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Bart Duriez & Dirk Hutsebaut
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Abstract
Recently, Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten and Hutsebaut (2003) have shown that the Post-Critical
Belief Scale (PCBS; Duriez, Fontaine & Hutsebaut, 2000) captures the two orthogonal bipolar
dimensions of Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic along which
Wulff (1991, 1997) organized the various possible approaches to religion. This chapter outlines
the original and valuable contribution of the PCBS to the psychology of religion. In addition, this
chapter provides additional evidence from 9 different samples (total N = 2657) gathered in
Flanders (Belgium) of the fact that its internal structure can truly be represented in terms of the
dimensions of Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic. Finally, this
chapter reviews the results of the research that has been conducted so far on the external
relationships of these two dimensions.
2
Introduction
In the early 1960s, a guy called Zimmerman wrote a song called The times they are a-changin'.
Meanwhile, times have changed. More than ever, we find ourselves exposed to other cultures,
other religions, other politics, other ways of building ethical frameworks, ... Because of this, we
have entered a time of unprecedented thinking and rethinking. A time also in which beliefs about
belief are shaken as never before. We can no longer convince ourselves, let alone others, that our
religious story is the "true" one. Not surprisingly, therefore, there is growing consensus among
philosophers that ideas - including religious ideas - cannot be understood apart from the people
and the language systems that created them (similar ideas can be found among, for instance,
members of the Sea of Faith Network; http://www.sofn.org.uk). It is against this background that
one should interpret the writings of the French philosopher Ricoeur (1970). Ricoeur tried to
answer the question how people can still call themselves religious after taking into account the
criticism of athesm as formulated by, among others, Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud, which has
tried to unveil religion as, respectively, opium for the masses and wishful thinking. Ricoeur
concludes that in order to make it possible for religious contents to stay meaningful in spite of
this criticism, a restorative interpretation is necessary. In this respect, Ricoeur introduced the
concepts of Second Naveté and Post-Critical Belief. Relying on the work of Ricoeur (1970),
Wulff (1991, 1997) recently provided an interesting new perspective on religious attitudes.
According to Wulff, there are four possible approaches to religion, which can be located in a twodimensional
space along two orthogonal bipolar dimensions. We will start this chapter with a
presentation of Wulff's theoretical model of the various possible approaches to religion. Doing so,
we will stress its original and valuable contribution to the field of the psychology of religion. The
presentation of this theoretical model will allow us to easily and comprehensibly introduce the
Post-Critical Belief Scale (PCBS). The PCBS was recently developed by Hutsebaut (1996, 1997)
to measure individual differences in the four approaches to religion which Wulff described. Only
very recently, however, thorough assessments were made of the construct validity of the PCBS.
Duriez, Fontaine and Hutsebaut (2000) have shown that its subscales provide accurate measures
of Wulff's four approaches to religion, and Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten and Hutsebaut (2003) have
shown in 16 samples (total N = 4648) that, once individual differences in acquiescence are
corrected for, two components are sufficient to explain the empirical relations between the PCBS
items and that these two components can be interpretated in terms of the underlying dimensions
of Wulff's conceptual model: Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic.
Next, we will present additional evidence from 9 different samples (total N = 2657) gathered in
Flanders (Belgium) of the fact that the internal structure of the PCBS can indeed be represented
in terms of the dimensions of Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic.
Finally, we will summarize the results of the research that has been conducted so far on the
external relationships of these two dimensions.
Wulff's conceptual model
Relying on the work of Ricoeur (1970), Wulff (1991, 1997) recently provided an
interesting new perspective on religiosity. According to Wulff, all possible attitudes to religion
can be be located in a two-dimensional space along two orthogonal bipolar dimensions. The
vertical axis in this space, the Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence dimension, specifies the
degree to which the objects of religious interest are granted participation in a transcendent reality.
The horizontal axis, the Literal vs. Symbolic dimension, indicates whether religion is interpreted
literally or symbolically. In this way four quadrants are defined, each covering a specific attitude
towards religion: Literal Affirmation, Literal Disaffirmation, Symbolic Disaffirmation (or
3
Reductive Interpretation) and Symbolic Affirmation (or Restorative Interpretation). This
multidimensional theoretical model implies a departure from the established models of religiosity,
such as Allporťs distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic religiousness (e.g., Allport & Ross,
1967) and Batson's quest dimension which was introduced as an extension of this model (Batson,
1976a, 1976b). Although Batson's quest dimension, which refers to an open ended search for the
meaning in religious contents, can be situated at the symbolic end of Wulff's model, Allporťs
dimensions of extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity cannot be situated in this model. Whereas Allport
made a distinction between the underlying motivations of the religiously, Wulff's model is
situated at the level of social cognitions. Therefore, the classification of Allport and Wulff are
logically unrelated. An extrinsic religious person can either deal with religious contents in a
literal way or in a symbolic way. The same is true for an intrinsic religious person. In addition,
Wulff's model can be extended to non-religious persons as well. A non-religious person can
neither be extrinsically religious nor intrinsically religious. However, he can be dealing with
religious contents either in a literal way or in a symbolic way.
Towards a new religiosity measure
Building further on this, Hutsebaut (1996) developed the Post-Critical Belief Scale (PCBS)
to measure the different approaches of religion which Wulff described within a Christian context.
