Non-Corrigé Uncorrected CR 2008/23 International Court Cour internationale of Justice de Justice THE HAGUE LA HAYE YEAR 2008 Public sitting held on Monday 8 September 2008, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding, in the case concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) ________________ VERBATIM RECORD ________________ ANNÉE 2008 Audience publique tenue le lundi 8 septembre 2008, 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président, en ľaffaire relative ľApplication de la convention internationale sur ľélimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie) ____________________ COMPTE RENDU ____________________ - 2 Present: President Higgins Vice-President Al-Khasawneh Judges Ranjeva Shi Koroma Buergenthal Owada Simma Tomka Abraham Keith Sepúlveda-Amor Bennouna Skotnikov Judge ad hoc Gaja Registrar Couvreur - 3 Présents : Mme Higgins, président M. Al-Khasawneh, vice-président MM. Ranjeva Shi Koroma Buergenthal Owada Simma Tomka Abraham Keith Sepúlveda-Amor Bennouna Skotnikov, juges M. Gaja, juge ad hoc M. Couvreur, greffier - 4 The Government of Georgia is represented by: Ms Tina Burjaliani, First Deputy-Minister of Justice, H.E. Ms Maia Panjikidze, Ambassador of Georgia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as Agents; Mr. Payam Akhavan, Professor of International Law, McGill University, as Co-Agent and Advocate; Mr. James R. Crawford, S.C., LL.D., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge, Member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, Mr. Paul S. Reichler, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bars of the United States Supreme Court and the District of Columbia, as Advocates; H.E. Mr. Nika Gvaramia, Minister of Justice, Mr. Ekaterine Zguladze, First Deputy-Minister of the Interior, Mr. Archil Giorgadze, Head of Human Rights Unit, Office of the Prosecutor-General, Mr. Philippe Sands, Professor of Law, University College London, Member, Matrix Chambers, Mr. Zachary Douglas, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge, Ms Stephanie Ierino, Barrister & Solicitor, Supreme Court of Tasmania, Research Associate, Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge, Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the United States Supreme Court, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Mr. Andrew B. Loewenstein, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bar of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Ms Clara E. Brillembourg, Foley Hoag LLP, Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and New York, as Advisers. The Government of the Russian Federation is represented by: Mr. Roman Kolodkin, Director, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, H.E. Mr. Kirill Gevorgian, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as Agents; - 5 Le Gouvernement de Géorgie est représenté par : Mme Tina Burjaliani, premier vice-ministre de la justice, S. Exc. Mme Maia Panjikidze, ambassadeur de Géorgie auprs du Royaume des Pays-Bas, comme agents ; M. Payam Akhavan, professeur de droit international ľUniversité McGill, comme coagent et avocat ; M. James R. Crawford, S.C., LL.D., F.B.A., professeur de droit international ľUniversité de Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, avocat, Matrix Chambers, M. Paul S. Reichler, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., membre des barreaux de la Cour suprme des Etats-Unis ďAmérique et du district de Columbia, comme avocats ; S. Exc. M. Nika Gvaramia, ministre de la justice, Mme Ekaterine Zguladze, premier vice-ministre de ľintérieur, M. Archil Giorgadze, chef du département des droits de ľhomme au bureau du procureur général, M. Philippe Sands, professeur de droit au University College de Londres, avocat, Matrix Chambers, M. Zachary Douglas, avocat, Matrix Chambers, chargé de cours la faculté de droit de ľUniversité de Cambridge, Mme Stephanie Ierino, avocat et Solicitor la Cour suprme de Tasmanie, Research Associate au Lauterpacht Centre for International Law de ľUniversité de Cambridge, M. Lawrence H. Martin, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux de la Cour suprme des Etats-Unis ďAmérique, du district de Columbia et du Commonwealth du Massachusetts, M. Andrew B. Loewenstein, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau du Commonwealth du Massachusetts, Mme Clara E. Brillembourg, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de Columbia et de New York, comme conseillers. Le Gouvernement de la fédération de Russie est représenté par : M. Roman Kolodkin, directeur du département des affaires juridiques du ministre des affaires étrangres de la Fédération de Russie, S. Exc. M. Kirill Gevorgian, ambassadeur de la Fédération de Russie auprs du Royaume des Pays-Bas, comme agents ; - 6 Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, member and former Chairman of the International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit international, Mr. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the University of Kiel, Director of the Walther-Schückling Institute, Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Mr. Samuel Wordsworth, member of the English Bar, member of the Paris Bar, Essex Court Chambers, as Counsel and Advocates; Mr. Dmitry Ognev, Solicitor, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev and Partners, Moscow, Mr. Khristofor Ivanyan, Managing Partner, Ivanyan and Partners law firm, Moscow, as Advocates; Mr. Nikolay Uvarov, Lieutenant General, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Mr. Ilya Tiatkin, Major General, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Mr. Elbrus Kargiev, Principal Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. Grigory Lukyantsev, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, New York, Mr. Maksim Musikhin, First Secretary, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Mr. Ivan Volodin, Acting Head of Division, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ms Maria Zabolotskaya, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations in New York, Mr. Pavel Kornatskiy, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Ms Svetlana Shatalova, Attaché, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ms Diana Taratukhina, Attaché, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ms Anastasia Tezikova, Attaché, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. Christian J. Tams, LL.M., Ph.D. (Cambridge), Walher-Schückling Institute, University of Kiel, Ms Alina Miron, Temporary Lecturer and Research Assistant, University Paris Ouest-La Défense, Researcher, Center for International Law of Nanterre (CEDIN), - 7 M. Alain Pellet, professeur ľUniversité de Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre associé de ľInstitut de droit international, M. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), professeur de droit ľUniversité de Kiel, directeur de ľInstitut Walther-Schücking, membre de la Cour permanente ďarbitrage, M. Samuel Wordsworth, membre des barreaux ďAngleterre et de Paris, Essex Court Chambers, comme conseils et avocats ; M. Dmitry Ognev, Solicitor, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners, Moscou, M. Khristofor Ivanyan, associé gérant, cabinet Ivanyan & Partners, Moscou, comme avocats ; M. Nikolay Uvarov, général de division au ministre de la défense de la Fédération de Russie, M. Ilya Tiatkin, général de brigade au ministre de la défense de la Fédération de Russie, M. Elbrus Kargiev, conseiller principal au ministre des affaires étrangres de la Fédération de Russie, M. Grigory Lukyantsev, conseiller la mission permanente de la Fédération de Russie auprs de ľOrganisation des Nations Unies New York, M. Maksim Musikhin, premier secrétaire ľambassade de la Fédération de Russie aux Pays-Bas, M. Ivan Volodin, chef de division par intérim du département des affaires juridiques du ministre des affaires étrangres de la Fédération de Russie, Mme Maria Zabolotskaya, deuxime secrétaire la mission permanente de la Fédération de Russie auprs de ľOrganisation des Nations Unies New York, M. Pavel Kornatskiy, deuxime secrétaire ľambassade de la Fédération de Russie aux Pays-Bas, Mme Svetlana Shatalova, attaché au département des affaires juridiques du ministre des affaires étrangres de la Fédération de Russie, Mme Diana Taratukhina, attaché au département des affaires juridiques du ministre des affaires étrangres de la Fédération de Russie, Mme Anastasia Tezikova, attaché au département des affaires juridiques du ministre des affaires étrangres de la Fédération de Russie, M. Christian J. Tams, LL.M., docteur en droit de ľUniversité de Cambridge, Institut Walther-Schücking de ľUniversité de Kiel, Mme Alina Miron, attaché temporaire ďenseignement et de recherche ľUniversité de Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, chercheur au centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), - 8 Mr. Sergey Usoskin, Lawyer, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev and Partners, Ms Elena Krotova, Lawyer, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners, Ms Tatiana Tolstaya, Lawyer, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev and Partners, Ms Anna Shumilova, Junior Lawyer, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev and Partners, Ms Oxana Gogunskaya, Junior Lawyer, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev and Partners, as Advisers. - 9 M. Sergey Usoskin, juriste, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners, Mme Elena Krotova, juriste, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners, Mme Tatiana Tolstaya, juriste, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners, Mme Anna Shumilova, juriste junior, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners, Mme Oxana Gogunskaya, juriste junior, cabinet Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners, comme conseillers. - 10 The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is now open and the Court meets this afternoon to hear the first round of oral observations of the Russian Federation on the Request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Georgia. I now call upon Mr. Kolodkin, Agent of the Russian Federation. Mr. KOLODKIN: I. INTRODUCTION 1. Madam President, distinguished Members of this honourable Court. May it please the Court. It is a great honour and privilege for me to appear before the International Court of Justice on behalf of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation reaffirms its strong commitment to the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and its respect for the principal judicial body of the family of nations. 2. It is the first time that the Russian Federation has been called to appear before this Court. To our regret, the occasion of this appearance is a tragic one. 3. On behalf of the Russian Federation I would like to express deep sorrow with respect to the tragedy that has affected many people of different ethnic origin, mostly Ossetians and Georgians. This tragedy was a result of recent bloody events in which my country had no other choice but to become involved. I would like to express condolences to the families of those who lost their lives, and sympathies to those who were injured, lost their homes and suffered as a result of the hostilities. At the same time, I wish to stress that it was not Russia that launched the armed activities at issue. 4. I would like to quote the first line of the Preamble of the Constitution of the Russian Federation that crystallized the fundamental basis of Russia's statehood. It says, "We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation". Indeed, for such an ethnically diverse State as Russia, strict adherence to the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is of vital importance. We observe and implement the Convention. Racial discrimination is criminally punishable under the legislation of the Russian Federation as can be seen, inter alia, in Article 4 of the Convention itself. - 11 - 5. Madam President, Members of the Court, pursuant to the established practice of the Court, as was expressed in the case of Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Provisional Measures: "on a request for provisional measures the Court need not, before deciding whether or not to indicate them, finally satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, yet it ought not to indicate such measures unless the provisions invoked by the applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which jurisdiction of the Court might be established" (Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), p. 124, para. 21). 6. The Applicant has invoked a sole ground of the Courťs jurisdiction Article 22 of the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. That means that both the Applicant and the Respondent, and the Court itself, are restricted to, and must stay, on this ground. 7. But, and it is a very important "but", the dispute that the Applicant has brought to this Court is not a dispute under the said Convention. This is not a dispute on racial discrimination. And, if a dispute were before the Court, it would be related to the use of force, armed activities and international humanitarian law. 8. Therefore, the Respondent is of the view that the Court manifestly lacks jurisdiction in the present case. 1. General statement of facts 9. Madam President, on the night of 7 August, the military forces of Georgia launched a massive armed assault on the Ossetian settlements of South Ossetia. In the first instance, the city of Tskhinval, the main city in South Ossetia, inhabited by thousands of civilians, was heavily bombarded. The Russian peacekeepers lawfully and legitimately, with the consent of Georgia, stationed in South Ossetia, were attacked as well ­­ I would like to draw your attention to the documents relating to the peacekeeping status of the Russian forces, reproduced in Document 1, Annex 3 of the "Contribution of the Russian Federation". It was a massive, well-planned attack with the involvement of aviation and tanks, artillery and multiple launch rocket systems. It immediately resulted in numerous casualties among civilians and the Russian peacekeepers. This attack left the Respondent no other option than to use military force in self-defence. Russia's use - 12 of force prevented greater losses among the Russian peacekeepers, civilians, mass deaths among the non-Georgian population of South Ossetia or their eviction from the territory of South Ossetia. 10. The armed conflict, initiated by Georgia on the night of 7 August, may be seen as a logical outcome of the long-term policy of the Georgian authorities, as will be explained in more detail by the other Agent, Ambassador Kirill Gevorgian. Already in the beginning of the 1990s, the Georgian authorities embarked on a manifestly nationalistic political course, which was commonly labelled "Georgia for Georgians". In 1990, the autonomous status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as parts of Georgia ­­ that, in its turn, was a part of the USSR ­­ was revoked by the Georgian Government. From that time, the Government of Georgia repeatedly used force against South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was the way the Georgian Government considered appropriate to solve the questions of territorial integrity of its country and the long-term ethnic conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia, Georgia and Abkhazia. Each time such use of force resulted in grave humanitarian consequences for the people living in these territories, including people of Georgian origin as well. 11. It is well known that the hostilities ceased three weeks ago. All the parties involved have accepted the "Six Principles" plan agreed by Presidents Medvedev and Sarkozy. The Russian troops are being pulled out from Georgia and South Ossetia. The remaining military presence is limited. There are observation posts and units dealing with de-mining, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction of civilian infrastructure damaged during the conflict. It will be further curtailed as soon as an international security presence is arranged. Displaced persons of all ethnicities are returning to their homes, and all parties agree on the right to return. 12. The Russian Federation strongly objects to the Applicanťs claim on facts that were presented this morning 13. The Applicant has failed to submit anything approaching sufficient proof of its allegations, either in the documents presented to the Court, or in the oral pleadings. As will be demonstrated in detail in the presentation of the other Agent, from the beginning of the 1990s up to the armed assault launched by Georgia on 7 August, the Russian Federation was bona fide exercising its peacekeeping functions on the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Before - 13 - 7 August, there was no armed conflict between the Russian Federation and Georgia, and this conflict, as I have just said, is over. 14. Russian armed forces were present and are now present on the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, this presence was not and is not occupation, as Georgia claims. Russian military forces and therefore, Russia itself, did not and do not control either the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or the authorities or armed units of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia has not exercised jurisdiction with respect to the territory or population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This allegation is absurd. This is no less true now, given that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are independent States, as recognized by Russia. 