

Téma: Vymezení základních pojmů III – inovace v používání pojmů
sekta-kult-církev (Johnson, Yinger, Stark & Bainbridge, Wilson)

Many new religious bodies are created by schisms - they break off from other religious organizations. Such new religions commonly are called sects. Many other new religious bodies do not arise through schisms; they represent religious innovation. Someone has a novel religious insight and recruits others to the faith. These new religions are also often called sects, but a theory that explains why schismatic religious groups occur may have nothing to say about religious innovation. Is it then only a partial theory of sect formation? Or shall we distinguish among religious groups on the basis of their origins? If so, what names should we employ for this distinction? And what of the many "quasi religions," such as astrology, yoga, and the like? Are they religious movements? How shall we identify them? These questions are not merely academic; they must be settled before coherent discussion, let alone research, is possible.

UN-IDEAL TYPES

The conceptual literature on churches and sects is dominated by typologies. Indeed, the literature refers not to churches and sects, but to the "church-sect typology." Sad to say, the kind of types sociologists usually develop are of no use in theory construction. They serve as tautological substitutes for real theories and tend to prevent theorizing.

The trouble started with Weber, who introduced both the church-sect typology and a misunderstanding of the ideal type. In his classical work on methods, Weber (1949:91, 97) advocated the construction of ideal types

... by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to these one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found anywhere in reality They are used as conceptual instruments for comparison with the measurement of reality.

Generations of sociologists have regarded Weber's ideal type as similar to concepts commonly found in the physical sciences. Physics, for example, abounds with "ideal gases" and "frictionless states." It is understood that such do not exist, but are the absolute base points on a measuring continuum against which degrees of friction or the expansion of gases can be calibrated. But there is an immense and fatal difference between these ideal types and those

Weber proposed and compounded. The ideal types of physics anchor a single continuum along which it is possible to rank all empirical or hypothetical cases. Comparisons with the ideal are direct and unambiguous and thus permit measurement. But Weber's types prevent comparison and measurement, despite his claim that they are indispensable for this purpose.

Following Weber, sociologists often use correlates in their definitions of concepts. But it is attributes, not correlates that belong in a definition. Consider the most minimal use of a definition: to permit clear identification of cases as belonging or not belonging to the defined class. Because correlates are not always present and often may not be present, their use as defining features often leads to misclassification. Worse yet, when many correlates are involved (as Weber advised they should be), the result is a jumble of mixed types that cannot be ordered and thus cannot yield measurement. The usual outcome is a proliferation of new sub-concepts or types, and sometimes it seems that each new empirical case must become a unique type -which is to classify nothing.

When attributes are the basis of definition (because they are always present in the phenomena to be classified) and when enough attributes have been utilized to limit the class in the desired fashion, no ambiguity results, for then the concept forms an underlying uni-dimensional axis of variation. This kind of ideal type does provide a zero point for comparison and ranking.

CHURCHES AND SECTS

Although Weber introduced the notions of church and sect, his student, Ernst Troeltsch (1931), first made them important. Troeltsch used an ideal type of church and an ideal type of sect to categorize roughly what he regarded as the two main varieties of religious bodies in pre-19th-century Christian Europe. Each type was identified by a host of characteristics that were, at best, weak correlates of one another and of the phenomena to be classified. Subsequent attempts to utilize Troeltsch's types in other times and places caused frustration. The empirical cases just would not fit well; so new users created new church-sect typologies, some of them extremely ornate with many subcategories. Indeed, it would be close to the truth to claim that each new user, or at least each new user with new cases to classify, created a new typology based on different correlated features of the phenomena to be classified. Each new typology suffered the same defects as those it replaced: It would not organize the data.

Many social scientists have pointed to the serious inadequacies in church-sect conceptualizations (Eister, 1967; Goode, 1967; Gustafson, 1967; Dittes, 1971; Knudsen et al., 1978), and many of the best sociologists of religion have labored long and hard to perfect the

distinction. Thomas O'Dea (1966:68) summarized some of the definitions proposed by Troeltsch and later scholars, suggesting that church and sect had the following "attributes":

CHURCH:

1. Membership in fact upon the basis of birth
2. Administration of the formalized means of grace and their sociological and theological concomitants - hierarchy and dogma
3. Inclusiveness of social structure, often coinciding with geographical or ethnic boundaries
4. Orientation toward the conversion of all
5. The tendency to adjust to and compromise with the existing society and its values and institutions

SECT:

