

fact that it never lost its cumbrousness and elaboration to "its unique sacredness" (p. 50).

27. Many authorities have commented upon the lack of development in Egypt after the initial achievements of the Old Kingdom: for a discussion (and a contrary view), see John A. Wilson in *Before Philosophy*, ed. H. Frankfort and others (London, 1949), pp. 115-16 [pub. in U.S.A. as *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man* (Chicago, 1946)].

28. "The world view of the Egyptians and Babylonians was conditioned by the teaching of sacred books; it thus constituted an orthodoxy, the maintenance of which was in the charge of colleges of priests" [Benjamin Farrington, *Science in Antiquity* (London, 1936), p. 37]. See also Gordon Childe, *What Happened in History*, p. 121.

29. Gelb, *Study of Writing*, p. 196, maintains that all the main types of syllabary developed in just this way. Driver rejects the possibility that the Phoenician alphabet was invented on Egyptian soil, as it would have been "stifled at birth" by the "deadweight of Egyptian tradition, already of hoary antiquity and in the hands of a powerful priesthood" (*Semitic Writing*, p. 187).

30. "Immensely complicated." Driver calls the pre-alphabetic forms of writing Semitic (*Semitic Writing*, p. 67).

31. For Hittite, see O. R. Gurney, *The Hittites* (London, 1952), pp. 120-21. For Mycenaean, see John Chadwick, *The Decipherment of Linear B* (Cambridge, 1958).

32. Chadwick, *The Decipherment of Linear B*, p. 130; see also "A Prehistoric Bureaucracy," *Diogenes*, 26 (1959), pp. 7-18.

33. As is exhaustively documented in David Diringer, *The Alphabet, A Key to the History of Mankind* (New York, 1948).

34. *The Alphabet*, pp. 214-218. On the "accidental" nature of this change see C. F. and F. M. Voegelin, "Typological Classification," pp. 63-4.

35. According to Ralph E. Turner, *The Great Cultural Traditions* (New York, 1941), I, pp. 346, 391, the Hebrews took over the Semitic system in the eleventh century B.C., and the Indians a good deal later, probably in the eighth century B.C.

36. Gandz, "Oral Tradition in the Bible," pp. 253-4.

37. e.g. Luke, 20; Matthew, 23; in the 7th century B.C., even kings and prophets employed scribes, Jer. xxxvi, 4, 18.

38. Driver, *Semitic Writing*, pp. 87-90, where he instances the case of one scribe who having no son "taught his wisdom to his sister's son."

39. "If the alphabet is defined as a system of signs expressing single sounds of speech, then the first alphabet which can justifiably be so called is the Greek alphabet." Gelb, *Study of Writing*, p. 166.

40. I. Kings 17, iv-vi; see *A Dictionary of the Bible*... ed. James Hastings (New York, 1898-1904), s.v. "Elijah."

41. 810 a. From the ages 10 to 13.

42. *L'Adoption universelle des caractères latins* (Paris, 1934); for more recent developments and documentation, see William S. Gray, *The Teaching of Reading and Writing: An International Survey, Unesco Monographs on Fundamental Education X* (Paris, 1956), especially pp. 31-60.

43. Chester G. Starr, *The Origins of Greek Civilization* (New York, 1961), pp. 189-190, 349 ff.

44. Starr, *The Origins of Greek Civilization*, pp. 87-88, 357.

45. Starr, *The Origins of Greek Civilization*, p. 169.

46. L. H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford, 1961), p. 21; R. M. Cook and A. G. Woodhead, "The Diffusion of the Greek Alphabet," *American Journal of Archaeology*, 63 (1959), pp. 175-78. For North Syria, see S. Leonard Woolley, *A Forgotten Kingdom* (London, 1953).

47. Chester Starr speaks of its use by "a relatively large aristocratic class" (p. 171) and Miss Jeffery notes that "writing was never regarded as an esoteric craft in early Greece. Ordinary people could and did learn to write, for many of the earliest inscriptions which we possess are casual graffiti" (p. 63).

48. Frederic G. Kenyon, *Books and Readers in Ancient Greece and Rome* (2nd ed., Oxford, 1951), p. 67.

49. Jérôme Carcopino, *L'Ostracisme athénien* (Paris, 1935), pp. 72-110.

50. *Protagoras*, 325 d.

51. I. 1114; in 414 B.C. See also Plato, *Apology*, 26 d, and the general survey of Kenyon, *Books and Readers in Ancient Greece and Rome*.

52. *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (New Haven, 1955), II, p. xiii; and *An Essay on Man* (New York, 1953), especially pp. 106-130, 281-3. For Werner Jaeger, see especially *The Theology of The Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1947).

53. "Magic, Science and Religion" in *Science, Religion and Reality*, ed. Joseph Needham (New York, 1925), reprinted *Magic, Science and Religion* (New York, 1954), p. 27. For an appreciation of Lévy-Bruhl's positive achievement, see Evans Pritchard, "Lévy-Bruhl's Theory of Primitive Mentality," *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, University of Egypt*, 2 (1934), pp. 1-36. In his later work, Lévy-Bruhl modified the rigidity of his earlier dichotomy.

54. *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande* (Oxford, 1937). See also Max Gluckman's essay, "Social Beliefs and Individual Thinking in Primitive Society," *Memoirs and Proceedings of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society*, 91 (1949-50), pp. 73-98. From a rather different standpoint, Lévi-Strauss has analysed "the logic of totemic classifications" (*La Pensée sauvage*, p. 48 ff.) and speaks of two distinct modes of scientific thought; the first (or "primitive") variety consists in "the science of the concrete," the practical knowledge of the handy man (*bricoleur*), which is the technical counterpart of mythical thought (p. 26).