2. This is not a dispute under the 1965 Convention 15. Madam President, the Court already has the point firmly in mind: Article 22 of the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination constitutes the sole alleged basis of the Courťs jurisdiction in the present case. Accordingly, the Applicant must claim the existence of a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention and that Russia has violated its obligations under the said Convention. 16. One would have expected to see acts of racial discrimination demonstrated before this Court. But what in fact appears from the documents submitted by the Applicant to the Court, and, in particular, the observations of Georgia that were presented three days ago and this morning, it is not at all evidence to support a claim of racial discrimination by Russia. My colleague Mr. Samuel Wordsworth will deal with this point in detail. 17. In fact, if there is a dispute, it is a dispute over such issues as the legality of the use of force, the relation of the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, alleged violations of international humanitarian law, but certainly not a dispute within the framework of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. - 14 - 3. The Respondent never consented to the jurisdiction of the Court in the matters brought by the Applicant before this Court 18. Madam President, the jurisdiction of this Court is based on the principle of consent. As early as in 1927, the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzów Factory case pronounced its fundamental dictum: "when considering whether it has jurisdiction or not, the Courťs aim is always to ascertain whether an intention on the part of the Parties exists to confer jurisdiction upon it" (Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 32). This has been reiterated time and again by the Court. 19. The Russian Federation has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36 (2) of the Statute. Our consent to the jurisdiction of the Court is confined to certain international treaties, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination being among them. 20. The Russian Federation pursues a policy of step-by-step acceptance of jurisdiction of the Court under international treaties. Starting from the 1980s, my country has formulated no reservations to international treaties that provide for the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. In 1989 we withdrew reservations to six human rights treaties including the 1965 Convention. Furthermore, again, in 2007 Russia withdrew such reservations to another six conventions. 21. When the Respondent consented to submit to the Court its disputes with States parties under the Convention, it could not have imagined that Article 22 of the 1965 Convention would be used as a pretext to abuse the Court. involving it in the consideration of disputes that have nothing to do with the Convention and to which our consent did not extend. 22. It seems that the Applicant understands this perfectly. It has tried to disguise its claims to Russia regarding hypothetical violations of the principle of non-use of force, norms of humanitarian law and other obligations under the pretext that the Applicant and the Respondent are both Parties to a dispute under the 1965 Convention. In the Application and in the first Request for provisional measures the absence of any reasonable connection between the 1965 Convention and the scope of the claims brought before this Court was so evident that the Applicant decided to produce a second Request to try to cover this evident defect. - 15 - 23. We do submit that if this honourable Court, nevertheless, decides in this case that it has prima facie jurisdiction, such a decision might have an adverse impact on the future acceptance of the Courťs compulsory jurisdiction under international treaties. 24. One additional consideration: were the Court to establish prima facie jurisdiction under the 1965 Convention in this case, it is likely to find itself in a situation where in subsequent "armed conflict" cases the parties would consider that they had some kind of jurisdictional ground to invoke the 1965 Convention and other "anti-discrimination" treaties. This danger is all the more manifest given that in so many armed conflicts individuals of different ethnic origins suffer as a result of military activities. 4. The Applicant never invoked the 1965 Convention 25. Madam President, the absence of a dispute between the Applicant and the Respondent under the 1965 Convention is illustrated by the fact that the Applicant did not resort to the procedures of dispute settlement provided for in the 1965 Convention before it initiated the proceedings in the Court, nor did it seek to negotiate a dispute under the Convention. This issue will be addressed in detail by Professor Alain Pellet. 26. But I would like to draw your attention to the following: the 1965 Convention is a treaty where implementation procedures provided for in Articles 11 to 14 are of utmost importance. A major part of the 1965 Convention is devoted to such procedures. The Court was deliberately mentioned in this treaty only once in Article 22 in order to stress that the Court should only become involved at the ultimate stage of the implementation procedures under the Convention. In its Application, Georgia alleges three phases of "Russia's intervention in South Ossetia" that cover a period from 1990 to 2008, although of course the 1965 Convention entered into force for Georgia only in 1999. One may wonder why did Georgia never invoke this Convention with respect to the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in its relations with Russia in an extended period of ongoing alleged violations by Russia of its rights? The Applicant only resorted to the 1965 Convention when it became obvious that its armed assault on South Ossetia was unsuccessful. - 16 - 5. Structure of the Respondenťs presentation 27. Madam President, Members of the Court. The oral submissions of the Respondent will be presented in the following order. The other Agent, H. E. Kirill Gevorgian, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Netherlands, will set out the historical and factual context of the present case. Afterwards Professor Alain Pellet will dwell in greater detail on the Courťs manifest lack of jurisdiction over the present case. Professor Andreas Zimmermann and Mr. Samuel Wordsworth will demonstrate why the Court should not, in any event, indicate provisional measures. 28. Madam President, I hope you would understand that we may not be able to react immediately to specific issues raised by the Applicant and that we will, of course, do so on Wednesday. 6. Concluding remarks 29. Madam President, distinguished Members of this honourable Court, the Russian Federation requests this Court to declare that it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the Application of Georgia, to reject the Request for provisional measures and to remove this case from the General List. 30. The Respondent would like to emphasize that the fact that the Respondent has appeared before this Court today is without prejudice to its position that the Court has no jurisdiction in the present case. 31. This completes my submissions. May I ask you, Madam President, now to give the floor to H. E. Ambassador Kirill Gevorgian. Thank you for your attention. The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr Kolodkin. I now indeed give the floor to the Agent, H. E. Mr. Gevorgian. M. GEVORGIAN : II. EXPOSÉ HISTORIQUE ET FACTUEL 1. Madame le président, Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, je suis trs honoré de représenter la Fédération de Russie devant votre haute juridiction. - 17 - 2. Mon rôle consiste décrire le contexte historique et factuel de ce litige qui nous oppose aujourďhui la Géorgie. Je voudrais préciser que je n'entre pas dans la discussion sur le fond et que ma brve excursion historique n'est faite que pour permettre la Cour de se prononcer sur les mesures conservatoires en prenant en compte toutes les circonstances de ľaffaire. Ďautant plus que la requte de ľEtat demandeur comporte de nombreuses inexactitudes et mme des distorsions considérables des faits pertinents pour ľexamen de la présente affaire. 3. Les destins historiques des peuples russe et géorgien sont indissolublement liés. Les relations entre les deux pays remontent des temps anciens. Elles sont décrites en détail dans ľexposé historique (Historical Background) qui a été transmis la Cour. 4. Au XVIIIe sicle, alors que le Caucase était ľarne de rivalités entre les Empires russe, perse et ottoman, le rapprochement avec la Russie n'était qu'un choix naturel pour la Géorgie orthodoxe, seul de nature lui permettre de préserver son identité nationale. 5. La Géorgie orientale a été intégrée au sein de ľEmpire russe en 1801. Depuis lors les deux peuples ont été étroitement unis. A toutes les époques les Géorgiens qui sont venus habiter en Russie ont fait partie de la meilleure société. 6. Ľhistoire des peuples osste et abkhaze est également étroitement liée avec celle de la Géorgie et de la Russie. 7. Les Géorgiens, les Abkhazes et les Osstes ont cohabité pendant des sicles dans le Caucase. Ce sont néanmoins trois peuples distincts, chacun avec sa propre identité linguistique et culturelle. Le peuple osste, qui s'installait des deux côtés de la crte caucasienne, s'est trouvé partagé en deux, ďo vient cette distinction entre ľOssétie du Nord et ľOssétie du Sud. 8. ĽOssétie du Sud est entrée au sein de la Russie comme partie intégrante de la Géorgie orientale. La principauté abkhaze s'est jointe la Russie en 1801 et jusqu' 1864 elle a préservé une large autonomie. Au sein de ľEmpire russe, ľAbkhazie a toujours été une entité administrative séparée de la Géorgie. 9. Aprs la révolution russe en février 1917, la Géorgie s'est séparée de la Russie. Suite la révolution ďoctobre de 1917, ľOssétie du Sud et ľAbkhazie ont aussi créé leurs propres organes ďautogestion. Des révoltes des Osstes et des Abkhazes ont été violement réprimées par les - 18 nationalistes géorgiens. Selon les sources osstes le bilan de la répression a été de plus de 5000 morts, beaucoup plus de blessés et 20 000 refugiés en Ossétie du Nord. 10. En 1921, ľAbkhazie et la Géorgie ont conclu un traité ďalliance. Un an plus tard, la Géorgie, y compris ľAbkhazie, est entrée au sein de ľUnion soviétique. Le statut spécial de ľAbkhazie a été cependant réduit en 1931 celui ďune République autonome au sein de la Géorgie. ĽOssétie du Sud a joui partir de 1925 ďun statut de région autonome. 11. La période soviétique se caractérise par la géorgification (entre guillemets) des Osstes et des Abkhazes. Ceci était indéniablement lié la politique de Staline. La géorgification s'est traduite surtout par ľaltération de la composition démographique des régions. Selon le recensement de 1926 les Abkhazes formaient plus de 30 % de la population de ľAbkhazie et les Géorgiens, 36 %. Selon le recensement de 1959, les Abkhazes ne représentaient plus que 15 %, mais les Géorgiens 39 %. 12. Cette politique a évidement provoqué des tensions ethniques dans les régions autonomes géorgiennes, qui se sont exacerbées la fin des années quatre-vingt avec ľarrivée au pouvoir en Géorgie des nationalistes indépendantistes, tels que Zviad Gamsakhourdia, le premier président de la Géorgie, qui a lancé le slogan de son programme politique : La Géorgie pour les Géorgiens. Dans ľune de ses interviews que vous pouvez trouver dans notre contribution écrite, il a résumé son attitude ľégard des minorités nationales sans équivoque : la population autochtone doit avoir la suprématie sur les autres ethnies1 . 13. La Géorgie a pris des mesures pour priver ľAbkhazie et ľOssétie du Sud de leurs statuts respectifs ďautonomie. La perspective ďtre intégrés la Géorgie indépendante sans garanties juridiques ďautogestion a provoqué une réaction des Abkhazes et des Osstes. Tbilissi a réagi par ľenvoi en janvier 1991, de troupes militaires et paramilitaires Tskhinval, la capitale de ľOssétie du Sud. 14. Des efforts pris dans ces conditions par les autorités soviétiques pour préserver ľordre dans une république fédérée et arrter une effusion de sang, sont présentés par la Géorgie dans sa 1 Ma colpa del Cremlino, La Stampa, 17 février 1991. - 19 requte comme une preuve ďune intervention flagrante dans les affaires intérieures de la Géorgie et une atteinte son intégrité territoriale. 15. Le 9 avril 1991 la Géorgie a déclaré son indépendance. En exerçant son droit ľautodétermination, la Géorgie a privé de ce droit les Abkhazes et les Osstes. En outre, le peuple osste s'est trouvé séparé entre les deux Etats : tandis que dans ľUnion soviétique les frontires entre ľOssétie du Nord et ľOssétie du Sud n'étaient qu'administratives, suite la dissolution de ľURSS, elles sont devenues internationales. 16. En 1992, une guerre civile s'est déclenchée en Abkhazie. Le gouvernement du nouveau président géorgien Edouard Chevardnadze a envoyé les troupes militaires Soukhoumi, capitale de ľAbkhazie. Les affrontements entre les forces géorgiennes et la milice abkhaze ont provoqué de nombreux morts de part et ďautre. 17. Le rapport de la mission ďinvestigation de ľONU en Abkhazie du 17 novembre 1993, dont des extraits se trouvent dans ľexposé historique transmis la Cour, contient les témoignages de nombreuses violations des droits de ľhomme commises par les deux parties. 18. Et dans ce cadre, je tiens souligner que la Russie est restée impartiale. Le rapport de Human Rights Watch, auquel la Partie géorgienne se réfre dans sa requte, décrit cette position de la manire suivante : When the Abkhaz broke the ceasefire in September 1993, the Russian Government seemed surprised. It condemned the attack, issued calls to Abkhaz forces to cease the offensive and its accompanying human rights violations, and cut off electricity and telephone service to Abkhazia. It also supported resolutions in the Security Council condemning Abkhaz forces for breaching the ceasefire. At the same time, the Russian Government criticized the Georgian Government for refusing, once the attack was underway, to negotiate.2 19. Et plus loin : Russian policy during the battles immediately after the breach of the ceasefire appeared to follow four lines. First, the government condemned the breach and imposed certain sanctions on the Abkhaz. Second, Russian forces returned essential artillery parts to Georgian forces that had been turned over to them as part of the ceasefire, thus allowing the Georgians to return the guns to action. Third, the Russian Black Sea fleet participated in the humanitarian evacuation of tens of thousands of 2 HRW Report, Georgia/Abkhazia. Violations of the laws of war and Russia's role in the conflict, mars 1995, p. 45. - 20 Georgians from Sukhumi. Fourth, Russia continued to sponsor peace talks under UN auspices between the parties.3 20. Ce sont ces événements que la Géorgie qualifie dans sa requte avec un aplomb indécent de premire phase ďintervention russe en Ossétie du Sud et en Abkhazie. 21. En réalité, la Russie n'a pas ménagé les efforts pour mettre fin ľeffusion de sang au Caucase dans les années 1992-1994, obtenir les accords de cessez-le-feu entre les parties et créer les mécanismes de maintien de la paix et du rglement des conflits. 22. La phase violente du conflit en Ossétie du Sud s'est terminée par la signature le 24 juin 1992 Sotchi du traité entre la Russie et la Géorgie sur les principes de rglement du conflit. Conformément ce traité la force conjointe de maintien de la paix a été déployée dans la région. Elle consistait de trois bataillions russe, géorgien et osste chacun comprenant 500 militaires. Ďailleurs, ces forces n'étaient déployées que dans la zone de leur responsabilité qui ne couvrait qu'un tiers du territoire de ľOssétie du Sud ainsi qu'une zone de sept kilomtres dans le territoire de la Géorgie en tant que telle. Il est préciser que dans les villages géorgiens, c'étaient les forces géorgiennes qui accomplissaient les fonctions de maintien de la paix. 23. Les hostilités en Abkhazie se sont en majeure partie arrtées suite au déploiement du contingent russe agissant en tant que la force mixte de maintien de la paix de la Communauté des Etats indépendants. Cette force a été créée conformément ľaccord entre la Géorgie et ľAbkhazie signé sous ľégide de la Russie en 1994. Le mandat de la force a été approuvé par une décision du conseil des chefs ďEtat de la CEI. Son effectif n'a pas dépassé 1900 personnes. Les militaires de cette force de maintien de la paix étaient déployés dans une zone de responsabilité dans les territoires de ľAbkhazie et de la Géorgie mme. Cette zone ne couvrait qu'un dixime du territoire abkhaze. 24. En mme temps, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies , par sa résolution 858 (1993), a décidé de créer la mission ďobservation des Nations Unies en Géorgie (MONUG), comprenant jusqu' quatre-vingt-huit observateurs militaires ayant pour tâche de vérifier le respect de ľaccord de cessez-le-feu, ainsi qu'un minimum de personnel civil ďappui. 