1
ACCOMMODATION OF MUSLIM RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN EUROPE
Theory and practice
Gouvetas Demetrios
The approaches taken by Western European countries to the way they treat
their Muslim minorities range from aggressive efforts at assimilation, to policies
that border on benign neglect and that often have resulted in the marginalization
of this community. In order to answer to the question, why states have responded
differently to the religious needs of Muslims we should engage a cross-national
approach. Muslim citizens and permanent residents in these countries share nearly
identical goals: they want to build mosques for public worship and religious
schools to transmit the faith, and they want the state to make the concessions
necessary so that they can practice their religion. What is different across Western
European states is how states have responded to those religious concerns.
France, exercising a policy that has its roots in the French Revolution of
the late 18th century, which was driven by a belief that a set of universal values
("liberty, equality, fraternity") could be applied to everyone, is one of the most
activist states in this regard, as it has pursued a vigorous policy of assimilation
through its educational and other institutions, aiming to create Frenchmen from
the country's largely North African immigrants and their offspring. According to
many native French, that set of values, combined with the country's highly
regarded traditional culture, are supposed to make assimilation irresistible to
newcomers.
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has adopted a more multicultural
model. Its' policy focuses on getting immigrants to accept Britain's core
institutions and to learn English, rather than changing them into Englishmen. As
Soper1
says "...I think they've found a good balance because they're doing much
better than most other countries in Europe. Muslims in Britain are making more
progress in business and politics than they are most elsewhere."
1 Joel Fetzer and Christopher Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany (Cambridge: University of
Cambridge Press, 2005)
2
By far the majority of European countries, including Germany, Italy and
Spain, have, at least until recently, taken a third, more laissez faire approach. This
kind of policy seems to treat Muslim minorities as a temporary phenomenon that
will eventually go away and hence can safely be ignored. Until 2000, the rhetoric
of German politicians was full of references to (Muslim) minorities as guest
workers, no matter how long they had been living and working there, and "guest"
implied temporary. Germany until then based its citizenship laws on jus sanguinis,
or blood, rather than jus solis, or place, as is the case in the United States, making
it difficult for Turks and other immigrants who were not ethnically German, as
well as their children and grandchildren born in Germany, to acquire citizenship.
In 2000, the country overhauled its naturalization laws, making those born
in the country, regardless of ethnicity, eligible for citizenship, and easing
citizenship requirements for other longtime residents. However, this new law is
not by itself enough to make a significant part of native German population to
accept that Germany is an immigrant country, an acceptance already made by the
politicians. Germans have yet to come to grips with the presence of a permanent
non-German minority.
In the wake of 9/11, all of Europe's governments, as well as their people,
have taken much greater notice of the Islamic communities in their midst. Indeed,
the fear of terrorism, reinforced by the Madrid and London bombings and the
attacks in the Netherlands, has prompted some of these states to pursue a more
assimilationist model of integration. In Denmark, for instance, the government
banned arranged marriages, still popular among many Muslims. Even in
multicultural Britain, civics classes and a loyalty oath were added as requirements
for citizenship. The results of this transformation are also evident on Muslim
organizations. According to Nielsen, "the pressure imposed on Muslim
organizations by European official, legal, political and bureaucratic expectations
is such that Islam has to become and ethnic identity".2
Before examining the theories that explain the variety of ways of state
accommodation, it is necessary to point out, who constitutes a Muslim. Shahid
2 Jorgen.Nielsen, Muslims in Western Europe (Third Edition. Edinburgh University Press 2004)
3
and Köningsveld3
, classify Muslims under four categories, according to degrees of
religious convictions:
* confessionals "who are practicing believers and who regard Islam not as a
religion but also as a socio-cultural way of life";
* believers "who accept the religious and socio-ethical principles of Islam
without observing the specifically religious obligations";
* liberals "who attach great value to many ethical and philosophical aspects
of Islam, but at the same time are critical of or even reject many of the
religious aspects, especially in the socio-political sphere";
* and agnosticists "who do not believe in the Islamic articles of faith and
reject religion as a basis of socio-cultural life in general."
