All At Sea
The Meaning of 'Europe' in British Political Discourse
To probe the meaning of the word 'Europe' in British usage, is straight away to appreciate one
of the defining features of Britain's European debate, namely a profound ambivalence about
whether or not 'Europe' includes the United Kingdom. For while the exact connotations and
associations that the concept evokes have evolved considerably over the course of the 20th
century, it has always remained possible both to include or exclude Britain. This uncertainty
will constitute the central theme of an essay which will start with an examination of what
'Europe' has been taken to imply away from the political arena, before turning to investigate
the layers of meaning involved in the political debate about Europe.
In every day English, the most striking feature of the way in which 'Europe' is used, is
the manner in which it has often become synonymous with 'continental' ­ i.e. a geographical
area which does not include the British Isles.1
A newspaper competition announcing 'Free
Flights to Europe' is thus not to be taken to mean that air tickets between London and
Edinburgh might be won. Instead it indicates that winners will be able to travel to a variety of
continental, and most probably, Western European tourist destinations. Similarly a decision
to take one's holidays 'in Europe' is more likely to mean that the merits of Italian sunshine
prevailed over the charms of the English seaside, than it is to suggest that Greece or Scotland
is being preferred to Florida. 'Europe' is used as an alternative to Britain, not as a
geographical area distinct from Africa, Asia or the Americas.
Used in this fashion, 'Europe', 'European' or the ubiquitous prefix 'Euro-', can of course
carry negative overtones. It is not uncommon to hear fans of Anglo-American pop music,
speak somewhat derisively of 'Euro-pop'. Uninspiring car designs are on occasion dismissed
as 'Euro-boxes', while cinema critics periodically denounce overwrought continental films as
'Euro-puddings'. One of Britain's television channels has for years broadcast a programme
devoted to some of the more salacious and off-beat aspects of continental European life
known as 'Euro-trash'. In each case the designation is uncomplimentary; in most cases,
moreover, an implicit contrast is drawn with the more 'normal' British or Anglo-American
fare to which British viewers and listeners have grown accustomed.
As often, however, the reference to Europe is designed to convey sophistication,
exoticism or simply difference. Over recent years, large numbers of British companies have
1
The Encyclopedia Britannica confirms this peculiarity, noting that the position of the British Isles represents
the sole uncertainty about Europe's western border. (15th
edition, 1974), p.590
2
adopted the prefix 'Euro-' partly no doubt in an effort to sound distinctive and exciting. The
Oxford telephone directory, for instance, lists no fewer than 32 companies so designated,
ranging from the 'Euro Foto centre' to the intriguingly named 'Euroquip Automotive Ltd.', by
way of 'Euro Shred Ltd' and 'Euroclip Sheep Shearing Equipment'. Some such as 'EuroIndustrial
Plastics' or 'Europipes' presumably also intend to signal their ambition to a market
that stretches beyond the UK. But others like 'Euro Fine Foods' clearly plan to trade on the
implicit sophistication of the word 'Euro' ­ a tactic which is particularly likely to be successful
in the field of gastronomy. Similarly bedding companies, trying to persuade the British of
the merits of the duvet over the traditional sheet and blanket, consistently market their product
as 'continental quilts'. In all of these cases 'European' or 'continental' is certainly meant to
underline difference from plain 'English' or 'Britishness', but it is done in a positive rather than
negative manner.
In many further cases, the label 'European' is largely value-free, being simply intended
to describe something which neither pertains to Great Britain nor to Asia, Africa, or the
Americas. For many years, the Oxford University history syllabus thus required students to
prepare three papers on 'English' history and two more on 'European' history ­ a terminology
which eventually fell into disuse, not because of a recognition that Britain might be part in
Europe, but instead out of the belief that some American, Asian and African history ought to
be included as well and that the non-British papers should henceforth be called 'general'
papers.2
In similar fashion the most widespread handbook for those interested in ornithology
is entitled 'The Birds of Britain and Europe'.3
And to use a still more up to date example, the
handbook which accompanies our current mobile phone, notes that its GSM capacity means
that the phone can be used 'in Britain, Europe and beyond.' In none of these cases is 'Europe'
intended to be interpreted favourably or unfavourably. As with the cases described above it is
undeniably meant as somewhere foreign and distinct from the UK.
In other contexts, however, the term 'European' has been used by the English in a
fashion which includes themselves as well as the French, Portuguese or Polish. Perhaps the
most striking 18th
and 19th
century example comes from the Empire and particularly India,
where soldiers dispatched from the UK rather than recruited locally were routinely referred to
as 'European' not 'British' or 'English' despite the fact that many, if not most, of them, almost
certainly were of British origin. Similarly the 1844 survey, British India written by H.H.
Wilson, spoke of 'Europeans in India rarely possessing... the inclination to invest capital in
2
That this was not just Oxford being idiosyncratic is confirmed by Keith Robbins, History, Religion and Identity
in Modern Britain (London: The Hambledon Press, 1993), pp.50-6
3
John Gooders, Birds of Britain and Europe (HarperCollins, 1998)
3
landed property' while E. Dicey in 1882 wrote of 'the gradual Europeanization of Egypt.'4
In
none of these cases were the British intending to play down their own role; they were simply
including themselves in the wider phenomenon of European colonial expansion.