3 Ibid. - 21 - 25. Le 4 avril 1994, la Géorgie, ľAbkhazie, la Russie, et le Haut Commissaire des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés ont signé ľaccord quadripartite sur le retour volontaire des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées. 26. Les mécanismes de maintien de la paix et de négociations ont reçu ľappui ďorganisations internationales gouvernementales, telles que ľONU et ľOSCE, et de la Géorgie elle-mme. 27. Je tiens cet égard attirer ľattention de la Cour sur les sections 5 8 du document Collection of relevant facts and documents, qui contiennent une multitude ďextraits de différents documents confirmant ľapprobation par la communauté internationale du rôle de la Russie dans le maintien de la paix et de sécurité dans la région pendant toute cette période, que ľEtat requérant maintenant qualifie de la deuxime phase de ľintervention russe en Ossétie du Sud et en Abkhazie. Parmi eux, je peux citer le document de Budapest de la CSCE de 1994, selon lequel les efforts de la Fédération de Russie ont facilité les progrs du rglement pacifique du conflit entre Géorgiens et Osstes. Il y a aussi la référence aux nombreuses résolutions du Conseil de sécurité de ľONU se félicitant du rôle joué par les forces collectives de maintien de la paix de la Communauté ďEtats indépendants comme facteurs de stabilisation dans la zone du conflit abkhaze. 28. Vous y trouverez de mme un extrait de la déclaration du ministre des affaires étrangres géorgien Alexandre Tchikvadze au cours de la quarante-neuvime session de ľAssemblée générale de ľONU, selon lequel : La Fédération de Russie participe activement au processus visant trouver une solution pacifique au conflit abkhaze. Elle assume une grande responsabilité dans le processus de paix.4 29. Le progrs dans le processus de la paix a eu lieu jusqu' ľarrivée au pouvoir de M. Saakachvili la fin de ľannée 2003. Ds mai 2004, il a fait entrer dans la zone du conflit géorgien-osste, que les accords ont réservée strictement pour les forces de maintien de la paix, des unités spéciales et des troupes du ministre de ľintérieur géorgien. En aot, ces troupes ont bombardé Tskhinval en essayant de ľenvahir. En février 2005, il a formellement renoncé au 4 A/49/PV.16, 4 octobre 1994, p. 28 - 22 cessez-le-feu, conclu entre les parties en novembre 2004 grâce la médiation active de la Russie. En Abkhazie, le progrs dans le processus du rglement a été torpillé par le déploiement en 2006 du contingent géorgien dans la gorge de Kodori, en violation de tous les accords et des décisions de ľONU. En conséquence, le président Saakachvili a perdu toute crédibilité aux yeux des Osstes et Abkhazes en essayant de remplacer les gouvernements élus par des structures concurrentes artificielles, auxquelles se référait ce matin Mme le ministre représentant la Partie requérante. 30. Par contre, la Russie a toujours agi conformément son rôle de médiateur dans les conflits. Elle a continué de reconnaître ľintégrité territoriale de la Géorgie, mme aprs la tenue des référendums dans les deux régions, au cours desquels la majorité écrasante des Osstes et des Abkhazes ont voté pour ľindépendance. 31. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, la situation dans la zone du conflit osséto-géorgien s'est brusquement aggravée les 1er et 2 aot dernier, quand les forces militaires géorgiennes ont bombardé des quartiers ďhabitation de Tskhinval causant plusieurs victimes. Le soir du 2 aot et la nuit du 3 aot, la Géorgie a procédé des manoeuvres ouvertes de ses troupes aux environs de Tskhinval, amenant forces et blindés lourds vers la zone du conflit, ce qui a déj provoqué la fuite des civils. 32. La Russie a continué ses efforts pour prévenir un nouvel éclatement du conflit. Ľenvoyé spécial du ministre des affaires étrangres russe, ľambassadeur Youri Popov, s'est rendu dans la zone du conflit pour essayer ďorganiser une rencontre des représentants de la Géorgie et de ľOssétie du Sud. Mais le 7 aot, 11 heures et demi du soir le commandant du contingent géorgien des forces de maintien de la paix, M. Kourachvili, a annoncé la décision de Tbilissi de rétablir entre guillemets ľordre constitutionnel. 33. Le 7 aot, les unités militaires géorgiennes ont lancé une attaque massive de Tskhinval en utilisant des armes lourdes et en procédant ďune façon indiscriminée. Elles ont bombardé des quartiers résidentiels de Tskhinval, ľhôpital, les écoles et les maternelles. La capitale ďOssétie du Sud a été sérieusement détruite, beaucoup ďautres villages sud-osstes presque entirement rasés. 34. La population civile a été prise de panique. Ľaventure géorgienne, cyniquement qualifiée dans la requte géorgienne ďopération restreinte dans un territoire tenu par les partisans du séparatisme ethnique, a provoqué une véritable catastrophe humanitaire. Des dizaines de - 23 milliers de civils essentiellement des femmes, des vieillards et des enfants ont pris la fuite vers ľOssétie du Nord. Rien qu'en deux jours 34 000 réfugiés ont traversé la frontire russe. En fait, 34 000, cela représente la moitié de toute la population osste ! 35. De surcroît, les hommes du contingent géorgien au sein des forces collectives de maintien de la paix ont sciemment ouvert le feu sur leurs compagnons ďarmes russes. Résultat : nous avons perdu quinze soldats de maintien de la paix, soixante-dix ont été blessés. 36. Personne ne conteste plus aujourďhui que la crise du mois ďaot a été provoquée par ľattaque des forces géorgiennes. Dans notre contribution écrite il y a de nombreuses références ľappui de ce fait. Mme les médias occidentaux, qu'on ne peut pas soupçonner de sympathie particulire ľégard de la Russie, reconnaissent que le conflit a été commencé par Tbilissi et que les forces géorgiennes n'ont pas hésité bombarder la population civile et une base des forces de maintien de la paix russes. 37. Face cette situation, la Russie a fait tous les efforts en son pouvoir pour résoudre la crise par la voie diplomatique. Elle a immédiatement convoqué la réunion du Conseil de sécurité pour attirer ľattention de la communauté internationale sur la crise sans résultat. Ds lors, la Russie n'avait pas ďautre choix que ďenvoyer des unités de renfort dans la zone du conflit pour éviter de nouvelles victimes parmi les civils et nos soldats de maintien de la paix. Vous trouverez dans notre contribution écrite la notification adressée cet égard au Conseil de sécurité conformément ľarticle 51 de la Charte de ľONU. 38. En mme temps, la Russie a pris des mesures urgentes pour accorder ľaide humanitaire aux réfugiés et aux autres civils, qui se sont retrouvés en péril. Et, je voudrais souligner que ľassistance a été distribuée sans aucune discrimination, y compris aux victimes géorgiennes. Ainsi, vingt-cinq tonnes ďaide humanitaire ont été envoyées la ville géorgienne de Gori. Pareillement, des centaines de personnes ont reçu des provisions alimentaires et ľassistance médicale dans les villages géorgiens en Ossétie du Sud. 39. Le 12 aot Moscou, les présidents de la Russie et de la France ont adopté les six principes de ľaccord politique afin ďobtenir un cessez-le-feu définitif dans la zone du conflit osste-géorgien. - 24 - 40. Ces six principes Medvedev-Sarkozy représentent une base solide pour le rétablissement de la paix et de la sécurité internationales dans cette région. La Fédération de la Russie a confirmé sa volonté de suivre la lettre ces six principes qui sont les suivants : 1) non-recours la force ; 2) cessation définitive des hostilités ; 3) libre accs ľaide humanitaire ; 4) retrait des forces géorgiennes dans leurs lieux habituels de cantonnement ; 5) retrait des forces militaires russes sur ses lignes antérieures au déclenchement des hostilités ; en attendant la création ďun mécanisme international, mise en oeuvre par ces forces des mesures additionnelles de sécurité ; 6) ouverture de discussions internationales sur les modalités de sécurité et de stabilité dans la région. 41. Le protocole ďaccord fixant ces principes a été successivement signé par les parties au conflit, c'est--dire les leaders de ľOssétie du Sud, de ľAbkhazie et de la Géorgie par ľintermédiaire de la Russie et en présence de ľOSCE et de ľUnion européenne. 42. La Partie russe a immédiatement commencé mettre en oeuvre les six principes. Le cessez-le-feu a été annoncé le 12 aot. Le 16 aot, les forces russes ont commencé leur retrait. Cette tâche a été accomplie vers le 2 septembre. Aujourďhui, il ne reste aucune présence militaire hors les zones de sécurité établies en conformité avec le cinquime principe Medvedev-Sarkozy, ďautant plus que ces zones concident avec les zones de responsabilité des forces de maintien de la paix tant qu'elles étaient définies avant le déclenchement de ľoffensive géorgienne. 43. Quant la situation actuelle, en Abkhazie il se trouve 3750 soldats de maintien de la paix russes, comparé avec peu prs 10 000 membres de la milice abkhaze. En Ossétie du Sud, il y a 3 700 militaires russes. Parmi eux, 272 sont stationnés sur 8 postes ďobservation au long du périmtre de la zone de sécurité. Cette ligne s'étend sur 85 kilomtres. En outre, 180 soldats sont répartis sur les 10 postes ďobservation au long de la frontire entre ľOssétie du Sud et la Géorgie. Les autres militaires sont chargés de déminage, assemblage et évacuation du matériel militaire, reconstruction de ľinfrastructure civile endommagée aux cours des hostilités (les routes, les ponts, les lignes électriques, le systme de distribution de ľeau), distribution de ľaide humanitaire et assistance médicale. Tout cela est fait dans un seul but : celui ďaider ľOssétie du Sud revenir la vie normale, y compris dans les villages osstes habités par les Géorgiens. La quantité de ces troupes se réduit au mesure que ces tâches sont accomplies. - 25 - 44. Je tiens préciser que selon le cinquime principe Medvedev-Sarkozy, les mesures additionnelles de sécurité prises par les forces russes sont cesser ds qu'un mécanisme international est mis en place. La Russie participe aux négociations intenses sur la création ďun tel mécanisme. Ainsi, la Partie russe a soutenu la décision de ľOSCE proposant une augmentation substantielle du nombre ďobservateurs militaires de ľOSCE dans la région allant jusqu' cent personnes. 45. Ainsi, en occurrence, Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, vous voyez bien que la présence russe sur le terrain ne constitue pas une occupation dont ont tant parlé les représentants de la partie demanderesse ce matin. 46. Madame le président, Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, j'espre que ľexposé des événements, que je viens de faire, vous a convaincu que le différend actuel entre la Géorgie et la Russie n'a rien voir avec la discrimination raciale ou ethnique. La Russie n'a jamais pratiqué, encouragé ou appuyé la discrimination raciale en Ossétie du Sud et en Abkhazie. 47. Il serait absurde de parler ďune quelconque discrimination des Géorgiens par la Russie en prenant en compte le niveau de ľintégration des Géorgiens dans toutes les sphres de la société russe. Des centaines de milliers des Géorgiens habitent aujourďhui en Russie. Depuis 1992, plus de 270 000 Géorgiens ont acquis la nationalité russe. Ce chiffre n'est pas négligeable pour un pays qui compte cinq millions ďhabitants. 48. Actuellement, il y a des représentants de la nation géorgienne parmi les élites scientifique, artistique et politique, aussi bien que dans les milieux ďaffaires. Il est inutile ďénumérer leurs noms : les représentants les plus fameux sont ďailleurs cités dans un des documents de notre contribution écrite. 49. Il est évident que les relations entre la Russie et la Géorgie traversent aujourďhui une crise. Cependant, comme ľa déclaré M. Sergue Lavrov, le ministre des affaires étrangres russe, il n'y a pas ďattitude hostile et préconçue ľégard du peuple géorgien. Nous voudrions continuer tre amis avec le peuple géorgien, nous voudrions continuer de jouir sincrement de cette amitié.5 Ce n'est pas par hasard que le lendemain de ľattaque géorgienne le 5 Interview accordée Radio Ekho Moskvy, communiqué de presse du MAE de la Russie no 1194-15-08-2008, 14 aot 2008, disponible http://www.mid.ru. - 26 président Medvedev a ordonné au ministre des affaires intérieures russe de prendre les mesures pour prévenir toutes formes de discrimination contre tous les étrangers résidant en Russie. 50. Rejetant les fausses allégations géorgiennes, il devient clair qu'il s'agit ici des conflits ethniques qui ravagent depuis des sicles le Caucase. Jusqu' la crise actuelle la Russie ne jouait dans ces conflits que le rôle ďun médiateur impartial et ďun garant de la paix et de la sécurité dans la région. Conformément ce rôle elle n'a pas pu s'abstenir ďintervenir, quand la Géorgie a perfidement attaqué la population civile osste et les soldats de maintien de la paix russes en ruinant par ceci une paix fragile qui s'était établie au Caucase, y compris par les efforts des médiateurs russes. 51. J'ai terminé mon exposé et je tiens remercier la Cour de sa courtoise attention et je vous prie, Madame le président et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, de bien vouloir passer maintenant la parole M. Alain Pellet. The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Your Excellency. I now call Professor Pellet. M. PELLET : Merci, Madame la présidente. III. INCOMPETENCE MANIFESTE DE LA COUR 1. Madame la présidente, Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie vivement ďaccepter stoquement de m'écouter une nouvelle fois ! Toutefois, avant ďentrer dans le vif de mon sujet, assez schement juridique, je voudrais dire toute ma sincre compassion pour les victimes de tous bords du conflit armé qui est ľorigine de ľaffaire dont la Géorgie a cru devoir vous saisir. Et ceci, Madame la présidente, n'est pas une déclaration pour la galerie ; je le pense profondément et je tiens préciser que je le dis avec le plein accord des agents de la Russie. 2. Je m'emploierai montrer, cet aprs-midi, que la Cour est manifestement incompétente pour se prononcer sur la requte formée par la République de Géorgie et, par voie de conséquence, qu'elle n'a, fortiori, pas compétence prima facie pour décider les mesures conservatoires que ľEtat requérant a demandées dans la foulée. - 27 - 3. Par deux de vos ordonnances du 2 juin 1999, vous avez rayé du rôle les affaires que la Yougoslavie avait introduites contre ľEspagne et les Etats-Unis en considérant que la Cour n'avait : manifestement pas compétence pour connaître de la requte de la Yougoslavie ; qu'elle ne saurait ds lors indiquer quelque mesure conservatoire que ce soit ľeffet de protéger les droits qui y sont invoqués ; et que, dans un systme de juridiction consensuelle, maintenir au rôle général une affaire sur laquelle il apparaît certain que la Cour ne pourra se prononcer au fond ne participerait assurément pas ďune bonne administration de la justice (Licéité de ľemploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Espagne), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999, p. 773, par. 35 ; voir. aussi Licéité de ľemploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Etats-Unis ďAmérique), ibid., p. 925, par. 29). Madame la présidente, il doit en aller de mme en ľespce. 4. Bien évidemment, la Fédération de Russie ne conteste pas qu'elle est partie la convention de 1965 sur ľélimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale, mais la base de compétence que constituerait, selon la Géorgie, ľarticle 22 de ce traité est, en la présente occurrence, tellement manifestement artificielle et mal fondée qu'il est inenvisageable que la Cour puisse exercer sa compétence au fond sur ce prétendu fondement. 5. Mme si vous en avez déj longuement entendu parler ce matin, il ne me paraît pas superflu de lire nouveau cette disposition : Tout différend entre deux ou plusieurs Etats parties touchant ľinterprétation ou ľapplication de la présente convention, qui n'aura pas été réglé par voie de négociation ou au moyen des procédures expressément prévues par ladite Convention, sera porté, la requte de toute partie au différend, devant la Cour internationale de Justice pour qu'elle statue son sujet, moins que les parties au différend ne conviennent ďun autre mode de rglement. 6. Or, Madame la présidente : il n'existe, ľévidence, aucun différend entre la Géorgie et la Russie touchant ľinterprétation ou ľapplication de la convention de 1965 ; et mme si ľon admettait qu'un tel différend existât quod non, il est clair que ľEtat requérant n'a pas pris la moindre initiative pour le régler par voie de négociation ou au moyen des procédures expressément prévues par la convention, ce qui exclut également votre compétence. Ce sont les deux points que je me propose ďaborder successivement. - 28 - 1. Ľabsence de différend entre la Géorgie et la Russie sur ľinterprétation et ľapplication de la convention de 1965 7. A vrai dire, Madame la présidente, le premier suffit disposer de la question : il n'existe tout simplement pas de différend entre la Géorgie et la Russie au sujet de ľinterprétation (in concreto) et de ľapplication de la convention sur ľélimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale : il est clair que cet instrument n'envisage nullement les véritables questions de fait et de droit que soulve la Géorgie, questions ľégard desquelles la Cour n'a aucune compétence pour se prononcer. Tout ľatteste, qu'il s'agisse de la requte, des demandes en indication de mesures conservatoires de ľEtat requérant ou de toute son attitude antérieure. 