1. Separatism from the general society and withdrawal from or defiance of the world and its institutions and values
2. Exclusiveness both in attitude and in social structure
3. Emphasis upon a conversion experience prior to membership
4. Voluntary joining
5. A spirit of regeneration
6. An attitude of ethical austerity, often of an ascetic nature

These definitions have a certain intuitive rightness to them, but they also are imprecise and ambiguous. One can easily name a church with all five attributes of church (the Catholic church in Spain). And religious groups that seem to fit the definition of sect may come to mind fairly easily. But one can also name many religious organizations that scramble the 11 defining points in many different ways. The 6 points defining sect may tend to go together-they correlate to some extent with each other- but many of the religious groups commonly called sects fail to have some of the properties listed. In fact, the attributes O'Dea lists are not really attributes at all, but correlates, properties that may tend to go together but often do not. In the American and Canadian context, it is hard to find any religious group that fits the definition of church; so we commonly use the term denomination to refer to religious groups possessing several churchlike qualities, but not all of them. If denominations are watered-down churches, then adding this third category to the typology only renders fluid and uncertain an intellectual scheme that was supposed to be a solid basis for analysis. What about a group like the Hutterites (Eaton and Weil, 1955; Peters, 1965; Hostetler, 1974), separated from the general society and stressing

austerity, yet gaining members through birth rather than conversion and having no greater emphasis upon voluntary joining than any large denomination? Is it a sect or a church? Clearly, the church-sect typology cannot be applied to religious groups in our own society without letting most cases be exceptions to the rule. But what good are categories if we cannot place cases in them with confidence and without ambiguity?

No typology so constructed will ever create the organization needed for theorizing. This problem is easy to illustrate. Suppose five correlates are used to define the ideal church, with negative values on these same five defining the ideal sect. Then suppose we treat these criteria as dichotomies. The result is 32 logically possible types (because the defining criteria can vary independently), of which 30 are mixed types. These mixed types cannot be ordered fully. Which is more churchlike, a group possessing characteristics A and B but lacking C, D, and E or one with D and E but not A, B, or C? In the empirical world, mixed types have been the rule. Underlying most sociologists' interest in churches and sects is a theory about religious movements. In 1929, H. Richard Niebuhr argued that the sect is an unstable type of religious organization that, through time, tends to be transformed into a church. But, he argued, following this transformation, many members' needs that had been satisfied by the sect go unmet by the church. In time, this leads to discontent, which prompts schism and the splitting off of a new sect, which is then transformed slowly into a church, thus to spawn a new sect: an endless cycle of birth, transformation, schism, and rebirth of religious movements. This theory has long captivated sociologists of religion. Unfortunately, a typological conception of churches and sects prevents all theorizing. How can one theorize about the movement from sect to church when one cannot rank groups as more or less churchlike? It would humble physicists to try to theorize under such handicaps.

Thus it was an event of considerable magnitude when Benton Johnson (1963:542; cf. 1957,1971) discarded dozens of correlates from the various definitions of church and sect and settled on a single attribute to classify religious groups: "A church is a religious group that accepts the social environment in which it exists. A sect is a religious group that rejects the social environment in which it exists."

Johnson postulated a continuum representing the degree to which a religious group is in a state of tension with its surrounding socio-cultural environment. The ideal sect falls at one pole, where the surrounding tension is so great that sect members are hunted fugitives. The ideal church anchors the other end of the continuum and virtually is the socio-cultural environment - the two are so merged that it is impossible to postulate a basis for tension.

Johnson's ideal types, unlike Weber's, are ideal in precisely the same way that ideal gases and frictionless states are ideal. They identify a clear axis of variation and its end points.

Johnson's reconceptualization also permits clear definition of two other important concepts: religious movement and religious institution. When we look at the low tension end of his axis, we find not only churches but also religious institutions. That is, we find a stable sector of the social structure, a cluster of roles, norms, values, and activities associated with the performance of key social functions.

Social institutions are not social movements if we define social movements as organized groups whose primary goal is to cause or prevent social change. Institutions adapt to change. Social movements seek to alter or become institutions. Thus, if religious institutions are one pole of the tension axis, as we move along the axis in the direction of greater tension, we discover religious movements. That is, religious movements are social movements that wish to cause or prevent change in a system of beliefs, values, symbols, and practices concerned with providing supernaturally based general compensators. Religious movements are organized groups wishing to become religious institutions. Such groups would like to become the dominant faith in their society, although they may make little effort to achieve this end if they are convinced that their chances are too remote.

