The Rise of
Illiberal Democracy
Fareed Zakaria
THE NEXT WAVE
The American diplomat Richard Holbrooke pondered a problem
on the eve of the September 1996 elections in Bosnia, which were meant
to restore civic life to that ravaged country. "Suppose the election was
declared free and fair," he said, and those elected are "racists, fascists,
separatists, who are publicly opposed to [peace and r?int?gration].
That is the dilemma." Indeed it is, not just in the former Yugoslavia,
but increasingly around the world. Democratically elected regimes,
often ones that have been reelected or reaffirmed through referenda, are
routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving
their citizens of basic rights and freedoms. From Peru to the Palestinian
Authority, from Sierra Leone to Slovakia, from Pakistan to the Philip
pines, we see the rise of a disturbing phenomenon in international life?
illiberal democracy.
It has been difficult to recognize this problem because for almost
a century in the West, democracy has meant liberal democracy?a
political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also
by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of
basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property. In fact,
this latter bundle of freedoms?what might be termed constitu
tional liberalism?is theoretically different and historically distinct
Fareed Zakaria is Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs and a Con
tributing Editor for Newsweek.
Ua]
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The Rise of Illiberal Democracy
from democracy. As the political scientist Philippe Schmitter has
pointed out, "Liberalism, either as a conception of political lib
erty, or as a doctrine about economic policy, may have coincided
with the rise of democracy. But it has never been immutably or
unambiguously linked to its practice." Today the two strands of
liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western political fabric, are
coming apart in the rest of the world. Democracy is flourishing;
constitutional liberalism is not.
Today, 118 of the world's 193 countries are democratic, encom
passing a majority of its people (54.8 percent, to be exact), a vast
increase from even a decade ago. In this season of victory, one
might have expected Western statesmen and intellectuals to go one
further than E. M. Forster and give a rousing three cheers for
democracy. Instead there is a growing unease at the rapid spread of
multiparty elections across south-central Europe, Asia, Africa,
and Latin America, perhaps because of what happens after the
elections. Popular leaders like Russia's Boris Yeltsin and Argentina's
Carlos Menem bypass their parliaments and rule by presidential
decree, eroding basic constitutional practices. The Iranian parlia
ment?elected more freely than most in the Middle East?imposes
harsh restrictions on speech, assembly, and even dress, diminishing
that country's already meager supply of liberty. Ethiopia's elected
government turns its security forces on journalists and political
opponents, doing permanent damage to human rights (as well as
human beings).
Naturally there is a spectrum of illiberal democracy, ranging
from modest offenders like Argentina to near-tyrannies like
Kazakst?n and Belarus, with countries like Romania and
Bangladesh in between. Along much of the spectrum, elections are
rarely as free and fair as in the West today, but they do reflect the
reality of popular participation in politics and support for those
elected. And the examples are not isolated or atypical. Freedom
House's 1996-97 survey, Freedom in the World, has separate rankings
for political liberties and civil liberties, which correspond roughly
with democracy and constitutional liberalism, respectively. Of the
countries that lie between confirmed dictatorship and consolidated
democracy, 50 percent do better on political liberties than on civil
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Fareed Zakaria
ones. In other words, half of the "democratizing" countries in the
world today are illiberal democracies.1
Illiberal democracy is a growth industry. Seven years ago only 22
percent of democratizing countries could have been so categorized;
five years ago that figure had risen to 35 percent.2 And to date few
illiberal democracies have matured into liberal democracies; if any
thing, they are moving toward heightened illiberalism. Far from
being a temporary or transitional stage, it appears that many coun
tries are settling into a form of government that mixes a substantial
degree of democracy with a substantial degree of illiberalism. Just
as nations across the world have become comfortable with many
variations of capitalism, they could well adopt and sustain varied
forms of democracy. Western liberal democracy might prove to be
not the final destination on the democratic road, but just one of
many possible exits.
DEMOCRACY AND LIBERTY
From the time of Herodotus democracy has meant, first and fore
most, the rule of the people. This view of democracy as a process of
selecting governments, articulated by scholars ranging from Alexis de
Tocqueville to Joseph Schumpeter to Robert Dahl, is now widely used by
social scientists. In The Third Wave, Samuel P. Huntington explains why:
Elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of democracy, the in
escapable sine qua non. Governments produced by elections may be
aRoger Kaplan, ed., Freedom Around the World, 1997, New York: Freedom House,
1997, PP- 21-22. The survey rates countries on two 7-point scales, for political rights and
civil liberties (lower is better). I have considered all countries with a combined score of
between 5 and 10 to be democratizing. The percentage figures are based on Freedom
House's numbers, but in the case of individual countries I have not adhered stricdy to
its ratings. While the Survey is an extraordinary feat?comprehensive and intelligent?
its methodology conflates certain constitutional rights with democratic procedures,
which confuses matters. In addition, I use as examples (though not as part of the data
set) countries like Iran, Kazakst?n, and Belarus, which even in procedural terms are
semi-democracies at best. But they are worth highlighting as interesting problem cases
since most of their leaders were elected, reelected, and remain popular.
