This article is published in a peer-reviewed section of the Utrecht Law Review
145
Changing International ‘Subjectivity’ and Rights and Obligations
under International Law – Status of Corporations
Merja Pentikäinen*
http://www.utrechtlawreview.org | Volume 8, Issue 1 (January) 2012 | URN:NBN:NL:UI:10-1-101433 |
1. Doctrine of the subjects of international law
1.1. Broadening the circle of subjects
Introductory textbooks on public international law invariably include a section on the subjects of international
law appearing as part of the fundamentals of this branch of law.1
The doctrine of international
‘subjectivity’2
is also among the international law topics that have attracted the attention of a number of
scholars who have entered the debate on the content and reach of this ‘subjectivity’. The subject of international
law has been defined, for instance, in the following way: it is an entity capable of possessing
international rights and duties and having the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international
claims;3
it is capable of independently bearing rights and obligations under international law.4
The idea
of subjects of the international legal system is often linked – even conflated – with the notion of international
legal personality.5
It has been suggested that international legal personality arises in three principal
contexts: capacity to make claims in respect of breaches of international law; capacity to make treaties
and agreements valid on the international plane; and the enjoyment of privileges and immunities from
national jurisdictions.6
A review of the literature addressing the issue of international ‘subjectivity’ suggests
that varying kinds of links are made between international (legal) ‘subjectivity’, international (legal)
capacity and international (legal) personality.7
*	 LL.D., Acting Professor of International Law, University of Turku (Finland). E-mail: merpen@utu.fi. The writer participates in the research
project on ‘How to Rule the Economy’ running in the Law Faculty of the University of Turku in 2011-2014 and funded by the Academy of
Finland.
1	 See e.g. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 1999, pp. 57-68; A. Cassese, International Law, 2005, pp. 71-150; M. Dixon,
Textbook on International Law, 2007, pp. 111-141.
2	 The word ’subjectivity’ is probably not a very eloquent English expression. It is said to be a Germanism (J. Klabbers, An Introduction to
International Institutional Law, 2009, p. 40, fn. 10), but since it does appear in the literature on international law addressing the subjects
of international law, the author feels it is appropriate to use it.
3	 See Brownlie, supra note 1, p. 57. Brownlie’s definition echoes the elements put forth in the ICJ’s advisory opinion on Reparation for
­Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. See the remarks on this case below. Brownlie considers this conventional definition
to be circular when it recognizes the capacity to act at the international level of an entity that is already capable of acting at the
international level. See also A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, 2006, p. 64. Challenging this circularity, see
A.  ­Meijknecht, Towards International Personality: The Position of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 2001, p. 24.
4	 See Klabbers, supra note 2, p. 38.
5	 Ibid., p. 39. Klabbers points out that hypothetically entities can possess legal personality under any legal system, p. 44.
6	 See Brownlie, supra note 1, p. 57.
7	 See also Meijknecht, supra note 3, pp. 23-63; Clapham, supra note 3, p. 64; J. Wouters et al., ‘Introductory Remarks’, in J. Wouters et al.
(eds.), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International Organisations, 2010, pp. 1-18, at p. 6. In his publication from the 1970s
C.N. Okene considers international ‘subjectivity’ through treaty-making capacity. See C.N. Okene, Controversial subjects of contemporary
international law. An examination of the new entities of international law and their treaty-making capacity, 1974.
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Changing International ‘Subjectivity’ and Rights and Obligations under International Law
	 In the past, when international law was viewed as regulating solely inter-state relations, states were
the only subjects of international law. Departure from this exclusively state-centric model of the international
legal system in the course of the years – thus recognising the changes in the dynamic of the
international system – has also resulted in the widening of the group of entities labelled as international
law subjects. An important step was taken in 1949 when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave
its advisory opinion concerning the international rights and duties of international organisations, more
specifically the UN in the case at hand. In the case of Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations the UN was characterised as an international person and as a subject of international
law, capable of possessing international rights and duties and capacity to maintain its rights by bringing
international claims.8
Subsequently, international ‘subjectivity’ of international organisations has been
widely recognised, and the capacities of international organisations are regarded as also encompassing
the capacity to become parties to international agreements and the capacity to enjoy certain privileges
and immunities.9
	 While states have the status of primary subjects of international law with the most extensive capacities
(full legal capacity),10
the ‘subjectivity’ of international organisations is limited and determined by the
powers vested in them.11
The scope of this ‘subjectivity’ does give rise to various interpretations. Among
other things, the issues of human rights obligations of international organisations and the accountability
of international organisations for human rights violations have sparked vivid debates.12
While it has
been concluded that universally recognised human rights are binding upon international organisations,
international law is still in a state of flux, e.g. where it concerns the division of responsibilities between
international organisations and their Member States.13
	 The contemporary literature on international law also lists other actors among the subjects of international
law, including insurgents, national liberation movements, and certain sui generis or state-like
entities.14
Even individuals have appeared on some of these lists of subjects.15
Those who challenge this
view of seeing individuals as subjects of international law underline the fact that individuals are under
the exclusive control of states. When treaties provide for the rights and duties of individuals, this would
mean that each state only undertakes (by agreement vis-à-vis the other Contracting States) to confer
such rights and impose duties on individuals solely within its own legal system. Individuals’ rights to file
complaints with international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies are just exceptional, being no more than a
procedural right which lacks any attendant substantive right or the power to enforce a possible decision
8	 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, (1949) ICJ Reports 174, at p. 179. The ­advisory
opinion arose out of the establishment of the state of Israel. The resulting unrest in the Middle East forced the UN to nominate a
­mediator, the Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte, to consider the issue. Count Bernadotte and a number of his associates were killed in
Jerusalem in September 1948, allegedly by a private gang of terrorists. After this incident the UN General Assembly sought an advisory
opinion from the ICJ. The question was raised as to whether the UN, as an organisation, could claim reparation for these injuries from the
responsible state.