Johnson's axis also permits us to characterize the direction taken by religious movements. When they move toward less tension with their socio-cultural environment, they are church movements (although a group may remain a sect during a long period of movement in this churchlike direction). When groups move toward the high tension pole, they are sect movements. In Chapter 3, we show that the degree of tension experienced by a religious group can be measured easily and unambiguously and explain that tension with the socio-cultural environment is equivalent to subcultural deviance in which the relationship between the high tension group and the surrounding society is marked by difference, antagonism, and separation—three integrated but conceptually distinguishable aspects of deviance. Tension so defined can be measured; so numerous empirical studies testing any hypothesis or theory in which tension plays a part can now be performed.

Using Johnson's reconceptualization of church and sect, we may see at a glance that the Catholic church in the United States is more sect like than is the Catholic church in Ireland. In most prior typologies, this could not be seen. Because the axis of variation is clear, variation cries out for explanation. It becomes obvious how to proceed toward theories to rectify and extend Niebuhr's work. Indeed, many important variables long thought to influence the eruption of sects or their transformation into churches can now be examined. In the past, these

variables have been utilized in typologizing and thus were locked in tautology. Now we can ask, for example, if the arrival of a generation of members socialized into the sect as children, rather than converted into it as adults, plays a major role in pushing sects down the road to churchliness (chapters 6 and 7). In the past, this variable was lost in the creation of (I) sects with converted members, (2) sects with socialized members, (3) churches with converted members, and (4) churches with socialized members. These four boxes tell us nothing. A proposition that relates socialization to the transformation of sects into churches could tell us much.

SECTS AND CULTS

There are at least two kinds of religious movements in a high state of tension with their surrounding socio-cultural environment, and it demonstrably inhibits efficient theorizing to regard both kinds as sects and ignore differences between them. Therefore, we must now add some complexity to Johnson's elegant parsimony.

Niebuhr's theory exclusively concerns schismatic religious movements, which he identifies as sects. He was not speaking of all small, deviant religious movements, but only of those whose existence began as an internal faction of another religious body. This is, of course, a very common kind of religious movement. However, it is not the only kind of religious movement in a high state of tension with the surrounding socio-cultural environment. Many such movements have no history of prior organizational attachment to a "parent" religion; thus, they are not schismatic. Indeed, they lack a close cultural continuity with (or similarity to) other religious groups in a society.

These non-schismatic, deviant religious groups are themselves of two types. One type represents cultural innovation. That is, along with the many familiar components of religious culture appearing in the beliefs, values, symbols, and practices of the group, there is something distinctive and new about them as well. The second type exhibits cultural importation. Such groups represent (or claim to represent) a religious body well established in another society. Examples are various Asian faiths in the United States or Christianity in Asia. In common parlance, these deviant but non-schismatic bodies are often referred to as cults (Eister, 1972).

Both cults and sects are deviant religious bodies - that is, they are in a state of relatively high tension with their surrounding socio-cultural environment. However, sects have a prior tie with another religious organization. To be a sect, a religious movement must have been founded by persons who left another religious body for the purpose of founding the sect. The term sect, therefore, applies only to schismatic movements. It is not required in this definition

that a sect break off from a church, as Niebuhr argued. To do so would land us back in the wilderness of typologies, for sects sometimes break off from other sects. Indeed, it has happened that churches have broken off from sects (Steinberg, 1965). Furthermore, we plan to apply elements of church-sect theory to the career of cults. Therefore, these are matters to theorize about, not to lock into definitions.

Because sects are schismatic groups, they present themselves to the world as something old. They left the parent body not to form a new faith but to reestablish the old one, from which the parent body had "drifted" (usually by becoming more church like). Sects claim to be the authentic, purged, refurbished version of the faith from which they split. Luther, for example, did not claim to be leading a new church, but the true church, free of worldly encrustations. Cults, with the exception to be noted, do not have a prior tie with another established religious body in the society in question. The cult may represent an alien (external) religion, or it may have originated in the host society, but through innovation, not fission.

Whether domestic or imported, the cult is something new vis-a-vis the other religious bodies of the society in question. If domestic regardless of how much of the common religious culture it retains-the cult adds to that culture a new revelation or insight justifying the claim that it is different, new, "more advanced." Imported cults often have little common culture with existing faiths; they may be old in some other society, but they are new and different in the importing society.

