(1999) have observed that certain individuals with high self-esteem who have narcissistic tendencies (including an inflated sense of self-esteem) can, in the face of threats to the ego, externalize blame and react violently to others. These arguments are reviewed. Finally, this chapter points to practical applications in considering interventions to promote realistically positive self-evaluations that serve adaptive mental health functions.

Developmental Differences in Self-Representations during Childhood and Adolescence

A central theme in this chapter is that the self is both a cognitive and a social construction. In this section, six stages of self-development are described, three in childhood and three during adolescence, focusing on both cognitive and social processes (see Table 30.1 and Table 30.2). Developmental differences in the structure, content, and valence of self-representations are highlighted. As I observed previously, it is critical to understand that developmental changes in the I-self (here viewed as cognitive processes) will affect the Me-self (namely, how one describes oneself). It is also imperative to realize that the self is constructed in the crucible of social relationships that will also affect these dimensions, particularly the content and valence of the Me-self. (See Harter, 1999, for more detailed discussion of these levels with illustrative cameo descriptions for each of the six stages.)

Toddlerhood to Early Childhood (Approximately Ages 2–4)

Theory and evidence (see Fischer, Hand, Watson, Van Parys, & Tucker, 1984; Griffin, as cited in Case, 1992; Harter, 1999; Higgins, 1991; Watson, 1990) indicate that the young child can construct very concrete cognitive representations of observable features of the self (e.g., "I know my ABCs; I can count; I can run fast; I live in a big house"). Damon and Hart (1988) label these as "categorical identifications" in that the young child understands the self only as separate, taxonomic attributes that may be physical (e.g., "I have blue eyes"), active (e.g., "I play ball"), social (e.g., "I have two sisters"), or psychological (e.g., "I am happy"). Case (1992) has referred to this level as "interrelational," in that young children can forge rudimentary links in the form of discrete event–sequence structures that are defined in terms of physical dimensions, behavioral events, or activity. However, they cannot coordinate two such structures (see also Griffin, 1992), in part because of working memory constraints that prevent the young child from holding several features in mind simultaneously.

Fisher's (1980) formulation is very similar. He has labeled these initial structures as "single representations." Such structures are highly differentiated from one another, because the cognitive limitations at this stage render the child incapable of integrating single representations into a coherent self-portrait. One manifestation of this self-structure is the inability to acknowledge that one can possess opposing attributes, for example, "good" and "bad" or "nice" and "mean" (Fischer et al., 1984). Children also deny that they can experience two *emotions,* both same-valence feelings (e.g., mad and sad) and opposite-valence emotions (e.g., happy and sad) at the same time (Harris, 1983; Harter & Buddin, 1987), leading to unrealistic perceptions of the emotional experience of self and others.

Moreover, self-evaluations during this period are likely to be unrealistically positive, as young children have difficulty distinguishing between their desired and their actual competence, a confusion initially observed by both Freud (1952) and Piaget (1932). For contemporary cognitive developmentalists, this problem stems from another cognitive limitation of this period, namely the inability to bring social comparison information to bear meaningfully on their competencies (Frey & Ruble, 1990). The ability to use social comparison toward the goal of self-evaluation requires that the child be able to relate one concept (one's own performance) to another (someone else's performance), a skill that is not sufficiently developed in the young child.

Higgins (1991), building on the models of Case (1985), Fischer (1980), and Selman (1980), has focused more on the interaction between the child's cognitive abilities and the role of socializing agents. He has provided evidence that at Case's stage of inter-

TABLE 30.1. Normative-Developmental Changes in Self-Representations during Childhood

