CHICAGO 
 
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 126 
 
 
 
 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP 
 
Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner 
 
 
THE LAW SCHOOL 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
 
 
May 2006 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at the Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 
Series:  http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html and 
The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=901991  
* Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
** Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. We thank the
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law for organizing this symposium on our
book, the symposium participants for their very thoughtful comments on Limits, and Kal
Raustiala for helpful comments on the essay. Eric Posner thanks the Lynde and Harry Bradley
Foundation and the John M. Olin Foundation for financial support.
1
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
463
RESPONSE
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP
Jack Goldsmith* & Eric A. Posner**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Limits of International Law sets forth a general theory of international
law.1
The book rejects the traditional explanations of international law based
on legality, morality, opinio juris, and related non-instrumental concepts.
Using simple rational choice tools, the book seeks instead to provide an
instrumental account of when and why nations use international law, when and
why they comply with it, and when and why international law changes. The
basic descriptive story is that international law emerges from and is sustained
by nations acting rationally to maximize their interests (i.e., their preferences
over international relations outcomes), given their perception of the interests
of other states, and the distribution of state power. Limits also makes two
normative arguments: nations have no moral obligation to comply with
international law, and liberal democratic nations have no duty to engage in the
strong cosmopolitan actions so often demanded of them.
We are grateful for the thoughtful criticisms of Limits in this symposium.
Below we identify points of agreement, clarify some of our positions, and
respond to major criticisms. We also outline what appears to be an emerging
consensus about the appropriate path of international law scholarship.
II. POINTS OF CONSENSUS
464 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 34:463
2
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24-25 (1990).
3
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?,106YALEL.J.2599,2603
(1997).
4
Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of International Human Rights Law, 34
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 395 (2006); Daniel Bodansky, International Law in Black and
White, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 285, 288 (2006); Peter J. Spiro, A Negative Proof of
International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 445, 453 (2006).
5
Allen Buchanan, Democracy and the Commitment to International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 305, 309 (2006).
6
Kenneth Anderson, Remarks By an Idealist on the Realism of The Limits of International
Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 253, 254 (2006). Anderson also notes that this view prevails
among NGOs and other international activists.
7
Id.
Most of the essays in the symposium are critical of the book. But
underneath the criticisms lies an emerging consensus in support of several
propositions central to Limits.
The primary intellectual target of Limits is the claim—widespread in earlier
generations of international law scholarship, and still dominant today—that
nations comply with international law for non-instrumental reasons. Noninstrumental
explanations for compliance can include a sense of obligation to
comply (opinio juris), or international law’s normative pull,2
or the absorption
of international law into a nation’s internal value set.3
To our surprise, many
of the essays in this symposium question whether these non-instrumental
explanations are even worthy of an academic response. Andrew Guzman and
Kal Raustiala reject the non-instrumental approach explicitly. Margaret
McGuinness calls our focus on it “a classic straw man,” a sentiment echoed by
Peter Spiro and Daniel Bodansky.4
And Allen Buchanan says that the claim
that nations have a moral obligation to comply with international law is an
obvious “error” that is hardly worthy of a response.5
As Ken Anderson correctly notes, “norm-based methods of international
law [the view “that international law itself exerts a discernible ‘pull’ upon the
behavior of states, as a normative and moral force”] still predominate in the
international legal academy both in the United States and Europe.”6
The fact
that none of the commentators in this symposium defends such normative
approaches to international law, and that many question our focus on it, is
surely, as Anderson says, a “telling fact about shifts in international law
scholarship, at least in the United States.”7
A related point is that, as Anderson also notes, the symposium participants
“are all quite accepting of the basic utility of the rationalist paradigm that
2006] THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP 465
8
Id. Anderson and McGuinness are partial exceptions, as is Buchanan, who is not a lawyer,
and who does not express a view on the descriptive elements in Limits.
9
Bodansky, supra note 4, at 288. Our most sympathetic critic at the symposium, Anderson,
is the major exception here. Anderson correctly notes that not everyone has been swept away
by the advance of the social sciences over the last three decades. And Anderson (along with
others in the symposium) correctly identifies a central methodological move in Limits (and in
social science and the natural sciences generally)—namely, simplification. We explained in
Limits the virtues of building a theory from simple and reductive premises, virtues canvassed in
Bodansky’s essay, and we will not rehearse the arguments in favor of doing so (or of using social
science methodologies generally). These arguments are extremely familiar and can be found in
many places—in legal debates about law and economics, in philosophical critiques of rational
choice, in the work of dissenting economists, and in the debates over the advance of rational
choice in political science.
10
Anderson, supra note 6, at 254.
11
See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004).
underlies” Limits.8
To be sure, McGuinness and Spiro question whether we
have focused on the right actors (nations v. NGOs), David Golove raises
methodological objections to our particular use of rational choice, and Guzman
and Raustiala argue that rational choice is consistent with more robust
conceptions of international law. But overall these essays reflect a point made
by Bodansky: “many international lawyers . . . would not fundamentally
disagree with [Limits’] rationalist methodology.”9
The contrast between the attitudes of the symposium participants and the
non-instrumental view of international law embraced by traditional
international law scholars thus could not be starker. This raises a puzzle. How
can the traditional international law scholarship “predominate” if the
symposium participants “are all quite accepting of the basic utility of the
rationalist paradigm that underlies” Limits?10
The answer is that a major
generational change is underway. The symposium participants are generally
young people who have rejected the traditional international law scholarship
of their elders. Having been exposed in law school to social scientific
approaches to legal scholarship, and having witnessed how political science
and economics have brought fruitful insights to international relations, these
scholarshaverealizedthat international law scholarship has fallen behindother
areas of legal scholarship by at least thirty years. This is not just a point about
rational choice. Other new forms of international law scholarship that reject,
or complement, rational choice approaches are also more sensitive to
methodological issues and empiricism.11
The result is greater attention to the
social science virtues: methodological self-consciousness, empiricism, and
theoretical rigor.