55. e.g. the Trobriands (Malinowski, *Myth in Primitive Psychology*, pp. 33ff).

56. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece*, p. 46.

57. "It was in Ionia that the first completely rationalistic attempts to describe the nature of the world took place" [G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge, 1957), p. 73]. The work of the Milesian philosophers

Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, is described by the authors as "clearly a development of the genetic or genealogical approach to nature exemplified by the Hesiodic *Theogony*" (p. 73).

58. F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*, Vol. I, *Genealogie und Mythographie* (Berlin, 1923), fr. 1a.

59. *Reflections on Violence*, trans. T. E. Hulme (New York, 1941), p. 136; *cit.* Robert Redfield, *The Primitive World and its Transformations* (Ithaca, New York, 1953), p. 125.

60. *cit.* Joseph Hone, *W. B. Yeats* (London, 1942), p. 405 (our italics).

61. Hermann Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 1951), fr. 11, 23; see also John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (2nd ed. London, 1938), pp. 131, 140-141, and Werner Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1947), pp. 42-7; Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, pp. 163 ff.

62. Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, fr. 40, 42, 46, 57, 106; see also Francis M. Cornford, *Principium Sapientiae: The Origins of Greek Philosophical Thought* (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 112 ff.; Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, pp. 182 ff.

63. Francis M. Cornford, *Greek Religious Thought from Homer to the Age of Alexander* (London, 1933), xv-xvi. See also Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 1.

64. 1st Olympian Ode.

65. See Eric H. Warmington, *Greek Geography* (London, 1934), pp. xiv, xxxviii.

66. *History*, 4, 36-40.

67. Warmington, *Greek Geography*, pp. xvii-xviii, 18 ff.

68. *Cit.* Lionel Pearson, *Early Ionian Historians* (Oxford, 1939), p. 3.

69. Felix Jacoby, *Atthis* (Oxford, 1949), p. 354.

70. *History*, I, 1. See also Moses I. Finley (ed.), *The Greek Historians* (New York, 1959), pp. 4 ff.

71. See Pearson, *Early Ionian Historians*, pp. 152-233, especially pp. 193, 232-33.

72. See, for instance, Bronislaw Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (London, 1922), pp. 290-333.

73. Thucydides, *History*, I, 20-22, 97. For a picture of note-taking (*hypomnemata*) among Athenians, see *Theaetetus*, 142 c-143 c.

74. Felix Jacoby notes that "fixation in writing, once achieved, primarily had a preserving effect upon the oral tradition, because it put an end to the involuntary shiftings of the *mnemai* (remembrances), and drew limits to the arbitrary creation of new *logoi* (stories)" (*Atthis*, 1949, p. 217). He points out that this created difficulties for the early literate recorders of the past which the previous oral *mnemones* or professional "rememberers" did not have to face: whatever his own personal view of the matter, "no true *Atthiographos* could remove Kekrops from his position as the first Attic king... Nobody could take away from Solon the legislation which founded in *nuce* the first Attic constitution of historical times." Such things could no longer be silently forgotten, as in an oral tradition.

The general conclusion of Jacoby's polemic against Wilamowitz's hypothesis of a "pre-literary chronicle" is that "historical consciousness... is not older than historical literature" (p. 201).

75. As writers on the indigenous political systems of Africa have insisted, changes generally take the form of rebellion rather than revolution; subjects reject the King, but not the kingship. See Evans-Pritchard, *The Divine Kingship of the Shilluk of the Nilotic Sudan* (The Frazer lecture, Cambridge, 1948), pp. 35ff; Max Gluckman, *Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa* (The Frazer lecture, 1952), Manchester, 1954.

28. Social Class, Language and Socialisation

BASIL BERNSTEIN

INTRODUCTION¹

It may be helpful to make explicit the theoretical origins of the thesis I have been developing over the past decade. Although, initially, the thesis appeared to be concerned with the problem of educability, this problem was imbedded in and was stimulated by the wider question of the relationships between symbolic orders and social struc-

ture. The general theoretical question, which dictated the approach to the initially narrow but important empirical problem, was concerned with the fundamental structure and changes in the structure of cultural transmission. Indeed, any detailed examination of what superficially may seem to be a string of somewhat repetitive papers, I think would show three things:

¹From *Current Trends in Linguistics*, Volume 12, ed. A. S. Abramson et al. (Mouton, 1973). Reprinted by permission.

1. The gradual emergence of the dominance of the major theoretical problem from the local, empirical problem of the social antecedents of the educability of different groups of children.

2. Attempts to develop both the generality of the thesis and to develop increasing specificity at the contextual level.

3. Entailed in (2) were attempts to clarify both the logical and empirical status of the basic organising concept, code. Unfortunately, until recently these attempts were more readily seen in the *planning* and *analysis* of the empirical research than available as formal statements.