Age period	Salient content	Structure/ organization	Valence accuracy	Nature of comparisons	Sensitivity to others
Very early childhood	Concrete, observable characteristics; simple taxonomic attributes in the form of abilities, activities, possessions, preferences	Isolated representations; lack of coherence, coordination; all-or-none thinking	Unrealistically positive; inability to distinguish real from ideal selves	No direct comparisons	Anticipation of adult reactions (praise, criticism); rudimentary appreciation of whether one is meeting others' external standards
Early to middle childhood	Elaborated taxonomic attributes; focus on specific competencies	Rudimentary links between representations; links typically opposites; all-or-none thinking	Typically positive; inaccuracies persist	Temporal comparisons with self when younger; comparisons with age-mates to determine fairness	Recognition that others are evaluating the self; initial introjection of others' opinions; others' standards becoming self-guides in regulation of behavior
Middle to late childhood	Trait labels that focus on abilities and interpersonal characteristics; comparative assessments with peers; global evaluation of worth	Higher-order generalizations that subsume several behaviors; ability to integrate opposing attributes	Both positive and negative evaluations; greater accuracy	Social comparison for purpose of self-evaluation	Internalization of others' opinions and standards, which come to function as self-guides

TABLE 30.2. Normative-Developmental Changes in Self-Representations during Adolescence

Age period	Salient content	Structure/ organization	Valence accuracy	Nature of comparisons	Sensitivity to others
Early adolescence	Social skills, attributes that influence interactions with others or one's social appeal; differentiation of attributes according to roles	Intercoordination of trait labels into single stractions; abstractions compartmentalized; all-or-none thinking; opposites; don't detect, integrate, opposing abstractions	Positive attributes at one point in time; negative attributes at another; leads to innacurate overgeneralizations	Social comparison continues, although less overt	Compartmentalized attention to internalization of different standards and opinions of those in different relational contexts
Middle adolescence	Further differentiation of attributes associated with different roles and relational contexts	Initial links between single abstractions, often opposing attributes; cognitive conflict caused by seemingly contradictory characteristics; concern over which reflect one's true self	Simultaneous recognition of positive and negative attributes; instability leading to confusion and inaccuracies	Comparisons with significant others in different relational contexts; personal fable	Awareness that the differing standards and opinions of others represent conflicting self-guides, leading to confusion over self-evaluation and vacillation with regard to behavior; imaginary audience
Late adolescence	Normalization of different role-related attributes; reflecting personal beliefs, values, and moral standards; interest in future selves	Higher-order abstractions that meaningfully integrate single abstractions and resolve inconsistencies, conflict	More balanced, stable view of both positive and negative attributes; greater accuracy; acceptance of limitations	Social comparison diminishes as comparisons with one's own ideals increase	Selection among alternative self-guides; construction of one's own self-standards that govern personal choices; creation of one's own ideals toward which the self aspires

relational development, very young children can place themselves in the same *category* as the parent who shares their gender, which forms an initial basis for *identification* with that parent. For example, the young boy can evaluate his overt behavior with regard to the question: "Am I doing what Daddy is doing?" Attempts to match that behavior, as well as cultural ideals concerning gender-appropriate behavior, will determine which attributes become incorporated into the young child's self-definition. Thus one observes the influence of the socializing environment on the self.

Higgins (1991) has noted that at the interrelational stage, young children can also form structures that allow them to detect the fact that their behavior evokes a reaction in caregivers, which in turn causes psychological reactions in themselves. These experiences shape the self to the extent that the child chooses to engage in behaviors designed to please the parents. Stipek, Recchia, and McClintic (1992), in a laboratory study, have provided empirical evidence for this observation, demonstrating that slightly before the age of 2, children begin to anticipate adult reactions, seeking positive responses to their successes and attempting to avoid negative responses to failure. At this age, they also find that young children show rudimentary appreciation for adult standards by turning away from adults and hunching their shoulders in the face of failures (see also Kagan, 1984, who has reported similar distress reactions). Although young children are beginning to recognize that their behavior has an impact on others, their I-self cannot yet evaluate their Me-self, consistent with the first stage of Selman's (1980) developmental model of self-awareness.

