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95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
Blame It on the Machines: How Autonomous Vehicles Will
Impact Allocation of Liability Insurance and the Resulting
Impact on the Legal Community*
INTRODUCTION
The notion of a driverless car transcends generations, ever since
the American people became fascinated with the idea during a time
when optimism was at a premium. The 1939 New York World's Fair
featured an exhibit named "The World of Tomorrow" to which
millions came to see a glimpse into the future.' One particular exhibit
by General Motors displayed "abundant sunshine, fresh air [and] fine
green parkways" with cars that could drive themselves.2
In today's
popular culture, a vision of the future imagines a similar element of
automation, with driverless cars serving as an integral element of that
vision. Science fiction movies set in the not-so-distant future feature
artificial intelligence, sleek design, and a swath of autonomous
vehicles carrying passengers going about their daily business.3
Now it
seems that this long-awaited vision may be coming sooner than
anticipated, as Google has developed a series of prototype
autonomous vehicles' that have now logged over one million selfdriven
miles.5
Dampening the enthusiasm for the new technology is a growing
concern that the invention has outpaced its legal framework.6
The
concern came to fruition in July 2015 when a regular car collided with
* @ 2016 Andrew M. Brown.
1. Ben Cosgrove, 'The World of Tomorrow': Scenes From the 1939 New York
World's Fair, TIME (Apr. 29, 2014), http://time.com/3879706/1939-new-york-worlds-fairphotos/
[https://perma.cc/6Y4S-3LNG].
2. Tom Vanderbilt, Autonomous Cars Through the Ages, WIRED (Feb. 6, 2012, 6:30
AM), http://www.wired.com/2012/02/autonomous-vehicle-history/ [http://perma.cc/FJ47-6EHV].
3. See, e.g., I, ROBOT (20th Century Fox 2004).
4. Google Self-Driving Car Project: FAQ, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com
/selfdrivingcar/faq/#q3 [http://perma.cc/ZJ27-Y6L3].
5. Google Self-Driving CarProject, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/selfdrivingcar/
[http://perma.cc/D2B5-ULL5].
6. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, When DriverlessCarsBreak the Law, N.Y. TIMES (May
13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/upshot/when-driverless-cars-break-the-law
.html? r=2 [https://perma.cc/J2MQ-4PAR]; Chris Nichols, Liability Could Be Roadblockfor
Driverless Cars, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Oct. 30, 2014, 4:31 PM), http://www
.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2013/Oct/30/liability-driverless-car-transovation-google/
[http://perma.cc/MB82-BTKK].
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
30 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95
Google's autonomous vehicle, causing minor injuries to the three
Google employee passengers.' This scenario raises the question of
who pays for the costs of an accident when a fully autonomous vehicle
collides with another object.
State legislatures have been slow to create statutory frameworks
to regulate this new form of transportation. At least one legal scholar
has proposed that autonomous vehicles are already legal in the
United States without the adoption of statutes explicitly allowing for
the use of such cars.8 Furthermore, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration ("NHTSA") has begun to prepare for the legal
challenges posed by autonomous vehicles. NHTSA, an agency within
United States Department of Transportation, sets and enforces safety
performance standards for motor vehicles and motor vehicle
equipment.9 NHTSA, in a letter to Google, 0
stated that it "will
interpret 'driver' in the context of Google's described motor vehicle
design as referring to the [self-driving system], and not to any of the
vehicle occupants."" If NHTSA's letter indicates a changing
interpretation that "drivers" of autonomous vehicles are actually the
7. The accident occurred when a self-driven vehicle stopped in a line of traffic at a
stoplight, and a manually driven vehicle failed to stop at the line of traffic and rear-ended
the self-driven vehicle. Google Driverless Car Involved in FirstInjury-CausingAccident,
CBS NEWS (July 17, 2015, 10:30 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/google-driverless-car
-involved-in-first-injury-causing-accident/ [http://perma.cc/68ME-XEWF].
8. See generallyBryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are ProbablyLegal in the
United States, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411 (2014) (discussing how current state statutes do
not prohibit the implementation of driverless cars and with careful drafting may encourage
the adoption of such vehicles).
9. Who We Are and What We Do, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Who+We+Are+and+What+We+Do [https://perma
.cc/EVQ6-AW9L].
10. NHTSA letters represent the opinion of the agency on a question presented.
NHTSA's InterpretationFile Search, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., http://
isearch.nhtsa.gov [http://perma.cc/FXL2-7R6S]. However, these letters only represent the
opinion of the chief counsel as to the presented situation, which may not apply to a later
incident and can be superseded by subsequent standards and regulations propagated by
NHTSA. Id.
11. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Open Letter on Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards (Feb. 4, 2016), http://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/Google%20--%20compiled
%20response%20to%2012%20Nov%20%2015%20interp%20request%20--%204%2OFeb
%2016%20final.htm [http://perma.cc/85UF-KSQR]; see also David Shepardson & Paul
Lienert, In Boost to Self-Driving Cars, U.S. Tells Google Computers Can Qualify as
Drivers, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2016, 1:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-alphabetautos-selfdriving-exclusive-idUSKCNOVJ00H
[http://perma.cc/3HWR-B6T4]. NHTSA sent
this letter as a response to Google's request for interpretation of a number of provisions in
the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards with respect to Google's design for a fully
autonomous motor vehicle. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., supra.
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
2016] AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE LIABILITY 31
vehicles themselves, then a new question arises: who should bear the
liability when the driver is the self-driving system crashes?