Only recently, however, thorough assessments of its construct validity were made. Duriez et al.
(2000) have shown that its subscales (Orthodoxy, External Critique, Relativism and Second
Naiveté) provide accurate measures of Wulff's four approaches to religion, and Fontaine et al.
(2003) have shown that, once individual differences in acquiescence are corrected for, two
components are sufficient to explain the empirical relations between the PCBS items and that
these two components can be interpreted in terms of Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence
and Literal vs. Symbolic.
According to Fontaine et al. (2003), once individual differences in acquiescence are
corrected for, two components are sufficient to explain the empirical relations between the items
of the PCBS and that these two components can be interpreted in terms of the dimensions
Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic. In this section, first we will
discuss what acquiescence is and why should it be corrected for. Second, we will explain why
Fontaine et al. (2003) have advocated the use of the two components of Exclusion vs. Inclusion
of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic instead of the subscales of Orthodoxy, External
Critique, Relativism and Second Naiveté. Third, we will present additional evidence from 9
different samples (total N = 2657) gathered in Flanders (Belgium) will now be presented, which
will show that the internal structure of the PCBS can truly be represented in terms of the
dimensions of Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic.
Correcting for acquiescence
What is acquiescence and why should it be corrected for? It is important to keep in mind that all
items of the most commonly used 33 item version of the PCBS (see Appendix) are positively
worded, and need to be scored on a 7 point Likert scale (see below). It is also important to keep
in mind that, in the theory of Wulff, Literal Affirmation (as measured by Orthodoxy) and
Symbolic Disaffirmation (as measured by Relativism) are mutually exclusive, and Literal
Disaffirmation (as measured by External Critique) and Symbolic Affirmation (as measured by
Second Naiveté) are mutually exclusive. Hence, theoretically speaking, a high Orthodoxy score
4
should go hand in hand with a low Relativism score (and vice versa) and a high External Critique
score should go hand in hand with a low Second Naiveté score (and vice versa). For each
individual, the mean score on these four subscales should thus equal four (= the neutral point on
the 7 point Likert scale). Obviously, this is not always the case. But what does this mean?
Imagine that the mean score of a certain person equals five. Theoretically speaking, this means
that, for this person, the neutral point is not situated at four but at five. This must mean that this
person tends to agree with all of the items, irrespective of their content. In other words, this
persons makes use of the 7 point Likert scale in an idiosyncratic and unintended way. This can be
adjusted for by a correction for acquiescence. A first step in this correction is to compute a
person's average score (= his neutral point) on the four subscales. A second step is to subtract this
average score from the original scores this person obtained on all 33 items of the PCBS. If
someone obtains an average score of four, then four is subtracted from the item scores. As a
result, the mean score across the four subscales now equals zero. Likewise, if someone obtains an
average score of five on the four subscales, then five is subtracted from all the item scores. As a
result, the mean score across the four subscales now also equals zero. In this way, a common
neutral point is created. For each persons, all 33 item scores are now centered around this neutral
point of zero (with a standard deviation of 1). Deviations from this neutral point on a certain
subscale can now be compared straightforwardly across different persons. Correction for
acquiescence thus implies to compute standardized scores.
Two dimensions vs. four subscales
At this point, one might wonder why Fontaine et al. (2003) have advocated the use of the two
components of Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic instead of the
subscales of Orthodoxy, External Critique, Relativism and Second Naiveté. There are three
reasons for this. First, because of the correction for acquiescence that is done prior to the
extraction of the two components, the scores that are used to represent an individuaľs position in
Wulff's model are no longer infected by differences in acquiescence (see above). Second, using
factor scores instead of the traditional unweighted sum of item scores guarantees a reliability
equal to or greater than that which is obtained by using unweighted sum of item scores (see
Armor, 1974). The reason for this is that, in contrast to unweighted sum score, factor scores allow
items to contribute differentially to a construct. That is, factor scores allow some items to make a
greater contribution to the construct than other items. In this way, the factor scores are based on
all of the items included in the PCBS instead of only on some of them. Hence, the scores that are
derived to represent an individuaľs position in Wulff's model are more reliable and more accurate.
Third, these factor scores allow to disentangle the effects of being religious or not (Exclusion vs.
Inclusion of Transcendence) from the way in which religious contents are processed (either in a
literal or in a symbolical way). This allows to directly test theoretical predictions. In this respect,
it is important to keep in mind that these predictions directly relate to the two main dimension of
this model, and that predictions that relate to the four subscales are only attained by combining
the predictions that relate to these main dimensions. Hence, working with the subscales is a
detour, which becomes unnecessary when provided with the possibility to directly assess the
underlying dimensions. At the same time, people who are interested in the results that would have
been obtained when using the four subscales can easily compute these results from the results
obtained with the two factor scores (as was illustrated by Duriez, in press-a).
5
Internal structure Samples. In total, 9 different samples were gathered in Flanders (Belgium).
Table 1 lists some descriptive statistics of these samples, including sample type, number of
participants, sex, and mean age of the participants. Participants in the adolescent samples (sample
1, 2 and 3) were pupils from a secondary school who were contacted by an undergraduate student.