Looking back with hindsight, I think I would have created less misunderstanding if I had written about sociolinguistic codes rather than linguistic codes. Through using only the latter concept it gave the impression that I was reifying syntax and at the cost of semantics. Or worse, suggesting that there was a one to one relation between meaning and a given syntax. Also, by defining the codes in a context free fashion, I robbed myself of properly understanding, at a theoretical level, their significance. *I should point out that nearly all the empirical planning was directed to trying to find out the code realisations in different contexts.*

The concept of sociolinguistic code points to the social structuring of meanings and to their diverse but *related* contextual linguistic realisations. A careful reading of the papers always shows the emphasis given to the form of the social relationship, that is, the structuring of relevant meanings. Indeed, role is defined as a complex coding activity controlling the creation and organisation of specific meanings and the conditions for their transmission and reception. The general sociolinguistic thesis attempts to explore how symbolic systems are both realisations and regulators of the structure of social relationships. The particular symbolic system is that of speech, *not* language.

It is pertinent, at this point, to make explicit earlier work in the social sciences which formed the implicit starting point of

the thesis. It will then be seen, I hope, that the thesis is an integration of different streams of thought. The major starting points are Durkheim and Marx, and a small number of other thinkers have been drawn into the basic matrix. I shall very briefly, and so selectively, outline this matrix and some of the problems to which it gave rise.

Durkheim's work is a truly magnificent insight into the relationships between symbolic orders, social relationships and the structuring of experience. In a sense, if Marx turned Hegel on his head, then Durkheim attempted to turn Kant on his head. For in *Primitive classification* and in *The elementary forms of the religious life*, Durkheim attempted to derive the basic categories of thought from the structuring of the social relation. It is beside the point as to his success. He raised the whole question of the relation between the classifications and frames of the symbolic order and the structuring of experience. In his study of different forms of social integration he pointed to the implicit, condensed, symbolic structure of mechanical solidarity and the more explicit and differentiated symbolic structures of organic solidarity. Cassirer, the early cultural anthropologists, and in particular Sapir (I was not aware of von Humboldt until much later) sensitised me to the cultural properties of speech. Whorf, particularly where he refers to the fashions of speaking, frames of consistency, alerted me to the selective effect of the culture (acting through its patterning of social relationships) upon the *patterning* of grammar together with the pattern's semantic and thus cognitive significance. Whorf more than anyone, I think, opened up, at least for me, the question of the deep structure of linguistically regulated communication.

In all the above work I found two difficulties. If we grant the fundamental linkage of symbolic systems, social structure and the shaping of experience, it is still unclear *how* such shaping takes place. The *processes* underlying the social structuring of experience are not explicit. The second difficulty

is in dealing with the question of change of symbolic systems. George Herbert Mead is of central importance in the solution of the first difficulty, the HOW. Mead outlined in general terms the relationships between role, reflexivity and speech, and in so doing provided the basis of the solution to the HOW. It is still the case that the Meadian solution does not allow us to deal with the problem of change. For the concept, which enables role to be related to a higher order concept, "the generalised other" is, itself, not subject to systematic enquiry. Even if "the generalised other" is placed within a Durkheimian framework, we are still left with the problem of change. Indeed, in Mead change is introduced only at the cost of the re-emergence of a traditional Western dichotomy in the concepts of the "I" and the "me." The "I" is both the indeterminate response to the "me" and yet at the same time shapes it. The Meadian "I" points to the voluntarism in the affairs of men, the fundamental creativity of man, made possible by speech; a little before Chomsky.

Thus Meadian thought helps to solve the puzzle of the HOW but it does not help with the question of change in the structuring of experience; although both Mead implicitly and Durkheim explicitly pointed to the conditions which bring about pathological structuring of experience.

One major theory of the development of and change in symbolic structures is, of course, that of Marx. Although Marx is less concerned with the internal structure and the process of transmission of symbolic systems he does give us a key to their institutionalisation and change. The key is given in terms of the social significance of society's productive system and the power relationships to which the productive system gives rise. Further, access to, control over, orientation of and *change* in critical symbolic systems, according to the theory, are governed by these power relationships as these are embodied in the class structure. It is not only capital, in the strict economic sense, which is subject to appropriation, manipula-

tion and exploitation, but also *cultural* capital in the form of the symbolic systems through which man can extend and change the boundaries of his experience.

I am not putting forward a matrix of thought necessary for the study of the basic structure and change in the structure of cultural transmission, *only* the specific matrix which underlies my own approach. Essentially and briefly I have used Durkheim and Marx at the macro level and Mead at the micro level, to realise a sociolinguistic thesis which could meet with a range of work in anthropology, linguistics, sociology and psychology.

OTHER VIEWS OF THE RELATION OF LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL SYSTEMS

I want also to make clear two views I am not concerned with. Chomsky in *Aspects of the theory of syntax* neatly severs the study of the rule system of language from the study of the social rules which determine their contextual use. He does this by making a distinction between competence and performance. Competence refers to the child's tacit understanding of the rule system, performance relates to the essentially social use to which the rule system is put. Competence refers to man abstracted from contextual constraints. Performance refers to man in the grip of the contextual constraints which determine his speech acts. Competence refers to the Ideal, performance refers to the Fall. In this sense Chomsky's notion of competence is Platonic. Competence has its source in the very biology of man. There is no difference between men in terms of their access to the linguistic rule system. Here Chomsky, like many other linguists before him, announces the communality of man, all men have equal access to the creative act which is language. On the other hand, performance is under the control of the social-performances are culturally specific acts, they refer to the choices which are made in specific speech encounters. Thus from one point of view, Chomsky indicates

the tragedy of man, the potentiality of competence and the degeneration of performance (this view explicitly derives from Hymes 1966).