2 Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1992
199J, pp. 620-26; Freedom in the World, 1989-1990, pp. 312-19.
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inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted,
irresponsible, dominated by special
interests, and incapable of adopting
policies demanded by the public
good. These qualities make such
governments undesirable but
they do not make them un
democratic. Democracy is
one public virtue, not the
only one, and the relation
of democracy to other pub
lic virtues and vices can only
be understood if democracy
is clearly distinguished from
the other characteristics of
political systems.
This definition also accords with the
commonsense view of the term. If a
country holds competitive, multiparty
elections, we call it democratic. When
public participation in politics is increased,
for example through the enfranchisement
of women, it is seen as more democratic. Of
course elections must be open and fair, and this
requires some protections for freedom of speech
and assembly. But to go beyond this minimalist
definition and label a country democratic only if
it guarantees a comprehensive catalog of social,
political, economic, and religious rights turns the
word democracy into a badge of honor rather than
a descriptive category. After all, Sweden has an economic system
that many argue curtails individual property rights, France until
recently had a state monopoly on television, and England has an
established religion. But they are all clearly and identifiably
democracies. To have democracy mean, subjectively, "a good gov
ernment" renders it analytically useless.
Constitutional liberalism, on the other hand, is not about the proce
dures for selecting government, but rather government's goals. It refers
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Fareed Zakaria
to the tradition, deep in Western history, that seeks to protect an indi
vidual's autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source?
state, church, or society. The term marries two closely connected ideas.
It is liberal because it draws on the philosophical strain, beginning with
the Greeks, that emphasizes individual liberty.3 It is constitutionalbccause
it rests on the tradition, beginning with the Romans, of the rule of law.
Constitutional liberalism developed in Western Europe and the United
States as a defense of the individual's right to life and property, and free
dom of religion and speech. To secure these rights, it emphasized checks
on the power of each branch of government, equality under the law,
impartial courts and tribunals, and separation of church and state. Its
canonical figures include the poet John Milton, the jurist William Black
stone, statesmen such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, and
philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, Baron
de Montesquieu, John Stuart Mill, and Isaiah Berlin. In almost all of its
variants, constitutional liberalism argues that human beings have certain
natural (or "inalienable") rights and that governments must accept a
basic law, limiting its own powers, that secures them. Thus in 1215 at
Runnymede, England's barons forced the king to abide by the settled
and customary law of the land. In the American colonies these laws were
made explicit, and in 1638 the town of Hartford adopted the first written
constitution in modern history. In the 1970s, Western nations codified
standards ofbehavior for regimes across the globe. The Magna Carta, the
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, the American Constitution, and
the Helsinki Final Act are all expressions of constitutional liberalism.
THE ROAD TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
Since 1945 Western governments have, for the most part, embodied
both democracy and constitutional liberalism. Thus it is difficult
to imagine the two apart, in the form of either illiberal democracy
or liberal autocracy. In fact both have existed in the past and per
sist in the present. Until the twentieth century, most countries in
3The term "liberal" is used here in its older, European sense, now often called classical
liberalism. In America today the word has come to mean something quite different,
namely policies upholding the modern welfare state.
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The Rise of Illiberal Democracy
Western Europe were liberal autocracies or, at best, semi-democ
racies. The franchise was tightly restricted, and elected legislatures
had little power. In 1830 Great Britain, in some ways the most
democratic European nation, allowed barely 2 percent of its pop
ulation to vote for one house of Parlia- _
ment; that figure rose to 7 percent after
1867 and reached around 40 percent in the
1880s. Only in the late 1940s did most
Western countries become full-fledged
democracies, with universal adult suffrage.
But one hundred years earlier, by the late
Democracy does not
necessarily bring
about constitutional
liberalism.
1840s, most of them had adopted impor
tant aspects of constitutional liberalism?the rule of law, private
property rights, and increasingly, separated powers and free speech
and assembly. For much of modern history, what characterized
governments in Europe and North America, and differentiated
them from those around the world, was not democracy but consti
tutional liberalism. The "Western model" is best symbolized not
by the mass plebiscite but the impartial judge.
The recent history of East Asia follows the Western itinerary.