This Recent Development will look at the automotive liability
landscape through two lenses: (1) the common law fault-based
litigation approach and (2) the no-fault liability insurance scheme.12
Further, this Recent Development will analyze how each type of
insurance scheme currently in place could apply to autonomous
vehicles, while also determining which insurance scheme is most
appropriate to adequately compensate plaintiffs in claims related to
fully autonomous vehicles. Finally, this Recent Development argues
that strict liability should be imposed on the manufacturer of an
autonomous vehicle, due to the passive nature of the owner's usage of
the vehicle, the complexity of the driverless system, and the ability to
spread losses and encourage research and development by the vehicle
manufacturer.
Discussion proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background
on autonomous vehicles and describes the various levels of
automation prescribed by NHTSA-ranging from level zero (no
automation) to level four (complete automation). Part II breaks down
the difference in automobile liability insurance by describing the
traditional tort system and the less prevalent no-fault system.
Furthermore, Part II will also analyze how the shift will affect legal
strategies and available defenses under each tort regime.
Additionally, Part II will discuss the likely impact autonomous
vehicles may have on these schemes based on the recent NHTSA
statement that a "driver" of an autonomous vehicle is the computer
system itself.13
Part III argues that liability should be imputed to
manufacturers of autonomous vehicles and computer systems due to
the passive nature of the vehicle owners. Lastly, Part III considers the
potential impact of this shift, especially with regards to the tort goals
of cost-spreading and deterrence and explains how a strict liability
scheme will best accomplish those goals.
I. BACKGROUND ON AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
While the concept may seem farfetched, automated vehicles have
been in development for quite some time. Currently, most cars have
some level of automation ranging from typical safety features to
12. As of November 2015, twelve states, as well as Puerto Rico, that have some form
of no-fault automotive insurance laws. See What Is No-FaultInsuranceand What Does it
Cover?, ALLSTATE (Nov. 2015), https://www.allstate.com/tools-and-resources/car-insurance
/no-fault-insurance-cover.aspx [https://perma.cc/GGV3-DRXC].
13. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., supranote 11.
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
32 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95
advanced luxury options. Some of the newer features include antilock
brake systems ("ABS"),14
traction control systems,'5 and electronic
stability control ("ESC") systems.1 6 ESC works by automatically
applying the brakes to a specific wheel to control the car's speed and
direction upon detection that the vehicle is spinning out of control."
Many luxury vehicles now come with automated parallel parking
which uses surround cameras to locate and steer into a spot large
enough to park the vehicle while the driver operates the accelerator
and brake pedals.
A key element in each of the aforementioned systems is that the
system is not a complete substitution for a human driver. In
recognition of the continuum from human control to complete
automation, NHTSA created a system to define the level of
automation in a system ranging from level zero, representing no
automation, to level four, representing complete automation.' 9
Periphery systems such as ESC, or ABS are considered level one, or
function-specific automation.2 0
At this level, "[t]he driver has overall
control, and is solely responsible for safe operation, but can choose to
cede limited authority over a primary control." 2
' Beyond level one
automation is level two, which is defined as "Combined Function
Automation." 22
This level automates at least two control functions of
14. See Anti-lock Brake System, TOYOTA, http://www.toyota-global.com/innovation
/safety technology/safety technology/technology file/active/ [https://perma.cc/F8QF-KDPX].
ABS detects sudden braking by monitoring the speed of each wheel, and upon sudden
braking the system will release braking pressure to prevent the wheels from locking up
while enhancing steering control. Id.
15. See Traction Control and Validation Test, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/problems/Equipment/TractionControl/pages/3TractionSystems
.htm [https://perma.cc/4RMP-CXXM]. Automatic Traction Control Systems utilize the wheel
speed sensors from Anti-Lock Braking Systems to determine whether there is a low friction
surface or the vehicle is skidding to prevent a loss of stability or control. Id.
16. ESC is standard equipment on all new vehicle models as of 2012. Electronic
Stability Control to be Standard by 2012, CONSUMER REPORTS (Feb. 2011), http://www
.consumerreports.org/cro/cars/new-cars/news/2006/nhtsa-proposal-to-make-esc-standard-onall-cars-9-06/overview/nhtsa-proposal-to-make-esc-standard-on-all-cars-9-06.htm
[http://perma
.cc/39P5-YNM8].
17. Electronic Stability Control, SAFECAR.GOV, http://www.safercar.gov/Vehicle
+Shoppers/Rollover/Electronic+Stability+Control [http://perma.cc/Y663-VQF6].
18. James R. Healey & Kelsey Mays, Which Cars Park Themselves Best? Challenge
Results, USA TODAY (Dec. 6, 2012, 1:06 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars
/2012/12/06/self-parking-cars-challenge/1743199/ [https://perma.cc/4MIFD-PVBW].
19. Preliminary Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles, NAT'L
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. 4, https://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf
/Automated Vehicles Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/YC55-2HF2].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 5.
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
2016] AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE LIABILITY 33
the vehicle; for example, when "adaptive cruise control [is used] in
combination with lane centering." 23
The majority of driverless systems
both on automobiles and mass transit24 meet or exceed level three, or
"Limited Self-Driving Automation." 25 At this level of automation, the
driver can "cede full control of all safety-critical functions under
certain traffic or environmental conditions" while also being able to
transition back into control when coming to an area such as an active
construction site.26 The final stage and main consideration of this
Recent Development is level four, or "Full Self-Driving
Automation," in which the driver provides the destination or
navigation input while relinquishing control of the vehicle during the
trip.2
Although level one technology has existed since the early 1970s,2 8
it is reasonable to expect that producing a level four vehicle would
require significant research and development, in addition to road
testing. In a very rudimentary sense, autonomous vehicles work
through either a vehicle-to-vehicle ("V2V") or a vehicle-toinfrastructure
("V21") system. 2 9
In a V2V system, a vehicle warns
other vehicles of its presence through short-range radio devices.3 0
Conversely, in a V2I system, a vehicle "talks" wirelessly with a grid
system that updates multiple vehicles on its grid regarding car
placement and traffic light patterns.3
'
Currently, there are ten companies that are approved by the
California Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") to test
23. Id.
24. What is Metro Automation?, OBSERVATORY OF AUTOMATED METROS (2013),
http://metroautomation.org/automation-essentials/ [https://perma.cc/MGT5-YTDF].