Clearly, much is to be gained in rigour and explanatory power through the severing of the relationship between the formal properties of the grammar and the meanings which are realised in its use. But if we are to study speech, *la parole*, we are inevitably involved in a study of a rather different rule system, we are involved in a study of rules, formal and informal, which regulate the options we take up in various contexts in which we find ourselves. This second rule system is the cultural system.

This raises immediately the question of the causal relationship between the linguistic rule system and the cultural system. Clearly, specific linguistic rule systems are part of the cultural system, but it has been argued that the linguistic rule system in various ways shapes the cultural system. This very briefly is the view of those who hold a narrow form of the linguistic relativity hypothesis. I do not intend to get involved in that particular quagmire. Instead, I shall take the view that the code which the linguist invents to explain the formal properties of the grammar is capable of generating any number of speech codes, and there is no reason for believing that any one language code is better than another in this respect. On this argument, language is a set of rules to which all speech codes must comply, but which speech codes are realised is a function of the culture acting through social relationship in specific contexts. Different speech forms or codes symbolize the form of the social relationship, regulate the nature of the speech encounters, and create for the speakers different orders of relevance and relation. The experience of the speakers is then transformed by what is made significant or relevant by the speech form.

This is a sociological argument because the speech form is taken as a consequence of the form of the social relation or, put more generally, as a quality of a social structure.

Let me qualify this immediately. Because the speech form is initially a function of a given social arrangement, it does not mean that the speech form does not in turn modify or even change that social structure which initially evolved the speech form. This formulation, indeed, invites the question: under what conditions does a given speech form free itself sufficiently from its embodiment in the social structure so that the system of meanings it realises points to alternative realities, alternative arrangements in the affairs of men? Here we become concerned immediately with the antecedents and consequences of the boundary maintaining principles of a culture or sub-culture. I am here suggesting a relationship between forms of boundary maintenance at the cultural level and forms of speech.

LANGUAGE, SOCIALISATION AND CLASS

I am required to consider the relationship between language and socialisation. It should be clear that I am not concerned with language, but with speech, and concerned more specifically with the contextual constraints upon speech. Now what about socialisation? I shall take the term to refer to the process whereby a child acquires a specific cultural identity, and to his responses to such an identity. Socialisation refers to the process whereby the biological is transformed into a specific cultural being. It follows from this that the process of socialisation is a complex process of control, whereby a particular moral, cognitive and affective awareness is evoked in the child and given a specific form and content. Socialisation sensitizes the child to various orderings of society as these are made substantive in the various roles he is expected to play. In a sense then socialisation is a process for making people safe. The process acts selectively on the possibilities of man by creating through time a sense of the inevitability of a given social arrangement, and through limiting the areas of permitted change. The basic agencies of socialisation in

contemporary societies are the family, the peer group, school and work. It is through these agencies, and in particular through their relationship to each other, that the various orderings of society are made manifest.

Now it is quite clear that given this view of socialisation it is necessary to limit the discussion. I shall limit our discussion to socialisation within the family, but it should be obvious that the focussing and filtering of the child's experience within the family in a large measure is a microcosm of the macroscopic orderings of society. Our question now becomes: what are the sociological factors which affect linguistic performances within the family critical to the process of socialisation?

Without a shadow of doubt the most formative influence upon the procedures of socialisation, from a sociological viewpoint, is social class. The class structure influences work and educational roles and brings families into a special relationship with each other and deeply penetrates the structure of life experiences within the family. The class system has deeply marked the distribution of knowledge within society. It has given differential access to the sense that the world is permeable. It has sealed off communities from each other and has ranked these communities on a scale of individual worth. We have three components, knowledge, possibility, invidious insulation. It would be a little naive to believe that differences in knowledge, differences in the sense of the possible, combined with invidious insulation, rooted in differential material well-being would not affect the forms of control and innovation in the socialising procedures of different social classes. I shall go on to argue that the deep structure of communication itself is affected, but not in any final or irrevocable way.

As an approach to my argument, let me glance at the social distribution of knowledge. We can see that the class system has affected the distribution of knowledge. Historically and now, only a tiny percentage

of the population has been socialised into knowledge at the level of the meta-languages of control and innovation, whereas the mass of the population has been socialised into knowledge at the level of context-tied operations.

A tiny percentage of the population has been given access to the principles of intellectual change whereas the rest have been denied such access. This suggests that we might be able to distinguish between two orders of meaning. One we could call universalistic, the other particularistic. Universalistic meanings are those in which principles and operations are made linguistically explicit whereas particularistic orders of meaning are meanings in which principles and operations are relatively linguistically implicit. If orders of meaning are universalistic, then the meanings are less tied to a given context. The meta-languages of public forms of thought as these apply to objects and persons realise meanings of a universalistic type. Where meanings have this characteristic then individuals may have access to the grounds of their experience and can change the grounds. Where orders of meaning are particularistic, where principles are linguistically implicit, then such meanings are less context independent and more context bound; that is, tied to a local relationship and to a local social structure. Where the meaning system is particularistic, much of the meaning is imbedded in the context and may be restricted to those who share a similar contextual history. Where meanings are universalistic, they are in principle available to all because the principles and operations have been made explicit and so public.