8. Bien entendu, Madame la présidente, ľEtat demandeur s'efforce ďaffubler sa requte, je dirais ďun habillage discriminatoire par lequel il voudrait faire croire que ľobjet de son différend avec la Fédération de Russie serait effectivement ľapplication de la convention de 1965. Mais, Madame et Messieurs les juges, vous ľavez dit maintes reprises : [I]l arrive que des incertitudes ou des contestations surgissent quant ľobjet réel du différend dont la Cour est saisie ou la nature exacte des demandes qui lui sont soumises. En pareil cas, la Cour ne saurait s'en tenir aux seuls termes de la requte ni, plus généralement, s'estimer liée par les affirmations du demandeur... Il incombe la Cour, tout en consacrant une attention particulire la formulation du différend utilisée par le demandeur, de définir elle-mme, sur une base objective, le différend qui oppose les parties, en examinant la position de ľune ou de ľautre. Ou encore : C'est ... le devoir de la Cour de circonscrire le véritable problme en cause et de préciser ľobjet de la demande. Il n'a jamais été contesté que la Cour est en droit et qu'elle a mme le devoir ďinterpréter les conclusions des parties ; c'est ľun des attributs de sa fonction judiciaire. (Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), arrt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 466, par. 30 ; voir aussi Demande ďexamen de la situation au titre du paragraphe 63 de ľarrt rendu par la Cour le 20 décembre 1974 dans ľaffaire des Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), ordonnance du 22 septembre 1995, C.I.J. Recueil 1995, p. 304, par. 55.) (Compétence en matire de pcheries (Espagne c. Canada), compétence de la Cour, arrt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 448, par. 29 et 30.) 9. Comme ľa dit tout ľheure ľun des agents de la Russie, en la présente occurrence, il ne fait pas de doute qu'il n'y a aucun différend entre la Géorgie et la Russie, qui puisse tre rattaché la convention sur ľélimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale. Or, comme la Cour ľa rappelé avec une netteté particulire dans ľaffaire des Plates-formes pétrolires que pourtant M. Crawford n'a pas hésité citer ce matin , lorsque des Parties s'opposent sur la question de savoir si le différend surgi entre elles concerne ľapplication ďun traité particulier, - 29 [elle] ne peut se borner constater que ľune des Parties soutient qu'il existe un différend et que ľautre le nie. Elle doit rechercher si les violations du traité ... [alléguées par ľune ďelles] entrent ou non dans les prévisions de ce traité et si, par suite, le différend est de ceux dont la Cour est compétente pour connaître ratione materiae par application... de la clause juridictionnelle du traité en question (Plates-formes pétrolires (République islamique d`Iran c. Etats-Unis ďAmérique), exception préliminaire, arrt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996, p. 810, par. 16 ; voir aussi ľopinion individuelle de Mme Higgins, ibid., p. 847-861) en ľespce, ľarticle 22 de la convention de 1965. Et il en va ainsi, comme vous ľavez déclaré sans ambiguté dans vos ordonnances de 1999 en indication de mesures conservatoires dans ľaffaire du Génocide, lorsqu'il s'agit ďétablir, mme prima facie, comme c'est le cas dans le cadre de ľexamen ďune demande en indication de mesures conservatoires, si un différend au sens ďune telle disposition existe. (Licéité de ľemploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Belgique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999, p. 137, par. 38. Voir aussi, au sujet de ľarticle XIV de la convention Unesco, Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (nouvelle requte : 2002) (République démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 10 juillet 2002, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 248, par. 85.) 10. La Géorgie annonce la couleur si je puis dire, on ne peut plus clairement, ds la premire phrase de sa demande en indication de mesures conservatoires du 12 aot dernier : the rights of the Republic of Georgia under the International convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ('CERĎ) to protect its citizens against violent discriminatory acts by Russian armed forces, acting in concert with separatist militia and foreign mercenaries, including unlawful attacks against civilians and civilian objects, murder, forced displacement, denial of humanitarian assistance, and extensive pillage and destruction of towns and villages, in South Ossetia and neighbouring regions of Georgia, and in Abkhazia and neighbouring regions, under Russian occupation.6 . 11. On ne saurait dire plus crment que ľobjet du différend que la Géorgie voudrait voir examiné par la Cour ne consiste nullement en de prétendues violations par la Russie de ses obligations en vertu de la convention de 1965, mais qu'il repose (et repose seulement) sur des allégations ďinterventions illicites et contraires au droit international humanitaire en Ossétie du Sud et en Abkhazie. Comme je ľai dit, et comme c'est son droit, la Fédération de Russie estime 6 Requte, par. 1. - 30 qu'il n'est pas approprié de discuter dans cette enceinte ces accusations ľégard desquelles la Cour de céans n'a, ľévidence, pas compétence. 12. Je sais bien, Madame la présidente, que, consciente sans doute ďavoir commis une bévue, la Partie géorgienne a tenté de rectifier le tir dans ce qu'elle a appelé sa demande amendée (amended request) du 25 aot, qu'elle a essayé de recentrer sur la convention de 1965. Mais le stratagme ne peut abuser : il s'agit bien de la mme demande, fondée sur les mmes faits la différence que les mentions (artificielles) de la convention (CERD) y sont plus nombreuses ; mais ce saupoudrage cosmétique ne suffit évidemment pas modifier la nature de la requte. Ceci est ďailleurs logique puisque, amendée ou non, la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires ne peut avoir pour effet que la préservation du droit de chacun ; et, s'agissant du demandeur en tout cas, ce droit est défini dans la requte introductive ďinstance. 13. Conformément une jurisprudence constante (voir, parmi de trs nombreux précédents, Réforme agraire polonaise et minorité allemande, ordonnance du 29 juillet 1933, C.P.J.I. série A/B no 58, p. 177 ; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (Royaume-Uni c. Iran), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 5 juillet 1951, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 93 ; Interhandel (Suisse c. Etats-Unis ďAmérique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 24 octobre 1957, C.I.J. Recueil 1957, p. 111 ; Passage par le Grand-Belt (Finlande c. Danemark), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 29 juillet 1991, C.I.J. Recueil 1991, p. 16, par. 16 ; Frontire terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 15 mars 1996, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (I), p. 21-22, par. 35 ; Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (nouvelle requte : 2002) (République démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 10 juillet 2002, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 241, par. 58 ; Certaines procédures pénales engagées en France (République du Congo c. France), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 17 juin 2003, C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 107-108, par. 22-29 ; ou Usines de pâte papier sur le fleuve Uruguay (Argentine c. Uruguay), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 13 juillet 2006, C.I.J. Recueil 2006, p. 129, par. 61-62) et comme vous ľavez rappelé encore trs récemment : la Cour, ľoccasion de ľexamen ďune demande en indication de mesures conservatoires, doit se préoccuper de sauvegarder ... les droits que ľarrt qu'elle aura ultérieurement rendre pourrait éventuellement reconnaître, soit au demandeur, soit au défendeur (Frontire terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 15 mars 1996, - 31 C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (I), p. 22, par. 35) ; ... un lien doit donc tre établi entre les droits allégués dont la protection est recherchée par les mesures conservatoires sollicitées et ľobjet de la demande principale soumise la Cour (Demande en interprétation de ľarrt du 31 mars 2004 en ľaffaire Avena et autres ressortissants mexicains (Mexique c. Etats-Unis ďAmérique) (Mexique c. Etats-Unis ďAmérique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 16 juillet 2008, par. 58). 14. Or la requte géorgienne elle-mme, ne laisse aucun doute. Ľagencement des faits présentés par ľEtat requérant auxquels renvoie expressément la demande amendée du 25 aot, comme pertinents est significatif : il n'y est question dans cet exposé des faits que des différentes phases de ľintervention russe (of Russia's Intervention) en Ossétie du Sud ou en Abkhazie. Et ce ne sont pas les allusions la convention sur la non-discrimination dont elle est parsemée qui peuvent faire illusion : ce sont bien ces interventions que la Géorgie entend voir condamner par la Cour et sous la forme sommaire et inévitablement mal (et hâtivement) documentée ďune ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires. Ďailleurs, ce matin mme, ce sont bien ces interventions qu'ont dénoncées nos contradicteurs (paralllement aux pratiques discriminatoires des milices en maraude), et des actes de guerre, indiscriminés selon eux, mais srement pas discriminatoires au sens de la convention. 15. Les observations que la Géorgie a déposées au Greffe jeudi dernier sont tout aussi révélatrices : il n'y est question que ďattaques armées (de la part des troupes géorgiennes aussi bien que russes ďailleurs7 et des milices osstes8 ), ďattaques indiscriminées contre des civils9 , ďutilisation de bombes fragmentation10 , de réfugiés et de personnes déplacées11 ou ďindépendances proclamées et de reconnaissances12 . Mais il faut vraiment faire preuve de beaucoup de complaisance pour interpréter ces documents comme portant sur un différend relatif ľapplication de la convention de 1965 qui, je le souligne, n'est pas mentionnée une seule fois au long de ces 248 pages pas une fois ; pour sa part le mot discrimination (et cela vaut aussi pour 7 Voir Human Rights Watch, Georgia : International Groups Should Send Missions, annexe 4 ; Human Rights Watch, Georgian Villages in South Ossetia Burnt, Looted, annexe 5. 8 Voir Human Rights Watch, Georgia : Satellite Images Show Destruction, Ethnic Attacks, annexe 1 ; Human Rights Watch, EU: Protect Civilians in Gori District, annexe 2, Human Rights Watch, Georgian Villages in South Ossetia Burnt, Looted, annexe 5. 9 Voir Human Rights Watch, Georgia : International Groups Should Send Missions, annexe 4 (ici de la part des forces géorgiennes ďailleurs), Amnesty International, Continuing Concern for Civilians after Hostilities in Georgia, annexe 6. 10 Voir Human Rights Watch, Civilians Killed by Russian Cluster Bomb Duds, annexe 3. 11 Voir Amnesty International, Continuing Concern for Civilians after Hostilities in Georgia, annexe 6. 12 Voir EUobserver.com, France accuses Russia of Ethnic Cleansing, annexe 16. - 32 ses déclinaisons) apparaît une fois, une seule, dans la déclaration ďun témoin, qui impute ďailleurs ľacte discriminatoire en question non pas la Russie mais aux autorités abkhazes de fait (de facto Abkhazian authorities)13 . Je n'ai pas ľimpression que le dossier qui nous a été remis ce matin appelle des constatations différentes. 16. Je tiens tre clair, Madame la présidente, la question n'est pas de savoir s'il se produit (ou si se sont produites) des violations du droit international général ou humanitaire en Ossétie du Nord ou en Abkhazie. Vous ne pouvez, faute de base votre compétence, répondre cette question ni aujourďhui, ni plus tard. La seule sur laquelle vous pouvez (et devez) vous interroger est de savoir si, oui ou non, il existe, prima facie, un différend entre les Parties sur ľapplication de la convention de 1965 sur ľélimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale. 17. Autrement dit, qu'il y ait un (ou des) différend(s) entre les Parties, c'est indéniable. Mais il est tout aussi indiscutable qu'il(s) ne porte(nt) pas sur ľapplication de la convention de 1965. Ceci résulte des pices de procédure introduites par la Géorgie et du dossier qu'elle a produit et que, je présume, les conseils de la Géorgie ont d constituer aussi soigneusement qu'ils ľont pu. Mais cela résulte aussi de ľattitude de ľEtat défendeur depuis le tout début des années quatre-vingt-dix période o ce différend imaginaire serait né puisque, selon la requte, [t]he Russian Federation has violated its obligations under CERD during three distinct phases of its interventions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia14 , la premire de ces trois phases ďintervention remontant la période 1991-1994 période durant laquelle, je le note en passant, la Géorgie n'était ďailleurs pas partie la convention. 18. Ceci veut dire que, selon nos contradicteurs, il existerait depuis 1991, entre la Géorgie et la Russie, un différend relatif la convention sur la non-discrimination raciale. Un différend qui, durant dix-huit ans, n'aurait jamais été mentionné par le Gouvernement géorgien, ni dans ses relations avec la Russie ; ni devant le Conseil de sécurité ou ľOSCE ; 13 Declaration of Zaza Gorozia, annexe 30. 14 Requte, par. 5 ; les italiques sont de nous. - 33 - ni (peut-tre surtout) devant ľorgane de la convention créé pour en connaître, le Comité pour ľélimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale, pas davantage ďailleurs que dans sa récente demande de mesures provisoires devant la Cour européenne des droits de ľhomme des 11 et 12 aot, qui ne vise pas ľarticle 14 de la convention. Il y a l une sorte ďopinio juris négative : cette abstention ďagir, ce silence constant gardé durant de si longues années, témoigne indiscutablement de ľabsence de tout différend se rapportant ľinterprétation et ľapplication de la convention, aux yeux des dirigeants géorgiens qui n'hésitent pourtant pas en général faire valoir avec une certaine véhémence leurs griefs ľégard de la Russie15 . 19. La Géorgie a ratifié la convention en 1999. Depuis lors, en application de ses obligations en vertu de ľarticle 9, elle a soumis trois rapports périodiques au Comité16 . Dans aucun elle n'a mis en avant les actes de la Russie pour s'exonérer de ses propres responsabilités conventionnelles comme elle tente de le faire aujourďhui, pas davantage, bien sr qu'elle n'a évoqué un possible différend avec la Fédération différend qui n'a été mentionné ni dans les rapports périodiques ni ľoccasion de leur examen, dans les discussions entre les membres du Comité et les représentants géorgiens17 . A fortiori, on ne trouve nulle allusion un litige de ce genre dans les conclusions du Comité. 20. Il va sans dire, que ľon chercherait tout aussi en vain la moindre allusion un différend relatif ľapplication de la convention entre la Géorgie et la Russie ľoccasion de ľexamen par le CERD des rapports de cette dernire. Il est particulirement révélateur que, durant la dernire session du CERD qui s'est terminée Genve le 15 aot 2008, une semaine aprs le début du conflit armé, pas la moindre mention n'a été faite ďun possible différend sur ľapplication de la convention entre la Géorgie et la Russie et cela alors mme que le Comité élaborait ses 15 Voir par exemple ľallocution de M. Mikheil Saakashvili, président de la Géorgie, ľAssemblée générale des Nations Unies, 26 septembre 2007, Nations Unies, doc. A/62/PV.7, en particulier, p. 20, 21 et 22. 16 Documents CERD/C/369/Add.1 du 24 mai 2000 et CERD/C/461/Add.1 du 21 juillet 2004 (ce document contient les deuxime et troisime rapports de la Géorgie). 17 Comptes rendus, voir : CERD/C/SR.1453 du 15 mars 2001, CERD/C/SR.1454 du 16 mars 2001, CERD/C/SR.1705 du 3 aot 2005 et CERD/C/SR.1706 du 4 aot 2005. - 34 conclusions sur les dix-huitime et dix-neuvime rapports périodiques de la Fédération de Russie18 . Au surplus, le Comité étant en session, on aurait pu s'attendre ce que la Géorgie le saisît sur le fondement de ľarticle 11 ou, au moins, portât ses griefs son attention. Ďautant plus que, depuis 1993, le CERD a mis un place un mécanisme ďalerte rapide19 qui lui permet de réagir aux situations ďurgence, par des demandes ďexplications ľEtat partie concerné, ou bien en sollicitant ľintervention ďautres organes des Nations Unies, y compris le Conseil de sécurité20 ou le Secrétaire général21 . 21. Il n'en a rien été. Et aucune plainte individuelle n'a été soumise au Comité contre la Russie alors mme que celle-ci a accepté les obligations de ľarticle 14 depuis 1991. 22. Et, pour apporter de tous premiers élément de réponse sur deux points mon aujourďhui adversaire mais toujours ami, James Crawford, je relve ďores et déj : ďune part que les rapports du CERD concernant la Géorgie sur lesquels il s'est fortement appuyé ce matin ne mentionne pas une seule fois la Russie ; et, ďautre part, que pour tenter ďétablir ľexistence de négociations entre les Parties sur ce prétendu différend il s'est référé je parle du professeur Crawford divers documents des Nations Unies (résolutions du Conseil de sécurité, rapports du Secrétaire général), ainsi qu' ľaccord quadripartite ďavril 199422 , en omettant soigneusement de mentionner le fait, pourtant essentiel, que tous ces documents font référence la Russie, lorsqu'ils le font, non pas comme une partie au conflit, mais en tant que facilitateur (terme utilisé par exemple par la résolution 1808 (2008) du Conseil de sécurité. 