AU/ACSC/4439/AY06
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
MUSLIM ASSIMILATION INTO GERMANY
by 

Charles L. Ford Jr., Major, USAF 

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty 

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements 

Instructor: Lt Col Tom Ruby, USAF 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

April 2006 

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not
reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In
accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the
United States government.
1

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................... 3 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................
HOW GERMAN ADOLESCENTS FEEL ON INCLUSION AND 

........................... 4 

INTRODUCTION.......................................................................... 5 - 6 

CITIZENSHIP............................................................................... 7 

German Citizenship by Nationality................................................... 9 

Foreign Population in Germany........................................................ 11 

In-Flow of Foreign Population into Germany......................................... 12 

Summary................................................................................... 13 

Analysis.................................................................................... 14 

EXCLUSION OF IMMIGRANTS (A University of Bielefeld Study)..................15 

General Feeling of German, Turkish, and Resettler Youth.......................... 16 

Disapproval and Approval Comparison................................................ 18 

Experience of inter-ethnic personal contact............................................ 19 

THE "ROAD AHEAD"................................................................... 20 - 27 

CONCLUSION............................................................................. 28 - 29 

BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................................... 30 - 31 

2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to express my thanks to my wife Rhonda, who has been an inspiration to me for
the past 13 years. I'd like to recognize my three girls, Taylor, Mackenzie and Peyton, who are
all a blessing from God. They give me the energy and drive to tackle my studies daily.
Secondly, I must recognize my good friends from Germany, the Strauss Family,
Wolfgang, Edeltraud, Katharina, and Jan. My family lived across from them for three years
from 1999-2002. It was both an honor and privilege. My children learned a great deal from this
terrific family, and three years later now realize how important they were to my wife and
children. We miss them dearly. I'd also like to recognize my good friend, Ulo Poerschmann,
who attends the University of Bielefeld in Germany with Katharina.
Finally, I'd like to thank all of my instructors here at Air Command and Staff College
(ACSC). Each of them challenged me from day one, and hopefully one day I'll be able to apply
and pass along what I've learned over the past year.
3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Muslims have been living in Germany for over 300 years. After World War II Germany
experienced a large wave of Muslim immigrants flowing into the country as guest-workers. The
Muslim population is currently estimated at 3 million of Germany's total population of 82
million. Out of this 3 million Muslim population, two-thirds are of Turkish origin and one third
of them are under the age of 18. Additionally, the birthrate of the immigrant Muslim population
is three times the German average, and by 2020, experts say, the native German population will
decline by more than 4% while the Muslim population is forecasted to double.
This growing Muslim population is of considerable concern to the Germans. Currently,
there is an energetic debate in Germany concerning public policy goals. One argument is for the
German government to pursue policies that encourage Muslims to assimilate themselves to the
values of Western society, even when that means abandoning some particular features of their
religious identity. The other argument is for the government to encourage and celebrate religious
diversity.1
As a result of the 1991 and 1992 anti-asylum riots in the German cities of Rostock,
Hoyerswerda, and Mannheim, Germany has been forced to address their immigration policies.
Arguably, these riots fed the German's fear of the Muslim population and thus caused Muslim
alienation. In November 1992, Muslims themselves were victimized in a firebombing in Molln,
Germany, which killed two Turkish girls and a Turkish grandmother.2
Subsequently in 2002,
after the events of 9/11, non-government organizations in Germany have understandably
reported a rise in "Islamophobia". Consequently, Muslim organizations report efforts to
integrate into German society are often met with resistance.
1
Joel S. Fetzer & J. Christopher Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain France, and Germany, 2005, page 3.
2
Ibid, page 105.
4

INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, many Europeans began to look more
fearfully at the Muslims in their midst. The Europeans started speaking more openly and
critically about the Muslims and the societal changes the Muslims have wrought. Muslims, for
their part, protested that they suddenly had been turned into aliens in their adoptive German
home.3
As a result, tension between the German majority and the Muslim minority became an
issue for the German government.
Turkish Muslims have been living in Germany in various degrees of assimilation. On
one hand, there are Turks living in Germany who consider themselves German. On the other
hand, there are Turks living in Germany who have no intention of adopting the culture of their
German host country and in fact openly oppose the culture.4
For many young Muslims in
Germany, the goal is not to assimilate themselves into the secular values of the West, but instead
to adopt a true Islamic identity while living in the West. For example, Tuba Uncar, a 21 year old
Muslim female from Berlin, commented about assimilation into Germany when she said, "I am
integrated. I speak the German language. If you say I should live like Germans do, well, that's
not integration. That's assimilation and I don't want that." Her comment raises even the more
provocative question of whether Muslim's even strive for acceptance, or do they just want to live
in more of a secular environment.
Theorists of assimilation widely use generational categories to describe adaptation
processes. This entails distinguishing between the first, second, and third generations.
Subsequent generations are no longer described as `immigrants'. The second generation is
expected to be better adapted and similar to the host society than the first, and more likely to
3
Peter Grier, A Crescent Over Europe. Air Force Magazine, Jul 05, page 1. 