Early to Middle Childhood (Approximately Ages 5–7)

At the next level, children show some abilities to intercoordinate concepts that were previously compartmentalized (Case, 1985; Fischer, 1980). For example, they can form a category or representational *set* that relates a number of their competencies (good at running, jumping, climbing) to one another. Of particular interest are the structures that Fischer (1980) labels as "representational mappings," a level that was missing in earlier developmental models. Mappings represent links that are unidirectional or nonreversible. Thus representations are linked or mapped onto one another. One very common type of mapping involves a link in the form of *opposites*. For example, in the domain of physical concepts, children can oppose up and down, taller and shorter, thinner and wider, although they cannot yet demonstrate the reversible operation required for conservation. Educational instruction, as well as television programming (e.g., *Sesame Street*), serve to facilitate the detection and utilization of such opposites.

With regard to descriptions of self and other, the ability to oppose attributes perceived as "good" and "bad" (e.g., "nice" vs. "mean," "smart" vs. "dumb") is especially salient (Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990; Harter, 1986b; Ruble & Dweck, 1995). Given that "good" is defined as the opposite of "bad" and that the young child continues to identify self-attributes as positive, such a cognitive construction precludes the young child from acknowledging his or her negative characteristics (although *others* may be perceived as bad). Thus the child overdifferentiates good and bad. The very structure of such mappings, therefore, results in the unidimensional or all-or-none thinking that typically leads to self-descriptions that remain laden with virtuosity. (In child-rearing situations involving harsh discipline for misbehavior, or for a subset of children with very negative socialization histories involving abuse, maltreatment, or neglect, children may at times conclude that they are *all bad,* an unfortunate liability at this stage for such children. However, the underlying structure is the same, namely a mapping in the form of opposites that results in all-or-none, unidimensional thinking.) In Case's (1992) theory and its application to the self (Griffin, 1992), similar structures are posited. In fact, this stage is labelled "unidimensional" thinking. Evidence reveals that although children at this level can develop representational sets or categories for self-attributes and self-emotions, they cannot as yet integrate attributes or affects of opposing valence, for example, smart versus dumb (Harter, 1986b), nice versus mean (Fischer et al., 1984), or happy versus sad (Harter & Buddin, 1987).

Higgins (1991) has moved beyond a con-

sideration of the structural features of self-descriptors at this age level in examining how an increasing cognitive appreciation for the perspective of *others* influences self-development. The relational structures of this level allow the child to realize that socializing agents have a particular *viewpoint* (not merely a reaction) toward them and their behavior. As Selman (1980) has observed, the improved perspective-taking skills at this age permit the child to realize that others are actively *evaluating* the self, although they have not yet internalized these evaluations sufficiently to evaluate the self independently. Nevertheless, as Higgins argues, the viewpoints of others begin to function as "self-guides" as the child comes to identify further with what they perceive socializing agents expect of the self. These self-guides function to aid children in the regulation of their behavior. The findings of Stipek and colleagues (1992) provide direct evidence that these processes begin to be observed shortly after the age of 3.

With regard to the interaction between cognitive-developmental level and the socializing environment, there are some advances with regard to the ability to utilize social comparison information, although there are also limitations. Frey and Ruble (1985, 1990), as well as Suls and Sanders (1982), have provided evidence that children first focus on *temporal* comparisons (how I am performing now, compared with when I was younger) rather than comparisons with age-mates. Such temporal comparisons are particularly gratifying given the rapid skill development at this age level, and therefore such comparisons contribute to the positive self-evaluations that typically persist at this age level. Evidence (see Ruble & Frey, 1991) now reveals that younger children do engage in certain forms of social comparison; however, it is directed toward different goals than for older children. For example, young children use such information to determine if they have received their fair share of rewards, rather than for purposes of self-evaluation.

