Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1057761
35
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ICANN DOMAIN NAME
DISPUTE DECISIONS †
David E. Sorkin‡
Since late 1999 more than 3,000 quasi-arbitral proceedings have
been conducted to address disputes involving Internet domain names.1
These proceedings are governed by the Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy (UDRP) adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN).2
A UDRP proceeding is instituted by
a trademark owner who wishes to challenge a domain name.3
If the
UDRP panel orders that the domain name should be transferred to the
trademark owner, that order will be implemented unless the domain
name registrant promptly commences a lawsuit against the trademark
owner.4
Apart from this provision for external judicial review, there
is no appeal mechanism within the UDRP.
Domain name registrants have taken advantage of the right to
seek judicial review in a small but significant number of cases.5
At
†
Copyright © 2001 David E. Sorkin, http://www.sork.com/.
‡
Associate Professor of Law, Center for Information Technology and Privacy Law,
The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. The author serves as a panelist for domain
name dispute proceedings conducted pursuant to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (UDRP) adopted in 1999 by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN). He authored the dissenting opinion in NetLearning, Inc. v. Parisi, No.
FA0008000095471 (NAF Oct. 16, 2000), at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/95471.htm, a proceeding that is discussed in this
Article. The author expresses his gratitude to colleagues who commented on drafts of this
Article or assisted in locating relevant sources, including Diane Cabell, M. Scott Donahey,
Robert S. Gurwin, Laurence R. Helfer, Patrick L. Jones, and Megan Kirk.
1
See ICANN, Statistical Summary of Proceedings Under Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (Nov. 15, 2001), at http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm.
Over half of these proceedings have been conducted by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO). See WIPO, Domain Name Dispute Resolution Service in 2000 (Jan.
2001), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/brochure.pdf.
2
ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (approved Oct. 24, 1999)
[hereinafter ICANN Policy], at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm.
3
See infra text accompanying notes 24–25.
4
See infra text accompanying notes 35–36.
5
See Patrick L. Jones, UDRP Decisions Challenged in Court, THE UNIFORM DOMAIN
NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY LEGAL INFORMATION SITE, at
http://www.udrplaw.net/UDRPappeals.htm (last updated Nov. 30, 2001).
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1057761
36 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
least two U.S. courts thus far have held that they are not bound by
UDRP decisions, although the legal effect of these decisions remains
unclear.6
Courts normally apply an extremely deferential standard of
review to arbitration decisions. As this Article will explain, however,
courts should be very hesitant to place much reliance on the
conclusions of UDRP panels.
Part I of this Article discusses the scope of judicial review of
arbitration decisions generally. Part II describes ICANN’s UDRP
process, including some of the major differences between UDRP
proceedings and conventional arbitration. Part III examines the
experience to date of courts that have addressed disputes subject to
parallel UDRP proceedings.7
Finally, in Parts IV and V, the Article
discusses substantive and procedural objections following UDRP
decisions in legal proceedings, and concludes that a de novo standard
of review is warranted.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION DECISIONS GENERALLY
Arbitration offers numerous benefits. Compared to litigation,
arbitration is a fast, inexpensive, and efficient means of resolving
disputes, and it provides a greater degree of finality.8
Yet it does not
always deliver all of these promised benefits; in particular, arbitration
can be quite expensive and drawn out,9
and it is not uncommon for
those who lose in arbitration to seek recourse in the courts.
Courts apply an extremely narrow standard of review to
arbitration decisions. The Federal Arbitration Act10
provides only
four grounds for vacating an arbitration award, all of them procedural
in nature:
6
See Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752 (E.D. Va. 2001); WeberStephen
Prods. Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg. Supply, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1766, 1768 (N.D. Ill.
2000). The Weber court explicitly declined to decide the standard it would apply to a UDRP
decision, while the Parisi court held merely that the “extreme deference” standard of the Federal
Arbitration Act is not applicable, and implied that parties should be able to seek de novo review
of their underlying dispute.
7
Parallel legal proceedings, for the purposes of this Article, are legal proceedings
involving the same parties and disputed domain name(s) as a pending or completed UDRP
proceeding.
8
See Stephen A. Hochman, Judicial Review to Correct Arbitral Error—An Option to
Consider, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 103, 104 (1997); Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review
of Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471, 471 (1998);
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 433–34 (1988).
9
See Stipanowich, supra note 8, at 450–53.
10
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1994).
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1057761
2001] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ICANN DECISIONS 37
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of
any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.11
Some courts will also reverse arbitration awards that are
arbitrary or capricious, in manifest disregard of the law, or contrary to
public policy, even though these grounds do not appear in the federal
statute,12
and parties themselves may contract for broader judicial
review (for example, for errors of fact or law) in their arbitration
agreement.13
The primary justification for limiting the scope of judicial review
is to preserve the finality of arbitration awards. Absent such a
limitation, a losing party could always appeal to a court, avoiding
finality and defeating the other purposes of arbitration as well.14
Furthermore, courts frequently are not well equipped to address issues
decided in arbitration. Arbitration panels often decide cases without
making detailed findings of law and fact, making it difficult or
impossible for a court to review the substance of a panel’s
conclusions.15
In addition, parties often select arbitrators with
11
Id. § 10(a).
12
See Hochman, supra note 8, at 110; Adam Milam, Comment, A House Built on Sand:
Vacating Arbitration Awards for Manifest Disregard of the Law, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 705, 707
(1998); Karon A. Sasser, Comment, Freedom to Contract for Expanded Judicial Review in
Arbitration Agreements, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 337, 342-43 (2000).
13
See generally Sasser, supra note 12 (favoring expanded judicial review when
contracted for by parties); Di Jiang-Schuerger, Note, Perfect Arbitration = Arbitration +
Litigation?, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 231 (1999) (arguing against expanded review).
14
See Sasser, supra note 12, at 342.
15
The American Arbitration Association discourages arbitrators from publishing
reasoned awards, precisely because a written opinion might invite a losing party to attack the
decision. See Hochman, supra note 8, at 104–05; Stipanowich, supra note 8, at 439. In a
survey of construction attorneys conducted in 1985 and 1986, only about half the respondents
favored requiring arbitrators to provide a written rationale for their awards; most respondents
opposed requiring written conclusions of law, partly because of the likely effect on finality of
decisions. See Stipanowich, supra, at 469.
38 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
specialized industry expertise, sometimes with the intent that the
dispute be decided based on industry standards rather than legal
principles.16
Judges are very unlikely to possess comparable
expertise, and thus would find themselves at a great disadvantage in
reviewing the merits of an arbitration award.