466 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 34:463
12
This degree of rigor will be familiar to law professors who write about domestic law, and
especially to law and economics scholars. And it is largely absent from traditional international
law scholarship, where scholars generally (1) do not explain their assumptions, (2) do not
address limitations on their assumptions, (3) conflate their positive and normative arguments,
(4) do not advance testable hypotheses, (5) ignore evidence that contradicts their argument, and
(6) selectively choose evidence that supports their theory. No one who has read the international
law literature would deny these claims, so we do not think it is necessary or fruitful to cite
particular examples.
13
The content of international law can also reflect coercion, but treaties that result from
coercion always reflect a cooperative element, however thin. See GOLDSMITH &POSNER, supra
note 1, at 89. International law in the form of treaties can also provide important information
about the intensity of state preferences. Id. at 91-99.
Limits is unusual in the field of international law scholarship for (1) making
its assumptions explicit, (2) addressing the limitations and criticisms of its
assumptions, (3) separating positive and normative arguments, (4) framing
claims as testable hypotheses, (5) addressing alternative hypotheses and
attempting to weigh the evidence, and (6) choosing case studies and other
evidence carefully.12
Many of the commentators criticize Limits on
methodological and empirical grounds; we welcome such criticisms, and
address them below. For now, what is important to notice is how the standards
of analysis are shifting in international law scholarship. If international law
scholarship generally—including the scholarship of our critics—comes to
embrace the standards of methodological and empirical care that the critics
demand of Limits, the discipline would be significantly improved.
III. HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTERS
The responses evince much confusion about how we believe international
law matters to the behavior of states.
Our essential claims are as follows. International law provides a focal point
for coordination, and establishes what counts as cooperation in a prisoner’s
dilemma.13
Such patterns of behavior can arise in a decentralized fashion, in
which case they are identified as rules of customary international law (CIL).
But CIL rules tend to be relatively unclear, making cooperation and
coordination by custom relatively fragile. Through communication,
negotiation, and drafting common documents, nations can clarify their
expectations about the opportunities for the joint gains that can be achieved by
coordination and cooperation. In a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, a clear rule
of cooperation can reduce both opportunism and unintended defections from
2006] THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP 467
14
Bodansky says that “if international law has little potential to constrain state behavior,
then we have little reason to try to develop it.” Bodansky, supra note 4, at 287. This is untrue
if “constraint” is understood as we explain it in the previous paragraph.
the cooperative game. In a coordination situation, a clear rule reduces the
likelihood of an unintended failure of coordination.
Once the rule of cooperation or focal point for coordination is established
by custom or treaty, nations comply for one of three general (and not mutually
exclusive) reasons. The first is fear of retaliation in a prisoner’s dilemma.
Each state complies with the rule because it fears retaliation, and a loss of the
cooperative surplus, if it does not. The second is fear of a failure of
coordination. A CIL rule or treaty works by aligning the relevant expectations
and helping parties to avoid the costs of failing to coordinate. A third and quite
different reason is fear of reputational loss from failing to comply with the rule.
Under this theory, international law does not pull states toward compliance
contrary to their interests. International law emerges from states pursuing their
interests to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes, and it is sustained to the
degree to which it continues to serve those interests. When international law
changes, as it often does, it does so because state interests (again, state
preferences over international relations outcomes) change due (for example)
to changes in technology, or in relative wealth, or in domestic government.
The transition from the old to new rule of international law is not always
smooth, for the world lacks stable international institutions—legislatures,
regulatory agencies, effective courts—to facilitate the change. Instead, we
often see violation, rhetorical clashes, retaliation, and sometimes war as the
international order shifts from an old to a new equilibrium.
With this background, it should be clear that we do not, as many of our
critics suggest, think international law is irrelevant or unimportant. It is very
important, and indeed often crucial, in helping nations to reap gains from (and
avoid losses from) interaction. Nor do we think that international law is
inconsequential. The terms of a treaty matter to the gains each state receives
from the treaty through cooperation or coordination. That is why states
negotiate so intensely over treaty terms. We even accept that international law
“constrains” states, as long as one is careful to understand “constraint” to mean
that when international law establishes a focal point for coordination or the
cooperative solution in a prisoner’s dilemma, nations wanting to reap the
benefits of coordination or cooperation will be constrained to abide by the
coordinating or cooperating solution.
We do, however, think it is generally wrong and theoretically unhelpful to
view international law as an exogenous force on state behavior.14
In that sense,
468 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 34:463
15
But not Hans Morgenthau. McGuinness claims that Morgenthau argued that
“international law does not affect interstate relations and is therefore unworthy of much
scholarly attention.” McGuinness, supra note 4, at 394. To the contrary, Morgenthau thought
international law played an important role in international relations and he devoted significant
scholarly attention to it, see HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 249-86 (2d ed.
1955); Hans Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT’L
L. 260 (1940), although he did criticize excessive doctrinalism and excessive optimism about
international law’s ability to foster collective security.
and that sense primarily, our theory does not give international law the same
type of importance attributed to it by traditional international law scholars. In
addition, we show throughout the book that the evidence traditional scholars
have used to show the exogenous force of international law is susceptible to
multiple plausible interpretations, including the very simple interpretation that
states are acting consistently with the law because the law does not require that
they deviatefromtheirprivateinterest(the“coincidenceofinterest”paradigm).
Perhaps some scholars mistake the last claim to be an argument that
international law does nothing at all—a claim associated with some “realists”
in political science15
—but that is a serious misreading of our book.
It is true that our book emphasizes the “Limits” of international law, and
that we are more skeptical than most scholars about what international law
might accomplish. But it is important to understand why, in our view,
international law is so limited. International law is limited because it is a
product of, and is bounded by, state interests and the distribution of power.
Given the multiple conflicting interests of states on various issues, and the
particular distribution of state power with respect to those issues, many global
problems are unsolvable. To recognize this point is not to reject international
law.
Indeed, the view to the contrary implicitly adopts a kind of “Whig” theory
of the development of international law, analogous to the long discredited
Whig theory of history, which holds that history is a story of constant
improvement toward some ideal end. International law scholars recognize the
current imperfection of international law, but, lacking a theory of the limits of
international law, see no reason why this imperfection should be tolerated.
Thus, they are drawn to the conclusion that international law can only get
better, and all that stands in the way of its improvement is error or ideological
rigidity. This is not a plausible view of either international law or history.