23. Tout ceci confirme, si besoin est, que, jusqu' ce que, sans doute, des juristes particulirement imaginatifs aient inventé un différend dont nul, Tbilissi ou Moscou ne soupçonnait ľexistence, celui-ci, en effet n'existait point... Mais, il va sans dire qu'il n'existe 18 Voir le document CERD/C/RUS/CO/19 étudié par le Comité durant sa soixante-treizime session (28 juillet-15 aot) et les questions du rapporteur spécial en marge des dix-huitime et dix-neuvime rapports périodiques de la Fédération de Russie. 19 Rapport annuel pour 1993, document A/48/18, annexe III, Prévention de la discrimination raciale, alerte rapide et procédure ďurgence. 20 Voir décision CERD/C/66/DAR/Dec.2 du 11 mars 2005 concernant la situation au Darfour. 21 Voir décision CERD/C/62/Dec/1 du 21 mars 2003 concernant la situation des personnes déplacées en Côte ďIvoire. 22 S/1994/397, Annexe 2. - 35 toujours pas ! Encore une fois, Madame la présidente, il ne fait aucun doute que des différends, bien réels, et sérieux, opposent la Géorgie et la Russie mais ils ne portent pas sur ľapplication de la convention de 1965. Et si la Fédération de Russie entend bien les régler pacifiquement, elle n'a pas ľobligation, et ne souhaite pas, pour ľinstant, en tout cas, les porter devant la Cour. 2. Le non-respect des conditions préalables la saisine de la Cour 24. Madame la présidente, ľarticle 22 de la convention, que j'ai lu en commençant cette présentation, ne se borne pas subordonner la compétence de la Cour de céans ľexistence ďun différend entre les Parties touchant son interprétation ou son application. Il y met aussi des conditions de procédure puisqu'il ne vous donne compétence, Madame et Messieurs les juges, que si le différend en question n'a pas été réglé par voie de négociation ou au moyen de procédures expressément prévues par ladite convention. Il y a l une condition, alternative peut-tre mais préalable assurément, la saisine de votre haute juridiction. En ľabsence de négociation et/ou de recours aux procédures prévues par la convention négociation et procédures qui doivent porter sur le différend allégué une requte devant la Cour est irrecevable. 25. Les termes de ľarticle 22 sont limpides en ce sens. Et cette interprétation, conforme au sens naturel des mots, est confortée par les travaux préparatoires, qui montrent que la saisine de la Cour a été conçue par les rédacteurs de la convention, tant au sein de la Sous-Commission des droits de ľhomme qui a rédigé le premier avant-projet23 , que de la Commission des droits de ľhomme elle-mme24 , ou de ľAssemblée générale et de sa Troisime Commission25 , comme un ultime recours lorsque toutes les autres possibilités se sont révélées inopérantes et les travaux préparatoires sont limpides en ce sens. 26. En ľespce, je viens de le dire, il n'y a jamais eu la moindre négociation entre les Parties au sujet de ľinterprétation ou de ľapplication de la convention sur la non-discrimination raciale. Je le répte : il résulte des recherches soigneuses effectuées Moscou aprs le dépôt de la requte 23 Voir Résolution 2(XVI) (Mesures additionnelles de mise en oeuvre), doc. E/CN.4/873-E/CN.4/Sub.2/241, p. 51-57. 24 Voir Nations Unies, Documents officiels de la Commission des droits de ľhomme, vingtime session, compte rendu de la 1820e séance, doc. E/CN.4/SR.810. 25 Voir Nations Unies, Documents officiels de ľAssemblée générale, vingtime session, Troisime Commission, 1344e séance du 16 novembre 1965, p. 384 et Nations Unies, Documents officiels de ľAssemblée générale, vingtime session, Troisime Commission, 1367e séance du 7 décembre 1965, p. 485. - 36 géorgienne que jamais, la convention n'a été, ft-ce évoquée, dans les relations entre les deux Etats, jamais. A plus forte raison, les procédures prévues par celle-ci n'ont-elles été actionnées ni par la Russie, ni par la Géorgie : je ľai dit, mme aprs le déclenchement des hostilités, celle-ci n'a pas saisi le CERD au titre de ľarticle 11 de la convention, qui prévoit une procédure de conciliation dans le cas o un Etat partie estime qu'un autre Etat également partie n'applique pas les dispositions de la présente convention.... 27. Pas de négociation, pas de conciliation et donc, Madame la présidente, pas non plus de possibilité de saisine unilatérale de la Cour. 28. Il est rare que le droit se prte des raisonnements binaires oui ou non ; noir ou blanc ; tout ou rien c'est ďailleurs ce qui fait tout ľintért de notre métier de juriste, de juge ou ďavocat. Mais ici, justement, nous sommes dans ľun de ces cas exceptionnels : ou bien il y a eu des négociations entre les Parties ou ľune ďelles (ou, peut-tre, ľun de ses ressortissants) a saisi le CERD et, en cas ďéchec, la Cour peut, son tour, tre saisie unilatéralement ; ou bien aucune de ces deux voies n'a été utilisée et la Cour n'est pas compétente. 29. Heureusement pour les juristes, il pourra sans doute, dans la plupart des cas, y avoir place pour la discussion. Sans doute pas sur la nature du mécanisme prévu par la convention. Car, en admettant que la notion de self-contained régime ait un sens ce dont j'ai toujours douté , il semble difficile de considérer que c'est le cas ici et ďailleurs ça n'a pas ďintért concret : il suffit de constater que ľarticle 22 subordonne la faculté de saisir la Cour ce que ľon pourrait appeler ľexercice effectif de moyens de rglement préalables. On pourrait, en revanche, s'interroger, par exemple, sur la question de savoir si ľexpression procédures expressément prévues par ladite convention vise exclusivement la procédure (ou la série de procédures) des articles 11 13 ou inclut les saisines individuelles de ľarticle 14. Mais peu importe en ce qui nous concerne : ni ľun ni ľautre de ces mécanismes interétatiques ou individuels n'a été actionné. On peut aussi se demander si les négociations et le recours au CERD sont des conditions préalables cumulatives ou alternatives, car les termes de ľarticle 22 sont plus ambigus qu'il y paraît la lumire du contexte (et, surtout, du paragraphe 2 de ľarticle 11) et la lumire des travaux préparatoires. Mais, en ľespce, ceci est aussi sans importance : il n'y a eu ni négociation, ni recours la procédure de - 37 ľarticle 11 (ou celle de ľarticle 14). Si des négociations ou les procédures de la convention avaient commencé, les juristes pourraient discuter perte de vue pour savoir si ľéchec est avéré. Mais, ici encore, la question ne se pose pas en la présente occurrence : on ne peut s'interroger sur ľéchec ďune procédure qui n'a pas commencé. 30. Il s'en déduit, Madame la présidente, que quelle que puisse tre, sur tous ces points, la bonne interprétation de la convention, en tout cas et pour ľaffaire qui nous occupe, la ou les conditions préalables de ľarticle 22 ne sont pas remplies sans qu'aucune interprétation ou appréciation subjective soit de nature et puisse intervenir. Il n'y a pas eu de négociation ; il n'y a pas eu de recours une procédure prévue par la convention ; et la Cour n'est pas compétente. 31. Je me permets de rappeler cet égard, qu'ayant eu interpréter ľarticle 29 de la convention de 1979 sur la discrimination ľégard des femmes, rédigé dans des termes comparables ceux de notre article 22, la Cour a considéré, dans son ordonnance du 10 juillet 2002 évoquée ce matin, qu'il lui appartenait ďexaminer si les conditions préalables la saisine de la Cour internationale de Justice, prévues par ľarticle 29 de la convention en question, ont été respectées. Et, [c]onsidérant qu' ce stade de la procédure, le Congo [n'avait pas apporté] la preuve que ses tentatives en vue ďentamer des négociations ou ďengager une procédure ďarbitrage avec le Rwanda ... visaient ľapplication de ľarticle 29 de la convention sur la discrimination ľégard des femmes, vous avez estimé que les conditions préalables la saisine de la Cour fixées par ľarticle 29 de la convention ne semblent pas remplies prima facie (Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (nouvelle requte : 2002) (République démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 10 juillet 2002, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 247, par. 78 et 79 ; voir aussi, au sujet de ľarticle 75 de la Constitution de ľOMS, ibid., p. 248, par. 82). 32. Mais il y avait une différence avec ľaffaire en examen, Madame la présidente : alors que la RDC avait, en plaidoirie, excipé de ses tentatives pour amener le Rwanda ľarbitrage a-t-elle dit (ibid., p. 239, par. 51.), en citant des circonstances précises au cours desquelles ces tentatives auraient pris place, ni la requte de la Géorgie, ni ses deux demandes successives en indication de mesures conservatoires, ni aucun des documents que le demandeur a produits, ne mentionnent ft-ce ľamorce ďune négociation (non plus, évidemment, que la saisine du CERD !). Et, ce matin, la plaidoirie sur ce point du professeur Crawford a été éloquente, éloquente par son silence une - 38 rareté s'agissant de mon contradicteur, qui refuse rarement ľobstacle : il est hautement significatif qu'au lieu de tenter ďétablir ľexistence ďun semblant de négociations, il ait décrété qu'il n'était pas nécessaire ďy procéder. 33. Contrairement ce qui s'est produit dans ľaffaire Mavrommatis que M. Crawford a appelée la rescousse, les pourparlers ne sont pas parvenus un point mort, ni ne se sont heurtés finalement un non possumus ou un non volumus péremptoire de ľune des parties (Concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine, arrt no 2, 1924, C.P.J.I. série A no 2, p. 15). Il n'y a tout simplement pas eu le moindre début de négociations sur ľapplication de la convention CERD. 34. Dans ces conditions, il ne me paraît pas non plus vraiment nécessaire de discuter doctement, comme les avocats aiment le faire cette barre, sur la définition du seuil de votre compétence prima facie. Il suffit de garder ľesprit que si, lorsqu'elle est saisie ďune demande en indication de mesures conservatoires, la Cour n'a pas besoin, avant ďindiquer ces mesures, de s'assurer de manire concluante de sa compétence quant au fond de ľaffaire, ... elle ne doit cependant pas appliquer ľarticle 41 du Statut lorsque son incompétence au fond est manifeste (Compétence en matire de pcheries (République fédérale ďAllemagne c. Islande), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 17 aot 1972, C.I.J. Recueil 1972, p. 33, par. 16. Voir aussi, par exemple, Plateau continental de la mer Egée (Grce c. Turquie), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 11 septembre 1976, C.I.J. Recueil 1976, p. 8, par. 21 ; Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis ďAmérique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 10 mai 1984, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 179, par. 24 ; LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis ďAmérique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 3 mars 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (I), p. 13, par. 13 ; Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (nouvelle requte : 2002) (République démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 10 juillet 2002, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 241, par. 58). C'est le cas : ds lors que votre juridiction dépend ďune question laquelle vous pouvez répondre par oui ou par non et que, en ľespce, la réponse ne peut tre que non, comme ďailleurs, la Partie demanderesse semble le reconnaître. La Cour ne peut que le constater et décliner ľexercice de sa compétence. Ľhésitation n'étant pas permise, non seulement il vous appartient, Madame et Messieurs les juges, - 39 de refuser ďindiquer les mesures conservatoires demandées par la Géorgie, mais encore ľaffaire ne peut qu'tre rayée du rôle ce stade, ľincompétence de la haute juridiction étant manifeste. 35. Ce n'est donc que pour surplus de droit que le professeur Zimmermann et M. Wordsworth vont en outre montrer respectivement que, ďune part, la Cour ne peut ordonner les mesures demandées par la Géorgie et, ďautre part, les circonstances ne les requirent de toute manire pas. Je vous remercie, Madame et Messieurs les juges, de votre attention renouvelée, et je vous prie, Madame la présidente, de bien vouloir appeler le professeur Zimmermann la barre, je suppose aprs la pause. The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Pellet. There will now be a break. The Court adjourned from 4.30 to 4.45 p.m. The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Professor Zimmermann. Mr. ZIMMERMANN: Thank you very much, Madam President. IV. NO POTENTIAL BREACHES OF THE 1965 CONVENTION/PREJUDGMENT OF THE MERITS A. Introduction 1. Madam President, Members of the Court, may it please the Court. It is once again an honour to appear before the Court. B. The alleged breaches of the Convention are not capable of falling within the provisions of CERD 2. Madam President, as already noted by Alain Pellet, provisional measures can solely aim to protect rights at stake in the proceedings on the merits. Accordingly it is only if the alleged breaches were capable of falling within the provisions of the jurisdiction-conferring instrument, that the Court has indeed jurisdiction to entertain the case. 3. We submit that this required connection between the request and the main proceedings is missing for several reasons, the first being that Articles 2 and 5 of CERD upon which Georgia relies do not bind the Respondent outside its own territory. Accordingly Russia's extraterritorial - 40 conduct is not governed by Articles 2 and 5 of CERD, hence those provisions cannot form the basis for the requested interim order either. 1. Articles 2 and 5 of CERD do not apply extraterritorially 4. Madam President, in its Application and Requests, Georgia merely hinted and implied that Articles 2 and 5 of CERD apply on foreign soil. This morning, you heard Professor Crawford address the point. Yet he seemed to suggest that extraterritorial application is the rule rather than the exception. Allow me, therefore, to start by citing your statement, in the Wall case, according to which human rights obligations apply "primarily territorial[ly]" (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 179, para. 109). The general rule continues to be that treaties, including human rights treaties, in line with Article 29 of the Vienna Convention only bind States with regard to their own territory. 5. True, there might be exceptions but they cannot simply be asserted, they must be proven and again, the principle is reflected in Article 29 of the Vienna Convention which states that a different interpretation must appear either from the treaty itself or must otherwise be established. Thus, we do not need to look for "a provision restricting the scope of obligations ratione loci", as was put, but have to assess whether exceptionally, an obligation applies abroad. In the present case, however, none of the exceptions provided for in Article 29 of the Vienna Convention applies. 6. Of course, as was conceded by counsel for Georgia, CERD is different from other human rights instruments in that it does not contain a general applicability clause governing the territorial application of the treaty as such and as a whole. There is thus no equivalent to, let us say, e.g., Article 2 of ICCPR. Accordingly, the territorial scope of each specific norm of CERD has to be assessed, not by asserting a principle of "global application", but by looking at the specific way in which each of the norms is worded. Nothing else follows from the background to the Convention. In fact, the very Sharpville incident to which counsel for Georgia referred, and which informed the creation of the Convention, was a clear case of territorial application. - 41 - 7. Let us thus, therefore, now start by looking at Article 2 of CERD. The different obligations, listed in its paragraph 1, are clearly phrased as obligations to be implemented within each member State. This is clear from its very wording. I will merely draw your attention to four brief passages: First, paragraph 1 (a) requires each State party to ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national and local, shall not engage in racial discrimination26 . Second, in the same vein, Article 2, paragraph 1 (c), refers to the review of "governmental, national and local policies"27 . Third, paragraph 1 (d), in turn, requires States to "prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation, . . . racial discrimination"28 . Finally, pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 1 (e), each State "undertakes to encourage . . . integrationist multiracial organizations and movements and other means of eliminating barriers between races". All four quotations demonstrate that the focus is on action within a State's own territory, where its "national and local" institutions work, where it can "legislate" and where it is in a position to "encourage . . . multiracial organizations". The wording of the provision therefore contradicts Georgia's assumption of extraterritorial application. 