Nonetheless, a number of arguments have been made for
broadening the scope of judicial review. For example, where a
party’s participation in arbitration has effectively been compelled (as,
for example, by an adhesion contract), or where the arbitration award
effectively decides legal questions with important public policy
implications (for example, in employment discrimination cases),
courts may wish to subject arbitration awards to stricter scrutiny.17
Judicial review also may help reduce the incidence of fraud and
abuse.18
An appeal mechanism might encourage parties to enter into
arbitration agreements, cause arbitrators to decide cases more
conscientiously, and promote public confidence in arbitration.19
II. ICANN’S DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) was formed as a nonprofit entity in 1998, primarily at the
instigation of the U.S. Department of Commerce.20
ICANN is
charged with administering the Internet’s addressing systems,
16
See, e.g., Hochman, supra note 8, at 103 (noting that parties in certain industries
historically desired to have disputes decided by industry experts rather than lawyers).
17
See id. at 116–19; Stephen Buehrer, A Clash of the Titans: Judicial Deference to
Arbitration and the Public Policy Exception in the Context of Sexual Harassment, 6 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 265 (1998); Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No
Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 108–17 (1997); Ann C.
Hodges, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on Public Policy Grounds: Lessons from the
Case Law, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 91 (2000); Anthony J. Jacob, Comment, Expanding
Judicial Review to Encourage Employers and Employees to Enter the Arbitration Arena, 30 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1099 (1997); Shelly Smith, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in
Consumer Contracts: Consumer Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 1191 (2001); Elizabeth Tenorio, Note, The Public Policy Exception: A Narrow
Exception to Judicial Review or an Independent Means of Avoiding Arbitration Agreements?,
1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 173 (1997).
18
See Jessica L. Gelander, Comment, Judicial Review of International Arbitral Awards:
Preserving Independence in International Commercial Arbitrations, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 625,
626 (1997).
19
See id. at 626–27; Sasser, supra note 12, at 357.
20
See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn In Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 24, 70–72 (2000); Jonathan Weinberg,
ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 209–12 (2000).
2001] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ICANN DECISIONS 39
including the domain name system.21
ICANN has attracted
considerable attention over the past two years for its role in approving
and rejecting various proposals for new top-level domains (TLDs) to
supplement “.com” and other existing TLDs.22
As the de facto
accrediting agency for domain name registrars, however, ICANN also
has the power to set forth the terms under which registrars may
operate. In particular, ICANN directs accredited registrars to require
domain name registrants to submit to the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy.23
Under the UDRP, any person or entity with rights in a trademark
may initiate an administrative dispute resolution proceeding by
submitting a complaint to one of the four ICANN-approved dispute
resolution service providers: the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), the National Arbitration Forum (NAF),
eResolution, and the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution.24
The
complaint must allege three elements: (1) that the domain name is
identical or confusingly similar to the complainant’s trademark; (2)
that the registrant lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain
name; and (3) that the domain name has been registered and is being
used in bad faith.25
The complainant also must agree to submit to the
jurisdiction of the courts in a “mutual jurisdiction” with respect to a
21
See ICANN, ICANN Fact Sheet, at http://www.icann.org/general/fact-sheet.htm (last
modified Feb. 17, 2001).
22
Much of the controversy surrounding ICANN’s legitimacy appears to stem from its
effective control over expansion of the top-level domain space. See generally Weinberg, supra
note 20; Joe Salkowski, Dot-Com Credentialing Gets More Competitive, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 19,
2001, Bus. sec., at 4; ICANNWATCH, at http://www.icannwatch.org (last visited Nov. 15,
2001).
23
See ICANN, Policies Applicable to ICANN-Accredited Registrars (.com, .net and
.org), at http://www.icann.org/general/consensus-policies.htm (last modified Nov. 5, 1999). See
generally Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The
Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141,
157-89 (2001) (describing the historical evolution of the UDRP), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com (search by title and an author’s name; article is available for downloading
in pdf format).
24
ICANN, Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ¶ 3(a) (approved
Oct. 24, 1999) [hereinafter ICANN Rules], at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-
24oct99.htm; ICANN, Approved Providers for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/approved-providers.htm (last modified Apr. 14, 2001).
The vast majority of disputes are submitted to either WIPO or NAF, possibly because of
perceived relative biases of the various providers. See Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An
Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP 11 (Aug. 2001),
available at http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~geist/geistudrp.pdf; Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: An
Analysis of ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy 26 (Nov. 9, 2000), available at
http://dcc.syr.edu/roughjustice.pdf (finding a correlation between providers’ market share and
tendency to rule in favor of trademark owners).
25
See ICANN Policy, supra note 2, ¶ 4(a).
40 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
challenge to the proceeding.26
The provider then forwards the
complaint to the domain name registrant, who has twenty days to
submit its response.27
UDRP disputes are decided by a panel comprised of one or three
members; unless one of the parties elects a three-member panel, a
single panelist is appointed.28
Each provider maintains a list of
qualified panelists, and the sole or lead panelist is selected from the
provider’s list of panelists. Where a three-member panel is to be
appointed, each party may nominate prospective panelists drawn from
any provider’s list, and the provider administering the proceeding will
attempt to appoint a panelist nominated by each party.29
The panelists
generally are experienced intellectual property attorneys, academics,
or (in the case of the NAF) retired judges.30
The panel is instructed to decide the dispute on the basis of the
statements and documents submitted, applying any rules of law that it
deems applicable.31
Absent exceptional circumstances, the panel is
expected to render a decision within fourteen days of its
26
See ICANN Rules, supra note 24, ¶ 3(xiii). A “mutual jurisdiction” is defined as:
[A] court jurisdiction at the location of either (a) the principal office of
the Registrar (provided the domain-name holder has submitted in its
Registration Agreement to that jurisdiction for court adjudication of
disputes concerning or arising from the use of the domain name) or (b)
the domain-name holder’s address as shown for the registration of the
domain name in Registrar’s Whois database at the time the complaint is
submitted to the Provider.
Id. ¶ 1.
27
See ICANN Policy, supra note 2, ¶ 5(a).
28
The fee varies by provider. WIPO currently charges $1,500 for a single-panelist
proceeding involving up to five domain names, and $3,000 for a three-panelist proceeding. See
WIPO, Schedule of Fees under the ICANN Policy (effective Aug. 15, 2000), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/fees. The fee is paid by the complainant, unless the respondent
opts for a three-member panel, in which case each party pays half of the applicable fee. See
ICANN Rules, supra note 24, ¶ 19.
29
See ICANN Rules, supra note 24, ¶ 6(d).
30
See CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, CPR Specialized Panels: CPR Domain
Name Disputes Panel (ICANN), at http://www.cpradr.org/speclpan_domainname.htm (last
visited Nov. 16, 2001); eResolution, List of Panelists, at
http://www.eresolution.ca/services/dnd/arbitrators.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2001); National
Arbitration Forum (NAF), List of Qualified Dispute Resolution Panelists, at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/panelistResults.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2001); WIPO,
WIPO Domain Name Panelists, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/panel/panelists.html (last
modified Sept. 11, 2001); Christopher S. Lee, The Development of Arbitration in the Resolution
of Internet Domain Name Disputes, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, ¶¶ 34–36 (Fall 2000), at
http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v7i1/article2.html.