25. See PreliminaryStatement of Policy ConcerningAutomated Vehicles, supra note
19, at 5.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. The first anti-lock braking system for an automobile launched in 1970, and
Mercedes-Benz produced a second generation system in 1978. Mercedes-Benz and the
Invention of the Anti-Lock BrakingSystem: ABS, Ready for Productionin 1978, DAIMLER
(July 1, 2008), https://media.daimler.com/dcmedia/0-921-657486-1-803841-1-0-1-0-0-0-0-
614318-0-1-0-0-0-0-0.html [https://perma.cc/T25Y-WYNY].
29. Christopher B. Dolan, Self-Driving Cars and the Bumpy Road Ahead, AM. ASS'N
FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 2016), https://www.justice.org/what-we-do/enhance-practice-law
/publications/trial-magazine/self-driving-cars-and-bumpy-road-ahead [http://perma.cc/P29R-
FW7N].
30. Id.
31. The V21 system works by creating an infrastructure in which vehicles,
intersections, and road conditions are logged on a grid system. Id. That grid system is
currently under analysis in Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, New York,
and Virginia. Id.
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
34 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95
autonomous vehicles in the state, one of which is Google.32
The tech
company began work on its project in 2009.33 Google autonomous
vehicles currently operate without V2V and V21 communication and
instead rely on current mapping and sensor technology to determine
the car's location relative to the road and to objects around the car to
avoid collisions.34
Google's fleet of autonomous vehicles has amassed over one
million self-driven miles. 35 By using sensors to guide the vehicle while
removing the pedals and steering wheels, Google has created a
prototypical version of a level four automated vehicle.36
Preliminary
research regarding the vehicles has been largely positive and Google
has reported only eleven minor accidents thus far.37
While there have
been some accidents, Google has explained that "human error by the
drivers of the non-autonomous cars is, on the surface, causing
accidents." 38
For example, in at least one incident, an automated
vehicle inched forward and subsequently applied the brakes to avoid
an oncoming car, while the human-driven vehicle behind was
encouraged forward by the automated vehicle and rear-ended the
automated car when it quickly stopped.39
While it was inevitable that the research and development phase
would incur minor accidents like the one described above, the legal
rubber hit the road on February 23, 2016 when one of Google's
autonomous vehicles collided with a bus in California. Google noted
in a statement that the company must "bear some responsibility,"
marking the first collision in which the manufacturer of an
autonomous vehicle bore at least some degree of fault.40
While
Google may have resolved the immediate problem by accepting fault,
this accident prompted one more question in the minds of legal
32. Natasha Lomas, Driverless Car Accident Reports Make Unhappy Reading for
Humans, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 9, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/10/09/dont-blame-therobot-drivers/#.pp7ntwf:uzsj
[http://perma.cc/FG5U-2JH8]. Other such companies include
Volkswagen Group of America, Mercedes Benz, Delphi Automotive, Tesla Motors,
Bosch, Nissan, Cruise Automation, BMW, and Honda. Id.
33. Google Self-Driving Car Project:On the Road, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com
/selfdrivingcar/where/ [http://perma.cc/3YRD-2L6X].
34. Google Self-Driving Car Project: How It Works, GOOGLE, https://www.google
.com/selfdrivingcar/how/ [http://perma.cc/SW8H-29XR].
35. Google Self-Driving CarProject,supra note 5.
36. Google Self-Driving CarProject:How It Works, supranote 34.
37. See Lomas, supra note 32.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. David Shepardson, Google Says it Bears 'Some Responsibility'After Self-Driving
CarHit Bus, REUTERS (Feb. 29, 2016, 6:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-googleselfdrivingcar-idUSKCNOW22DG
[https://perma.cc/A4DC-WH23].
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
2016] AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE LIABILITY 35
scholars. Specifically, how would the courts proceed if Google was
unwilling to accept fault?
II. THE CURRENT AUTOMOTIVE ACCIDENT LIABILITY SYSTEMS
Collectively, states use two methods of determining liability
following an automobile accident. Thirty-eight states use a traditional
tort-based system centered on alleging fault or negligence.4
1 The
remaining twelve have adopted a no-fault based insurance system that
provides a statutorily defined amount that an insurance company will
pay out for damages incurred in an automobile accident without
determining legal fault.42
This Part argues that a traditional tortliability
insurance system, rather than a no-fault system, better
incentivizes a manufacturer to produce a safer autonomous vehicle.
This approach also places fault with the party that has the resources
and technological capacity to improve safety and reduce accidents.
A. The TraditionalTort-Liability InsuranceSystem
Under the modern fault-based tort litigation system, a driver is
judged by the same objective standard used in most tort cases, which
requires that the driver behave in the same manner as an ordinary,
reasonably prudent person when behind the wheel.43
To prevail, the
plaintiff bears the burden of showing not only that the driver
breached the duty of ordinary care to the plaintiff, but that the breach
was the legal cause44
of the plaintiff's injury, and that the plaintiff
suffered damages as a result of the injury.4 5
The contributory
negligence doctrine, which applies in Alabama,46
North Carolina,47
Maryland,48
Virginia,4 9
and the District of Columbia 5
allows a
41. No-FaultInsuranceandFaultInsurance,DMV.ORG, http://www.dmv.org/insurance
/fault-and-no-fault-insurance.php [https://perma.cc/8DST-P5MA].