Participants in one of the student samples (sample 4) followed an introductory psychology course
at a large Belgian university. In the other student sample (sample 5), half of the participants
followed an introductory psychology course, and each of these participants was instructed to
recruit a university student of the same age but from the opposite sex. Participants in one of the
adult samples (sample 6) were recruited by the undergraduate students from sample 5 who were
instructed to ask their parents to participate. In those cases where this was impossible, they were
instructed to recruit adult of the same age and the same sex as their parents. Participants in the
other adult samples (sample 7, 8 and 9) were recruited by the undergraduate students who used
the data that were included in this study for their master thesis.
All participants had Belgian nationality and belonged to the Flemish-speaking part of the
country. In Belgium, Roman Catholicism is the dominant religion, and although only about 10%
of the Belgians attend church services regularly, about 90% is baptized by the Roman Catholics.
So all of the participants were either Roman Catholics (and hence Christian) or had a fair
knowledge of Roman Catholic doctrines and customs (and Christianity). Participants having over
three missing values were excluded from further analyses. In total, 48 participants needed to be
removed across the different samples. For participants which were not removed, missing values
were replaced by the sample-specific mean of the item. In total, 174 missing values were replaced.
Measures. Participants completed the 33 item Post-Critical Belief Scale (PCBS; Duriez et al.,
2000). All items were scored on a 7-point Likert scale (1=completely opposed, 4=neutral,
7=completely in agreement). In the Appendix, the 33 items are listed by subscale (i.e., Orthodoxy,
External Critique, Relativism and Second Naiveté). Each item is given a label that allows its
identification in the tables and figures presented throughout this article, as well as a label that
indicates its position in the PCBS. In line with the procedure described above, a level of
acquiescence estimation was subtracted from the raw scores (see also Fontaine et al., 2003).
Results. The question that needs to be answered is whether two underlying dimensions are
sufficient to account for the relations between the items of the PCBS, and, if this is the case,
whether these dimensions can be interpreted in terms of Exclusion vs. Inclusion of
Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic. To answer the question whether two dimensions are
sufficient to account for the relations between the items of the PCBS, principal component
analyses (PCA) were performed. In this way, the adequate number of components was
investigated in each sample separately. In line with Fontaine et al. (2003), the scree test (Cattell,
1966) pointed to a two-componential solution for all samples (see Table 2 for the eigenvalues of
the first six components). In line with Fontaine et al. (2003), this solution accounted, on average,
for about 35% of the total variance in each sample (see Table 2).
The analyses reported above indicate that two dimensions are sufficient to account for the
relationships between the items of the PCBS. The question that remains is whether these
dimensions can be interpreted in terms of Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal
vs. Symbolic. To answer this questions, orthogonal Procrustes rotation were performed (McCrae,
Zonderman, Costa & Bond, 1996; Schonemann, 1966). For each sample, the obtained twocomponential
configuration was orthogonally rotated towards the average two-componential
structure reported by Fontaine et al. (2003) (see Table 3 and Figure 1). In line with Fontaine et al.
(2003), the results indicate that, in all of the samples, the two components can be interpreted as
Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic respectively. For both
6
Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. symbolic, with only one small exception,
Tucker's phi's were above .90 (see Table 2), suggesting good congruence (Bentler & Bonett, 1980;
Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). In all samples, estimates of internal consistency (theta; Armor,
1974) were above .80 for both Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic
(see Table 2).
Discussion. The analyses reported above show that there are two dimensions that explain a
significant amount of variance in the responses to the items of the PCBS, that these are sufficient
to account for the relations between the items of the PCBS, and that they can be interpreted in
terms of Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic. These findings
replicate the findings of Fontaine et al. (2003), and support the claim that an individuaľs position
in Wulff's model can be represented on the bases of two factor scores. A high score on Exclusion
vs. Inclusion of Transcendence indicates a tendency to include transcendence. A high score on
Literal vs. Symbolic indicates a tendency to deal with religion in a symbolic way. These factor
scores allow researchers to disentangle the effects of being religious or not (Exclusion vs.
Inclusion of Transcendence) from the way in which religion and religious contents are processed
(either in a literal or in a symbolical way). This allows to identify the antecedents and
consequences of both of these dimensions.
External relations
Although the results that are presented in this chapter are limited to the internal structure of
the PCBS, a number of studies that yield support for its external validity have been conducted as
well. Results of these studies show that, when disentangling the effects of being religious or not
(Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence) from the way in which religious contents are
processed (either in a literal or in a symbolical way), both the dimensions of Exclusion vs.
Inclusion of Transcendence and of Literal vs. Symbolic relate in a theoretically meaningful way
to a number of external variables. In the remainder of this section, some of these results will be
summarized (other results can be found on our homepage:
http://www.psy.kuleuven.ac.be/religion). In this way, we will demonstrate the value and utility of
the PCBS vis  vis some important debates in the psychology of religion.
Personality Traits
A first debate within the psychology of religion is whether there is a relation between religiosity
and personality, and if so, which personality traits are related to religiosity. Early research into
this relation using Eysenck's three-dimensional personality model (PEN; Psychoticism,
Extraversion and Neuroticism) (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968, 1985) confirmed the hypothesis that
religiosity corresponds, at least to some extent, to individual differences in personality traits.