Likewise a portion of the British educated elite throughout the modern era would have
acknowledged some debt to a European culture which stretched back to Ancient Greece and
Rome, but which also included the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and
Romanticism. As a result, some at least of the artists, authors and intellectuals of Britain
during the last two centuries would have acknowledged that their own output belonged within
a wider European tradition.5
Both the leisure travel patterns and the language learning habits
of the British elite for most of the last 200 years have also reflected a sense of proximity to the
continent, with France, Italy, Switzerland and Germany emerging as the favourite
destinations, and French, followed by German and then Italian as the most frequently studied
modern language. The centrality of Latin and Ancient Greek to a 'proper' education up until
the mid-point of the 20th
century suggests that the British felt themselves to be the heirs of a
European tradition stretching back to Classical antiquity. This European bias has persisted
even into the era of mass tourism, with the package holiday makers heading for Greece, Spain
or Southern Italy confirming the European centred pattern of travel set by the more moneyed
travellers heading for Tuscany, the Algarve or the Dordogne. The Cimitero degli Inglesi in
the middle of Florence is an eloquent reminder that even at the height of 'splendid isolation'
the British never cut themselves off entirely from continental culture; the Volvo-loads of
contemporary English families who descend on 'Chiantishire' each summer are testimony that
the links still remain strong.
In postwar years, moreover, the British general public has grown accustomed to the
spectacle of British clubs and sports stars competing in European tournaments. Well before
the 1990s when the sudden flood of continental players and managers into English football
led to a remarkable Europeanization of the British domestic game, British sports fans had
become used to the notion that Liverpool or Manchester United should periodically take on
Real Madrid, Inter Milan or Bayern Munich in competitions to designate the best football
team in Europe, or that British runners like Sebastian Coe or Linford Christie should compete
for European titles, to place alongside their Olympic, World and Commonwealth awards. In
golf indeed, viewers are even treated once yearly to the spectacle of a combined European
4
Both are cited in Oxford English Dictionary (2nd
Edition, 1989)
5
Philip Bell & Peter Morris note however the irony that in the same period that Britain has become involved in
political moves towards greater European unity, public consciousness of belonging to a shared European culture,
centred on the classics and Christianity, has grown much weaker. Bell & Morris, 'Les "Europe" des Européens
ou la notion d'Europe' in René Girault & Gérard Bossuat (eds.), Les Europe des Européens (Publications de la
Sorbonne, 1993), p.71
4
team taking on the United States, although it has to be acknowledged that the sight of British
fans so passionately backing Spanish or German golfers against US opposition, was
considered sufficiently unusual in the early 1990s to be the subject of at least one newspaper
editorial. (Revealingly, however, a more recent golf tournament which pitted a team from
continental Europe against one from Britain and Ireland, was widely described in the British
media as being 'Britain vs. Europe'.)
In British domestic politics, moreover, the last decades of the 20th
century witnessed
the steady rise in the number of references made to European standards, European growth
rates, and European norms. Although the use of such comparative data has not entirely
displaced allusions to American, Australian or New Zealand examples, it nevertheless bears
testimony to the way in which it has become common place to assume that Britain belongs in
European league tables of wealth, pollution, defence spending, heart disease, crime or teenage
pregnancy and that such comparisons possess both intellectual validity and political weight.
Prime Minister Blair's recent pledge to raise British health spending to the European average
within five years attracted much political comment about whether such an increase would be
possible and whether or not the figures cited by the government could be relied upon.
Nobody challenged the notion, however, that the comparison used by the government was a
relevant one. To the extent that a country's identity is defined by the company that it sees
itself as keeping, British domestic political discourse does thus suggest a surprising degree of
consensus that the UK is indeed a European country.
Despite such recent developments, however, the fundamental ambivalence persists.
Europe as both a place and as a concept may include Britain; alternatively, it may not. This
linguistic and attitudinal uncertainty has been compounded by the presence, throughout the
20th
century, of a number of competing identities towards which the British felt themselves
drawn. Prominent amongst these has been the idea of Empire or Commonwealth, the most
frequently cited 'alternative' to European alignment in British political debate, both between
the wars and since 1945. But they also include the notion of an Atlantic Community,
incorporating some of Europe certainly, but also extending to the United States and Canada,
and the hazy, yet oddly persistent appeal of 'the English speaking peoples'. The presence of
such rival communities and groupings meant that the British have rarely seen themselves as
having to choose between European involvement or isolation. Instead, participation in the
affairs of the continent, whether economically, diplomatically or by means of institutionalised
co-operation, has been seen by the UK as just one of several possible policy options.
Other European countries have of course also flirted with alternative alignments. All
bar one of the original six member states of the European Communities had at one point of
5
the 20th
century been important and ambitious colonial powers. In 1958 when the Treaty of
Rome was signed, two of them, France and Belgium, still ruled sizeable empires. Italy's
interwar view of the Mediterranean as Mare Nostrum and the Scandinavian states' recurrent
interest in schemes for Nordic unity should act as reminder meanwhile that Britain has not
been unique in having other, non-Imperial, options to pursue. But with a few exceptions notably
perhaps Nordic co-operation ­ these rival visions, while able to distract the energies
and attentions of policy-makers during periods where ideas of European unity have been
absent from the policy-agenda, have not permitted their advocates to feel uninvolved
whenever wider European vistas have opened up. Instead, imperial or sub-regional options
have tended to have been ditched in favour of European co-operation, or at best, as with the
case of the colonial arrangements France succeeded in incorporating in the Treaty of Rome,
reconciled with a European strategy. Britain, by contrast, has periodically felt able both to
support European integration for others and an alternative grouping for itself. Churchill in the
interwar years as much as in the postwar era was particularly representative of this view both
his famous 1930 article on 'The United States of Europe' and his 1946 Zurich speech
advocated a united Europe living in harmony with a powerful British Empire. But this stance
was far from exclusively Churchillian. The same assumption underpinned the attitude of
'benevolent neutrality' which is normally held to have been Britain's approach to integration
amongst the Six in the 1950-55 period, and recurs in the arguments of those opposed to
Britain joining the Euro in the contemporary debate. In public at least, most of those hostile
to British membership assert that they wish no ill towards the single currency itself; they
simply do not feel that it is the right choice for the UK.6
The very multiplicity of policy options available to Britain, has fuelled a further
distinctive feature of the British debate, namely a recurrent tendency to attack regionalism in
the name of global co-operation. The UK one might argue slightly cynically has responded to
its own unwillingness (or inability) to choose where and with which partners its own future
belongs, by accusing those more willing to press ahead with regional co-operation of
threatening global harmony. Expressed more charitably, the world-wide nature of Britain's
own economic and strategic interests, has encouraged the UK to champion global economic
liberalism and the widest possible international co-operation. As a result, interwar schemes
for European co-operation, notably the 1930 Briand Plan, were rejected by the British on the
grounds that they would be contrary to the principles of free trade and that they would
6
The ill-disguised glee apparent in British press coverage of the Euro's recent fall in value, however, might
suggest that much of Britain's `benevolent neutrality' is only skin-deep.