Middle to Late Childhood (Approximately Ages 8–11)

The major advance of this age period is the ability to coordinate self-representations that were previously differentiated or considered to be opposites. In Case's (1985, 1992) theory, this level is labeled "bidimensional" thought. In identifying similar structures, Fischer (1980) labels this stage as "representational systems." Siegler's (1991) strategy construction processes at this level also include higher order generalizations of features previously compartmentalized. These frameworks lead to the expectation, supported by findings (see Harter, 1999), that the child is capable of forming higher order concepts, namely trait labels, based on the integration of more specific behavioral features of the self. Thus the higher order generalization that one is smart integrates observations of success in both English and social studies. Similarly, the child could construct a hierarchy for the construct "dumb," coordinating perceptions of lack of ability in mathematics and in science. In the domain of social relationships, the self can be viewed as both rowdy (with close friends and with kids on the bus) and shy (around someone they don't know and with someone who is more competent). Thus concepts previously viewed as opposing can now be integrated, leading to both positive and *negative* self-evaluations.

Such bidimensional thought is applied to emotion concepts, as well, as a growing number of empirical studies indicate (Carroll & Steward, 1984; Donaldson & Westerman, 1986; Fischer et al., 1990; Gnepp, McKee, & Domanic, 1987; Harris, 1983; Harris, Olthof, & Meerum-Terwogt, 1981; Harter, 1986b; Harter & Buddin, 1987; Reissland, 1985). Thus one can develop a representational system by integrating *happy* (when one is playing sports) with *sad* (when my efforts on the team are not successful). With the emerging ability to integrate positive and negative concepts about the self, the child is much less likely to engage in the type of all-or-none thinking observed in the previous stages, in which typically only one's positive attributes were touted. As a result, self-descriptions begin to represent a more balanced presentation of one's abilities in conjunction with one's limitations, perceptions that are likely to be more veridical with others' views of the self.

For Case (1985, 1992), the emergence of these structures partially depends on experiences in which two lower order features, for

example, perceptions of smartness and dumbness, are activated simultaneously or in rapid sequence. Thus events that make each of these attributes salient will foster such bidimensional structures. Moreover, Case emphasizes the general role of *practice*. Repeated exposure to such events (e.g., "On my report card I got an A in English but only a C+ in Math") should reinforce this type of intercoordination. One can imagine scenarios in which there would be little environmental support for such integration. For example, children who are severely abused typically develop negative self-perceptions that not only lead them to feel unworthy and unlovable but to experience a profound sense of inner badness, as if they were inherently "rotten to the core," as revealed in clinical observations (Briere, 1992; Harter, 1999; Herman, 1992; Terr, 1990; Westen, 1993), as well as research (Fischer & Ayoub, 1994). In abusing environments, family members typically offer and continue to reinforce negative evaluations of the child that are then incorporated into the child's self-portrait. As a result, there may be little scaffolding for the kind of self-structure that would allow the child to develop, as well as integrate, both positive and negative self-evaluations. Moreover, negative self-evaluations that become *automatized* (Siegler, 1991) are even more resistant to change.

The more balanced view of self, in which both positive and negative attributes of the self are acknowledged, is also fostered by social comparison. A number of studies conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s (reviewed in Frey & Ruble, 1990; Ruble & Frey, 1991) have presented evidence that it is not until middle childhood that one could utilize comparisons with others as a barometer of the skills and attributes of the self (see also Damon & Hart, 1988). From a cognitive developmental perspective, the ability to use social comparison information toward the goal of *self-evaluation* requires that children compare their own performance with that of another simultaneously, a skill that is not sufficiently developed at younger ages (see also Moretti & Higgins, 1990). Age stratification in school stimulates greater attention to individual differences between age-mates (Mack, 1983). The primary motive for children in this age period to utilize social comparison is for personal competence assessment. Moreover, with increasing age, children shift from more conspicuous forms of social comparison to more subtle avenues as they become more aware of the negative social consequences of overt forms, for example, being accused of boasting about their superior performance (Pomerantz, Ruble, Frey, & Greulich, 1995).