9	 See Brownlie, supra note 1, p. 58. See also Klabbers, supra note 2, pp. 40-42, 131-152, 251-270; D.E. Arzt & I.I. Lukashuk, ‘Participants
in International Legal Relations’, in C. Ku & P.F. Diehl (eds.), International Law. Classic and Contemporary Readings, 1998, pp. 155-176, at
p. 155.
10	 Cassese refers to states as fundamental subjects of international law. See Cassese, supra note 1, p. 71.
11	 For remarks on attributed and implied powers of international organisations, see Klabbers, supra note 2, pp. 53-73. Brownlie calls states
and international organisations the ‘normal types’ of legal person on the international plane. See Brownlie, supra note 1, p. 58.
12	 See e.g. the publication by Wouters et al., supra note 7.
13	 For discussion of whether or not international organisations are bound by international human rights obligations under international
law, see O. De Schutter, ‘Human Rights and the Rise of International Organisations: The Logic of Sliding Scale in the Law of International
Responsibility’, in J. Wouters et al. (eds.), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International Organisations, 2010, pp. 51-128, at
pp. 55-73, 104, 125.
14	 See Cassese, supra note 1, pp. 124-150. Insurgents and national liberation movements are noted to have special links to states since they
are entities potentially on their way to becoming states. The former come into being through their struggle against the state to which they
previously belonged. The latter group is viewed as consisting of organised groups particularly fighting against colonialism, racist regimes
or alien domination. This legitimisation is based on the principle of self-determination. Cassese labels the Holy See, the sovereign order
of Malta and the International Committee of the Red Cross as being sui generis entities. Clapham calls de facto regimes, the Holy See
and the Order of Malta as the entities with state-like qualities also often counted among the subjects of international law. See Clapham,
supra note 3, p. 59. For Brownlie, ‘established legal persons’ include states, political entities legally proximate to states, condominiums,
internationalised territories, international organisations, agencies of states and agencies of organisations. Non-self-governing peoples,
states in statu nascendi, legal constructions, belligerent and insurgent communities, entities sui generis and individuals he describes as
having ‘special types of personality’. See Brownlie, supra note 1, pp. 59-66.
15	 See ibid., pp. 58, 66; Cassese, supra note 1, pp. 142-150; Clapham, supra note 3, p. 61.
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Merja Pentikäinen
of an international body.16
However, developments in international law over the years have made the
international position of individuals complex and multifaceted. Under modern international law, individuals
have gradually come to be regarded not only as holders of material interests acknowledged at the
international level, but they are also capable of infringing fundamental values of the world community.
The development of international human rights law and the doctrine of individual criminal responsibility
under international law have introduced important changes in the international legal system. The
most recent affirmation of individual criminal responsibility at the international level is to be found in
the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) which provides for criminal jurisdiction over
individuals accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the ‘crime of aggression’.17
These changes have influenced the debate on the international ‘subjectivity’ of individuals. As a result of
both granting individuals legal rights and placing obligations on them that are operational at the international
level, there are scholars who are of the opinion that individuals possess international legal status
as subjects of international law.18
1.2. Multinational corporations – contested subjects
If there are different scholarly views on the international ‘subjectivity’ of individuals, the status of corporations
as subjects of international law is even more contested. The debate on the international ‘subjectivity’
of corporations revolves around the business entities that operate across national borders, labelled
‘multinational corporations’, for instance.19
Debates on this matter are characterised by a strong resistance
to include corporate entities among the subjects of international law, and until recently suggestions
that corporations be considered as having international legal personality were exceptional. Many authors
have simply left the question open.20
	 Those scholars who have addressed the issue have noted, for instance, that multinational corporations
have ‘controversial candidatures’ which in principle have no international legal personality.21
According to some views, these entities are sometimes counted among the subjects of international law.22
It is acknowledged that the situation becomes more complex when a corporation is closely controlled by
a government so that it could be considered as a state agency, with or without some degree of autonomy.
