1. Forms of speech (expression) including e.g. truth, opinions, commercial speech etc.

 

 

 

a. All verbal or/and non-verbal forms of communication by which the idea or opinion is communicated

b. Symbolical expressions

 

c. Freedom not to speak

 

 

d. Free commercial speech

 

 

e. „The freedom of speech is protected independently on situation, if the expression is rational or emotional, well-grounded or groundless or if is accepted by others as useless or harmful, valuable of worthless.”

Federal Constitutional Court of FRG 1 BvR 1762/95.

 

 

f. Assertion of facts

g. False assertions

 

2. Forms of expressions in decisions of ECHR

3. Censorship

 

 

 

 

 

4. National security

 

 

 

 

 

 

5. Contempt of Court 

R. v. Grey [1900] 2 Q.B. 36

 

 

The release of defamatory information concerning a person active in public life cannot be considered reasonable (legitimate) (1) unless it is proven that reasonable grounds existed for relying on the truthfulness of the defamatory information; (2) unless it is proven that available measures were taken to verify the truthfulness of such information, to such degree and intensity to which the verification of the information was available and definite; and (3) if the person releasing the defamatory information had reason not to believe that such information was true. The release of such information cannot be considered to be legitimate or reasonable also in cases when the disseminator of such information did not verify the truthfulness of the same by querying the person concerned by such information and did not make known the opinion of such a person, except in instances when such a procedure is impossible and/or in cases when such procedure was obviously not necessary (Lange v. Australian Corporation, 1997, cited in case Reynolds Lds. - see above). Examination of motive is an important point for assessing the legitimacy of the release of such information. Legitimacy cannot be inferred when such a release of information is predominantly motivated by a desire to aggrieve the person to which such data is related, and when the disseminator themself did not believe the information, and/or when they published it inconsiderately and with gross negligence without verifying whether the information was truthful or not.

 

The first sphere actually involves protection of privacy, within which the right to honour is also undoubtedly applied. Principally, it is up to each individual what they release from this sphere as information suitable for the outside world and to what degree. In other words, this sphere is usually governed by complete self-determination as regards information.

 

The societal, civil and professional domains reflect the social nature of fundamental rights, or reflect the fact that an individual lives in a society and enters into communication with its other members, and, through their conduct or very existence, influences other members of the society. In this sphere, absolute self-determination in respect of information is no longer applicable. In other words, under certain circumstances, it is possible to enter into such a sphere, as the same might contain facts within a topic that justifies public interest. Thus, the social spheres may be interfered with through proportional interventions by a public power in order to protect the interests of society.

 

The outer edges of the social domain of an individual are part of the "public sphere". This is a segment of human life which may be perceived and acknowledged by anybody (Löffler/Rickler, Handbuch des Presserechts, 4th ed., 2000, chapter 42, note No. 7). In this sphere, there are practically no restrictions on dissemination of truthful facts from it (Soehring, Presserecht, 3rd ed., 2000, note No. 19.40). It is obvious that this sphere of human life completely overlaps with the professional sphere of persons active in public life.    

 The fundamental right to honour is applied in several spheres - the private domain, societal domain, civil domain and professional domain. The last three may be defined as a social sphere.

 

 

Newspaper publications, concerning injunction proceedings pending in the district court and tending in the circumstances to create the impression that a particular decision would evoke public suspicion of the judge's integrity or fairness and bring him into public odium and would be met by public resistance, and tending in the circumstances to provoke such resistance in fact, held contemptuous, rendering the company owning the paper and its editor subject to summary conviction and punishment.Such wrongful publications are not within the "freedom of the press," nor does the Act of 1831, supra, Jud.Code § 268, intend to sanction them.

As it is the reasonable tendency of such publications that determines their contemptuous character, it is not material that they were not circulated in the courtroom or seen by the judge, or that they did not influence his mind.

In determining whether there was any evidence to justify attributing such a tendency to the publications in question, this Court considers the evidentiary facts found by the district court only so far as to determine whether they have any reasonable tendency to sustain the general conclusions of fact based upon them by that court and the circuit court of appeals.