Although some authors failed to find a link between religious attitudes and personality, a series of
studies in a variety of cultures and denominations converged on the conclusion that religious
people tend to be lower in Psychoticism. Regarding Extraversion and Neuroticism, no such
convergence was reached. Different studies yielded inconsistent results, leading to the conclusion
that these factors are unrelated to religiosity (for recent overviews, see Duriez, Soenens & Beyers,
in press; Saroglou, 2002a; Saroglou & Jaspard, 2000). Recently, Costa and McCrae (1978, 1992)
presented the Five Factor Model of personality (FFM; Extraversion, Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, Openness to Experience). This model can be regarded as an
extension of Eysenck's model, with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness providing a twodimensional
view of low Psychoticism and Openness to Experience constituting a new element.
7
Positive relations wih Agreeableness and Conscientiousness were found. However, these
relations are typically low, and sometimes even absent. Regarding the other factors, no clear
relation with religiosity emerged (for recent overviews, see Duriez, Soenens & Beyers, in press;
Saroglou, 2002a; Saroglou & Jaspard, 2000). In spite of this, McCrae (1999) has urged attention
to Openness to Experience in order to understand religiosity. Individuals high in Openness to
Experience can be characterized by an active motivation to seek out the unfamiliar, which goes
hand in hand with tolerance of ambiguity and open-mindedness, and which leads them to endorse
liberal values (McCrae, 1996). Hence, Openness to Experience is considered highly relevant
towards social attitudes and ideologies. The importance of Openness to Experience towards
religiosity was supported by Streyffeler and McNally (1998), who found fundamentalist and
liberal Protestants to differ with respect to this factor only, and by Saucier (2000), who found
Openness to Experience to relate negatively to alphaism (a broad social attitude dimension which
is comprised of, among other things, conventional religion).
In line with all this, whereas Duriez, Soenens and Beyers (in press) expected Openness to
Experience to be only modestly related to being religious or not, and hence to be only modestly
related to Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence, they expected it to be very important to
understand the way in which people process religious contents, and hence to be strongly related
to Literal vs. Symbolic. The hypothesized importance of Openness to Experience was confirmed
in a late adolescent sample. Additionally, a positive relation between Agreeableness and Literal
vs. Symbolic was found. This finding was in line with McCrae (1999), who argued that, just like
Openness to Experience, although to a lesser extent, Agreeableness is relevant to social attitudes
and ideologies, and that, as a consequence, a similar pattern of relations with social attitudes and
ideologies might be expected. The other personality dimensions (Extraversion, Conscientiousness
and Neuroticism) were found to be unrelated to both Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence
and Literal vs. Symbolic. And although Duriez & Soenens (2003a) have shown that the relations
between the religiosity dimension and these personality factors may fluctuate quite a bit across
different samples, the positive relation of Literal vs. Symbolic with both Openness to Experience
and Agreeableness appeard to be highly stable. Value Orientations
A second debate within the psychology of religion is whether there is a relationship
between religiosity and values, and if so, which values are related to religiosity. The empirical
study of religiosity-value relations has to be credited to Rokeach (1968) who asked subjects to
rank a number of values and compared religious and non-religious subjects with respect to the
average rank order. He found religious subjects to rank certain values (e.g., salvation, forgiveness
& obedience) higher and other values (e.g., independence, pleasure, intellectual & logical) lower
than non-religious subjects. Most of the research on the religiosity-value relation was inspired by
this approach. However, because values are treated as isolated entities, the multitude of relations
leads to poorly organized results.
A solution to this problem was proposed by Schwartz (1992), who has shown that, within
the value domain, ten value types (Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, Universalism,
Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, Security, Power and Achievement) can be distinguished.
When represented in a two-dimensional space, these value types are organized in a circular
fashion, with value types with compatible goals being positively related and emerging adjacent to
one another, and value types with conflicting goals being negatively related and emerging
opposite one another. In total, Schwartz (1992) identified three main conflicts within this value
structure. The first is a conflict between Openness to Change and Conservation, which opposes
value types referring to novelty and personal autonomy (Stimulation & Self-direction) to value
types leading to stability, certainty and social order (Tradition, Conformity & Security). The
8
second is a conflict between Self-Enhancement and Self-Transcendence, which opposes value
types referring to the pursuit of selfish interests (Achievement & Power) to value types
promoting the welfare of both close and distant others (Benevolence & Universalism). The third
is a conflict between values referring to the gratification of one's desires (Hedonism) and values
implying self-restraint and the acceptance of external limits (Tradition & Conformity). Fontaine,
Duriez, Luyten, Corveleyn and Hutsebaut (2003) have shown that the value pattern associated
with Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence is characterized by a conflict between Hedonism,
Stimulation and Self-Direction on the one hand, and Tradition and Conformity on the other hand.
These findings largely replicate the findings of Schwartz and Huismans (1995) and Saroglou,
Delpierre and Dermelle (in press) and suggest that a dependence-autonomy rather than a
Conservation vs. Openness conflict seems to be the central intra-personal conflict concerning
religiosity. Importantly, the value pattern associated with Exclusion vs. Inclusion of
Transcendence showed virtually no correspondence with the Self-Enhancement vs. SelfTranscendence
conflict. In contrast, the value pattern associated with Literal vs. Symbolic could
almost perfectly be described in terms of the latter conflict. Apparently, whereas being religious
as such does not seem to make a person more sensitive for the well-being of others, dealing with
religion in a symbolic way does.
Conservative Beliefs
In a somewhat related vain, the psychology of religion has also been concerned with the
relation between religiosity and conservative beliefs. In the past, researchers often assumed that
political parties and political attitudes could be arrayed on a single left-right dimension (e.g.