Indicators of religiosity among Muslims worldwide and non-Muslims in the
United States and Western Europe  (WVS 99-01)4
% Importance
of Religion
("somewhat" or
"very
important")
% At least
once monthly
attendance at
religious
services
%
Describe
self as a
religious
person
% Belong to a
religious
organization
Muslims
Worldwide
85 48 90 5.5 (71.5)*
Non-Muslims
United States
83 61 83 58
Non-Muslims
Western
Europe
47 31 63 32
Western Europe combines data from France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark,
Belgium, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Luxembourg and Austria.
* Value in parentheses is for Muslims resident in Western Europe.
3 W.A.R Shahid, and P.S. Van Köningsveld
, Religious Freedom and the Position of Islam in Western Europe (Kampen
Kok Pharos Publishing, 1995)
4 Source : WVS (World Values Survey [computer file]). 1999-2001. Ronald Ingelhart et al. [producer]. Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor].
4
Theories of State Accommodation
Tariq Ramadan claims that "Muslim integration into the fabric of Europe will
have three main strands straightforward taking-on of citizenship, involvement in
society and politics at all levels, and the demand for financial and political
independence".5
Three theories have been employed, aiming to explain state
accommodation of Muslim minorities religious practices:
* Resource mobilization theory, which focuses on the political resources of
Muslims, as the determinant of success in achieving concessions.
* Political opportunity structure theory, which emphasizes the role of
political institutions in creating the fertile ground for each group's political
activism.
* Ideological theories, which claim that national ideas about citizenship,
nationhood and assimilation primarily determine state response.
On the other hand, we should also emphasize the influence of church-state
relations, which explains the particularities of relations between states and Muslim
minorities.
Political Resource Mobilization theory
According to the resource mobilization theory, the political resources of
Muslims, determine the extent of concessions generated by the governments of the
host countries. Effective organizational structures, wealth channeled into these
organizations to further political agendas of the group, and successful leadership,
knowledgeable of the political system are some aspects of these political
resources, which are necessary for mobilization of groups and securing desired
policy outcomes. An examination of the organizational degree and leadership of
European Muslims would easily indicate that there is lack of "resources necessary
to bargain effectively with the state, a situation closely related to the failure of
Muslim groups to obtain desired policy outcomes."6
5 Tariq Ramadan, "Who Speaks for Europe's Muslims?" Le Monde Diplomatique (12 June 2000): 1
6 Fetzer and Soper , 8
5
This argument has extensive merit, for:
- Islam is characterized by its personal-faith framework, which, in contrast with
Catholicism for example, does not sanction the authority of a single voice, leading
to issues of legitimacy of leadership and, at the end, to a natural lag for Muslims
as new comers to adapt to the political system.
- European states have adopted strict neutralization rules, allowing only a small
percentage of Muslims to vote. Of course, political activism does not require
citizenship, however a non-voting interest group always finds it extremely
difficult to convince politicians to support its demands.
- Moreover, heterogeneity is likely to challenge group cohesion despite shared
problems and demands.
Generally, "the absence of native-born clergy and group leadership almost
certainly means that Muslim groups lack key resources, particularly information
about how best to use the political system to their advantage".7
Nevertheless, as
Muslims are becoming more and more experienced, and under the growing
pressure, caused by the necessity for problems to be resolved, they gradually
develop viable methods to deal with the above stated issues. According to
Klausen, "Muslim leaders often identify themselves with... the 'new line' in
European Muslim politics... described as a focus on national politics, a new
emphasis on Muslim unity irrespective of ethnic and religious differences, certain
expectations about professionalism and 'playing by the rules' of national political
discourse."8
Trying to explain a state's policy on Muslim religious rights, by analyzing
domestic political considerations and the relative power of parties and movements
that support Muslim religious rights against those that oppose them would involve
focusing on the origin, ethnic composition, and organizational patterns of Muslim
communities, within a particular nation state. These descriptions accent the role of
resources in mobilizing Muslim groups in Western Europe and stress the
organizational structures which link individuals into a social movement.