4
Hans S. Nichols. Germany Grapples With Immigration. Insight on the News Article. 30 Sep 2002. Page 1.

5

identify with the host society.5
As Germany faces the growing Muslim population of their
second, third and even fourth generations, questions arise as to whether Muslims can
successfully assimilate into German society. Can they adopt the customs and attitudes of the
prevailing German culture?
To measure Muslim assimilation into Germany this paper will measure assimilation
through two variables. The first variable is to measure citizenship. The dictionary defines
citizenship as an inhabitant of a town or city, one entitled to the rights and privileges of a free
man; a member of a state; a native of a naturalized person who owes allegiance to a government
and is entitled protection from it. Citizenship is defined as the status of being a citizen.6
Muslims requesting citizenship will be measured against other non-Muslim immigrants to see if
Muslims receive citizenship at a higher or lower rate than non-Muslims from other countries.
The second measurement of assimilation is an analysis of how adolescents in Germany
(regardless of their ethnic background) feel about inclusion and exclusion of immigrants. These
results come from a survey conducted by the University of Bielefeld in 2004. This study
compared inter-ethnic attitudes and inter-ethnic personal contact across three groups; Germans,
Turks, and Resettler Adolescents. The Bielefeld study addresses the Social Dominance Theory.
This theory argues that the major forms of intergroup conflict, such as racism, classism and
patriarchy, are all basically derived from the basic human predisposition to form and maintain
hierarchical and group-based systems of social organization. 7
5
Patricia Ehrkamp, Becoming Turkish: Enacting home, identity and resistance. Paper present at the TIRES 

Summer Institute, Miami, Fl, 2002, page 1.

6
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary; Tenth Edition.

7
Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto, Social Dominance, May 2001. 

http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521805406&ss=cop

6

CITIZENSHIP
Prior to the year 2000, the German concept of citizenship was based on ethnic descent
(jus sanguinis) as opposed to place of birth (jus soli). This traditional policy presented nearly
insurmountable hurdles for non-ethnic German foreigners who wished to gain German
citizenship.8
This concept discouraged foreigners from seeking citizenship. Thus, relatively
few non-European foreigners obtained German citizenship during this time.9
It was not until 2000 that Germany changed its citizenship law. First, the new law gave
an automatic right of citizenship to children born in Germany to foreign parents. (These children
can actually hold dual citizenship until adulthood, but then they must choose one or the other,
German citizenship or citizenship of their parents' native country, before reaching the age of 23).
Second, the new law allowed foreigners an opportunity to become a German citizen. The new
German citizenship law stated that one must reside in the country for a minimum of 8 years, have
a clean criminal record, have a secured income, and proof of integration in the form of language
comprehension and declaration of allegiance to Germany.10
The new citizenship law comes after many years of discussion of how long-term resident
aliens could best be integrated into German society. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder noted in his
first policy statement in 1998 before the Bundestag (Germany's parliament), "For far too long
those who have come to work here, who pay their taxes and abide by our laws have been told
that they are just 'guests.' But in truth they have for years been part of German society. For this
reason, this government will modernize the law on nationality". The revisions were intended to
8
Joel S. Fetzer & Christopher Soper. Muslims and the State of Britain, France, and Germany, 2005, page 100. 

9
Ibid. page 101.

10
Heike Hagedorn, University of Munster, Republicanism and the Politics of Citizenship in Germany and France: 

Convergence or Divergence? 2006, page 2. 

7

send Germany's foreign residents "a signal that we welcome all those who profess loyalty to our
democratic constitutional state as citizens with equal rights." 11
The challenges, however, of obtaining citizenship in Germany are magnified in some
parts of the country. Baden-Wurttemberg, one of the sixteen states within Germany, is an
example. In January 2006, Baden-Wurttemberg put tougher restrictions on Muslims applying for
citizenship by creating an additional two-hour oral exam to test an applicant's loyalty to
Germany. This test is to be taken in addition to the standard test of language proficiency skills
and German allegiance. Baden-Wurttemberg's state interior minister said the test would be used
to filter Muslims who might not be suited for living in Germany. Additionally those who
answered "correctly" on the test but later act against the expected behavior in Germany, such as
wife-beating, could have their German citizenship removed.12
Hesse, a different German state,
is planning to join Baden-Wurttemberg's initiative in the spring of 2006. According a source in
Germany, the test in Hesse contains numerous German history questions, which most average
German nationals would not be able to answer as well.13
The other 14 German states, in
contrast, are not requiring this additional test and in fact the Christian Democratic-led state
governments of Bavaria, North Rhine-Westafalia, Thuringia and Saxony strongly oppose this
additional test.
Ironically, even with the new citizenship law passed in 2000, the total number of
foreigners receiving German citizenship has been on a steady decline since 1995. In 1995,
313,606 foreigners received German citizenship. This number, however, had been cut in half,
11
German Embassy, Washington D.C.,28 Feb 06, 

http://www.germany.info/relaunch/info/archives/background/citizenship.html 

12
Kate Connolly, Loyalty test for Muslims in Germany. The Telegraph, Calcuta, India, 2 Jan 06, pg 1.

www.telegrpahindia.com

13
Katrina Strauss is the source. She is currently a student working on her PhD at the University of Bielefeld in

Germany.

