Avis juridique important

| 61974J0041

Judgment of the Court of 4 December 1974. - Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office. - Reference for a
preliminary ruling: High Court of Justice, Chancery Division - United Kingdom. - Public policy. -
Case 41-74.
European Court reports 1974 Page 01337
Greek special edition Page 00537
Portuguese special edition Page 00567
Spanish special edition Page 00529
Swedish special edition Page 00389
Finnish special edition Page 00395

Summary
Parties
Subject of the case
Grounds
Decision on costs
Operative part

Keywords

++++

1 . WORKERS - FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT - DIRECT EFFECT

( EEC TREATY, ARTICLE 48 )

2 . ACTS OF AN INSTITUTION - DIRECT EFFECT - DIRECTIVE

( EEC TREATY, ARTICLE 177, ARTICLE 189 )

3 . WORKERS - FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT - RESTRICTIONS - ARTICLE 3 OF DIRECTIVE NO 64/221 OF THE COUNCIL
- DIRECT EFFECT

4 . COMMUNITY LAW - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE - DEROGATION - NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY - STRICT
INTERPRETATION - DISCRETIONARY POWER OF NATIONAL AUTHORITIES

5 . WORKERS - FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT - DEROGATION - THREAT TO NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY - NATIONAL OF
ANOTHER MEMBER STATE - PERSONAL CONDUCT - ASSOCIATION WITH A BODY WHICH IS NOT ILLEGAL - ACTIVITIES
OF THAT BODY CONSIDERED TO BE SOCIALLY HARMFUL

( EEC TREATY, ARTICLE 48; COUNCIL DIRECTIVE NO 64/221, ARTICLE 3 ( 1 ))

Summary


1 . AS THE LIMITATIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS WHICH MEMBER STATES MAY
INVOKE ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC SECURITY, OR PUBLIC HEALTH ARE SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL OF
THE COURTS, THE PROVISO IN PARAGRAPH ( 3 ) DOES NOT PREVENT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 48 FROM
CONFERRING ON INDIVIDUALS RIGHTS WHICH THEY MAY ENFORCE IN THE NATIONAL COURTS AND WHICH THE LATTER
MUST PROTECT .

2 . IT WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE BINDING EFFECT ATTRIBUTED TO A DIRECTIVE BY ARTICLE 189 TO
EXCLUDE, IN PRINCIPLE, THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE OBLIGATION WHICH IT IMPOSES MAY BE INVOKED BY THOSE
CONCERNED . IN PARTICULAR, WHERE THE COMMUNITY AUTHORITIES HAVE, BY DIRECTIVES, IMPOSED ON MEMBER
STATES THE OBLIGATION TO PURSUE A PARTICULAR COURSE OF CONDUCT, THE USEFUL EFFECT OF SUCH AN ACT
WOULD BE WEAKENED IF INDIVIDUALS WERE PREVENTED FROM RELYING ON IT BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURTS AND
IF THE LATTER WERE PREVENTED FROM TAKING IT INTO CONSIDERATION AS AN ELEMENT OF COMMUNITY LAW .
ARTICLE 177, WHICH EMPOWERS NATIONAL COURTS TO REFER TO THE COURT QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE VALIDITY
AND INTERPRETATION OF ALL ACTS OF THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS, WITHOUT DISTINCTION, IMPLIES
FURTHERMORE THAT THESE ACTS MAY BE INVOKED BY INDIVIDUALS IN THE NATIONAL COURTS .

IT IS NECESSARY TO EXAMINE IN EVERY CASE WHETHER THE NATURE, GENERAL SCHEME AND WORDING OF THE
PROVISION IN QUESTION ARE CAPABLE OF HAVING DIRECT EFFECTS ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES
AND INDIVIDUALS .

3 . ARTICLE 3 ( 1 ) OF COUNCIL DIRECTIVE NO 64/221 OF 25 FEBRUARY 1964 ON THE COORDINATION OF
SPECIAL MEASURES CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT AND RESIDENCE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS WHICH ARE JUSTIFIED ON
GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC SECURITY OR PUBLIC HEALTH CONFERS ON INDIVIDUALS RIGHTS WHICH ARE
ENFORCEABLE BY THEM IN THE NATIONAL COURTS OF A MEMBER STATE AND WHICH THE LATTER MUST PROTECT .