Cults, then, represent a deviant religious tradition in a society. In time, they may become the dominant tradition, in which case there is no longer much tension between them and the environment, and they become the church or churches of that society. Long before cults become churches, they too are prone to internal schisms. Thus, within the context of cult movements, schismatic movements can form. A theory to explain sect formation can then be applied to cults to explain their schismatic tendencies. But a theory of sect formation simply will not serve as a theory of cult formation. The geneses of the two are very different.

To sum up, sects are breeds of a common species. That is, sects are deviant religious movements that remain within a non-deviant religious tradition. Cults are a different species and occur by mutation or migration. That is, cults are deviant religious movements within a deviant religious tradition. Sects, being schismatic movements, begin life as religious organizations and thus their status as religious movements is clear. However, many cults do not develop into full-blown religious movements. Therefore, it is necessary to survey more closely the range of cults to identify various forms, only some of which fall within the scope of a theory of religious movements.

CULTS

Three degrees of organization (or lack of organization) characterize cults. The most diffuse and least organized kind is an audience cult. Sometimes some members of this audience actually may gather to hear a lecture. But there are virtually no aspects of formal organization to these activities, and membership remains at most a consumer activity. Indeed, cult audiences often do not gather physically but consume cult doctrines entirely through magazines, books, newspapers, radio, and television.

More organized than audience cults are what can be characterized as client cults. Here the relationship between those promulgating cult doctrine and those partaking of it most closely resembles the relationship between therapist and patient or between consultant and client. Considerable organization may be found among those offering the cult service, but clients remain little organized. Furthermore, no successful effort is made to weld the clients into a social movement. Indeed, client involvement is so partial that clients often retain an active commitment to another religious movement or institution.

Cult movements can be distinguished from other religious movements only in terms of the distinctions between cults and sects previously developed. We address only cult movements in our subsequent theory, but the less organized types currently are more common and need to be described so they will not be confused with the full-fledged cult movement.

Audience Cults

In 1960, Rodney Stark and John Lofland (Lofland and Stark, 1965) went in search of a cult movement to study. William Bainbridge began a similar search in 1970 (Bainbridge, 1978c). Our initial discovery was that the bulk of cult activity is not connected to cult movements, but, to the degree it involves face-to-face interaction at all (as opposed to reliance on mass communications media), it most closely resembles a very loose lecture circuit. Persons with a cult doctrine to offer rely on ads, publicity, and direct mail to assemble an audience to hear their lectures. Efforts almost invariably are made at these lectures to sell ancillary materials books, magazines, souvenirs, and the like - but no significant efforts are made to organize the audience. Furthermore, these public gatherings of ten are most unsystematic. A description of a typical spacecraft convention held during the early sixties illustrates this point. About 500 persons registered for the annual spacecraft convention held in Oakland, California. The alleged focus of interest was flying saucers (UFOs). Approximately 20 speakers were scheduled over each two-day convention, and many others with a cult message set up booths.

Some of these speakers devoted their time to describing their trips to outer space on flying saucers piloted by persons from other planets. Some even showed (and sold) photographs of the saucer they had gone on and of outer space creatures who had taken them for the ride. What seemed astounding in context, because tales of those contacted by spacemen (contactees) seemed to be accepted uncritically, was the fact that other speakers spent their time trying merely to demonstrate that some kind of UFOs must exist, but without claiming that they necessarily came from outer space. People who had given nodding support to tales of space travelers also gave full attention to those who merely suggested that saucers might exist. Moreover, many speakers (and the majority of those working out of booths) had little connection with the saucer question at all. Instead, they pushed standard varieties of pseudoscience and cult doctrines on the ground that these flourish on the more enlightened worlds from which UFOs come. Astrologers, medical quacks, inventors of perpetual motion machines (seeking investors), food faddists, spiritualists, and the like were all present and busy. Conversations with many in attendance at space craft conventions revealed that these people are not the stuff of which social movements can be made. They accept everything, more or less, and in effect accept nothing. They are "interested" in all new ideas in the general area of the eccentric and the mystical. Their sheer open mindedness makes it impossible for them to develop a strong commitment to any complete system of thought; they are constitutional nibblers. Many speakers at the conventions want to found cult movements, but efforts to create organization meet no significant success. Later observation within several cult movements taught us that such movements soon learn to avoid the cult audiences in their search for converts. It is easy to get a hearing from such persons, but serious commitment is almost never forthcoming.

Nevertheless, persons who attend events like the spacecraft convention are among the most committed and active members of cult audiences. Perhaps the majority of persons who presently give credence to ideas that are defined as cult doctrines in American society do so entirely through impersonal communications. They read astrology columns and books and swell the circulation of the National Enquirer and other publications that give play to psychics, biorhythms, spiritualism, UFOs, and similar pseudoscientific, mystical meaning systems. Although many people who end up in cult movements seem to have once been part of this audience, few members of the audience are ever recruited into a cult movement.