31
See ICANN Rules, supra note 24, ¶ 15(a). Panels occasionally cite to statutes and
court decisions, generally from the jurisdiction in which one or both parties are located,
although citations to previous UDRP decisions (and of course to the UDRP itself) are much
more common.
2001] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ICANN DECISIONS 41
appointment.32
The only remedies available are cancellation of the
domain name and transfer of the name to the complainant.33
A panel
also may determine that the complaint was brought in bad faith—a
practice often referred to as reverse domain name hijacking—but such
a determination has no practical effect.34
The panel’s decision is
communicated to the parties and subsequently published on the
provider’s Web site.35
If the panel orders that a domain name be transferred or
cancelled, the domain name registrar ordinarily will implement that
order after ten business days have passed. However, the registrant
may stay that action by commencing a lawsuit against the
complainant in the mutual jurisdiction previously specified by the
complainant. The registrant must furnish documentation of the
lawsuit to the registrar within the ten-day period. The registrar then
will stay implementation of the order pending resolution of the
lawsuit.36
UDRP proceedings differ from conventional arbitration in a
number of ways. Participation in UDRP proceedings is mandatory
for domain name registrants, but optional for trademark owners (as
they are not bound by contracts with domain name registrars), who
32
See id. ¶ 15(b).
33
See id. ¶ 4(i). In practice, cancellation of a domain name is rare, as it causes the
domain name to be released for re-registration by anyone. As a result, knowledgeable
complainants and those represented by capable counsel normally seek transfer rather than
cancellation. See, e.g., ISL Mktg. AG v. Chung, No. D2000-0034 (WIPO Apr. 3, 2000), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0034.html. But see, e.g.,
Montgomery Mall Assocs. L.P. v. Smirk, Inc., No. FA0104000097042 (NAF May 14, 2001)
(ordering cancellation of a domain name, apparently on the ground that neither party ought to
possess exclusive rights in the name), at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/97042.htm; Fiber-Shield Indus., Inc. v. Fiber
Shield Ltd., No. FA0001000092054 (NAF Feb. 29, 2000), at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/92054.htm. Most of the cancellation decisions to
date have been issued by National Arbitration Forum panels, perhaps because panelists affiliated
with other providers tend to have a better understanding of the domain name system. One critic
describes the cancellation option rather coarsely as “a classic case in point of what happens
when stupid people are asked to do something requiring thought.” See John Berryhill, WIPO
Suction, THE UDRP CANCELLED DOMAIN COLLECTION, at http://www.nokiagirls.com (last
visited Nov. 16, 2001).
34
See ICANN Rules, supra note 24, ¶ 15(e).
35
See id. ¶ 16; ICANN Policy, supra note 2, ¶ 4(j). ICANN’s Web site contains links to
the providers’ Web sites and to an engine that searches the text of the decisions. See ICANN,
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm (last
updated Aug. 26, 2001).
36
See ICANN Policy, supra note 2, ¶ 4(k). Some commentators have proposed that an
internal appellate process be made available in lieu of external judicial review. See, e.g., M.
Scott Donahey, Adding Appeals Procedure to Dispute Resolution Might Satisfy ICANN Critics,
6 BNA’S ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 21, 33 (Jan. 10, 2001).
42 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
may choose to take their trademark or related claims directly to
court.37
UDRP decisions are not binding; a losing domain name
registrant can block implementation of a cancellation or transfer order
by filing a lawsuit following the decision, and a losing trademark
owner can resurrect its claim by filing suit or (depending on the
panel) merely by filing a second UDRP complaint.38
UDRP
proceedings are conducted almost exclusively via documents, with
live hearings being rare or nonexistent.39
Furthermore, panelists
generally have only a few days to review these documents, conduct
their deliberations, and draft the decision. It should not be surprising
that they often seem hesitant to delve deeply into contested factual
matters or complex policy questions.40
Default proceedings are commonplace; domain name registrants
do not even file a response in one third to one half of all UDRP cases,
and complainants have prevailed in nearly all such instances.41
UDRP panelists are expected to write reasoned opinions describing
their decisions, and decisions are promptly published on the Web.42
37
See Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 751 (E.D. Va. 2001).
38
See, e.g., High Speed Prod’ns., Inc. v. Thrasher Magazine, Ltd., No.
FA0103000097008 (NAF June 20, 2001) (finding in favor of trademark owner that had lost
previous identical proceeding, citing UDRP decisions on both sides of preclusion question), at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/97008.htm; County Bookshops Ltd. v. Loveday,
No. D2000-0655 (WIPO Sept. 22, 2000) (noting that “the Policy does not absolutely bar a
Complainant from reapplying by filing a new Complaint (subject to payment of a further fee) if
it is able to present more substantial and convincing evidence to justify its claim.”), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0655.html.
39
In-person hearings (including teleconferences) are permitted only if a panel deems a
hearing necessary “as an exceptional matter.” ICANN Rules, supra note 24, ¶ 13.
40
See, e.g., J.L. Wilson Co. v. Ultraviolet Res. Int’l, No. FA0105000097148 (NAF June
18, 2001) (describing UDRP process as “very streamlined,” and suggesting that parties with a
complex dispute resort to litigation), at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/97148.htm; 402 Shoes, Inc. v. Weinstock, No.
D2000-1223 (WIPO Jan. 2, 2001) (noting that courts are better able to address questions of
whether a mark is generic or possesses secondary meaning, since panel is constrained by
summary nature of UDRP process), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1223.html; Bridgestone Firestone,
Inc. v. Myers, No. D2000-0190 (WIPO July 6, 2000) (noting that courts are better suited than
UDRP panels to perform fact-intensive analyses of trademark issues), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html; Jason M. Osborn, Note,
Effective and Complementary Solutions to Domain Name Disputes: ICANN’s Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy and the Federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of
1999, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 209, 247 (2000). But see Ciccone v. Parisi, No. D2000-0847
(WIPO Oct. 12, 2000) (disagreeing with view that UDRP panels should refrain from deciding
disputed factual issues), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0847.html.
41
See John G. White, Note, ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
in Action, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229, 236–37 (2001); Mueller, supra note 24, at 11–12.
42
The panel is instructed to “provide the reasons on which [its decision] is based.”
2001] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ICANN DECISIONS 43
Indeed, the UDRP has in effect given rise to a new system of
international common law, with panelists increasingly citing to, and
relying upon, previous UDRP decisions.43
Commentators have been highly critical of some UDRP
decisions, often arguing that panels have stretched the UDRP far
beyond its intended scope, or that they have simply applied it
incorrectly.44
Nevertheless, relatively few UDRP decisions have been
brought to the courts,45
perhaps because of the high expense of
litigation relative to the value of a domain name, or perhaps because
trademark owners and domain name registrants believe it would be
difficult to convince a court to overturn a UDRP decision.