6
undermine the authority and effectiveness of the League of Nations.7
Similarly, the initial
British response to the Messina conference and the idea of a Common Market among the Six,
was to condemn a step which, British representatives claimed, would divide Western Europe
economically, undermine the wider liberalisation programme being carried out by the OEEC,
and be contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of GATT. Enthusiasts for Commonwealth cooperation
meanwhile, often contrasted what Hugh Gaitskell could describe as 'this remarkable
multiracial association, of independent nations, stretching across five continents, covering
every race', with the narrow regionalism of 'Little Europe'.8
In similar fashion, one of the 'no'
slogans in the 1975 referendum was 'Out of Europe and into the World'.9
To many opponents
of integration, it has been the self-styled 'Europeans' who have been guilty of a narrow and
restrictive vision, not themselves.
Taken together, this fundamental ambivalence about whether or not Britain is a
European nation at all, the presence of alluring alternatives to European co-operation, and a
persistent belief that the widest possible global co-operation is preferable to action at a
regional level, go a long way towards explaining why the UK has often reacted with
uncertainty, perplexity and even hostility to the ideas of European co-operation which have
been advanced by its neighbours, and hesitated profoundly about the extent to which it has
wanted any involvement at all with the affairs of the continent. So strong indeed have been
the forces pushing Britain away from Europe that it is at first sight surprising that the question
of involvement, let alone integration, has even arisen. And yet for all the temptations of
detachment, the British have found themselves deeply entwined with 20th
century historical
developments, acting as major combatants in both World Wars, intervening frequently
through diplomatic and economic means in the affairs of the continent, and, for the last thirty
years, playing a role as a central member state of the principal forum for European cooperation,
namely the EC/EU. The actual reality of Britain's position has thus been much
closer to 'the heart of Europe' than the frequent talk of detachment or 'splendid isolation'
implies.
In attempting to explain this apparent paradox, most British historiography has
focused on a series of pragmatic calculations made by British governments. Involvement in
European affairs, it has been argued, has not arisen out of sentiment, idealism or any powerful
urge, at public or at elite level, to be part of the continent. Instead it has reflected an
assessment of the geo-political and economic advantages of throwing Britain's weight into
7
Sir Arthur Salter, The United States of Europe and other papers (George Allen & Unwin, 1933), pp. 106-122
8
Gaitskell's speech to the Labour Party conference, October 1962. Cited in Martin Holmes (ed.), The
Eurosceptical Reader (Macmillan, 1996), p.28
9
Holmes, The Eurosceptical Reader, p.1
7
European affairs. Hard-headed calculations of national interest have driven policy, not
diffuse ideas about the meaning of Europe.
Britain's decision to go to war with the Central Powers in 1914 tends thus to be
explained in terms of London's assessment of how the balance of power in Europe would tilt
against Britain in the case of UK neutrality, while the hesitations and ambivalence about any
'continental commitment' during the interwar years are attributed to a combination of
economic and military weakness, a desire to avoid a new bloody conflict, and a sense of
commitment towards global and imperial interests not European ones. The initial aloofness
towards the Six is put down to the perceived difference in stature between Britain and the
main continental powers in the immediate postwar years, a lack of economic interest in
continental regional integration as opposed to Commonwealth free trade and global monetary
liberalisation, and the contrary pull of Empire, whereas the belated turn towards the EEC is
explained in terms of Britain's diminished strength relative to the Superpowers, the ongoing
disappearance of the Empire/Commonwealth option, and American pressure. Similarly,
Britain's discomforts since it has joined 'Europe' in 1973 tend to be linked to the divergent
economic and political interests of the UK and its partners, as well as with Britain's dislike of
some of the institutional and policy characteristics of the Community which had developed in
the years before the British had been able to enter the EEC.
Policy-making of this sort would, prima facie, appear to be a rather poor hunting
ground for 'meanings of Europe'. Totally pragmatic calculation should be grounded in
objective geo-political or economic realities, not value judgements about Europe's worth,
appeal or meaning. But on closer inspection British decision-making can be seen to be
influenced by, if not shaped, by a variety of assumptions and attitudes towards Europe which
have been much less than objective. And it is on these more subjective judgements which the
remainder of this essay will focus.