Client Cults

Some cults manage to become service and therapy occupations. In the past, the primary services sold were medical miracles, forecasts of the future, or contact with the dead. Since Freud, however, cults increasingly have specialized in personal adjustment. Thus, today one can "get it" at *est*, get "cleared" through Scientology, store up or gone and seek the monumental orgasm through the Reich Foundation, get rolfed, actualized, sensitized, or psychoanalyzed. Although cults of this type more fully mobilize participants than do audience cults, their mobilization is partial, rather than all-embracing. Most participants remain clients, not members. Some of them participate in two or more cults simultaneously, although with greater involvement than is usual in cult audiences. And quite often clients of these cults retain their participation in an organized religious group. In our travels through the cult world, we found that many people who frequent spiritualist groups go regularly to a conventional church come Sunday morning. (It is significant that they usually go to churches, not sects. As we show in Part IV, sects are much more hostile than are churches to anything with religious implications that is external to the sect.) Indeed, it is not uncommon to find clergy from conventional churches at various client cults, particularly those of the personal adjustment variety, apparently feeling little stress from their dual involvements.

Cult Movements

When the spiritualist medium is able to get his or her clients to attend sessions regularly on Sunday morning, and thus, in a Christian context, to sever their ties with other religious organizations, we observe the birth of a wit movement. Cult movements are full-fledged religious organizations that attempt to satisfy all the religious needs of converts. Dual membership with another faith is out. Attempts to cause social change, by converting others, become central to the group agenda.

Nevertheless, cult movements differ considerably in the degree to which they attempt to mobilize their members and to usher in the "New Age." Many cult movements are very weak organizations. They are essentially study groups that gather regularly to hear discussions of the new revelations or latest spirit messages gained by the leader. Little more than modest financial support, attendance at group functions, and assent to the truth of the cult doctrines is asked of members. Frequently, the group observes no moral prohibitions more restrictive than those of the general society. Unless an outsider gets into a religious discussion with members, no indication of their religious deviance is likely to be evident. Many other cult movements function much like conventional sects.

Levels of member commitment are quite intense; tension with the outside world is high (moral prohibitions exceed those of the general society); but participation is only partial. That is, most members continue to lead regular secular lives - they work, marry, rear children, have hobbies, take vacations, and have contact in the ordinary way with non-cult members such as family and friends.

But some cult movements demand much more. They are a total way of life. They require members to dispense with their secular lives and devote themselves entirely to cult activities. Such members become, in Philip Selznick's (1960) felicitous expression, "deployable agents." Their lives are circumscribed wholly by the demands of the cult. Usually they live in. If they hold jobs, it will be only where and when they are directed to do so, often in enterprises the cult owns and operates. Today it is common for cult members to support themselves and their movements by working the streets, sometimes begging, sometimes selling books, pamphlets, charms, or even candy and flowers for a "donation" (Bromley and Shupe, 1980). When not hustling money, these deployable agents seek converts or devote themselves to group chores or worship activities. Most people would be very surprised at how much money a small number of deployable agents can raise by street hustling these days, and perhaps this is one reason why cults seem so liable to adopt this strategy at this time. But the requirement that members become deployable agents probably has drawbacks. It may limit the growth of the group (Chapter 14), and, as we discuss later in this chapter, it increases tension with the outside world.

If we did no more than catalogue variations among cults, we would be guilty of the same empty typologizing we criticized at the start of this chapter. However, these variations can be organized efficiently by concepts introduced in Chapter I. Thus, our three varieties of cults can be distinguished on the basis of the quality and generality of the compensators they offer. Audience cults offer compensators of modest value at a correspondingly modest cost - that is, audience cults deal in vague and weak compensators often amounting to no more than a mild vicarious thrill or social entertainment rather than a credible promise that a reward of significant value will eventually be obtained. Client cults offer valuable, but relatively specific compensators. Psychoanalysis and Dianetics claim to cure neurosis, but they do not promise everlasting life. Astrologers offer specific advice, but they do not reveal the meaning of the universe. Witches sell love potions, but not the secret of eternal youth. Only cult movements offer the most general compensators, the kind we have defined as available from religions. Thus, only cult movements are fully developed religious movements.