Lipset, 1960; McClosky, 1958). However, more recently it has been argued that the meaning of
this dimension varies across nations and over time and is thus often insufficient to represent the
relevant political dimensions in a given society (e.g., Inglehart, 1990; Rokeach, 1973).
Middendorp (1978), for instance, analyzed the ideological components of basic political conflicts
and distinguished two unrelated dimensions rather than one. The first was labeled cultural
conservatism vs. progressivism and concerns individual rights and readiness for social change.
Cultural conservatives are concerned with maintaining discipline in people's lives, especially
within the family (e.g., by making divorce difficult and by tightening controls over abortion and
euthanasia), and are in favor of a harsh upbringing and traditional sex-roles. The second was
labeled economic conservatism vs. progressivism and concerns the desirable level of economic
equality among people as well as the desirability of trade unions and governmental interference
in economics, with economic conservatives opposing economic equality, trade unions and
governmental interference in the economic sphere. The distinction between Cultural and
Economic Conservatism is similar to the distinction between social and economic conservatism
(Lipset, 1981) and between social traditionalism and economic conservatism (Johnson & Tamney,
2001). In this respect, Duriez (2003a) has shown that, whereas Cultural Conservatism relates to
both the Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and the Literal vs. Symbolic dimension,
Economic Conservatism is unrelated to these dimensions. As far as Exclusion vs. Inclusion of
Transcendence is concerned, these results are in line with studies that reported a strong
relationship between Cultural Conservatism and religiosity, as well as with studies that reported
Economic Conservatism to be independent of religiosity (for a recent overview, see Duriez,
2003a). As far as Literal vs. Symbolic is concerned, these results are in line with studies that have
shown that Literal vs. Symbolic and Cultural Conservatism are both related to dogmatism,
closed-mindedness and intolerance of ambiguity (for a recent overview, see Duriez, 2003a), as
well as with the reasoning that pragmatism prevents economic conservatives both from being
9
intolerant towards people with different worldviews and from reflecting about the symbolic
meaning of religious language (see Johnson & Tamney, 2001).
Prejudice
The religiosity-prejudice relation is probably the most important paradox within the
psychology of religion. Whereas all world religions proclaim brotherly love, history is littered
with moments in which religion has provided a justification for, or has given cause to, atrocities
directed towards people from a different religion, a different culture, a different race, a different
sex, or a different sexual orientation. A number of historians and theologians concluded from this
that religion should be considered as a catalyst for prejudice and intolerance, and a lot of
psychological and sociological research has been carried out to investigate this (for a recent
research overview, see Duriez, in press-a). In this respect, Duriez (in press-a, Duriez, Appel &
Hutsebaut, in press) has recently shown that Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence is not
related to racial prejudice. In sharp contrast, the Literal vs. Symbolic dimension is highly
negatively related to racial prejudice. These findings are compatible with earlier research, which
has shown that there is no clear relation between being religious or not and being prejudiced or
not, but that this is dependent upon how people deal with religion. More specifically, the present
findings suggest that what seems to be crucially important is not so much whether one is religious
or not, but the way in which religious contents are processed. If religious contents are processed
in a literal fashion, one is more likely to be intolerant against people of a different race and / or
culture. In contrast, if religious contents are processed symbolically, one is unlikely to hold racist
attitudes. Hence, these results contribute to the debate whether religious people are more inclined
to hold racist opinions. When the way in which religious contents are processed is taken into
account, the impact of being religious or not is trivial. This implies that the danger of religious
fundamentalism does not lie in religion as such but in the cognitive style that is applied when
processing religious issues.
This is in line with the reasoning of Altemeyer (2003), who has argued that the relationship
between religious fundamentalism and prejudice should be accounted for by a general attitude
towards whatever belief one holds, rather than in terms of particular religious beliefs. According
to Altemeyer, religious fundamentalists are characterized by two important tendencies: The
tendency to show heightened identification with what they perceive to be the religious in-group
and the tendency to show heightened rejection of what they perceive to be the religious out-group.
Following this reasoning, it can be argued that Religious Fundamentalism (= RF) can also be
displayed by non-religious people. Some non-religious people, namely those that process
religious isses in a literal and closed-minded way, can be expected to show these very same
tendencies. The only difference between religious and non-religious RF would then be the nature
of the in-group. Whereas, for religious RF, the in-group will be the own denomination, for nonreligious
RF the in-group will be the group of atheists. From this perspective, both religious and
non-religious RF can be expected to go hand in hand with a racial prejudice that is grounded in
RF. For instance, when thinking of immigrants, people in Western Europe spontaneously think of
Muslims. This group of people is especially likely to become a target of RF. They will be a target
of non-religious RF because of their religiousness, and of religious RF because of the fact that
they belong to a distinctly non-Catholic (and even non-Christian) denomination. Duriez (in pressa)
has shown that this religious ethnocentrism cannot be reduced to differences in
authoritarianism or to differences in empathy and perspective taking capacity (see below).