The first group of assumptions have centred on Europe's stability and on the likelihood
of conflict or collapse either between or within the major states. Britain's readiness or
otherwise to assume a major role in European diplomacy has, to a large extent, been
influenced by judgements about whether or not European politics have been stable and likely
to remain so. Such assessments, however, have often revealed more about Britain's
underlying prejudices than they have about the real state of politics in continental Europe.10
In the interwar period, and in the immediate aftermath of World War II, a great deal of
British concern centred on the likelihood of further European conflict. The Great War
10
For a discussion of how far back such prejudices go historically, see Linda Colley, Britons. Forging the
Nation, 1707-1837 (Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 24-5 & 364-8.
8
produced an understandable desire, both amongst the public at large, and within the political
elite, to ensure that no comparable carnage could occur again. It also produced a wave of
sentiment which associated 'Europe' and 'European history' in particular with bloodshed and
conflict. Even an observer like Churchill, someone who would subsequently rekindle his
political reputation through his determination to ensure that Britain did not turn its back on
the continent, could write of continental European developments in deeply blood-tinged
language. In a 1930 article which compared the idea of European unity to a fire which had
smouldered for years but which was only now at a stage where it was likely to set alight the
'rubbish heap' of Europe, he went on:
'We must regard this heap a little more closely in the glowing light. It has been the
growth of centuries, and even millenniums have passed since some of its still-existing
materials were deposited. In the main, it is made up of the bones and broken weapons
of uncounted millions who brought one another to violent death long ago. Upon these,
three or four centuries have cast masses of rotting vegetation, and latterly an
increasing discharge of waste paper. But in it, mixed up with all this litter, scattered
about and intermingled, are some of the most precious and dearly loved of treasures of
the strongest races in the world. All the history books of Europe are there; its
household gods; all the monuments and records of wonderful achievement and
sacrifice; the battle flags for which heroes of every generation have shed their blood;
the vestments of religions still living and growing in the minds of men; the
foundations of the jurisprudence still regulating their relations one with another ­ all
flung and blended together.'11
For Churchill the conclusion to be drawn from this mix of barbarity and civilisation was that
Britain should do all in its power to encourage Europe to unite ­ without itself taking part thereby,
perhaps, putting an end to the continent's endemic bloodshed. But it was hardly
surprising if other statesmen, while sharing with Churchill the association between Europe
and bloodshed, drew rather different conclusions.
Fear of further European war also threw into sharp relief, the fundamental uncertainty
about whether or not Britain was European. For Imperial statesmen such McKenzie King, the
Canadian Prime Minister, the best response to the underlying dangers of European
involvement was clearly disengagement: Canada he asserted should take advantage of the fact
that 'We live in flame-proof house, far from inflammable materials.'12
Many other statesmen
from the Dominions ­ influential figures in interwar Britain ­ shared his view. Yet for Britain
itself the decision to disengage itself from European affairs was much harder to take,
particularly at a time when the great military development of the age, the emergence of air
power, was actually increasing Britain's vulnerability to attack from the continent not
11
Winston Churchill, 'The United States of Europe', Saturday Evening Post, 15.2.1930
12
Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment. The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of Two
World Wars (Penguin, 1974), pp. 75-6
9
decreasing it. The flammable material in other words was much too close, the house itself far
from flame-proof. The story of Britain's military and strategic planning between the wars, is
thus one which centres on an agonising debate about how 'European' or how Imperial Britain
could afford to be. Through most of the 1920s and the first part of the 1930s, guided by
figures such as Austen Chamberlain and Stanley Baldwin, Britain opted primarily for the
politics of European involvement. As Baldwin put it graphically to the House of Commons in
1934, 'When you think of the defence of England you no longer think of the chalk cliffs of
Dover; you think of the Rhine. That is where our frontier lies.'13
But neither public opinion,
nor all of Baldwin's Conservative colleagues were wholly convinced. Two years later, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, could thus respond to a plea by the army
for the necessary resources to be able to intervene on the continent, by noting that public
opinion 'strongly opposed to continental adventures... will be strongly suspicious of any
preparation made in peace time with a view to large scale military operations on the Continent
and they will regard such preparations as likely to result in our being entangled in disputes
which do not concern us.'14
From such views to the belief that the Sudeten crisis was 'a
quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing' was but a short step.
Appeasement was thus in part a function both of attitudes about how European Britain should
be, and of assessments of how dangerous and unstable continental politics were likely to
prove.
Britain's disinclination to involve itself too deeply in 1930s Europe was bolstered by
an equally strong suspicion of domestic continental politics.15
Distaste at the Italian Fascist
and Nazi German regimes was, of course, deeply comprehensible, as were the equally strong
misgivings about Soviet Russia. But British dislike of 'European' politics extended also to
countries which had remained democratic such as France. The perpetual comings and goings
of III Republic governments were looked at with a mixture of dismay and contempt, and even
as Anglophile a French leader as Leon Blum, had to struggle in order to establish a close
rapport with London. The interwar failure to build a strong Anglo-French alliance against
Hitler, was hence intertwined with a sweeping British judgement about the nature of
European politics.