MAGIC AND RELIGION

In Chapter I, we severely criticized Emile Durkheim's definition of religion. But here we acknowledge that he, much more adequately than other writers who dealt with the issue, found the key to distinguish magic from religion, which led him to conclude, quite correctly, that magic does not concern itself with the meaning of the universe, but only with the manipulation of the universe for specific goals. Although religion addresses the most general questions and the most general human desires, Durkheim (1915:42) pointed out that magic is "more elementary, undoubtedly because, seeking technical and utilitarian ends, it does not-waste its time in pure speculation."

Put into our conceptual language, magic deals in relatively specific compensators, and religion always includes the most general compensators. This characteristic of magic has two extremely important implications for understanding religious movements and makes it possible to distinguish cult movements from other cult phenomena.

First, because magic deals in specific compensators, it often becomes subject to empirical verification. This means that magic is chronically vulnerable to disproof. Claims that a particular spell will cure warts or repel bullets can be falsified by direct tests. This makes magic a risky exchange commodity and accounts for the rapid turnover among popular magicians.

In Part V, we suggest that the inclusion of magic in the traditional teachings of the major world religions made them extremely vulnerable to attacks by science over the past several centuries and that this has resulted in considerable secularization of these faiths. But we also pay considerable attention in those chapters to the fact that it is only magic, not religion, that is vulnerable to scientific test. The most general compensators, based on supernatural assumptions, are forever secure from scientific assessment. It is this feature of religion that leads us to conclude in chapters 19 through 22 that, although particular religions, perhaps those of greatest prominence, may go into eclipse, religion will continue.

The empirical vulnerability of magic also helps us identify the line between magic and science. Here we fully agree with Max Weber (1963:2), who distinguished magic from science on the basis of the results of empirical testing: "Only we, judging from the standpoint of our modern views of nature, can distinguish objectively in such behavior those attributes of causality which are 'correct' from those which are 'fallacious,' and then designate the fallacious attributions of causation as irrational, and the corresponding acts as 'magic.'" Magic flourishes when humans lack effective and economical means for such testing. Indeed, it can be said that

we developed science by learning how to evaluate specific explanations offered by magic. That is, science is an efficient procedure for evaluating explanations.

We have not identified magic with supernaturally based compensators. Often magic does invoke supernatural assumptions, as when ritual magicians attempt to call up devils to do their bidding. However, the supernatural is often not clearly implicated in magic. Thus, magicians may attempt to overcome natural law - in effect, to perform miracles without relying on supernatural agents or clear supernatural assumptions to accomplish such wonders. Indeed, magical properties often are thought to inhere in a particular substance -love potions or Laetrile "work" because of their inherent magical qualities. Some people believe they can cause pain by sticking pins in a Voodoo doll, and, as Richard Kieckhefer (1976:6) notes:

For most processes that they employ, people have some vague (and perhaps incorrect) notion of the mechanism involved, or else they assume that they that someone understands the link between cause and effect. But the man who mutilates his enemy's representation cannot make any of these claims. He may believe that the magical act works, but he cannot explain how.

Similarly, people often will believe in their own or others' magical powers without necessarily explaining these powers by reference to supernatural agents. Psychics, fortune-tellers, water dowsers (water witches), and even astrologers often claim inexplicable gifts, but many do not attribute these to supernatural sources. By excluding clear supernatural assumptions from our definition of magic and focusing instead on claims to circumvent natural laws, we leave room in our definition of magic for many folk practices and "superstitions" as well as for present-day pseudo-sciences, which also often lack clearly supernatural assumptions. This is important later in the book because it permits us to see the conditions under which such "secular" magics do turn toward supernatural assumptions or even evolve into fully developed religions. It also makes it possible to see that religious organizations may impute supernatural assumptions to magical practices that, in fact, do not clearly make such assumptions. For example, as we see in Chapter 5, Christianity often has interpreted folk magic as performed by the devil, even though its practitioners did not believe this. Whether or not they assume the supernatural, these magics can be identified as compensators (and thus as magic) in the manner suggested by Weber and by Kieckhefer, that is, by empirical falsification of their claims. They constitute magic rather than incorrect efforts at science because they are offered without regard for their demonstrable falsity. Thus, we reserve the term magic for compensators that are offered as correct explanations without regard for empirical evaluations and that, when evaluated, are found wanting.