42. See No-FaultAuto Insurance,supranote 12.
43. See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 296 (1850) (asserting the
proposition that a defendant may be held to a standard of reasonable care, meaning the
"kind and degree of care which prudent and cautious men would use").
44. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) ("The
actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule relieving the actor
from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in harm.");
WILLIAM B. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 44 (1896).
45. H. GERALD CHAPIN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 501 (1917).
46. Williams v. Delta Int'l Mach. Corp., 619 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (Ala. 1993).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4(3) (2015).
48. Bd. of Cty Comm'rs v. Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc., 695 A.2d 171, 181 (Md. 1997).
49. Baskett v. Banks, 45 S.E.2d 173, 177 (Va. 1947).
50. Wingfield v. People's Drug Store, 379 A.2d 685, 687 (D.C. 1994).
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
36 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95
defendant to completely bar plaintiff's recovery upon a showing that
the plaintiff was at least minimally negligent or that the defendant did
not breach the duty of reasonable care.5
' The states operating under
the traditional torts regime that reject contributory negligence allow a
defendant to use evidence of the plaintiff's negligence to reduce the
amount of the award through the comparative negligence doctrine.52
This defense bars the plaintiff's recovery if the plaintiff was more than
fifty percent at fault, or lessens the plaintiff's recovery by the amount
of fault allocable to that plaintiff.53
The subjective nature of the
comparative fault determination, and related uncertainty, has led
some states to adopt a new system of insurance that took fault out of
the equation.
B. A Newer Approach: The No-FaultInsuranceSystem
No-fault automotive insurance arose as a response to the alleged
pitfalls of fault-based liability insurance.54
Initial fault-based liability
statutes had two clear problems: (1) since fault-based liability
insurance was geared to protect all drivers, the amount of coverage
was typically low and a low percentage of drivers met the statutory
minimum of liability coverage; and (2) if proof of fault failed, then
there was no protection to the insured motorist.5 One of the original
proposals for a no-fault liability scheme came from Professors Robert
E. Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell.5 6
The Keeton-O'Connell scheme
was called a "basic protection" plan and was based on loss insurance
under which the victim claims against the insurance company
covering the insured's own car.5
' This coverage applied regardless of
fault.5
' The plan called for coverage up to $10,000 of reasonable
expenses and also included a partial-tort exemption.59
Under the
51. Clark v. Roberts, 263 N.C. 336, 343, 139 S.E.2d 593, 597 (1965) ("Every person
having the capacity to exercise ordinary care for his own safety against injury is required
by law to do so, and if he fails to exercise such care, and such failure, concurring and
cooperating with the actionable negligence of defendant contributes to the injury
complained of, he is guilty of contributory negligence.").
52. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975) (abolishing the
legal doctrine of contributory negligence to adopt the doctrine of comparative negligence
in the state of California).
53. Id. at 1242.
54. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
603 (5th ed. 1984).
55. See id.
56. Id. at 606.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
2016] AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE LIABILITY 37
provision, unless the damages for pain and suffering exceeded $5,000
or personal damages exceeded $10,000 then basic protection coverage
replaced a cause of action for a tort suit.60
For example, if Vehicle A
runs into Vehicle B, causing damage personal damages of $8,000 and
pain and suffering of $2,000, then Vehicle B does not have a cause of
action against Vehicle A and insurance would pay the damages
regardless of fault. However, if damages for pain and suffering to
Vehicle B exceed $5,000, such damages exceed the cap for the partialtort
exemption, and Vehicle A's insurance will not cover those
damages.
This plan provided the basic tenets of no-fault automotive
insurance as it is known today. Currently, the term "no-fault" applies
only to the state laws that both provide for the payment of no-fault
first-party benefits and restrict the right to sue, known as the "limited
tort" option.6
' Furthermore, most no-fault laws prohibit the victim
from suing the other driver for noneconomic damages, further
limiting recovery in these states.62
As the liability scheme gained
popularity, up to "26 states had passed some form of no-fault
insurance, including three states that offered drivers a choice between
no-fault and tort insurance" by 1976.63 However, over time political
support for no-fault liability insurance has waned as insurance
premiums in no-fault states have risen due to high medical costs and a
greater number of applicable claims.64
C. Crashingthe System: How Autonomous Vehicles Will Affect
These Schemes
In considering the potential effects of a shift to a products
liability framework with respect to automotive liability insurance
litigation, it is likely that the traditional tort-system states and no-fault
liability states will see varying results. Autonomous vehicles will
probably have the greatest effect in two different scenarios: (1) where
an individual acts as plaintiff, perhaps as an injured pedestrian or
60. Id.
61. See No-FaultAuto Insurance,supranote 12.
62. See LAURA ZAKARAS, RAND, WHAT HAPPENED TO No-FAULT AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE?, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research briefs/2010/RAND
RB9505.pdf [http://perma.cc/6MMR-9TAN].
63. Id.
64. In 2004, premiums under no-fault liability schemes were fifty percent higher than
those under tort liability schemes. Id. In states that repealed no-fault legislation, including
Colorado, Connecticut, and Georgia, the price of liability premiums dropped dramatically.
Id.
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
38 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95
passenger, and brings a claim against a manufacturer and (2) where a
manufacturer brings a claim against another manufacturer.