It is evident that the Euro-Muslim organizations' action has been
characterized by political ineffectiveness, due to lack of resources, necessary to
7 Fetzer and Soper, 9
8 Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)
6
bargain with the state. The Muslims have failed to create really representative
organizations at national levels, which would manage to promote their interests
and could force the governments to respond to their political demands: " Muslims
in most Western European states have thus far been unsuccessful in creating
representative organizations at national levels, which can function as spokesman
for the Muslim communities with the respective government".9
The existence of ethnic, religious, national and linguistic divisions should
be noted, since one of the defining characteristics of this minority group is its
heterogeneity, which seems to be acting as a barrier to their political mobilization
as, in the UK for example, where they are divided by nation of origin (India,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Arab countries), major branches of Islam (Sunnism,
Shiism) and Islamic schools of thought (Deobandis, Barlewis and Wahhabism),
Muslims have organized several political organizations, none of which has ever
managed to become an effective national group. Hence, it may be misleading to
take Muslims in Europe as a single unit of analysis for any given policy issue. For
even within one country, "...Muslims are not a unified constituency. Ethnicity,
gender, political outlook, and class are sources of disagreement and dissent"10
.
In France, majority of the Muslims are of North African descent with
complicated colonial history, whereas in Germany, Turkish guest workers and
their families have been the most prominent wave of immigrants. In the United
Kingdom, on the other hand, most Muslims are highly educated citizens from
former Commonwealth countries; i.e. today's Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh.
One of the most important consequences of this diversity, is its complicating
effects on the bargaining power of Muslim minorities to further their policy
demands from the state as a single constituency.
The weakness caused by the ineffectiveness of their political
representation becomes even worse, given their failure to produce a native-born
leadership. The fact that, in France for example, an estimated 95% of all imams
come from abroad, and that the percentage in other West-European countries is
similar, as long as religious leaders in other Western countries are concerned, the
9 Shahid and Köningsveld, 3
10 Klausen, 52
7
absence of native-born clergy and group leadership means that Muslim groups
lack key resources, especially information.
Besides, some analysts11
argue that there might be something endemic in
the structure and ideology of Islam itself, something that makes the mobilization
extremely difficult. It is true that there is no counterpart in Islam to a Christian
church, no formally instituted body to supervise the religious and political agenda,
and no religious hierarchy, especially among the Sunnis. A comparison between
the politics of Muslim and Jewish groups in Britain would lead to interesting
conclusions: Jewish groups have been much more effective, gaining concessions,
since they have three significant political resources, generally absent in the
Muslim community: communal unity, coherent organizational resources, and the
strategic placement of communal personnel in elite positions.
Political Opportunity Structures theory
According to the second theory, the main reason for the impotence of the
Muslims to force the governments to respond to their demands, has to do with the
system itself constraining or facilitating group actions, with the political
institutions. The capacity of the Muslim groups to engage in collective action is
being influenced through direct and indirect ways, by the state officials and
institutions. The main characteristics, upon which the Muslim groups'
effectiveness depends, are whether it is a unitary or a federal polity, the type of
electoral system, the separation of powers between the executive, legislative and
judicial branches of government and the position of key political elites.
Evidently, strict neutralization rules, legislation on minority rights, antidiscrimination
laws, and even laws designating the recipients of welfare, directly
impact the prospects for the social, economic, and political status of Muslim
minorities, and inevitably, the prospects for securing accommodation for their
religious demands from the state. To take one example, because of very different
citizenship laws in the two countries, a much higher percentage of British
11 Carolyn Warner "Organizing Islam for Politics in Western Europe" (Paper prepared for presentation at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia,1999): 5
8
Muslims are citizens than are German Muslims, which is translated in much more
political opportunities.