III. UDRP DISPUTES IN THE COURTS
Limited insight into how courts will consider UDRP panel
rulings is available from five recent federal court decisions. The first,
ICANN Rules, supra note 24, ¶ 15(d).
43
See David G. Post, Juries and the UDRP, ICANNWATCH, at
http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/juries_and_the_udrp.htm (Sept. 6, 2000).
44
See, e.g., Ian L. Stewart, Note, The Best Laid Plans: How Unrestrained Arbitration
Decisions Have Corrupted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 53 FED.
COMM. L.J. 509, 522–24 (2001), available at
http://www.law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v53/no3/stewart.pdf; Mueller, supra note 24, at 23 (listing
seven “Really Bad Decisions”); Doug Isenberg, Net Law Notebook: Cybersquatter Shows Bruce
Springsteen Who’s the Boss, INTERNET WORLD, Feb. 12, 2001, at
http://www.internetworld.com/news/isen/02122001b.html; Brian Livingston, Groups Cite Bias
in Domain Name Arbitration, CNET NEWS.COM, July 7, 2000, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-
1278-210-3287304-1.html; DOMAINSHAME, UDRP BREACHES, at
http://www.domainshame.com/udrpbreaches.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2001); James Love,
CPT Comments to WIPO RFC on Domain Names (Aug. 11, 2000), at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/random-bits/2000-August/000255.html. Among the decisions
that seem to be criticized most frequently are: Tata Sons Ltd. v. D & V Enters., No. D2000-
0479 (WIPO Aug. 18, 2000) (sole panelist) (transferring “bodacious-tatas.com” to India-based
company Tata Sons), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0479.html;
Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona v. Barcelona.com Inc., No. D2000-0505 (WIPO
Aug. 4, 2000) (sole panelist) (transferring “barcelona.com” to city government of Barcelona,
Spain), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0505.html; J. Crew Int’l,
Inc. v. crew.com, No. D2000-0054 (WIPO Apr. 20, 2000) (2-1 decision) (transferring
“crew.com” to trademark owner J. Crew), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0054.html; Hearst Comm., Inc. v.
Spencer, No. FA9003763 (NAF Apr. 13, 2000) (2-1 decision) (transferring “esquire.com” to
publisher of Esquire magazine), at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/93763.htm.
All of these cases were decided in favor of the trademark owner. The most controversial case in
which a domain name registrant prevailed is probably Springsteen v. Burgar, No. D2000-1532
(WIPO Jan. 25, 2001) (2-1 decision) (declining to transfer “brucespringsteen.com” to musician
Bruce Springsteen), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html.
45
See Post, supra note 43.
44 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
Weber-Stephen Products Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Building
Supply,46
involved a trademark lawsuit brought by a manufacturer
against a retailer that had registered webergrills.com and various
other domain names incorporating the manufacturer’s trademarks.47
The manufacturer had initiated a UDRP proceeding one day prior to
filing the lawsuit. The retailer asked the court to declare the UDRP
proceeding non-binding and to stay the court case pending its
resolution.48
Relying largely upon the language of the UDRP itself, the Weber
court noted that the policy contemplates the possibility of parallel
legal proceedings, and that it does not intend UDRP panel decisions
to be binding on courts.49
The court held that it was not bound by the
outcome of UDRP proceedings, and it granted the requested stay.50
However, the court specifically declined to decide the applicable
standard of review and degree of deference that it would apply to a
UDRP decision.51
The second case, Referee Enterprises, Inc. v. Planet Ref, Inc.,52
was a dispute between a magazine publisher and an on-line publisher.
The magazine publisher initiated a UDRP proceeding based upon its
trademark rights in the word “referee” as a magazine title, challenging
the on-line publisher’s use of “ereferee” in various domain names.53
The UDRP panel denied the complaint on the grounds that the on-line
publisher was using the term “referee” legitimately, in its generic
sense.54
The magazine publisher subsequently filed suit in federal
court, alleging various violations of federal trademark law. The court
granted an extremely broad preliminary injunction that prohibited the
46
Weber-Stephen Prods. Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg. Supply, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
1766 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
47
The domain names at issue were webergrills.com, webergrill.com, weber-grills.com,
weber-grill.com, webergrillsource.com, webergrillstore.com, webergrillshowroom.com,
webergrills-ah.com, webgrills.com, and web-grills.com. See Weber-Stephen Prods. Co. v.
Armitage Hardware, No. D2000-0187 (WIPO May 11, 2000), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0187.html.
48
In the alternative, the retailer asked the court to consider whether the retailer could be
compelled to participate in the UDRP proceeding, and to stay the UDRP proceeding pending its
determination of that question. See Weber-Stephen Prods. Co., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1768.
49
See id.
50
See id.
51
See id.
52
Referee Enters., Inc. v. Planet Ref, Inc., No. 00-C-1391 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 24, 2001),
available at http://www.loundy.com/CASES/Referee_Ent_v_Planet_Ref.html.
53
The domain names at issue were ereferee.com, ereferee.net, and ereferee.org. See
Referee Enters., Inc. v. Planet Ref, Inc., No. FA0004000094707 (NAF June 26, 2000), at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/94707.htm.
54
Id.
2001] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ICANN DECISIONS 45
on-line publisher from using any domain name or URL that included
the word “referee.”55
Interestingly, the court did not even mention the
UDRP proceeding in its ruling, perhaps suggesting that it gave the
prior decision no deference at all.56
The third case, Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc.,57
was a declaratory
judgment action brought by a domain name registrant subsequent to
his loss in a UDRP proceeding.58
The trademark owner moved to
dismiss the action, arguing that the complaint failed to allege
sufficient grounds to vacate an arbitration award under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).59
The court denied the trademark owner’s
motion to dismiss, holding that the FAA does not apply to UDRP
proceedings.60
Like the courts in Weber and Referee Enterprises,
however, the Parisi court declined to specify the weight it would give
to a UDRP decision.
The fourth case, Registral.com, LLC v. Fisher Controls
International, Inc.,61
also involved a domain name registrant seeking
to avoid implementation of an unfavorable UDRP ruling. The Fisher
court described the parallel UDRP proceeding in a footnote,62
but did
55
See Referee Enters., Inc. v. Planet Ref, Inc., No. 00-C-1391 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 24, 2001),
available at http://www.loundy.com/CASES/Referee_Ent_v_Planet_Ref.html. The on-line
publisher later was found in contempt for using one of the disputed domain names to redirect
traffic to its new web site, and the parties subsequently settled out of court. See Gretchen
Schuldt, Texas Firm Found in Contempt, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 13, 2001, at 2D,
available at 2001 WL 9344006 and
http://www.jsonline.com/bym/Tech/news/mar01/referee13031201a.asp; Texas, Racine Firms
Settle Internet Lawsuit, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 3, 2001, at 2D, available at 2001 WL
9353805 and http://www.jsonline.com/bym/news/may01/bizbrfs03a1050201.asp.