Additionally, ownership of shares may give a state a controlling interest in a ‘private law corporation’.23
The rights and responsibilities of corporations that are state-owned or otherwise controlled by a state
raise important questions from the viewpoint of human rights protection. The prevailing state of affairs
16	 See Cassese, supra note 1, pp. 144-150. For the denial of international ‘subjectivity’ of individuals (in earlier literature), see e.g.
H. ­Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, 1968, pp. 6-9.
17	 See Art. 5 of the Statute of the ICC, Rome, 17 July 1998, in force 1 July 2002, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, United Nations Treaty Series,
Vol. 2187. Nowadays individual criminal responsibility under international law also extends to such international crimes as slavery,
­disappearances and torture. See Clapham, supra note 3, p. 29.
18	 For remarks on the status of individuals in international law, see Cassese, supra note 1, pp. 142-150. See also Arzt & Lukashuk, supra
note 9, pp. 157-166.
19	 These entities have been described using different combinations of the terms multinational, transnational, business and enterprise.
Regardless of the exact term used, this kind of entity is characterised by its ability to operate across national borders and outside the
effective supervision of domestic and international law that makes them important actors from the viewpoint of international law.
M.T. Kamminga & S. Zia-Zarifi, ‘Introduction’, in M.T. Kamminga & S. Zia-Zarifi (eds.), Liability of Multinational Corporations under International
Law, 2000, pp. 1-15, at pp. 2-3. For the remarks on defining multinational corporations, see also C. Wells & J. Elias, ‘Catching
the Conscience of the King: Corporate Players on the International Stage’, in P. Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights, 2005,
pp. 141-175, at pp. 148-150. Clapham has opted for the term transnational corporations. See Clapham, supra note 3, pp. 76-80, 199-201.
Arzt & Lukashuk refer to transnational enterprises, supra note 9, pp. 166-173.
20	 See Clapham, supra note 3, pp. 76-77.
21	 See Brownlie, supra note 1, p. 66. Brownlie notes that although corporations can make agreements with foreign governments, a concession
or contract between a state and a foreign corporation is not governed by the law of treaties. See also Arzt & Lukashuk, supra note 9,
pp. 167, 173.
22	 See Klabbers, supra note 2, p. 38. See also Kamminga & Zia-Zarifi, supra note 19, p. 4; S. Tully, Corporations and International Lawmaking,
2007, p. 323.
23	 Brownlie notes that legal persons created by states by treaty nowadays perform important functions, and the status of the bodies is
regulated by the national law of one or more of the parties. Brownlie calls these bodies ‘intergovernmental corporations of private law’
and ‘établissements publics internationaux’. A corporation may receive a privileged status in (even independence from) national law, and
it may have both a considerable quantum of delegated powers and organs with autonomy in decision- and rule-making. In this case, the
body concerned has the characteristics of an international organisation. Despite this, Brownlie does not view it as representing a distinct
species of legal person on the international plane. See Brownlie, supra note 1, pp. 67-68.
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Changing International ‘Subjectivity’ and Rights and Obligations under International Law
appears to enable the state to escape its human rights obligations when the state operates in the business
context as a company actor.
	 As regards the broader question of whether corporations have rights and obligations under international
law, they are viewed as possessing rights, for instance, under international investment law, including
the right not to be discriminated against vis-à-vis national firms and a right to receive compensation
in the event of expropriation. Under human rights law, corporate entities enjoy such rights
as the right to a fair trial, the right to privacy, the right of freedom of expression, and property rights.24
Corporations have been granted locus standi before some international tribunals.25
A corporate entity
can be an applicant even before a human rights supervisory body. This possibility was created under
the European Convention on Human Rights.26
In one of the seminal judgments of the European Court
of Human Rights, i.e. in the case of The Sunday Times v United Kingdom, the first applicant was Times
Newspapers Ltd.27
In some cases, the legal person may be the only appropriate victim that can complain
to the Strasbourg Court.28
In a recent case in which the Strasbourg Court ruled, the applicant was a
publicly-traded private open joint-stock company.29
	 There are scholars who consider that it is at least theoretically possible that international law could
impose some human rights obligations directly on corporations.30
Some of the existing general rules
of international human rights law found in public international law, and traditionally applicable only
to states, can be said to apply also to non-state actors. This is to recognise the importance of non-state
actors and their influence without suggesting that they have achieved the role of legislator. The situation
has been described as states having fixed non-state actors with some rights and duties, whereby
these actors have become subjects of interest without any automatic legitimising effect.31
It is worth noting
that corporate accountability was actively discussed in the preparatory process of the Statute of the
ICC, and that references to the prosecution of corporate entities were even inserted in the draft Statute.
Eventually, however, these references were left out from the final text of the Statute.32
It has been pointed
out that the lack of international jurisdiction does not mean that corporations are under no international
legal obligations, nor does it prevent us from speaking about corporations breaking international law.