The institutional structure itself can also surely influence the political
activism of groups. In France, for example, where there is significant
concentration of power, these groups find it much more difficult to bargain, since
they have to do it at a national level. They are obviously aiming for national
legislation to win concessions, while in Switzerland, with the federal political
system, Muslims find it much easier to mobilize at a local level, where their power
is concentrated, and they have gradually been able to win more policy victories.
Generally, there is a direct connection between the institutionalization of the
immigrant culture and what the host country's legal system allows. The same goes
for the electoral system, and the incentives and electoral pressures which are
exercised during the planning of the public policy.
Ideological theory
The way the state resolves issues related to immigrant rights, and
especially to religious ones, is also being shaped by the nation's political ideology.
This ideology is mainly constituted by ideas about citizenship, nationality,
assimilation and pluralism, that determine state response.
The strong connection between ideology and political practice towards the
Muslims is evident, comparing the dominant ideologies in France and Britain.
France's culturally particular idea of what it means to become a French citizen led
the elites to oppose separate Islamic institutions, due to the state's ideological
commitment to integrating individual outsiders. In France it is the republican
ideals of the concept of citizenship as well as laicism that accounts for the state
response to religious demands of minorities.
At the same time, the British dominant political ideas place greater
emphasis on managing relations among divergent populations, and allow these
groups to retain their identities. Both of the major parties have been recognizing
Islamic immigrants through public policy, and as a result, the British state has
supported multicultural education, separate Islamic schools, race relations'
9
legislation and the development of independent Muslim communities. At the same
time, the British realistic, pragmatic political tradition, guarantees preference to
practical policies, instead of abstract theorizing.
Attitudes among citizens of Western democracies toward Muslim residents
Country % of public
that regards
immigration
from MENA*
a "bad thing"
for society
% of
public
reporting
a
"favorable
opinion"
of
Muslims
% of public
that regards
relations
between
Muslims
and
Westerners
"generally
good"
% of
public that
regards
Muslims
as
"respectful
of
women"
% of public
that
perceives a
conflict
between
Muslim
piety and
modern
society
France 41 65 33 23 26
Germany 59 36 23 17 70
Spain 33 29 14 12 58
UK 32 63 28 26 54
US -- 54 32 19 40
* Middle East and North African countries.
The three theories described above, explain, to a point, the different
approaches of state accommodation of Muslim religious practices by the Western
European countries, and indicate the various reasons for the failure of these
religious minorities to promote decisively and achieve effectively their goals.
These three factors obviously interact with each other and define the social and
political environment, into which the European Muslim has to fight for the
satisfaction of his religious needs:
Ideology ­ State (Political Opportunity Structures): The state institutions'
structure is shaped by ideology. Laws, which constitute political opportunity
structures within which Muslim minorities have to function, are the
institutionalizing organs of ideals such as republicanism and citizenship. Results
of this interaction are the requirements for admission to the political community.
10
For example, as Kastoryano says,12
marriage or period of residence, 'good
moral character' and knowledge of the French language and culture from living in
the society, are required in France. Meanwhile, Sweden has allowed dual
citizenship since 2001, in order to help immigrants in Sweden, many of whom are
not able or willing to renounce their original citizenship, to have a better chance at
integration by becoming Swedish citizens.
Resource Mobilization ­ Muslim Minorities: Effective organizational
structures, wealth, successful leadership, and group cohesion, are aspects of
political resources of the Muslims, qualifiers of their minority as an interest group.
Institutional Framework of Islam ­ Muslim Minorities: Islam, especially
Sunni Islam is shaped by an institutional framework which does not sanction a
hierarchical clergy or an established church. Scholars who are specialized in
subjects of Islamic law, can by no means be considered as authoritative figures, as
their ideas and interpretations have minimum influence on Muslims, especially
those in the West. This personal-faith framework raises issues of leadership
legitimacy within the Muslim minority group, making it more challenging to
negotiate with the state as a unitary actor represented by a designated body or an
individual.