After brief flirtations with democracy after World War II, most East
Asian regimes turned authoritarian. Over time they moved from
autocracy to liberalizing autocracy, and, in some cases, toward liber
alizing semi-democracy.4 Most of the regimes in East Asia remain
only semi-democratic, with patriarchs or one-party systems that
make their elections ratifications of power rather than genuine con
tests. But these regimes have accorded their citizens a widening
sphere of economic, civil, religious, and limited political rights. As in
the West, liberalization in East Asia has included economic liber
alization, which is crucial in promoting both growth and liberal
democracy. Historically, the factors most closely associated with full
fledged liberal democracies are capitalism, a bourgeoisie, and a high
Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia are examples of liberalizing autocracies, while
South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand are liberal semi-democracies. Both groups, however,
are more liberal than they are democratic, which is also true of the region's only liberal
democracy, Japan; Papua New Guinea, and to a lesser extent the Philippines, are the
only examples of illiberal democracy in East Asia.
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Fareed Zakaria
per capita gnp. Today s East Asian governments are a mix of democracy,
liberalism, capitalism, oligarchy, and corruption?much like Western
governments circa 1900.
Constitutional liberalism has led to democracy, but democracy
does not seem to bring constitutional liberalism. In contrast to the
Western and East Asian paths, during the last two decades in Latin
America, Africa, and parts of Asia, dictatorships with little back
ground in constitutional liberalism have given way to democracy.
The results are not encouraging. In the western hemisphere, with
elections having been held in every country except Cuba, a 1993
study by the scholar Larry Diamond determined that 10 of the 22
principal Latin American countries "have levels of human rights
abuse that are incompatible with the consolidation of [liberal]
democracy."5 In Africa, democratization has been extraordinarily
rapid. Within six months in 1990 much of Francophone Africa lifted
its ban on multiparty politics. Yet although elections have been held
in most of the 45 sub-Saharan states since 1991 (18 in 1996 alone),
there have been setbacks for freedom in many countries. One of
Africa s most careful observers, Michael Chege, surveyed the wave of
democratization and drew the lesson that the continent had "overem
phasized multiparty elections . . . and correspondingly neglected the
basic tenets of liberal governance." In Central Asia, elections, even
when reasonably free, as in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakst?n, have resulted
in strong executives, weak legislatures and judiciaries, and few civil
and economic liberties. In the Islamic world, from the Palestinian
Authority to Iran to Pakistan, democratization has led to an increasing
role for theocratic politics, eroding long-standing traditions of secu
larism and tolerance. In many parts of that world, such as Tunisia,
Morocco, Egypt, and some of the Gulf States, were elections to be
held tomorrow, the resulting regimes would almost certainly be more
illiberal than the ones now in place.
Many of the countries of Central Europe, on the other hand,
have moved successfully from communism to liberal democracy,
5 Larry Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America," in Tom Farer, ed., Beyond Sover
eignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in a World of Sovereign States, Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 73.
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The Rise of Illiberal Democracy
having gone through the same phase of liberalization without
democracy as other European countries did during the nineteenth
century. Indeed, the Austro-Hungarian empire, to which most
belonged, was a classic liberal autocracy. Even outside Europe, the
political scientist Myron Weiner detected a striking connection
between a constitutional past and a liberal democratic present. He
pointed out that, as of 1983, "every single country in the Third
World that emerged from colonial rule since the Second World
War with a population of at least one million (and almost all the
smaller colonies as well) with a continuous democratic experience
is a former British colony."6 British rule meant not democracy?
colonialism is by definition undemocratic?but constitutional lib
eralism. Britain's legacy of law and administration has proved
more beneficial than France's policy of enfranchising some of its
colonial populations.
While liberal autocracies may have existed in the past, can one
imagine them today? Until recently, a small but powerful example
flourished off the Asian mainland?Hong Kong. For 156 years, until
July 1,1997, Hong Kong was ruled by the British Crown through an
appointed governor general. Until 1991 it had never held a meaningful
election, but its government epitomized constitutional liberalism, pro
tecting its citizens' basic rights and administering a fair court system
and bureaucracy. A September 8,1997, editorial on the island s future
in The Washington Post was titled ominously, "Undoing Hong Kong's
Democracy." Actually, Hong Kong has precious little democracy to
undo; what it has is a framework of rights and laws. Small islands may
not hold much practical significance in today s world, but they do
help one weigh the relative value of democracy and constitutional lib
eralism. Consider, for example, the question of where you would
rather live, Haiti, an illiberal democracy, or Antigua, a liberal semi
democracy. Your choice would probably relate not to the weather,
which is pleasant in both, but to the political climate, which is not.
