Chapter 10

RELIGION AND MORALITY

> [Religion] makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice. . . . Some people say the only cure for prejudice is more religion; some say the only cure is to abolish religion.[1]
>
> . . . history, down to the present day, is a melancholy record of the horrors which can attend religion: human sacrifice, and in particular the slaughter of children, cannibalism, sensual orgies, abject superstition, hatred as between races, the maintenance of degrading customs, hysteria, bigotry, can all be laid at its charge. Religion is the last refuge of human savagery.[2]
>
> . . . being helpful is a scriptural criterion of true religion (James 1:27), and humans will ultimately be judged on their efforts on behalf of those in need of aid or comfort (Matthew 25:31–46).[3]
>
> At least initially, temperance was part of a new kind of effort to assert the authority of religious ideas in the public sphere, and to regroup religious forces under auspices outside the church.[4]
>
> NO to condom distribution in the schools, NO to taxpayer funding of abortion, NO to sex-education classes in the public schools that promote promiscuity, NO to homosexual adoptions and government-sanctioned gay marriages.[5]

DOES RELIGION DICTATE MORALITY?

Religion has a lot to say about morality. Christians, Jews, Buddhists, Muslims, and Hindus may not agree on the nature of God, or on religious rituals and teachings, but they do tend to agree about moral issues. In fact, when it comes to ethics, major world religions are amazingly consistent in their teachings about right and wrong, especially concerning murder, stealing, and adultery. In Christianity, this distilled essence of morality is captured by the Ten Commandments. And all major world religions seem to teach some version of "Do unto others what you would have them do unto you."

Persons with a proreligious orientation would be inclined to argue that religion has tremendous potential to improve our world by teaching an ethical system that would benefit all of us. In fact, the theologies of such diverse religious bodies as Buddhists, Christians, and Jews have claimed that faith and morality are inseparable.[6] And some groups, such as the conservative "Christian Coalition" in the United States, are apparently "eager to impose what it sees as a Bible-backed morality on the American public at large."[7] On the other hand, some

people are not convinced that religion holds the key to morality in the world, and they may argue that it can actually cause problems.

Religion as "Good"

We can all think of examples in which religion apparently served or serves as a source of tolerance, helpfulness, and personal and interpersonal integrity. Mother Teresa spends her life in appalling conditions in order to help the poor, the sick, and the downtrodden, in the cause of Christian charity. Martin Luther King faced considerable danger, and was eventually assassinated, in his religiously based fight for equal rights and self-respect for black Americans. Churches also provide money, housing, and social support for refugees from other lands, and soup kitchens and halfway houses are sponsored by religious organizations. The list could go on and on.

Religion as "Bad"

On the other hand, many examples can be cited in which religion seemed or seems to have no impact at all, or may even have contributed to dishonesty, intolerance, physical violence, and prejudice. Anti-Semitism is preached openly in some North American pulpits. The Christian-based Ku Klux Klan spreads hatred of blacks, Jews, and Catholics. Many wars and other violent conflicts in today's world are religiously based: Catholics battle Protestants in Northern Ireland; fundamentalist Muslims in the Middle East clash with their nonfundamentalist brethren; Muslims and Christians fight in the former Yugoslavia; Sikhs and Hindus die in violent conflicts in India. Some may well wonder whether religion does not directly contribute to violence and injustice.

Considering the Evidence

Clearly, it would be a mistake to oversimplify these issues and to generalize about "religion" contributing to "morality" or "immorality." Faith is complex, and there are many unique religious groups, orientations, and dimensions that may differentially relate to specific aspects of "right and wrong."

Furthermore, we should not assume that religion has an impact on ethics through the process of "moral development" in childhood and adolescence. We have pointed out in Chapter 2 that Kohlberg thought of moral development as quite distinct from its religious counterpart, and he asserted that we should not assume that religion in any way causes or even contributes to the emergence of morality. Reviews of the literature concerning the acquisition of morality typically make little or no mention of religion in this process.[8]

Quite apart from formal moral development in Kohlbergian or other terms, it has been claimed that religiousness is associated with being a "better person" in numerous ways. In addition to broad moral imperatives such as "love thy neighbor," many religions have specific things to say about various personal issues: honesty and cheating, substance use and abuse, sexual behavior, criminal behavior and delinquency, helping others, and prejudice and discrimination. After a brief discussion of moral attitudes and religion, we explore each of these areas in turn, attempting to determine whether or not religion and "morality" are associated. In the case of helping behavior and prejudice, relationships with religion are especially complex and have been of considerable interest in the psychology-of-religion lit-

erature, possibly because the associations are not always what we might expect. Thus, our coverage of these latter topics is more detailed.

MORAL ATTITUDES

It is not surprising that religion is related to people's attitudes on a host of morality-related issues. Typically, people who are religious (as measured in many different ways) are "more conservative" in their attitudes. In general, those who are more religious show more opposition to abortion,[9] divorce,[10] pornography,[11] Communism,[12] contraception,[13] homosexuality,[14] feminism,[15] nudity in advertising,[16] suicide,[17] euthanasia,[18] amniocentesis,[19] women going topless on beaches,[20] and so on. The highly religious are also more likely to support marriage,[21] capital punishment,[22] traditional sex roles,[23] conservative political parties,[24] more severe criminal sentences,[25] censorship of sex and violence in the mass media,[26] and the like.

However, it is one thing to oppose premarital sex or alcohol use on the basis of religion, and quite another to act consistently with this attitude when the opportunity presents itself. Furthermore, it is possible that one's personal position on ethical issues may differ from one's "public" stance. For example, it has been found that people who personally oppose abortion on moral or religious grounds may actually *favor* legal abortion.[27] Thus, although associations between faith and moral attitudes are informative, they do not always tell us much about religion and moral *behavior*. So we now turn to a survey of several areas of behavior with strong ethical implications, in order to assess the role of religion in people's actions.

MORAL BEHAVIOR

Honesty and Cheating

In light of the emphasis placed on honesty by most religions, we might expect that their adherents would be less likely to lie, cheat, or otherwise deceive others. Of course, this is a difficult issue to study. One can imagine the problems associated with simply asking people how "religious" and how "honest" they are, to see whether the two variables are correlated. For both practical and ethical reasons, it is also not easy to place people in realistic circumstances that provide an opportunity to lie and cheat in order to observe their reactions. First, it is difficult to construct such situations that are realistic and believable to those being studied. Second, to provide an opportunity for people to lie or cheat could violate ethical standards of research, especially since it might be necessary to conceal the true purpose of such research in order to encourage "real-life" responding.

In spite of these problems, some studies have attempted to investigate these personal morality issues. And although we might expect religion to have some impact in reducing dishonesty and cheating among religious persons, the evidence in general suggests that it has little or no impact in this regard.

Early Research

Hartshorne and May investigated a possible link between religiousness and cheating in their massive studies involving some 11,000 school children in the 1920s.[28] They devised ingenious

tests for cheating—for example, by measuring peeking during "eyes-closed" tests, and by checking to see whether students changed their original answers when they were allowed to grade their own exams. In the end, they found essentially no relationship between religion and honesty or cheating. In fact, there was even some tendency for children who attended Sunday school to be less cooperative and helpful. Other early studies, such as that by Hightower, similarly found no relationship between Biblical knowledge on the one hand, and lying and cheating on the other.[29]

More Recent Studies

A 1960 investigation by Goldsen and colleagues even found that 92% of religious college students affirmed that it was morally wrong to cheat, but that 87% of them agreed with the statement "If everyone else cheats, why shouldn't I?"[30] Consistent with this, a 1980s investigation by Spilka and Loffredo reported that 72% of a group of highly religious college students admitted that they had cheated on examinations.[31] And even among Mormons, a group known for its conservative and strict approach to moral issues, 70% of a sample of more than 2,000 adolescents admitted that they had cheated on tests at school.[32]

Other research, involving behavioral measures and diverse samples, has also confirmed that religion does not decrease cheating behavior. Guttman investigated sixth-graders from religious schools in Israel and discovered that religious children indicated some resistance to temptation on a paper-and-pencil test, but were actually more inclined to cheat on a behavioral measure.[33] Smith, Wheeler, and Diener studied undergraduate college students, categorizing them as involved in the "Jesus movement" or as being otherwise religious, nonreligious, or atheistic; no differences emerged among the groups with respect to their tendency to cheat on a class examination when the opportunity was available.[34]

Some studies have found a negative link between religiousness and cheating, but these involved self-reports rather than actual behavioral measures. For example, Grasmick and his colleagues have carried out investigations of the relationship between religion and self-reported admission of the likelihood respondents would cheat on their income taxes (and in one study, commit theft and engage in littering) in the future.[35] There was some tendency for more religious persons to indicate they were less likely to cheat on their taxes (and less likely to litter, but there was no significant relationship for theft). Similarly, in a recent nationwide Dutch survey, ter Voert, Felling, and Peters found that "strong Christian believers" reported holding a stricter moral code with respect to self-interest morality (different forms of cheating).[36] We must be careful in interpreting such findings, however, since they represent self-reports only; as indicated above, what people say they will do is not always consonant with their actual behavior.

Conclusion

In summary, the available research spans a considerable time period (from the 1920s to the present), and has involved many diverse samples and measures. In the end, there is not much evidence from studies of actual behavior to support the position that religious people are somehow more honest, or less likely to lie or cheat, than are their less religious or nonreligious peers. In view of the clear teachings of most faiths on such issues, we are left to ponder why religion does *not* have a significant impact in reducing cheating *behavior*.

Drug and Alcohol Use/Abuse

Religious teachings typically oppose the use and abuse of such substances as alcohol and illicit drugs. One might expect, therefore, that faith would be associated with decreased substance use/abuse. And in fact, the related literature generally does confirm this. Gorsuch and Butler noted this in their survey of studies prior to the mid-1970s,[37] and more recent reviews by Benson and Gorsuch concluded that research since the mid-1970s has quite consistently confirmed the tendency for more religious persons (as defined in many different ways) to be less likely to use and abuse alcohol and drugs.[38]

The range of studies in this area is impressive, focusing variously on alcohol, tobacco, and illicit drugs used for nonmedical purposes (such as cocaine, heroin, amphetamines, barbiturates, and psychedelic substances). Some studies focus on either alcohol *or* "drugs," but many investigate the impact of religion on both. Here we consider the findings of the various studies together, because their results are so similar.

The Negative Relationship between Religion and Substance Use/Abuse

In the early 1980s, Khavari and Harmon analyzed data from almost 5,000 people between the ages of 12 and 85, and concluded that there was a "powerful" negative relationship between religiousness and both alcohol consumption and the use of psychoactive drugs.[39] People who reported that they were "not religious at all" tended to use more tobacco products, marijuana, hashish, and amphetamines, compared with people who considered themselves to be religious. Results such as these seem to suggest that religion somehow contributes to decreased use of a variety of products that have possible negative implications for health.[40]

Similarly, a massive study of over 10,000 youths in Minnesota by Benson and his colleagues found that many indices of religious belief and behavior were negatively related to the use of such drugs as marijuana, LSD, PCP, Quaaludes, and amphetamines.[41] Congruent results were obtained by Perkins in a study of several thousand New York college students between 1982 and 1991.[42]

The Magnitude and Generality of the Relationship. The size of the relationships noted above varies from study to study, but Benson concluded that on average, correlations with alcohol, tobacco, and marijuana use are roughly −.20, and that the corresponding relationships for other illicit drugs are lower.[43] Donahue noted some tendency for the strength of the associations to decline in the 1980s, at least among high school seniors.[44] Although the obtained relationships are fairly weak, they typically remain significant even after the effects of age, gender, race, region, education, income, and other variables are controlled for (see, e.g., studies by Cochran, Beeghley, & Bock[45] and by Benson & Donahue[46]).

Benson has further pointed out that the negative relationship between religion and substance use/abuse has been found in multiple studies of adolescents, college students, and adults, and that it seems to hold for both males and females.[47] With few exceptions, consistent findings have been obtained in diverse parts of the United States,[48] as well as in countries such as Canada,[49] Nigeria,[50] England,[51] Sweden,[52] Israel,[53] Kuwait,[54] and Australia.[55]

New Religions. The negative association between religion and substance use/abuse is not limited to traditional religious groups, as discussed in Chapter 8. Although there is evi-

dence that individuals who become members of cults often have a history of greater drug and alcohol use before joining,[56] research suggests that their subsequent use of these substances often declines, sometimes dramatically (see, e.g., Richardson[57]; Galanter & Buckley[58]). In fact, these sorts of findings led Latkin to suggest that "The study of new religions may provide insights into methods of improving drug treatment programs."[59]

Why Does This Relationship Exist? It is one thing to find an association between variables, and quite another to explain *why* that relationship exists. There are probably many factors involved in the inverse correlation between religion and substance use/abuse, and various theories have been proposed to explain the association.[60] Benson's review of the related empirical literature led him to infer:

> Nearly all of these efforts appeal to the social control function of religion, in which religious institutions and traditions maintain the social order by discouraging deviance, delinquency, and self-destructive behavior. Religion, then, prevents use through a system of norms and values that favor personal restraint.[61]

The impact of reference groups has further been isolated as one means by which religion can influence substance use.[62] It has also been argued that religion has its strongest influence when there is no general social consensus on the acceptability of alcohol and drugs. That is, religious norms may be particularly powerful referents when there is "social dissensus" concerning substance use, since people will then be most likely to look to their religion for guidance.[63]

Benson has argued that in addition to social control mechanisms, religion also decreases alcohol and drug use/abuse indirectly by "promoting environmental and psychological assets that constrain risk-taking."[64] He is referring here to religion's attempts to encourage positive behaviors through family harmony and parental support, by sponsoring prosocial values and social competence. Research is needed to assess the extent to which such indirect mechanisms are effective deterrents to drug and alcohol use/abuse.