56
See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Domain Name Litigation – Exclusivity, Finality
and Deference, N.Y.L.J., June 6, 2001, at 3. To the extent that the domain name registrant in
Referee Enterprises fared worse in court than in the UDRP process, this case seems to represent
an anomaly, as trademark owners generally seem to fare better in UDRP proceedings than in
court. See Mark K. Anderson, Ref vs. Ref: Who Decides?, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 9, 2001, at
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,42248,00.html. Nonetheless, it is significant in
that it is one of only a handful of court decisions addressing trademark-related domain name
disputes previously adjudicated under the UDRP.
57
Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2001).
58
See NetLearning, Inc. v. Parisi, No. FA0008000095471 (NAF Oct. 16, 2000), at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/95471.htm. The domain name in question,
“netlearning.com,” had been registered more than one year before the complainant’s first use of
its “NetLearning” trademark. See id.; Raysman & Brown, supra note 56.
59
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1994).
60
Parisi, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 752–53.
61
Registral.com, LLC v. Fisher Controls Int’l, Inc., No. H-01-1423, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10002 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2001).
62
See id. at *8 n.1.
46 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
not otherwise mention or rely upon the result of that proceeding in
reaching its decision on the merits.
Most recently, in Strick Corp. v. Strickland,63
the court cited
Parisi for the proposition that UDRP decisions are subject to de novo
review.64
The domain name owner in Strick prevailed in a UDRP
proceeding and subsequently won on summary judgment in court. As
in Fisher, the court included only a brief mention of the parallel
UDRP proceeding in its decision.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS
Judicial deference to UDRP decisions is problematic in part
because of significant differences in the scope and substance of
parallel UDRP and legal proceedings. At least in theory, the UDRP is
intended to cover only a narrow range of domain name disputes:
claims of “abusive registration” of a domain name made with the
intent to profit from another’s trademark.65
The UDRP itself
contemplates that most domain name disputes, including all
“legitimate” disputes, are beyond its scope.66
Furthermore, although parallel legal proceedings are sometimes
described as appeals of UDRP decisions,67
in fact a UDRP decision
lacks formal legal status, unlike a court judgment or an arbitration
63
Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. Supp. 2d 372 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
64
See id. at 374 & n.5.
65
The ICANN staff report released when the policy was approved describes its scope as
follows:
[The UDRP] calls for administrative resolution for only a small, special
class of disputes. Except in cases involving “abusive registrations” made
with bad-faith intent to profit commercially from others’ trademarks (e.g.,
cybersquatting and cyberpiracy), the adopted policy leaves the resolution
of disputes to the courts (or arbitrators where agreed by the parties) and
calls for registrars not to disturb a registration until those courts decide.
The adopted policy establishes a streamlined, inexpensive administrative
dispute-resolution procedure intended only for the relatively narrow class
of cases of “abusive registrations.” Thus, the fact that the policy’s
administrative dispute-resolution procedure does not extend to cases
where a registered domain name is subject to a legitimate dispute (and
may ultimately be found to violate the challenger's trademark) is a feature
of the policy, not a flaw. The policy relegates all “legitimate” disputes—
such as those where both disputants had longstanding trademark rights in
the name when it was registered as a domain name—to the courts; only
cases of abusive registrations are intended to be subject to the streamlined
administrative dispute-resolution procedure.
ICANN, Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy ¶ 4.1(c) (Oct. 25, 1999), at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-
24oct99.htm.
66
Id.
67
See, e.g., Jones, supra note 5.
2001] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ICANN DECISIONS 47
award.68
A legal action that challenges a UDRP decision therefore
does so only incidentally to the legal claims that the action involves,
claims potentially involving trademark and unfair competition law,
contract law, fraud, conversion, privacy and personality rights, free
speech, due process, public policy, and other matters related to the
parties’ overarching dispute.69
The scope of UDRP proceedings, on
the other hand, is extremely narrow, encompassing only the three
elements set forth in the policy (identicality/similarity to a trademark,
lack of legitimate interests, and bad faith registration and use).70
While a UDRP panel also has discretion to consider other matters,71
it
is unusual for panels to journey far beyond the UDRP and general
principles of trademark law.72
68
See Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752 (E.D. Va. 2001) (noting that
unlike arbitration awards, UDRP decisions are not subject to court confirmation and
enforcement under the Federal Arbitration Act).
69
See, e.g., id. (stating that UDRP calls for parallel litigation to resolve overarching
claims); Famology.com, Inc. v. Perot Sys. Corp., No. 00-2363, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8554,
(E.D. Pa. June 19, 2001). But see Virtuality L.L.C. v. Bata Ltd., 138 F. Supp. 2d 677 (D. Md.
2001) (where court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over trademark owner in parallel litigation
is based upon consent to “mutual jurisdiction” required by UDRP, court possesses jurisdiction
only for purposes of trademark claims).
70
See supra text accompanying note 25. UDRP panels also may address the separate
issue of reverse domain name hijacking, see supra text accompanying note 34, although in
practice this question arises in relatively few cases.
71
A panel may consider “any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”
ICANN Rules, supra note 24, ¶ 15(a).
72
For example, UDRP panels faced with disputes involving personal or geographic
names generally have considered only the trademark rights that may attach to such names. See,
e.g., Port of Helsinki v. Paragon Int’l Projects Ltd., No. D2001-0002 (WIPO Feb. 12, 2001)
(finding that no trademark rights exist in the name “Port of Helsinki”), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-0002.html; Rush v. Oregon
CityLink, No. FA0007000095318 (NAF Sept. 7, 2000) (finding no trademark rights in the name
of Gold Beach, a town in Oregon), at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/95318.htm;
Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona v. Barcelona.com Inc., No. D2000-0505 (WIPO
Aug. 4, 2000) (finding trademark rights in the name of Barcelona, Spain, based upon registered
trademarks that include the city’s name), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0505.html; Sumner v. Urvan, No.
D2000-0596 (WIPO July 24, 2000) (expressing doubt that musician known professionally as
Sting has trademark rights in that name, and noting that the UDRP does not cover personality
rights), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0596.html; Roberts v.
Boyd, No. D2000-0210 (WIPO May 29, 2000) (finding that actress Julia Roberts has commonlaw
trademark rights in her name), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html; Winterson v. Hogarth,
No. D2000-0235 (WIPO May 22, 2000) (finding that author Jeanette Winterson has commonlaw
trademark rights in her name), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0235.html. This approach is
consistent with and indeed dictated by the UDRP (though some panels may have stretched the
concept of trademark rights rather far in order to compensate for the lack of protection for
personal and geographic names), but it makes UDRP decisions particularly unhelpful to courts.