6Myron Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory," in Myron Weiner and Ergun
Ozbudun, eds., Competitive Elections in Developing Countries, Durham: Duke Univer
sity Press, 1987, p. 20. Today there are functioning democracies in the Third World that
are not former British colonies, but the majority of the former are the latter.
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Fareed Zakaria
ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY
John Stuart Mill opened his classic On Liberty by noting t
as countries became democratic, people tended to believe that "
much importance had been attached to the limitation of power itsel
That. . . was a response against rulers whose interests were oppo
to those of the people." Once the people were themselves in char
caution was unnecessary. "The nation did not need to be protec
against its own will." As if confirming Mill's fears, consider the wo
of Alexandr Lukashenko after being elected president of Belarus wi
an overwhelming majority in a free election in 1994, when ask
about limiting his powers: "There will be no dictatorship. I am of th
people, and I am going to be for the people."
The tension between constitutional liberalism and democracy c
ters on the scope of governmental authority. Constitutional liberalism
about the limitation of power, democracy about its accumulation
use. For this reason, many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liber
saw in democracy a force that could undermine liberty. James Mad
explained in The Federalist that "the danger of oppression" in a dem
racy came from "the majority of the community." Tocqueville warn
the "tyranny of the majority," writing, "The very essence of democ
government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majority."
The tendency for a democratic government to believe it has absol
sovereignty (that is, power) can result in the centralization of auth
ity, often by extraconstitutional means and with grim results. Over
last decade, elected governments claiming to represent the peo
have steadily encroached on the powers and rights of other elem
in society, a usurpation that is both horizontal (from other branch
of the national government) and vertical (from regional and lo
authorities as well as private businesses and other nongovernmen
groups). Lukashenko and Peru's Alberto Fujimori are only the wo
examples of this practice. (While Fujimori's actions?disbanding
legislature and suspending the constitution, among others?mak
difficult to call his regime democratic, it is worth noting that he w
two elections and was extremely popular until recently.) Even a b
fide reformer like Carlos Menem has passed close to 300 presiden
decrees in his eight years in office, about three times as many a
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previous Argentinean presidents put to
gether, going back to 1853. Kyrgyzstan's
Askar Akayev, elected with 60 percent
of the vote, proposed enhancing his
powers in a referendum that passed
easily in 1996. His new powers include
appointing all top officials except the
prime minister, although he can dis
solve parliament if it turns down three
of his nominees for the latter post.
Horizontal usurpation, usually by
presidents, is more obvious, but ver
tical usurpation is more common.
Over the last three decades, the Indian
government has routinely disbanded
state legislatures on flimsy grounds,
placing regions under New Delhi's
direct rule. In a less dramatic but typical move, the elected govern
ment of the Central African Republic recently ended the long
standing independence of its university system, making it part of
the central state apparatus.
Usurpation is particularly widespread in Latin America and the
states of the former Soviet Union, perhaps because both regions
mostly have presidencies. These systems tend to produce strong leaders
who believe that they speak for the people?even when they have
been elected by no more than a plurality. (As Juan Linz points out,
Salvador Allende was elected to the Chilean presidency in 1970 with
only 36 percent of the vote. In similar circumstances, a prime minister
would have had to share power in a coalition government.) Presidents
appoint cabinets of cronies, rather than senior party figures, main
taining few internal checks on their power. And when their views
conflict with those of the legislature, or even the courts, presidents
tend to "go to the nation," bypassing the dreary tasks of bargaining
and coalition-building. While scholars debate the merits of presidential
versus parliamentary forms of government, usurpation can occur
under either, absent well-developed alternate centers of power such as
strong legislatures, courts, political parties, regional governments, and
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Fareed Zakaria
independent universities and media. Latin America actually combines
presidential systems with proportional representation, producing
populist leaders and multiple parties?an unstable combination.
Many Western governments and scholars have encouraged the cre
ation of strong and centralized states in the Third World. Leaders in
these countries have argued that they need the authority to break down
feudalism, split entrenched coalitions, override vested interests, and
bring order to chaotic societies. But this confuses the need for a legiti
mate government with that for a powerful one. Governments that are
seen as legitimate can usually maintain order and pursue tough policies,
albeit slowly, by building coalitions. After all, few claim that govern
ments in developing countries should not have adequate police powers;
the trouble comes from all the other political, social, and economic
powers that they accumulate. In crises like civil wars, constitutional
governments might not be able to rule effectively, but the alternative?
states with vast security apparatuses that suspend constitutional
rights?has usually produced neither order nor good government.