International human rights obligations can fall on states, individuals and other non-state actors. Where
obligations exist, different jurisdictions may or may not be able to enforce them. In the absence of in-
24	 J.A. Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility. Limitations and Opportunities in International Law, 2006, p. 75. See also
Clapham, supra note 3, pp. 80-81.
25	 This is the case before the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Tribunals. Corporations may also
submit amicus briefs to WTO panels. See Tully, supra note 22, p. 323. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was established in the aftermath
of the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 to resolve claims between Iran and the United States as well as between Iranian and
US nationals, including corporations. Arzt & Lukashuk, supra note 9, pp. 167-168. A corporation could be a respondent in the Seabed
Disputes Chamber of the Law of the Sea Tribunal. See Arts. 187 and 291(2) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), United
Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1833. See also Clapham, supra note 3, p. 31.
26	 See Clapham, supra note 3, p. 81.
27	 [1979] ECHR, Ser. A. No. 30.
28	 See Clapham, supra note 3, p. 81. Clapham refers to the case of Agrotexim and Others v Greece, judgment of 24 October 1995. The
Strasbourg Court interpreted the concept of ‘non-governmental organisations’, regarded as possible victims of violations of the rights
stipulated in the Convention, as extending to legal persons more broadly, hence also corporations. See Clapham, supra note 3, pp. 81-82.
29	 Case of OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia, judgment of 20 September 2011, [2011] ECHR 1342. Among other things, the Court
found that the respondent state had violated the company’s rights under Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to
a fair trial). For remarks on the standing of corporations before the Strasbourg Court, see S. Joseph, ‘Scope of Application’, in D. Moeckli
et al. (eds.), International Human Rights Law, 2010, pp. 150-170, at p. 153.
30	 See Zerk, supra note 24, pp. 76-79.
31	 See Clapham, supra note 3, p. 28. In his earlier writings Clapham noted that non-state bodies, including corporations, have long been
subject to human rights obligations, as implemented and enforced under domestic and regional law. See A. Clapham, Human Rights in the
Private Sphere, 1993. It is worth noting that corporate actors can contribute to international law making through the work of the International
Labour Organization (ILO) in which ‘tripartism’ enables the representation of employers’ interests and thereby can incorporate
corporate contributions in the work of the organisation. See also Tully, supra note 22, p. 321. For some remarks on historical developments
of corporate contributions to international law making, see pp. 320-321.
32	 This is noted to be a result of concern over the practicalities of prosecuting corporate defendants, rather than doubt as to whether international
criminal law actually applies to companies. See Zerk, supra note 24, p. 76. See more elaborately A. Clapham, ‘The Question of
Jurisdiction under International Criminal Law over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court’,
in M.T. Kamminga & S. Zia-Zarifi (eds.), Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law, 2000, pp. 139-195, at pp. 143-160.
Several international treaties have expressly included corporate crimes, including the Apartheid Convention, and treaties governing corruption
and bribery, hazardous wastes, and other environmental violations. B. Stephens, ‘The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations
and Human Rights’, 2002 Berkeley Journal of International Law 20, pp. 45-90, at p. 77.
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Merja Pentikäinen
ternational enforcement mechanisms open to claims against corporate actors, international law is being
used to hold corporations accountable for human rights violations at the national level.33
Among the
most notable national context to hold corporations accountable for the violations of international human
rights is the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) in the USA.34
	 The debate on the status of corporations in the international legal system has features similar to that
on the ‘subjectivity’ of individuals, including whether rights and obligations stipulated in international
documents apply directly to corporations under international law or indirectly through national legal
systems. The traditional way of seeing the human rights regulation of corporations is as ‘indirect’ regulation
through national law when, on the basis of states’ international obligations, states are obligated
to ensure that human rights norms are not breached by private actors.35
Based on states’ obligation to
protect human rights, states are obliged to take steps to ensure protection against human rights abuses by
private actors operating under or within their jurisdiction. Under this traditional ‘indirect’ form of regulation
and state-centred framework, human rights standards are imposed on corporations at national
level and states may be held responsible for human rights violations if these violations result from their
failure to regulate corporate activity effectively. In these situations states’ performance is assessed on the
basis of the standard of due diligence.
	 There are strong arguments as to why human rights law should be applied directly to corporations,
i.e. why international law should ‘directly’ regulate corporate activities: corporations can and do affect
enjoyment of human rights, and they enjoy considerable rights and benefits flowing from international
law.36
Additionally, in practice, states have different capacities to regulate corporate activities effectively
at the national level. For instance, developing host states that are highly dependent on foreign investment
may face particular problems to effectively regulate the activities of multinational corporations. In these
situations when it is not possible to depend exclusively on host states to hold multinational corporations
accountable for human rights violations, attention has been drawn to the regulatory potential of corporations’
home states.37
This state of affairs has also strengthened demands to render corporations directly
accountable under international law.