1. Individual Acting as Plaintiff
The majority of claims involving fully autonomous vehicles will
likely be brought as design defect claims. Such claims assert that a
flaw in the computer software or algorithm, which guides the car,
caused the accident.65
In such a situation, the design defect claim will
involve a reasonableness analysis similar to the traditional tort
system, as design defect claims are meant to achieve the same
objectives as liability predicated on negligence.6 6
With regard to
defenses asserted to insulate the defendant from liability, a defendant
may still claim contributory or comparative negligence. However, the
inquiry will turn upon whether the plaintiff's behavior contributed to
the injury, either through abnormal use or failure to discover a defect
through reasonable inquiry.67
Given that automobile accidents
between manually driven vehicles are often due to human error,68
resolution of claims via the court system will typically require a
showing of a breach of the ordinary care standard as described
earlier.69
Adapting that system to autonomous vehicles should be
fairly similar to the current tort-based system of liability regardless of
whether a strict liability or design defect claim is brought, given that a
showing of fault will determine which party will bear the costs of the
collision.
While the doctrinal shift to a products liability framework should
be fairly smooth in traditional tort-based states, the shift in no-fault
states could be more jarring. Unless a comparable no-fault statutory
scheme is erected for autonomous vehicles, or the same principles are
applied to the "driver" system as defined by the NHTSA,70
then there
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (AM. LAW INST.
1997). It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which two competing autonomous vehicle
manufacturers with different proprietary computer systems collide, and a court must
determine whether a reasonable alternative design was available to either of the vehicles.
66. See id. at cmt. d.
67. See, e.g., Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343, 345 (10th Cir. 1962)
(asserting that a woman smoking in bed after taking a sleeping pill constituted negligence
on the plaintiff's part barring her from recovering against the manufacturer of a nightgown
that caught fire); Dix W. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory
Negligence, andAssumption ofRisk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 95-106 (1972).
68. See Bryant Walker Smith, Human Erroras a Cause of Vehicle Crashes, THE CTR.
FOR INTERNET AND SoC'Y (Dec. 28, 2013, 3:15 PM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog
/2013/12/human-error-cause-vehicle-crashes [https://perma.cc/52KH-V2HR].
69. See supra Section II.A.
70. See Shepardson & Lienert, supra note 11.
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
2016] AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE LIABILITY 39
will be some showing of fault under a products liability framework,
whether it is under a strict liability or negligence standard. Barring a
settlement, courts applying a products liability approach will have to
determine the reasonableness of the design" or adequacy of the
warning.72
This would conflict with the goals of state legislatures that
adopted no-fault automotive insurance schemes seeking to avoid
court involvement and streamline the process of allocating damages
following an automobile accident.73
2. Manufacturer v. Manufacturer
The second scenario arises when an accident between two
autonomous vehicles occurs and a manufacturer consequently brings
a claim against another manufacturer to recover for damages to the
vehicle. While it may seem strange for a large manufacturer to be
involved in such an array of disputes, the sheer magnitude of
potential liability would likely demand such an approach. In a letter
to Google, NHTSA stated that for purposes of a level four automated
vehicle, the self-driving system and software will be considered the
driver, rather than any of the vehicle's occupants.74
Such a designation
would be groundbreaking because it would allow the development of
autonomous vehicles without drafting separate legislation in each
state, 5 instead substituting the software as the "driver" for the
purposes of existing legislation and allow many more autonomous
vehicles to get on the roads quickly.
Assuming that the self-driving system will be considered the
driver,7 6
it is possible that one self-driving system will be pitted
against a separate self-driving system to determine liability and
indemnify the owners of those vehicles. To avoid such widespread
liability exposure for manufacturers, practitioners have suggested
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
72. Id. § 2(c).
73. See ZAKARAS, supranote 62.
74. See Shepardson & Lienert, supra note 11.
75. Currently, sixteen states have proposed legislation discussing autonomous
vehicles, while Nevada, California, Florida, Michigan, North Dakota, Tennessee, and
Washington D.C. have passed legislation relating to autonomous vehicles. See
Autonomous/Self-Driving Vehicles Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (July 1, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomousvehicles-legislation.aspx
[http://perma.cc/Z6MA-YQZL].
76. It is worthwhile to recognize that states such as California have suggested
additional legislation that would require a steering wheel and a licensed driver in all selfdriving
cars. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(4) (West 2015) (defining "operator" of a
driverless vehicle as the person seated in the driver's seat).
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
40 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95
either a resurgence of no-fault liability for manufacturers," or the
imposition of strict liability on owners.7
' There are two separate levels
of analysis and several questions regarding a situation in which two
autonomous vehicles collide. First, there is a question as to which
party should bear the responsibility of obtaining insurance for the
purpose of paying damages in the claim. After determining whether
that responsibility should lie with the manufacturer or the owner of a
autonomous vehicle, the next question is whether fault should be
proven through a traditional negligence standard, a no-fault insurance
scheme as implemented by a minority of states, or through a strict
liability standard in which the reasonable care of the manufacturer is
not determinative in allocating fault.7 9
To best spread losses and
encourage development of a safer product, manufacturers should be
held strictly liable for damage caused by the utilization of an
autonomous vehicle.
III. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK: MANUFACTURER STRICT
LIABILITY BEST ACHIEVES TORT GOALS
Determining liability in an autonomous vehicle collision requires
consideration as to whom to allocate the fault in the event of an
accident, as well as the method by which to determine fault. This Part
argues that the manufacturer is in a better position to assume loss and
design a safer product to prevent future injury, and that strict liability
is the best method to determine fault by streamlining litigation and
incentivizing improvements through research and development.