4 . THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMMUNITY AND WHERE, IN PARTICULAR, IT IS
USED AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR DEROGATING FROM A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF COMMUNITY LAW, MUST BE
INTERPRETED STRICTLY, SO THAT ITS SCOPE CANNOT BE DETERMINED UNILATERALLY BY EACH MEMBER STATE
WITHOUT BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL BY THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY .

NEVERTHELESS, THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING RECOURSE TO THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC POLICY MAY
VARY FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER AND FROM ONE PERIOD TO ANOTHER, AND IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY IN
THIS MATTER TO ALLOW THE COMPETENT NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AN AREA OF DISCRETION WITHIN THE LIMITS
IMPOSED BY THE TREATY .

5 . ARTICLE 48 OF THE EEC TREATY AND ARTICLE 3 ( 1 ) OF DIRECTIVE NO 64/221 MUST BE INTERPRETED AS
MEANING THAT A MEMBER STATE, IMPOSING RESTRICTIONS JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY, IS
ENTITLED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, AS A MATTER OF PERSONAL CONDUCT OF THE INDIVIDUAL CONCERNED, THE
FACT THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IS ASSOCIATED WITH SOME BODY OR ORGANIZATION THE ACTIVITIES OF WHICH THE
MEMBER STATE CONSIDERS SOCIALLY HARMFUL BUT WHICH ARE NOT UNLAWFUL IN THAT STATE, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT NO RESTRICTION IS PLACED UPON NATIONALS OF THE SAID MEMBER STATE WHO WISH TO TAKE SIMILAR
EMPLOYMENT WITH THE SAME BODIES OR ORGANIZATIONS .

Parties

IN CASE 41/74

REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE CHANCERY DIVISION OF THE HIGH
COURT OF JUSTICE, ENGLAND, FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN

YVONNE VAN DUYN

AND

HOME OFFICE

Subject of the case

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 48 OF THE EEC TREATY AND ARTICLE 3 OF COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 64/221/EEC
OF 25 FEBRUARY 1964 ON THE COORDINATION OF SPECIAL MEASURES CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT AND RESIDENCE
OF FOREIGN NATIONALS WHICH ARE JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC SECURITY OR PUBLIC
HEALTH . ( OJ OF 4 . 4 . 1964, P . 850 ).

Grounds

1 BY ORDER OF THE VICE-CHANCELLOR OF 1 MARCH 1974, LODGED AT THE COURT ON 13 JUNE, THE CHANCERY
DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND, REFERRED TO THE COURT, UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE
EEC TREATY, THREE QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW
CONCERNING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS .

2 THESE QUESTIONS ARISE OUT OF AN ACTION BROUGHT AGAINST THE HOME OFFICE BY A WOMAN OF DUTCH
NATIONALITY WHO WAS REFUSED LEAVE TO ENTER THE UNITED KINGDOM TO TAKE UP EMPLOYMENT AS A SECRETARY
WITH THE " CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY ".

3 LEAVE TO ENTER WAS REFUSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
IN RELATION TO THE SAID ORGANIZATION, THE ACTIVITIES OF WHICH IT CONSIDERS TO BE SOCIALLY HARMFUL .

FIRST QUESTION

4 BY THE FIRST QUESTION, THE COURT IS ASKED TO SAY WHETHER ARTICLE 48 OF THE EEC TREATY IS DIRECTLY
APPLICABLE SO AS TO CONFER ON INDIVIDUALS RIGHTS ENFORCEABLE BY THEM IN THE COURTS OF A MEMBER
STATE .

5 IT IS PROVIDED, IN ARTICLE 48 ( 1 ) AND ( 2 ), THAT FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS SHALL BE
SECURED BY THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND THAT SUCH FREEDOM SHALL ENTAIL " THE ABOLITION OF
ANY DISCRIMINATION BASED ON NATIONALITY BETWEEN WORKERS OF MEMBER STATES AS REGARDS EMPLOYMENT,
REMUNERATION AND OTHER CONDITIONS OF WORK AND EMPLOYMENT " .