IV. REPUTATION AND THE ROBUSTNESS OF MULTILATERAL
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
2006] THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP 469
16
Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379,
381-82 (2006).
17
GOLDSMITH &POSNER, supra note 1, at 102. For our reliance on reputational arguments,
see id. at 31, 93, 103-04, 172-75.
18
With respect to the first approach, we set it aside for methodological reasons, and we
question its empirical basis, see id. at 9-10, 103, but we did not claim to demonstrate that it is
untrue.
Guzman says that we “dismiss reputation” and “ignore reputation
altogether”—at least with regard to multilateral cooperation.16
This is not quite
so. Limits relies on reputational theories of compliance “throughout the
book,”17
including in our analysis of multinational institutions. But Limits is
indeed much more cautious than Guzman in its reliance on reputational
arguments.
There are several ways that economists model reputation, and these ways
can all be applied to international legal compliance, as a matter of theory. First,
one might simply assume that a state incurs a reputational cost whenever it
violates international law. Second, one might use a model of asymmetric
information, where states comply with international law in order to show that
they have characteristics that make them appealing cooperative partners with
other states. Third, one might rely on the simple iterated prisoner’s dilemma,
where information is complete and states keep promises only to avoid
retaliation.
One cannot dismiss any of these approaches out of hand, and we did not in
Limits.18
But we think the first and second are less fruitful approaches than the
third, and we rely mainly on the third in the book. The first has the virtue of
simplicity, but, as we noted in Limits, it assumes what needs to be
explained—namely, why statescomply withinternationallaw. The second can
be used to explain compliance, but it is much more complicated than the third,
and is thus difficult to test. The third has the virtue of simplicity and
testability. For this reason, the book relies mainly on the third theory, though
in several places (especially in chapters 4 and 6), we rely on the second theory
as well.
One of the hypotheses that can be derived from the third approach (but not
the second, at least not as clearly) is that compliance with a treaty should
decline as the number of state parties increases. This hypothesis is familiarly
known as the collective action problem. While this is hardly a novel claim, it
is ignored by traditional international law scholarship, which attributes greater
significance to multilateral treaties and international organizations than to oldfashioned
bilateral treaties, which, on our account, should be more robust.
470 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 34:463
19
Id. at 87-88.
20
Id. at 102.
21
Kal Raustiala, Refining The Limits of International Law, 34 GA.J.INT’L &COMP.L. 423,
429 (2006).
22
The U.N. data base contains 517 multilateral treaties, but it is not clear whether this
collection is comprehensive. It does appear to hold all major multilateral treaties; there may be
other such treaties that are of minor importance. See http://untreaty.un.org/English/access.asp.
Indeed, we argue that the main function of multilateral treaties is to provide
focal points around which pairs of state cooperate.19
Two important
implications follow from this view. First, bilateral collective goods will vary
greatly even though all the states are members of the same treaty regime.
Second, multilateral treaties do not solve multilateral collective action
problems; instead, they help states solve multiple bilateral cooperation
problems. These implications are testable, and we support them with evidence
throughout the book; unfortunately, with the exception of Golove, none of our
critics discusses the evidence.
Ultimately, the role played by reputation is, as we noted in Limits, an
empirical question.20
Raustiala, relying in part on credibility (i.e., reputation)
arguments, maintains that states engage in “extensive” and deep multilateral
cooperation.21
If Raustiala is right—if we see multilateral treaties and
international organizations solving genuine multilateral prisoner’s dilemmas
among several dozen or more states—then it would be fair to conclude that
reputational concerns of either the first or second sort outlined above would be
doing more work than we suggest in Limits. But do we really see extensive and
deep multilateral cooperation?
Raustiala notes that there have been over 50,000 treaties since 1945. This
number is much less impressive than it seems. If each of 190 states entered just
two treaties—say, an extradition treaty and a treaty of amity—with every other
state, this would amount to about 36,000 treaties. All of these bilateral treaties
might (at best) reflect genuine bilateral cooperation, but would say nothing
about multilateral cooperation. And of course most nations have many more
than two bilateral treaties. So the 50,000 figure is misleading, since the vast
majority of the 50,000 treaties are merely bilateral treaties that do not purport
to reflect multilateral cooperation. More relevant is the multilateral treaty, of
which, according to the U.N., there are perhaps 500 or 600.22
In our book, we
address only a half dozen or so of these treaties, and provide evidence that they
do not reflect genuine multilateral cooperation. Do the remaining treaties
actually solve n-player collective action problems? Or do they do other things,
2006] THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP 471
23
Raustiala, supra note 21, at 429 (emphasis added).
24
At least not before 9/11, when the NATO nations agreed that the attacks on the United
States triggered Article 5. But the subsequent response of NATO to the 9/11 attacks has hardly
been an example of solving a multinational prisoner’s dilemma, or even of compliance with the
NATO treaty.
25
Our claim is not that NATO has been inconsequential. We think it has been consequential
in discrete contexts, but that international law’s contribution to these consequences is the
establishment, in the NATO treaty, of a coordinating forum and process.
26
See generally MICHAEL GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER:
INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOSOVO (2001).
27
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, ch. 5.
like provide coordination for pairwise cooperation (our conjecture), express
symbolic commitments, or simply fail because they were too ambitious?
These are important questions, and we lack space and time to analyze and
address the literatures cited by Raustiala. But we do have simple answers to
Raustiala’s questions: “Why [do] NATO, the WTO, the U.N., and the many
other international organizations that populate New York, Geneva and
elsewhere [exist],” and “why, if international law is so limited, do states keep
creating and elaborating it?”23
Raustiala and we agree that nations entered into
these treaties because they perceived that they gained more than they lost from
them. But what they gained from these three treaties in particular was not, we
think, the solution to a multilateral prisoner’s dilemma. Article 5 of the NATO
treaty imposes an important obligation of mutual self-defense that was never
tested.24
The rest of the treaty imposes empty obligations (such as settling
disputes by peaceful means and strengthening free institutions) and performs
the coordinating function of providing a forum and basic procedural rules
whereby different constituencies can come together to solve particular
problems at the retail level, often in small groups.25
This coordinating function
is also the primary accomplishment of the U.N. Charter. The Charter does, to
be sure, impose strict obligations about the use of force, but these obligations
have been honored in the breach.26
As for the WTO, we argued in Limits that
it is an example of an institution that is best understood as resolving bilateral
disputes between states.27
These answers are necessarily compressed, and there is much more to say
about what multilateral institutions accomplish. But even these observations
do lead us to flip Raustiala’s question above and ask, “Why, if international
law is not so limited, do states keep failing to create effective international
law?” There are pressing international problems—war, refugee crises, global
warming, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, international terrorism, the
depletion of fisheries, intrastate conflict, lingering protectionism—that states
472 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 34:463
28
Id. at 6.