I shall argue that forms of socialisation orient the child towards speech codes which control access to relatively context-tied or relatively context-independent meanings. Thus I shall argue that elaborated codes orient their users towards universalistic meanings, whereas restricted codes orient, sensitize, their users to particularistic meanings: that the linguistic realisations of the two orders are different, and so are the social

relationships which realise them. Elaborated codes are less tied to a given or local structure and thus contain the potentiality of change in principles. In the case of elaborated codes the speech is freed from its evoking social structure and takes on an autonomy. A university is a place organised around talk. Restricted codes are more tied to a local social structure and have a reduced potential for change in principles. Where codes are elaborated, the socialised has more access to the grounds of his own socialisation, and so can enter into a reflexive relationship to the social order he has taken over. Where codes are restricted, the socialised has less access to the grounds of his socialisation, and thus reflexivity may be limited in range. *One of the effects of the class system is to limit access to elaborated codes.*

I shall go on to suggest that restricted codes have their basis in condensed symbols whereas elaborated codes have their basis in articulated symbols. That restricted codes draw upon metaphor whereas elaborated codes draw upon rationality. That these codes constrain the contextual use of language in critical socialising contexts and in this way regulate the orders of relevance and relation which the socialised takes over. From this point of view, change in habitual speech codes involves changes in the means by which object and person relationships are realised.

ELABORATED AND RESTRICTED SPEECH VARIANTS

I want first to start with the notions of elaborated and restricted speech variants. A variant can be considered as the contextual constraints upon grammatical-lexical choices.

Sapir, Malinowski, Firth, Vygotsky, Luria have all pointed out from different points of view that the closer the identification of speakers, the greater the range of shared interests, the more probable that the speech will take a specific form. The range of syn-

tactic alternatives is likely to be reduced and the lexis to be drawn from a narrow range. Thus, the form of these social relations is acting selectively on the meanings to be verbally realised. In these relationships the intent of the other person can be taken for granted as the speech is played out against a back-drop of common assumptions, common history, common interests. As a result, there is less need to raise meanings to the level of explicitness or elaboration. There is a reduced need to make explicit through syntactic choices the logical structure of the communication. Further, if the speaker wishes to individualise his communication, he is likely to do this by varying the expressive associates of the speech. Under these conditions, the speech is likely to have a strong metaphoric element. In these situations the speaker may be more concerned with how something is said, when it is said, silence takes on a variety of meanings. Often in these encounters the speech cannot be understood apart from the context, and the context cannot be read by those who do not share the history of the relationship. Thus the form of the social relationship acts selectively on the meanings to be verbalised, which in turn affect the syntactic and lexical choices. The unspoken assumptions underlying the relationship are not available to those who are outside the relationship. For these are limited, and restricted to the speakers. The symbolic form of the communication is condensed yet the specific cultural history of the relationship is alive in its form. We can say that the roles of the speakers are communalised roles. Thus, we can make a relationship between restricted social relationships based upon communalised roles and the verbal realisation of their meaning. In the language of the earlier part of this paper, restricted social relationships based upon communalised role evoke particularistic, that is, context-tied meanings, realised through a restricted speech variant.

Imagine a husband and wife have just come out of the cinema, and are talking about the film: "What do you think?" "It

had a lot to say." "Yes, I thought so too—let's go to the Millers, there may be something going there." They arrive at the Millers, who ask about the film. An hour is spent in the complex, moral, political, aesthetic subtleties of the film and its place in the contemporary scene. Here we have an elaborated variant, the meanings now have to be made public to others who have not seen the film. The speech shows careful editing, at both the grammatical and lexical levels, it is no longer context tied. The meanings are explicit, elaborated and individualised. Whilst expressive channels are clearly relevant, the burden of meaning inheres predominantly in the verbal channel. The experience of the listeners cannot be taken for granted. Thus each member of the group is on his own as he offers his interpretation. Elaborated variants of this kind involve the speakers in particular role relationship, and *if you cannot manage the role, you can't produce the appropriate speech.* For as the speaker proceeds to individualise his meanings, he is differentiated from others like a figure from its ground.

The roles receive less support from each other. There is a measure of isolation. *Difference* lies at the basis of the social relationship, and is made verbally active, whereas in the other context it is *consensus*. The insides of the speaker have become psychologically active through the verbal aspect of the communication. Various defensive strategies may be used to decrease potential vulnerability of self and to increase the vulnerability of others. The verbal aspect of the communication becomes a vehicle for the transmission of individuated symbols. The "I" stands over the "We." Meanings which are discrete to the speaker must be offered so that they are intelligible to the listener. Communalised roles have given way to individualised roles, condensed symbols to articulated symbols. Elaborated speech variants of this type realise universalistic meanings in the sense that they are less context-tied. Thus individualised roles are realised through elaborated speech variants which involve complex

editing at the grammatical and lexical levels and which point to universalistic meanings.

Let me give another example. Consider the two following stories which Peter Hawkins, Assistant Research Officer in the Sociological Research Unit, University of London Institute of Education, constructed as a result of his analysis of the speech of middle-class and working-class five-year-old children. The children were given a series of four pictures which told a story and they were invited to tell the story. The first picture showed some boys playing football, in the second the ball goes through the window of a house, the third shows a woman looking out of the window and a man making an ominous gesture, and in the fourth the children are moving away.

Here are the two stories:

- (1) Three boys are playing football and one boy kicks the ball and it goes through the window the ball breaks the window and the boys are looking at it and a man comes out and shouts at them because they've broken the window so they run away and then that lady looks out of her window and she tells the boys off.
- (2) They're playing football and he kicks it and it goes through there it breaks the window and they're looking at it and he comes out and shouts at them because they've broken it so they run away and then she looks out and she tells them off.