6 THESE PROVISIONS IMPOSE ON MEMBER STATES A PRECISE OBLIGATION WHICH DOES NOT REQUIRE THE ADOPTION
OF ANY FURTHER MEASURE ON THE PART EITHER OF THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS OR OF THE MEMBER STATES AND
WHICH LEAVES THEM, IN RELATION TO ITS IMPLEMENTATION, NO DISCRETIONARY POWER .

7 PARAGRAPH 3, WHICH DEFINES THE RIGHTS IMPLIED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR
WORKERS, SUBJECTS THEM TO LIMITATIONS JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC SECURITY OR
PUBLIC HEALTH . THE APPLICATION OF THESE LIMITATIONS IS, HOWEVER, SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL CONTROL, SO
THAT A MEMBER STATE' S RIGHT TO INVOKE THE LIMITATIONS DOES NOT PREVENT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE
48, WHICH ENSHRINE THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS, FROM CONFERRING ON INDIVIDUALS
RIGHTS WHICH ARE ENFORCEABLE BY THEM AND WHICH THE NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .

8 THE REPLY TO THE FIRST QUESTION MUST THEREFORE BE IN THE AFFIRMATIVE .

SECOND QUESTION

9 THE SECOND QUESTION ASKS THE COURT TO SAY WHETHER COUNCIL DIRECTIVE NO 64/221 OF 25 FEBRUARY 1964
ON THE CO-ORDINATION OF SPECIAL MEASURES CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT AND RESIDENCE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS
WHICH ARE JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC SECURITY OR PUBLIC HEALTH IS DIRECTLY
APPLICABLE SO AS TO CONFER ON INDIVIDUALS RIGHTS ENFORCEABLE BY THEM IN THE COURTS OF A MEMBER
STATE .

10 IT EMERGES FROM THE ORDER MAKING THE REFERENCE THAT THE ONLY PROVISION OF THE DIRECTIVE WHICH IS
RELEVANT IS THAT CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 3 ( 1 ) WHICH PROVIDES THAT " MEASURES TAKEN ON GROUNDS OF
PUBLIC POLICY OR PUBLIC SECURITY SHALL BE BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE PERSONAL CONDUCT OF THE
INDIVIDUAL CONCERNED " .

11 THE UNITED KINGDOM OBSERVES THAT, SINCE ARTICLE 189 OF THE TREATY DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN THE
EFFECTS ASCRIBED TO REGULATIONS, DIRECTIVES AND DECISIONS, IT MUST THEREFORE BE PRESUMED THAT THE
COUNCIL, IN ISSUING A DIRECTIVE RATHER THAN MAKING A REGULATION, MUST HAVE INTENDED THAT THE
DIRECTIVE SHOULD HAVE AN EFFECT OTHER THAN THAT OF A REGULATION AND ACCORDINGLY THAT THE FORMER
SHOULD NOT BE DIRECTLY APPLICABLE .

12 IF, HOWEVER, BY VIRTUE OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 189 REGULATIONS ARE DIRECTLY APPLICABLE AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, MAY BY THEIR VERY NATURE HAVE DIRECT EFFECTS, IT DOES NOT FOLLOW FROM THIS THAT OTHER
CATEGORIES OF ACTS MENTIONED IN THAT ARTICLE CAN NEVER HAVE SIMILAR EFFECTS . IT WOULD BE
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE BINDING EFFECT ATTRIBUTED TO A DIRECTIVE BY ARTICLE 189 TO EXCLUDE, IN
PRINCIPLE, THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE OBLIGATION WHICH IT IMPOSES MAY BE INVOKED BY THOSE CONCERNED .
IN PARTICULAR, WHERE THE COMMUNITY AUTHORITIES HAVE, BY DIRECTIVE, IMPOSED ON MEMBER STATES THE
OBLIGATION TO PURSUE A PARTICULAR COURSE OF CONDUCT, THE USEFUL EFFECT OF SUCH AN ACT WOULD BE
WEAKENED IF INDIVIDUALS WERE PREVENTED FROM RELYING ON IT BEFORE THEIR NATIONAL COURTS AND IF THE
LATTER WERE PREVENTED FROM TAKING IT INTO CONSIDERATION AS AN ELEMENT OF COMMUNITY LAW . ARTICLE
177, WHICH EMPOWERS NATIONAL COURTS TO REFER TO THE COURT QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE VALIDITY AND
INTERPRETATION OF ALL ACTS OF THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS, WITHOUT DISTINCTION, IMPLIES FURTHERMORE
THAT THESE ACTS MAY BE INVOKED BY INDIVIDUALS IN THE NATIONAL COURTS . IT IS NECESSARY TO EXAMINE,
IN EVERY CASE, WHETHER THE NATURE, GENERAL SCHEME AND WORDING OF THE PROVISION IN QUESTION ARE
CAPABLE OF HAVING DIRECT EFFECTS ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND INDIVIDUALS .