There are interesting variations in the relationship between religion and substance use/abuse across faith groups. Cochran, for example, found that for alcohol consumption, this association was strongest for religious bodies that condemn alcohol; faiths that were silent regarding alcohol revealed little influence of religiosity.[65] (See Research Box 10.1 for further details.) In another study, Beeghley, Bock, and Cochran found that when people changed religions, the effects of faith on alcohol consumption were strongest when their new religious group banned the use of alcohol.[66] These findings confirm the importance of religion in the context of reference groups, and also mesh neatly with the important distinction between religiously proscribed and nonproscribed behavior, as conceptualized by Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis[67] and described in more detail in our discussion of religion and prejudice later in this chapter.

The Role of Religion in Prevention and Treatment of Substance Abuse

The many studies that show religion and substance use/abuse to be negatively related might suggest that religion could be incorporated into treatment programs to combat substance abuse. Of course, the studies illustrating this association are correlational in nature, and we cannot assume a cause-and-effect relationship. It is likely that some prevention, treatment, and support programs could benefit from the aspects of religion that combat substance abuse,

Research Box 10.1. Effects of Religiosity and Denomination on Adolescent Self-Reported Alcohol Use (Cochran, 1993)

In this investigation, Cochran sought to assess the possibility that religious proscriptions might vary for different types of alcoholic beverages, and that this might be related to the frequency of use of these beverages. The data base came from an extensive anonymous questionnaire study of 3,065 high school students in three Midwestern states. Personal religiousness was measured by three items that asked how religious respondents were, how important church activities were to them, and what their attitudes were toward alcohol use. They were also asked about the extent to which adults and peers close to them approved or disapproved of alcohol use. Finally, Baptists, Methodists, and Pentecostals were grouped together and contrasted with Catholics, Jews, Episcopalians, Lutherans, Presbyterians, and "nones," under the assumption that the former grouping would be more proscriptive than the latter. Controls were included for age, race, gender, and socioeconomic status.

On the basis of sophisticated regression analyses, Cochran suggested that his findings, combined with those of previous work, led to two important conclusions:

> First, the effects of religiosity vary across faith groups. Where official doctrine proscribes use, the effects are strongest; where doctrine stands mute with regard to use (i.e., the nonproscriptive faith groups), the effects of personal religiosity are attenuated. Second, the effects of religiosity on use vary by beverage type. For alcoholic beverages such as beer and liquor, whose consumption is restricted largely to recreational use, the effects are strongest; for wine, an alcoholic beverage consumed for functional and ceremonial purposes, as well as recreational purposes, the effects of personal religiosity are less evident. (p. 488)

though research is needed to clarify what those specific elements are. Gorsuch has suggested that religion may be especially effective for religious people who want their beliefs to be considered in treatment for substance abuse, if it is within a nurturing, supportive faith context.[68] As Benson laments, the potential of religion has not been recognized in the general prevention and treatment literature on alcohol and drug abuse.[69]

This is not to say that prevention and treatment approaches do not include religious elements. Some programs sponsored by churches rely heavily on a religious perspective. Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) is an organization that has had some success in treating alcoholism over the years;[70] although AA is essentially a secular organization, it has incorporated aspects of religious experience and practices in its treatment program, especially a reliance on a higher power (God) as the source of rehabilitation.[71] However, the specific contribution of religion to such programs, as compared to the contribution of their other features, is difficult to assess. Research is needed that attempts to isolate the extent to which religion actually contributes to the success of prevention and treatment programs, and to show how it might better be incorporated into such attempts to better people's lives.

Caveats

One drawback of the many studies on religion and substance use/abuse is that they typically rely on self-reports of the latter. If, as Batson et al. have suggested, religious persons (espe-

cially the intrinsically oriented) have an inclination toward socially desirable responses,[72] it is possible that they are reporting a kind of ideal image of themselves, rather than an accurate assessment of their actual substance use and abuse. Apparently, few investigators have considered this possibility.

In addition, most of the studies in this area examined religiousness in a very general sense, relying on measures such as church attendance and affiliation. There is evidence that in some specific contexts, the usual negative relationship between religion and substance use/abuse may disappear, or even be reversed. For example, after an extensive survey of more than 18,000 children and parents, Forliti and Benson concluded that a "restrictive" religious orientation was in fact associated with *increased* alcohol use.[73] Makela has claimed that the liberalization of alcohol policies (both religious and other) would result in increases in *moderate* alcohol consumption, but would decrease *heavy* drinking.[74]

In spite of repeated findings of low negative correlations between religion and substance use/abuse, there are exceptions. Some "failures" to find the expected association may reflect unique cultural or religious situations. For example, studies carried out in Iran,[75] in Colombia,[76] and among Chinese students in Singapore[77] have shown no link between religion and alcohol or drug use.

Finally, we must remember that the "substances" considered in this section sometimes play a part in religious ceremonies or rituals for specific faith groups, and that within this context their use may actually be increased by religious involvement. For example, religious ceremonial use was one justification for drinking alcohol in Nigerian[78] and Mexican and Honduran[79] samples. In the 1960s some new religious groups encouraged the use of LSD, and Clark[80] and Siegel[81] have argued that psychedelic drugs may contribute to religious experiences and behaviors. In a different vein, Westermeyer and Walzer have even suggested that drug use among young people may occur in part because it generates personal and social benefits that would formerly have derived from religious practice.[82]

Summary

The vast majority of studies in this area reveal a negative link between religion and substance use and abuse. The relationship is typically rather weak; there are confounds to consider, and also occasional failures to replicate the effect, but all in all, it is impressive how general and consistent the association is across diverse samples and studies. In light of this, it is somewhat surprising that the overall literature on substance use/abuse makes only token acknowledgment of religion as an important explanatory variable, and then only as one of many possible cultural influences.[83]

Sexual Behavior

Religious institutions have made considerable attempts to control sexual behavior over the years, and one might agree with Shea that these attempts have historically resulted in a great amount of human distress and misery:

> If we consider those people prosecuted and punished for sexual sins or crimes in Christian communities, we might conservatively estimate the number of castrations, whippings, incarcerations, burnings, beheadings, hangings, and other executions attributable directly to Christian teaching to be in the millions.[84]

Shea points out that such treatment has (to some extent) continued to the present time, but suggests that religion's active attempts to control personal sexuality go far beyond such blatant physical punishments. Religion has engendered shame, guilt, fear, and anxiety for a wide variety of sexual "sins."[85] The psychological effects of religiously based conflict over sexuality are considered in Chapter 12. Here, however, we evaluate the evidence that religion does indeed influence the perceived morality of human sexuality, as well as sexual behavior itself.

Traditionally, religion has acknowledged the proper role of sexuality as being for procreative purposes within the marital relationship (see Chapter 4). Consequently, virtually any sort of sexual expression outside of heterosexual marriage was considered to be inappropriate and sinful. These norms have been both strong and stable across the centuries, but recent changes in these standards have occurred, particularly in Europe and North America. The population at large and some religious groups are currently showing an increased tolerance of masturbation, premarital sex, and even some extramarital sexual behavior. As Cochran and Beeghley have pointed out,

> some churches have addressed the problem by adjusting and softening their stand, while others have steadfastly avoided such secularization. As a result, there are significant differences in the official stands taken toward nonmarital, particularly premarital sex, among mainstream religious bodies in America.[86]

Is There a Negative Relationship between Religion and Nonmarital Sex?

In spite of these denominational differences, research has generally found that stronger religious beliefs and involvement are associated with decreased premarital sexual activity in a broad sense. For example, a recent textbook on lifespan development concluded:

> One of the clearest cultural influences on adolescent sexual behavior is religious participation. Adolescents who attend religious services frequently and who value religion as an important aspect of their lives have less permissive attitudes toward premarital sex. This finding applies equally to Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish young people. The relationship is accentuated in adolescents who describe themselves as Fundamentalist Protestant or Baptist.[87]

The reader will recognize that cause and effect are not entirely clear in such correlational relationships. It is tempting to infer that religiousness is influencing sexual beliefs and practices. However, it is also possible that sexual beliefs and practices are affecting religious commitment. Most probably, young people are making their own decisions about both religion and sexuality at approximately the same time. But decisions to have more permissive attitudes concerning sexuality could influence people to be less frequent church attenders, possibly because religious participation is less satisfying to them.[88] Of course, the bulk of the literature assumes that the causal direction is from religion to sexuality; given religious teachings about sexual morality, this is certainly a reasonable position.

Recent work has typically found this negative association between religiousness and nonmarital sexuality, but has also tried to further specify and explain the relationship. For example, Cochran and Beeghley examined cumulative data from the National Opinion Research Center's General Social Surveys conducted in the United States between 1972 and 1989, involving almost 15,000 people.[89] They did find an overall tendency for religious per-

sons to disapprove more strongly of premarital sexuality, extramarital sexuality, and homosexuality than their less religious fellows. However, there were notable variations across different religious groups (see Table 10.1), apparently indicative of the official doctrines of U.S. churches. The more strongly one's (religious) reference group condemns and prohibits various sexual acts, the more likely one is to agree. "That is, as religious proscriptiveness increases, the effect of religiosity on nonmarital sexual permissiveness increases."[90]

Qualifications

It is surprising that there has not been more interest in the relationship between specific religious *orientations* and nonmarital sexual attitudes and behavior. Haerich recently investigated the role of intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness in the sexual attitudes of about 200 undergraduate psychology students.[91] Consistent with other research, Haerich found that lower church attendance and religiousness (by self-report) were weakly but significantly associated with more permissive attitudes toward nonmarital sexuality, as measured by a sexual permissiveness scale. Furthermore, permissive attitudes were inversely linked to intrinsic scores and positively associated with extrinsic scores, usually in the .20 to .30 range. This is consistent with Woodroof's finding that extrinsics were more likely to be nonvirgins and to have had more sexual experience than intrinsics.[92] Haerich interprets these findings as indicating that greater commitment to religious institutions (intrinsic scores) is associated with decreasing permissiveness, whereas people with a religious orientation that focuses on personal comfort and security (extrinsic scores) will, in a similar manner, use sexual intimacy to contribute to their personal comfort and security. However, this interpretation must be considered speculative, pending further research.

The many studies that simply look for relationships between general measures of religiousness and sexual attitudes and behaviors neglect potentially important factors. For example, Reynolds has pointed out that the research investigating premarital sexual experience typically assumes that early sexual activity is consensual, when in many cases it is not, especially for females.[93] Cases of nonconsensual sex should not be included in studies of the

TABLE 10.1. Attitudes toward Nonmarital Sexuality: Percentage Saying Specific Behaviors Are "Almost Always Wrong" or "Always Wrong" among Different Religious Groups

	Attitude toward		
Religious group	Premarital sexuality	Extramarital sexuality	Homosexuality
Nonaffiliated	10	66	49
Jewish	18	75	43
Catholic	36	87	77
Episcopalian	25	85	66
Presbyterian	36	89	76
Lutheran	40	90	81
Methodist	43	91	84
Baptist	49	90	89
Other Protestant	55	93	86
Total sample	40	88	79

Note. Adapted from Cochran and Beeghley (1991, pp. 54–55). Copyright 1991 by the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion. Adapted by permission.

influence of religion on sexuality, she argues, since this could distort the nature and strength of the overall relationship.

Finally, Hammond, Cole, and Beck have noted another complicating factor in the relationship between religion and nonmarital sexuality.[94] Their investigation indicates that at least among white Americans, young people from fundamentalist and sect-like religions are more likely to marry before the age of 20 than are mainline Protestants, even when various other factors are controlled for. They argue that this tendency may result from generally stronger pressures to avoid premarital sexual intercourse. In one sense, this is important because it emphasizes another way in which a person's religious background may influence an aspect of the transition to adulthood—namely, marriage. In another sense, this tendency could also unfairly contribute to the "religion deters premarital sexual activity" finding in many studies, because early marriages in fundamentalist groups will reduce the "opportunity" for premarital sexual interaction between highly religious young people. By definition, one obviously cannot engage in *pre*marital sex *after* marriage.