With the first story the reader does not have to have the four pictures which were used as the basis for the story, whereas in the case of the second story the reader would require the initial pictures in order to make sense of the story. The first story is free of the context which generated it, whereas the second story is much more closely tied to its context. As a result the meanings of the second story are implicit, whereas the meanings of the first story are explicit. It is not that the working-class chil-

tion is an elaborated code having its basis in individualised roles realising context free, universalistic, meanings.

In order to prevent misunderstanding some expansion of this point is necessary. It is likely that where the code is restricted, the speech in the regulative context may well be limited to command and simple rule announcing statements. The latter statements are not context dependent in the sense previously given for they announce general rules. We need to supplement the context independent (universalistic) and context dependent (particularistic) criteria with criteria which refer to the extent to which the speech in the regulative context varies in terms of its *contextual specificity*. If the speech is context-specific then the socialiser cuts his meanings to the *specific* attributes/intentions of the socialised, the specific characteristics of the problem, the specific requirements of the context. Thus the general rule may be transmitted with degrees of *contextual specificity*. When this occurs the rule is individualised (fitted to the local circumstances) in the process of its transmission. Thus with code elaboration we should expect:

1. Some developed grounds for the rule.
2. Some qualification of it in the light of the particular issue.
3. Considerable *specificity* in terms of the socialised, the context and the issue.

This does *not* mean that there would be an *absence* of command statements. It is also likely that with code elaboration the socialised would be *given* opportunities (role options) to question.

Bernstein and Cook (1965) and Cook (1970) have developed a semantic coding grid which sets out with considerable delicacy a general category system which has been applied to a limited regulative context. G. Turner, linguist to the Sociological Research Unit, is attempting a linguistic realisation of the same grid.

We can express the two sets of criteria diagrammatically. A limited application is given by Henderson (1970):

Realisation of the Regulative Context

| | |
|-----------------|--------------|
| Universalistic | |
| Specific | Non-specific |
| Particularistic | |

It may be necessary to utilise the two sets of criteria for *all* four socialising contexts. Bernstein (1967, published 1972) suggested that code realisation would vary with context.

If we look at the linguistic realisation of the regulative context in greater detail we may be able to clear up another source of possible misunderstanding. In this context it is very likely that syntactic markers of the logical distribution of meaning will be extensively used.

"If you do that, then. . ."

"Either you . . . or. . ."

"You can do that but if. . ."

"You do that and you'll pay for it"

Thus it is very likely that young children may well in the *regulative* context have access to a range of syntactic markers which express the logical/hypothetical irrespective of code restriction or elaboration. However, where the code is restricted it is expected that there will be reduced specificity in the sense outlined earlier. Further, the speech in the control situation is likely to be well-organised in the sense that the sentences come as wholes. The child responds to the total *frame*. However, I would suggest that the informal *instructional* contexts within the family may well be limited in range and frequency. Thus the child, of course, would have access to and so have *available*, the hypotheticals, conditionals, disjunctives etc. but these might be rarely used in *instructional* contexts. In the same way, as we have suggested earlier, all children have access to linguistic expressions of uncertainty but they may differ in the context in which they receive and realise such expressions.

I must emphasise that because the code is restricted it does not mean that speakers at

no time will use elaborated speech variants. Only that the use of such variants will be infrequent in the socialisation of the child in his family.

Now, all children have access to restricted codes and their various systems of condensed meaning, because the roles the code pre-supposes are universal. But there may well be selective access to elaborated codes because there is selective access to the role system which evokes its use. Society is likely to evaluate differently the experiences realised through these two codes. I cannot here go into details, but the different focussing of experience through a restricted code creates a major problem of educability only where the school produces discontinuity between its symbolic orders and those of the child. Our schools are not made for these children; why should the children respond? To ask the child to switch to an elaborated code which presupposes different role relationships and systems of meaning without a sensitive understanding of the required contexts may create for the child a bewildering and potentially damaging experience.

FAMILY TYPES AND COMMUNICATION STRUCTURES

So far, then, I have sketched out a relationship between speech codes and socialisation through the organisation of roles through which the culture is made psychologically active in persons. I have indicated that access to the roles and thus to the codes is broadly related to social class. However, it is clearly the case that social class groups today are by no means homogeneous groups. Further, the division between elaborated and restricted codes is too simple. Finally, I have not indicated in any detail how these codes are evoked by families, and how the family types may shape their focus.

What I shall do now is to introduce a distinction between family types and their communication structures. These family types can be found empirically within each social class, although any one type may be

rather more modal at any given historical period.

I shall distinguish between families according to the strength of their boundary maintaining procedures. Let me first give some idea of what I mean by boundary maintaining procedures. I shall first look at boundary maintenance as it is revealed in the symbolic ordering of space. Consider the lavatory. In one house, the room is pristine, bare and sharp, containing only the necessities for which the room is dedicated. In another there is a picture on the wall, in the third there are books, in the fourth all surfaces are covered with curious postcards. We have a continuum from a room celebrating the purity of categories to one celebrating the mixture of categories, from strong to weak boundary maintenance. Consider the kitchen. In one kitchen, shoes may not be placed on the table, nor the child's chamber pot—all objects and utensils have an assigned place. In another kitchen the boundaries separating the different classes of objects are weak. The symbolic ordering of space can give us indications of the relative strength of boundary maintaining procedures. Let us now look at the relationship between family members. Where boundary procedures are strong, the differentiation of members and the authority structure is based upon clear-cut, unambiguous definitions of the status of the member of the family. The boundaries between the statuses are strong and the social identities of the members very much a function of their age, sex and age-relation status. As a shorthand, we can characterise the family as *positional*.