A. Allocate Liabilityto the Manufacturer
Some legal scholars anticipate the proliferation of autonomous
vehicles will result in a shift in liability from the human driver to the
autonomous vehicle manufacturer.so By placing liability with the
77. See Sarah Croft, Who Will be Liable for Driverless Cars?, AUTOMOTIVEWORLD
(July 29, 2013), http://www.automotiveworld.com/analysis/comment-who-will-be-liable-for
-driverless-cars/ [http://perma.cc/E2P3-A2HU].
78. Sophia H. Duffy & Jamie P. Hopkins, Sit, Stay, Drive: The FutureofAutonomous
Car Liability, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 453, 467-71 (2013) (analogizing a strict
liability system in which owners of autonomous cars that injure another are strictly liable
in a scheme similar to owners of dogs that injure another). But see Jeffrey K. Gurney,
Recent Development, Sue My Car Not Me: Products Liability and Accidents Involving
Autonomous Vehicles, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 247, 252 (2013) (proposing that the
liability scheme for driverless vehicles should hold the manufacturers liable as the
"drivers" of autonomous vehicles).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
80. See JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND, AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE
TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 115, (2016), http://www.rand.org/content
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
2016] AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE LIABILITY 41
manufacturer, the threat of litigation creates a natural incentive to
create a safer product while allocating the cost to the party that has
the ability to design around future incidents.8
The less desirable alternative is to hold the owners of automated
vehicles liable.82
A strict liability standard would function similar to a
products liability claim, essentially holding the owner liable regardless
of whether due care was exercised in operation of the autonomous
vehicle.83
Thus, rather than placing the onus on manufacturers to
obtain insurance to pay for claims relating to a collision, the owner of
an autonomous vehicle would have to purchase insurance that would
pay for damages in the event of an accident, irrespective of fault.84
While this would reduce manufacturers' liability exposure, it would
also discourage consumers from purchasing autonomous vehicles due
to the increased cost of ownership. Legal and insurance claims
relating to autonomous vehicles could be costlier, largely due to
additional sensors and software that guide the vehicle. 5 Each of these
considerations supports the conclusion that liability should rest with
the manufacturer.
B. Imposing StrictLiability
A Brookings Institution report proposed the principles of
products liability that will be the guideposts for dispute resolution
regarding autonomous vehicle based claims.86
Depending on
jurisdiction, a plaintiff may assert a products liability claim under the
theory of strict liability, manufacturing defect, design defect, or
failure to provide adequate warning.
This Recent Development argues allocating fault by imposing
strict liability on manufacturers is the best option to achieve optimal
/dam/rand/pubs/research reports/RR400/RR443-2/RAND RR443-2.pdf [https://perma.cc
/AK6N-CRXN].
81. See John Villasenor, ProductsLiability and Driverless Cars:Issues and Guiding
Principles for Legislation, BROOKINGS (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu
/research/products-liability-and-driverless-cars-issues-and-guiding-principles-for-legislation/
[http://perma.cc/K6CQ-YV6T].
82. For a complete discussion on strict liability for autonomous car owners, see Duffy
& Hopkins, supra note 78, at 471-79.
83. Id. at 472.
84. Id. at 476.
85. see TODD LITMAN, VICTORIA TRANSP. POLICY INST., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE
IMPLEMENTATION PREDICTIONS 5, (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.vtpi.org/avip.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G5FV-JTM8] (stating that currently, computer systems and sensors necessary to
guide the vehicle would cost tens of thousands of dollars, although they will likely
decrease in cost upon mass production).
86. Villasenor, supranote 81.
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
42 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95
deterrence and loss-spreading in the case of autonomous vehicles.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, in certain situations,
strict liability will be predicated on whether the product is deemed
unreasonably dangerous." In recent years, scholars have doubted the
wisdom of holding manufacturers strictly liable in other industries,"
stating that the compensation rationale has led to an erosion of
principles of personal responsibility.8 9 However, unlike a situation in
which a plaintiff knowingly selects a product that is less safe and
subsequently sues the manufacturer for injury,90
the average driver of
an autonomous vehicle would not have the requisite control over the
vehicle or software to make the car safer. Rather, the manufacturer is
in a better position to understand the various systems and risks
associated with those computer systems.91
Professor Howard A. Latin observed a situation such as this
while analyzing how different theories of tort liability achieve various
tort objectives. 92 To best define the appropriate theory of tort liability
given varying levels of manufacturer and consumer knowledge,
Professor Latin uses a matrix to evaluate how to allocate loss between
the injured and the party at fault, as well as "high-attention risk"93
and "low-attention risk." 94
In a situation in which there are highattention
risks for the party at fault and low-attention risks for the
injured, the preferable theory is strict liability for the party at fault.95
Such a result makes sense both logically and equitably; in the
situation of an autonomous vehicle, the individual is no longer a
driver, but becomes a passenger while the driver that controls the
movement of the vehicle is the computer system designed by the
87. Whether the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
the product is irrelevant to the determination of liability under this section.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
88. William A. Worthington, The "Citadel" Revisited: Strict Tort Liability and the
Policy ofLaw, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 227, 244-252 (1995).
89. Id. at 262.
90. See id. at 271.
91. Also, it is arguably unreasonable to require that every purchaser of an
autonomous vehicle have a background in computer programming or software design
without greatly restricting the pool of potential consumers.
92. See Howard A. Latin, Problem-SolvingBehaviorand Theoriesof Tort Liability, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 677, 696-97 (1985).