British dismissiveness towards the stability of continent was much in evidence after
1945 as well. Although the late 1940s were an era when Britain did take the lead in building
13
Howard, The Continental Commitment, p.112
14
Howard, The Continental Commitment, p. 116
15
For an interesting discussion of the links between such suspicion and the way in which Britain interpreted its
own historical development, see Philip Bell, `A Historical Cast of Mind. Some Eminent English Historians and
Attitudes to Continental Europe in the Middle of the Twentieth Century', Journal of European Integration
History, vol.2, no.2, 1996
10
a variety of trans-European bodies, designed both to distribute American Marshall aid and put
in place defensive structures which might help repel a Soviet attack, it did so with misgivings,
unwilling either to see itself reduced to the level of 'just another European country' or to allow
its own survival to become unduly dependent on unreliable continental armies which were as
likely to collapse in the face of a Soviet challenge as they had been in the face of the Germans
in 1940. The British military in particular continued to feel that continental Europe was
indefensible without American assistance, and made no effort whatsoever to plan for ways in
which the UK might honour the defensive obligations its politicians had decided to assume by
means of the Dunkirk and Brussels treaties.16
British European policy-making in the first
years of the Cold War, was thus deeply influenced by the 'lesson' of 1940, namely that no
continental country could be considered militarily reliable. Both its military strategy, which
went on being centred on the Middle East and Commonwealth defence long after NATO's
creation in 1949, and its attitude towards European projects such as the Schuman Plan,
reflected this dismissive judgement of Europe's prospects in the event of war with the Soviet
Union.17
As during the interwar period, question marks about Europe's strategic reliability went
hand in hand with uncertainty about the domestic politics of the major continental countries.
Britain admittedly was not alone in taking time to regain its trust of Germany, but by the
1960s the tone of caution, mistrust and ill-concealed hostility which still characterised
Britain's approach to Bonn looked increasingly anachronistic. In 1963 relatively junior
British diplomats based in Bonn, seeking to explain why Adenauer had seemingly sided with
de Gaulle against British membership of the EEC, pleaded with their government 'to
demonstrate that we regard the Federal Republic as a trusted ally, instead of a rather shady
business partner to be tolerated but not liked.'18
Revealingly, however, their ambassador
continued to harbour many of the sceptical feelings shown by his political masters, and
repeatedly demonstrated an extraordinary willingness to write off the ageing Chancellor as all
but senile. Relations with France were also less than ideal. Britain has never been good at
understanding the intricacies of coalition politics, and its attitude towards the rapid rotation of
governments under the IV Republic, only confirmed this rule. French governments were seen
as transient, weak and totally unreliable, the policy consistency which sprang from the
powerful French Civil Service being usually totally overlooked. But matters did not improve
with the advent of the V Republic, since dismissiveness about weak governments was
16
John Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism. Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942-9 (Macmillan, 1993),
pp.76-91
17
The longevity of such dismisiveness is illustrated by the way in which the Conservative Defence Minister,
Michael Portillo could still win applause at the 1995 party conference with his allusion to...
11
replaced with near paranoia about de Gaulle's maverick foreign policy. Italy, meanwhile,
was treated with scant respect, its politics and economy both dismissed as backwards, long
after the latter at least had begun its remarkable postwar boom. 19
As one senior British
diplomat recalled of the postwar decade: `we were highly sceptical about Europe. Europe was
a collection of aliens and foreigners... who were erratic. They were unreliable. Some of
them had let us down. Some of them had fought against us. All of them were seen, in 1948,
to be liable to communist subversion and they were, quite frankly, not the sort of area that we
­ in contrast to the Commonwealth and the all its glittering prospects as we saw it ­ wanted to
tie ourselves down to.'20
This dismissiveness fed through into Britain's early policy making towards European
integration. For a start it tended to cast doubts about the viability of the whole enterprise.
Despite the success of the ECSC, the British would remain unpersuaded of integration's
effectiveness until very late in the 1950s, and were still expressing doubts about whether it
would survive after de Gaulle and Adenauer as they prepared for Community membership in
the early 1960s. But it also led both to a strong sense that full participation, as opposed to
association, would somehow be demeaning for a country such as Britain, and to the
unfounded expectation that Britain had only to say the word to be able to assume control over
the process. Expectations that Britain could push `Europe' where it willed were to reach their
apogee in the mid 1950s with the Free Trade Area scheme and would subsequently fade
somewhat. The belief, however, that Britain's negotiating position was much stronger than it
really was, continued to shape British policy making under both Macmillan and Wilson. Its
most famous expression after all, in the form of George Brown's reported outburst to Willy
Brandt, 'come on Willy, you must get us in so that we can take the lead' dates from the end of
the 1960s rather than from the previous decade.
A vein of dismissiveness towards much continental politics has continued up until the
present day. Fully fledged attacks on the viability of continental democracy, along the lines
of Lord Attlee's full-page advertisement in 1962 in which he spoke of Europe being
'politically unstable' and asked whether France, Germany and Italy would still be democracies
in twenty years time, have faded somewhat.21
But the sentiments arguably live on, both in the
recurrent attacks on the undemocratic structures of the Community itself and in the repeated
questioning of the honesty and freedom from corruption of most continental politicians and
indeed of continental life. Michael Portillo' off-the-record comments about how easy it was
18
PREM 11/4524, Rose to FO, No. 32 Saving, 2.2.1963
19
See N.Piers Ludlow, `A Slow Reassessment: British Views of Italy=s European Policy 1950-1963', Storia
delle relazioni internazionali, special issue, forthcoming 2000
20
Joseph Garner cited in Michael Charlton, The Price of Victory (BBC, 1983), p.62
12
to buy a degree in most European countries were indicative of a widespread mistrust of
continental fairness.