29
Id. at 91-95, 104-06, 138-39.
30
Id. at 6.
are unable to solve. A good theory would explain both why international law
exists and why it remains highly imperfect. Limits tries to do this. Other
theories—at least other theories in the legal academy—do not.
V. STATE ACTORS AND STATE INTERESTS
Limits assumes that the relevant agent is the state, not the individual. We
talk of states acting in their interest, rather than individuals causing states to act
in their (the individuals’) interest. As we explain in Limits, we generally
identify the state interest with the interest (preferences) of its leadership—an
interest that can be informed by many factors.28
The most prevalent criticism
of Limits concerns its focus on the state as the relevant actor, and on the
concept of a state “interest.” We explained these choices in Limits, but we add
further thoughts here.
The assumption that collective entities like states act instrumentally to
achievecertainendstracksordinary languageandhasprovenextremely fruitful
in the social sciences. In economics, it is conventional to assume that
households, firms, corporations, governments, and—yes—states make
decisions and take actions based on instrumental calculations. In political
science, it is conventional to assume that Congress, the judiciary, parliament,
governments, and—yes—states similarly make decisions and take actions to
maximize their preferences. In these and other fields, scholars implicitly
assume that collective entities act instrumentally. The claim that any good
social science theory must assume that individuals are the relevant agents
would require one to reject a huge swath of influential scholarship going back
decades.
We do not deny that one can learn something about leaders’ preferences
(and thus about state interests) by looking at the domestic influences that
inform those preferences. Indeed, in many places in the book—for example,
in talking about the role of legislatures in ratification, or about how domestic
interest groups determine a state’s interest related to trade, or about how
bureaucrats and courts foster compliance with international law—we do just
this.29
In this sense, our focus on the preference of government leaders as the
embodiment of the state interest is, as we explained in Limits, a parsimonious
methodological choice that can be modified in discrete contexts when focus on
the domestic politics underlying leaders’ preferences would be fruitful.30
2006] THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP 473
31
Many others have taken this approach. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, States, NGOs, and
International Environmental Institutions, 41 INT’L STUD. Q. 719 (1997).
McGuinness and Raustiala urge us to reject our presumptive focus on the
state and rely more thoroughly and systematically on domestic politics. They
argue that if we did, we might find reasons to be less skeptical of international
law’s power to foster cooperation. We are doubtful that a more thorough
examination of domestic politics would lead to this conclusion, for we doubt
that domestic actors systematically prefer international legalization or
international law compliance to their opposites. Of course we might be wrong;
it might be possible to build up a comprehensive theory of international law
based on domestic politics and domestic actors that would be superior to, and
more optimistic than a theory that rested primarily on government leaders and
the state itself. We suspect that such a theory would be too complicated and
fine-grained to yield general insights or predictions, but we will not know
whether this is true until someone proposes such a theory. As far as we know,
no one has. Although there is an interesting body of literature (some of which
McGuinness and Raustiala cite) that tries to find correlations in particular
contexts between international law and domestic political structure, no one
writing in this literature offers a general theory of international law. We
suspect the reason is that most of the interesting features of international law
can be explained by simple assumptions about the state interest in discrete
contexts, as opposed to lower-level or more fine-grained phenomena, which
introduce unnecessary complexity. But again, we emphasize, we could be
wrong, and as mentioned above, we sometimes found it useful for
understanding the state interest to look at domestic politics.
McGuinness and Spiro make a different point about individual actors. They
say that our theory is flawed because it leaves NGOs and other non-state actors
out of the equation. In our view NGOs are like other interest group inputs that
help determine the state interest.31
We also make an important point—largely
overlooked in the literature and in the commentaries—that NGOs have no
particular interest in forcing states to comply with international law as opposed
to whatever goals or agendas those NGOs have. McGuinness and Spiro want
to give NGOs a more elevated status, but while they provide many stories, their
claims are vague and they fail to advance a theory that makes sense of the
significance of these actors. They both say, for example, that NGOs influence
international norms more than they influence international law, a point we do
not address in Limits. Spiro calls our failure to address such influence a
“formalist dodge,” because we focus on how legal rules and institutions, as
474 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 34:463
32
For criticisms of the various NGO theories of international law, see Eric A. Posner,
International Law and the Disaggregated State, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 797 (2005).
33
David M. Golove, Leaving Customary International Law Where It Is: Goldsmith and
Posner’s The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L COMP. L. 333, 337-38 (2006).
34
See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 109-10 (defining state interest in the
human rights context); id. at 138-39 (defining state interest in the trade context).
35
Golove, supra note 33, at 338.
opposed to other factors, affect international behavior. But we are not engaged
in a formalist dodge; we are trying to figure out how international law, as
opposed to scores of other factors, influence state behavior. In a book about
the “limits of international law,” we do not take a position on whether norm
cascades, religious movements, the actions of great leaders like Napoleon and
Gandhi, frenzies of nationalism, multinational institutions or NGOs like
Amnesty International and Microsoft Corporation, and other economic,
sociological, and psychological phenomena, might affect the behavior of states
or the people who lead them. Indeed, compared to these kinds of phenomena,
we suspect international law is often of minor importance. Perhaps
McGuinness and Spiro agree? McGuinness and Spiro jumble up international
law and non-legal norms into a witch’s brew of influences on state behavior.