8

down to 154,547 by 2002. The latest figures for 2003 and 2004 show an even further decline
down to 127,150 approvals by the end of 2004.
German citizenship rates are listed below in Graph 1. The following countries are
represented: Turkey, Russia, Poland and Romania. The citizenship rates of the four countries
are by year from 1995 to 2002.
Graph 1 - German Citizenship by Nationality
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: Migration Information, www.migrationinformation.org
Turkey (Muslim)
Poland (non-Muslim)
Romania (non-Muslim)
Russia (non-Muslim)
Muslim migration from Turkey, as compared to the total average, however, has shown a
generally upward trend. In 1995, a total of 31,578 Turks received German citizenship. This
figure peaked in 1999 when 100,324 Turks received German citizenship. The German
government, as of 2004, report 2.6 million Turks in Germany, however, 1.9 million Turks still
have their Turkish citizenship. The number of Turks who have received German citizenship
total 500,000; and over 200,000 Turkish children born since 2000 are eligible for German
citizenship under the new rules.
The number of Poles receiving German citizenship since 1995 has decreased from 10,174
to 2,646, approximately a 70% decrease. Romanian numbers are comparable, dropping from
12,028 in 1995 to 1,974 in 2002; an approximate 80% decrease. Arguably, the biggest decrease
9

was in the Russian applications for and citizenship received, dropping from 60,335 in 1995 to
3,374 in 2002; a reduction of approximately 85%.
Arguably, one of the major reasons for this decrease is `economic' factors. Of the three
countries studied, two countries have gained acceptance into the European Union. Poland gained
acceptance in the European Union (EU) in May of 2004. Romania just received acceptance to
the EU and are scheduled to become a member 1 January 2007. Acceptance into the EU has
opened the door `economically' for these former eastern bloc countries. Thus, the Polish and
Roman immigrants seem to opt to remain citizens of their own country instead of moving their
allegiance to Germany.
The Russian numbers are harder to explain. Most of the Russians immigrating to
Germany are Jewish. They are impacted by the law the German Government approved making
Judaism an official religion in Germany. This law allows over 3 million dollars in government
money to be distributed to Jewish groups, which helps with assimilating the newly immigrated to
the country.14
Based upon this new law, one might think the number of Russians (mainly
Russian Jews) receiving Germany citizenship would be increasing; but they are not.
Louise Hendrickson, in an article about the Impacts of Assimilation, argues that RussianGermans
are facing many problems. There are around 2 million Russians in Germany; and most
of them live in `self-created' ghettos. Most do not have language proficiency and they do not
have a professional job that would allow them to compete in the German labor market. She
argues that within the Russian German communities there are large amounts of crime, drug
dealing, and unemployment.15
This could these be the reasons Russians are not applying for and
receiving German citizenship at the same rate they were just ten years ago.
14
Louise Herdrickson, The Impacts of Assimilation: Concepts of Citizenship in Germany. Jan 05, page 9.
15
Ibid 15.
10

Graph 2 - Stock of Foreign Population in Germany
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: Migration Information, www.migrationinformation.org
Turkey (Muslim)
Poland (non-Muslim)
Romania (non-Muslim)
Russia (non-Muslim)
The total number of foreigners in Germany by country of origin is indicated in Graph 2.
The number of foreigners has steadily increased since 1995, when 7.17 million foreigners lived
in the country of Germany. In 2002, the number increased by 160,000 to 7.33 million foreigners.
Of the four countries being studied, Turkey and Romania showed a decrease in their
foreign population in Germany while Poland and Russia showed an increase. Germany had 2.01
million foreigners from Turkey living in Germany in 1995. This number had steadily decreased
to 1.91 million in 2002. In comparison, the number of Romanian foreigners decreased from
109,256 in 1995 to 88,879 in 2002. Poland and Russia, however, showed an increase in their
foreign population in Germany. The number of Polish foreigners living in Germany slowly
increased from 276,752 in 1995 to 317,603 in 2002; a 25% increase. Russia showed the largest
increase during this period - over 400% from 39,967 in 1995 to 155,583 foreigners in 2002.
11

Graph 3 - Inflow of Foreign Population into Germany
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: Migration Information, www.migrationinformation.org
Turkey (Muslim)
Poland (non-Muslim)
Romania (non-Muslim)
Russia (non-Muslim)
The annual inflow of the foreigners to the German population is shown in Graph 3. The
inflow of Turkish foreigners has been consistent during the measured period. In 1995, 73,592
moved to Germany, and in 2002, this number had fallen slightly to 57,187. The average inflow
of Turkish foreigners into Germany per year was 57,342.
The change in `inflow' of Polish and Romanian foreigners into Germany was similar to
Turkey; a small decline. In 1995, Poland had 87,238 foreigners migrated to Germany, and by the
end of 2002, the number had dropped to 81,466. The average for Poland each year was 76,178.
Romanian inflow into Germany was 24,814 in 1995, and declined slightly to 23,803. The
average for Romania was 20,035. Russia, on the other hand, had a small increase from 1995 to
2002 with 32,986 foreigners migrating to Germany in 1995; in 2002 the number had increased to
35,816 for an average of 30,404 per year.
Overall (not listed in Graph 3) the total number of foreigners coming to Germany in 1995
was 792,701. Seven years later in 2002 this number had steadily decreased to 658,341.
12