Suspicion of Germany in particular has frequently bubbled to the surface, often
combined with ill-disguised irritation at Britain's inability to displace Paris and Bonn from the
leadership of the European integration process. As early as 1956 Harold Macmillan was
warning that the project that had been launched at Messina could constitute 'an instrument for
the revival of German power through economic means. It is really giving them on a plate
what we fought two world wars to prevent.' Similar sentiments have been expressed more
recently by Nicholas Ridley, the Conservative Secretary of State for the Environment under
Thatcher who described the EC to The Spectator as 'a German racket designed to take over
the whole of Europe', as well as by Thatcher herself in the notorious 1990 Chequers study
day, and have been given spurious academic credibility by Niall Ferguson.22
In all cases, the
aggressiveness of the Germans and the political unreliability of the remaining 'Europeans' has
been contrasted, normally implicitly, sometimes explicitly, with the reliability, fairness,
honesty and respect for democracy of the British (and sometimes the rest of the Englishspeaking
world.)23
Although extreme, a recent outburst by Lady Thatcher illustrates the basic
attitudes well, the former Prime Minister telling a gathering of Scottish Tories that
We are quite the best country in Europe... I dare say it ­ I'm told I have to be careful
about what I say and I don't like it ­ in my lifetime all our problems have come from
mainland Europe and all the solutions have come from the English-speaking nations of
the world that have kept law-abiding liberty alive for the future.24
This long tradition of British criticism of the military and political reliability of its
continental neighbours is most usually associated with those opposed to closer links between
the UK and the Continent and those dismissive of any idea of European unity or co-operation.
The prominence in the preceding paragraphs of Eurosceptics such as Attlee, Thatcher or
Portillo only reinforce this linkage. But the fact that men such as Churchill and Macmillan
have also been periodically outspoken in their denunciations of the state of continental
politics, underlines the fact that unhappiness at the state of Europe has not necessarily been an
argument for indifference or detachment. On the contrary, some of the most powerful
advocates of British involvement have drawn much of their zeal from the twin beliefs that,
firstly the UK could not but be affected by either instability or conflict amongst its nearest
21
Attlee's advertisement appeared in all the major British dailies on 15.8.1962
22
For Thatcher and Ridley, see Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair
(Macmillan, 1998), pp. 359-62; for Ferguson...
23
See also Wolfram Kaiser, Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans. Britain and European Integration, 1945-63
(Macmillan, 1996), pp.221-5
24
The Times 6.10.1999
13
geographical neighbours, and secondly, that British involvement would be the best means of
stabilising the situation and ensuring that matters were not allowed to slip out of control.
Thinking of this sort has been observable in the British political and policy-making
debate throughout the 20th
century. In what might be perhaps termed its weaker variant, it has
not necessarily overcome British doubts about whether European co-operation is suitable for
itself, but has led British politicians and diplomats to feel that the UK should play an
encouraging and positive role from the sidelines. Churchill's advocacy of such an approach
has been noted above. In similar vein, the initial Foreign Office response to the Briand plan,
while observing that UK participation would lead to serious problems with the
Commonwealth, counselled against too negative a reply on the grounds that British
dismissiveness might harm the French Foreign Minister. Briand was, in the view of the
Foreign Office, 'an old and valued friend of this country... almost alone among French
politicians he has in recent years consistently shown himself a good European, the friend of
peace, and of the improvement of international relations.'25
The poor state of French and
European politics generally was in other words being advanced as a strong reason for
mitigating British criticism of the plan. In the postwar era comparable anxieties about the
adverse effect of British hostility, tempered both Labour and Conservatives attacks on the
Schuman and Pleven Plans. Anthony Eden, in particular, became so convinced that the EDC
was vital for European stability, that he was prepared to go to great lengths in his efforts to
salvage the project.26
In its stronger form, the perceived need for British encouragement has been
superseded by the belief that the stability of Europe can only be achieved through actual
British participation. The best known interwar manifestation of this line of thought, were of
course the arguments of those who opposed appeasement and denounced the Munich
agreement. In their eyes, Britain, France and Russia would have to act together in order to
curb German aggression and preserve peace in Europe. Full-hearted British involvement in
the politics of Europe was thus essential, if war was to be avoided and the dictators held in
check. Since 1945, comparable reasoning has been applied with regard to European
integration. The 1960 Lee Committee report, for instance, a document widely regarded as
being a major milestone on Britain's road to EEC membership, noted the strong foreign policy
pressures which would be brought to bear on the UK should the Six succeed in their collective
endeavour and then went on:
25
Cited in Robert Boyce, British Capitalism at the Crossroads 1919-1932. A study in politics, economics and
international relations (CUP, 1987), pp. 247-8
26
Spencer Mawby, Containing Germany. Britain and the arming of the Federal Republic (Macmillan, 1999),
pp.73-103
14
If on the other hand, the Six 'fail', there would be great damage to Western interests,
and the weakening of Europe which would follow would be a serious matter for the
United Kingdom; it would be too later for us to go in to prevent failure when a
breakdown was seen to be coming, but if we were already in, we could probably
strengthen the European bloc and prevent its disintegration.27
The potential for European instability was once more being turned into an argument for
British involvement rather than against.
Throughout the last one hundred years, the British have thus been recurrently drawn
into making sweeping generalisations about the stability, the reliability and the honesty of
'European' politics. Such judgements when made have rarely, if ever, been the product of a
genuine pan-European survey, ready and able to differentiate between different tendencies
across the differing parts of the continent. On the contrary, they have most often been snap
judgements, based primarily on a patchy knowledge of Western Europe in general and France
and Germany in particular.28
But despite their questionable reliability, such assessments have
played a central role in the determination of British policy towards its neighbours, at times
forming the basis of arguments for isolation and detachment, at others underpinning the belief
that Britain needed to become more deeply involved.
The second cluster of attitudes which need to be considered in understanding the
assumptions that have underpinned Britain's European policy, are questions surrounding the
idea of 'Europe' and modernity. For, in the postwar period especially, assessments about the
extent to which participation in European co-operation would drive Britain forward or hold
the country back, have been present, and telling, in virtually all of Britain's intermittent
debates about 'Europe'.