	 However, for the time being any agreement on the direct applicability of international human rights
law on corporations is lacking.38
The traditional ‘indirect’ regulation model according to which states are
the only bearers of human rights obligations under international law still appears to be the prevailing
standpoint. In defence of this traditional view, it is claimed that attempting to extend legal duties under
human rights law to non-state actors bestows on such actors an unfortunate legitimacy, which will undermine
the authority of the state and dilute the responsibilities of states with respect to their human
rights obligations. Changing the original course would allegedly cause the unravelling of the whole human
rights project.39
	 The role of corporations in the area of human rights protection has recently acquired considerable
attention when the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on the issue of human rights
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises (the Special Representative of the UN
Secretary General on Business and Human Rights (SRSG)) submitted his reports, and the final one in the
33	 See Clapham, supra note 3, pp. 31, 58.
34	 Ibid., p. 237. For regimes of domestic regulation (including civil liability) of corporate behaviour, see R.G. Steinhardt, ‘Corporate Responsibility
and the International Law of Human Rights: The Next Lex Mercatoria’, in P. Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights, 2005,
pp. 177-226, at pp. 187-202.
35	 See Zerk, supra note 24, pp. 76-93.
36	 Corporations acquired benefits under international law when a huge number of international treaties contributed to a conducive business
environment. See also Zerk, supra note 24, pp. 76-79. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on Business and
­Human Rights (SRSG) points to a far-reaching role of bilateral investment treaties and host government agreements. See SRSG 2010, infra
note 40, p. 6. For advantages of direct regulation of multinational corporations, see S. Joseph, ‘An Overview of the Human Rights Accountability
of Multinational Enterprises’, in M.T. Kamminga & S. Zia-Zarifi (eds.), Liability of Multinational Corporations under International
Law, 2000, pp. 75-93, at pp. 87-88.
37	 See Zerk, supra note 24, pp. 83-91. The SRSG draws attention to the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction. See e.g. SRSG 2010, infra note 40,
p. 11; SRSG 2011, infra note 40, p. 7.
38	 The existing international regulation of business conduct in the area of human rights is characteristically of a non-binding nature. See
Steinhardt, supra note 34, pp. 202-213. See also D. Weissbrodt & M. Gruger, ‘Human Rights Responsibilities of Businesses as Non-State
Actors’, in P. Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights, 2005, pp. 315-350.
39	 See Clapham, supra note 3, p. 25. For remarks on states’ reservations about upgrading the status of multinational corporations (transnational
enterprises) at the international level, see also Arzt & Lukashuk, supra note 9, pp. 168-169.
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Changing International ‘Subjectivity’ and Rights and Obligations under International Law
spring of 2011.40
These reports have sparked an unprecedented debate on the responsibilities of corporate
actors for human rights violations. The SRSG introduced the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework,
underlining the crucial and primary role of states to protect human rights but also drawing attention
to the role of corporations in the area of human rights protection. The Framework underlines different
roles and duties of states and corporate actors41
and calls for corporate responsibility to respect human
rights.42
The ‘Remedy part’ of the Framework draws attention to the need to strengthen effective access
to remedies with respect to human rights violations linked to corporate activities. The SRSG’s proposals
have been vividly discussed – also criticised – by academics.43
The business community appears to have
welcomed them since they are viewed to clarify the situation on the responsibilities of business actors
in the area of human rights protection.44
In his reports the SRSG neither expressly calls for changing the
international law system on responsibilities nor touches upon the issue of international ­‘subjectivity’
(nor personality or capacity), but he labels his approach as ‘principled pragmatism’.45
Obviously the
SRSG’s proposals cannot result in changes in international law as such, but actions of states are crucial
for any substantive modifications of the existing international law system. However, the SRSG’s reports
are of great significance because they have set off an extremely useful debate, e.g. on the existing gaps in
­human rights regulation and responsibilities of corporate actors under international law. Furthermore,
the reports have been instrumental in putting the spotlight on the role of business actors in conflict
­situations when human rights are at particular risk – often left unprotected to a great extent –46
and on
the operation of corporations that are state-owned or otherwise state-controlled.47
Although the question
of whether the SRSG’s remarks and proposals will have any concrete effects on the international legal
­system remains to a great extent in the hands of states, it is nevertheless notable that the ‘Protect, Respect,
Remedy’ Framework has already influenced legislation at the national level and practices of international
organisations, e.g. in the area of responsible supply chain management of business actors. These effects
have been concretised in the context of the minerals originating from conflict-ridden Eastern Congo
­resulting, among other things, in the introduction of a piece of national legislation in the USA (the
Dodd-Frank Act). The SRSG’s proposals have also influenced UN and OECD practices.48
2. ‘Subjectivity’ as a relative notion; criticism of the doctrine of ‘subjectivity’
Whatever is viewed to be the exact group of subjects of international law, apart from states, the other
subjects possess limited legal capacity under international law: they have a limited capacity to be granted
international rights and powers or to be under international obligations, or a limited capacity to act, i.e.