More often, such states have become predatory, maintaining some
order but also arresting opponents, muzzling dissent, nationalizing
industries, and confiscating property. While anarchy has its dangers,
the greatest threats to human liberty and happiness in this century have
been caused not by disorder but by brutally strong, centralized states,
like Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Maoist China. The Third
World is littered with the bloody handiwork of strong states.
Historically, unchecked centralization has been the enemy of liberal
democracy. As political participation increased in Europe over the
nineteenth century, it was accommodated smoothly in countries such
as England and Sweden, where medieval assemblies, local govern
ments, and regional councils had remained strong. Countries like
France and Prussia, on the other hand, where the monarchy had effec
tively centralized power (both horizontally and vertically), often ended
up illiberal and undemocratic. It is not a coincidence that in twentieth
century Spain, the beachhead of liberalism lay in Catalonia, for centuries
a doggedly independent and autonomous region. In America, the
presence of a rich variety of institutions?state, local, and private?made
it much easier to accommodate the rapid and large extensions in suffrage
that took place in the early nineteenth century. Arthur Schlesinger Sr.
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has documented how, during Amer
ica's first 50 years, virtually every
state, interest group and faction
tried to weaken and even break up
the federal government.7 More
recently, India's semi-liberal
democracy has survived because
of, not despite, its strong regions
and varied languages, cultures,
and even castes. The point is log
ical, even tautological: pluralism
in the past helps ensure political
pluralism in the present.
Fifty years ago, politicians in
the developing world wanted ex
traordinary powers to implement
then-fashionable economic doc
trines, like nationalization of in
dustries. Today their successors
want similar powers to privatize
those very industries. Menem's
justification for his methods is
that they are desperately needed
to enact tough economic reforms. I
Similar arguments are made by
Abdal? Bucarem of Ecuador
and by Fujimori. Lending in
stitutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank, have been sympathetic to these pleas, and the bond market
has been positively exuberant. But except in emergencies like war,
illiberal means are in the long run incompatible with liberal ends.
Constitutional government is in fact the key to a successful economic
reform policy. The experience of East Asia and Central Europe sug
gests that when regimes?whether authoritarian, as in East Asia, or
7Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., New Viewpoints in American History, New York: Macmil
lan, 1922, pp. 220-40.
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Fareed Zakaria
liberal democratic, as in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic?
protect individual rights, including those of property and contract,
and create a framework of law and administration, capitalism and
growth will follow. In a recent speech at the Woodrow Wilson Inter
national Center in Washington, explaining what it takes for capitalism
to flourish, Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan concluded that,
"The p-nidinp- mechanism of a free market
The democratic
peace is actually the
liberal peace.
economy. .. is a bill of rights, enforced by an
impartial judiciary"
Finally, and perhaps more important,
power accumulated to do good can be used
subsequently to do ill. When Fujimori dis
banded parliament, his approval ratings
shot up to their highest ever. But recent opinion polls suggest that
most of those who once approved of his actions now wish he were
more constrained. In 1993 Boris Yeltsin famously (and literally)
attacked the Russian parliament, prompted by parliament's own
unconstitutional acts. He then suspended the constitutional court,
dismantled the system of local governments, and fired several
provincial governors. From the war in Chechnya to his economic
programs, Yeltsin has displayed a routine lack of concern for consti
tutional procedures and limits. He may well be a liberal democrat at
heart, but Yeltsin's actions have created a Russian super-presidency.
We can only hope his successor will not abuse it.
For centuries Western intellectuals have had a tendency to view
constitutional liberalism as a quaint exercise in rule-making, mere for
malism that should take a back seat to battling larger evils in society.
The most eloquent counterpoint to this view remains an exchange in
Robert Bolt's play A Man For All Seasons. The fiery young William
Roper, who yearns to battle evil, is exasperated by Sir Thomas Mores
devotion to the law. More gently defends himself.
More: What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get
after the Devil?
Roper: I'd cut every law in England to do that!
More: And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned on
you?where would you hide Roper, the laws all being flat?
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The Rise of Illiberal Democracy
ETHNIC CONFLICT AND WAR
On December 8,1996, Jack Lang made a dramatic dash to Belgrade.
The French celebrity politician, formerly minister of culture, had been
inspired by the student demonstrations involving tens of thousands
against Slobodan Milosevic, a man Lang and many Western intellec
tuals held responsible for the war in the Balkans. Lang wanted to lend
his moral support to the Yugoslav opposition. The leaders of the move
ment received him in their offices?the philosophy department?only
to boot him out, declare him "an enemy of the Serbs," and order him
to leave the country. It turned out that the students opposed Milosevic
not for starting the war, but for failing to win it.