For many on the left of British politics, one of the most persuasive reasons to look
askance at the whole integrative project, despite the Labour Party's ostensible commitment to
internationalism and transnational solidarity, was the belief that Western Europe was
primarily reactionary and conservative, and that as such, British involvement could only
impede the UK's own path towards the construction of a socialist state. 'Europe' in this sense
became not an alternative to 'Commonwealth' or 'Atlanticism' but instead a barrier to
'Socialism' and that New Jerusalem which the postwar Labour Party wished to build. This
attitude can be traced back to the very start of post-1945 discussions about European
integration. In April 1948, for instance, the Labour-leaning Daily Herald, urged Labour
27
PRO. CAB 134/1853, ES(E) Cttee, June 1960
28
The centrality of France and Germany ­ and the general dismissiveness of UK views ­ is confirmed by Anne
Deighton & Geoffrey Warner, 'British Perceptions of Europe in the Postwar Period' in Girault & Bossuat, Les
Europe des Européens, pp.60-2
15
delegates to boycott the Hague Conference since the gathering would merely provide a
platform for Churchill and others who desired 'the old order of things'.29
During the 1960s and the great debate about British membership of the EEC, there
was a similar sub-text about the compatibility of European integration and Socialism.
Gaitskell's 1962 party conference speech, in which he attacked the Macmillan government's
headlong rush into Europe, displayed strong doubts about whether or not joining the
Community would be progressive.
For although, of course, Europe has had a great and glorious civilisation, although
Europe can claim Goethe and Leonardo, Voltaire and Picasso, there have been evil
features in European history too ­ Hitler and Mussolini, and today the attitude of some
Europeans to the Congo problem, the attitude of at least one European government to
the United Nations. You cannot say what this Europe will be: it has two faces and we
do not know yet which is the one which will dominate.30
This sense of general unease was compounded by more specific doubts about whether EEC
membership would allow Britain the economic freedom to tackle local unemployment and the
extent to which economic planning would be permitted. For those on the Labour left, such as
Barbara Castle or Richard Crossman, the choice between Europe and socialism was much
more clear cut, as the latter's diary account of 1967 Cabinet discussions of the issue reveal.
Those who are in charge ­ Michael Stewart, George Brown, Harold Wilson, Jim
Callaghan ­ all now feel that the attempt to have a socialist national plan for the
British Isles keeps us balanced on such a terribly tight rope that it really has got to be
abandoned and that of course is the main reason why they favour entry into the
Market. Today Barbara [Castle] made a tremendous speech saying that entry would
transform our socialism and make us abandon all our plans. In a sense she's
completely right. It anybody wanted, apart from myself, Britain to be a socialist offshore
island, entry to the Market would mean the abandonment of that ideal.31
The way to the left's vision of modernity and the path to 'Europe' were thus seen as utterly
divergent. To the Labour left, the Wilson government's espousal of Common Market entry,
signalled its abandonment of fully-blown socialism. In the light of such views, it is
unsurprising that the apogee of left wing power within the Labour Party, saw the party fight
the 1983 General Election on a platform of withdrawal from the European Community.
By the mid to late 1980s, however, it had become the Thatcherite right not the
socialist left, who felt that their opportunity radically to transform Britain was being
obstructed by the European Community. The tension between the ideals espoused by the
29
Cited in Jeremy Moon, European Integration in British Politics 1950-1963: A study of issue-change (Gower,
1985), p.107
30
Cited in Holmes, The Eurosceptical Reader, p.21
31
Entry for Sunday, April 30th
, 1967. Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol. II, p.335
16
European Community and the free market vision of the British Prime Minister was nowhere
better expressed than in Thatcher's 1988 Bruges speech.
I want to see us work more closely on the things we can do better together than alone.
Europe is stronger when we do so, whether it be in trade, in defence, or in our
relationship with the rest of the world. But working more closely together does not
require power to be centralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed
bureaucracy. Indeed, it is ironic that just when those countries such as the Soviet
Union, which have tried to run everything from the centre, are learning that success
depends on dispersing power and decisions away from the centre, some in the
Community seem to want to move in the opposite direction. We have not successfully
rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a
European level, with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from
Brussels.32
As had been the case with the Labour left during the years between 1945 and 1983, the most
radical members of Britain's political class thus regarded the notion of collective European
action as something which would at best dilute and at worst altogether remove their capacity
for a far-reaching transformation of the British economy and society. To those with the most
extreme visions of modernity, 'Europe' was a regressive rather than a modernising concept.
The alarming radicalism of both the left and the Thatcherite right may equally have
led some with more centrist convictions into a more favourable position towards European
integration. That same capacity to obstruct or dilute far-reaching change which so appalled
the radicals, would appear rather attractive to those hostile to socialist or Thatcherite ideals.
There is some evidence of this happening in the 1950s and 1960s. The Daily Telegraph
editorial, for instance, entitled 'Socialism vs. Europe' which advocated observer status at least
for the British at the Schuman Plan negotiations, may well have been born in part out of the
belief that the worse excesses of the postwar Labour government might be contained by
European involvement.33
And it is sometimes claimed that one of the unspoken arguments
behind the Tory volte-face on Europe of the early 1960s was the need to make Britain safe
from the socialism of any future Labour government.34
But it is in the 1980s that this
phenomenon is most easily observed. The swing towards pro-Europeanism of the TUC and
the majority of the British Labour movement, for instance, was strongly related to the
growing conviction amongst British trade unionists that Europe, far from posing a danger to
their aspirations, instead represented the most effective means of protecting the conquests of
the past from a right-wing British government which appeared instinctively hostile to
unionism. To beleaguered British trade union officials, who had come to dread virtually all
economic, social and fiscal policy-making under the Thatcher, Jacques Delors' sweeping (and
32
Cited in Holmes, The Eurosceptical Reader, pp.91-2
33
See Moon, European Integration in British Politics
17
ill-founded) prediction that 'in ten years time, 80% of economic, and perhaps social and tax
legislation, will be of Community origin' sounded like a promise of liberation.35
Similarly,
there is much to suggest that the transformation of Scottish opinion towards European
integration in the course of the 1980s, which saw what had in the 1975 referendum been the
most hostile part of the British electorate to the idea of remaining inside the EEC become, by
the late 1980s, consistently more pro-European than the national average, had much to do
with Scotland's antipathy to Thatcherism. For many in Edinburgh, Brussels represented the
best protection available from the excesses of London.