On the other hand, where boundary procedures are weak or flexible, the differentiation between members and the authority relationships are less on the basis of position, because here the status boundaries are blurred. Where boundary procedures are weak, the differentiation between members is based more upon *differences between persons*. In such families the relationships become more egocentric and the unique attributes of family members more and more

dren do not have in their passive vocabulary the vocabulary used by the middle-class children. Nor is it the case that the children differ in their tacit understanding of the linguistic rule system. Rather, what we have here are differences in the use of language arising out of a specific context. One child makes explicit the meanings which he is realising through language for the person he is telling the story to, whereas the second child does not to the same extent. The first child takes very little for granted, whereas the second child takes a great deal for granted. Thus for the first child the task was seen as a context in which his meanings were required to be made explicit, whereas the task for the second child was not seen as a task which required such explication of meaning. It would not be difficult to imagine a context where the first child would produce speech rather like the second. What we are dealing with here are differences between the children in the way they realise in language use apparently the same context. We could say that the speech of the first child generated universalistic meanings in the sense that the meanings are freed from the context and so understandable by all. Whereas the speech of the second child generated particularistic meanings, in the sense that the meanings are closely tied to the context and would be only fully understood by others if they had access to the context which originally generated the speech.

It is again important to stress that the second child has access to a more differentiated noun phrase, but there is a restriction on its use. Geoffrey Turner, Linguist in the Sociological Research Unit, shows that working-class, five-year-old children in the same contexts examined by Hawkins, use fewer linguistic expressions of uncertainty when compared with the middle-class children. This does not mean that working-class children do *not* have access to such expressions, but that the eliciting speech context did not provoke them. Telling a story from pictures, talking about scenes on cards, *for-*

mally framed contexts may not encourage working-class children to consider the possibilities of alternate meanings and so there is a reduction in the linguistic expressions of uncertainty. Again, working-class children have access to a wide range of syntactic choices which involve the use of logical operators, "because," "but," "either," "or," "only." The constraints exist on the conditions for their use. Formally framed contexts used for eliciting context independent universalistic meanings may evoke in the working-class child, relative to the middle-class child, restricted speech variants, because the working-class child has difficulty in managing the role relationships which such contexts require. This problem is further complicated when such contexts carry meanings very much removed from the child's cultural experience. In the same way we can show that there are constraints upon the middle-class child's use of language. Turner found that when middle-class children were asked to role play in the picture story series, a higher percentage of these children, when compared with working-class children, initially refused. When the middle-class children were asked "What is the man saying?" or linguistically equivalent questions, a relatively higher percentage said "I don't know." When this question was followed by the hypothetical question "What do you think the man might be saying?" they offered their interpretations. The working-class children role played without difficulty. It seems then that middle-class children at five need to have a very precise instruction to *hypothesise in that particular context*. This may be because they are more concerned here with getting their answers right or correct. When the children were invited to tell a story about some doll-like figures (a little boy, a little girl, a sailor and a dog), the working-class children's stories were freer, longer, more imaginative than the stories of the middle-class children. The latter children's stories were tighter, constrained within a strong narrative frame. It

was as if these children were dominated by what they took to be the *form* of a narrative and the content was secondary. This is an example of the concern of the middle-class child with the structure of the contextual frame.

It may be worthwhile to amplify this further. A number of studies have shown that when working-class black children are asked to associate to a series of words, their responses show considerable diversity, both from the meaning and form-class of the stimulus word. In the analysis offered in the text this may be because the children for the following reasons are less constrained. The form-class of the stimulus word may have reduced associative significance and so would less constrain the selection of potential words or phrases. With such a weakening of the grammatical frame a greater range of alternatives are possible candidates for selection. Further, the closely controlled middle-class linguistic socialisation of the young child may point the child towards both the grammatical significance of the stimulus word and towards a tight logical ordering of semantic space. Middle-class children may well have access to deep interpretive rules which regulate their linguistic responses in certain formalised contexts. The consequences may limit their imagination through the tightness of the frame which these interpretive rules create. It may even be that with five-year-old children, the middle-class child will innovate *more* with the arrangements of objects (i.e. bricks) than in his linguistic usage. His linguistic usage is under close supervision by adults. He has more *autonomy* in his play.

To return to our previous discussion, we can say briefly that as we move from communalised to individualised roles, so speech takes on an increasingly reflexive function. The unique selves of others become palpable through speech and enter into our own self, the grounds of our experience are made verbally explicit; the security of the condensed symbol is gone. It has been replaced

by rationality. There is a change in the basis of our vulnerability.

FOUR CONTEXTS

So far, then, I have discussed certain types of speech variants and the role relationships which occasion them. I am now going to raise the generality of the discussion and focus upon the title of the paper. The socialisation of the young in the family proceeds within a critical set of inter-related contexts. Analytically, we may distinguish four contexts.

1. The regulative context—these are authority relationships where the child is made aware of the rules of the moral order and their various backings.

2. The instructional context, where the child learns about the objective nature of objects and persons, and acquires skills of various kinds.

3. The imaginative or innovating contexts, where the child is encouraged to experiment and re-create his world on his own terms, and in his own way.

4. The interpersonal context, where the child is made aware of affective states—his own, and others.

I am suggesting that the critical orderings of a culture or subculture are made substantive—are made palpable—through the forms of its linguistic realisations of these four contexts—initially in the family and kin.