Graph 4 - Summary
0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
T=Inflow
T=Citizenship
T=Stock
P=Inflow
P=Citizenship
P=Stock
Rom=Inflow
Rom=Citizenship
Rom=Stock
Rus=Inflow
Rus=Citizenship
Rus=Stock
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Putting this all together in a summary chart, graph 4 shows each of the four countries.
T = Turkey, P = Poland, Rom = Romania, and Rus = Russia. Inflow represents the inflow of the
foreign population into Germany by country. Citizenship represents the number of approved
applications by country per year. Stock represents the total number of foreigners from each
country. Finally, as a reminder, Turks are associated with Muslims, and the term "Resettler"
13

labeled youths that are ethnically German but come from culturally Slavic families from the
former USSR, Romania and Poland.
So what does all this mean? Turks (Muslims) are applying for and being approved for
German citizenship at higher rates than the other three countries combined. Turks receiving
German citizenship have increased 200% between 1995 and 2002, while the Poles, Russians and
Romanians receiving German citizenship have fallen between 70 and 85 percent respectively
during this same time period. The `citizenship' trends are a positive sign in a process that is
going to take a long time.
In comparison, Poland's inflow of foreigners has remained constant from 1995 to 2002.
Their total stock of foreigners has risen, and yet, they seem less likely to apply for German
citizenship. Romania's inflow and their total numbers have remained consistent during this
period, yet they are also less likely to apply for German citizenship. Russia, the final country in
this study, shows an increase of their foreign population into Germany each year. The total stock
of Russian foreigners has tripled over this eight year period; yet, Russians applying for German
citizenship has decreased substantially each year.
Arguably, if Muslim assimilation into Germany is going to occur, the total number of
Muslim foreigners (in this case Turks) would continue to decrease while the number of Muslims
receiving German citizenship increases at a greater rate than the number of "inflow" foreigners
each year. In this analysis, Turkey is the only country receiving German citizenship at a higher
rate than the number of inflow foreigners. This information is reflected in Graph 4. These
numbers indicate a positive signal the Turkish minority is electing to remain in Germany and not
returning to their native land.
14

HOW GERMAN ADOLESCENTS FEEL ON INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION OF 

IMMIGRANTS
Funded by the German Science Foundation, the University of Bielefeld in Germany,
researched social inclusion and exclusion of immigrants in 2001. Their research on social
inclusion and exclusion of immigrants has repeatedly shown that conflicts emerge during the
process of integration. Assimilation preferences and prejudices play a considerable role with
respect to integration. The goal of the study was to assess the empirical relationships between
adolescents of German, Turkish and Resettler descent, particularly focusing on inter-ethnic
attitudes (acceptance/rejection) and personal contact.16
Resettler's are defined as ethnically
German, but come from culturally Slavic families from the former USSR, Romania, and Poland.
This study consisted of pupils in the tenth grade (ages 16 to 18) who went to one of the
four main state school types (Hauptschulen, Realschulen, Gesamtschulen, and Gymnasien) in the
state of North Rhine-Westphalia during 2001.17
The selected sample was students who came
from a German, Turkish, or Resettler family background in 24 urban and rural areas. Roughly
69,200 German, 5,200 Turkish, and 8,400 Resettler adolescents were asked to participate in this
study. In the end, 11,000 students agreed to participate. The final numbers of those
participating were 6,055 German; 1,652 Turkish, and 3,539 Resettler students.18
16
Dr Joachim Brus, Proud But Isolated? Effects of In-Group Favoritism and Acculturation Preferences on InterEthnic
Attitudes and Contact Between German, Turkish and Resettler Adolescents, Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies, Vol 31, No 1, January 2005, page 4.
17
Note: Hauptschulen is the lowest form of scholarly education in Germany ­ the minimum requirement for
graduation at ninth grade. Realschulen is more competitive than Hauptschule and finishes in the tenth grade.
Students in Realschulen are required to have "Mittlere Reife" which is needed to start further "blue collar" skills
such as training a carpenter, handcraft training, etc. Gesamtschulem is combination of all three schools, and the
student can change between the different types depending on their academic performance. Gymnasien is the highest
level of education ­ the minimum requirement is 13 years of education and finishes with the "Abitur". In the last
three years students specialize in their subjects; and take at least two foreign languages. Special thanks to Katharina
Strauss for this information.
18
Ibid, page 12.
15