10
Authoritarianism
Two research lines have dominated the quest for the antecedents of prejudice. The first has
viewed prejudice as resulting from group processes (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The second has
regarded it as a results of dispositional factors making people more or less likely to adopt
prejudice (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1981; Pratto,
Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994). The latter approach received support from research that
demonstrated the generality of prejudice. That is, people that are unfavorable to one outgroup
tend to be unfavorable to other outgroups (e.g., Duckitt, 1992). This generality principle has been
interpreted as suggesting stable individual differences, such as personality characteristics or
enduring beliefs, that predispose people to adopt prejudice. Two individual difference dimensions
have received empirical support. The first ­ the authoritarian personality ­ was introduced by
Adorno et al (1950), and was reconceptualized to Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) by
Altemeyer (1981). RWA can be defined as the covariation of (1) a strict adherence to
conventional norms and values (conventionalism), (2) an uncritical subjection to authority
(authoritarian submission), and (3) feelings of aggression towards norm violators (authoritarian
aggression). The second ­ the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) ­ was introduced by Pratto et
al. (1994) as a dimension which delineates the extent to which one desires the ingroup to
dominate outgroups. And although, according to Altemeyer (1998), RWA and SDO constitute
two faces of the authoritarian personality, with RWA referring to authoritarian submission and
SDO referring to authoritarian dominance, research has shown that both constructs have a
different genesis and are powerful but relatively independent predictors of prejudice (Duckitt,
2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; Duriez, Van Hiel & Kossowska, in press;
Van Hiel, Pandelaere & Duriez, in press). Among other things, Duriez and Van Hiel (2002)
focussed on the relation between the PCBS and both RWA and SDO. The results of their
analyses suggest that, whereas Literal vs. Symbolic relates to both RWA and SDO, Exclusion vs.
Inclusion of Transcendence relates to RWA but not to SDO. These findings support previous
research which has shown that fundamentalism is typical of authoritarianism (e.g., Altemeyer,
1996) and that religiosity is typical of RWA but not of SDO (Altemeyer, 1998; Saucier, 2000;
Van Hiel and Mervielde, 2002). It is important to note that, according to some researchers, three
factors can be discerned in the RWA scale: Punitive authority, sexual morality, and rejecting
dissent. The religiosity-RWA relation would primarily be caused by the sexual morality factor
(see Schluderman, Schluderman, Needham, Mulega & Huynh, 2003). This might explain the
relations between Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and RWA, and would bring the
findings on religiosity and RWA perfectly in line with the findings on racial prejudice.
Altruism and Empathy
Recently, McFarland (2001) made an extensive review of all the known individual
differences that correlate with one or more forms of prejudice, and set up a series of studies to
identify the most important prejudice dispositions. According to McFarland (2001), apart from
RWA and SDO, a third important prejudice disposition is constituted by lack of empathy. In line
with these findings, Batson (1983) has argued that empathy mediates a kin-specific altruistic
impulse that is part of the human genetic heritage, and that one of the functions of religion is to
extend the range of this altruistic impulse far beyond the kinship circle. Religion achieves this
goal through the use of kinship language and imagery: By teaching that we are all children of
God, religion enhances an altruistic impulse that is already present, extending it from the kinship
circle to human kind in general. However, it is clear that religion does not always succeed in this
(see above). In this respect, Duriez (in press-b) focussed on empathy because it is considered
11
fundamental to altruism and helping behaviour (e.g., Batson, 1991, 1998). It was shown that,
whereas empathy is unrelated to Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence, it is positively related
to Literal vs. Symbolic. These results contribute a great deal to the debate whether religious
people are nicer people, in the sense that they are more inclined to feel empathy towards their
fellow men and, hence, are more likely to provide help to a person in need. The answer is no. The
present study shows that, apparently, this debate has its origin in the fact that the religiosity
measures that have been used in previous studies confuse being religious or not with the way in
which religion contents are processed. When separating both aspects, religiosity as such has no
connection with empathy whatsoever. In contrast, the way in which religion contents are
processed tells a great deal about whether or not one is likely to experience feelings of empathy
and, hence, to expose helping behaviour. These findings are in line with the findings reported
earlier on the relation between the religiosity dimensions and Agreeableness, as well as with the
findings reported on the relation between the religiosity dimensions and both the conflict between
Self-Enhancement and Self-Transcendence values and racial prejudice and authoritarianism.
Morality
Another important topic within the psychology of religion has been the relation between
religiosity and morality. Kohlberg (1981) has argued that religiosity and moral reasoning are
inherently unrelated because they constitute two distinct areas of human concern. Whereas moral
decision making is grounded in rational arguments of justice and is influenced by level of
cognitive development (e.g., education) and exposure to socio-moral experiences (e.g., role
taking opportunities), religious reasoning is based on revelations by religious authorities. Thus,
whereas the primary function of morality would be to resolve competing claims among
individuals, the primary function of religion would be to affirm morality. In other words, whereas
moral reasoning provides moral prescriptions, religious reasoning affirms moral judgment as
meaningful. In spite of Kohlberg's arguments, several researchers have attempted to associate
both concepts and have come to the conclusion that religiosity and morality are not unrelated at
all (for a recent overview, see Duriez, 2003b). However, some researchers (e.g., Wahrman, 1981)
have argued that the apparent religiosity-morality relation can probably be explained by cognitive
processes such as dogmatism. Given the fact that the PCBS allows to disentangle the effects of
being religious or not (Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence) from the way in which
religious contents are processed (either in a literal or in a symbolical way), and given the fact that
the Literal vs. Symbolic dimension relates to dogmatism, closed-mindedness, etc. (for a recent
overview, see Duriez, 2003a), the PCBS allows to directly test this hypothesis.