13 BY PROVIDING THAT MEASURES TAKEN ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY SHALL BE BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE
PERSONAL CONDUCT OF THE INDIVIDUAL CONCERNED, ARTICLE 3 ( 1 ) OF DIRECTIVE NO 64/221 IS INTENDED TO
LIMIT THE DISCRETIONARY POWER WHICH NATIONAL LAWS GENERALLY CONFER ON THE AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE ENTRY AND EXPULSION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS . FIRST, THE PROVISION LAYS DOWN AN OBLIGATION
WHICH IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY EXCEPTION OR CONDITION AND WHICH, BY ITS VERY NATURE, DOES NOT REQUIRE
THE INTERVENTION OF ANY ACT ON THE PART EITHER OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY OR OF MEMBER
STATES . SECONDLY, BECAUSE MEMBER STATES ARE THEREBY OBLIGED, IN IMPLEMENTING A CLAUSE WHICH
DEROGATES FROM ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE TREATY IN FAVOUR OF INDIVIDUALS, NOT TO
TAKE ACCOUNT OF FACTORS EXTRANEOUS TO PERSONAL CONDUCT, LEGAL CERTAINTY FOR THE PERSONS CONCERNED
REQUIRES THAT THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO RELY ON THIS OBLIGATION EVEN THOUGH IT HAS BEEN LAID DOWN IN A
LEGISLATIVE ACT WHICH HAS NO AUTOMATIC DIRECT EFFECT IN ITS ENTIRETY .

14 IF THE MEANING AND EXACT SCOPE OF THE PROVISION RAISE QUESTIONS OF INTERPRETATION, THESE
QUESTIONS CAN BE RESOLVED BY THE COURTS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALSO THE PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 177
OF THE TREATY .

15 ACCORDINGLY, IN REPLY TO THE SECOND QUESTION, ARTICLE 3 ( 1 ) OF COUNCIL DIRECTIVE NO 64/221 OF
25 FEBRUARY 1964 CONFERS ON INDIVIDUALS RIGHTS WHICH ARE ENFORCEABLE BY THEM IN THE COURTS OF A
MEMBER STATE AND WHICH THE NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .

THIRD QUESTION

16 BY THE THIRD QUESTION THE COURT IS ASKED TO RULE WHETHER ARTICLE 48 OF THE TREATY AND ARTICLE 3
OF DIRECTIVE NO 64/221 MUST BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT

" A MEMBER STATE, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS DUTY TO BASE A MEASURE TAKEN ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC
POLICY EXCLUSIVELY ON THE PERSONAL CONDUCT OF THE INDIVIDUAL CONCERNED IS ENTITLED TO TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT AS MATTERS OF PERSONAL CONDUCT :

( A ) THE FACT THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IS OR HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH SOME BODY OR ORGANIZATION THE
ACTIVITIES OF WHICH THE MEMBER STATE CONSIDERS CONTRARY TO THE PUBLIC GOOD BUT WHICH ARE NOT
UNLAWFUL IN THAT STATE;

( B ) THE FACT THAT THE INDIVIDUAL INTENDS TO TAKE EMPLOYMENT IN THE MEMBER STATE WITH SUCH A BODY
OR ORGANIZATION IT BEING THE CASE THAT NO RESTRICTIONS ARE PLACED UPON NATIONALS OF THE MEMBER
STATE WHO WISH TO TAKE SIMILAR EMPLOYMENT WITH SUCH A BODY OR ORGANIZATION . "