Worth mentioning is that of the four different German schools, there were variances as to
participation. First, there were fewer adolescents from Gesamtschulen schools across all the
groups. Second, there were fewer migrant youths from the Gymnasium schools compared with
the overall population distribution. Third, students from the Hauptschule schools composed a
disproportionate percentage of the sample. Finally, there were too few students from the
Gymnasium schools.
Across all four schools, the gender distribution was unbalanced with more Turkish and
Resettler females participating in the study. Turkish and Resettler adolescents were classified
according to their migration background, not their citizenship.19
To balance the overall sampling
distribution with the population, the analysis was weighted to adjust for gender and school type
in relation to the distribution in the population.20
Table 1 below shows the result of first part of the study.
Table 1 ­ Average responses to the feeling barometer
General Feelings German Adolescents
Turkish
Adolescents
Resettler
Adolescents
Towards German
Youth M = 1.26 M = 0.90 M = 1.00
Towards Turkish
Youth M = -0.24 M = 1.36 M = -0.26
Towards Resettler
Youth M = 0.18 M = 0.41 M = 1.19
Labeled -2 for very negative Source: IKG
feeling Youth
Labelled +2 for very positing
feeling Panel, 2001
According to the study, each group of adolescents ranked the German youth in a positive
manner. Conversely, the German adolescents did not express warm feelings towards the Turkish
or Resettler youth. However, rather than negative expressions towards the minority groups, they
19
Ibid, page 13.
20
Ibid, page 14.
16

remained for the most part indifferent. This corresponds closely with assumptions of the Social
Dominance Theory since the dominant group expresses closeness with the in-group but keeps the
subordinate or lower-status groups at a certain distance.21
The Turkish youth received the worst ranking from the German and Resettler adolescents.
The Germans thought negatively about the Turkish youth, and the Resettlers
thought negatively about the Turkish youth as well. The Turkish adolescents, however, had an
extremely high opinion of themselves. Their positive ranking about themselves was higher than
the German and Resettler positive ranking about themselves. More importantly, the Turkish
youth ranked the high-status group (German Youth) in a very positive manner.
The Resettler adolescents from the former USSR, Poland and Romania, showed the
largest differences in their feelings towards the other two groups. Resettler adolescents ranked
the German youth extremely positive; almost as positive as they ranked their own group. The
Resettler ranking of the Turkish youth showed a very negative trend with a tendency towards
rejection. In summary, the Resettlers maintained the social hierarchy by expressing closeness
with the dominant group but distance to the low-status group.22
Analyzing the key aspects of Table 1, the study indicates German adolescents are friendly
to Resettler's adolescents than Turkish adolescents. Secondly, the Turkish adolescents favored
themselves (autonomy) over the German or Resettler adolescents. Finally, the Resettler
adolescents clearly favored the German adolescents over the Turkish adolescents.
Table 2 below shows the average approval and disapproval in the attitude structure.
21
Ibid, page 14.
22
Ibid, page 14.
17

Table 2 ­ Average approval and disapproval in the attitude structure
Disapproval and approval of German Adolescents Turkish Adolescents Resettler Adolescents
Regarding w/TA w/RA w/GA w/RA w/GA w/TA
Emotional Factor -0.30 0.11 0.91 0.28 1.00 -0.37
Behavioral Factor -0.01 0.22 0.68 0.05 0.85 -0.27
Resource anxieties -0.32 -0.53 -1.12 -0.83 -1.15 -0.45
Evaluations towards outgroup
sociality -0.65 -0.38 -0.14 -0.13 -0.03 -0.53
Note: Means are based on a scale ranging from -2 for 'strong disapproval' to +2 for 'strong approval'. 

Source: IKG Youth Panel 2001 

Minority adolescents (Turkish and Resettler) have strong approval towards the German youth
regarding the emotional and behavioral relationships. The results favor a very positive
relationship. German adolescents, however, seem to disapprove the Turkish and Resettler youth
regarding the emotional and behavior factors. In fact, the German adolescents ranked the
Turkish and Resettler adolescents negatively in 6 of the 8 categories above. Only the Resettler
adolescents were viewed favorable by the German adolescents regarding emotional and behavior
factors.
It appears to be the case that German adolescents are widely accepted by the minority
youth (Turkish/Resettler). Turkish immigrants, however, seem to be rejected or at least kept at a
certain distance by both the Germans and Resettlers. Resettler adolescents were viewed more
favorable by the German youth, but they seem to view Turkish adolescents in a negative
manner.23
Furthermore, Turkish adolescents received disapproval rankings in all categories from
the German and Resetter adolescents.
The final part of the study analyzed Inter-Ethnic Behavior (Personal Contact).
Interpersonal contact is a very personal matter based of mutual liking and an overlap of interests
and sharing of preferences. The items measuring inter-ethnic contact focused on voluntary
23
Ibid, page 16.
18