Summary

There is little dispute about the typically weak but consistent tendency for religion to be negatively related to nonmarital sexual attitudes and behaviors. However, it is also evident that the relationship is not as simple as was once thought. Again, we look to future research to specify these relationships further.

Criminal Behavior and Delinquency

We are all familiar with the statistics on rising crime rates, and recent projections suggest that crime and delinquency will continue to increase, possibly to "epidemic" proportions.[95] As is the case for alcohol and drug use/abuse, and to some extent nonmarital sexuality, churches and synagogues typically take strong stands against criminal or delinquent behavior. One might hope that religion could act as a powerful deterrent to such acts. Of course, the phrase "criminal and delinquent behavior" covers considerable territory. Furthermore, crime statistics themselves may be unreliable: Definitions may vary from one jurisdiction to the next; some governments and police agencies may be more zealous in enforcing laws; and much crime undoubtedly goes unreported. Also, the methodological and statistical challenges in teasing out religion–delinquency relationships are considerable.

The Historical Context

Historically, the theoretical underpinnings of the expectation that low religious involvement may be associated with higher crime rates can be traced to the early years of this century—particularly Durkheim's emphasis on the social roots of religion, and his social integration theory of deviance and religion's place in society.[96] Durkheim felt that religion is integrally tied to the social order, playing an important role in legitimizing and reinforcing society's values and norms. Deviance may then stem from a breakdown in the church's role in this regard. Consistent with what many people would consider "common-sense" reasoning, the Durkheimian tradition links strong religious ties with decreased crime rates. In fact, many of the relevant data available to us today come from sociologists who have carefully scrutinized crime and deviance statistics and their relationship to church attendance, denomina-

tional affiliation, religious commitment, and so on. The majority of this work focuses on adolescent delinquency, with fewer investigations of adult crime.

Contradictory Findings

Some early research did indeed show the expected negative religion–delinquency correlations.[97] However, a widely cited paper with the provocative title "Hellfire and Delinquency," published in the late 1960s by Hirschi and Stark, reported that there was little or no association between religiousness and delinquency among several thousand California adolescents.[98] The authors suggested that earlier findings of a negative relationship had been weak and were probably spurious. Possibly because this finding was unexpected, it stimulated numerous subsequent investigations of this topic. Some of this follow-up research seemed to replicate Hirschi and Stark's original finding.[99] However, other investigators have challenged this conclusion by finding that religion was indeed negatively correlated with some kinds of delinquency.[100]

In a notable study, Jensen and Erickson reanalyzed Hirschi and Stark's data, and concluded that the original authors had reached erroneous conclusions because of their methodology.[101] There was actually a negative relationship between religion and delinquency, they claimed, which had remained hidden because of the statistical analyses carried out by Hirschi and Stark. Their own findings, based on several thousand Arizona high school students, confirmed the general inverse religion–delinquency relationship, though specific comparisons were often weak and did not always achieve statistical significance. Furthermore, Jensen and Erickson noted that the importance of religious variables in "explaining" crime statistics was greater for Mormons than it was for Catholics and Protestants. This tendency for correlations to be stronger, relatively speaking, within samples of Mormon adolescents has recently been replicated by Chadwick and Top.[102] That is, denominational variations may affect the results obtained.

The general tendency toward relatively weak and not always consistent findings has continued in more recent research. Some studies find low but significant relationships; others generate few if any statistically reliable results. In an extensive investigation, Bainbridge examined data from 75 U.S. metropolitan areas and, after taking into account some possible intervening variables (e.g., social mobility, poverty), claimed that larceny, burglary, and assault were apparently deterred by religion, but murder, rape, and possibly robbery were not.[103] Pettersson investigated the relationship between religion and a variety of criminal behaviors by analyzing data from almost a thousand Swedes.[104] He noted that relationships varied, depending on the type of crime at issue, but the pattern differed somewhat from that found by Bainbridge in the United States. A negative association was found between church involvement and crimes associated with violence, violations of public order and safety, and alcohol abuse; however, there was no substantial relationship for property, narcotic, or moral offenses. Shaffer and colleagues investigated narcotic addicts and found that a variety of their criminal activity was linked with lack of early religious training, among other things.[105]

To complicate things even more, Cochran and colleagues recently studied more than 1,500 Oklahoma high school students.[106] They observed, similar to Hirschi and Stark 25 years earlier,[107] that for most categories of delinquency the effect of religiosity was reduced to nonsignificant levels when nonreligious control variables were also considered. This led Cochran et al. to assume that in most cases, the religion–delinquency relationship is spurious.

Making Sense of the Contradictions

It is difficult to draw general conclusions from these efforts, given the differences in samples, findings and interpretations of various authors. Recently, Bainbridge offered several important conclusions, based on his review of the relevant research.[108] First, there has been some tendency for studies carried out in areas where organized religion is weak to show no relationship. But work conducted in areas where organized religion is relatively strong usually generate the negative religion–delinquency findings. Thus, consistent with previous inferences by Stark,[109] Bainbridge suggests that the religious community context is critical in explaining the contradictory findings in this area. Religion is more likely to act as a deterrent to delinquency if religious social support exists (e.g., are one's friends also religious?).

Bainbridge also draws an important distinction between "hedonistic" or "antiascetic" acts and other forms of deviance. His own research (as well as that of others) suggests that religion is negatively associated with drug and alcohol use, promiscuous sexuality, and similar "hedonistic" acts, regardless of the religious community context. It is when deviant acts such as theft, assault, and murder are examined that the religious social context apparently becomes important in qualifying the religion–delinquency relationship.

Finally, it is clear that zero-order correlations between gross measures of religion and delinquency can be quite misleading, since the removal of the effects of other social and cultural variables often reduces these associations considerably.

Partner and Child Abuse

Some studies have focused on family violence, such as partner or child abuse. Capps[110] and Greven[111] have suggested that religion may be seen by some people as "justifying" child abuse, in the sense that it may encourage physical punishment of children. These authors point to numerous Biblical passages, as well as books and articles written by Christian authors, that encourage the use of physical force in disciplining children; it is argued that these could serve as a justification for various forms of abuse (e.g., "It is for the child's own good"). Furthermore, Bottoms and colleagues have suggested that religious beliefs can threaten the welfare of children in various ways, including the withholding of medical care and attempts to rid children of evil, as well as direct physical and psychological abuse that adults see as religiously justified.[112]

There is apparently little research to assess religion's possible role in exacerbating or inhibiting abuse of children. Neufeld[113] and Steele and Pollock[114] have suggested that fundamentalist religious parents may be especially prone to punish their children physically, and also possibly to abuse them; Hull and Burke have proposed that members of the "religious right" may be more likely to tolerate family abuse in general.[115] However, these possibilities must be considered conjectural, pending thorough empirical assessment. These issues are further discussed in Chapter 4.

Recently, Elliott investigated childhood sexual abuse among almost 3,000 professional women.[116] She could find no evidence that its prevalence was related to family religious affiliation, but there was a tendency for adult religious practices to mediate the severity of symptoms for those victimized as children. Studies such as this underline the potential of religion to help some adult survivors to cope with their earlier abuse.

There have been suggestions that family abuse, generally speaking, has roots in the strong patriarchal family structure espoused by some religions. This patriarchal system is sometimes

interpreted as justifying the subordination of women, particularly in terms of their subjection to powerful male authority,[117] though some women may turn to religion as a source of empowerment in other ways.[118] The problem may be confounded by some clergy, who counsel women to remain with abusive husbands because it is their religious duty and responsibility to stay with and obey their spouses.[119]

Work on courtship and spousal violence has sometimes found links with religion, though few studies have focused on this issue. The findings of Makepeace seem to contradict the line of thinking described above, since religion was found to be negatively associated with courtship violence among college students.[120] Brinkerhoff, Grandin, and Lupri investigated possible religious involvement in spousal violence in a Canadian sample of more than a thousand adults.[121] Their hypothesis that the more fundamentalist, conservative Protestants would be more abusive "because of the stereotypes surrounding their value of patriarchy"[122] received mixed support. Conservative Protestant women (but not men[123]) reported the highest rates of violence (37.8%), compared to mainline Protestants (28.1%), Catholics (23.9%), and the nonaffiliated (30.8%). Furthermore, church attendance was related to spousal violence in a curvilinear manner, with frequent attenders being the least violent. These findings are potentially important, but await corroboration from further research with different samples and measures.

Does Religion Sometimes Contribute to Crime?

Although some studies show that religion and crime are negatively (albeit weakly) associated, we must consider the possibility that religion may also contribute to criminal behavior, at least in some situations. Some religions may emphasize the importance of standing up for one's rights ("an eye for an eye"), or a particular religious group may stress that members of this group are superior to various others; either of these factors could potentially incline individuals to act aggressively in some situations. In a study of regional differences in crimes against persons in the United States, Ellison[124] concluded that there was some evidence that "the public religious culture" of the South played a role in legitimizing this kind of violence.[124] That is, an emphasis on the "an eye for an eye" approach to the world, instead of "turn the other cheek," may have contributed both to greater tolerance of physical force and to personal justification for retaliatory violent acts. There have been few investigations of this issue, however, and research is needed to clarify the specific contexts (if any) in which religion might actually exacerbate such acts.

In recent years, there has been much publicity concerning physical and sexual abuse of children, adolescents, and sometimes adults by members of the clergy. It has been suggested that religion may be a contributing factor to such abuse because of celibacy requirements, rigid rules and expectations concerning sexuality, and so on. This issue is discussed further in Chapter 12.

Summary

The literature on religion and crime or delinquency is somewhat contradictory and ambiguous. Although some studies do show a negative relationship, it tends to be weak and inconsistent. As in some other areas, there has been a tendency to use very general measures of religion (e.g., church attendance, denominational affiliation), and to ignore the important but subtle differences that may be based on religious *orientation*, rather than simple atten-

dance or affiliation. When this deficiency is combined with the unreliability of crime statistics and with other problems, it becomes almost impossible to reach firm conclusions.

Benson, Donahue, and Erickson's survey of the literature on adolescence and religion led them to conclude that the weight of the evidence supports the existence of a weak to moderate negative relationship between religion and delinquency.[125] But, along with others,[126] they point out that much of this association may be attributable to social environment factors other than to religion itself: "After accounting for whether they have friends who engage in deviant behaviors, the adolescents' closeness to their parents, and how important it is for them to do what their parents say, religion contributes little independent constraining effect."[127]

In general, the negative relationship seems most likely to appear for "victimless activities" (e.g., use/abuse of alcohol and drugs, consensual premarital sexual activity), rather than other delinquent behavior.[128] It is important to go beyond simple correlational relationships, as indicated in research carried out by Peek, Curry, and Chalfant.[129] They found evidence that over time, higher delinquency rates appeared among students who declined in religiousness, compared to those who were low in religiousness throughout the same period. Such longitudinal trends may provide the basis for future investigations of adolescent delinquency.

Helping Behavior

"Help those in need." "Love one another." "Treat others as you would have them treat you." These are simple yet powerful imperatives, and similar themes are espoused by all of the world's major religions, as Coward has pointed out.[130] Religion has been identified with humanity and community through terms such as "love," "justice," "compassion," "mercy," "grace," "charity," and so on. The scriptural writings of most religions provide many examples of religious persons being kind to and helping others in need. And even in contemporary society, religious organizations and individuals sometimes stand out in their efforts to assist others, as noted at the beginning of this chapter. Churches become involved in relief efforts to ease the effects of famines, earthquakes, and other disasters. Religious organizations organize and fund soup kitchens in cities large and small; they help refugees to escape from unbelievable horrors and to become established in a new land; they become actively involved as peacemakers in the world's "hot spots." Øliner and Oliner's interviews with hundreds of people who rescued Jews in Nazi Europe revealed some who attributed their behavior to their religious values.[131] The list of religiously sponsored or promoted helping efforts is a long one.

Yet many nonreligious and even antireligious persons assist others as well. Present-day society offers unlimited opportunities to aid others in a secular context, and many people accept this challenge; "religion" apparently has little or nothing to do with their good will. Of course, this is why anecdotes are of little use in clarifying our understanding of the relationship between religion and helping behavior. Examples can be marshaled to show that both religious and nonreligious individuals and organizations assist others, and that both religious and nonreligious persons and organizations can act with callous neglect when other people cry out for assistance. Our challenge is to move beyond rhetoric and anecdotal material—to examine more general links between religion and helping, as revealed in the empirical literature.

Measurement and Definitional Problems

As in many areas of the psychology of religion, psychometric and methodological issues are important in the study of helping behavior. In keeping with many psychological studies of

religion, much research in this area relies on questionnaires, asking for self-reports of religiousness and helping behavior. This raises concerns about "self-presentation" issues. For example, it can be argued that religious persons may be concerned about appearing to be good representatives of their faith, and therefore would be inclined to exaggerate the extent to which they help others. Fortunately, there are also some studies in this area that have utilized behavioral measures, as described below, and these serve as an important counterbalance to the many questionnaire studies on helping.