8. The same follows from the wording of Article 5 of CERD. For the sake of brevity, I will merely make two points in this regard. First, Article 5 ­­ The PRESIDENT: Professor Zimmerman, will you help the interpreters who have only recently had sight of this, so it will be a particular help if you will speak a little more slowly. Mr. ZIMMERMANN: Certainly I will, Madam President. The same conclusion follows from the wording of Article 5 of CERD. For the sake of brevity, I will merely make two points in this regard. 26 Emphasis added. 27 Emphasis added. 28 Emphasis added. - 42 - First, Article 5 is meant to govern the implementation of the general obligations set out in Article 2 which, as I have just shown, are territorially limited. It is not intended to impose obligations that extend beyond Article 2, but rather to require States to implement these obligations in a certain way. Second, Georgia has sought to interpret Article 5 (d) (i) of CERD as if it created an absolute right to freedom of movement. Yet, Article 5 specifically restricts that right to the "freedom of movement and residence within the border of the State" the State in question being Russia. The very wording of the provision thus shows that Article 5 (d) (i) of CERD does not apply extraterritorially. 9. In short, the very wording of Articles 2 and 5 of CERD demonstrates that these provisions are not to be applied abroad. Let me add that the specific formulation was the result of long debates preceding the adoption of the Convention. The drafters at the time were no doubt aware of other approaches and of other clauses and treaties which indeed envisage their extraterritorial application, such as, for example, Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights or common Article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions requiring parties "to respect . . . the present Convention in all circumstances". Articles 2 and 5 of CERD are worded much more restrictively. There simply does not again to use the words of Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties "appea[r] from the treaty" "a different interpretation" warranting their extraterritorial application. 10. Let me now further demonstrate that, even if one were to follow arguendo, Georgia's general assertion that CERD can, as a matter of principle, be applied extraterritorially, the necessary threshold for any such application is not given in the case at hand since Russia never exercised at any given moment the necessary extent of control. 2. CERD is not applicable because South Ossetia and Abkhazia have never been under the effective control of the Russian Federation 11. Madam President, Members of the Court, if we accept arguendo that Articles 2 and 5 CERD can govern a State's conduct outside its own borders, any such extraterritorial application is - 43 subject to specific conditions. This was admitted by Georgia itself when it asked the Court to order specific measures in areas "under the effective control of the Russian Federation"29 . 12. Even accepting for the sake of argument that CERD applies to "all areas under a State's effective control", the requested interim measures would still not be justified since the Respondent does not at present, nor will it in the future, exercise effective control over South Ossetia or Abkhazia30 . 13. Madam President, the only two cases, where this Court has found a State to exercise effective control in order to trigger the general applicability of human rights treaties, namely the Wall case (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, paras. 78, 89, 108, 109) and the case concerning Armed Activities in the Congo (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, paras. 173 et seq.), both dealt with a situation of belligerent occupation. But even in cases of occupation, courts such as the House of Lords have not been prepared to accept that occupying Powers necessarily exercise effective control. Hence, while the House of Lords accepted that a person within a British prison in Iraq was within the effective control of the United Kingdom, a person outside such a confined space, at a checkpoint, was not considered to be exposed to such effective control31 . 14. You, this Court, has also placed great emphasis on the time factor in order to find effective control. Hence your Opinion in the Wall case specifically referred to "the long-standing presence of Israel" in the West Bank and Gaza (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 179, para. 110) which at the relevant time had lasted for more than 37 years. For this reason, the comparison with the Israeli cases examined by the Committee against Racial Discrimination (made by counsel for the other side) does not lead very far either especially since the reports centred on Article 3 CERD, which is not in dispute here, to which I will come back in a moment anyway. 29 See amended Request, para. 23. 30 Cf. the formulation used in Georgia's amended Request, paras. 23, 24. 31 R (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, [2007] 3 WLR 33, [2007] 3 All ER 685. - 44 - 15. Madam President, if we seek to apply this to the facts of the present case a clear picture emerges, namely that the Respondent did not, at no point in time exercise effective control in South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Its status in those territories simply cannot be compared to that of Israel in the West Bank, that of Uganda in the DRC, or that of South Africa in Namibia for that matter. 16. First and foremost, Russia is not an occupying Power in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Both regions had an internationally recognized autonomous status and have enjoyed de facto independence already for a quite significant time. In particular, Russia has never to paraphrase the test you applied in the Congo v. Uganda case (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, para. 173) Russia, let me repeat, Russia has never assumed the role of the existing authorities, that is the Abkhazian and South Ossetian authorities, recognized as such by Georgia itself. Besides, the Russian presence, apart from its participation in limited peace-keeping operations, has been restricted in time and stretches only for a few weeks. 17. Furthermore, local authorities have always retained their independence and continue to do so. As was outlined in more detail by our Agent, the presence of Russian military forces is also limited to certain strategic points and does not cover the whole territory in question. This lack of effective control is confirmed, as will be demonstrated by my friend and colleague Sam Wordsworth in more detail, by the fact that Russia has frequently dissociated itself from and even condemned, the Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities. Finally, the number of troops currently stationed in the area has already been reduced very significantly and will be further reduced in the future. 18. In short, applying the standard you, this Court, has developed so far, the Respondent does not exercise effective control over the disputed territories. This result is also confirmed by the most recent practice of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination of 15 August 2008 to which Alain Pellet already made reference. One indeed wonders why the Committee did not say a word not a single word about the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia if, as was argued by Georgia, it had indeed considered Russia to be effectively controlling the territory and CERD being accordingly applicable. At least the Committee thus does not seem to think as was put forward by counsel for the other side this morning that Russia - 45 had exercised control over the two disputed regions by virtue of the simple fact that Georgia had lost control over them. 19. That brings me to my next point, namely that even if one were to accept that CERD would apply to the relevant areas, the acts of organs of South Ossetia and Abkhazia or that of private groups and individuals would not be attributable, not even prima facie, to the Russian Federation. 3. Acts of organs of South Ossetia/Abkhazia or private groups and individuals are not attributable to the Russian Federation 20. Madam President, Members of the Court, counsel for the Applicant this morning seemed to suggest that attribution need not be addressed at all, but that it could be simply assumed. Yet even at this stage, we submit that Georgia has to make its case, and cannot be allowed to merely assert it merely assert attribution. Let me therefore start with what I believe is undisputed, namely that the conduct of South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities is not conduct by organs of the Russian Federation. 21. Beyond, it is only exceptionally, and under specific, very specific conditions, that the conduct of entities other than organs may be attributed to a State as constituting de facto organs or as being subject to its effective control. In the present case, however, South Ossetian or Abkhazian entities can neither be qualified as de facto organs of the Respondent, nor does the Respondent effectively direct and control them. 22. As regards the first exception, even Georgia's Request did not claim that South Ossetian or Abkhazian entities qualified as de facto organs. As a matter of fact, it is evident that both, during their time as recognized autonomous regions within Georgia, as well as since their declarations of independence, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have not been mere instruments of the Respondent lacking any real autonomy within the meaning of your jurisprudence (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, paras. 391 et seq. (referring to Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, paras. 109-110)): rather, they have conducted their own policy, have held elections, and have had independent governments. - 46 - 23. Madam President, as to the issue of direction and control this Court has recently confirmed the strict "Nicaragua test" of attribution (ibid., pp. 64-65, para. 115) requiring control "in respect of each operation in which the alleged violations occurred" (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, para. 400). 24. Our Agent has already outlined the role of Russia as mediator in the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia prior to the outbreak of recent hostilities. While it is true that the situation has evolved since 7 August, there are no indications that, as regards effective control, the relationship between the Respondent on the one hand, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other, has changed in any legally relevant manner. More specifically, the Applicant has not demonstrated and, indeed, could not demonstrate, not even prima facie that the required high degree of control, as set out in your jurisprudence, does currently exist and even less so that it will exist in the future. 25. Let me now address specific claims by Georgia, namely those contained in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the Request. 4. Articles 2 and 5 CERD do not enshrine a duty to prevent breaches 26. Madam President, the measures listed in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the Request, if ever adopted, would require Russia to take active steps to ensure or to prevent certain results from happening in the areas concerned. These Georgian claims therefore presuppose that Articles 2 and 5 CERD which are indeed the only provisions Georgia invokes as of now contain an obligation of prevention, including an obligation to prevent racial discrimination occurring abroad. That argument must fail however because those provisions do not enshrine the alleged duty to prevent breaches. CERD is notably different from the Genocide Convention, to which counsel for the Applicant, Mr. Reichler, frequently referred. Unlike the Genocide Convention, it simply does not contain a general duty to prevent even less one, an "undisputable one" as was referred to. 27. This follows from the very wording of Articles 2 and 5 of CERD. Nowhere in Article 2, let alone Article 5, let me repeat, nowhere, and in sharp contrast to Article 3 of the Convention, do States undertake to prevent breaches of the Convention, let alone undertake to do so abroad. - 47 Admittedly, Article 2 requires certain positive measures such as in subparagraph (c) or in subparagraph (e), but when it comes to acts or practices of racial discrimination, the obligations are formulated as mere negative obligations. There simply is, in Articles 2 and 5 of the Convention, no duty to prevent racial discrimination by other actors, let alone other States and even less a duty to prevent acts of racial discrimination that occur outside a State's own territory. 28. These Georgian interim requests are therefore not to paraphrase your Order in the Legality of Use of Force cases "capable of falling within the provisions of [CERD]" (cf. mutatis mutandis case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), p. 137, para. 38). As a consequence, they cannot possibly form the subject of an interim order either, even if, to state the obvious, Russia will do all within its power to prevent such acts. 29. Madam President, this reading of CERD is fully in line with your Judgment in the Bosnia genocide case. There, you held that the Respondent had breached the Genocide Convention by failing to prevent genocide. In order to reach that result, you thoroughly analysed the Genocide Convention's "duty to prevent". Yet, unlike CERD which only contains in its Article 3 a duty with regard to racial segregation and apartheid, the Genocide Convention lays down a general duty of prevention. When assessing the content of that clearly-worded obligation, you felt it necessary to clarify that "the Genocide Convention is not the only international instrument providing for an obligation . . . to take certain steps to prevent the acts it seeks to prohibit" (case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, para. 429). 30. You then referred, in the Bosnian Genocide case, to "[m]any other instruments [that] include a similar obligation" (ibid.). What is telling, for purposes of our case however, is that you did not say a single word about CERD. Had you considered CERD to contain, apart from its Article 3, a general duty to prevent, and given the fundamental role the prohibition of racial discrimination plays in international law, it would have been most obvious to include CERD in that list. The very fact that you did not include CERD clearly implies that you did not consider CERD to belong to the list of conventions enshrining a general duty to prevent apart from the specific obligation contained in its Article 3 which is, however, not invoked by the Applicant. - 48 - 31. This has obvious consequences for the present proceedings. Since Articles 2 and 5 of CERD do not enshrine a duty to prevent, such a duty or specific, positive measures deduced from it cannot form the subject of the main proceedings. As a consequence, it is not a right that can be protected through interim measures either. C. No anticipation of a possible judgment on the merits 32. Madam President, this brings me to my last point, namely that the measures requested may not be indicated since they would necessarily prejudge the final outcome of the case. 33. It is well settled jurisprudence that this Court must decline to indicate interim measures where the request is designed to obtain an interim judgment (Factory at Chorzów, Order of 21 November 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 12, p. 10, as well as e.g., case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 December 1979, I.C.J. Reports 1979, p. 16, para. 28) and that any provisional measures may not anticipate the Courťs judgment by reason of any initiative regarding the matters in issue before the Court (Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 103, para. 20). Thus, a major purpose of proceedings under Article 41 is to avoid prejudging in any manner whatsoever the outcome of the claim on the merits (cf. e.g., Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Provisional Measures, Order of 10 January 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 11, para. 30). 34. You have also recently specifically held that the very purpose of Article 41 is to preserve the respective rights of both parties (Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France), Provisional Measures, Order of 17 June 2003, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 107, para. 22). Accordingly, the Court must concern itself with the preservation of rights which "belong either to the Applicant or to the Respondent" (ibid.). 35. Madam President, it seems obvious that the Georgian request contains and presupposes numerous a priori determinations as to the role of the Russian Federation in the recent conflict assumptions which the Respondent challenges and which we believe are misrepresenting the facts on the ground and which, in any case, have not been proven not even prima facie. - 49 - 36. The requested measures, given their content, inter alia presuppose that Russia has been and continues to be involved in the acts enumerated in the Request and that, besides, these acts have allegedly also been committed with the intention to expel the ethnic Georgian population. Were the Court to adopt these measures, it would have to share the underlying assumption that Russia is indeed committing such acts, without the Court previously having had any chance to verify the underlying alleged facts in an orderly procedure and with a full evidentiary hearing. 