But this explains nothing, and only highlights the fact that their assertions
about the influences of NGOs are not based on a theory about how, or when,
or why they have influence (and how, or when, or why they do not).32
Golove and others complain about our use of the concept of state interest.33
Golove is wrong to claim that we do not specify a state’s interest, for we were
careful to do so in discrete contexts.34
His real objection seems to be that our
concept of state interest is too fluid and too context-dependent.35
Any
instrumental account of state behavior—and Golove does not object to
instrumental accounts in general—must posit what the state is trying to
maximize. And, of course, there is nothing unusual, in everyday talk or in
social science, about ascribing different preferences to states in different
contexts. When economists model the behavior of corporations, they often
assume that corporations maximize value to shareholders; but sometimes they
assume that corporations maximize the interests of their managers or some
combination of shareholders’ and managers’ interests. There is no single right
way to model the interest of the corporation; the correct modeling strategy
depends on the problem to be studied. Similarly, we do not assume that there
is a single state interest like security or prosperity; a complex aggregation of
factors influences such as leaders’ decisions on the international stage, and so
generalization is hazardous.
2006] THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP 475
36
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 138-39.
37
Id. at 109-10.
38
Id. chs. 1-2.
39
Spiro, supra note 4, at 455; Golove, supra note 33, at 348.
40
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 45.
41
Spiro, supra note 4, at 455.
But when one moves from abstract discussions and tries to understand a
particular area of international law, it becomes possible to make reasonable
conjectures about leaders’ preferences and thus about state interests. In the
case of trade, for example, we agree with the approach of economists who
assume that states maximize the interests of domestic exporters, importcompeters,
and consumers.36
In the case of human rights, we assume that states
do care to some degree about abuses in other states.37
Both of these
assumptions reflect common sense, both are possibly wrong, and both are the
subject of valuable literatures. But however one ends up specifying the state
interest (and it is noteworthy that our critics do not challenge our specifications
in particular contexts), the structural factors identified by our theory—general
problems of collective action and coercion, and the opportunities of
coordination and cooperation—remain relevant.
VI. CIL, CASE STUDIES, HISTORY
In Limits we argued that because CIL rules were vaguer, more contested,
and more ambiguous than rules embodied in treaties, CIL did a poorer job than
treaties of fostering cooperation and coordination, and as a result was more
fragile than treaties. We examined four case studies of supposedly well-settled
CIL rules and concluded that the behaviors associated with these rules were
more consistent with our theory than with other accounts of CIL.38
Golove and Spiro say that our CIL case studies suffer from selection bias.39
We are sensitive to problems of selection bias, and (unlike the overwhelming
majority of international law scholarship) we explained the reasons we chose
our case studies. We chose them because (a) they were supposed to be settled
rules of CIL, according to the literature, and thus hard cases for us, and (b)
there was lots of historical evidence that we could explore to test our theory.40
Spiro criticizes us for looking at “musty old rules of little contemporary
relevance or interest.”41
We looked for well-settled contemporary rules of CIL
against which to test our theory, but frankly could not find a single example.
The CIL of human rights is much talked about, of course. But as we explained
in a different part of Limits, the gap between what this CIL requires and the
476 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 34:463
42
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 132-33.
43
Golove, supra note 33, at 362, 370-74.
44
Id. at 363-64.
actual behavior of states is vast.42
We thus did not think that human rights was
a plausible candidate for a case study of a CIL—it would have been too easy
a case to discredit—and we doubt Spiro would either. We also looked at other
CIL rules—for example, rules concerning prescriptive jurisdiction, or various
modern aspects of the laws of war—and again could not find any settled and
uncontroversial examples. In Limits we invited critics to offer different
examples of CIL—modern or traditional—that contradict our hypothesis. No
one at this symposium did.
We also invited critics to examine our case studies for accuracy and
completeness. Golove took us up on this offer and his examination of
historical materials concerning neutrality rules in the Civil War is useful and
illuminating. There is much to agree with and argue about here, but we will
focus on Golove’s two central themes.
The first theme is that the relevant CIL rules were actually much less settled
than we claimed in the 1860s, and thus the United States’ response, while
perhaps hypocritical, technically did not violate CIL.43
As Golove notes, many
treatise writers have claimed that the United States did in fact violate various
CIL rules of neutrality during the Civil War.44
We will not attempt to further
defend this view, for such a defense would (because of the hopelessly contested
nature of CIL) involve irresolvable arguments about what types of, and how
much, evidence constitutes a settled and binding rule of CIL. We instead make
three other points related to the broader themes in Limits.
First, a remarkable aspect of Golove’s history is how rigorously
instrumental both U.S. and British leaders were in calculating whether and how
to comply with CIL. Golove provides no evidence of leaders being motivated
by moral obligation to follow international law, or by internalized habit, or by
the pull of legitimacy. Second, Golove basically argues that an apparently
settled rule of CIL was not in fact settled or binding, because the rule in fact
was a complex standard or a nuanced group of rules-and-exceptions. This is
a typical response to arguments and evidence that CIL rules do not constrain
states. But this typical move in an area of supposedly settled CIL just
underscores our main point about why CIL is so weak and manipulable. Third,
as Golove briefly notes, the fragile CIL rules of neutrality did not survive
World War I. This point is a useful reminder of an important dimension of
international law (especially CIL) that our theory makes sense of, but that
traditional theories neglect, namely: international law changes, sometimes
2006] THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP 477
45
Such changes happen not only when a regime fails altogether, as in the neutrality case,
but also in cases (such as with the U.N. Charter) where treaty terms stay constant but practices
associated with treaties change dramatically as the political situation in the world changes.
46
Golove, supra note 33, at 337.
47
Id. at 365.
48
Id. at 345.
frequently. This usually happens when exogenous shocks of various sorts are
followed by “violations” of international law as states adjust to a new
equilibriumreflectingthe new configuration of power and interest.45
Theselast
two points highlight an irony in Golove’s argument: He begins by criticizing
us for claiming that CIL is “weak and unstable,”46
but he then tells a story
about how it was weaker and less stable and more manipulable than we
imagined at the outset of the Civil War, and did not survive World War I. If
this is what Golovemeansby “leaving customary international law where it is,”
we concur.