40	 The UN Secretary General appointed Professor John Ruggie from Harvard University as his Special Representative on this matter. The
most important reports summarizing the work of the SGSR are the reports published in 2008, 2009 and 2010, as well as the final report
of 2011: Reports of the SRSG on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie:
­Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development.
­Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, A/HRC/8/5, 2008 (SRSG 2008); Promotion and protection of all
­human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. Business and human rights: Towards
­operationalizing the ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework, A/HRC/11/13, 2009 (SRSG 2009); Business and human rights: Further
steps towards the operationalization of the ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework, A/HRC/14/27, 2010 (SRSG 2010); Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, Advanced edited version,A/HRC/17/31,
2011 (SRSG 2011).
41	 Among other things, the SRSG refers to the lack of democratic legitimacy of companies. See SRSG 2010, supra note 40, para. 64.
42	 The SRSG’s Framework is intended to apply to all states and to all business enterprises, both transnational and others, regardless of their
size, sector, location, ownership and structure. See SRSG 2011, supra note 40, Annex, p. 6.
43	 Note e.g. the critical remarks of Radu Mares.
44	 For the remarks on the positive reception of the proposal on the Framework, see e.g. SRSG 2011, supra note 40, Introduction to the
­Guiding Principles, Para. 8.
45	 The SRSG notes that the normative contribution of his proposal does not lie in the creation of new international law obligations but
‘in elaborating the implications of existing standards and practices for states and businesses; integrating them within a single, logically
­coherent and comprehensive template; and identifying where the current regime falls short and how it should be improved’. See
SRSG 2011, supra note 40, Introduction to the Guiding Principles, Para. 14. See also Annex, p. 6.
46	 See e.g. SRSG 2010, supra note 40, Paras. 12, 44-45, 61, 69.
47	 See e.g. SRSG 2011, supra note 40, Annex, Paras. 4-6. According to the SRSG, where a business enterprise is controlled by the state, or
where its acts can be attributed otherwise to the state, an abuse of human rights by the business enterprise may entail a violation of the
state’s own international law obligations. Ibid., Para. 4.
48	 M. Rajavuori, Corporate Human Rights Due Diligence and Congolese Conflict Mineral Supply Chains, Master of Laws thesis, Law Faculty
of the University of Turku, 2011.
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Merja Pentikäinen
to put into effect their rights and powers in judicial and other proceedings (to enforce their rights) at the
international level.49
Already in its Reparation for Injuries opinion, the ICJ noted that there is neither a
uniform nature nor content for the subjects of international law.50
In general, there is no standard set of
rights and obligations for each and every subject of international law, but ‘subject’ is a relative notion,
the precise contents of which may differ from subject to subject and even between various subjects of the
same category.51
At best, the legal situation can be characterised as complex, and the number of entities
with personality for particular purposes is considerable. A great deal depends on the relation of the particular
entity to the various aspects of the relevant substantive law. For instance, while the individual is
in certain contexts regarded as a legal person, he/she has no treaty-making capacity under international
law.52
	 In light of the debates revolving around the question of international ‘subjectivity’, it is hardly surprising
that many scholars view the very idea of ‘subjects’ in the international legal system as confusing,
even misleading.53
The confusion is seen to stem in part from the doctrine of ‘subjectivity’ being
conflated with the notion of international legal personality and international capacity.54
Some authors
see ‘subjectivity’ and legal personality as being the same, while others do not equate these concepts. It
has been underlined that the elements of international legal personality, international legal capacity and
international ‘subjectivity’ should not be tightly linked.55
	 Andrew Clapham has discussed the issue of international ‘subjectivity’ under the heading of ‘subjects
as prisoners of doctrine’.56
He considers the traditional treatment of the question regarding subjects of international
law both confusing and incomplete. According to him, it makes complete sense to talk about
limited international personality of corporations, but the problem is that the question of international
legal personality has remained entangled with the misleading concept of subjects of international law
and the related question of attributions of statehood under international law. Increasing the categories
of international legal persons recognised under international law is assumed to lead to an expansion of
the possible authors of international law. This is seen to threaten the viable development of a decentralised,
state-centred international legal order.57
In Clapham’s view, the concept of a subject of international
law is often useless. While the role of non-state actors on the international plane cannot be ignored, the
doctrine of ‘subjectivity’ developed to explain the framework of rights and duties under international
law constrains the debate. Therefore, scholars are increasingly rejecting the whole notion of subjects
and exposing the fact that there seem to be no commonly agreed rules to determine who can be classed
as a subject. Clapham suggests concentrating on the rights and obligations of entities rather than their
personality and moving from the debate on ‘subjectivity’ to the capacity of the entity to enjoy rights and
bear obligations. Rights and obligations under international law should not depend on the ‘mysteries of
subjectivity’.58
	 Jennifer A. Zerk points to the fact that the development of human rights law and international
­economic law has dramatically increased the scope for participation in international law by non-state
actors. According to her, rather than dividing participants into ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ of international
49	 See Cassese, supra note 1, pp. 72, 150. The ‘subjectivity’ of non-state entities is characterised as derivative. J. Klabbers, ‘(I Can’t Get No)
Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State Actors’, in J. Petman & J. Klabbers (eds.), Nordic Cosmopolitanism. Essays
in International Law for Martti Koskenniemi, 2003, pp. 351-369, at p. 361.
