bank always has sent statements of account to his address in Belgium is
considered incorrect as Fortis has stated ­ undisputed ­ that bank statements always have
been sent to V's address in the Netherlands and that V always responded.
V disagrees and brings an appeal in cassation. The Supreme Court rejects V's complaints as
far as these are aimed at the Amsterdam Courťs judgment with regard to art. 3(1) InsReg:
3.4.1. According to art. 3 section 1 of this Regulation the courts of the Member
State within the territory of which the centre of a debtor's main interests is situated
shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings. With regard to companies
and legal persons, according to this section, the place of the registered office shall
be presumed to be the centre of its main interests in the absence of proof to the
contrary. Towards natural persons the Regulation does not contain similar
presumption, subject to proof of the contrary. In the Recitals to the regulation under
(13) it is mentioned that the `centre of main interests' should correspond to the
place where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular
basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties. The point of departure that with
regard to a natural person his place of residence has to be regarded as his centre of
main interest as meant in art. 3(1) EU Insolvency Regulation does not follow from
the text, nor from the recitals. For this plea one finds unsufficient support in the
passage in the explainary report of Virgós and Schmit accompanying the
Bankruptcy Convention of 1995, which has not been enacted, and which report has
served as a model for the rules of the EU Insolvency Regulation. The passage cited
by the Attorney-General24
does not imply that with regard to natural persons the
23
HR 9 januari 2004, LJN-nummer: AN7896; Zaaknr. R03/091HR, available (in Dutch) at
<<www.rechtspraak.nl>>.
24
The Attorney-General quotes Report Virgós/Schmit, nr. 75: `In principle, the centre of main interests will in the
case of professionals be the place of their professional domicile and for natural persons in general, the place of
their habitual residence', for which he uses the book of Moss et al (2000) (note xx above). The Attorney-General
quotes the English version of the Virgós/Schmit report, adding that a Dutch version has not been published, which
is incorrect, where a Dutch version exists and is easily available in an Ars Aequi legal texts edition and in the only
available two-Volumes loose-leafe on the `Faillissementsweť (Bankruptcy Act) in the Dutch market.
 International Insolvency Institute ­ www.iiiglobal.org
common place of residence has to apply as centre of main interests or that this is a
rebuttable presumption.
In an additional note the Supreme Court further considers:
3.4.2. ..... did not ignore that in a case like this in which a debtor has left the
Netherlands, the Kingdom in Europe, under circumstances no international
jurisdiction ex art. 3 section 1 EU Insolvency Regulation will exist anymore,
especially when the debtor not only has left his place of residence, but also has
relocated his centre of main interest to another country. In the Court of Appeaľs
judgement however, this is not the case, as the Court apparently and not
incomprehensible has adopted the view that V, with regard to the substantial
interests in a large number of companies established in the Netherlands, has
maintained to administer these commercial interest in the Netherlands and that V's
position that he has left the Netherlands and went to the British Virgin Islands and
subsequently to Belgium, in which country he lived until shortly prior to the Court
of Appaeľs judgment, preceeding his recently terminated detention in Belgium, did
not lead to another judgment.
7. Concluding remarks
The topic of `centre of main interesť will be only one of the very many that will have to be
solved in applying the huge mass of rules that the last five years have been spread of Europe
in creating an efficient framework for the effectiveness of insolvency proceedings having
cross-border effects. In the introduction I described some relevant sources. They contain
many vague terms, standards and norms that will have to be decided on in the near future.
From the EU Insolvency Regulation I took a term that until now has been addressed by courts
in the UK, the Netherlands and Germany.25
With regard to COMI of natural persons the
approach to distinct between a non-professional and a professional debtor has been suggested
in the Report Virgós/Schmit (1996), nr. 75 and in literature.26
As demonstrated, some courts
seem to apply a division between a private person acting as a non-professional (COMI is
habitual residence) or acting as professional (COMI is professional domicile), be it with
different outcomes. Courts seem furthermore to give different weight to the (subjective)
desire of a natural person to have its centre of main interest elsewhere, and act accordingly.
Where some authors stress the meaning of subjective factors, like the debtors' declaration
`where his emotional ties are'27
, I would be much more reluctant, as one of the key aims of
the Insolvency Regulation ­ avoiding forum shopping28
­ may be easily undermined.
For a fact intensive criterion as `centre of main interesť the judgement of the Nehterlands
Supreme Court demonstrates that all relevant facts should be addressed and explained, e.g:
- `centre' versus a place one visits several times;
- `main' versus other `non-main' interests;
- `interests', representing commercial or professional activities, but also general economic
activities, including, living, eating, sporting and all other activities (maintaining a flat abroad,
having bank accounts abroad) in live which are relevant to (making) creditors.
As often with an `open standarď, facts and rules are intertwined.
25
It is a matter of great concern that the EC itself or (European) organisations of insolvency practitioners or of
judges have not been able to organise a system in which court judgments are gathered and translated.
26
See e.g. Moss et al (2002), nr. 8.41.
27
See Dicey and Morris, Third Cum. Suppl. (2003), nr. 31-090.
28
See recital 4: `It is necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market to avoid incentives for the parties
to transfer assets or judicial proceedings from one Member State to another, seeking to obtain a more favourable
legal position (forum shopping).
 International Insolvency Institute ­ www.iiiglobal.org