Muslim Minorities ­ State (Political Opportunity Structures): Together
political resources and the institutional framework of Islam influence
effectiveness of Muslim minorities to bargain with the state. However, Muslim
minorities have to function within the political opportunity structures, such as the
neutralization laws, which determine what rights immigrants or asylum seekers
have, and how easily immigrants or descendants of immigrants can become
citizens. Another example is the regulations for organizations: for instance, in
France even though Muslim organizations would not be recognized under
religious criteria, there are roughly 1000 associations run by Muslims, registered
by the law of 1901 because of their cultural activities at local level.
However, in order to fully analyze the phenomenon of Muslims' state
accommodation, we should also take into consideration the Church-state relations,
and combine this factor, maybe the most important one, with the other three.
12 Riva Kastoryano, "Citizenship: Beyond Blood and Soil" in Leveau (eds.), New European Identity and Citizenship,
(Burlington: Ashgate Publications, 2002): 17
11
Church-State Structure ­ State (Political Opportunity Structures): Laws
institutionalize Church-state relations, constituting political opportunity structures.
For instance, in countries with a concordat, such as Spain and Germany, states
recognize certain religious groups and extend them privileges such as public
funding for schools and tax exempt status. Fetzer and Soper13
suggest that conflict
over the headscarf and school curriculum in France is merely the product of that
country's "long and contentious state-church history"; similarly, they find that
"inherited state-church institutions best explain how Germany has accommodated
Muslims".
Ideology ­ Church-State Structure: In exactly the same way, ideology,
such as laicism, shapes the institutionalization of church-state relations.
Church-State Structure ­ Muslim Minorities: Established church-state
relations set the institutional framework within which Muslim minorities have to
function .
The cases of the United Kingdom, France and Germany
The presence of a formal religious establishment, the Church of England,
shapes state accommodation in Britain . One would might think that the activity of
an established, dominant, official religion, playing such an important role, would
be translated into a barrier to Muslims as they negotiated with the state over
contested religious practices . On the contrary, the British model of church-state
relations been a major factor of institutional organization, political motivation and
ideological expression for Muslim activists , rather than leaving Muslims out of
the policy mix of state benefits. British church-state policy makes significant
allowances for religious groups and, as a consequence, resources flow to religious
schools and social service agencies14
. "Because they are more likely to be citizens,
British Muslims have myriad political opportunities for activism at their disposal.
They can, for instance, participate through conventional political channels (voting
13 Fetzer and Soper : 94, 126
14 S.Monsma, and J.C.Soper, The Challenge of Pluralism: Church and State in Five Western Democracies (Lanham,
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Press 1997)
12
and running for elective office), and existing parties have an incentive to make
direct electoral appeals to them".15
Most importantly, the presence of an established church encouraged
Muslim groups to look to the state for a public recognition of their religious rights
and public policy needs. In other words, the establishment of an official religion
sets the example for Muslims to bargain with the state on their religious issues.
According to Nielsen, "...access to citizenship, legally speaking, and access to
political participation in Britain is easy. Germany, and, above all, Switzerland are
examples of the opposite end of the scale". (Jorgen S. Nielsen, April 2003).16
Although "policy statements made by prominent politicians seeking votes usually
ignore the negative impact on the minorities whose votes are not deemed worth
seeking"17
in Britain, where the Muslim community is older and has enjoyed
recognition in more positive terms, instances of the Muslim community-political
parties or representatives is more directly observable.
At the same time, Muslims no longer vote blindly, but for those politicians
and parties that specifically address the issues of concern to their group. As the
previous British MP from Birmingham wrote, "Anxious immigrants who throw
themselves on the mercy of their members of parliament are now a minority. Their
children and grandchildren will only vote for politicians who explicitly meet their
demands...Muslims expect something approaching a personal relationship with
their members of parliament. They demand audible and visible support particularly
in face of the fashionable suspicion of all things Islamic"18
Muslim politicians themselves are also changing, since they do not wish to
present themselves and be voted for as Muslims, but rather as regular politicians.
