QUESTION II
1. WiivKVKR dul he call the supreme god father And maker of all things ? * Was it because he is of gods» the gods that arc engendered/ and of men father, as
Homer names him * but maker of irrational being» and of inanimate things ? * l;or not even of the placenta» says Chrysippus* though it is a product of the seed, is he who provided the seed called father. Or is it by his customary use of metaphor that he has called him who is responsible for the universe its father ? So in the Symposium J he called Phaedrus father of the amatory discourses because he was instigator of them and in the dialogue that bears his name * called him blessed with fair children beivuíM.* as a result of his initiative philosophy had been filled with many fair discourses/ Or is there a difference between father and maker and between birth * and coming to be ? For as what has been born has ipso facto come to be but not contrariwise so it is that he who has lxagntten has ipso facto made* for birth is the coming to be of an animate thing. Also in the case of a maker, such as a builder is or a weaver or one who produces a lyre or a statue, his work when done is separated from him, whereas the principle
or force emanating from the parent is blended in the progeny0 and cohibits its nature, which is a fragment or part of the procreator.* Since, then, the universe is not like products that have been moulded or fitted together but has in it a large portion of vitality ami divinity, which god sowed from himself in the matter' and mixed with it, it is reasonable that, since the universe hafr come into being a living I hing, god be named at the same time father of it and maker.
2* While this most nearly coincides with ľlatos opinion, consider whether there will be plausibility in the following statement also : There arc two con* stituent parts of the universe, body and soul.- The former god did not beget ; but, matter having sub* mitted itself to him, he formed and fitted it together * by binding and bounding the unlimited with suitable limit« and shapes/ The soul, however, when it has partaken of intelligence und reason and con*
cord»* is not merely a work but also a part of god and has come to be not by his agency but both from him as source and out of his substance.*