Golove’s second major theme is more of a challenge to the theory
articulated in Limits. Whileourempiricalanalysis focused on the United States
side of the war, Golove also looked at the British side. And what he found was
that leaders in Great Britain, in deciding how to respond to the United States’
“switch” to embrace something closer to the traditional British view of
neutrality, cared about the effects of their actions on disputes with third parties
in future wars. It is no surprise to our theory that British leaders were thinking
instrumentally about the future. Nor is it a surprise to our theory that the law
of nations was relevant in “framing and often in resolving” disputes, a point
that we emphasize throughout Limits. But what does raise an interesting
question for our theory is the fact that British officials “believed that the
precedents established by the U.S. measures would serve British interests in
future wars, not only with regard to the United States but also with regard to
states more generally.”47
What might explain this fact? It is possible, as Golove suggests, that
“reputation may play a wider role [than we claim], affecting not only future
bilateral relations between the cooperating and defecting states but the future
interactions between the defecting state and third parties.”48
British worries
about the third-party effects of switching (or maintaining) certain neutrality
rules might be evidence of a more robust role for reputation, just as (as we
suggested above) evidence of deep and widespread multilateral treaty
cooperation would. This possibility would not represent a challenge to our
instrumental framework, but would weaken our claim that bilateralism
predominates and suggest a more robust role in our framework for reputation.
478 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 34:463
49
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 54-59, 87-88, 130, 144-60.
50
Buchanan asserts that the claim that nations lack a moral obligation to comply with
international law is obvious and hardly worthy of discussion. Buchanan, supra note 5, at 309.
The point may be obvious to Buchanan, but it has not been obvious to many law professors and
advocates, and thus we welcome Buchanan’s concurrence. Buchanan further maintains that
cosmopolitan theorists do not, as we suggest, ascribe cosmopolitan duties to institutions. Id. at
Another possibility, however, is that Britain was attempting to maintain its
traditional policy stance as the focal point for what counted as cooperation in
independent bilateral encounters. Neutrality is a classic example of
international law that reflects multiple pairwise relationships rather than a
genuine collective good. Britain was constantly at war during the nineteenth
century, and it no doubt wanted the rest of the world to know what its policy
on neutrals was, so that small wars would not inadvertently become big wars.
Embracing a different rule with the Americans would have ambiguated the
content of its policy and weakened its ability to “cooperate” in future conflicts
with different states. As discussion in Limits of diplomatic immunity and
multilateral treaties suggests, states will often (for the sake of convenience)
promote or agree to uniform rules but violate them bilaterally and selectively,
depending on the degree of conflict of interest with the various other states to
which the rules nominally apply.49
We do not know whether Golove is right or we are. One way to decide
would be to examine whether Britain adopted uniform neutrality policies, in
practice, vis-à-vis all (or, we would accept, most) states, regardless of whether
they are more or less powerful, or more or less important for British strategic
interests. If Britain talked the same game, but sometimes acted differently
depending on the nature of the bilateral relationship, that would support our
view—indeed, it would be consistent with other case studies in our book,
especially the one concerning the rules governing ambassadorial immunity. If
Britain’s deeds matched its words regardless of the bilateral pairing, that would
support Golove’s view.
VII. NORMATIVE ISSUES
Buchanan focuses on chapters 7 and 8 of Limits, where we argued that
nations have no moral obligation to comply with international law, and that
liberal democratic nations have no duty to engage in strong cosmopolitan
action like ratifying treaties that do not promote national welfare or engaging
in humanitarian intervention. Buchanan does not believe these arguments are
important, and thus he does not engage them.50
Instead, he changes the subject
2006] THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP 479
321, n.20. On this point he is simply wrong. In addition to the prominent scholars cited in
Limits whom Buchanan does not discuss, see GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 207-08,
Martha Nussbaum’s recent book Frontiers of Justice (to take yet one more example) expressly
ascribes cosmopolitan duties to institutions. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE:
DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 306-10 (2006). Buchanan claims that
Nussbaum does not ascribe cosmopolitan obligations to institutions, see Buchanan, supra note
5, at 321, n.20, but in Frontiers and elsewhere she clearly does. Moreover, Buchanan complains
that Limits indiscriminately lumps together cosmopolitan theorists like Nussbaum with Michael
Green, whose work ascribing cosmopolitan obligations to institutions Buchanan does not seem
to take seriously. Id. But Nussbaum explicitly relies upon Green’s work in attributing
cosmopolitan duties to institutions. NUSSBAUM, supra, at 308, 444.
51
Buchanan, supra note 5, at 312-13.
52
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 109-10.
to focus on the moral obligations of individuals. In particular, he maintains
that our state-centered claims do not adequately address a point that he takes
to be fundamental, namely: that individuals have a moral obligation to cause
their nations to promote the rule of law in international affairs. Buchanan
thinks that if individuals do in fact have such obligations, and if they act on
those obligations, then states that represent them might not act merely
instrumentally, but rather might act in ways to achieve moral progress or to
attain cosmopolitan goals.51
Buchanan is confused about what international law, conceived in purely
instrumental terms, might accomplish. If morally motivated citizens convince
agovernment(perhapsonpenalty ofnon-reelection)toengageincosmopolitan
action or further the international rule of law, then the nation would be acting
instrumentally to further its interests. Nothing in our instrumental approach to
international law rules out the types of moral state action that Buchanan is so
eager to preserve, and indeed, Limits discussed examples of such state
behavior.52
Buchanan is right to say that Limits provides many descriptive and
normative reasons to be skeptical of his robust moralistic conception of what
internationallawmightaccomplish,but(asAnderson’sessayattimessuggests)
nothing in an instrumental approach to international law rules out this
conception per se. (Indeed, Buchanan assumes that his moral individuals will
cause their governments to serve their preferences on the international
stage—an instrumental state-centered conception.)
Setting aside for a moment the degree to which Buchanan engages the
arguments in Limits, what about his central claim that individuals have a moral
obligation to cause their nations to promote the rule of law in international
affairs? The first thing to notice about Buchanan’s argument is that he says
nothing concrete about what it means to promote the international rule of law.
480 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 34:463
53
Buchanan, supra note 5, at 309.
54
Id. at 316.