They appeal to their voters' support for their capabilities as political leaders of
their entire constituency, not just its Muslim members. Sadiq Khan, MP from
Tooting in the UK, uses these words to describe himself: "I am a Tooting, boy and
15 Fetzer and Soper, 12
16 Jorge Nielsen, Speech presented at the "Muslims in Europe Post 9/11" conference at St Antony's College (Oxford, 23-24
April 2003)
17 Nielsen, 2004: 126
18 Roy Hattersley, "I took the Muslim vote for granted, but that has all changed" The Guardian (8 Apr 2005)
13
man. I was born in the constituency and I have lived there all my life. I married a
Tooting girl..."19
.
The case of France is completely different, as lacité is the ideal that
dominates in the French public sphere. Separationism between religion and state is
the ultimate rule, and the French policy on state accommodation of religious
practices could do nothing but serve as a certain version of that separationism .
Not only secularists, but even most practicing Christians, Jews, and Muslims still
justify their respective positions by appealing to some version of this particularly
French concept.
Cesari, argues that "Lacité refers to the uneasy compromise that French
people have made between the letter of the law of separation of state and church
and its peculiar implementation within French culture. Quite paradoxically, when
passed in 1905, the law's primary intention was not to champion religious freedom
per se in France. Rather, it was to weaken Catholic influence by putting
Catholicism on an equal footing with religious minorities within the public
domain. Practically speaking, confirming to the law meant confining religious
belief to the private sphere. Ideally speaking, conformity meant and still means
extirpating homage to religious values from all spheres: personal, familial, social,
cultural, and political. Through the decades, major religious groups-Christian and
Jewish- have made uneasy peace with la cit by relegating religious expression to
private domains. Muslim settlement in France has disrupted that peace. It has
introduced new confusion over boundaries between public and private space and
led to renewed controversy over religious freedom and political tolerance"20
.
According to Fetzer and Soper (2005:62-97)21
, lacité could be divided
into two broad categories: strict (a.k.a. militant or closed) and soft (also called
pluralist or open). According to the first version of lacité, French citizens may,
in their private life, believe what they will about religion . However, lacité sets
several restrictions to religious individuals, when the public sphere is concerned.
Praying in public, refusing to eat certain kinds of food in a school cafeteria, and
wearing religiously distinctive clothing or jewelry outside the home, for example,
19 Khan Sadiq, Maiden Speech House of Commons Hansard (23 May 2005)
20 Jocelyne Cesari "Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religious Minority" in Haddad (eds.), Islam in the West: From
Sojourners to Citizens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)
21 Fetzer and Soper, 62- 97
14
all violate the first type of lacité, and generally they are not allowed to engage in
any exterior manifestation of their religion.
According to the soft version of lacité, the state should respect all
religious beliefs but also foster the free exercise of religion by, for example,
funding private religious schools. Far from wanting to confine religion to the
private sphere, advocates of open lacité wish to encourage interreligious
understanding and public dialogue among different religious groups, even in the
public schools.
As both a form of public policy and an ideological tradition, lacité has
structured the political arguments of Muslim groups and political leaders in
France. Muslims in France find themselves contesting rearguard actions on highly
symbolic, though still very significant, issues such as the right of girls to wear the
ij ~b in state-run schools. At the same time, Muslims have not, been able to put on
the policy agenda such things as support for separate Islamic schools or state aid
for Muslim social service organizations, both of which are viewed as simply
unacceptable given the state's supposed commitment to church-state separation.
The pre-existing church-state model in France, therefore, restricted Muslim efforts
successfully to negotiate with the state on substantive religious issues of concern
to their religious community.