37. Still, assuming arguendo for the moment that the measure requested in subparagraph (a) of the request were granted, Russia would be exposed to the perception that this Court had believed, by adopting the order as requested, that Russia is indeed legally responsible for such acts. 38. This approach is confirmed by the Bosnia genocide case. There, the Court, while recognizing "the existence of some risk" still declined to indicate certain provisional measures then requested by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia having determined that there was a lack of sufficient evidence of the alleged facts (cf. case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 346, para. 45). 39. The danger of prejudging a possible future judgment on the merits becomes even more obvious if one looks at the specific measures requested. 40. Under the very first Request, the Russian Federation would be obliged to "ensure that no ethnic Georgians or any other persons are subject to violent or coercive acts". Taking into account my previous remarks why the Respondent cannot be held (and even be less so presumed) responsible for alleged acts of discrimination for lack of effective control, the measures, if granted, would make the Russian Federation legally responsible for any acts of discrimination by whomever they are committed by South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities or by private individuals and would thereby necessarily prejudge a later finding of what we believe is a correct reading of the Convention, namely that it does not apply vis--vis the Russian Federation neither rationae materiae nor geographically to the conflict in question. 41. According to the second Request, the Russian Federation would be subject to an even more far-reaching obligation, namely to "take all necessary measures to prevent groups or - 50 individuals" from subjecting ethnic Georgians to the acts enumerated in the request. Leaving aside the fact that Articles 2 and 5 do not contain an obligation to prevent prohibited acts by them a question I have already dealt with this Request raises the fundamental question for the acts of which groups and individuals the Russian Federation might legally be held responsible. 42. Madam President, as I have said, this Court has confirmed in most unequivocal terms that a State can only be held responsible for acts of groups over which it exercises effective control (case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, paras. 396 et seq.). Yet, the measure requested by Georgia contemplates that the Respondent should be held responsible for acts of all groups and all individuals that commit any of the acts referred to in subparagraph (b) of the amended Request. As a matter of fact, if Russia were really ordered "to take all necessary measures", it might even have to significantly increase its military presence in the area and thereby establish effective control. 43. As to the request contained in subparagraph (c), which is mutatis mutandis identical to the one contained in subparagraph (f), and which therefore to a large extent is redundant anyhow, it must be noted that it is inherently linked to the international legal status of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Both are, however, not participating in these proceedings and are not subject to the Courťs jurisdiction under Article 22 CERD. Still, the Court would have, in order to grant the request, to decide upon the underlying issue of the status of said territories thereby, again, prejudging even questions not linked to the subject-matter of this case. Besides, the measures would necessarily affect the rights of these third parties. 44. That leaves us with the requests contained in subparagraphs (d) and (e) respectively. 45. Madam President, Members of the Court, it is common knowledge that until recently an armed conflict has been ongoing, which led to hostilities in large parts of South Ossetia and certain parts of Abkhazia. As in many other armed conflicts, these hostilities have unfortunately led to the displacement of a large number of persons from all different ethnicities. However, ordering the return of persons, as requested by the Applicant in subparagraphs (d) and (e) referring to their "expulsion", once again would have to take it for granted that the persons in question have not been fleeing an armed conflict, but that they indeed have been expelled by reason of their ethnicity. - 51 Besides, the Russian Federation would have to eventually interfere with the sovereign dealings of South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities which are both, legally and de facto, simply beyond its control. 46. Generally, the requested measures, if adopted, would impose upon the Respondent very ambiguous and unclear obligations, which, in any case, it cannot comply with given that it is not, as I have demonstrated, exercising effective control with regard to the territory in question and besides, is also legally not in a position to enforce the requested measures vis--vis South Ossetia respectively Abkhazia. 47. Madam President, let me respectfully remind you of the prudent words of President Jiménez de Aréchaga that the Courťs power under Article 41 does not consist in a general police power over the maintenance of international peace or in a general competence to settle disputes (Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Interim Protection, Order of 11 September 1976, I.C.J. Reports 1976; separate opinion of Judge Jiménez de Aréchaga, p. 16), but is rather limited to preserving the rights of both parties without prejudging in any manner whatsoever the final outcome of the case. 48. Madam President, Members of the Court, this concludes my argument. Thank you very much for your kind attention. I would now ask you to be so kind and call upon my colleague. The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Zimmermann. We now call Mr. Wordsworth. Mr. WORDSWORTH: V. THE CRITERIA FOR THE GRANT OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES ARE NOT MET 1. Madam President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear before you. 2. The Court will already have firmly in mind the exceptional nature of its jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute. This, of course, follows from the fact that the Court is being asked to make an order against a party in circumstances where its jurisdiction over that party has not been established and, still less, has that party had an opportunity to deploy its case on the merits of the claim. A high threshold applies, and as one former President of the Court, Judge Nagendra Singh has put it: - 52 "If . . . in the exercise of its inherent powers (as enshrined in Article 41 of the Statute) the Court grants interim relief, its sole justification to do so is that if it did not, the rights of the parties would be so prejudiced that the judgment of the Court when it came could be rendered meaningless." (Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973; declaration of Judge Nagendra Singh, p. 109; and Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973; declaration of Judge Nagendra Singh, p. 145.) 3. The caution that must inevitably accompany the exercise of the Courťs powers under Article 41, is all the more necessary in a case such as the present, where there is, at the very least, a high degree of artifice in the way the underlying dispute has been brought before the Court. That underlying dispute concerns the parties' respective armed actions; and yet the Courťs prima facie jurisdiction is said to have been established by virtue of the never previously mentioned CERD. The caution is needed because there is no doubt that there are facts in play, which have led to the imposition of provisional measures in the past, namely, armed actions by the parties before the Court, in particular leading to loss of life; and yet those facts cannot of themselves be central in the Courťs consideration of this Request. The key question must be whether Georgia has put before you a sufficiently strong case of ongoing and irreparable racial discrimination by Russia, in breaches of Articles 2 and 5 of the CERD, such that the circumstances may require the grant of provisional measures. 4. In considering this question, I wish to address two topics: first, irreparable prejudice to rights of Georgia under the CERD, and then, urgency. All this, of course, is assuming that Georgia has rights under the CERD that are capable of applying in this case, and Professor Zimmermann has just shown that this is not so. No serious risk of irreparable prejudice 5. So far as concerns irreparable prejudice, Russia, of course, accepts that loss of life is irreparable. There are questions as to whether all the types of harm alleged by Georgia are truly irreparable for example, the CERD recommendation No. 22, from which Georgia has built its Article 5 case, expressly contemplates that appropriate compensation may, in circumstances, be paid instead of restoration of property. But today, I want to focus on the key issue of whether there is a risk of irreparable prejudice to the specific rights that Georgia claims. - 53 - 6. This is not a case like Cameroon v. Nigeria, where the armed actions took place in the context of ongoing proceedings and on the territory that was the subject of those proceedings. In such circumstances, the nexus between the irreparable prejudice in particular the loss of life and the rights which were the subject of the dispute could readily be established (Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 March 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996, paras. 35-42). In this case, by contrast, the relevant context is not an ongoing territorial dispute between Russia and Georgia, but rather an extended history of inter-ethnic conflict within Georgia, marked by a total absence of allegations by Georgia of discriminatory conduct on the part of Russia in breach of the CERD. And, to adopt the test applied in the Cameroon v. Nigeria Provisional Measures Order, Russia submits that Georgia has not established that any rights opposable to Russia under Articles 2 and 5 of the CERD however broadly drawn are exposed to "serious risk" of irreparable damage. 7. As to the so-called first and second phases of Russia's intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia there is no need to focus on the detail but I do invite the Court to turn the pages of Russia's "Collection of Relevant Facts and Documents", and time and again there are statements of Georgian Ministers, decisions and international agreements to which Georgia is a party, in which Russia's role and the role of the peacekeeping forces are consented to and recognized as wholly beneficial. And, if I can give the Court one example, and this is one of many, on 31 March 1999, Georgia was party to a decision of the Joint Control Commission, signed by itself, Russia, and the North Ossetian and South Ossetian sides, recording that the "peacekeeping forces keep on being a major sponsor of the peace and [a] calm life"32 . 8. In addition, the Security Council repeatedly welcomed the CIS peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia as a stabilizing factor and in resolution 1808 of 15 April of this year was again stressing "the importance of close and effective co-operation between UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force as they currently play an important stabilizing role in the conflict zone". At the same time, paragraph 14 of this resolution called upon Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities "to fulfil their 32 Collected Facts and Documents, p. 25. - 54 obligations in this regard and to extend full co-operation to UNOMIG and to the CIS peacekeeping force". 9. This is radically inconsistent with Russia being a cause of racial discrimination in Abkhazia or indeed South Ossetia and, all the more so, with Russia being a cause of irreparable prejudice to the rights of Georgia under the CERD. Precisely the same may be said for (i) the absence of any complaints against Russia concerning the CERD by Georgia or any other party, and (ii) the fact that Russia, through resolutions of the Security Council and otherwise, had repeatedly condemned various unlawful acts of the Abkhaz authorities, and reiterated and reaffirmed as fundamentally important the right of return for all refugees and IDPs to Abkhazia (for example, most recently, in Security Council resolutions 1781 and 1808). 10. If Georgia's allegations as to these first two alleged phases of intervention were to be accepted, it would have to follow: first, that Georgia was wholly quixotic in its relations with Russia, consenting and welcoming the presence or involvement of a party that was nonetheless a powerful force for racial discrimination within Georgia; secondly, that Russia has consistently acted in bad faith in its relations with the international community, including as a member of the Security Council, condemning the acts of the Abkhaz authorities and seeking the return of IDPs, whilst in truth it sought to foster objectives that were completely to the contrary. 11. No decisions on the facts can be made at the provisional measures phase; but Georgia has sought to portray the events from August 2008 in a context of a long-standing breach and prejudice to its rights. Russia's position is that that case has simply not been made out, even prima facie. And precisely the same follows for any claim that Russia was somehow controlling the South Ossetian or Abkhaz authorities in these so-called first and second phases. By its conduct, from the agreements it signed, from the decisions it was party to (this is all as set out at Sections 2, 7 and 9 of Russia's "Collection of Facts and Documents"), it is quite clear that Georgia did not consider that to be the case. 12. I move on to the events of the past month. The Court is not of course in a position to disentangle the allegations and counter-allegations that are now before it. The facts that can be - 55 relied on with reasonable certitude are few but, we submit, that they do tell against the existence of a serious risk to the rights Georgia now claims: (a) First, there have unquestionably been armed actions, but these have led to deaths of the armed forces of all parties concerned, the deaths of civilians of all ethnicities, and a mass displacement of persons of all ethnicities: tens of thousands of ethnic Ossetians and Russians fleeing into Russia; tens of thousands of ethnic Georgians fleeing into Georgia33 . There is no question that greater numbers of ethnic Georgians fled, but there is equally no question that this is a case where persons of all ethnicities have fled from conflict zones. Although you heard nothing this morning, I have to add, about the 30,000 Ossetians who fled into Russia. (b) Secondly, the armed actions have now ceased, and civilians of all ethnicities are returning to some, although not yet all, of the former conflict zones. As appears from the United Nations OCHR ReliefWeb map showing the situation in Georgia as of 25 August 2008, "Since 24 August significant spontaneous and organized returns took place", and the expectation as recorded on that map is that high percentages of these populations will return within 3 months the figure is 67 per cent so far as concerns returns to South Ossetia34 . The figure is 90 per cent for western Georgia. 13. So, what do Georgia's so-called "Observations" show? 14. First, what these do not show. I invite the Court to work its way through the annexes, and what is remarkable is that the "Observations" contain almost no evidence at all on the situation in Abkhazia, a fact to say the least that was rather glossed over in this morning's presentations. When you turn over the tabs of the Georgian Observations, you see Annex 1, satellite images of South Ossetia; Annex 2, attacks by South Ossetian militias; Annex 3, alleged use of cluster bombs in South Ossetia; Annex 4, mounting evidence that Russia and Georgia used armed force unlawfully during the South Ossetian conflict; Annex 5, villages in South Ossetia burned and looted; Annex 6, Amnesty International on South Ossetia; and so on. And yet the serious risk to 33 See e.g. the ReliefWeb map of 25 August at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps_Sa.nsf/luFullMap/0CBA6DADE11185A3C12574B10021B52D/$File/rw_CE_geo 080826.pdf?OpenElement. 34 Ibid. - 56 rights concerning Abkhazia is one of the central features of this Request. What is there in Georgia's annexes on Abkhazia? (a) First, there is the General Assembly resolution of May of this year on which Professor Crawford placed such weight a resolution passed with only 14 affirmative votes, 11 votes against, and 105 abstentions (Annex 8); (b) Secondly, there is a press release of 27 August saying that European relief teams do not have access to the rebel Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; (c) Thirdly, and finally, there are two signed declarations, one containing an allegation that ethnic Georgians are being forced to accept Russian passports (Annex 30), the other from a resident of Ganmukhuri who makes certain allegations based on hearsay but also says that he "is not aware of any acts of murder or injury to civilians by Russian forces or Abkhaz separatists" and that "they haven't burnt down the houses" (Annex 36). 