Lang's embarrassment highlights two common, and often mistaken,
assumptions?that the forces of democracy are the forces of ethnic
harmony and of peace. Neither is necessarily true. Mature liberal
democracies can usually accommodate ethnic divisions without violence
or terror and live in peace with other liberal democracies. But without
a background in constitutional liberalism, the introduction of democracy
in divided societies has actually fomented nationalism, ethnic conflict,
and even war. The spate of elections held immediately after the col
lapse of communism were won in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia by
nationalist separatists and resulted in the breakup of those countries.
This was not in and of itself bad, since those countries had been bound
together by force. But the rapid secessions, without guarantees, insti
tutions, or political power for the many minorities living within the
new countries, have caused spirals of rebellion, repression, and, in
places like Bosnia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, war.
Elections require that politicians compete for peoples' votes. In so
cieties without strong traditions of multiethnic groups or assimilation,
it is easiest to organize support along racial, ethnic, or religious lines.
Once an ethnic group is in power, it tends to exclude other ethnic
groups. Compromise seems impossible; one can bargain on material
issues like housing, hospitals, and handouts, but how does one split
the difference on a national religion? Political competition that is so
divisive can rapidly degenerate into violence. Opposition move
ments, armed rebellions, and coups in Africa have often been directed
against ethnically based regimes, many of which came to power
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Fareed Zakaria
through elections. Surveying the breakdown of African and Asian
democracies in the 1960s, two scholars concluded that democracy "is
simply not viable in an environment of intense ethnic preferences." Re
cent studies, particularly of Africa and Central Asia, have confirmed
this pessimism. A distinguished expert on ethnic conflict, Donald
Horowitz, concluded, "In the face of this rather dismal account. . .
of the concrete failures of democracy in divided societies . . . one is
tempted to throw up one's hands. What is the point of holding elec
tions if all they do in the end is to substitute a Bemba-dominated
regime for a Nyanja regime in Zambia, the two equally narrow, or a
southern regime for a northern one in Benin, neither incorporating the
other half of the state?"8
Over the past decade, one of the most spirited debates among schol
ars of international relations concerns the "democratic peace"?the as
sertion that no two modern democracies have gone to war with each
other. The debate raises interesting substantive questions (does the
American Civil War count? do nuclear weapons better explain the
peace?) and even the statistical findings have raised interesting dissents.
(As the scholar David Spiro points out, given the small number of both
democracies and wars over the last two hundred years, sheer chance
might explain the absence of war between democracies. No member of
his family has ever won the lottery, yet few offer explanations for this
impressive correlation.) But even if the statistics are correct, what explains
them? Kant, the original proponent of the democratic peace, contended
that in democracies, those who pay for wars?that is, the public?make
the decisions, so they are understandably cautious. But that claim sug
gests that democracies are more pacific than other states. Actually they
are more warlike, going to war more often and with greater intensity than
most states. It is only with other democracies that the peace holds.
When divining the cause behind this correlation, one thing becomes
clear: the democratic peace is actually the liberal peace. Writing in the
8Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Demo
cratic Instability, Columbus: Charles E. Merill, pp. 62-92; Donald Horowitz, "Democ
racy in Divided Societies," in Larry Diamond and Mark F. Plattner, eds., Nationalism,
Ethnic Conflict and Democracy, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp.
35-55
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eighteenth century, Kant believed that democracies were tyrannical,
and he specifically excluded them from his conception of "republican"
governments, which lived in a zone of peace. Republicanism, for Kant,
meant a separation of powers, checks and balances, the rule of law,
protection of individual rights, and some level of representation in
government (though nothing close to universal suffrage). Kant's other
explanations for the "perpetual peace" between republics are all closely
linked to their constitutional and liberal character: a mutual respect for
the rights of each other's citizens, a system of checks and balances
assuring that no single leader can drag his country into war, and classical
liberal economic policies?most importantly, free trade?which create
an interdependence that makes war costly and cooperation useful.
Michael Doyle, the leading scholar on the subject, confirms in his 1997
book Ways of War and Peace that without constitutional liberalism,
democracy itself has no peace-inducing qualities:
Kant distrusted unfettered, democratic majoritarianism, and his argu
ment offers no support for a claim that all participatory polities?
democracies?should be peaceful, either in general or between fellow
democracies. Many participatory polities have been non-liberal. For
two thousand years before the modern age, popular rule was widely
associated with aggressiveness (by Thucydides) or imperial success (by
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Fareed Zakaria
Machiavelli) . . . The decisive preference of [the] median voter might
well include "ethnic cleansing" against other democratic polities.