contact situation during leisure time, not distorted by institutionally enforced contact situations.
Participants were asked how often they had met members of the other groups since the last
summer vacation in order to: play together, invite her/him to their home, go to the cinema,
borrow something, and visit him/her at their house.24
As expected, according to the study, the personal contact mainly related to in-group
encounters. Almost all German respondents (99 percent) had met with other German adolescents
for leisure activities since the last summer holidays in 2000. Ninety-five percent of the Turkish
adolescents had in-group gathering whereas ninety-two percent of the Resettler adolescents had
in-group encounters.
The comparison of the inter-group relations revealed 82 percent of Turkish and 87
percent of Resettler adolescents met German youths; whereas 38 percent of the German
adolescents met Turkish youths, and 51 percent of the Germans met Resettler adolescents during
leisure time in 2000 and 2001.25
Table 3 - Experiences of inter-ethnic personal contact
Personal Contact
German
Adolescents Turkish Adolescents
Resettler
Adolescents
With German adolescents m = 2.98 M = 1.76 m = 2.08
With Turkish adolescents m = .63 M = 2.34 m = 0.67
With Resettler adolescents m = .92 M = 0.92 m = 2.49
Source: IKG Youth 0 for never
Panel, 2001 4 for very often
Table 3 shows the Experiences of Inter-Ethnic Personal Contact. German adolescents
have more personal contact with Resettler adolescents (.92) than with Turkish adolescents (.63).
Turkish adolescents have more personal contact with German adolescents (1.76) than with the
Resettler adolescents (.92). Resettler adolescents also had more contact with German
24
Ibid, page 16.
25
Ibid, page 16.
19

adolescents (2.08) than with Resettler adolescents. Resettler adolescents had relatively low
personal contact with Turkish adolescents. Both immigrant groups had more contact with the
host society than with the other minority groups.
So what does the University of Bielefeld study tell us about Muslim assimilation in
Germany? Arguably, these findings indicate that it does not seem to be that one of these three
ethnic groups is isolated, but the high rates of in-group encounters for the immigrant groups
might indicate a tendency towards self-isolation.26
In the end, members of the host society
(Germany) might insist on assimilation whereas the member of the migrant groups
(Turks/Resettlers) might stress dissimilation if they are not willing to give up their traditional
way of life.27
This study supports the Social Dominance Theory that once a group gains dominance of
another group, it will monopolize resources in an attempt to maintain and perpetuate its
privileged status.28
Because the ability to attain one's goals is deeply connected to one's social
status, those of lesser status (Turkish/Resettlers) might find it in their interest to challenge the
status quo that assigns them in a low position.29
Furthermore, because nobody wants to be on the
bottom of the social hierarchy, and few are willing to share the top; such group conflicts between
different ethnic groups tend to be very difficult to resolve.30
26
Ibid, page 17. 

27
Ibid, page 4.

28
Michelle Maiese, Social Status, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/social_status/, September 2004. 

29
Ibid, page 2. 

30
Ibid, page 3. 

20

THE "ROAD AHEAD"
Looking at Germany's `Road Ahead', there are a few recommendations that need to be
tackled so Muslims can better assimilate into Germany. First, Muslims need to be fluent in
German, their host country's language. Second, grants of citizenship to the Muslim population
needs to continue on its upward trend. Third, achieving public corporation status would also
represent a symbolic affirmation by Germany that Islam has become part of the everyday
religious landscape. Fourth, the German public school system needs to offer Islam as a religious
class option. Fifth, leadership needs to continue to promote unity between Muslims and nonMuslims.
Sixth, the citizens of Germany need to move away from calling 2nd
and 3rd
generations
of Muslims "foreigners." Finally, the importance of Turkey's acceptance into the EU can't be
overemphasized.
The first recommendation in the "Road Ahead" is the language barrier of the first and
second generation Muslims. The language barrier has hindered the process and serves as a
difficult obstacle for older generations of Turkish guest workers. When Turkish laborers were
recruited for the car, steel and mining industries, they were offered mostly arduous shift work.
At the time, they weren't required to take language courses, nor did their shift schedule make it
easy to find the time.31
More than likely the older segment of the Turkish (Muslim) population
will continue to have challenges with the language barrier; and therefore, never receive German
citizenship due to inability to meet the language proficiency requirement. Hence, the total
number of Turkish foreigners in Germany will continue to remain high until the first and second
generations of Turkish immigrants pass.
31
Hans Nichols. Germany Grapples With Immigration. Insight on the News, Article, 30 September 2002, Volume
18 Issue 36, pg 24, 2p, 1c
21

Other experts have argued the importance of the minority group speaking the host society
language. For example, Louise Hendrickson, a professor from San Francisco State University, in
a January 2005 article argues that the main determining factor to whether someone is assimilated
into German culture largely rests on whether individuals can speak German and are willing to
follow German customs and rules. She further elaborates that all that truly matters is if one can
speak the language, until then, all immigrant groups stay in their isolated communities, removed
from the German citizens.32
A second recommendation to better assimilate Muslims into Germany is that grants of
citizenship to the Muslim population continue on its upward trend. According to Dr. Ghulam M.
Haniff, St. Cloud University, St. Cloud, Minnesota, the arrival, settlement, and adjustment of the
Muslim population to their adopted land takes place in five stages. The first stage is
bewilderment. The second stage is adaptation and adjustment. The third stage consists of
organization. The fourth stage is activism, and the fifth stage is integration. His study indicates
the Muslim community in Germany has remained separate and apart from the rest of the German
society. He argues, "The result is that even after half a century of living in Germany; Muslims,
collectively, are not fully accepted into society. The large community of Turkish and other
Muslims continue to be viewed as guest workers that now should go home."33
Dr. Haniff states the future is faced with many obstacles, but there are positive trends for
Muslim assimilation into Germany. Arguably, Muslim assimilation is in the early fifth state of
integration. As assimilation is part of a process, citizenship (or the sense of belonging) plays an
integral role. As the citizenship analysis indicates, Turks (Muslims) are receiving German
citizenship at higher rates than the other three countries combined. Turks receiving German
32
Louise Herdrickson, The Impacts of Assimilation: Concepts of Citizenship in Germany. Jan 05, page 15
33
Graham M. Haniff, Muslim Communities in the West: From Margins to the Mainstream", Paper presented at the
AMSS 32nd
Annual Conference Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 26-28 Sep 2003.
22