17 IT IS NECESSARY, FIRST, TO CONSIDER WHETHER ASSOCIATION WITH A BODY OR AN ORGANIZATION CAN IN
ITSELF CONSTITUTE PERSONAL CONDUCT WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 3 OF DIRECTIVE NO 64/221 .
ALTHOUGH A PERSON' S PAST ASSOCIATION CANNOT IN GENERAL, JUSTIFY A DECISION REFUSING HIM THE RIGHT
TO MOVE FREELY WITHIN THE COMMUNITY, IT IS NEVERTHELESS THE CASE THAT PRESENT ASSOCIATION, WHICH
REFLECTS PARTICIPATION IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE BODY OR OF THE ORGANIZATION AS WELL AS
IDENTIFICATION WITH ITS AIMS AND ITS DESIGNS, MAY BE CONSIDERED A VOLUNTARY ACT OF THE PERSON
CONCERNED AND, CONSEQUENTLY, AS PART OF HIS PERSONAL CONDUCT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE PROVISION
CITED .

18 THIS THIRD QUESTION FURTHER RAISES THE PROBLEM OF WHAT IMPORTANCE MUST BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE FACT
THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ORGANIZATION IN QUESTION, WHICH ARE CONSIDERED BY THE MEMBER STATE AS
CONTRARY TO THE PUBLIC GOOD ARE NOT HOWEVER PROHIBITED BY NATIONAL LAW . IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED
THAT THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMMUNITY AND WHERE, IN PARTICULAR, IT IS
USED AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR DEROGATING FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR
WORKERS, MUST BE INTERPRETED STRICTLY, SO THAT ITS SCOPE CANNOT BE DETERMINED UNILATERALLY BY EACH
MEMBER STATE WITHOUT BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL BY THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY . NEVERTHELESS,
THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING RECOURSE TO THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC POLICY MAY VARY FROM ONE
COUNTRY TO ANOTHER AND FROM ONE PERIOD TO ANOTHER, AND IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY IN THIS MATTER TO
ALLOW THE COMPETENT NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AN AREA OF DISCRETION WITHIN THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY THE
TREATY .

19 IT FOLLOWS FROM THE ABOVE THAT WHERE THE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES OF A MEMBER STATE HAVE CLEARLY
DEFINED THEIR STANDPOINT AS REGARDS THE ACTIVITIES OF A PARTICULAR ORGANIZATION AND WHERE,
CONSIDERING IT TO BE SOCIALLY HARMFUL, THEY HAVE TAKEN ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES TO COUNTERACT THESE
ACTIVITIES, THE MEMBER STATE CANNOT BE REQUIRED, BEFORE IT CAN RELY ON THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC
POLICY, TO MAKE SUCH ACTIVITIES UNLAWFUL, IF RECOURSE TO SUCH A MEASURE IS NOT THOUGHT APPROPRIATE
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES .

20 THE QUESTION RAISES FINALLY THE PROBLEM OF WHETHER A MEMBER STATE IS ENTITLED, ON GROUNDS OF
PUBLIC POLICY, TO PREVENT A NATIONAL OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE FROM TAKING GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT WITHIN
ITS TERRITORY WITH A BODY OR ORGANIZATION, IT BEING THE CASE THAT NO SIMILAR RESTRICTION IS PLACED
UPON ITS OWN NATIONALS .

21 IN THIS CONNEXION, THE TREATY, WHILE ENSHRINING THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS
WITHOUT ANY DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF NATIONALITY, ADMITS, IN ARTICLE 48 ( 3 ), LIMITATIONS
JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC SECURITY OR PUBLIC HEALTH TO THE RIGHTS DERIVING FROM
THIS PRINCIPLE . UNDER THE TERMS OF THE PROVISION CITED ABOVE, THE RIGHT TO ACCEPT OFFERS OF
EMPLOYMENT ACTUALLY MADE, THE RIGHT TO MOVE FREELY WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF MEMBER STATES FOR THIS
PURPOSE, AND THE RIGHT TO STAY IN A MEMBER STATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF EMPLOYMENT ARE, AMONG OTHERS
ALL SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS . CONSEQUENTLY, THE EFFECT OF SUCH LIMITATIONS, WHEN THEY APPLY, IS
THAT LEAVE TO ENTER THE TERRITORY OF A MEMBER STATE AND THE RIGHT TO RESIDE THERE MAY BE REFUSED TO
A NATIONAL OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE .

22 FURTHERMORE, IT IS A PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, WHICH THE EEC TREATY CANNOT BE ASSUMED TO
DISREGARD IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES, THAT A STATE IS PRECLUDED FROM REFUSING ITS OWN
NATIONALS THE RIGHT OF ENTRY OR RESIDENCE .

23 IT FOLLOWS THAT A MEMBER STATE, FOR REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY, CAN, WHERE IT DEEMS, NECESSARY,
REFUSE A NATIONAL OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE THE BENEFIT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR
WORKERS IN A CASE WHERE SUCH A NATIONAL PROPOSES TO TAKE UP A PARTICULAR OFFER OF EMPLOYMENT EVEN
THOUGH THE MEMBER STATE DOES NOT PLACE A SIMILAR RESTRICTION UPON ITS OWN NATIONALS .

24 ACCORDINGLY, THE REPLY TO THE THIRD QUESTION MUST BE THAT ARTICLE 48 OF THE EEC TREATY AND
ARTICLE 3 ( 1 ) OF DIRECTIVE NO 64/221 ARE TO BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT A MEMBER STATE, IN
IMPOSING RESTRICTIONS JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY, IS ENTITLED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, AS A
MATTER OF PERSONAL CONDUCT OF THE INDIVIDUAL CONCERNED, THE FACT THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IS ASSOCIATED
WITH SOME BODY OR ORGANIZATION THE ACTIVITIES OF WHICH THE MEMBER STATE CONSIDERS SOCIALLY HARMFUL
BUT WHICH ARE NOT UNLAWFUL IN THAT STATE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO RESTRICTION IS PLACED UPON
NATIONALS OF THE SAID MEMBER STATE WHO WISH TO TAKE SIMILAR EMPLOYMENT WITH THESE SAME BODIES OR
ORGANIZATIONS .

Decision on costs

25 THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT, ARE NOT RECOVERABLE, AND AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE,
INSOFAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE CONCERNED, A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE
NATIONAL COURT, COSTS ARE A MATTER FOR THAT COURT .

Operative part

ON THOSE GROUNDS,

THE COURT

IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS REFERRED TO IT BY THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, BY ORDER OF THAT COURT,
DATED 1 MARCH 1974, HEREBY RULES :

1 . ARTICLE 48 OF THE EEC TREATY HAS A DIRECT EFFECT IN THE LEGAL ORDERS OF THE MEMBER STATES AND
CONFERS ON INDIVIDUALS RIGHTS WHICH THE NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .

2 . ARTICLE 3 ( 1 ) OF COUNCIL DIRECTIVE NO 64/221 OF 25 FEBRUARY 1964 ON THE COORDINATION OF
SPECIAL MEASURES CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT AND RESIDENCE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS WHICH ARE JUSTIFIED ON
GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC SECURITY OR PUBLIC HEALTH CONFERS ON INDIVIDUALS RIGHTS WHICH ARE
ENFORCEABLE BY THEM IN THE NATIONAL COURTS OF A MEMBER STATE AND WHICH THE NATIONAL COURTS MUST
PROTECT .

3 . ARTICLE 48 OF THE EEC TREATY AND ARTICLE 3 ( 1 ) OF DIRECTIVE NO 64/221 MUST BE INTERPRETED AS
MEANING THAT A MEMBER STATE, IN IMPOSING RESTRICTIONS JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC POLICY, IS
ENTITLED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AS A MATTER OF PERSONAL CONDUCT OF THE INDIVIDUAL CONCERNED, THE FACT
THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IS ASSOCIATED WITH SOME BODY OR ORGANIZATION THE ACTIVITIES OF WHICH THE MEMBER
STATE CONSIDERS SOCIALLY HARMFUL BUT WHICH ARE NOT UNLAWFUL IN THAT STATE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO
RESTRICTION IS PLACED UPON NATIONALS OF THE SAID MEMBER STATE WHO WISH TO TAKE SIMILAR EMPLOYMENT
WITH THE SAME BODY OR ORGANIZATION .