The second important implication of the fact that magic deals only in specific compensators is that magic lacks the exchange characteristics needed to sustain organizations (cr. Fortune, 1932; Evans-Pritchard, 1937). The most general compensators often require individuals to engage in a lifelong commitment in order to maintain the value of these compensators, but specific compensators can sustain only short-term commitments. In our formal theory, we are able to deduce these differences between magic and religion as follows:

1. Magicians cannot require others to engage in long-term stable patterns of exchange.
2. In the absence of long-term, stable patterns of exchange, an organization composed of magicians and a committed laity cannot be sustained.
3. Magicians will serve individual clients, not lead an organization.

In the case of religions, however, all these "cannots" become "cans." Religious leaders can create stable organizations because the most general compensators do require long-term, stable patterns of exchange. The Christian, Jew, Moslem, Buddhist, Mormon, or Moonie who lapses from his or her religious obligations risks losing those vast rewards promised by the general compensators of his or her faith.

To summarize this discussion, we quote the most insightful passage in Emile Durkheim's *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1915:44-45):

... whenever we observe the religious life, we find it has a definite group as its foundation ... It is quite another matter with magic. To be sure, the belief in magic is always more or less general; it is frequently diffused in large masses of the population, and there are even peoples where it has as many adherents as the real religion. But it does not result in binding together those who adhere to it, nor uniting them into a group leading a common life. There is no Church of magic. Between the magician and the individuals who consult him, as between these individuals themselves, there are no lasting bonds which make them members of the same moral community, comparable to that formed by believers in the same god The magician has a clientele and not a Church, and it is very possible that his clients have no other relations between each other, or even do not know each other; even the relations they have with him are generally accidental and transient, they are just like those of a sick man with his physician. It is true that in certain cases, magicians form societies among themselves But what is especially important is that when these societies of magic are formed, they do not include all the adherents to magic, but only the magicians; the laymen ... are excluded A Church is not a fraternity of priests; it is a moral community formed by all the believers in a single faith, laymen as well as priests. But Magic lacks any such community.

MAGICAL AND RELIGIOUS CULTS

We have given so much attention to the distinction between religion and magic because it plays a vital role, not only in many later chapters, but in helping us here to distinguish among our three varieties of cults. Briefly put, some cults deal only in magic, although only cult movements deal in religion.

Audience cults are preoccupied with simple mythology and with only very weak forms of magic. To attend a film such as *In Search of Ancient Astronauts*, which presents the theories of Erich von Daniken, is to confront magical claims about the history of civilization (Bainbridge, 1978a). But the film provides no grand explanation of the meaning of life and does not offer compensators for even the most limited rewards. Similarly, Uri Geller may convince people that he has bent a key with psychic energy, but he offers to provide no more useful services with his magic (Randi, 1975).

Client cults deal in serious magic. They exchange specific compensators for rewards of substantial value. Astrologers do not offer access to heaven, but they claim to be able to give us valuable advice by reading the heavens. If astrologers really could improve our life chances by telling us the right day to make investments, get married, or stay away from the office, those would indeed be valuable rewards. To the extent that astrologers' clients believe in them, their compensators also have value.

Whether or not they also offer magic, cult movements provide religion. Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church does explain the meaning of the universe and instructs us how to gain everlasting life. The same is true of the Divine Light Mission of Gum Maharaji.

That only some cults are full-fledged religions helps us understand why disputes so often arise over the religious status of many deviant groups. Scientology and Synanon are both embroiled in a series of court cases in which they seek to be considered religions; Transcendental Meditation recently lost a court case in which it tried to resist classification as a religion (see Chapter 13). Part of this dispute concerns the fact that many cult groups are not (or not yet) religions and this makes it confusing to determine which ones are. A second reason is that, because cults are not merely deviant religions, but new religions (at least new to the society in question), the conventional definitions of religion does not automatically apply to them. When a sect breaks away from a church, it takes with it the label "religion." But cults are not born with the religious label attached. To identify which cults are religious requires examination to determine whether they offer general or only specific compensators.

It must not be supposed, however, that what is only a client cult today will necessarily be one tomorrow. Just as sects are sometimes transformed into churches, so magical cults are often transformed into religions. In later chapters, we inquire more deeply into why this occurs. Here two examples suffice to demonstrate the point: Scientology (Wallis, 1976) and The Process (Bainbridge, 1978c). Both groups began as limited psychotherapy services. Because they were culturally novel and were not based on any body of verified scientific research, they were magical client cults rather than technical medical services. As the years passed, both began offering compensators that were more and more general and for which no equivalent rewards existed. Their ideologies ramified into complex systems of ultimate meaning. Both became highly developed cult movements.