The distinction between liberal and illiberal democracies sheds light
on another striking statistical correlation. Political scientists Jack Snyder
and Edward Mansfield contend, using an impressive data set, that over
the last 200 years democratizing states went to war significantly more
often than either stable autocracies or liberal democracies. In countries
not grounded in constitutional liberalism, the rise of democracy often
brings with it hyper-nationalism and war-mongering. When the politi
cal system is opened up, diverse groups with incompatible interests gain
access to power and press their demands. Political and military leaders,
who are often embattled remnants of the old authoritarian order, realize
that to succeed that they must rally the masses behind a national cause.
The result is invariably aggressive rhetoric and policies, which often drag
countries into confrontation and war. Noteworthy examples range from
Napoleon Ill's France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Taisho Japan to those
in today's newspapers, like Armenia and Azerbaijan and Milosevic's Ser
bia. The democratic peace, it turns out, has little to do with democracy.
THE AMERICAN PATH
An American scholar recently traveled to Kazakst?n on a U.S.
government-sponsored mission to help the new parliament draft it
electoral laws. His counterpart, a senior member of the Kazak parl
ment, brushed aside the many options the American expert was outlin
ing, saying emphatically, "We want our parliament to be just like you
Congress." The American was horrified, recalling, "I tried to say some
thing other than the three words that had immediately come screamin
into my mind: 'No you don't!'" This view is not unusual. Americans in
the democracy business tend to see their own system as an unwieldy co
traption that no other country should put up with. In fact, the adoptio
of some aspects of the American constitutional framework could ame
liorate many of the problems associated with illiberal democracy. The
philosophy behind the U.S. Constitution, a fear of accumulated power,
is as relevant today as it was in 1789. Kazakst?n, as it happens, would b
particularly well-served by a strong parliament?like the America
Congress?to check the insatiable appetite of its president.
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The Rise of Illiberal Democracy
It is odd that the United States is so often the advocate of elections
and plebiscitary democracy abroad. What is distinctive about the
American system is not how democratic it is but rather how unde
mocratic it is, placing as it does multiple constraints on electoral ma
jorities. Of its three branches of government, one?arguably para
mount?is headed by nine unelected men and women with life
tenure. Its Senate is the most unrepresentative upper house in the
world, with the lone exception of the House of Lords, which is pow
erless. (Every state sends two senators to Washington regardless of
its population?California's 30 million people have as many votes in
the Senate as Arizona's 3.7 million?which means that senators rep
resenting about 16 percent of the country can block any proposed
law.) Similarly, in legislatures all over the United States, what is strik
ing is not the power of majorities but that of minorities. To further
check national power, state and local governments are strong and
fiercely battle every federal intrusion onto their turf. Private busi
nesses and other nongovernmental groups, what Tocqueville called
intermediate associations, make up another stratum within society.
The American system is based on an avowedly pessimistic concep
tion of human nature, assuming that people cannot be trusted with
power. "If men were angels," Madison famously wrote, "no government
would be necessary." The other model for democratic governance in
Western history is based on the French Revolution. The French model
places its faith in the goodness of human beings. Once the people are
the source of power, it should be unlimited so that they can create a just
society. (The French revolution, as Lord Acton observed, is not about
the limitation of sovereign power but the abrogation of all intermediate
powers that get in its way.) Most non-Western countries have embraced
the French model?not least because political elites like the prospect of
empowering the state, since that means empowering themselves?and
most have descended into bouts of chaos, tyranny, or both. This should
have come as no surprise. After all, since its revolution France itself has
run through two monarchies, two empires, one proto-fascist dictator
ship, and five republics.9
9Bernard Lewis, "Why Turkey Is the Only Muslim Democracy," Middle East Quar
terly, March 1994, pp. 47-48.
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Fareed Zakaria
Of course cultures vary, and different societies will require
different frameworks of government. This is not a plea for the whole
sale adoption of the American way but rather for a more variegated
conception of liberal democracy, one that emphasizes both parts of
that phrase. Before new policies can be adopted, there lies an intel
lectual task of recovering the constitutional liberal tradition, central
to the Western experience and to the development of good govern
ment throughout the world. Political progress in Western history has
been the result of a growing recognition over the centuries that, as the
Declaration of Independence puts it, human beings have "certain in
alienable rights" and that "it is to secure these rights that governments
are instituted." If a democracy does not preserve liberty and law, that
it is a democracy is a small consolation.
LIBERALIZING FOREIGN POLICY
A proper appreciation of constitutional liberalism has a variety of
implications for American foreign policy. First, it suggests a certain
humility. While it is easy to impose elections on a country, it is more
difficult to push constitutional liberalism on a society. The process of
genuine liberalization and democratization is gradual and long-term,
in which an election is only one step. Without appropriate prepara
tion, it might even be a false step. Recognizing this, governments and
nongovernmental organizations are increasingly promoting a wide
array of measures designed to bolster constitutional liberalism in de
veloping countries. The National Endowment for Democracy pro
motes free markets, independent labor movements, and political
parties. The U.S. Agency for International Development funds inde
pendent judiciaries. In the end, however, elections trump everything.