Jennings22
identifies four characteristics of French thought on the subject
of immigrant integration: 1) integration of immigrants must be in accord with the
secularism of the state; 2) it is individuals rather than groups that integrate 3)
integration presupposes rights and duties 4) immigrants and the French must be
treated equally. Perhaps the most important of these is the notion that individuals
may integrate, but not groups: in a republican democracy, groups are not to be
differentiated as such, and indeed the targeting of nationals of a particular country
is only likely to bring about dreaded communautarisme
Separation between church and state also exists in Germany, however not
in the way it does in France. German Basic Law establishes that separation
formally, but at the same time the Constitution secures cooperation (particularly
strong for the historically dominant and state-supported Roman Catholic and
22 Jeremy Jennings "Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France," Bristish Journal of
Political Science (30:4, 2000): 583
15
Evangelische churches, which together represent over ninety percent of
Germany's religious population) between the two institutions in such areas as
education and social welfare provision23 24
.It seems that the German church-state
system strikes a middle ground between Britain's established church and France's
lacité. State schools in Germany provide formal religious instruction
(Religionsunterricht). Moreover, churches that are recognized by the state as
public corporations are eligible the proceeds of a church tax (Kirchensteuer) that
is collected by the government, and the state runs a significant portion of its social
welfare services through agencies of these publicly recognized churches. The
question, however, is whether the state will expand its informal religious
establishment to include Islam.
The German federal system, not surprisingly, leads to large differences in
how or whether public schools provide instruction on Islam. Educational policy is
the responsibility of Land governments and in some Länder, such as Berlin and
North-Rhine Westphalia, teaching about Islam has been included in the state
school curriculum. Other states have even financed separate Muslim schools. Of
course, not all Länder have been so accommodating to Muslim demands, and no
German Land has yet granted public corporation status to a Muslim group.
"German Muslims...cannot as effectively participate through conventional
politics, parties have limited reasons to make appeals to them, and they face the
threat of deportation if they engage in unconventional political activism."25
Cem Ozdemir (the first ethnic Turk to be elected Member of Parliament
in Germany) claims authorities have ensured their political incapacity: "Voters of
Turkish origin are not seen as one group with common interests. They are more or
less ignored by the two main parties (the Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats), and they have failed to organize themselves to speak with one
voice"26
.
Despite these setbacks, the German church-state model legitimates Muslim
demands for state accommodation of their religious practices and creates
23 Gerhard Robbers "State and Church in Germany" In Gerhard Robbers, editor, State and Church in the European Union.
Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft
24 Grace Davie, Religion in Modern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000)
25 Fetzer and Soper, 12
26 Cem Ozdemir, 24 Nov 2005
16
opportunities for the political mobilization of Muslim groups around discrete
public policy issues. At the same time, as Kastoryano27
notes, "Germany stands
today as one of the most liberal states in Europe with regard to citizenship."
The public incorporation of Muslims in the three countries can be
interpreted as a path dependent process shaped by the constitutional and legal
patterns of church-state relations in each country as well the history of countryspecific
arrangements that have been worked out over time between religious
groups and the state. The result has been policy divergence, as states have
responded to Muslim demands in light of the countries' unique legal, historical,
and constitutional structures. Pre-existing church-state practices have shaped the
contours of the debate in unique ways in each of the three states.
This maturing Muslim community has moved beyond being an immigrant
population in search of better immigration laws and working conditions, and
toward demands any minority makes: education, socio-economic benefits and
equality in rights. As Tariq Ramadan28
put it, "These new Muslims may be
European, but they are still Muslim. And they are upsetting the old lines of
demarcation - they are not like the old Muslim leaders who were so docile and so
little nuisance". (Tariq Ramadan, June 2000: 3). They may identify with their
respective ethnic community more than the religious one, but even then it is more
often the case that they wish not to be perceived as solely an exponent of that
group: "I'm not going to deny my roots. But I see myself primarily as a Dutch
politician, with special antenna into the Turkish community", the Dutch Muslim
politician Coskun Coruz said.29
A systematic opposition to the secular state seems to be confined to a
relatively small group among Muslims living in Europe, whereas the majority of
Muslims have apparently been able to adapt quite well to the secular political
order. However, "Secularism is becoming a religion: banning crucifixes, banning
headscarves...The whole idea behind state secularism is that everyone should
27 Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2002)
28 Tariq Ramadan, 12 June 2000: 3
29 Washington Post (24 Apr 2005)
17
have the same rights. But if secularism restricts someone's identity then it's going
to be against this principle"30
.