55
For a philosophically skeptical take on the possibility of global justice, see Thomas Nagel,
The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113 (2005); see also Jack Goldsmith &
Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, 132 DAEDALUS (2003), available at 2003 WLNR
6542939.
He suggests vaguely that the ideal rule of international law would protect
individuals’ interests and autonomy.53
He then lists standard elements of the
domestic rule of law—generality, stability, impartiality, publicity, equality
before the law, conflict resolution that does not rest primarily on power, and
principled deliberation.54
How do these elements apply to the international rule
of law, and what relationship do they bear to individuals’ interests and
autonomy?
We have no idea. Buchanan says that commitment to the international rule
of law does not require adherence to international law, and indeed he advocates
violation of international law in humanitarian intervention and other contexts.
But what, then, is the international rule of law? Is it the idea that international
law should apply to states generally and impartially? Regardless of their
relative power, or domestic form of governance? Are states supposed to
engage in principled deliberation in designing international institutions? Does
this mean that relative power and self-interest should be off the table in
international negotiations? How, in a decentralized world of necessarily quite
different nation-states (an assumption Buchanan embraces, as he pooh-poohs
world government), are we supposed to establish this international rule of law?
Does Buchanan have in mind the rule-of-law idea that a person should have the
chance to defend herself before an impartial forum prior to conviction for a
crime? It is not clear how this idea might be applied to states that are accused
of violating international law. There is no neutral international forum; and it
is not clear that a neutral international forum is possible, or that the type of
forumthat might be realistic should have the power to resolve disputes between
states, or that states would comply with the decisions of such a forum, or that
states should be punished for violating international law that reflects the
interests of powerful nations or that is made by non-democratic nations; and so
on. Finally, would Buchanan’s international rule of law better promote
individual freedom and autonomy more than the current international system
does? How, realistically?55
Buchanan does not address these or scores of other obvious issues that must
be addressed in order to assess whether the international rule of law is an
attractive ideal. Rather than pursue these considerations, he simply asserts that
2006] THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP 481
56
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 221-23.
57
Ironically, in other work Buchanan distances himself from what he regards as the woollyheaded
reform-the-U.N. style of scholarship, and claims that reform for the sake of advancing
the international rule of law must be consistent with international realities. See ALLEN E.
BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004). However, lacking a theory of the limits of state behavior, he
proposes institutions—such as an EU-operated military force that would intervene in
humanitarian crises—that are themselves no less dubious. For a discussion and critique of his
views on these grounds, see Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach, U. CHI.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
the ideal is possible and attractive and asserts that individuals have a moral
obligation to achieve it. Buchanan is right that Limits does not address the
ideal of the international rule of law. It does not address this ideal because the
ideal is inadequately defined—in Buchanan’s work and more generally.
In addition to arguing that individuals have a duty to cause their states to
further the international rule of law, Buchanan argues that individuals have a
duty to cause their states to engage in more cosmopolitan action. Individuals
should cause states to engage in more humanitarian intervention, to give away
more wealth to poor countries, to enter into treaties that further global welfare
even at the expense of local welfare, and the like. This is an idea that we at
least understand. But as far as the project of Limits is concerned, it suffers
from two problems.
The first is that, as a matter of descriptive fact, individuals usually do not
live up to the obligations that Buchanan says they have. Even liberal
democracieswithpopulationsthatareby reputationmuchmoreother-regarding
than the United States are not much interested in humanitarian intervention,
and give away only a pittance (and a diminishing pittance) of their GDP to poor
countries (and even then in self-regarding ways).56
And the validity of
Buchanan’s optimistic take on the possibilities of human development to
support more humanitarian action must be considered in light of the failures in
the Sudan following the supposedly important lessons learned in Rwanda.57
The second and related point is that Buchanan’s entire argument turns on
individuals both possessing moral duties to cause states to engage in more
cosmopolitan action, and acting on these duties successfully. If individuals do
not in fact have the obligations that Buchanan posits, or if they violate their
obligations, or if they are members of a disempowered minority, then, as we
arguedinLimits,thereislittlelegitimatebasis,withindemocraticgovernments,
for leaders to engage in cosmopolitan action of the type Buchanan wants to
preserve.
482 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 34:463
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP
By way of conclusion, we return to where we began, to the emerging
consensus about the appropriate path of international law scholarship. The
consensus is reflected not only in the essays of most of the contributors; it is
also reflected in much recently published work by authors not present at the
symposium. The consensus marks a decisive rejection of the old style of
internationallawscholarship,andthereforewethinkitappropriatetorecognize
the emergence of a “New International Law Scholarship.”
The New International Law (NIL) scholars are a diverse group, and it is
always difficult to generalize. Nonetheless, we claim that NIL scholars differ
from traditional scholars along one—or more frequently, more—of the
following dimensions.
Positive v. Normative. NIL scholars distinguish normative and positive
claims, and state positive claims as hypotheses that can, in principle, be tested.
Traditional scholars tended to confuse normative and positive claims.
Empiricism. NIL scholars are interested in doing empirical scholarship,
includingbothquantitativeandqualitativestudies. NILscholarstry toevaluate
evidence that might contradict their theories. Traditional scholars tend to
choose anecdotes that best support their arguments.
Skepticism. The scholarly attitude is one of skepticism toward received
wisdom and easy answers. NIL scholars take a skeptical attitude toward the
efficacy of international law and institutions. Traditional scholars defend
internationallawandseekto“advance”internationallaw, which usually means
both subjecting more of international relations to it and revising it in order to
make it consistent with liberal internationalism. As noted above, the historical
sense of international law scholars is Whiggish rather than scholarly.
Anti-doctrinalism. NIL scholars focus on doctrinal scholarship less than
traditional scholars. Although doctrinal scholarship is important, traditional
international legal scholars spend too much time on it, and not enough on
understanding the theoretical underpinnings of doctrine.
Social Science. NIL scholars are influenced by social scientific theory and,
especially, rational choice theory. Traditional scholars do not completely
ignore theory, but they use theory mainly as a source of rationalizations, and
in some cases rely on philosophical rather than social scientific theories.
However, much of traditional scholarship is devoid of theoretical
underpinnings.