The ability to utilize social comparison information for the purpose of self-evaluation is founded on cognitive developmental advances and is supported by the socializing environment. However, it also ushers in potential liabilities, as others have cogently observed (Maccoby, 1980; Moretti & Higgins, 1990), contributing to individual differences in self-evaluation. With the emergence of the ability to rank order the performance of other students in the class, all but the most competent children will fall short. Jacobs (1983) has noted that this is a major liability for children with learning disabilities. Other research supports this observation in that learning-disabled students who were mainstreamed were found to have more negative perceptions of their scholastic competence than those in self-contained classrooms restricted only to learning-disabled students (Renick & Harter, 1988). Thus the very ability and penchant to compare the self with others makes one's self-concept vulnerable in those domains that are valued (e.g., scholastic competence, athletic prowess, and peer popularity). Moreover, to the extent that negative self-evaluations are now organized as relatively stable dispositional *traits* (rather than mere behaviors), they may be more resistant to disconfirmation.

The advances of this period also have implications for those looking-glass-self processes that require the ability to incorporate the opinions of significant others. For Higgins (1991), the newfound cognitive ability to form dispositional traits leads children to construct a more general evaluation of themselves as *persons*. This observation is consistent with my own empirical work demonstrating that the concept of global self-worth or self-esteem—namely, how much one likes oneself as a person—does not emerge until middle childhood (Harter, 1990b). Higgins has further observed that

the child can now focus on the "type of person" that others desire or expect him or her to be. Further cognitive acquisitions at this age allow the child to incorporate these expectations into self-guides that become even more internalized. Thus, as Selman (1980) also notes, the child incorporates both the standards and opinions of significant others, allowing the I-self to directly evaluate the Me-self.

Early Adolescence (Approximately Ages 12–14)

During this period, the young adolescent becomes capable of thinking abstractly (Case, 1985; Fischer, 1980; Flavell, 1985; Harter, 1983; Higgins, 1991). The ability to construct abstractions can be applied to inanimate features of one's world, as well as to self and others (see Table 30.2). This cognitive advance represents further intercoordination in that now trait labels are integrated into abstractions. For example, one may construct an abstraction of the self as *intelligent* by combining such traits as *smart* and *creative*. One also may create an abstraction that oneself is an "airhead," given situations in which one feels dumb and uncreative. Similarly, one may construct abstractions that one is an extrovert (integrating the traits of being rowdy and talkative), as well as that one is an introvert in certain situations (when one is shy and quiet). With regard to emotion concepts, one can be depressed (combining *sad* and *mad*), as well as cheerful (combining *happy* and *excited*). With regard to the *content* of these abstractions, Damon and Hart (1988) report that in the self-portraits of young adolescents, interpersonal attributes and social skills that influence interactions with others or one's social appeal are typically quite salient.

From a traditional Piagetian perspective, the formal operational skills that emerge during this age period should not only usher in abstract thinking but should also equip the adolescent with the tools to construct a formal, hypothetico-deductive theory (Piaget, 1960). Such a theory, be it about physical phenomena in the universe or about psychological attributes of the self, should meet certain criteria, for example, internal consistency, and should represent an integrated nomological network of postulates (Epstein, 1973). However, a neo-Piagetian analysis indicates that the newfound abstract representations are compartmentalized; that is, they are quite distinct from one another (Case, 1985; Fischer, 1980; Harter, 1990a; Higgins, 1991). For Fischer (1980), they are overdifferentiated from one another because the young adolescent lacks "cognitive control" over such abstractions and therefore can think about them only as isolated self-attributes. However, this inability to integrate seemingly contradictory characteristics of the self (*intelligent* vs. *airhead*, *extrovert* vs. *introvert*, *depressed* vs. *cheerful*) has the psychological advantage of sparing the adolescent conflict over opposing attributes in one's self-theory (Harter & Monsour, 1992). Increased differentiation functions as a cognitive buffer, reducing the possibility that negative attributes in one sphere may spread or generalize to another sphere (see Higgins, 1991; Linville, 1987; Simmons & Blyth, 1987).