In this section we purposely use the term "helping" rather than "altruism," in order to avoid the thorny issue of whether all helping behavior is egoistically motivated, or whether at least some helping behavior is motivated purely by the ultimate goal of benefiting someone else (i.e., altruistic behavior). The reader interested in this issue might consult Batson's book on altruism, which addresses philosophical, theoretical, and empirical aspects of this distinction.[132]

Early Questionnaire Studies

Early survey studies in this area tended to rely on measures of frequency of church attendance as the primary measure of religiousness, with occasional forays into measures of such factors as belief in God, affiliation, or religious involvement. Assessment of "helping" typically involved self-reports (and occasionally others' reports) of one's inclination to assist others. These studies were fairly "primitive" in the sense that the measures of both religion and helping were quite simple and basic, and investigators merely looked for correlations between such general measures. These studies typically reported low to moderate correlations between religiousness and helping,[133] with some investigations reporting mixed or qualified associations.[134]

Most of these studies failed to take other factors into account. They did not, for example, control for church-related helping as opposed to helping outside of the "church walls." Nelson and Dynes found that when their low but significant associations between religiousness and helping through social service agencies were corrected for some other factors (e.g., helping through one's church, income, age), the correlations essentially disappeared.[135] Similarly, Hunsberger and Platonow found that although religiously orthodox students reported that they were more likely to volunteer to help in religion-related contexts, there was no evidence that they were more helpful in a nonreligious context.[136] Furthermore, when we turn to studies that incorporate actual behavioral measures of helping, there is little evidence that religious people are more helpful than less religious or nonreligious people.

Early Behavioral Studies

Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis have provided a thorough review of the literature on religion and helping, and point to a considerable difference between "pencil-and-paper" and behavioral studies of helping.[137] The questionnaire investigations often showed at least some positive connection between religion and helping, as indicated above. However, consistent with studies indicating that the positive correlations from questionnaire studies tended to disappear when possible confounding variables were controlled for, Batson et al.'s review of six early studies employing behavioral measures shows that five of the six found no evidence that more religious persons are more helpful.

These early studies were creative in their employment of behavioral measures. For example, Forbes, TeVault, and Gromoll "lost" addressed letters near different churches and

examined the extent to which people "helped" by putting these letters into mailboxes.[138] Smith, Wheeler, and Diener gave people the opportunity to volunteer to work with a retarded child.[139] Annis, in two investigations, put people in a situation where they apparently heard a woman in distress after a ladder fell.[140] McKenna measured the extent to which people would call a garage for a stranded woman motorist without any money.[141] Yinon and Sharon examined financial contributions to help a needy family.[142]

Only the last of these studies (the one by Yinon and Sharon) showed any inclination for "more religious" individuals to be more likely to help than their less religious counterparts, and even this finding held only when the request came from a religious person. Batson et al. have concluded that "this evidence strongly suggests that the more religious show no more active concern for others in need than do the less religious. The more religious only present themselves as more concerned."[143]

Dimensions of Religion and Helping

The reader will observe that the studies discussed above did not take into account possible differences in helping tendencies associated with varying religious *orientations*. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic orientations, for example, would lead one to expect that intrinsic persons should be more helpful since they tend to "live" their religion, and extrinsic persons should be less helpful because their religion derives from self-interest. Batson, on the other hand, has proposed that intrinsic religiousness relates only to the *appearance* of being more helpful, whereas the "quest" dimension of religion is the best and most direct predictor of helping behavior.[144] Batson has carried out a series of investigations to test these proposals, and we describe this program of research shortly. First, however, we describe several studies that have focused on the extent to which helping may be associated with intrinsic, extrinsic, or related religious orientations.

A number of researchers have relied entirely on self-reports of helping-related values and religious orientation. These have usually resulted in positive correlations between intrinsic scores and self-reports of values associated with aiding others.[145] Batson et al. have argued that this kind of study does not resolve the issue of whether intrinsics are really more helpful, because intrinsic persons are simply trying to "look good" by agreeing with altruistic values.[146] Other studies have found significant correlations between intrinsic–extrinsic orientations and self-reported helping. For example, Benson and colleagues found that "nonspontaneous helping," as measured by self-reports of the kinds of charitable activities that people engaged in to assist others, was positively related to intrinsic scores ($r = .30$).[147] Unfortunately, we do not know the extent to which social desirability might have played a role in this relationship. Also, Benson et al. did not distinguish between church-related helping and secular charitable situations. Hunsberger and Platonow had participants volunteer for *secular* charitable work in their study, and found that there was a weak but significant correlation between such volunteering and intrinsic scores ($r = .17$), as well as a negative association for extrinsic scores ($r = -.27$). Furthermore, a measure of social desirability was *not* related to intrinsic scores ($r = .02$), but it was significantly correlated with extrinsic scores ($r = .22$).[148]

In the end, the evidence suggests that more religious persons, especially intrinsic individuals, tend to help others through their religious organizations in a variety of ways. Also, it would appear that intrinsic religiosity is positively but weakly related to an inclination to say that one helps others, and apparently also to the tendency actually to volunteer in a chari-

table context. There is some evidence that social desirability does not explain this relationship, though the relevant studies have relied to a large extent on self-reports. The situation is certainly not clear-cut, since the associations that have appeared tend to be weak, and not entirely consistent from one study to the next. Batson has argued that only behavioral studies can resolve the controversy over a possible religion–helping relationship.

Batson's Research Program

C. Daniel Batson is a respected researcher in the general social-psychological literature on helping behavior, who has also investigated the relationship between religion and helping. Much of his religion-related work has focused on the controversy concerning how religious *orientation* is related to assisting others, and he has introduced a number of important behavioral measures of helping which have allowed this area to escape from the problems associated with investigations based solely on self-report.

The Good Samaritan Study. Batson's first study in this area attempted to operationalize the parable of the good Samaritan, and this investigation, highlighted in Research Box 10.2, has served as a model for some subsequent research.[149] In this investigation, there was no tendency for means (similar to extrinsic), end (similar to intrinsic), or quest orientations to be related to helping behavior.

Darley and Batson's conclusion that among those who did offer to help, the more orthodox, intrinsic persons might be helping for their own reasons instead of being sensitive to those needing aid has been challenged.[150] Maybe those higher on quest helped "tentatively" because they really weren't very committed to helping in the first place, and the more assertive assistance of the high intrinsics reflected more genuine caring and concern on their part. Furthermore, we may wonder about the generalizability of findings from the relatively homogeneous and religious sample of seminary students. Another study, by Batson and Gray,[151] extended the original Darley and Batson findings in a very different context.

"Helping Janet." In this follow-up investigation, 60 female introductory psychology students at the University of Kansas, all of whom reported being at least moderately religious, were placed one at a time in an experimental situation involving an exchange of written notes. "Janet," supposedly another participant, was a fictitious person who indicated that she was feeling lonely and needed to work through some problems. Half of the time Janet expressly asked the real participant to meet with her again for further conversation, and the other half of the time Janet indicated quite clearly that she was resolved to work out her problems on her own. How did the participants respond to Janet's clear request for help or no help? Intrinsic scores were positively correlated with participants' previously obtained self-reports of helpfulness and concern for others. But when Batson and Gray examined actual helping responses, intrinsic scores were correlated about .27 with helping, *whether or not* Janet wanted any help. Quest scores, however, were positively associated with helping ($r = .37$) when Janet said she wanted help, and negatively related to helping ($r = -.32$) when Janet indicated she wanted to work things through on her own. This finding supports Darley and Batson's earlier suggestion that high questers are sensitive to the expressed needs of others with respect to help needed, but that people with an intrinsic (end) orientation are rather indiscriminately inclined to help, whether the other person wants help or not.

Research Box 10.2. Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior (Darley & Batson, 1973)

In the parable of the good Samaritan, Jesus described a man who is robbed, beaten, and left for dead at the side of the road. Two "religious" individuals, a priest and a Levite, pass by but do not stop to help. However, a Samaritan, a religious outcast, does (at some cost to himself) give the robbery victim the help he needs. Jesus wanted to make the point that people should model their behavior after the Samaritan, not after "religious" people, who may be so caught up in their thoughts that they don't see the needs of people around them.

Would the results differ if this situation were to occur in contemporary society? Darley and Batson attempted to construct a similar "help-needed" situation at Princeton University. Sixty-seven seminary students first completed questionnaires to assess their religious orientation, among other things; then, one at a time, 40 of them showed up for a follow-up experimental session. They were asked to prepare a short talk based on either (1) the parable of the good Samaritan, or (2) jobs that seminary students might pursue. After having a few minutes to prepare for their forthcoming talk, participants were given a map to show them how to get to a room in another building where they would give their talk. Half of the participants were told that they would need to hurry, since they were late for their appointment.

As these students passed down an alley, they met a man in need of help. A confederate of the experimenters was slumped in a doorway, head down, eyes closed, not moving. As each seminarian passed, the victim coughed and groaned; given the geographical setting, it was virtually impossible to miss him. The key dependent measure in this study was whether or not the students stopped to offer any kind of help. In fact, just 16 of the 40 seminarians (40%) offered assistance. And religious orientation (means, end, or quest) did not predict who would stop to offer aid.

However, among those who did stop, an interesting finding emerged. When a seminarian offered help, the victim indicated that he had just taken his medication, he would be fine if he just rested a few minutes, and he would like to be left alone. Some of the "good Samaritans" were quite insistent, however. In spite of the victim's objections, some participants insisted on taking him into a nearby building and pouring some coffee and/or religion into him. Among only those who did stop to help, the intrinsic (end) dimension correlated positively with this "I know what is best for you" helping style ($r = .43$), but the quest orientation was negatively associated with such insistent aid ($r = -.54$). Darley and Batson concluded that the more intrinsic seminarians seemed to be guided by a "preprogrammed" helping response, which was not affected by the expressed needs of the victim. It was almost as if the "super helpers" were satisfying their own internal need to help, rather than meeting the needs of the victim. However, those with a quest orientation had a more "tentative" helping style, sensitive to the person needing help, since they tended to accept the victim's statement that he really just wanted to be left alone and everything would be fine.

Before we leave our consideration of this study, there are some loose ends to tie up. Contrary to expectations, it did not make any difference whether the participant was preparing to give a speech on the parable of the good Samaritan or on jobs for seminary graduates. Apparently, thinking about helping in a Biblical context did not make participants more likely to offer aid in a similar situation. Finally, those participants in the "hurry up, you're late" condition were significantly less likely to stop and offer any kind of help than were those with no "hurry up" instructions. Apparently, the most powerful variable in determining helping behavior overall in this study was a nonreligious one—whether or not a participant was in a hurry.

Additional Research. Three further studies by Batson have attempted to delve into the "altruistic versus egoistic" issue concerning underlying motivation for helping by people with different religious orientations, and these have provided additional valuable data concerning the relationship of intrinsic and quest orientations to helping behavior. Two of these investigations, reported by Batson's group in 1989,[152] are discussed in Research Box 10.3. The findings were generally consistent with the group's interpretation of intrinsic-based helping as motivated by concern for "appearances" and quest-based assistance as stemming from sensitivity to others' needs.

Batson and Flory subsequently attempted to manipulate the extent to which research participants thought they would "look good," by employing a cognitive interference task (involving the Stroop effect) and an appeal involving a family tragedy similar to that in the second Batson et al. study (see Research Box 10.3).[153] As they expected, Batson and Flory found that high intrinsic scores were associated with "looking good," and there was a weak (nonsignificant) tendency for quest scores to be linked with helping stemming from concern for the victim's welfare.

This series of studies has provided substantial but not entirely consistent support for Batson's interpretation of tendencies to help, and motivation for assisting others, depending on religious orientation. These investigations all involved small samples of university students, and the generalizability of the findings may be questioned. Furthermore, the expected correlational relationships did not always achieve significance in specific studies, and the weak psychometric properties of the Quest scale used in these studies is a serious concern. However, the combined impact of these investigations suggests that the tendency for the intrinsically religious to be helpful may stem to some extent from personal need rather than from the needs of others. Moreover, the quest orientation has predicted helping under some circumstances, and the evidence indicates that the resulting assistance is motivated by the needs of others rather than by personal reward or appearance. In this sense, quest-related helping may approach "altruistic" assistance, whereas intrinsic-related helping may have a more "egoistic" basis.[154]

Summary

The study of religion and helping behavior is especially interesting because of the availability of both self-report questionnaires and investigations of actual behavior. Furthermore, few areas have seen such systematic theorizing, accompanied by a systematic research program, as that provided by Batson and his coworkers.

Not all authors are prepared to accept Batson's conclusions that intrinsic religion is related to the *appearance* of helping, and that the assistance provided by such individuals is likely to be a preprogrammed, self-serving type of aid. Nor is there complete acceptance of the finding that the quest orientation is a good predictor of *actual* (behavioral) helping, and that quest-based assistance is motivated by the needs of others.[155] Specific criticisms have been directed at the measures of religion used, as well as the context for helping.[156] However, Batson has provided a systematic program of research, the results of which provide general support for his conclusions. We hope that those who prefer alternate interpretations of the Batson findings will carry out their own multiple-study programs of research to test these interpretations. Until such investigations are forthcoming, we are inclined to cautiously accept Batson's findings and interpretations.