93. High-attention risk describes an accident in which the actor is able to most
effectively minimize cost, and that actor understands "material risks and applicable
liability doctrines, [and] must pay attention to risks and legal rules while engaged in risky
conduct." Id. at 697.
94. Low-attention risk describes a situation in which one of the conditions pertinent
to a high-attention risk is not present. Id.
95. Id.
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
2016] AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE LIABILITY 43
manufacturer.96
Given the complexity of the sensor system and the
passive nature of the owner of the autonomous vehicle, the
manufacturer is in a better position to respond to liability costs by
creating a safer supply of autonomous vehicles. Alternatively, placing
liability in the hands of the owner will not encourage less risky
behavior; it will simply discourage consumers from purchasing the
vehicles.
With regards to loss-spreading, by asserting a strict liability
scheme for manufacturers, litigation costs should decrease97
and outof-court
settlements should increase. In addition, accident frequency
could decrease by as much as 80% by 2040 according to a 2015 study
by KPMG.9 8
This number is not surprising given the estimate that
90% of motor vehicle crashes are caused at least in part by human
error.99 Furthermore, the KPMG study predicts that the automotive
insurance losses could shrink from $145 billion in 2013 to $86 billion
by 2040 due to increased safety features.'00
Finally, some in the legal community recognize the potential
litigation from implementing such a vast technological change. The
American Association for Justice decried the suggestion of
implementing a no-fault insurance scheme for manufacturers as a
chilling force on safety development and stated that "[i]t is important
to ensure that manufacturers and their products are held up to the
scrutiny of the product-specific, strict liability system."'
Arguably, assigning the loss to the manufacturer will slow
production of autonomous vehicles due to high costs of products
liability insurance.1 02
Furthermore, scholars have suggested that the
high costs of products liability litigation offset loss-spreading and
compensation advantages.'03
However, even with changing to a strict
liability scheme, decreased accident rates due to integrated
96. See PreliminaryStatement of Policy ConcerningAutomated Vehicles, supra note
19, at 5.
97. See Latin, supranote 92, at 715.
98. Assuming that fully autonomous vehicles are available and integrated at that
point. See JERRY ALBRIGHT ET AL., KPMG, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IN THE ERA OF
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 5 (June 2015), https://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndlnsights
/ArticlesPublications/Documents/automobile-insurance-in-the-era-of-autonomous-vehiclessurvey-results-june-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4C5Y-S99K].
99. See Smith, supranote 68.
100. See ALBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 98, at 5, 9.
101. See Dolan,supra note 29.
102. See Worthington, supra note 88, at 249 (claiming that $80 billion annually was
directly attributable to litigation costs which increased insurance premiums for
manufacturers).
103. Id. at 250-52.
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
44 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95
autonomous vehicle systems 04
should significantly mitigate the
potential increase in manufacturer production costs.
C. StrictLiabilityIs Preferableto TraditionalNegligence and No-
FaultSchemes
For the reasons mentioned above, imposing strict liability on the
manufacturer best effectuates traditional tort goals and ensures a
safer product for the consumer.105
Under the theoretical purposes of
no-fault liability insurance, it would be simple to assume that the
scheme would lower costs of litigation by creating a streamlined,
predictable system to settle disputes.10 6
However, according to a
twenty-year study by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, "liability
premiums have been consistently higher in no-fault states, and the
gap has widened over time. By 2004, premiums under no-fault were
50 percent higher than those under tort."' 7 Additionally, the study
found that medical costs in no-fault states were nearly double that of
traditional tort liability states.'0
s A key component of this discrepancy
is that health insurers in traditional tort states have "sophisticated
techniques for managing medical care to minimize costs" while
automotive insurers with less medical expertise serve as medical
insurers in no-fault states.' 09 Furthermore, since a no-fault claim by
nature does not absolve an innocent party of fault, policyholders of
no-fault liability insurance have found that a previous no-fault claim
significantly raises premiums."1
The traditional negligence standard also seems less attractive. In
applying a traditional negligence standard, a manufacturer could
avoid accident liability by showing the computer system displayed
ordinary care in executing any road-going maneuver."' Furthermore,
a manufacturer may avoid liability by asserting that there was not an
economically feasible "reasonable alternative design" that would
104. See ALBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 98, at 5.
105. See supra Sections I.A.-III.B.
106. See ZAKARAS, supranote 62.
107. Id. Also note that these results persist "even after partially controlling for other
factors that may influence these costs, such as climate, the road system, and density of the
population." Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Christopher Menon, No-fault Claims Adding 30% to Car Insurance, AA Finds,
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2014, 9:47 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/apr
/16/no-fault-claims-car-insurance-aa [https://perma.cc/82S3-BVSG] (finding that one nofault
claim raised premiums on average by 30% and two or more non-fault claims raised
premiums by 10-50%).
111. See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 296 (1850).
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
2016] AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE LIABILITY 45
significantly or entirely prevent the injury suffered by the plaintiff.112
However, upon adopting the traditional negligence system, there
remains a practical and moral problem relating to the manufacturer's
ability to account for, and allow injury to occur.
The classic Learned Hand"13
formulation states there are three
essential factors in determining liability for negligence: "the
likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the
seriousness of the injury if it happens, and balanced against the
interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.""4
The formula may
be roughly approximated as saying that "[t]he loss lies on the injured
victim unless the injurer knew or should have known, at the time he
or she acted, that accident avoidance by him or her was cheaper than
the cost of the accident."" 5
Applying this formula to a manufacturer
of autonomous vehicles, that manufacturer will inevitably encounter a
situation in which the cost of developing a new autonomous vehicle
system to avoid such an accident exceeds the likelihood of an accident
multiplied by the damages incurred by an injury to plaintiff. In such a
situation, theoretically the manufacturer would not face liability for
the claim under a traditional negligence framework, effectively
limiting the incentive for a manufacturer to research and develop a
safer method while subsidizing the new technology at the expense of
injured plaintiffs.