citizenship have increased 200% between 1995 and 2002, while the Poles, Russians, and
Romanians receiving German citizenship have fallen between 70 and 85 percent during this
same period. The `citizenship' trends are a positive sign in this assimilation process that is going
to take time.
A third key factor in the "Road Ahead" involves financial benefits from official
recognition and achieving public corporation status. This would represent a symbolic
affirmation by the state that Islam has become part of the everyday religious landscape in
Germany. Given that Germany has ultimately granted public corporation status to religious
groups other than Protestants and Catholics in the past, it is hard to believe that more than three
million German Muslims will be forever shut out of this system.34
There are approximately
45,000 Jews in Germany. In 2003, for example, Germany officially recognized Judaism as a
religion. This action brought in over 3 million dollars in money to be distributed to Jewish
groups, which can help with assimilating the newly immigrated to Germany.35
The fourth aspect to the "Road Ahead" is an examination of religious education in
Germany's school system. Most German schools provide religious education as part of their
core curriculum; and parents can choose whether to send their children to Evangelical or
Catholic religious classes, or to withdraw them from such school activities. If a student opts to
withdrawal from a religious class, he/she can still graduate, but cannot receive extra points on
his/her diploma. One must have high points to get accepted into a German University.
Understandably, Muslims would like Islam to be one of the religious choices. Islam, however, is
not being taught in the German schools, and discussions of the issue are very contentious. Islam
34
Joel S. Fetzer & J. Christopher Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain France, and Germany, 2005, page 100
35
Louise Hendrickson, The Impacts of Assimilation: Concepts of Citizenship in Germany, Article, San Francisco
State University, 2005, page 9.
23

is the third largest religion in Germany after Catholicism and Protestantism. Yet, unlike them, it
is not officially recognized as a legal public body.36
Muslim organizations have persistently requested the inclusion of an Islamic alternative
subject taught in the German schools, and so far they have received varying responses from cities
and federal states. Several regions are considering requests for Islamic religious courses in
schools, but this issue has not yet been resolved. For example, in May 2005, it was announced in
the state of Hesse that all schools will soon offer instruction in Islam to Muslim students.37
In
some areas of Germany, like Bremen, students learn about Islam in their extracurricular Turkish
language and civilization classes, which are managed by an organization linked to the Turkish
government, with a secular character and orientation. In other areas, all German students study
Islam in a comparative course which is part of the core curriculum. The course is not
confessional but oriented towards the objective knowledge of the contents, practices and
histories of the different religions.38
The presence of Islam still poses a number of challenges for German schools, but the
integration of this religion is a key to assimilation in the future. Despite, however, concerns on
the part of secularists and others, as well as the divisions apparent in the Muslim community, the
movement to spread Islamic education in the German school system seems to be gathering
speed. Another challenge is the education of teachers to teach Islam. As of 2004, only one
university had announced plans to introduce training programs for teachers in Islamic
education.39
Therefore, despite the large number of Muslim students, there is no efficient system
36
Joel S. Fetzer & J. Christopher Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain France, and Germany, 2005, page 44. 

37
Sean. Hannity. Europe Closing Shop. 

38
Berta Alvarez-Miranda, Complutense University, Madrid, Muslim Communities in Europe, Recognition of

Religious Difference in Britain, Germany and France, Feb 2005, page 7.

39
Veysel Oezcan, Humboldt University Berlin, Top German Parties Back Islamic Education. 

www.migrationinformation.org, 1 Oct 2002, page 1. 

24

of religious instruction in the German schools for them.40
To be treated equally, the Muslim's
choice of religion should be offered at the German schools and the integration of Islam in the
school system should not be overlooked.
Fifth, leadership is a key aspect of assimilation. German leadership must refrain from
alienating the minority Muslim population. Strong leadership is needed from both the German
and Muslim communities in order to overcome alienation. Thankfully, world leadership has
taken a proactive step in this process; starting the process off in the right direction. In August
2005, for example, Pope Benedict XVI told Muslim leaders in Cologne, Germany, that
Christians and Muslims must work together to defeat terrorism. The Pope said terrorism
undermines the foundations of all civil society. Muslim leaders expressed satisfaction following
the meeting. The President of the Turkish Islamic Union said the participants shared the Pope's
position. He said: "With this common platform, we are able together to fight terrorism".41
Muslim leadership can continue to follow this peaceful process through media and
community outreach. For example, in Germany there are no holy days for Muslim, Jewish and
other minority religious groups. Holy days such as the Islamic Eid ul Fitr or the Jewish Rosh
Hashanah and Yom Kipper are not public holidays in Germany. Turkish elders have taken the
first step in community outreach. They are using major Turkish and Islamic holidays to host
celebrations to which they invite Germans, other Turks from the neighborhood, and the wider
city to create opportunities for encounters that serve to create better communication between
Turks and Germans. The primary goal for such events is to make Turkish culture and holidays
40
Ibid, page 2. 