Most of our critics at this symposium share our commitment to most of
these values. This is a good sign. Another good sign can be found in law
school hiring trends, which reflect increasing impatience among non-
2006] THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP 483
58
As Raustiala notes, “from the vantage point of political science, some of [Limits’]
conclusions are straightforward, and even obvious at times.” Raustiala, supra note 21, at 443.
As we noted in Limits, our approach to international law is indeed deeply influenced by political
science (and economics), though we differ from the mainstream of these approaches in our focus
on custom, the depth of our commitment to instrumentalism, a few analytical details about
treaties, and our normative arguments. See GOLDSMITH &POSNER, supra note 1, at 15-17. The
quite different reactions to the book by political scientists, who think we are saying little new
on the positive front, and international law scholars, who find the book to be shocking or radical
in some dimensions, is revealing.
international law scholars for the type of scholarship that they left behind
decades ago.
Our optimism about the trend in international law scholarship is only partly
tempered by the politically charged atmosphere of this field. As so many of the
commentators in this symposium make clear, some of the hostility toward our
book reflects the anxiety that more rigorous methodological approaches of the
type that the academy values are incompatible with the traditional liberal
internationalist agenda that has long dominated the international law academy,
and that continues to dominate it today.58
Younger scholars with liberal
internationalist leanings do not want to be identified with the older tradition of
international law scholarship, of which the legal academy is appropriately
contemptuous, and they are committed to methodological rigor. But they also
do not want to abandon their liberal internationalist ideals, and a great deal of
hostility toward our book is, we suspect, a reflection of their anxiety that
methodological rigor and liberal internationalism are mutually exclusive. We
predict, with some misgivings, that much of the NIL scholarship over the next
decade will reflect this tension. It will work hard to demonstrate, in a
methodologically rigorous fashion, that international law can foster robust
multinational cooperation and that the United States and other countries should
create more international law and organizations. Whether it will succeed
remains to be seen.
Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor Eric Posner
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
eposner@uchicago.edu
The University of Chicago Law School
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67. Bernard E. Harcourt, On Gun Registration, the NRA, Adolf Hitler, and Nazi Gun Laws:
Exploding the Gun Culture Wars {A Call to Historians} (June 2004)
68. Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs (July 2004)
69. Derek Jinks, Disaggregating “War” (July 2004)
70. Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act (August 2004)
71. Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death (August 2004)
72. Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Deliberation, Statistical Means, and Information
Markets (August 2004)
73. Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law
(September 2004)
74. Elizabeth Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness and the ADA (September
2004)
75. Adrian Vermeule, Three Strategies of Interpretation (October 2004)
76. Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry (October 2004)
77. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law (October 2004)
78. Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First Amendment Law (November 2004)
79. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy (December 2004)
80. Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War (December 2004)
81. Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice (December 2004)
82. Tim Wu, The Breach Theory of Treaty Enforcement (February 2005, revised March 2005)
83. Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Panics (February 2005)
84. Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal? (March
2005)
85. Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The
Relevance of Life-Life Tradeoffs (March 2005)
86. Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and Disaggregated Redistricting (April 2005)
87. Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and International Law (April 2005)
88. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic (April 2005)
89. Adam B. Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics (April 2005, NYU L. Rev. 70, #3)
90. Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War (May 2005, Harvard L. Rev.,
forthcoming)
91. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero (May 2005)
92. Bernard E. Harcourt, Policing L.A.’s Skid Row: Crime and Real Estate Development in
Downtown Los Angeles [An Experiment in Real Time] (May 2005)
93. Bernard E. Harcourt and Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York
City and a Five-City Social Experiment (May 2005)
94. Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Sentencing, Policing, and Punishing in an
Actuarial Age (May 2005)
95. Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards (May 2005)
96. Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespecting the “Opinions of Mankind” (June 2005)
97. Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decision Architectures (June 2005)
98. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Commons (July 2005)
99. Cass R. Sunstein, Ranking Law Schools: A Market Test? (July 2005)
100. Mary Anne Case, Pets or Meat (August 2005)
101. Adam Samaha, Executive Exposure: Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and
Platforms for Judicial Intervention (August 2005, revised November 2005)
102. Jason J. Czarnezki and William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical
Investigation of Legal Interpretation (August 2005)
103. Adrian Vermeule, Absolute Voting Rules (August 2005)
104. Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure (August 2005)
105. Adrian Vermeule, Reparations as Rough Justice (September 2005)
106. Arthur J. Jacobson and John P. McCormick, The Business of Business Is Democracy
(September 2005)
107. Tracey Meares and Kelsi Brown Corkran, When 2 or 3 Come Together (October 2005)
108. Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform (October 2005)
109. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude (November
2005)
110. Cass R. Sunstein, Fast, Frugal and (Sometimes) Wrong (November 2005)
111. Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s Democratic Pragmatism (November 2005)
112. Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting
Principles (November 2005)
113. Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process: Congressional Referral and Judicial Resistance in the
Schiavo Controversy (November 2005)
114. Bernard E. Harcourt, Should We Aggregate Mental Hospitalization and Prison Population
Rates in Empirical Research on the Relationship between Incarceration and Crime,
Unemployment, Poverty, and Other Social Indicators? On the Continuity of Spatial
Exclusion and Confinement in Twentieth Century United States (January 2006)
115. Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in the Budget Process (January
2006)
116. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism (January 2006)
117. Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure (February 2006)
118. Douglas G. Lichtman, Captive Audiences and the First Amendment (February 2006)
119. Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States (March 2006)
120. Jeff Leslie and Cass R. Sunstein, Animal Rights without Controversy (March 2006)
121. Adrian Vermeule, The Delegation Lottery (March 2006)
122. Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers (March
2006)
123. Bernard E. Harcourt, Muslim Profiles Post 9/11: Is Racial Profiling an Effective
Counterterrorist Measure and Does It Violate the Right to Be Free from Discrimination?
(March 2006)
124. Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias (April 2006)
125. Lior Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone (and Everything?) (April 2006)
126. Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The New International Law Scholarship (May 2006)
127. Eric A. Posner and John Yoo, International Law and the Rise of China (May 2006)
128. Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Chebronizing Foreign Relationsl Law (May 2006)