That is not to say that there is no merit to the application of a
negligence standard to autonomous vehicles. To the contrary, courts
have applied a negligence standard to determine the
"crashworthiness" of manually driven vehicles.11 6
With regards to the
crashworthiness test, courts have determined that in instances in
which a manufacturer is aware of the risks proposed by a given design
112. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (AM. LAW
INST. 1998).
113. Judge Learned Hand's consideration of mathematics and cost-benefit analysis to
determine a party's negligence, as later stated in United States v. CarrollTowing Co., 159
F.2d 169 (1947), has had a lasting effect on both legal and economic analysis of liability
rules. See Allan M. Feldman & Jeonghyun Kim, The Hand Rule and United States v.
CarrollTowing Co. Reconsidered,7 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 523,523-25 (2005).
114. See Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd, 312 U.S. 492
(1941).
115. Guido Calabresi & Alvin K. Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 585, 587 (1985).
116. " '[C]rashworthiness' means the protection a passenger motor vehicle gives its
passengers against personal injury or death from a motor vehicle accident .... " 49 U.S.C.
§32301(2) (2012); Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
46 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95
as well as the availability of an alternative design, strict liability is a
preferable standard to judge a design defect claim."'
D. Impact on the LegalProfession
Although it may seem intuitively simple to apply products
liability principles like strict liability to autonomous vehicles,"'
questions remain as to how the shift in legal framework will affect
insurance and production costs, as well as the legal market. By
looking at no-fault automotive insurance as a case study, a shift to
strict liability alone will not necessarily cause a decrease in legal
work." 9 To the contrary, a Rand Institute study noted that rates of
attorney utilization with traditional tort and no-fault tort states have
largely converged over time.120
However, the availability of work in
personal liability insurance will shift, as it is highly likely that personal
automotive claims will shrink significantly as autonomous cars are
integrated.1 2
' Furthermore, evidence supports that there may be a
sizeable decrease in claims related to traffic-related incidents given
the predicted decline in accident frequency.' 22 According to NHTSA,
legal costs relating to police-reported crashes totaled nearly $9.6
billion in 2010.123 While the social benefits of autonomous cars may be
significant, 2 4
the loss to the legal market may be sizeable as well.
117. See Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 59-63 (N.M. 1995) (discussing
how strict liability better serves the policy considerations of loss-spreading, plaintiff
protection, and general fairness in the case of a manufacturer that is aware of a design's
foreseeable risks).
118. It has been proposed that the principles of products liability will adapt to the new
technology in the same way that the principles have adapted in the past with new
technology such as electronic stability control, automatic braking, and other autonomous
devices. See ZAKARAS, supra note 62.
119. Molly Sinclair & Ed Bruske, No-FaultLaw Seen Working, WASH. POST (Oct. 7,
1984), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1984/10/07/no-fault-law-seen-working
/4dd5eb2l-63f8-43e8-9922-Ofaclef0233d/ [https://perma.cc/8HL7-Q8UV] ("Rather than
drying up their business as predicted, they said, the law has caused many clients to come to
them with new problems.").
120. See ZAKARAS, supra note 62.
121. The personal automotive sector is predicted to shrink from $125 billion to less
than $50 billion in loss coverage. See ALBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 98, at 9.
122. See supranote 98 and accompanying text.
123. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., REP. No. DOT HS 812 013, THE
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETAL IMPACT OF MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES, 2010 (REVISED) 15
(2015), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812013 [https://perma
.cc/H5FW-WA5C].
124. See Kyle Colonna, Note, Autonomous Cars and Tort Liability, 4 CASE W. RES.
J.L. TECH. & THE INTERNET 81, 111-14 (2012), for a discussion of the social utility of
autonomous cars.
95 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 29 (2016)
2016] AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE LIABILITY 47
CONCLUSION
Creative minds have contemplated a future where a person can
get in a vehicle, type in a destination, and enjoy the ride. It is only fair
then that legal minds have been hard at work contemplating what
happens when that ride goes awry. While much ink has been spilled
discussing the legality of autonomous vehicles as well as the use of
products liability as the framework for claims relating to those
vehicles, typical tort principles do not provide the answer. When two
autonomous vehicles collide, the human "driver" of a manual vehicle
is now a blameless passenger. A shift to a liability system in which the
manufacturer of the autonomous vehicle is strictly liable properly
incentivizes research and development by manufacturers. A strict
liability system also places the cost of adapting to the new
autonomous vehicle technology with the party ablest to insulate via
loss-spreading.
After considering the passive nature of the owner of an
autonomous vehicle, placing liability with that owner will do nothing
to incentivize an autonomous vehicle manufacturer to create a safer
product. Furthermore, that manufacturer is in the best position to
spread the losses through internalizing costs, which eventually will
dissipate through a gradual decrease in accident frequency. Holding
manufacturers to a strict liability standard is the best method to usher
in a new era of transportation technology while satisfying the goals of
tort law and ensuring consumer safety.
ANDREW M. BROWN
** I would like to thank Professor Richard Saver for his guidance and feedback in
the creation of this Recent Development. I would also like to thank the staff and board of
the North CarolinaLaw Review for the considerable time and effort put into reviewing my
Recent Development, with special thanks to Brian Liebman and Caleb Johnson for their
individual contributions to this Recent Development. Finally, I would like to thank my
family for their support and interest in my legal education.