Now if the linguistic realisation of these four contexts involves the predominant use of restricted speech variants, I shall postulate that the deep structure of the communication is a restricted code having its basis in communalised roles, realising context bound meanings, i.e., particularistic meaning orders. Clearly the specific grammatical and lexical choices will vary from one context to another.

If the linguistic realisation of these four contexts involves the predominant usage of elaborated speech variants, I shall postulate that the deep structure of the communica-

are made substantive in the communication structure. We will call these *person-centred* families. Such families do not reduce but increase the substantive expression of ambiguity and ambivalence. In person-centred families, the role system would be continuously evoking, accommodating and assimilating the different interests, attributes of its members. In such families, unlike positional families, the members would be making their roles, rather than stepping into them. In a person-centred family, the child's developing self is differentiated by continuous adjustment to the verbally realised and elaborated intentions, qualifications and motives of others. The boundary between self and other is blurred. In positional families, the child takes over and responds to the formal pattern of obligation and privilege. It should be possible to see, without going into details, that the communication structure within these two types of family are somewhat differently focussed. We might then expect that the reflexiveness induced by positional families is sensitized to the general attributes of persons, whereas the reflexiveness produced by person-centred families is more sensitive towards the particular aspects of persons. Think of the difference between Dartington Hall or Gordonstoun Public Schools in England, or the difference between West Point and a progressive school in the USA. Thus, in person-centred families, the insides of the members are made public through the communication structure, and thus more of the person has been invaded and subject to control. Speech in such families is a major media of control. In positional families of course, speech is relevant but it symbolizes the boundaries given by the formal structure of the relationships. So far as the child is concerned, in positional families he attains a strong sense of social identity at the cost of autonomy; in person-centred families, the child attains a strong sense of autonomy but his social identity may be weak. Such ambiguity in the sense of identity, the lack of boundary, may move

such children towards a radically closed value system.

If we now place these family types in the framework of the previous discussion, we can see that although the code may be elaborated, it may be differently focussed according to the family type. Thus, we can have an elaborate code focussing upon persons or an elaborated code in a positional family may focus more upon objects. We can expect the same with a restricted code. Normally, with code restriction we should expect a positional family, however, if it showed signs of being person-centred, then we might expect the children to be in a situation of potential code switch.

Where the code is elaborated, and focussed by a person-centred family, then these children may well develop acute identity problems, concerned with authenticity, of limiting responsibility—they may come to see language as phony, a system of counterfeit masking the absence of belief. They may move towards the restricted codes of the various peer group sub-cultures, or seek the condensed symbols of affective experience, or both.

One of the difficulties of this approach is to avoid implicit value judgements about the relative worth of speech systems and the cultures which they symbolize. Let it be said immediately that a restricted code gives access to a vast potential of meanings, of delicacy, subtlety and diversity of cultural forms, to a unique aesthetic whose basis in condensed symbols may influence the form of the imagining. Yet, in complex industrialized societies, its differently focussed experience may be disvalued, and humiliated within schools or seen, at best, to be irrelevant to the educational endeavour. For the schools are predicated upon elaborated code and its system of social relationships. Although an elaborated code does not entail any specific value system, the value system of the middle class penetrates the texture of the very learning context itself.

Elaborated codes give access to alterna-

tive realities yet they carry the potential of alienation, of feeling from thought, of self from other, of private belief *from role obligation*.

SOURCES OF CHANGE


Finally I should like to consider briefly the source of change of linguistic codes. The first major source of change I suggest is to be located in the division of labour. As the division of labour changes from simple to complex, then this changes the social and knowledge characteristics of occupational roles. In this process there is an extension of access, through education, to elaborated codes, but access is controlled by the class system. The focussing of the codes I have suggested is brought about by the boundary maintaining procedures within the family. However, we can generalise and say that the focussing of the codes is related to the boundary maintaining procedures as these affect the major socialising agencies, family, age group, education and work. We need, therefore, to consider together with the question of the degree and type of complexity of the division of labour the value orientations of society which it is hypothesized affect the boundary maintaining procedures. It is the case that we can have societies with a similar complexity in their division of labour but which differ in their boundary maintaining procedures.

I suggest then that it is important to make a distinction between societies in terms of their boundary maintaining procedures if we are to deal with this question of the focussing of codes. One possible way of examining the relative strength of boundary maintenance, at a somewhat high level of abstraction, is to consider the strength of the *constraints* upon the choice of values which legitimize authority/power relationships. Thus in societies where there is weak constraint upon such legitimising values, that is, where there are a variety of formally permitted legitimising values, we might expect a

marked shift towards person type control. Whereas in societies with strong constraints upon legitimising values, where there is a severe *restriction* upon the choice, we might expect a marked shift towards positional control.

I shall illustrate these relationships with reference to the family:

Division of labour Constraints upon legitimising values
(Boundary Maintenance)



Thus the division of labour influences the availability of elaborated codes; the class system affects their distribution; the focussing of codes can be related to the boundary maintaining procedures, i.e. the value system. I must point out that this is only a coarse interpretive framework.

CONCLUSION

I have tried to show how the class system acts upon the deep structure of communication in the process of socialisation. I refined the crudity of this analysis by showing how speech codes may be differently focussed through family types. Finally, it is conceivable that there are general aspects of the analysis which might provide a starting point for the consideration of symbolic orders other than languages (see Douglas 1970). I must point out that there is more to socialisation than the forms of its linguistic realisation.

NOTE

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