Research Box 10.3. Religious Prosocial Motivation: Is It Altruistic or Egoistic? (Batson et al., 1989)

In the first of two studies, participants were told that they could volunteer to help out a 7-year-old boy with a rare genetic disorder, but that even if they were willing to help, they would have to pass a sort of physical fitness qualifying task before they could participate in a walkathon. Some participants were led to believe that the qualifying standard was relatively easy; others were told that it was "extremely stringent." Batson et al. reasoned that when the standard was described as difficult, it would be easy to volunteer because there wasn't much chance that a participant would actually have to follow through with the volunteer commitment. Consistent with their expectations, the researchers found that an extrinsic orientation was negatively correlated with volunteering for both the easy and difficult qualifying standards ($r = -.37$, on average). Intrinsic scores, however, did not correlate with volunteering when the standard was easy, but they were positively correlated ($r = .50$) when the standard was difficult. Although other interpretations are possible, Batson et al. have suggested that this supports their contention that intrinsically inclined people want to *look* like helpers, but only if there is actually just a small chance of their having to carry through with the assistance.

Quest scores did not correlate with helping in either the easy or difficult conditions. Furthermore, those who volunteered were actually asked to proceed with the qualifying task (stepping up and down from a block for 30 seconds). There was evidence that intrinsically inclined individuals tried harder in the difficult condition only if they had *not* volunteered to help. Quest scores, on the other hand, were positively related to performance on the qualifying task only for those who *had* volunteered to help. Batson et al. have interpreted these rather complex findings as being consistent with Batson's earlier research findings. First, intrinsics' motivation for helping stemmed from a personal need to appear helpful (without actually having to help), rather than from the needs of others. Second, questers' motivation for helping was really generated by the needs of others, since they worked hardest when they thought it would be difficult to qualify to help.

A second investigation reported in the same article focused on a different helping context— an undergraduate who was coping with family tragedy and needed help from others to support her siblings. The pattern of correlations suggested that extrinsics were less likely to volunteer and questers were more likely to volunteer when there was little pressure to do so, but intrinsic scores were unrelated to offering assistance under either high- or-low-pressure conditions.

Prejudice, Discrimination, and Stereotyping

Few areas in the psychology of religion have generated as much interest, research, and controversy as the relationship between religion and prejudice. Since, as noted above, most world religions espouse a common theme of "love one another," it might be expected that this teaching would have a powerful effect in reducing prejudice among the members of these religions. But research has not been supportive of this generalization. In fact, many studies have linked various aspects of religiousness with *increased* discriminatory attitudes. Glock and Stark even built a case that Christianity contributes directly to anti-Semitic prejudice,[157] and in spite of challenges to this position, it has been confirmed by other researchers—most recently by Eisinga, Konig, and Scheepers in a Dutch investigation.[158]

Gordon Allport, one of the 20th century's most prominent authorities on prejudice, concluded that the effect of religion on prejudice is paradoxical, since "it makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice."[159] The reasoning behind this paradox is that different religious orientations may be differentially related to prejudice. First, let us consider the related research in historical perspective. In reviewing the work on religion and prejudice, we do not offer an exhaustive review of the literature that has accumulated in the area (such reviews have been provided in Gorsuch & Aleshire,[160] Batson et al.,[161] and Spilka, Hood, & Gorsuch[162]). Rather, we attempt to summarize different stages in the development of our understanding of the religion–prejudice relationship, and ultimately focus on promising developments that have occurred in the past decade or so, involving religious fundamentalism, quest, and right-wing authoritarianism.

Early Studies

Many studies over the years have found that people's responses to measures of religion and prejudice are related. In light of his review of the literature, Wulff was led to conclude:

> Using a variety of measures of piety—religious affiliation, church attendance, doctrinal orthodoxy, rated importance of religion, and so on—researchers have consistently found positive correlations with ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, dogmatism, social distance, rigidity, intolerance of ambiguity, and specific forms of prejudice, especially against Jews and blacks.[163]

Batson et al.,[164] Dittes,[165] Gorsuch and Aleshire,[166] Meadow and Kahoe,[167] Myers,[168] Paloutzian,[169] and Spilka, Hood, and Gorsuch[170] have similarly concluded that as a broad generalization, the more religious an individual is, the more prejudiced that person is. However, most of these authors are quick to qualify this inference in terms of a possible curvilinear relationship, and also in terms of religious orientation (see below).

Research showing a religion–prejudice link has a long history, dating at least to the 1940s, when Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford's famous studies of the authoritarian personality disclosed a positive association between religion and prejudice.[171] Batson et al. reviewed much work on religion and prejudice, and found that for investigations published in 1960 or earlier, 19 of 23 findings confirmed the positive relationship between religion and prejudice; there was no clear relationship in 3 studies; and just 1 revealed a negative relationship.[172] It is unusual for so many efforts in the social sciences to converge on such a clear conclusion. However, the generalization that religion is positively correlated with prejudice is more complex than it might first appear.

Is the Religion–Prejudice Relationship Curvilinear?

There have been suggestions—for example, by Gorsuch[173] and Wulff[174]—that this relationship is actually curvilinear with respect to church attendance. It has been proposed that nonattenders are relatively unprejudiced, that infrequent to moderately frequent church attenders are the most prejudiced persons, and that "Active church members [are] among the least prejudiced in society."[175] This curvilinear relationship is sometimes idealistically portrayed as a smooth bell-shaped curve.[176] Although the curvilinear relationship has apparently been readily accepted in the relevant literature, there is in fact limited empirical evidence to support it; authors often do not acknowledge the many weaknesses and qualifications associated with the findings, and some researchers have reported data suggesting that the relationship is in fact a reasonably strong linear one.[177]

Figure 10.1 shows where there is general agreement and also some disagreement in the literature. If one includes a broadly representative sample of people, from the nonreligious through to the highly religious, there is little argument concerning the solid line in section B of the graph. That is, moderately religious people are more prejudiced than very weakly religious people. There also seems to be a consensus that *non*religious people are relatively nonprejudiced, though it is not entirely clear whether they are less prejudiced than very weakly religious persons (see section A of Figure 10.1). The greatest controversy, however, is apparent in regard to section C, where contradictory evidence and arguments suggest that the religion–prejudice line either continues to increase (I), levels off (II), drops modestly (III), or declines precipitously (IV). The last of these would be the preferred conclusion in terms of the curvilinear relationship.

Even those studies that seem to have found a curvilinear relationship do not always provide strong evidence of this effect. For example, the tendency for prejudice scores to drop off for the highly religious apparently occurs (when it does appear) for just a tiny portion of the (highly) religious population. In one such study, by Struening, a "drop" in prejudice scores was apparent only for people who attended church more than twice a week (just 2.4% of the sample).[178] Furthermore, as pointed out elsewhere by Hunsberger,[179] there exists little empirical evidence to support the conclusion that very frequent church attenders are any less prejudiced than *non*religious persons,[180] who have been found to be the *least* prejudiced persons by Adorno et al.[181] and by Altemeyer and Hunsberger.[182]

Some of the confusion concerning curvilinear findings may have resulted from the fact that some investigators did not always distinguish between weakly religious and nonreligious persons (e.g., they combined members who attended seldom or never with nonmembers); others did not include nonreligious persons at all, and therefore their research can shed no light on this aspect of the proposed curvilinear relationship (section A of Figure 10.1). Furthermore, there is no agreement in the literature on what constitutes "high," "moderate,"



FIGURE 10.1. Possible relationships between religion and prejudice.

and "low" religiosity, and different studies may have used unique reference points in comparing these groups.

For example, the research of both Struening[183] and Friedrichs[184] has been cited as confirmation of the curvilinear effect.[185] As noted above, Struening reported that prejudice scores began to drop off for people who attended church more than twice a month (just 2.4% of the sample). Friedrichs found that those who attended three, four, or five times per month were in fact the *most* prejudiced people in his sample; prejudice scores began to decrease only for those who went to church more than once a week. So, based on frequency of church attendance, Struening's *least* prejudiced people would have been in Friedrich's *most* prejudiced group.

Finally, most authors have failed to mention the numerous qualifications accompanying their curvilinear findings. For example, Struening included five different measures of authoritarianism and prejudice, and only his prejudice measure showed a decrease for frequent church attenders; the other four instruments (authoritarianism, submission, suspicion, and nationalism) all showed increases in this group.[186]

Does Religious Orientation Make a Difference?

Of course, early research on religion did not often take religious *orientation* into account. Indeed, much of this initial work was conducted before the conceptualization and measurement of various religious orientations began in the mid-1960s and later. We might hope that such refinements in our thinking about religion would help to resolve the issue of a possible link between religion and prejudice.

Allport and Ross addressed this issue head-on when they published their famous article outlining the formulation of intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations, as well as scales developed to measure the concepts, since this was done in the context of their study of prejudice.[187] Ultimately, Allport and Ross concluded that more intrinsic persons were, as expected, less prejudiced than those with an extrinsic religious orientation, who in turn were less prejudiced than those with an "indiscriminately pro" (IP) orientation (i.e., those who scored high on both the intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions). This finding that intrinsics are less prejudiced than extrinsics, who are less prejudiced than IPs, has become firmly embedded in the literature.[188] In fact, in light of these findings, the first edition of the present text concluded over a decade ago that "the problem of religion and prejudice seems to be essentially solved."[189]

However, as Kirkpatrick has eloquently pointed out,[190] there were many problems with the original intrinsic and extrinsic concepts and scales as developed by Allport and Ross. In Research Box 10.4, we describe the original study and its findings; in Research Box 10.5, we critically reevaluate this influential study and its conclusions. The problems in this investigation (and in some subsequent research) make us reluctant simply to accept the Allport and Ross conclusion at face value. Furthermore, Hunsberger has argued that "although the findings of some other studies have paralleled Allport and Ross' results . . . the [intrinsic–extrinsic] conceptualization has not lived up to expectations in identifying or reducing prejudice."[191] Similarly, Donahue's review and meta-analysis of the intrinsic–extrinsic literature led him to conclude that "[the Intrinsic scale] is uncorrelated, rather than negatively correlated, with prejudice across most available measures. [The Extrinsic scale] is positively correlated with prejudice, but not nearly so strongly as Allport's writings might have predicted."[192] The many problems with the Extrinsic scale make its apparent link with prejudice

Research Box 10.4. Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice (Allport & Ross, 1967)

In light of previous research, which seemed to show a curvilinear relationship between church attendance and prejudice, Allport and Ross used Intrinsic and Extrinsic scales to assess whether people with an extrinsic religious orientation were more prejudiced than people with an intrinsic orientation. This, it was felt, would help to explain why some "religious people" are prejudiced while others are not, and it also fit neatly with Allport's earlier work,[a] in which he had distinguished between "immature" and "mature" religious orientations. It seemed to make sense that intrinsic persons, with a committed, interiorized faith, should live their religion and be less prejudiced, but that extrinsics, with a consensual, exteriorized, utilitarian religious orientation, should be more prejudiced.

Both direct and indirect questionnaire measures of prejudice were included; the former tapped prejudice against blacks, Jews, and other minorities, whereas the latter measured a lack of sympathy with mental patients and a generalized distrust of people. These instruments were administered to 309 Christian churchgoers from six faiths: 94 Roman Catholics from Massachusetts, 55 Lutherans from New York, 44 Nazarenes from South Carolina, 53 Presbyterians from Pennsylvania, 35 Methodists from Tennessee, and 28 Baptists from Massachusetts.

Allport and Ross initially conceptualized the intrinsic and extrinsic orientations as opposite ends of a single dimension, but found a positive correlation between various measures of prejudice and *both* the Extrinsic scale and a "total Extrinsic–Intrinsic scale" (p. 437), whereas they had expected to find a *negative* correlation between prejudice and intrinsic religiosity. In fact, they never reported the correlation between their prejudice measures and the Intrinsic scale alone.

After contemplating these initial results, which did not support their expectations, the authors decided that a "reformulation" was necessary. Instead of simply examining the correlations between intrinsic–extrinsic scores and prejudice, Allport and Ross decided that it might be better to categorize people according to four types determined by median splits on the Intrinsic and Extrinsic scales: consistently intrinsic, consistently extrinsic, "indiscriminately pro" (IP; i.e., high scores on both scales—also referred to as "religious muddle-headedness"), and "indiscriminately anti" (IA; i.e., low scores on both scales). Since they did not include any nonchurchgoers in their sample, they were not able to examine the IA category. Reanalyzing their data for the remaining three religious types (with each of the three types constituting very roughly one-third of the sample), they reported that the extrinsic type was more prejudiced on both direct and indirect measures of prejudice, and also that the IP persons were more prejudiced than either of the two consistent intrinsic and extrinsic types.