It would, however, be unfair to those who have occupied the centre ground of British
politics, to suggest that their pro-Europeanism sprang merely from the belief that Europe
would act as a restraining force on either or both of the political extremes. Instead, there has
always been a strong strand of argument within the moderate centre of British politics which
has equated European involvement with the modernisation of the country. Roy Jenkins, one
of the most articulate exponents of this view-point, could for instance write in 1961:
Looked at in more practical and more specifically European terms, would joining the
Six be likely to inhibit the rate of social progress in this country? Only those who are
still living in the world of 1949 could answer with a firm yes, for no one who has
observed the world of the fifties can believe that Britain is a less Tory nation than the
dominant powers of the EEC. For rapidity of economic growth (France, Germany and
Italy), for the fullest of full employment (Germany and France), for highly successful
nationalised industries (France), for a model system of economic planning (France),
and for a most imaginative and generous system of retirement benefits (Germany), the
Six have far more to show the Left than anything which this country has achieved for
years past.36
In the course of the 1960s debate a large number of other 'progressive' benefits were linked to
the European cause. These ranged from metrification to decimalization, from Parliamentary
reform to the building of a Channel Tunnel. At its most extreme, Lord Gladwyn could
conclude a 1961 newspaper plaidoyer in favour of EEC membership with the invocation:
'Somehow we must get out of our present nineteenth century rut and join the main stream of
mid-twentieth century history.'37
Much the same process has occurred during the 1980s and 1990s when 'Europe' was
seen as a powerful means to an end by those pursuing any number of 'progressive' goals.
Probably the two reforms of the British political system most frequently linked to European
integration have been electoral reform ­ it was often argued that pressure to devise a single,
34
Martin Holmes, 'The Conservative Party and Europe' in Holmes (ed.), The Eurosceptical Reader, pp.116-8
35
Jacques Delors, 'Europe 1992: The Social Dimension', Address to the TUC Conference, Bournemouth,
September 1988 (European Commission, 1988)
36
Roy Jenkins, 'From London to Rome', Encounter, August 1961
37
The Guardian, 31.7.1961
18
uniform electoral system for European elections, would by inexorable logic, strengthen the
case for the whole British system to move in the direction of proportional representation ­ and
the decentralisation of power. A more flexible approach to the sovereignty of Westminster
which recognised the need to pool some sovereignty at a European level would, it was
maintained, go hand in hand with a greater readiness to devolve power within the United
Kingdom itself. But both the mechanism of European integration and the example of
numerous continental countries, have also been invoked by those pressing for better public
transport, higher public spending, a more liberal criminal justice system (the role of the
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have reinforced this
tendency), more equal treatment of men and women, and a more 'enlightened' attitude towards
the use of soft drugs or sex education. Debates about 'Europe' amongst politicians from the
centre ground of British politics, whether Liberal Democrats or moderate Labour and
Conservative figures, have thus tended to convey more than just an attitude towards Britain's
place within the EC/EU; they have instead been about a whole-scale modification of Britain's
approach to a wide range of political, social and economic issues. From the standpoint of the
political centre, embracing Europe has also implied an embrace of 'modernity' defined in
centrist terms.
The extent to which Europe has been seen as a modernising force has thus depended
greatly on the standpoint of the observer. For those on the political extremes it has rarely
been seen as such, appearing instead as a regressive force, more likely to thwart than to
promote change. But those more centrist in their ideal, have repeatedly looked across the
Channel and invoked the ideal of 'Europe' both in the hope of blunting the more dangerous
zeal of some of their compatriots and in the belief that European involvement would
encourage a welcome Europeanization and therefore modernisation of British life. At the risk
of caricature, it is more often the case in Britain that the socially permissive, bike-riding
Liberal Democrat who calculates his or her height in centimetres will be pro-European than a
Toyota-driving, six foot three Tory, who is strongly in favour of capital punishment.
Despite the tendency of much of the current historiography to present Britain's attitude
towards Europe as one of calculating pragmatism and hard-headed realism, the concept of
Europe in British political discourse has been far from value-free. Britain's fundamental
uncertainty about whether or not it is part of Europe, geographically, culturally or politically
has certainly given the British debate about Europe a distinctive twist, as has the rival pull of
both Empire and the English-speaking world. But far from permitting a detached and
dispassionate objectivity, the question mark over Britain's Europeanness, has in fact allowed
Britain's policy-makers to let their choice for or against European involvement be guided by
19
assumptions about the stability, reliability and modernity of continental political life. In
circumstances where a choice to participate or not to participate in any form of European
activity has never been automatic, both the ferocity of the debate and the diversity of possible
views has always been increased. The concept of Europe has acquired multiple layers of
meaning as a result. Thus while a large portion of the British population still gives the
impression that it has not made up its mind whether Britain belongs in the heart of Europe, it
has become abundantly clear on the basis of 20th
century history that the concept of Europe
has come to occupy a position at the heart of British political discourse.
Piers Ludlow
LSE, 18.4.2000