Within our conceptual framework, we can also apply to cults many of the ideas originally developed in understanding sects and churches. For example, we can discuss the degree of tension that a cult experiences with the surrounding society. It would appear that cults can enjoy relatively low tension with their environment as long as they do not organize into religious movements. Participating in cult audiences seems to be a very low risk activity. A 1976 Gallup poll suggests that 22 percent of Americans believe in astrology, and astrology columns and publications flourish. But very little flak is directed toward astrology. In general, the clergy of American churches seem to ignore the astrology cult. At most, persons who participate in audience cults may risk censure from those immediately around them.

Client cults, too, do not provoke great hostility in the surrounding socio-cultural environment. As long as they do not run afoul of fraud statutes (by selling building lots on a fictitious planet, for example) or licensing statutes governing medical practice, they are not subject to much harassment. Client cults usually do not serve a low status market, if for no other reason than they charge for their services. Consequently, client cults also seem to be somewhat protected by the high status of their clientele. For example, the spiritualists primarily have drawn on a middle-class and upper-class clientele, as do most of today's personal adjustment cults. This clientele seems to have lent them considerable protection from opposition.

It is when cults become religious movements that their environment heats up. For example, as Scientology evolved from a client cult to a movement seeking major commitment from members, its legal troubles grew. In similar fashion, Transcendental Meditation took little heat so long as it concentrated on teaching clients to meditate during a few training sessions. With its transformation into an intense religious movement - amid claims that advanced members could fly (levitate) public reaction has grown. It is cult movements, not client cults or

audiences, that today face opposition from irate parents who hire deprogrammers to kidnap their children from the bosom of the cult.

Among cult movements, the more a cult mobilizes its membership, the greater the opposition it engenders. Cults whose members remain in the society to pursue normal lives and occupations engender much less opposition than do cults whose members drop everything and become fulltime converts. In part, this is probably because cults that function as total institutions rupture converts' ties to conventional institutions, which generates personal grievances against the movement. It is one thing to think your son or daughter, for example, attends a weird church and has odd beliefs, but it is something else to lose contact with a child who takes up full-time participation in an alien faith. Indeed, Catholic parents often find it painful to lose a child to a convent or monastery, even though the question of deviant faith is not at issue. Thus, the rule seems to be, the more total the movement, the more total the opposition to it.

CONCLUSION

Concepts must not only facilitate theorizing; they ought to inspire it. Concepts should identify a phenomenon that arouses our interest and should present a clear enough picture of the phenomenon's variation that we are prompted to explain it. We believe the conceptual scheme we have developed encourages such theory construction. Some basic questions are thrown into relief by these particular formulations and they must be answered by any adequate theory of religious movements.

The most obvious task is to seek a set of premises from which a theory of religious schism can be deduced. Why and under what conditions do factions form in a religious group? Why and when do these result in the splitting off of a sect movement or church movement? Under what conditions do schismatic forces produce secular rather than religious movements? This last question reminds us that we must theorize not merely about the internal workings of religious bodies, but also about their external environment. Thus, for example, we need to know not only how sects form within a parent body, but the social conditions under which religious schisms are more and less likely.

In posing these questions, we are permitted, by our concepts, to avoid the assumption that sects split off from churches. We are directed, instead, to the problem of faction and exodus in any kind of religious body. This is important because the historical record makes it clear that sect formation is probably more common within bodies that are themselves sects rather than churches. It also permits analysis of schismatic movements originating in cults, just

as it lets us deal with church movements that have split off from sects or cults. Instead of converting these alternatives into un-ideal types, our conceptual scheme makes it possible to construct propositions to account for these variations.

Our concepts make it clear that a theory of religious schism pertains to only some religious movements. Cults are not the result of schism (although, once founded, cults become subject to schism). Therefore, a theory of cult formation may have very few propositions in common with a theory of religious schism (a term to be preferred to sect formation because it is more inclusive). We must explain when the socio-cultural environment is conducive to cult formation and why. We must also specify the process by which people actually form a cult, and we must explain the contingencies governing importation of cults.

The next requirement is for a theory of development and transformation. Once a sect or cult is formed, what contingencies govern whether it will grow, stall, or fail? What factors operate to push it in a churchlike direction, toward lower tension? What factors push toward higher tension?

Finally, we must close the circle by showing how and to what extent the factors involved in the formation of religious groups influence their development and transformation and how these in turn are involved in the onset of schism and of cult formation and importation. This is, of course, a formidable list. But, given clear concepts, it is at least possible to see where to begin. In later chapters, we attempt at least partial answers to many of these questions.