48 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
Even the trademark questions that arise in UDRP proceedings
tend to differ from those at issue in litigation. Under the UDRP, for
example, a panel is to consider whether the disputed domain name is
“identical or confusingly similar” to the complainant’s trademark.73
Trademark law, on the other hand, imposes liability for the
commercial use of a copy or imitation of a registered trademark if the
use “is likely to cause confusion.”74
While both standards depend
upon the likelihood of confusion, the UDRP makes this determination
merely by comparing the domain name with the trademark (or its
textual component, in the case of a design mark75
), whereas the
Lanham Act considers the strength of the mark, the manner in which
the mark and the domain name are used, and many other contextual
facts.76
Perhaps because of this divergence, UDRP panels tend to
favor trademark owners over registrants of domain names that append
“sucks” to a trademark,77
even though courts have rejected parallel
73
See ICANN Policy, supra note 2, ¶ 4(a)(i).
74
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), (b), 1125(a)(1)(A) (1994 and Supp. 1999).
75
Most UDRP panels thus far have paid little attention to the type of trademark, and
design marks generally have been found sufficient under the identicality/similarity element.
See, e.g., Sweeps Vacuum & Repair Ctr., Inc. v. Nett Corp., No. D2001-0031 (WIPO Apr. 13,
2001) (finding “sweeps.com” identical to service mark consisting of the word “sweeps” with a
design), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-0031.html; Fábricas
Agrupadas de Muñecas de Onil S.A. v. Palameta, No. D2000-1689 (WIPO Mar. 14, 2001)
(finding “famosa.com” identical or confusingly similar to trademarks consisting of the word
“famosa” and design elements), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
1689.html. But see Nat’l Kidney Found. v. Los Girasoles, No. AF-0293 (eResolution Aug. 31,
2000) (finding that “nkf.org” is not confusingly similar to trademark consisting of a stylized
version of the letters “NKF”), at http://www.eresolution.ca/services/dnd/decisions/0293.htm; cf.
Acoustical Publ’ns, Inc. v. Cintron, No. AF-0319 (eResolution Oct. 3, 2000) (holding that
“soundandvibration.com” is not identical or confusingly similar to trademark consisting of the
letters S and V in a logo, with the words “sound and vibration” appearing below in smaller
type), at http://www.eresolution.ca/services/dnd/decisions/0319.htm.
76
Courts consider a number of factors in assessing likelihood of confusion, including:
1. strength of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3. similarity of the
marks; 4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels used; 6.
type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the
purchaser; 7. defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood
of expansion of the product lines.
AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979). If the goods produced by
the alleged infringer are completely unrelated to those of the trademark owner, then there cannot
be any infringement. See id. at 348.
77
See Bloomberg L.P. v. Secaucus Group, No. FA0104000097077 (NAF June 7, 2001)
(finding “michaelbloombergsucks.com” confusingly similar to Bloomberg trademarks, but
denying complaint on other grounds), at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/97077.htm; ADT Servs. AG v. ADT Sucks.com,
No. D2001-0213 (WIPO Feb. 26, 2001) (finding “adtsucks.com” confusingly similar to ADT
trademarks), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-0213.html; Société
Accor v. Hartmann, No. D2001-0007 (WIPO Jan. 19, 2001) (in proceeding involving French
parties and domain registry, finding that “accorsucks.com” is confusingly similar to Accor
2001] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ICANN DECISIONS 49
claims based upon trademark law.78
A similar incongruity exists in
the case of tarnishment claims. Under the Lanham Act, as amended
trademark because non-English speakers may not understand what “sucks” means), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-0007.html; TPI Holdings, Inc. v.
AFX Communications, No. D2000-1472 (WIPO Nov. 21, 2000) (finding “autotradersucks.com”
confusingly similar to Auto Trader trademark), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1472.html; Diageo PLC v. Zuccarini,
No. D2000-0996 (WIPO Oct. 22, 2000) (finding “guinness-beer-really-really-sucks.com” and
several other domain names confusingly similar to Guinness trademarks), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0996.html; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
MacLeod, No. D2000-0662 (WIPO Sept. 19, 2000) (finding “wal-martsucks.com” confusingly
similar to Wal-Mart trademark), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0662.html; Cabela’s Inc. v. Cupcake Patrol, No. FA0006000095080 (NAF Aug. 29, 2000)
(finding “cabelassucks.com” confusingly similar to Cabela’s trademark), at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/95080.htm; Direct Line Group Ltd. v. Purge I.T.,
No. D2000-0583 (WIPO Aug. 13, 2000) (finding “directlinesucks.com” confusingly similar to
Direct Line trademark), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0583.html; Dixons Group PLC v. Purge I.T., No. D2000-0584 (WIPO Aug. 13, 2000) (finding
“dixonssucks.com” confusingly similar to Dixons trademarks), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0584.html; Freeserve PLC v. Purge
I.T., No. D2000-0585 (WIPO Aug. 13, 2000) (finding “freeservesucks.com” confusingly similar
to Freeserve trademarks), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0585.html; Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC v. Purge I.T., No. D2000-0636 (WIPO Aug. 13, 2000)
(finding “natwestsucks.com” confusingly similar to Natwest trademarks), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0636.html; Standard Chartered PLC
v. Purge I.T., No. D2000-0681 (WIPO Aug. 13, 2000) (finding “standardcharteredsucks.com”
confusingly similar to Standard Chartered trademarks), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0681.html; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Walsucks, No. D2000-0477 (WIPO July 20, 2000) (finding “walmartcanadasucks.com” and
other domain names confusingly similar to Wal-Mart trademark), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0477.html. But see Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Parisi, No. D2000-1015 (WIPO Jan. 26, 2001) (finding that
“lockheedmartinsucks.com” and “lockheedsucks.com” are not confusingly similar to Lockheed
and Lockheed Martin trademarks), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1015.html; McLane Co. v. Craig,
No. D2000-1455 (WIPO Jan. 11, 2001) (finding that “mclanenortheastsucks.com” is not
confusingly similar to McLane Northeast trademark), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1455.html; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
wallmartcanadasucks.com, No. D2000-1104 (WIPO Nov. 23, 2000) (finding that
“wallmartcanadasucks.com” is not confusingly similar to Wal-Mart trademark), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1104.html; Osborn, supra note 40, at
249-50 (defending UDRP based upon author’s prediction that UDRP panels would not find a
“sucks” domain name to be confusingly similar to a trademark).
78
See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(noting in dictum that an average consumer would not confuse “lucentsucks.com” with Lucent
trademarks, negating likelihood of confusion element of trademark claims); Bally Total Fitness
Hold. Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1165–66 & n.2 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (applying Sleekcraft
factors and concluding that Web site entitled “Bally sucks” was not likely to be confused with
Bally trademarks, while noting in dictum that even “ballysucks.com” would not be likely to
cause confusion). On the other hand, some of the UDRP decisions have actually considered the
Sleekcraft factors and nonetheless found confusing similarity, see, e.g., Diageo PLC v.