50	 The Court held: ‘The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and
their nature depends on the needs of the community’. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, supra note 8,
p. 178.
51	 See Klabbers, supra note 2, p. 39.
52	 See Brownlie, supra note 1, p. 68.
53	 See e.g. Clapham, supra note 3, p. 80; Klabbers, supra note 2, p. 39.
54	 See Klabbers, supra note 2, p. 39.
55	 Meijknecht points out that international legal personality and international (legal) ‘subjectivity’ are not identical, but rather they are two
different aspects of the fact that an entity enters the field of international law. See Meijknecht, supra note 3, pp. 24-25, 34.
56	 See Clapham, supra note 3, pp. 59-63.
57	 Ibid., p. 59. Clapham mentions two fears that create resistance to the recognition of international legal personality for corporations. First,
the fear that foreign corporations would somehow more easily be able to interfere in the political and economic affairs of states if they
were acknowledged as possessing a degree of international personality. Second, the fear that these foreign corporations would be able to
trigger excessive diplomatic protection for national companies of the host state where the foreign nationals are controlling shareholders
in those companies, p. 78.
58	 Ibid., pp. 60-62, 68-69, 83.
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law, as has traditionally been done, a more useful approach would be to consider the degree to which
international law recognises the existence of different kinds of participants in the international legal sys-
tem.59
Rosalyn Higgins’ criticism of the division of ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ of international law is perhaps
the most compelling. She has concluded that ‘the whole notion of “subjects” and “objects” has no credible
reality, and, in my view, no functional purpose. We have erected an intellectual prison of our own choosing
and then declared it to be an unalterable constraint’. Higgins notes that it is more helpful, and closer
to perceived reality, to view international law as a particular decision-making process including a variety
of participants.60
	 Jan Klabbers has referred to the non-existence of any agreement among international lawyers about
the identity of international law subjects.61
He describes the ‘subjectivity’ of international law as a status
conferred by the academic community: a subject of international law is the legitimate subject of international
research and reflection. Personality, in turn, is a status conferred by the legal system. The confusion
results from the circumstance that the international legal system has no single authority ­endowed
with the power to confer personality. Consequently, the very notion of subjects of international law is
­characterised by fluidity. Given the circumstance that different subjects may have different sets of rights
and obligations under international law, the precise degree of rights and obligations is a matter of analysis.
Klabbers concludes that personality in international law, like ‘subjectivity’, is but a descriptive notion:
useful to describe a state of affairs, but normatively empty, as neither rights nor obligations flow from it
automatically. Personality is by no means a threshold that must be crossed before an entity can participate
in international legal relations; instead, once an entity does participate, it may be described as having
a degree of international legal personality.62
3. Rethinking ‘subjectivity’ in international law – discarding the doctrine altogether?
The creation of large multinational corporations and the ensuing increase in corporate power have made
corporations increasingly visible actors in international relations. Presently, corporate entities enjoy a
considerable number of rights and obligations deriving from international law. The role of corporations
has also resulted in including multinational corporations among the subjects of international law.
However, it appears that the doctrine of international ‘subjectivity’, at least in its present form, has difficulties
accommodating non-state entities.63
In the background one can detect states’ hesitancy to broaden
the circle of subjects and the fear of weakening the state-centric system of international regulation.64
As discussed in this article, the doctrine of subjects of international law has also come under critical
scrutiny by a number of scholars. Combining ‘subjectivity’ with such notions as personality and capacity
in various – often vague – ways has rendered the doctrine confusing, even misleading, and out of step
with the present-day needs of the international community. Many authors have suggested shifting the
focus from the debate on the subjects of international law to the participants in international legal relations,
concentrating on the capacity of an actor to enjoy rights and incur obligations under international
law. A number of remarks appear to favour discarding the very doctrine of international ‘subjectivity’.
	 If the doctrine of international ‘subjectivity’ were discarded and, for instance, the doctrine of participants
in international legal relations introduced in its stead, it would still be necessary to ask if this ‘trick’
helps to solve the problems linked to the former. Perhaps the doctrine of participants in international
legal relations is not as empty and ‘mysterious’ as that of ‘subjectivity’, but in order to move forward from
59	 See Zerk, supra note 24, pp. 73-74.
60	 R. Higgins, Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use it, 1994, pp. 49-50. Remarks on the subject-object dichotomy in
international law, see also Meijknecht, supra note 3, pp. 46-48.