Allport and Ross concluded that prejudice is often part of the personality structure, and that this is intertwined with the individual's religious orientation:

> One definable style marks the individual who is bigoted in ethnic matters and extrinsic in his religious orientation. Equally apparent is the style of those who are bigoted and at the same time indiscriminately proreligious. A relatively small number of people show an equally consistent cognitive style in their simultaneous commitment to religion as a dominant, intrinsic value and to ethnic tolerance. (p. 442)

Thus, it seemed that the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction would be a valuable tool in clarifying the links between religion and prejudice. In order of decreasing prejudice came the IPs, then the extrinsics, and finally the intrinsics.

[a]Allport (1954, 1956).

difficult to interpret, and Hoge and Carroll even concluded that the only thing they could be sure of was that the extrinsic scale "is *not* tapping extrinsic religious motivation."[193]

Is Social Desirability a Confounding Variable?

There have been attempts to reinterpret the intrinsic–extrinsic findings regarding prejudice. For example, Batson et al. have argued that social desirability may be acting as an intervening variable, confusing the relationship between prejudice and intrinsic–extrinsic religiosity.[194] They have suggested that social desirability and intrinsic religious orientation are positively correlated, making it difficult to assess the real relationship between intrinsicness and prejudice. Intrinsic persons may *seem* to be less prejudiced because they are also concerned with "looking good," and therefore they may respond to questionnaire items on prejudice in a biased manner, making themselves look less prejudiced than they actually are. Batson et al. have suggested that if we could just control for these "social desirability" effects among intrinsics, the negative correlation between intrinsicness and prejudice that sometimes appears may disappear or even be reversed. In fact, Batson and his colleagues carried out two studies that seem to support this interpretation.

Batson, Flink, Schoenrade, Fultz, and Pych[195] and Batson, Naifeh, and Pate[196] both reported that Intrinsic scores were negatively correlated with overt prejudice, but this relationship was not apparent when the effects of social desirability were controlled for in the first study, nor when a covert behavioral measure of prejudice was used in the second study. Extrinsic scores were unrelated to all measures of prejudice. These findings differ from previous research in important ways. As Donahue has pointed out,[197] previous research has typically revealed little or no relationship between Intrinsic and prejudice scores, but does show a weak positive correlation between Extrinsic scores and prejudice. The two Batson studies apparently reveal very different trends—positive associations between Intrinsic and prejudice scores, but no relationship for Extrinsic scores. Also, Batson et al. reported a link in one study between Intrinsic scores and social desirability (.36),[198] whereas other authors, such as Hunsberger and Platonow[199] and Spilka, Kojetin, and McIntosh,[200] have been unable to find a significant relationship in this regard, and Morris, Hood, and Watson found that controlling for social desirability did not change prejudice–religion relationships.[201] Furthermore, it has been argued by Watson and colleagues[202] that weak positive correlations between the intrinsic (or a similar religiousness) dimension and social desirability are unique to the Crowne–Marlowe Social Desirability scale,[203] the measure used by Batson et al.[204] That is, such correlations are not a result of social desirability, but appear because the Social Desirability scale "has a substantial number of items confounded by a religious relevance dimension."[205] More recently, Leak and Fish have challenged Watson et al.'s conclusions in this regard.[206] The reader can understand why these discrepancies make it difficult to come to firm conclusions regarding the role of social desirability in the relationship between intrinsic religiousness and prejudice.

In the end, the assertions of many articles and texts notwithstanding, we suggest that the relationship between prejudice and the intrinsic–extrinsic dichotomy is at best tenuous and difficult to interpret. At times it seems that the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction, which was intended to help us understand Allport's paradoxical assertion that religion both makes (extrinsic religious orientation) and unmakes (intrinsic religious orientation) prejudice, has instead led us into a psychometric and empirical morass of confusion. However, other approaches to religious orientation seem to offer more promise in explaining the religion–prejudice connection.

Research Box 10.5. A Critical Reevaluation of "Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice" (Allport & Ross, 1967)

A close examination of the Allport and Ross study calls into question its basic conclusions. First, the switch from using one continuous intrinsic–extrinsic scale to examining discrete orientation categories involved some "data analysis gymnastics," resulting in the final "intrinsic < extrinsic < IP" conclusion, which served as the basis for further research and conclusions that appeared regularly in the literature. This is not a minor point; as Donahue has observed,[a] few studies in the literature have actually used the four-way categorization recommended by Allport and Ross. Rather, most studies have simply reported correlations between each of the Intrinsic and Extrinsic scales and other measures—precisely what the original authors decided they should *not* do. In fact, later authors have incorrectly concluded that Allport and Ross reported a positive correlation between intrinsic scores and either humanitarian attitudes[b] or lower prejudice.[c] But all of this aside, if we ignore the reformulations and reanalyses that were necessary to reach the "extrinsics are more prejudiced than intrinsics" conclusion, and instead focus on the research itself, what do we find?

For one thing, although overall comparisons were significant, some considerable inconsistencies appear for the different religious subgroups. For example, just one of Allport and Ross's six religious denominational groups actually showed the intrinsic < extrinsic < IP pattern for the "anti-Negro prejudice" measure. In the other five groups, either the IPs' mean was lower than that for the extrinsics, or the extrinsics' mean was lower than that for the intrinsics.

Questions can also be raised concerning the prejudice measures used, especially their theoretical and psychometric strength, since such properties were typically not reported in this paper. One must wonder about potential biases, which might be stimulated by what Allport and Ross called an "indirect" measure of prejudice. It described the attempts of a black girl to rent a room in an all-white neighborhood, then asked "If you had been Mrs. Williamson, would you have rented to the Negro girl?" We suspect that a proreligious and possibly nondiscriminatory bias might have been aroused in participants by these sorts of measures, especially since apparently all of them knew that they were in this study because they attended a specific church.

We have previously noted the many problems with the Intrinsic scale and especially the Extrinsic scale. In fact, an entire subliterature has evolved, arguing the pros and cons of these two scales. At one extreme, Kirkpatrick and Hood have suggested, as one of several possibilities, that the scales might be abandoned because of their many problems.[d] Relevant to our concerns here, it is worth noting that the psychometric properties of these scales vary from study to study, and in the end are less than convincing. Cronbach's alpha (a measure of internal consistency) tends to be somewhat erratic, and Donahue has concluded that the Extrinsic scale especially suffers from low internal consistency and item–total correlations.[e] It is tempting to speculate that the problems with these scales contributed to Allport and Ross's decision not to report any psychometric information on the scales in their 1967 article. A number of authors have attempted to deal with the scales' problems by rewording, rewriting, reconceptualizing, or restructuring the scales. Most authors who use the Intrinsic and Extrinsic scales today rely on a Likert-type "agree–disagree" response format, although the original scale used different response formats

(*cont.*)

across items. In addition, attempts to consider subdimensions (personal vs. social well-being) of the extrinsic scale have offered some promise.[f]

It might be argued that, regardless of the problems with the scales and the original Allport and Ross report of a link between prejudice and intrinsic–extrinsic religiosity, so many subsequent studies have confirmed their initial conclusions that we should not overconcern ourselves with problems in the initial investigation. That is, the "weight of the evidence" clearly suggests that IP individuals are more prejudiced than are extrinsics, who in turn are more prejudiced than intrinsically oriented people, and that this in turn justifies the intrinsic–extrinsic conceptualization. But others are concerned about the scales' psychometric shortcomings, the lack of conceptual clarity, the inconsistency in Allport and Ross's results and some subsequent findings, and indeed the difficulty in making sense of these findings in light of the problems mentioned above.

[a]Donahue (1985a).
[b]Vergote (1993).
[c]Koenig (1992).
[d]Kirkpatrick and Hood (1990).
[e]Donahue (1985a).
[f]Kirkpatrick (1989); Gorsuch and McPherson (1989).

Proscribed versus Nonproscribed Prejudice

It seems logical that for religious people, the stand of their church on issues of prejudice would have some effect on their own attitudes and behavior. However, Batson et al. have noted that the existing research on religion and prejudice rarely considers the potential impact of the formal or informal stance of one's religious group on such issues.[207] If religious communities make serious attempts to eliminate prejudiced attitudes ("proscribed prejudice"), it is argued that highly religious (e.g., intrinsic) individuals will at least give the appearance that they are unprejudiced on overt measures of prejudice such as pencil-and-paper questionnaires. They see themselves as religious persons, and their church teaches that a specific prejudice is wrong; therefore, they say that they do not hold that particular prejudice.

Batson et al. go on to suggest that there are situations in which a religious group may not attempt to negate prejudice, and in fact may even formally or informally support specific prejudice ("nonproscribed prejudice"). In such cases, the same religious (e.g., intrinsic) persons will be likely to admit to their prejudice because it is sanctioned by their church. That is, people who try to live their religion will openly include discriminatory attitudes as part of their approach to the world around them. Furthermore, Batson et al. argue that even if prejudice is condemned, religious persons will admit to their discriminatory attitudes if the measure of prejudice is "covert," as in the case of subtle behavioral measures.

Other researchers, such as Griffin, Gorsuch, and Davis[208] and McFarland,[209] have made similar suggestions, though Batson et al. have most clearly articulated the potentially important distinction between proscribed and nonproscribed prejudice. But how do we decide which prejudices are proscribed and which are not? We might argue that all prejudice is proscribed by Christian and some non-Christian religions, which teach that people should be sensitive, caring, and helpful to *all* other people. Of course, specific religious individuals and groups have used religious teachings as justification for many discriminatory attitudes and

behaviors. Even within Christianity, interpretations of Biblical passages vary from denomination to denomination, from church to church, and even from individual to individual within a given church. It is not always easy to ascertain whether specific prejudice is proscribed or not, partly because of such variations.

Batson et al. have argued that some prejudice (e.g., racial) is now proscribed by mainline North American Christian churches, but that prejudice against homosexuals and Communists is not. Certainly, the link between religion and negative attitudes toward homosexuality is well established (see Chapter 4).[210] Unfortunately, studies on religion and homosexuality have not attempted to assess the proscribed–nonproscribed distinction. Research is needed to test these proposals—research that attempts to obtain clear estimates of the extent to which different prejudices are proscribed, possibly by analyzing the publications of specific religious groups, public statements by clergy, or even transcripts of sermons or religious services. It is conceivable that some of the previous findings that seemed contradictory could be "explained" by the proscribed versus nonproscribed distinction if we could accurately estimate the extent to which faiths denounce specific prejudices.

Religious Fundamentalism and Quest

Recent evidence suggests that there may be other ways of assessing religious orientation that are more productive in explaining religion's link with prejudice than the traditional intrinsic–extrinsic distinction is. Of particular interest are two concepts: religious fundamentalism and quest. Both of these approaches to religious orientation avoid focusing on the content of beliefs; rather, they emphasize the ways in which beliefs are held, as well as the openness of people to changes in their beliefs.

Defining Fundamentalism. Early in this century, William James anticipated the importance of going beyond the content or orthodoxy of a person's beliefs.[211] He argued that a rigid, dogmatic style of religious belief may be associated with bigotry and prejudice. In fact, over the years, some investigators have used the term "religious fundamentalism" to capture this rigid, dogmatic way of being religious. In this context, some researchers reported a positive relationship between fundamentalism and prejudice. However, definition of the term "fundamentalism" was quite variable, and often did not correspond to religious use of the word. In fact, early researchers often used the term interchangeably with "orthodoxy of belief," "intense interest in religion," or "considerable religious involvement."

More recently, Altemeyer and Hunsberger have offered a definition of religious fundamentalism that is theoretically distinct from these other aspects of religion:

> the belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity.[212]

This definition, which is consistent with other recent theoretical work on fundamentalism by Kirkpatrick and colleagues,[213] is potentially applicable to most major world religions, unlike much previous work on fundamentalism. Also, the reader will recognize that we might expect this conceptualization to be negatively related to Batson's quest orientation,

which involves a questioning approach to religion, openness and flexibility, and a resistance to clear-cut, pat answers.[214]

Fundamentalism and Quest Scales. Furthermore, scales with good psychometric properties have been generated to measure both of these religious orientations. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (see Research Box 10.6, below) developed a 20-item Religious Fundamentalism scale, balanced against response sets, which generated Cronbach's alphas of .91 to .95 in different studies; they also developed a 16-item balanced Quest scale, which had an alpha of .88.[215] Batson and Schoenrade's revised 12-item Quest scale generated alphas of .81 and .75 in two samples.[216] We must be careful in comparing the two Quest scales, however, since they have little item overlap, and it is not clear to what extent they might tap different conceptualizations of quest.