Zuccarini, No. D2000-0996 (WIPO Oct. 22, 2000), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0996.html; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
50 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, a tarnishment claim
requires proof that the trademark is famous,79
but under the UDRP, it
appears that any trademark can be the subject of tarnishment.80
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999
(ACPA),81
a set of amendments to the Lanham Act, represents the
closest counterpart to the UDRP in U.S. trademark law, and courts
and UDRP panels alike may well be tempted to rely upon findings
made under the corresponding regime. Nevertheless, there are
significant differences even between the ACPA and the UDRP.82
For
example, the ACPA covers only “famous” and “distinctive” marks,83
while the UDRP applies to any trademark.84
The ACPA applies to
registration, trafficking, or use of a domain name,85
while the UDRP
requires both registration and use.86
Furthermore, the ACPA requires
a “bad faith intent to profit,”87
while the UDRP merely requires bad
faith.88
Finally, a key substantive difference between the UDRP and
legal proceedings lies in the fact that the UDRP is inherently
international, or perhaps “anational”89
—UDRP panels base their
decisions on the policy itself, occasionally exercising their discretion
to consider legal rules of one or more jurisdictions that seem
relevant—while courts apply national or local laws, using formalized
Walsucks, No. D2000-0477 (WIPO July 20, 2000), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0477.html, so perhaps the
explanation lies elsewhere.
79
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(1), 1127 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
80
Under paragraph 4(c)(iii) of the UDRP, a domain name registrant possesses legitimate
interests in a domain name if the registrant is “making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of
the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to
tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.” ICANN Policy, supra note 2, ¶4(c)(iii); see also
ICANN, Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy, supra note 65, ¶ 4.6 & n.2.
81
Pub. L. No. 106-113, title III, 113 Stat. 1501A-545 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
1114, 1116, 1117, 1125, 1127, 1129 (1994 & Supp. 1999)).
82
See generally Osborn, supra note 40.
83
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
84
See ICANN Policy, supra note 2, ¶ 4(a)(i) (“[A] trademark or service mark in which
the complainant has rights . . . .”).
85
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
86
See ICANN Policy, supra note 2, ¶ 4(a)(iii).
87
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)(1)(A)(i), 1125(d)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
88
See ICANN Policy, supra note 2, ¶¶ 4(a)(iii), 4(b).
89
See Laurence R. Helfer, International Dispute Settlement at the Trademark-Domain
Name Interface, 29 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 2 & n.5), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com (search by title and author’s name; article is available for downloading in
pdf format).
2001] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ICANN DECISIONS 51
choice of law rules to determine what law to apply.90
V. PROCEDURAL CONCERNS
While the substantive differences between UDRP and legal
proceedings are far from trivial, the strongest arguments against a
deferential standard of review are procedural in nature. De novo
judicial review is consistent with parties’ expectations and the intent
of the UDRP, it promotes reliability and validity of outcomes, and
most important, it is essential to ensure fairness and due process.
The UDRP itself clearly contemplates that parties may initiate
parallel legal proceedings,91
as the Weber and Parisi courts noted,92
and specifically provides that an order is not to be implemented if
either party files a lawsuit challenging the order.93
Just as a provision
for expanded judicial review may encourage parties to agree to
arbitration in other contexts,94
the availability of parallel legal
proceedings may encourage domain name disputants to submit to the
UDRP process.95
Furthermore, the case for reviewability is much
stronger for UDRP decisions than it is for conventional arbitration
awards. Unlike conventional arbitration, the UDRP is not meant to
replace litigation, but merely to provide an additional forum for
dispute resolution, with an explicit right of appeal to the courts.96
To
deny parties the right to effective judicial review would frustrate their
intentions and deprive them of an essential benefit of their contract.
The UDRP by design is a streamlined method of resolving
90
See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet
Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151, 214 (2000) (noting that UDRP panels are
developing a “law of ICANN separate and apart from the law of any country or from any
international treaty.”).
91
See, e.g., ICANN Policy, supra note 2, ¶ 4(k); ICANN Rules, supra note 24, ¶¶ 3(xiii),
18.
92
See Weber-Stephen Prods. Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg. Supply, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
1766, 1767 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 751 (E.D. Va.
2001).
93
See, e.g., ICANN Policy, supra note 2, ¶ 4(k); see also supra text accompanying note
36.
94
See supra text accompanying note 19.
95
Trademark owners are not bound to use the UDRP process, but they are much more
likely to do so than they would be if they were required to waive legal rights as a condition of
filing a UDRP complaint. Similarly, although domain name registrants are bound by contract to
participate in UDRP proceedings, the availability of effective judicial review reduces their
incentive to attempt to pre-empt UDRP proceedings by filing suit, as did the domain name
registrant in Weber.
96
See Osborn, supra note 40, at 237–42 (describing UDRP proceedings and ACPA
litigation as complementary tactics for trademark owners).
52 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
disputes quickly and inexpensively.97
This streamlining, though,
comes at a cost: at least some degree of reliability and validity is
sacrificed.98
The parallel legal proceedings contemplated by the
UDRP are designed to mitigate the effects of this trade-off, but that
purpose would be defeated if courts were to defer to the conclusions
of UDRP panels. Furthermore, given the constraints of the UDRP
process, a court is in a much better position than a UDRP panel to
weigh evidence and assess credibility,99
so judicial deference makes
little sense even on pure questions of fact.
Another procedural concern relates to the precedential role of
UDRP decisions.100
To some extent it seems desirable for panels to
follow principles articulated in prior decisions: at the very least, this
practice tends to promote consistency and predictability, while
decreasing incentives for forum shopping. On the other hand, many
of the decisions being relied upon as precedent involve controversial
rulings by sole panelists in default cases, often reaching results that
are inconsistent with other decisions or with the UDRP itself.101
Absent an appellate forum with the ability to reconcile inconsistent
decisions, this situation likely will persist, and reliance upon UDRP
decisions as precedent will remain problematic.102
97
See Helfer, supra note 89 (manuscript at 4) (describing UDRP as “simple, cheap,
quick, and easily accessible by parties located anywhere in the world”); see supra text
accompanying notes 39–40.
98
See, e.g., Thornburg, supra note 90, at 205 (noting that in disputed cases, “[T]he lack
of a hearing can distort the fact finding process.”); cf. Hochman, supra note 8, at 106 (noting
that some parties intentionally forego the higher quality of the judicial system in order to avoid
delay and expense).
99
See Froomkin, supra note 20, at 100 (noting that “a summary procedure, in which
each side has only one submission, and in which there is neither testimony, cross-examination,
briefing, nor argument cannot by itself hope to make reliable credibility determinations or sort
out complex competing claims.”).
100
See, e.g., Thornburg, supra note 90, at 213–14 (noting that panelists have begun to
cite to prior UDRP decisions).
101
See Carl Oppedahl, Considerations for Innocent Domain Name Owners, Oppedahl &
Larson LLP Patent Law Web Server, at http://www.patents.com/dno.htm (last visited Nov. 15,
2001) (noting that, “Most of the ‘howler’ UDRP decisions . . . were from one-person panels.”).