61	 See Klabbers, supra note 49, p. 352.
62	 See Klabbers, supra note 2, pp. 39, 51-52. Klabbers refers to views according to which the very metaphor of personality (in this case as
regards international organisations) is misleading, p. 52. Also Arzt & Lukashuk deem it more important to concentrate on actual participation
in the process of creating, making claims under, and enforcing international law, rather than focusing on the formal issues of international
‘subjectivity’ or international legal personality. See Arzt & Lukashuk, supra note 9, p. 156. R. Urueña puts forth interesting views on
‘subjectivity’ and participation in international law in R. Urueña, No Citizens Here: Global Subjects and Participation in International Law,
Centre on Excellence in Global Governance Research, Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki, 2010.
63	 See also Klabbers, supra note 49, p. 369.
64	 See also ibid., pp. 362, 364-365, 367; and Meijknecht, supra note 3, p. 551.
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the confusion created by the ‘subjectivity’ doctrine, any doctrine introduced to replace it would also need
to be clarified. Who are the relevant participants, what kinds of rights and obligations do they have under
international law, and how are accountability and responsibilities to be concretised are some of the questions
that would need to be answered. However, before we discard old concepts and introduce new ones,
it may be worthwhile to consider if the existing doctrine of subjects of international law could be clarified
and modified in such a way as to make it workable. It is quite possible that after some proper academic
brainstorming the doctrine of international ‘subjectivity’ may well function as an umbrella concept for
the roles of different participants in international legal relations, also pointing to their rights and obligations
as well as making sense of accountability and responsibilities of various actors.
	 The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on Business and Human Rights (SRSG)
chose – and undoubtedly wisely so – to adopt the approach of ‘principled pragmatism’ in his work that
enabled him to avoid entering endless debates on theories and interpretations of international law, including
international ‘subjectivity’ characterised by disagreements and even deadlocks. The ‘Protect,
Respect and Remedy’ Framework proposed by the SRSG provides a good basis for the development of
the international legal system in the direction of increasing its ability to accommodate the accountability
of corporations for human rights violations. Strengthening this accountability is crucial in filling the
existing gaps in the area where the system of international law, including the allocation of responsibilities,
does not correspond to reality. Far too often corporations escape any accountability, for instance, in
situations when the host state is unwilling or unable to protect human rights. Furthermore, as the SRSG
pointed out, there are serious gaps in the protection of human rights in conflict situations and in contexts
having a state-business nexus.
	 What further complicates the issue of responsibilities nowadays is the privatisation of many functions,
such as medical care, that in many states have been taken care of by the public sector. This privatisation
development also concerns armed conflicts, when many states contract private firms to carry out
direct military activities or activities supporting them. In these circumstances of the privatisation of conflicts
the very question of state responsibility for violations of international law has become complicated
and blurred.65
This has also brought to the fore the question of the accountability of private corporations
participating in activities in conflict situations.66
Furthermore, it is not uncommon that many corporations
working and investing in conflict zones or having other business links to conflicts are state-owned
or otherwise state-controlled. These are just a few examples to highlight how challenging many presentday
situations may be from the viewpoint of human rights protection which also have links to the debates
on international ‘subjectivity’ and participation in international legal relations. There are major gaps in
human rights protection when various state interests (such as economic and military ones) come into
play. To fill these gaps the existing norms of international law on accountability and responsibilities require
thorough rethinking and redirecting, and, in general, more responsible thinking particularly on the
part of governments.
	 Paying attention to the roles and duties of various actors that are relevant to human rights protection
is crucial, regardless of labels, i.e. whether they are called subjects, participants or something else.
The role and duties of states are of the utmost importance, as is underlined by the SRSG in his reports.
While it is crucial to strengthen accountability of all actors affecting the protection of human rights,
the role of corporations as profit-creating actors and their different roles and capacities vis-à-vis states
should be paid due regard in considerations of ‘translating’ human rights obligations for corporate ac-
tors.67
Furthermore, there are compelling reasons for maintaining the international legal system in which
states retain their principal position as the drafters of international law norms. States are – if not always
in practice, at least potentially – more democratic actors than corporations. Governments must be able
65	 These challenges are elaborated upon in K. Creutz, Transnational Privatised Security and the International Protection of Human Rights,
publications of the Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, University of Helsinki, the Erik Castrén Institute Research
Reports 19/2006.
66	 For instance, it has been pointed out that in these contexts private security forces have often become part of the problem instead of
becoming part of the solution. One of the solutions offered to this challenge is to consider private security firms as (modern) mercenaries
in armed conflicts or agents of the state. At the same time it has been stated that this legal analysis fails to capture the full picture. See
Clapham, supra note 3, p. 302.
67	 See also Zerk, supra note 24, pp. 76-79.
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to assess competing public interests and freely discharge their regulatory responsibilities for achieving
social welfare objectives. It is precisely this capacity for performing important filtering functions that
justifies the state-centric fiction of international law making.68
68	 See also Tully, supra note 22, pp. 330-332, 345.