In this respect, Duriez (2003b) and Duriez and Soenens (2003b) examined the relation
between the PCBS and the Moral Judgment Test (MJT; Lind, 1998). In the MJT, people are
confronted with moral dilemmas. For each dilemma, a person has to indicate to which degree he
agrees with the solution chosen by the main character(s). Next, this person is confronted with six
arguments pro and six arguments contra his opinion on how to solve the dilemma. Each argument
represents one of Kohlberg's (1958) stages of moral reasoning. The sum score a person obtains
for the arguments referring to the same stage indicates the degree to which this person reasons
according to this socio-moral perspectives. In addition, the C-index measures the degree to which
the judgment about these arguments is consistent. A highly morally competent person will
appreciate all arguments referring to a certain socio-moral perspective, irrespective of whether it
is a pro or contra argument., and will obtain a C-index close to 100. A person with low moral
competence will appreciate the pro arguments only and will obtain a C-index close to zero.
12
Results showed that the apparent religiosity-morality relation that was observed in previous
studies can be explained by the way in which people process religious contents. People
processing religious contents in a symbolic way show higher moral competence. In addition,
people processing religious contents in a symbolic way tend to make a sharp distinction between
moral arguments of the lower stages of Kohlberg's model and moral arguments of the higher
stages. In comparison to people that process religious contents in a literal way, they tend to pay
less attention to arguments of the lower stages and more attention to arguments of the higher
stages. In contrast, in all samples, being religious as such was unrelated to both moral attitudes
and moral competence. Results supported the ideas of Kohlberg (1981) who argued that
religiosity and morality are inherently unrelated and the ideas of Wahrman (1981) who argued
that the apparent religiosity-morality relation that was observed in previous studies can be
explained by cognitive processes. Again, these findings are perfectly in line with the findings
reported above on prejudice, authoritarianism, etc.
Cognitive Conservatism
Another important topic within the psychology of religion has been the relation between
religiosity and cognitive conservatism (i.e., intolerance of ambiguity, dogmatism, rigidity, and
need for closure). Kruglanski (1989) argued that knowledge, beliefs and attitudes are arrived at
through the process of a motivated search for information. A central construct in this theory is the
need for nonspecific cognitive closure, which refers to the desire for any firm belief on a given
topic, as opposed to further ambiguity. Though need for closure may vary as a function of the
situation (e.g., Kruglanski & Webster, 1991; Kruglanski, Webster & Klem, 1993), it also
represents a dimension of stable individual differences (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). According
to Kruglanski (1989), the need for closure might spring from various sources. In particular, five
facets are assumed to represent the universe of the construct (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).
Persons with a high need for closure would (1) desire order and structure in their lives, (2) prefer
predictable situations, (3) experience a desire to reach closure which is reflected in the
decisiveness of judgments and choices, (4) experience ambiguous situations devoid of closure as
aversive, and (5) be unwilling to have one's knowledge and beliefs confronted and hence
rendered insecure by inconsistent evidence or alternative opinions. Thus, some people may desire
closure because they value ordered environments, whereas others may seek closure out of a
concern for predictability, decisiveness, ambiguity avoidance, or sticking to their own knowledge,
belief or opinion. Of course, closure may be desired for more than one reason. Hence, the
different facets are considered additive in their impact on the total need for closure (Kruglanski et
al., 1997).
Previous research suggest that at least some of the need for closure facets, and related
constructs, are positively related to religiosity. In this respect, no matter how it was measured,
religiosity has been related to intolerance of ambiguity, dogmatism and rigidity. However, these
relations are not always very strong. Some studies even suggest that religiosity is independent of
intolerance of ambiguity, dogmatism and rigidity (for recent overviews, see Duriez, 2003c;
Saroglou, 2002b). Some studies seem to suggest that the way in which religion is perceived and
treated might be more important than religiosity as such. Feather (1967), for instance, did find a
relation between religious affiliation and intolerance of ambiguity and dogmatism, but this
relation was obscured by the kind of religious affiliation, with members of fundamentalist groups
obtaining higher intolerance of ambiguity and dogmatism scores than members of liberal
religious groups (cf. Glass, 1971). In a similar vain, Stanley (1963) argued that it is
fundamentalism that represents the religious manifestation of the closed mind, and Pargament et
13
al. (1985) argued that churches may selectively attract and keep members with and / or shape
members towards varying levels of tolerance of ambiguity.
In line with these findings, Duriez (2003c) hypothesized that, rather than religion per se,
dealing with religious contents in a fundamentalist, dogmatic, literal way constitutes the real
threat to reason. Hence, he expected need for closure to relate to Literal vs. Symbolic, rather than
to Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence. However, both religiosity dimensions appeared to
relate to need for closure (cf. Saroglou, 2002b). In spite of this apparent similarity, a closer look
at the data revealed that both relgiosity dimensions related to different facets of need for closure.
Apparently, religious people have a higher need for closure than people who are less religious
because they desire an ordered and predictable environment. This suggests some instrumentality
of religion, which is in line with the point of view that religion, by offering a global worldview
and a moral program, reduces the complexity of life and creates a psychologically safe
environment (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). In contrast, people who deal with religious contents
in a literal way have a higher need for closure than people who deal with religious content in a
symbolical way because they need to avoid ambiguity or are unwilling to have their beliefs
confronted by alternative opinions. Thus, apparently, whereas religious belief as such seem
associated with a mere preference for order and structure as well as predictability, it is those who
deal with religious content in a literal way who are uncapable of dealing with alternative opinions.