41
Sabine Castelfranco, Pope Meets with Germany's Muslim Leaders, 20 August 2005, page 1.

25

known to the wider public and to educate Germans about Turkish culture and Islamic religious
practices.42
A sixth recommendation comes from the European Commission against Racism and
Intolerance (ECRI). In a report dated 6 June 04, the ECRI noted that persons of immigrant
origin, including those who are second or third generation born in Germany, tended to remain
"foreigners" in the eyes of the German public and in the way the German government keeps
demographic statistics. The report argues that the term "foreigner" still seems in fact to
encompass people who have applied and received German citizenship. ECRI encourages the
German authorities to make further progress in shaping immigration and integration policies
which do not consider immigrants primarily in terms of their utility value and which recognize
the positive role of immigration and the fact that immigrants constitute an integral part of the
German society.43
For many Germans the typical "foreigners" are Turks, even though they are
less than a half of all the foreigners in Germany. Cem Ozdemir, the first ethnic Turk elected to
the German Parliament, says there is alienation among Turks, which create conditions for a
potential explosion in Germany. He states, there is no guarantee that better integration precludes
all extremist violence, but if Germany's increasing Muslim population is not better integrated,
extremists will have more potential supporters to recruit and train.44
Lastly, and arguably, the toughest challenge in the upcoming years is Turkey's pending
entry into the European Union (EU). This is an important milestone for the Muslim community,
specifically for the Turks living in Germany. If the EU disapproves Turkey's entrance into this
42
Patricia Ehrkamp, Becoming Turkish: Enacting home, identity and resistance. Paper presented at the TIRES
Summer Institute, Miami, Fl, 2002, page 1.
43
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Third Report on Germany, Adopted on 5 December 2003
and released in Strasbourg 8 June 2004, page 13 & 14.
44
Pamela Irving Jackson and Peter A. Zervakis; The Integration of Muslims in Germany, France and the United
States: Law, Politics and Public Policy, Paper prepared at the 2004 annual meetings of the American Sociological
Association. All rights reserved 2004. Page 19.
26

union, then all Turks, and probably all Muslims, will wonder why they were not worthy to be
accepted into this union of states. The future of this relationship between Turkey and the EU is
a catalyst. If Turkey is denied entrance into Europe, millions of Muslims in Europe will feel
alienated, possibly causing resentment and possibly unrest where their population is the greatest.
This challenge is further exuberated when important members of the political elite, such as the
former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, call for rejecting Turkey's admission to the EU
because of its Muslim culture was irredeemably non-European.45
45
Stefano Allievi and Jorgen S. Nielsen. Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe.
Muslim Minorities Volume I. Copyright 2003. page 106.
27

CONCLUSION
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the United States and those recently in Spain and Britain
have forced many in the non-Muslim European majority to begin looking fearfully at
newcomers, mainly Muslims. There has been a sense of alienation between the German
majority and the Muslim minority. As a result of this alienation, tension between the German
majority and the Muslim minority is an issue the German government is addressing. This
tension, as a result of demographic changes in Germany and Europe, and the alienation of the
Muslim minority in Germany and Europe, could have crucial security ramifications for this part
of the world, and ultimately the United States.
The question of Muslims assimilating in to German society, conforming, and becoming
German is not easy to answer. Muslim acceptance by the German majority has thus far remained
colored more by alienation than by a sense of belonging and integration.46
Assimilation is not a
condition, but a process that takes time. The greater alienation by the German majority will
lessen assimilation of the Muslim minority into German society. There are numerous challenges
to Muslim assimilation in Germany. Measuring assimilation does not provide a definite yes, or a
definite no, to its answer set.
The "Road Ahead" for true Muslim assimilation into Germany will be faced with many
challenges in the upcoming years. The good news is Muslims are applying for and receiving
German citizenship at a higher rate than other minority countries. This signals a positive trend
that both the German majority and Muslim minority can continue to monitor and examine in the
years to come. The University of Bielefeld study, on the other hand, indicates Muslim children
are not yet being accepted by the host society. German adolescents are friendly to Resettler's
46
Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens. Copyright 2002, page 65
28

(non-Muslim) adolescents than Turkish (Muslim) adolescents. Secondly, Turkish adolescents
favored themselves (autonomy) over the German or Resettler adolescents; indicating a higher
degree of self-assessment. Third, the Resettler adolescents clearly favor the German adolescents
(host society) over the Turkish adolescent.
In the end, the two variables in this study; citizenship and University of Bielefeld study,
only scratch the surface of whether or not Muslims can assimilate into German society. As the
German government continues to debate their public policy goals, the issue of whether Germany
can be transformed into a multicultural society capable of naturalizing Islam remains to be seen.
29

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