The “inaction doctrine” that enables a panel to find bad faith use of a domain name in “passive
warehousing” cases (i.e., where the registrant’s only overt act is the initial registration of the
domain name) was first applied in Telstra Corp. v. Nuclear Marshmallows, No. D2000-0003
(WIPO Feb. 18, 2000), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0003.html.
See also White, supra note 41, at 242. The domain name registrant in Telstra did not submit a
response, and the decision was rendered by a sole panelist. Telstra has been cited for this
proposition in numerous subsequent UDRP decisions. See ICANN, Search Decisions in
Proceedings under the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrpdec.htm (search for “d2000-0003”) (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
102
In this respect, reliance on UDRP decisions as precedent is rather like reliance upon
canons of statutory construction, it is frequently possible to find contradictory authority on both
2001] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ICANN DECISIONS 53
Much of the criticism of the UDRP process includes claims of
bias on the part of panelists or dispute resolution service providers.103
Courts obviously should disregard findings made by biased
decisionmakers, but the extent of bias in UDRP process may well be
exaggerated. However, it is clear that panelists’ qualifications can
affect UDRP decisions, a phenomenon that is evident from a
comparison of decisions authored by the National Arbitration
Forum’s retired judges, the World Intellectual Property
Organization’s trademark attorneys, and eResolution’s law
professors.104
Courts can address these issues, while gaining public
confidence and ensuring the integrity of their own decisions, simply
by applying de novo review to rulings of UDRP panels. Effective
judicial review also would render panelists more accountable, serving
as a check on any potential bias.105
Finally, though the UDRP was intended to balance the interests
of trademark owners with those of domain name registrants, in
practice it is quite unbalanced, and it fails to afford parties the due
process protections they would have in a legal proceeding.106
UDRP
sides of a given proposition. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND.
L. REV. 395 (1951). For example: mere speculation in domain names is insufficient to create a
legitimate interest in a domain name, Libro AG v. NA Global Link Ltd., No. D2000-0186
(WIPO May 16, 2000), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0186.html,
but a legitimate interest can be found based upon the offering for sale of a domain name, see
Phillips Int’l, Inc. v. Tella, No. FA0008000095461 (NAF Sept. 21, 2000), at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/95461.htm; Allocation Network GmbH v.
Gregory, No. D2000-0016 (WIPO Mar. 24, 2000), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0016.html (registration of a domain
name without performing a trademark search can constitute bad faith registration). Failure to
perform a trademark search does not constitute bad faith. See FormLinc Info. v. Credit Suisse
Group, No. FA0102000096750 (NAF Apr. 25, 2001), at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/96750.htm. The UDRP requires both registration
and use of a domain name in bad faith, World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t, Inc. v. Bosman, No.
D99-0001 (WIPO Jan. 14, 2000), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/1999/d1999-
0001.html, but bad faith non-use can be sufficient, Phillips Int’l, Inc. v. Tella, supra.
103
See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 24, at 26; Froomkin, supra note 20, at 98, 136;
Livingston, supra note 44; Brian McWilliams, Was Madonna.com Decision Rigged?,
INTERNETNEWS.COM, Oct. 17, 2000, at http://www.internetnews.com/bus-
news/article/0,,3_487271,00.html.
104
This is, of course, somewhat of an overgeneralization, as are the accompanying
descriptions of the providers’ prototypical panelists, but it is not entirely inaccurate. See
Thornburg, supra note 90, at 209; see also supra notes 24 & 33.
105
See supra text accompanying notes 18–19.
106
See Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Va.
2000) (concluding that UDRP proceedings are “not an adequate substitute” for court
proceedings, in part because they lack procedural safeguards), available at
http://dnlr.com/reporter/technodome.
54 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
proceedings are voluntary for trademark owners but mandatory for
domain name registrants.107
(They are mandatory not because
registrants have chosen to participate in mandatory dispute resolution,
but rather by virtue of an adhesion contract: all ICANN-approved
domain name registrars impose an identical requirement.108
) The
trademark owner selects the timing and the provider, and has a much
greater influence than the domain name registrant over the selection
of the panel as well.109
A losing trademark owner can seek a legal
remedy at leisure, as an adverse award merely maintains the status
quo. A losing domain name registrant, on the other hand, has only
ten business days after the decision (and quite possibly less than two
months after receiving the initial notice of the dispute) to prepare and
file a lawsuit, possibly in a remote jurisdiction, in order to prevent the
immediate loss of its domain name.110
The “parity of appeal”
contemplated by the UDRP111
clearly does not exist in reality, but de
novo review of UDRP decisions would help reduce the imbalance.
107
See supra text accompanying note 37.
108
See supra text accompanying notes 17 & 23.
109
See Froomkin, supra note 20, at 98–99 & n.355. Professor Froomkin summarizes the
due process problems faced by domain name registrants:
ICANN’s arbitration rules—which all ICANN approved arbitration
providers are required to follow—do not require that respondents receive
actual notice of a complaint. While a system that provides for substituted
service is consistent with due process, minimal due process requires
serious attempts to achieve actual notice before proceeding with the
substitute. A related problem arises because the time allowed for a
response is so short. In theory, both complainant and respondent each
only get to file one set of papers with the arbitral tribunal. But the
complainant gets to work on his pleading as long as he wishes, collect the
relevant exhibits, and file when it suits him. The respondent has to
answer in twenty days or essentially forfeit the case. What is more, the
twenty-day clock to file a response starts ticking as soon as notice is
mailed and e-mailed. Other than extraordinary cases, which are entirely at
the discretion of the arbitrator, there is no procedure to provide extensions
of time to a respondent who receives the notice late. While this schedule
might be reasonable for business-to-business arbitration, it clearly is not
reasonable in all situations; indeed, it is inconsistent with due process for
a system in which many respondents will be ordinary people—people
who take vacations without laptops or do not routinely read their e-mail.
The opportunity to be heard is fundamental to due process. The UDRP
does not ensure that basic right.
Id. at 136–37 (citations omitted).
110
See id. at 137–38.
111
See ICANN, Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy, supra note 65, ¶¶ 4.7, 4.8; Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp.
2d 745, 752 (E.D. Va. 2001) (citing the Second Staff Report).
2001] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ICANN DECISIONS 55
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial deference to UDRP panel decisions invites serious
substantive and procedural objections. Even on mere factual
determinations, where deference ordinarily seems most warranted,
courts clearly are more capable of making accurate and informed
findings than are UDRP panels, and justice demands that courts
exercise independent judgment in such circumstances.
The UDRP process is novel, complex, and still relatively
untested. Its very legitimacy (as well as the legitimacy of its
architect, ICANN) is the subject of heated controversy.112
Even
discounting such concerns, though, the availability of parallel
litigation and effective judicial review is a critical element of the
UDRP by its very design. De novo review is consistent with the
purposes of the UDRP and is needed to ensure fairness and due
process.
112
See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 20; Weinberg, supra note 20; Helfer, supra note 89.