Relationships with Prejudice. All three of these scales have been found to correlate significantly with measures of prejudice. Batson et al.[217] cited five studies (by Batson et al.,[218] McFarland,[219] and Snook & Gorsuch[220]) that revealed significant negative relationships between Quest scores and prejudice. Two other studies (by Griffin et al.,[221] and Ponton & Gorsuch[222]) did not replicate this negative association. However, all of these studies apparently used the earlier, psychometrically weaker version of Batson's Quest scale.[223]

Altemeyer and Hunsberger reported that their Religious Fundamentalism and Quest scales were strongly negatively correlated (e.g., $r = -.79$ in an adult sample), as expected.[224] They also found that fundamentalism scores were significantly and positively correlated with four measures of prejudice and authoritarian aggression (r's ranged from .23 to .41), and that Quest scores were significantly negatively associated with the same prejudice measures (r's ranged from $-.26$ to $-.39$). The positive relationship between fundamentalism and prejudice has apparently been replicated by Kirkpatrick[225] and McFarland[226] in studies involving somewhat different measures of fundamentalism that had a more Christian focus.

Can Prejudice be Reduced by Decreasing Fundamentalism? Recently, Billiet has argued that among a sample of Flemish Catholics, "sociocultural Christianity" tended to prevent fundamentalism, "a religious orientation that could encourage ethnocentrism."[227] He defines sociocultural Christianity as "the values of solidarity, charity, and social justice, which have been emphasized in the legitimations and the collective identity of the Catholic social organizations [in Belgium] since the late sixties."[228] Thus, Billiet argues that a pattern of specific faith values (sociocultural Christianity), when taught and emphasized by churches, can serve to ameliorate ethnocentrism by counteracting the development of religious fundamentalism. Billiet points out that Flemish "Catholic church leaders and prominent Catholics declared openly that they favored the integration of immigrants, and Catholic organizations promoted the idea."[229] This is certainly consistent with the suggestion that the proscribed–nonproscribed distinction is important in the study of religion and prejudice.

Summary. In the end, these relationships between fundamentalism and quest on the one hand and prejudice on the other emphasize the potential importance and utility of these two approaches to religious orientation in explaining the historical religion–prejudice relationship. However, we need to consider an additional concept, right-wing authoritarianism, in this regard.

The Link with Right-Wing Authoritarianism

Religion, Authoritarianism, and Prejudice. Nearly 50 years ago, Adorno et al. noted that religiousness was related to authoritarianism, as measured by the California F scale.[230] For example, it was rare for religious people also to score low on authoritarianism. However, this early work on authoritarianism has received considerable criticism on methodological and conceptual grounds,[231] and Adorno et al. used rather unsophisticated operationalizations of religion (e.g., frequency of attendance, importance of religion).

Work by Altemeyer has confirmed that right-wing authoritarianism may help us to understand the relatively high levels of prejudice found among fundamentalist and nonquesting religious persons.[232] Altemeyer has done a considerable amount of work on reconceptualizing authoritarianism. He focuses on three attitudinal clusters (authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism) instead of Adorno et al.'s proposed nine components of authoritarianism. As Duckitt has noted, Altemeyer's conceptualization of authoritarianism and his development of a reliable and valid Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale to measure this construct "finally seem to have made it possible for the study of authoritarianism to move beyond the unresolved methodological controversies and inconclusive findings that have thus far plagued it."[233]

Adding Fundamentalism and Quest to the Equation. Altemeyer and Hunsberger conducted a study to assess the links among fundamentalism, quest, prejudice, and right-wing authoritarianism (see Research Box 10.6).[234] They found that people who scored high on the authoritarianism scale were commonly fundamentalist in religious orientation ($r = .68$), and prejudiced in a variety of ways (r's = .33 to .64). This is not to imply that all highly authoritarian individuals are religious fundamentalists, nor that fundamentalists are necessarily highly authoritarian. However, "off-quadrant" cases (i.e., those high in authoritarianism and low in fundmentalism, or vice versa) were quite rare, and Altemeyer has concluded that religion and authoritarianism do seem to "feed" each other.[235] That is, religious fundamentalism and authoritarianism both encourage obedience to authority, conventionalism, self-righteousness, and feelings of superiority.

Given these relationships, we might wonder whether fundamentalism or authoritarianism (or neither) is the more basic "causative agent" with respect to prejudice. This is not an easy matter to resolve, especially with the available correlational data, but the evidence leans toward authoritarianism as the more basic factor. For example, in Altemeyer and Hunsberger's central study of almost 500 adults, partialing out the effects of authoritarianism from the sizeable fundamentalism–prejudice relationship reduced these correlations to nonsignificant levels. But removing fundamentalism from the authoritarianism–prejudice associations only slightly reduced them. Although not definitive, this suggests that right-wing authoritarianism is the more basic contributor to prejudice. In other words, fundamentalism correlates with measures of prejudice because fundamentalists tend to be right-wing authoritarians. Thus, as Hunsberger has suggested elsewhere, "fundamentalism might be viewed as a religious manifestation of right-wing authoritarianism."[236] If this is true, one might expect people with right-wing authoritarian personalities to become religious fundamentalists, and religious fundamentalism would be expected to encourage and reinforce this (authoritarian) personality.

What about Non-Christian Religions? Recently, Hunsberger assessed these relationships in small samples of people from non-Christian religions in Canada.[237] The psychometric

Research Box 10.6. Authoritarianism, Religious Fundamentalism, Quest, and Prejudice (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992)

"Are religious persons usually good persons?" Altemeyer and Hunsberger sought to answer this question within the context of their measures of religious fundamentalism, religious quest, prejudice, and right-wing authoritarianism. They proposed a definition of fundamentalism (see text) that allowed the development of a 20-item Religious Fundamentalism scale, including items such as "God has given mankind a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed." They developed this measure, as well as a 16-item Quest scale, in several studies of university students in Manitoba and Ontario. Satisfied that their new measures were reliable and that they interrelated as expected among students, the authors then carried out an investigation of 491 Canadian parents of university students.

In addition to the Fundamentalism and Quest scales, these adults completed a 12-item Attitudes Toward Homosexuals scale (e.g., "In many ways, the AIDS disease currently killing homosexuals is just what they deserve"); a 20-item Prejudice scale (e.g., "It is a waste of time to train certain races for good jobs; they simply don't have the drive and determination it takes to learn a complicated skill"); the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale; and two additional measures of prejudice—a Posse–Radicals survey (in which participants indicated the extent to which they would pursue radicals outlawed by the government), and a Trials measure (in which respondents "passed sentence" in three court cases involving a dope pusher, a pornographer, and someone who spit on a provincial premier). The resulting web of relatively strong and significant correlations led these authors to conclude the following about the answer to their initial question ("Are religious persons usually good persons?"):

> [It] appears to be "no," if one means by "religious" a fundamentalist, nonquesting religious orientation, and by "good" the kind of nonprejudiced, compassionate, accepting attitudes espoused in the Gospels and other writings. But the answer is "yes" if one means by "religious" the nonfundamentalist, questing orientation found most often in persons belonging to no religion. Which irony gives one pause. (pp. 125–126)

The authors have cautioned against overgeneralizing these findings, since there were inevitably exceptions to the rule—people who scored high on the fundamentalism scale and low on the Quest scale who showed nonprejudiced, accepting attitudes, or nonfundamentalist questers who were quite bigoted. But the correlations that emerged were quite strong and clear-cut. Apparently fundamentalists and nonquesters, as defined here, tend to be prejudiced in a variety of ways. The authors speculate that fundamentalist beliefs can be linked to some of the psychological sources of authoritarian aggression (e.g., fear of a dangerous world and self-righteousness), as well as the tendency for authoritarians to reduce guilt over their own misdeeds through their religion.

properties of the fundamentalism scale, as well as its relationship to prejudice and right-wing authoritarianism, remained relatively stable in his samples of adult Hindus, Muslims, and Jews (Cronbach's alpha for the fundamentalism scale ranged from .85 to .94; its correlations with attitudes toward homosexuals were .42 to .65; and fundamentalism–authoritarianism correlations ranged from .45 to .74). These results seem to confirm the links among fundamentalism, right-wing authoritarianism and prejudice across various religious groups. How-

ever, further research is needed to assess the relationships in larger samples, and also among non-Christian groups outside of North America.

Reactions and Extensions. The findings described above have not gone without comment in the psychology-of-religion literature. Gorsuch has questioned several aspects of the Altemeyer and Hunsberger study,[238] and the original authors have provided additional data and arguments to support their conclusions.[239]

Leak and Randall have suggested that authoritarianism's positive association with religion is limited to measures of "less mature faith development."[240] They found that such "less mature" measures of religion (e.g., measures of Christian Orthodoxy, Fowler's second and third stages of faith development [see Chapter 2], and church attendance) were positively related to authoritarianism scores, but "more mature" measures of religion (e.g., Batson's Quest scale, measures of Fowler's fourth and fifth faith stages, and a Global Faith Development scale) were negatively correlated with authoritarianism. The real issue here may be semantics. Just what *is* "mature faith?" Leak and Randall have chosen to regard a quest sort of orientation as "mature." Their Global Faith Development scale includes items such as "It is very important for me to critically examine my religious beliefs and values,"[241] and in this respect it bears some resemblance to quest scales. It is not surprising that such measures have a negative association with authoritarianism, as previously reported by Altemeyer and Hunsberger. However, it seems a moot point to define, for example, Global Faith Development and Batson's quest orientation as "mature" and religious orthodoxy and fundamentalism as "less mature." Orthodox religious persons and those with a fundamentalist orientation may feel that *their* religion is the mature one and that questing is immature. In the end, we would suggest that Leak and Randall's findings are consistent with earlier findings of fundamentalism–quest–prejudice–authoritarianism relationships.

Finally, it is worth noting that the relationships described here are not unique to the specific measures and North American samples reported above. Recent studies by Eisinga et al.[242] and Billiet[243] in Europe, using very different measures of religiousness, authoritarianism, and prejudice, have found links among these measures which are quite consistent with the findings reported above. Apparently the religion–prejudice–authoritarianism findings cut across differing measures and cultural contexts, at least within Christianity.

Summary

Clearly, the religion–prejudice link is more complicated than the initial suggestion of a linear relationship between church attendance and prejudiced attitudes. However, unlike some other reviewers of the religion–prejudice literature, we have concluded that the intrinsic–extrinsic dichotomy has not been especially helpful in understanding the relationship between religion and prejudice. Furthermore, we now know that it was premature to conclude that Gorsuch and Aleshire's 1974 review of the prejudice–religion literature[244] "marked the end of an era," since "by the early 1970s, mainstream American culture no longer countenanced blatant prejudice. The casual church attender thus stopped admitting to bigoted outlooks, and results became nonreplicable."[245] Developments in the 1990s have shown that we have much to learn about this area. A religious fundamentalist and nonquesting orientation is apparently linked to prejudice and discrimination; there is also some evidence that it is not religious fundamentalism per se that causes prejudice, but rather the tendency for fundamentalists also to be right-wing authoritarians.

In keeping with one of our basic themes, this may be an example of how the meaning, control, and self-esteem that religion offers to people can lead to negative outcomes. In some circumstances, control can contribute to authoritarian submission and aggression, as manifested in prejudice. And meaning and self-esteem can be carried too far, possibly contributing to self-righteousness. However, such unpleasant associations with religion seem to have more to do with the style of holding religious beliefs than with the beliefs themselves.

It is disconcerting to some that those who make the strongest claims to being "true believers" of religious traditions, and who reportedly follow religious teachings most scrupulously, are also those who tend to be the most intolerant of others. That is, prejudice seems relatively unrelated to the content of people's beliefs, but it is associated with the ways in which people hold their religious beliefs, possibly through the influence of right-wing authoritarianism. These conclusions need further investigation, but findings from the past decade suggest considerable promise for this approach to the religion–prejudice relationship.

OVERVIEW

We have taken something of a roller-coaster ride in this chapter. Religion does indeed seem to be related to some aspects of moral attitudes and behaviors. We have seen that in the areas of substance use/abuse, nonmarital sexual behavior, and (to a lesser extent) crime and delinquency, more religious persons generally report that they have stricter moral attitudes and are less likely to engage in behaviors that contravene societal and especially religious norms. However, faith is surprisingly unrelated to some other behaviors, such as cheating/dishonesty and helping behavior. There are indications that religious people *say* they are more honest and helpful, but the data do not bear this out for actual behavior in a secular setting. Within a religious context, the more faithful do indeed help more by giving money, time, and talent to religiously based causes. However, outside such a context, it becomes very difficult to distinguish helpers from nonhelpers on the basis of their religion. Batson and his coresearchers have tried to build a case for the argument that intrinsic religiousness is only related to the *appearance* of helpfulness, not to actual behavior; however, some studies fail to find any association between intrinsicness and self-reported helping. Also, the quest orientation is positively associated with behavioral measures of giving assistance to others. Furthermore, when people do help others, there is some evidence that intrinsic persons may offer a kind of preprogrammed, self-serving aid, whereas individuals scoring high on quest offer a more flexible and victim-focused assistance. Still, there are arguments against this interpretation.