State-Religion Relations in 15 EU Members31
Established Religion
State
Funding of
Churches
Religious
Instruction in
Public Schools
Austria NO NO Optional
Belgium NO YES Optional
Denmark
Lutheran YES Optional
England Anglicanism
YES
Obligatory
Finland
Lutheran and
Orthodox
YES Obligatory
France
NO NO NO
Germany NO YES Obligatory
Greece Orthodox YES Obligatory
Ireland NO NO Obligatory
Italy
Catholic (signed a
concordat)
NO Optional
Luxemburg
NO YES Obligatory
Netherlands NO NO Optional
Portugal
Catholic (signed a
concordat)
YES Optional
Spain
Catholic (signed a
concordat)
YES Optional
Sweden
NO YES Optional
30 Hassan El Araby, Swiss Muslim politician, 25 Apr 2004
31 Sources: Gaillard 2004; U.S. 2004; Baubérot 1994c.
18
Conclusion: The Future of Islam in Western Europe
Attempting to distinguish the role that Islam could play in Western
Europe, Fetzer and Soper see three possible scenarios. These scenarios are public
policy secularism, pan-religious mobilization, and political backlash against
Muslims.
Scenario #1: Public Policy Secularism
A secular tide will move religion and the state further apart. Church
membership will decline and the religious belief will be limited to the private
sphere. The state will remove itself from the business of recognizing churches and
granting to them any statutory advantages (Iverson 2004)32
, since very few
citizens will be actively religious, and the inherited church-state links will be
abandoned by the politicians, due to the continuously increasing political disputes
around religion.
Scenario #2: Pan-Religious Mobilization
A political coalition will be formed by European Christians, Muslims, and
Jews, aiming to protect the very idea that the state should accommodate or aid
religion. Secularism will be seen as a generalized challenge to all religionists, as
a common threat, since the denial of religious instruction to one group will call
into question the benefits of all the others. In the same view, the realization that
Christians and Muslims share common interests and face a common enemy
(secularism) could lead to political alliances, that are now considered impossible.
The fact that European Muslims are more socially conservative than the general
European population, embracing a set of mores on such issues as abortion and
homosexuality closer to the traditional values and family agenda of the churches,
32 Hans Raun Iverson, "Religion in the 21st Century" Dialog: A Journal of Theology 43 (Spring 2004): 28-33
19
particularly those of the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy, makes possible that
Muslims and Christians might join forces politically to oppose further
secularization of public policy. Euthanasia, decriminalization of narcotics, and
the further sexualization of public spaces are all issues that have the potential to
create this kind of pan-religious mobilization, that would drew together two
religions with centuries of conflict history.
Scenario #3: Political Backlash Against Muslims
The electoral success of nativist political parties in France, the
Netherlands, Austria, and even Britain will set the example for a generalized
emergence of an islamophobist wave. The terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists
over the past several years have clearly tested the region's faith in
multiculturalism. The large Lyon mosque has been attacked at least three times,
once with bullets, once with a Molotov cocktail, and once with paint in the French
national colors. Such attacks are hardly rare in Western Europe. The current
wave of anti-Muslim hostility probably has not yet peaked in Western Europe33
,
and the war on terrorism continues.
The examination of the theories of state accommodation of Muslim
religious practices in Europe and their combination with the sensitive factor of the
church-state relations, showed the variety of tendencies, interests and structures
that clash and unite, in a struggle for maintaining vested rights or obtaining
official benefits. The historical background, the dynamic nature of religious
conflicts and the demographic facts indicate that the European societies will,
sooner or later, face the need for an inevitable transformation, a testing period for
their democratic sensibility and even their coherence.
33 Islamic Human Rights Commission. 2000. Anti-Muslim Discrimination and Hostility in the United Kingdom.
20
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