Middle Adolescence (Approximately Ages 15–16)

During this period, further cognitive links are forged (Case, 1985; Fischer, 1980) in that the teenager can now begin to relate one abstraction to another (e.g., one can recognize that it is possible to be both intelligent and an airhead, both an extrovert and an introvert, both cheerful and depressed). Within Fischerian theory, these abstract "mappings" bear features in common with the earlier representational mappings in that such links often take the form of opposites. However, the mapping structure is an immature form of relating two abstract concepts to one another in that one cannot yet integrate such self-representations in a manner that would resolve the apparent contradiction. Thus, at the level of abstract mappings, the adolescent still does not possess the cognitive tools necessary to construct an integrated theory of self in which the postulates, namely, personal attributes, are internally consistent. Moreover, an awareness of the opposites within one's self-portrait causes considerable intrapsychic conflict, confusion, and distress (Fischer et al., 1990; Harter & Monsour, 1992; Higgins, 1991), given the inability to coordinate these seeming contradictions. Mappings also lead to

instability in the self-portrait, another form of lack of cognitive control. As a result, adolescents at this stage may frequently demonstrate all-or-none thinking (Harter, 1990b), vacillating from one extreme to the other (e.g., they may view themselves as brilliant at one point in time and a total airhead at another).

A major contextual factor contributing to the contradictions experienced at this age level involves socialization pressure to develop different selves in different roles or relationships (Erikson, 1968; Grotevant & Cooper, 1986; Hill & Holmbeck, 1986; Rosenberg, 1986). Such pressures provide a backdrop for the emergence of the "conflict of the different Me's" (James, 1890). Several studies have provided evidence that the self-descriptions of adolescents vary across different roles, for example, self with parents, close friends, romantic partners, and classmates (Gecas, 1972; Griffin, Chassin, & Young, 1981; Hart, 1988; Harter & Monsour, 1992; Rosenberg, 1986). Conflicts between opposing attributes in these different relational contexts have been found to be particularly problematic for adolescents at this age, in comparison with attributes within a role (Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey, & Whitesell, 1997). Higgins (1991) describes this new vulnerability in terms of conflicting *self-guides* across different roles, as adolescents attempt to meet the incompatible expectations of parents versus peers. Such discrepancies have been found to produce confusion, uncertainty, and indecision with regard to self-regulation and self-evaluation, consistent with the findings reported previously.

The vulnerability of this period is exacerbated by the ability to reflect on one's thinking and to ponder internal events, which brings about a dramatic increase in introspection (see Broughton, 1978; Erikson, 1968; Harter, 1990b; Rosenberg, 1979). In their search for a coherent self, adolescents in this age period are often morbidly preoccupied with how they appear in the eyes of others (see also Elkind, 1967; Lapsley & Rice, 1988). Such self-consciousness includes the search for "who I am," as the adolescent seeks to establish self-boundaries and to more clearly sort out the multiple "Me's" that provide for a very crowded self-landscape. The creation of a coherent self-portrait also shifts to a larger canvas during this and the subsequent period, in which broad brushstrokes must come to define the social, occupational, religious, and political *identities* that one will assume.

Late Adolescence

The cognitive advances during this period involve the construction of higher order abstractions that represent the meaningful intercoordination of single abstractions. As such, they should provide the older adolescent with new cognitive solutions for developing a more integrated theory of self. Neo-Piagetians (see Case, 1985; Fischer, 1980) observe that developmental acquisitions at these higher levels typically require greater scaffolding by the social environment in the form of support, instruction, and so forth, in order for individuals to function at their optimal levels. If these new skills are fostered, they should aid the adolescent in integrating opposing attributes in a manner that does not produce conflict or distress. For example, one could integrate one's extraversion and introversion by constructing the higher order abstraction that one is "flexible" across different social situations. One may integrate one's tendencies to be both intelligent and an airhead under the higher order abstraction of "inconsistent." Being both cheerful and depressed could similarly be coordinated under the rubric of "moody." Such higher order abstractions provide self-labels that bring meaning and therefore legitimacy to what formerly appeared to be troublesome contradictions within the self.