These findings deserve a moment of reflection. Religious persons may derive some consolation from studies showing that personal faith is negatively associated with substance use/abuse, nonmarital sexual behavior, and some criminal and delinquent acts. However, these associations tend to be relatively weak when found. We might wonder why the correlations are not much larger, given the strength and consistency of religious teachings on these moral issues. In addition, there is the failure of religion to relate consistently to honesty versus cheating and to helping behavior. And the tendency for questers to be more apt to help is even more perplexing, in the sense that the quest orientation bears little similarity to what most people think of as religion in a traditional sense. Moreover, high questers tend to score low on measures of religious orthodoxy.[246]

Even more troubling than this, however, is what we find in the area of prejudice. Here, we go beyond the mere absence of a relationship to discover that in some ways, religion is

positively related to prejudice. This association has been researched and debated over the years, but in the end it seems that it is not religion per se that is linked to prejudice, but rather the ways in which one holds one's faith. Thus, religious fundamentalism is positively, and quest negatively, associated with various measures of prejudice.

One drawback to most of the research discussed in this chapter is that it relies very heavily on self-reports of moral attitudes and behaviors. We have already warned that such self-reports may be inaccurate and unreliable. However, in most cases it is very difficult to measure actual moral behavior, and few studies have attempted to do so, especially in highly sensitive domains such as prejudice. In consequence, we must rely on self-reports as "the next best thing," which in many cases probably gives us a reasonable impression of people's attitudes and behaviors. However, we must recognize the weakness inherent in this approach, and strive wherever possible to supplement these measures with convergent reports (e.g., from parents, friends, teachers) and especially with actual behavioral measures.

In the end, we are left to puzzle over many things. Why do the obtained relationships vary so much for different moral behaviors? Why doesn't religion have a stronger impact in *all* of these areas? How do we explain the "no relationship" findings? Why do some highly religious persons show considerable intolerance of others? We would suggest that styles of being religious (i.e., fundamentalism and quest) must be taken more seriously in research on religion and morality. We must also consider the potential impact of an associated personality variable, right-wing authoritarianism, especially with respect to the religion–prejudice link.

NOTES

1. Allport (1954, p. 444).
2. Whitehead (1926, p. 37).
3. Ritzema (1979, p. 105).
4. Schmidt (1995, p. 111).
5. Excerpt from a fund-raising letter distributed in March 1995 by the Christian Coalition, as quoted in Birnbaum (1995, p. 22).
6. Spilka, Hood, and Gorsuch (1985).
7. Birnbaum (1995, p. 22).
8. See, e.g., Darley and Shultz (1990).
9. Bryan and Freed (1993).
10. Hayes and Hornsby-Smith (1994).
11. Lottes, Weinberg, and Weller (1993).
12. Bibby (1987).
13. Krishnan (1993).
14. Marsiglio (1993).
15. Wilcox and Jelen (1991).
16. Alexander and Judd (1986).
17. Domino and Miller (1992).
18. Shuman, Fournet, Zelhart, Roland, and Estes (1992).
19. Seals, Ekwo, Williamson, and Hanson (1985).
20. Herold, Corbesi, and Collins (1994).
21. Hayes and Hornsby-Smith (1994).
22. Bibby (1987).
23. Larsen and Long (1988).
24. Bibby (1987).
25. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992).
26. Fisher, Cook, and Shirkey (1994).

27. Scott (1989).
28. Hartshorne and May (1928, 1929); Hartshorne, May, and Shuttleworth (1930).
29. Hightower (1930).
30. Goldsen, Rosenberg, Williams, and Suchman (1960).
31. Spilka and Loffredo (1982).
32. Chadwick and Top (1993).
33. Guttman (1984).
34. Smith, Wheeler, and Diener (1975).
35. Grasmick, Bursik, and Cochran (1991); Grasmick, Kinsey, and Cochran (1991).
36. ter Voert, Felling, and Peters (1994).
37. Gorsuch and Butler (1976).
38. Benson (1992b); Gorsuch (1995).
39. Khavari and Harmon (1982).
40. Khavari and Harmon (1982).
41. Benson, Wood, Johnson, Eklin, and Mills (1983).
42. Perkins (1994).
43. Benson (1992b).
44. Donahue (1987).
45. Cochran, Beeghley, and Bock (1988).
46. Benson and Donahue (1989).
47. Benson (1992b).
48. Donahue (1987).
49. Adlaf and Smart (1985); Hundleby (1987).
50. Adelekan, Abiodun, Imouokhome-Obayan, Oni, and Ogunremi (1993).
51. Francis and Mullen (1993).
52. Pettersson (1991).
53. Kandel and Sudit (1982).
54. Demerdash, Mizaal, el Farouki, and El Mossalem (1981).
55. Engs (1982); Najman, Williams, Keeping, Morrison, and Anderson (1988).
56. Rochford, Purvis, and NeMar (1989).
57. Richardson (1995).
58. Galanter and Buckley (1978).
59. Latkin (1995, p. 179).
60. See, e.g., Cochran (1992).
61. Benson (1992b, p. 216).
62. See, e.g., Cochran et al. (1988); Cochran, Beeghley, and Bock (1992).
63. See, e.g., Hadaway, Elifson, and Petersen (1984).
64. Benson (1992b, p. 218).
65. Cochran (1993).
66. Beeghley, Bock, and Cochran (1990).
67. Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis (1993).
68. Gorsuch (1995).
69. Benson (1992b).
70. Some authors have argued that AA's success, especially as portrayed in the mass media, is overrated. See, e.g., Bufe (1991).
71. Maxwell (1984); Morreim (1991).
72. Batson et al. (1993).
73. Forliti and Benson (1986).
74. Makela (1975).
75. Spencer and Agahi (1982).
76. Marin (1976).
77. Isralowitz and Ong (1990).
78. Oshodin (1983).
79. Natera et al. (1983).
80. Clark (1969).
81. Siegel (1977).
82. Westermeyer and Walzer (1975).
83. See, e.g., Gorsuch (1995); Petraitis, Flay, and Miller (1995).

84. Shea (1992, p. 70).
85. See, e.g., Patton (1988).
86. Cochran and Beeghley (1991, p. 46).
87. Newman and Newman (1995, p. 439).
88. Thornton and Camburn (1989).
89. Cochran and Beeghley (1991).
90. Cochran and Beeghley (1991, p. 46).
91. Haerich (1992).
92. Woodroof (1985).
93. Reynolds (1994).
94. Hammond, Cole, and Beck (1993).
95. Walinsky (1995).
96. Durkheim (1915).
97. Jensen and Erickson (1979).
98. Hirschi and Stark (1969).
99. See, e.g., Burkett and White (1974).
100. See, e.g., Elifson, Petersen, and Hadaway (1983); Peek, Curry, and Chalfant (1985).
101. Jensen and Erickson (1979).
102. Chadwick and Top (1993).
103. Bainbridge (1989).
104. Pettersson (1991).
105. Shaffer et al. (1987).
106. Cochran, Wood, and Arneklev (1994).
107. Hirschi and Stark (1969).
108. Bainbridge (1992).
109. Stark (1984).
110. Capps (1992).
111. Greven (1991).
112. Bottoms, Shaver, Goodman, and Qin (1995).
113. Neufeld (1979).
114. Steele and Pollock (1968).
115. Hull and Burke (1991).
116. Elliott (1994).
117. Clarke (1986); Pagelow and Johnson (1988).
118. Ozorak (1996).
119. Alsdurf and Alsdurf (1988).
120. Makepeace (1987).
121. Brinkerhoff, Grandin, and Lupri (1992).
122. Brinkerhoff et al. (1992, p. 28).
123. We must consider the possibility that this male–female difference could represent a self-serving bias on the part of the men.
124. Ellison (1991a).
125. Benson, Donahue, and Erickson (1989).
126. Burkett and Warren (1987); Cochran et al. (1994); Elifson et al. (1983); Welch, Tittle, and Petee (1991).
127. Benson et al. (1989, p. 172).
128. Chadwick and Top (1993).
129. Peek et al. (1985).
130. Coward (1986).
131. Oliner and Oliner (1988).
132. Batson (1991).
133. See, e.g., Langford and Langford (1974); Nelson and Dynes (1976); Rokeach (1969).
134. See, e.g., Friedrichs (1960); Cline and Richards (1965).
135. Nelson and Dynes (1976).
136. Hunsberger and Platonow (1986).
137. Batson et al. (1993).
138. Forbes, TeVault, and Gromoll (1971).
139. Smith et al. (1975).
140. Annis (1975, 1976).

141. McKenna (1976).
142. Yinon and Sharon (1985).
143. Batson et al. (1993, p. 342).
144. Batson (1976, 1990); Batson, Schoenrade, and Pych (1985); Batson et al. (1993).
145. Bernt (1989); Chau, Johnson, Bowers, Darvill, and Danko (1990); Johnson et al. (1989); Tate and Miller (1971); Watson, Hood, Morris, and Hall (1984); Watson, Hood, and Morris (1985).
146. Batson et al. (1993).
147. Benson et al. (1980).
148. Hunsberger and Platonow (1986).
149. Darley and Batson (1973).
150. Gorsuch (1988); Watson et al. (1985).
151. Batson and Gray (1981).
152. Batson et al. (1989).
153. Batson and Flory (1990).
154. Batson et al. (1989).
155. See, e.g., Gorsuch (1988); Watson et al. (1984).
156. Ritzema (1979).
157. Glock and Stark (1966).
158. Eisinga, Konig, and Scheepers (1995).
159. Allport (1954, p. 444).
160. Gorsuch and Aleshire (1974).
161. Batson et al. (1993).
162. Spilka, Hood, and Gorsuch (1985).
163. Wulff (1991, pp. 219–220).
164. Batson et al. (1993).
165. Dittes (1969).
166. Gorsuch and Aleshire (1974).
167. Meadow and Kahoe (1984).
168. Myers (1987).
169. Paloutzian (1996).
170. Spilka, Hood, and Gorsuch (1985).
171. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950).
172. Batson et al. (1993).
173. Gorsuch (1993); Gorsuch and Aleshire (1974).
174. Wulff (1991).
175. Gorsuch (1988, p. 212).
176. Spilka, Hood, and Gorsuch (1985, p. 271).
177. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1993).
178. Struening (1963).
179. Hunsberger (1995).
180. See, e.g., Eisinga, Felling, and Peters (1990).
181. Adorno et al. (1950).
182. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992).
183. Struening (1963).
184. Friedrichs (1959).
185. Wulff (1991).
186. Struening (1963).
187. Allport and Ross (1967).
188. See, e.g., Gorsuch (1988).
189. Spilka, Hood, and Gorsuch (1985, p. 273).
190. Kirkpatrick (1989); Kirkpatrick and Hood (1990).
191. Hunsberger (1995, p. 117).
192. Donahue (1985b, p. 405).
193. Hoge and Carroll (1973, p. 189). Emphasis added.
194. Batson et al. (1993).
195. Batson, Flink, Schoenrade, Fultz, and Pych (1986).
196. Batson, Naifeh, and Pate (1978).
197. Donahue (1985b).

198. Batson et al. (1978).
199. Hunsberger and Platonow (1986).
200. Spilka, Kojetin, and McIntosh (1985).
201. Morris, Hood, and Watson (1989).
202. Watson, Morris, Foster, and Hood (1986).
203. Crowne and Marlowe (1964).
204. Batson et al. (1978).
205. Watson et al. (1986, p. 230).
206. Leak and Fish (1989).
207. Batson et al. (1993).
208. Griffin, Gorsuch, and Davis (1987).
209. McFarland (1989).
210. See, e.g., Gentry (1987); Herek (1988); Kunkel and Temple (1992); Marsiglio (1993); VanderStoep and Green (1988).
211. James (1902/1985).
212. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992, p. 118).
213. Kirkpatrick, Hood, and Hartz (1991).
214. Batson et al. (1993).
215. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992).
216. Batson and Schoenrade (1991a, 1991b).
217. Batson et al. (1993).
218. Batson et al. (1978, 1986).
219. McFarland (1989, 1990).
220. Snook and Gorsuch (1985).
221. Griffin et al. (1987).
222. Ponton and Gorsuch (1988).
223. Batson and Ventis (1982).
224. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992).
225. Kirkpatrick (1993).
226. McFarland (1989).
227. Billiet (1995, p. 231).
228. Billiet (1995, p. 231).
229. Billiet (1995, p. 232).
230. Adorno et al. (1950).
231. Altemeyer (1981).
232. Altemeyer (1981, 1988).
233. Duckitt (1992, p. 209).
234. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992).
235. Altemeyer (1988).
236. Hunsberger (1995, p. 121).
237. Hunsberger (1996).
238. Gorsuch (1993).
239. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1993).
240. Leak and Randall (1995).
241. Leak and Randall (1995, p. 248).
242. Eisinga et al. (1995).
243. Billiet (1995).
244. Gorsuch and Aleshire (1974).
245. Spilka, Hood, and Gorsuch (1985, p. 274).
246. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992); Batson et al. (1993).