15. Simply, that is not enough to make out a case of serious risk. So far as concerns South Ossetia, the Court can immediately disregard the press reports in the "Observations", which are not evidence capable of proving facts, as follows from the Courťs well-known dicta in the Nicaragua case35 , and can hardly be held up as meeting high standards of objectivity, not least given that Russia has been able to submit equal and opposite press reports at Section 14 of its "Collection of Facts and Documents", often from the very same newspapers. For example, Georgia has submitted a Guardian article entitled "Russia's cruel intention" (Annex 13); while Russia has submitted an Article from the self-same newspaper which is called: "This is a tale of US expansion, not Russian aggression."36 We submit that all this gets the Court precisely nowhere. 16. There are two documents in the "Observations" that I would like to draw the Courťs attention to. 17. First, the Amnesty International bulletin of 22 August at Annex 6, and which is now at tab 6 of Georgia's judges' folder. This calls on all parties to the conflict to protect displaced civilians and refugees who fled during the hostilities, as well as those who remained in the areas 35 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, paras. 62-63. 36 Collection of Facts and Documents, pp. 63-64. - 57 where hostilities have taken place. There is a section "Apparent indiscriminate attacks against civilians must be investigated", which is expressly concerned with alleged violations of international humanitarian law, by all parties, and then a further section entitled "Possible ethnic targeting". The Court is invited to read this short section in which it is recorded that "Irregular armed groups reported to have formed in and around the region of South Ossetia have carried out human rights abuses", and it is recalled that Amnesty has called on all parties to the conflict "to provide protection to civilians who may be subjected to inter-ethnic reprisals", and "to initiate prompt, thorough, impartial and independent investigations into allegations of abuses on the basis of ethnic identity and to bring the perpetrators to justice". 18. This does not come close to evidencing that rights of Georgia under Articles 2 and 5 of the CERD are at serious risk by virtue of the acts of Russia. And as recorded in the Human Rights Watch bulletin, at Annex 5 of Georgia's "Observations", Russia's position is that there should be decisive and tough action against looters, and Russian troops on the ground have sought to bar Ossetian militias from certain areas to stop looting, as is recorded in other Human Rights Watch bulletins37 . 19. Second document: Annex 19 of Georgia's "Observations". This is a BBC report of 25 August, recording a Red Cross spokesman in the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali as saying that "the authorities there were holding 89 Georgian civilians who were taken into custody to save them from being lynched after the initial Georgian attack on the town earlier this month" (Ann. 19). In its enthusiasm to attribute all acts to Russia, Georgia has wholly lost sight of the fact that its attack on Tskhinvali has inevitably led to public anger that, on a practical level, means that displaced persons cannot all immediately return. That public anger is a fact on the ground; it is not evidence of serious risk to any rights of Georgia opposable to Russia under Articles 2 or 5 of the CERD. 20. And so far as concerns the principle of return, Russia's position is unambiguous. On 15 August, in discussions with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Russian 37 Collection of Facts and Documents, p. 75. - 58 Foreign Minister stated his agreement on the principle of the non-discriminatory nature of the right of return for all civilians forced to flee38 . 21. Let me just deal with tab 21 of Georgia's judges' folder, the comments of the President of South Ossetia, Mr. Kokoity, on 15 August, which got a lot of attention this morning. 22. First, on the "we have flattened everything" allegation, the document has to be read a little more fully. The interview continued: "[Question]: It has been claimed that there were cases of looting in Georgian villages. [Mr.] Kokoity: Yes, there were cases of looting, but it is the consequence of any war, any aggression. We are strictly suppressing such acts. [Question]: As I understand, these villages have already been cleansed. [Mr.] Kokoity: Yes, meaning civilian population had been evacuated before. There was nobody there, except for Georgian forces. As for the civilians, at some places where they still remained, in contrast to Georgian forces, we provided a corridor and gave civilian population the possibility to leave. I want to assure you once again that in fact, there was almost nobody in those enclaves. They had evacuated everybody well in advance . . . Georgians were seriously preparing for the aggression. They evacuated people and so-called alternative government [the] (pro-Georgian Temporary Administration of South Ossetia led by D. Sanakoev . . ." So that is a fuller picture of what Mr. Kokoity said on that particular matter. 23. Second, Mr. Kokoity's statement, in the same interview, that "we do not intend to let anybody in here anymore". Russia is well aware of that statement. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately characterized Mr. Kokoity's remarks as "an emotional statement made under the impact of the situation resulting from the massive armed assault on South Ossetia carried out by the Georgian leadership". The Ministry -- the Russian Ministry -- further stated that: "There are generally recognized rules of international law entitling people to return to their former habitual residence when the circumstances owing to which they had to leave them do not exist anymore. In particular, this is confirmed in Article 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees." 24. And we do also note that, on 22 August, Mr. Kokoity met with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and stated that there would be no discrimination based on ethnicity in the policy of voluntary return of refugees and other displaced persons. The High Commissioner stated that he was "reassured by [Mr. Kokoity's] commitment to prevent further displacement 38 Timeline of Events, p. 14. - 59 through the guarantee of safety for all members of the population, independently of their ethnic background"39 . There is no urgency 25. Madam President, I move onto the question of urgency. As recently reiterated at paragraph 66 of the Courťs Order of 16 July 2008 in the Avena case, the test is whether "there is urgency in the sense that action prejudicial to the rights of either party is likely to be taken before the Court has given its final decision" (emphasis added). Further, as Rosenne has noted "as a concept implicit in the requirement for provisional measures, urgency is construed strictly and in direct connection with the rights claimed"40 . 26. There are three initial points to make. 27. First, the case on urgency can only be built on the events subsequent to 7 August 2008. Before this, there was evidently no urgency of the requisite degree as Georgia had never even raised complaints of violations of the CERD with Russia. This is all common ground now, it seems. 28. Second, and following from this, the urgency is to be found, if at all, in the events post-7 August, that is in the armed actions and their repercussions since that date. This links into the point that Professor Pellet has just made: this case, and all the more so this Request, is really concerned with the recent armed actions of Georgia and Russia. 29. Third, once the Court focuses into the relevant period for the purposes of urgency, and that is precisely the past month, it is incontrovertible that there have been major developments within the course of that period which tell against the case for urgency. The Court is concerned with the position as it is now, not as it was when Georgia lodged its Application on 12 August. At that time, military activities were still taking place but, in the event, ceasefire was announced by Russia that very day. Armed actions are not now continuing and, in particular, the Parties signed on 13-16 August the six principles for the peaceful settlement of the conflict, of which the Court has already heard much. Since then, and this appears to be common ground, the armed actions are 39 http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/print?tbl=NEWS&id=48b0665c4. 40 Rosenne, Provisional Measures in International Law, p. 139. - 60 at an end and large numbers of IDPs have in fact already returned to Gori and villages nearby. Indeed -- again a factor of which we heard nothing this morning -- Georgia on 26 August issued a list of places safe to return to, including Gori, and actively encouraged return to those places41 . 30. So far as concerns ongoing security, on which so much emphasis has been placed this morning, on 19 August, the Permanent Council of the OSCE, striving to contribute to the full implementation of the six principles, decided to increase for a minimum period of six calendar months the number of military monitoring officers in the OSCE Mission to Georgia by up to 100. Russia has welcomed this decision, which was adopted with its active participation. 31. Georgia relied this morning on the comments of Rachel Denber of Human Rights Watch on 27 August and that is at tab 8 of Georgia's judges' folder where she speaks of Russia's obligation to ensure safety and said "but civilians are clearly not being protected. This is why the European Union should urgently agree on an international presence to ensure security." Well, on 4 September, Russia has proposed that the OSCE Permanent Council launch a civil police operation in the security zone adjacent to South Ossetia, with "the OSCE participating States and in particular the European Union providing the necessary human, material and financial resources". If European Union assistance is to be engaged, it certainly is not Russia that is standing in the way. 32. And this is also telling, because Georgia accepts it has to meet a case on urgency and imminence, and yet the latest document in its judges' folder is dated 29 August in the internet age in which we sadly now all have to operate, the absence of more recent documents tells a significant story. On Georgia's maps that Professor Arvashan showed the Court this morning, we can of course say nothing, because we know nothing about how those maps were put together. 33. In its Request, Georgia asserts that Russia is continuing to discriminate against ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and neighbouring areas by threatening the rights of ethnic Georgians to security and right of return. And it is also said that Russia is actively supporting groups or individuals that continue to perpetrate acts of violence against ethnic Georgians42 . 34. But the NGO bulletins in Georgia's "Observations" and now in the judges' folder, with their references to marauding militias and Ossetian militias and armed criminals, do not support a 41 Collection of Facts and Documents, p. 77. 42 Request, para. 22. - 61 case of continuing discrimination by Russia, or active support by Russia to acts of violence in South Ossetia; and still less in Abkhazia, of course. The case on urgency in relation to Abkhazia is built almost exclusively on inference, and that is not a sound basis for a provisional measures award. 35. In addition, and we heard not one word about this this morning, Georgia already has legal protection in place in the form of the provisional measures ordered by the European Court of Human Rights. Following a request by Georgia on 11 August, i.e. when the armed actions were still ongoing, of course, that Court ordered interim measures as follows: "considering that the current situation gives rise to a real and continuing risk of serious violations of the Convention. With a view to preventing such violations and pursuant to Rule 39, the President calls upon both the High Contracting Parties concerned to comply with their engagements under the Convention particularly in respect of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention." 36. There are five points that I wish to make. 37. First, and most obvious, the order is directed at both Russia and Georgia. That may be one reason why we have heard so little about this order. 38. Second, the Parties, including Russia, are called upon to comply with all their engagements under the European Convention of Human Rights. That obviously includes Article 14, which provides that the rights and freedoms under the Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground, including of course on grounds of race. In the margins, I must add that Georgia did not refer to Article 14 in its application to the European Court, which underlines once again the fact that Georgia's true dispute with Russia is not founded on issues of racial discrimination. 39. Third, particular reference is made in the order to Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, concerning respectively protection of the right to life and the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Those provisions have, of course, been broadly construed, in particular Article 3, and it is well established that discriminatory treatment, if of a sufficient severity, may constitute ill-treatment within the scope of Article 343 . 43 East African Asians v. United Kingdom, Report of the Commission, 14 Dec. 1973, para. 207; Cyprus v. Turkey, Judgment of 10 May 2001, (2002) 35 EHRR 731. See also Salah Sheekh v. The Netherlands (2007), Application No. 1948/04, para. 148. - 62 - 40. Fourth, interim measures ordered by the European Court of Human Rights are legally binding, as was established by the judgment of the Grand Chamber in Mamatkulov v. Turkey44 . 41. Fifth, pursuant to the Presidenťs request for information on measures taken to ensure that the Convention is fully complied with, Russia has submitted responses dated 22 August and 5 September to the European Court of Human Rights, in which it inter alia confirmed that it had always been acting in "resolute consciousness" of its engagements under the Convention and reaffirmed its "resolved determination to comply" with these. Russia also stated in its response of 22 August that its authorities "had strictly observed the relevant provisions of international law, in the first place the norms of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War and Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War and the First Additional Protocol thereto". These norms, of course, include the prohibition of racial discrimination as set out in Article 85 (4) of Additional Protocol 1. 42. In short, the existence of the order of 12 August is a further strong factor to the effect that the requisite urgency is absent in this case. It covers the same alleged conduct as is now sought to be covered by Georgia in these proceedings, and it is legally binding. 43. Madam President, I turn briefly to the Courťs discretion whether or not to order provisional measures, even if it considers that the criteria of Article 41 are met. In this case, there is a powerful factor that goes to discretion, and this is that the events of August 2008 were born out of Georgia's use of force in South Ossetia. It is undeniable that Georgia used force before Russia, leading to loss of life, which is, of course, irreparable, and to destruction of property. To quote the Human Rights Watch bulletin at Annex 4 of Georgia's "Observations", which interestingly is not a document but found its way into Georgia's judges' folder this morning: "Human Rights Watch continues to document Georgian forces' use of indiscriminate force during their assault on Tskhinvali and neighbouring villages on August 7-8, causing numerous civilian casualties and extensive destruction". The powerful, and inevitable, impact of that use of indiscriminate force on the long-standing inter-ethnic conflict is vividly reflected in the comments of the Red Cross spokesman to which I referred earlier. 44 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 4 Feb. 2005, (2005) 41 EHRR 494. - 63 - 44. These would be vital factors in so far as concerns the issue of discretion. However, I stress again, Russia is firmly of the view that the criteria of Article 41 are not met in this case: the circumstances do not require the grant of provisional measures. 45. Madam President, Members of the Court, that concludes my remarks and also ends Russia's presentation for today. I thank you for your patience. The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Wordsworth. This therefore brings an end to the first round of oral observations of the Russian Federation. The Court will meet again at 4.30 p.m. tomorrow to hear the second round of oral observations of Georgia. The Court now rises. The Court rose at 5.50 p.m. ___________