If a country holds elections, Washington and the world will tolerate a
great deal from the resulting government, as they have with Yeltsin,
Akayev, and Menem. In an age of images and symbols, elections are
easy to capture on film. (How do you televise the rule of law?) But
there is life after elections, especially for the people who live there.
Conversely, the absence of free and fair elections should be viewed
as one flaw, not the definition of tyranny. Elections are an important
virtue of governance, but they are not the only virtue. Governments
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The Rise of Illiberal Democracy
should be judged by yardsticks related to constitutional liberalism as
well. Economic, civil, and religious liberties are at the core of human
autonomy and dignity. If a government with limited democracy
steadily expands these freedoms, it should not be branded a dictator
ship. Despite the limited political choice they offer, countries like
Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand provide a better environment for
the life, liberty, and happiness of their citizens than do either dicta
torships like Iraq and Libya or illiberal democracies like Slovakia or
Ghana. And the pressures of global capitalism can push the process
of liberalization forward. Markets and morals can work together.
Even China, which remains a deeply repressive regime, has given its
citizens more autonomy and economic liberty than they have had in
generations. Much more needs to change before China can even be
called a liberalizing autocracy, but that should not mask the fact that
much has changed.
Finally, we need to revive constitutionalism. One effect of the
overemphasis on pure democracy is that little effort is given to cre
ating imaginative constitutions for transitional countries. Consti
tutionalism, as it was understood by its greatest eighteenth century
exponents, such as Montesquieu and Madison, is a complicated
system of checks and balances designed to prevent the accumula
tion of power and the abuse of office. This is done not by simply
writing up a list of rights but by constructing a system in which
government will not violate those rights. Various groups must be
included and empowered because, as Madison explained, "ambi
tion must be made to counteract ambition." Constitutions were
also meant to tame the passions of the public, creating not simply
democratic but also deliberative government. Unfortunately, the
rich variety of unelected bodies, indirect voting, federal arrange
ments, and checks and balances that characterized so many of the
formal and informal constitutions of Europe are now regarded
with suspicion. What could be called the Weimar syndrome?
named after interwar Germany's beautifully constructed constitu
tion, which failed to avert fascism?has made people regard con
stitutions as simply paperwork that cannot make much difference.
(As if any political system in Germany would have easily weath
ered military defeat, social revolution, the Great Depression, and
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Fareed Zakaria
hyperinflation.) Procedures that inhibit direct democracy are seen
as inauthentic, muzzling the voice of the people. Today around the
world we see variations on the same majoritarian theme. But the
trouble with these winner-take-all systems is that, in most democ
ratizing countries, the winner really does take all.
democracy's discontents
We live in a democratic age. Through much of human history the
danger to an individual's life, liberty and happiness came from the ab
solutism of monarchies, the dogma of churches, the terror of dicta
torships, and the iron grip of totalitarianism. Dictators and a few
straggling totalitarian regimes still persist, but increasingly they are
anachronisms in a world of global markets, information, and media.
There are no longer respectable alternatives to democracy; it is part
of the fashionable attire of modernity. Thus the problems of gover
nance in the 21st century will likely be problems within democracy.
This makes them more difficult to handle, wrapped as they are in the
mantle of legitimacy.
Illiberal democracies gain legitimacy, and thus strength, from
the fact that they are reasonably democratic. Conversely, the
greatest danger that illiberal democracy poses?other than to its
own people?is that it will discredit liberal democracy itself, cast
ing a shadow on democratic governance. This would not be un
precedented. Every wave of democracy has been followed by set
backs in which the system was seen as inadequate and new
alternatives were sought by ambitious leaders and restless masses.
The last such period of disenchantment, in Europe during the in
terwar years, was seized upon by demagogues, many of whom
were initially popular and even elected. Today, in the face of a
spreading virus of illiberalism, the most useful role that the inter
national community, and most importantly the United States, can
play is?instead of searching for new lands to democratize and
new places to hold elections?to consolidate democracy where it
has taken root and to encourage the gradual development of con
stitutional liberalism across the globe. Democracy without con
stitutional liberalism is not simply inadequate, but dangerous,
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The Rise of Illiberal Democracy
bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic
divisions, and even war. Eighty years ago, Woodrow Wilson took
America into the twentieth century with a challenge, to make the
world safe for democracy. As we approach the next century, our
task is to make democracy safe for the world.?
Theories of International
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