Findings (Harter & Monsour, 1992; Harter et al., 1997) indicate that not only do older adolescents utilize these strategies but that they also seek to normalize inconsistency by asserting that it would be strange and undesirable to display the same attributes across different relational contexts. Higgins (1991) has described the reduction in conflict as a function of further levels of internalization. Thus adolescents come to construct their *own* standards that represent an integration of a complex array of alternative self-guides that become less tied to their social origins. These findings are consistent with those of Damon and Hart (1988), who have reported that in late adolescence the

self is described in terms of an organized system of beliefs and values that include dimensions of personal choice and moral standards.

The Distinction between Global and Domain-Specific Self-Evaluations

The previous sections focused on more normative developmental processes that define changes in the structure, content, and valence of self-representations across childhood and adolescence. Emphasis now shifts to models and methods for examining *individual differences* in the valence of self-evaluations, asking the question of why some children and adolescents view the self favorably, whereas others report very unfavorable descriptions of self. In addressing this question, it is first necessary to distinguish between *global* perceptions of one's worth as a person (self-esteem or self-worth) and more *domain*-specific self-concepts (see Harter, 1999). A variety of multidimensional models have emerged in recent years, demonstrating that self-evaluations are multifaceted and that judgments will vary tremendously across domains, providing a *profile* of self-evaluations for given individuals (see Bracken, 1996; Harter, 1982, 1985, 1990b, 1993, 1999; Hattie, 1992; Marsh, 1986, 1987, 1993; Marsh & Hattie, 1996; Mullener & Laird, 1971; Oosterwegel & Oppenheimer, 1993; Shavelson & Marsh, 1986).

However, in each of these multidimensional models, the construct of global self-esteem or self-worth has also been retained. This construct is *not* assessed by aggregating the domain-specific scores but rather is tapped by its own set of items asking about how much one likes oneself overall as a person, values one's worth, and so forth. Of particular interest is the question of whether some domain-specific self-evaluations contribute more heavily to the prediction of global self-esteem than do others. From a developmental perspective, two features are noteworthy. The ability to make judgments of one's worth as a person does not emerge until middle childhood. Younger children are able to make judgments of their competence or adequacy in particular domains, although their self-evaluations are not as clearly differentiated (Harter & Pike, 1984). However, they do not possess a conscious, verbalizable concept of their overall self-esteem. Young children do *exude* a sense of their self-esteem, and these behavioral manifestations (e.g., displays of confidence, exploration) can be reliably rated by observers (Haltiwanger, 1989; Harter, 1999).

Secondly, the number of domains that can be differentiated increases with development across the periods of early childhood, middle and late childhood, adolescence, and adulthood (see Harter, 1999, for a listing of the specific domains at each developmental period). For example, the Self-Perception Profile for Children (Harter, 1985) taps five specific domains: Scholastic Competence, Athletic Competence, Peer Likability, Physical Appearance, and Behavioral Conduct, in addition to Global Self-Worth. The Self-Perception Profile for Adolescents (Harter, 1988) adds three new domains: Close Friendship, Romantic Appeal, and Job Competence. Additional domains are included on the Self-Perception Profile for College Students (Neemann & Harter, 1987) and the Self-Perception Profile for Adults (Messer & Harter, 1989), which can be found in Harter (1999). At every developmental level, preliminary interviews and focus groups were conducted to determine the domains that the majority felt were most salient.

Another popular series of multidimensional instruments has been developed by Marsh and Hattie (1996). Their self-description questionnaires tap domains appropriate for children, adolescents, and young adults, in addition to assessing general self-concept. The Multidimensional Self-Concept Scale developed by Bracken (1992, 1996) is the most recent such measure. For a comprehensive review of these and other self-concept measures, see Keith and Bracken (1996). The Harter and Marsh scales have also been reviewed by Wylie (1989). These instruments have been developed primarily for children and adolescents in Western, industrialized countries. Elsewhere (Harter, 1999), I have cautioned against using these measures in Eastern countries such as China, Japan, and Korea, where the findings reveal that for several reasons they are not culturally appropriate. Of particular interest in countries in which the scale has ex-