Identity
Finally, another (potentially) important topic within the psychology of religion concerns the
relation between religiosity and identity development. According to Erikson (1968), the primary
developmental task of adolescence is the formation of a personal identity. In the process of
searching and exploring one's identity, the adolescent is thought to develop a personal view on
issues of political, philosophical and religious nature. Therefore, an important question is whether
differences in identity development relate to the acquisition of religious beliefs. In spite of this,
research addressing the relation between religiosity and identity development is limited, and all
of these studies have relied on Marcia's (1966) identity status paradigm (for an overview, see
Duriez, Soenens & Beyer, in press) Although this paradigm has proven its utility in empirical
research (Marcia, 1980), it has been criticized for treating identity statuses as dispositional
outcome variables (e.g., Côté & Levine, 1988; van Hoof, 1999).
In an attempt to conceptualize individual differences in identity development in a more
process-oriented way, Berzonsky (1990, 1992) proposed three identity styles or ways of
processing information and of coping with problems that typically arise in identity crises during
adolescence: The informational, the normative, and the diffuse / avoidant identity style.
Information oriented individuals deal with identity issues by actively seeking out, processing and
utilizing identity relevant information. When confronted with information that is dissonant with
their self-conceptions, adolescents will revise and accommodate their self-perceptions. Normative
oriented individuals focus on the normative expectations and prescriptions held up by significant
others (e.g., parents or authority figures) and reference groups (e.g., a certain religious tradition),
and adhere rigidly to their identity structures, into which they assimilate all identity-relevant
information. Finally, diffuse / avoidant oriented individuals procrastinate decisions about and
one's identity, which results in a fragmented and loosely integrated identity structure.
Analyses revealed relatively stable relations between the identity styles and the religiosity
dimensions (Duriez, Soenens & Beyer, in press; Duriez & Soenens, 2003a). First, adolescents
who use an informational identity style tend to interpret religious contents in a personal and
symbolic way. This confirms the idea that information oriented adolescents critically evaluate
14
whether certain religious contents correspond to their personal self-definitions (Berzonsky, 1990).
Second, a negative relation was found between adolescents' use of a diffuse / avoidant identity
style and Literal vs. Symbolic. Based on the theory of Berzonsky (1990), adolescents using this
identity style are indeed thought to interpret religious contents in a literal way because they are
likely to avoid questioning difficult and personal issues such as religion. Third, late adolescents
who use a normative identity style were found to be more religious, at least in a context that is
characterized by a strong religious tradition. In addition, they also showed a slight but nonsignificant
tendency to interpret religious contents in a literal way. This confirms the theory of
Berzonsky (1990), which claims that adolescents using a normative oriented identity style are
likely to rely on and conform to the prescriptions and standards of significant others, reference
groups, authorities, and traditions.
Conclusion
The analyses reported in this chapter substantiate the claim that the Post-Critical Belief Scale can
be used to disentangle the effects of being religious or not (Exclusion vs. Inclusion of
Transcendence) from the way in which religion and religious contents are processed (either in a
literal or in a symbolical way). In this way, the Post-Critical Belief Scale is an extremely valuable
instrument to shed a new light in some important debates in the field of the psychology of
religion.
Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence
Religious people are neither more nor less (1) likely to have specific personality traits, (2)
inclined to hold prejudiced or social dominant attitudes, (3) likely to feel empathy towards fellow
human beings, and (4) to attain higher levels of moral competence. However, religious people are
less likely to attach importance to Hedonism, Stimulation and Self-Direction values and more
likely to attach importance to Tradition and Conformity values. In line with this, they are more
likely to hold cultural conservative and right-wing authoritarian beliefs, and they are more likely
to prefer order, structure and predictability. In addition, late adolescents who are religious are
more likely to base important choices in life on expectations of parents, authority figures, or
reference groups. In sum, although religious people are not characterized by specific personality
traits, they are characterized by the importance they attach to tradition values, norms and
conventions. This importance might stem from a psychological need for order, structure and
predictability. However, the importance that is attached to traditions is not as such accompanied
by a rejection of people that chose to live their lives according to different standards.
Literal vs. Symbolic
People who process religious contents in a literal way (1) are less likely to be Open to Experience
and less likely to be Agreeable, (2) attach more importance to Self-Enhancement values as
opposed to Self-Transcendence values, (3) are more likely to hold culturally conservative,
prejudiced, right-wing authoritarian and social dominant attitudes, (4) are less likely to feel
empathy towards fellow human beings, (5) are less likely to attain high levels of moral
competence, (6) are more likely to be closed-minded and intolerant of ambiguity, and (7) are less
likely to actively seeking out identity relevant information and are more likely to procrastinate
important choices in life. In sum, those who process religious contents in a literal way,
irrespective of wheter they accept or reject these contents, can be characterized as cold-hearted,
closed-minded and selfish creatures who are out to protect their luxury and their world-view from
15
people that are perceived to belong to (less fortunate) out-groups, and who refuse to question the
status quo and the associated injustices.
16
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