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European History Quarterly
DOI: 10.1177/026569148001000102
1980; 10; 17European History Quarterly
Robert W. D. Boyce
1929-30
Britain's First 'No' to Europe: Britain and the Briand Plan,
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17Robert
W. D. Boyce
Britain's First 'No'
to Europe: Britain and
the Briand Plan, 1929-30
In July 1929 Aristide Briand, the Foreign Minister of France, announced
his intention to address the forthcoming League of Nations
Assembly on the subject of European federation.1 There,
Briand declared his support for federation, and eight months later
the French government circulated a memorandum outlining his
proposals to the other twenty-six European League memberstates.2
The memorandum, however, raised doubts about Briand's
underlying motives, and most of the states responded with polite
but non-committal replies. Within a few months European relations
took a sharp turn for the worse, and within a year Briand's
plan was practically forgotten. In the light of the extreme nationalism
and autarky which characterized much of Europe during
the 1930s, it is perhaps not surprising that Briand's initiative should
now receive scarcely a footnote in the general accounts of this
period.3 Nevertheless it deserves to be remembered, not only as a
direct antecedent to post-war unification efforts, but because it illustrates
in striking fashion the impact of Britain's isolationism on
the pre-war 'European' movement.
The most impressive feature of the Tenth League Assembly,
which convened at Geneva in September 1929, was the preoccupation
of all participants with economic affairs. Briand, in his keenlyawaited
speech, proved no exception. Renewed efforts must be
made, he asserted, 'to secure not only political but also economic
peace among nations'. As for European federation, 'obviously,' he
continued, the arrangements must be 'primarily economic, for that
is the most urgent aspect of the question.' In retrospect, it may
seem odd that Briand should have laid such stress upon the need for
European Studies Review (SAGE, London and Beverly Hills), Vol. 10 ( 1980), 17-45
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collective economic action. Compared with the conditions that had
prevailed only a few years earlier, economic conditions in Europe
were reasonably buoyant; the Wall Street crash, heralding the start
of the world depression, was still seven weeks in the future. Indeed,
Briand's own country seemed particularly favoured: unemployment,
despite the influx of several million migrant workers, was,
according to official statistics, virtually non-existent; and so far
from experiencing balance of payments problems, the gold reserves
of the Bank of France were creating a literal embarras de richesses.
Even so, Briand's choice of emphasis deserves careful note, for it
provides the vital clue to an understanding of his plan, its origins,
its form, and its fate.
From the Armistice in 1918 each stage in the evolution of French
policy towards Germany had found its counterpart in economic
relations. Initially the determination to maintain supremacy was
reflected in French insistence upon burdening the German economy
with a crushing weight of reparation charges and discrimination
against German trade. The adoption of the Dawes plan modifying
reparation claims in 1924 marked the tentative start of FrancoGerman
rapprochement. The foundations were underpinned in
1926 by the institution of the European steel cartel, linking the industries
of France, Germany, and the Belgian-Luxembourg union;
and in 1927 by the conclusion of a Franco-German commercial
treaty, popularly known as the 'economic Locarno'.4 The treaty,
besides ending French discrimination against German trade with
the concession of most-favoured-nation treatment, brought extensive
modifications of the French tariff to facilitate bilateral trade.
Meanwhile, the French armed forces and public services increased
their reliance upon German imports, treated as reparations in kind,
while private industry was encouraged by tax incentives to do the
same.5 The first Hague conference, convened in July 1929, produced
a parallel shift in French reparations policy. Whereas originally
reparations had been regarded both as an end in themselves and, by
stifling German recovery, as a component of French security,
France now agreed to the reduction of reparation claims to the
point where they could be funded commercially and trusted in Germany's
desire for continued prosperity to ensure their future payment.
The ostensible removal of reparations from the field of
political contention and agreement on the early withdrawal of all
allied troops from the Rhineland, the principal results of the Hague
conference, eliminated two of the greatest obstacles to rapproche-
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ment with Germany as well as reducing the possibility of sustaining
an alternative policy. But if rapprochement were to be consolidated,
now was the moment, while Gustav Stresemann, obviously
a dying man, still held the reins of German foreign policy,
and while France, basically the weaker of the two powers, still held
the advantage in economic recovery and the security of a much
larger army. Bilateral arrangements threatened to raise objections
from all quarters: from Germany on account of the present imbalance
of power; from France's eastern allies, who constantly
feared arrangements made at their expense; and within France
herself, owing to an acute awareness of Germany's greater potential
strength and the concomitant determination to maintain close
relations with Britain as well as Poland and the countries of the 'little
entente'. The most promising approach was therefore by means
of an association of states, large enough to submerge the German
'problem' and remove fears of immediate French hegemony or
eventual German domination. And the most hopeful means of inducing
the participation of other states rested with a programme
aimed primarily at the resolution of economic frustrations common
to almost the whole of Europe.
The 1927 World Economic Conference, a semi-official gathering
sponsored by the League of Nations, had indicated the breadth of
concern throughout Europe at the continuing stagnation of international
trade due to the near-autarkic regulations thrown up during
the war and the multiplication of tariff barriers which had accompanied
the creation of new states. There, delegations representing
the business communities of every European country, as well
as some thirty overseas countries subscribed to resolutions endorsing
the total suppression of quantitative trade controls, the progressive
reduction of tariff levels, and an end to discriminatory
practices by the application of unconditional most-favoured-nation
treatment to foreign trade.6 Commercial agreements concluded
that year and the next confirmed that the resolutions were seriously
meant.7 But the increasing refinement of customs nomenclature
also revealed dissatisfaction with the working of the mostfavoured-nation
principle, and the extreme brevity of agreements a
general uncertainty about future developments. The World
Economic Conference, which had been hailed in Britain as marking
a victory for free-trade principles over French-inspired plans for
cartels, trusts, and other restrictive and inherently discriminatory
market-sharing arrangements, was not yielding the anticipated
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results;8 acceptance of the principle of multilateralism had also increased
the necessity to harmonize the commercial policies of the
major trading nations and the obstruction that even one nation
could cause by refusing to co-operate.9 In 1928 the League
Economic Committee took up the problem created by states which
claimed the benefit of most-favoured-nation rights while refusing
to participate in efforts to reduce trade barriers. Eventually agreement
was reached on the provision of an exception from mostfavoured-nation
commitments to allow for the development of
'plurilateral conventions of a general character and aiming at the
improvement of economic relations between people', on condition
that such conventions were approved by the League and were open
to the participation of all states on an equal footling. 10 This formula
had scarcely been devised, however, when in April 1929 the League
subcommittee formed to oversee the application of the World
Economic Conference resolutions was obliged to warn that progress
had been halted and that unless steps were taken immediately
a new wave of protectionism could be expected. II Europe, the subcommittee
acknowledged, was recoiling from the anticipated impact
of American tariff increases.
The United States, an exporter and lender of second rank before
1914, had come out of the war the world's pre-eminent economic
power. Thereafter American export sales seemed inexorably to increase,
with manufactures rapidly overtaking primary products as
the most important component, and equally rapidly America increased
her foreign claims, both of portfolio loans and direct investments
abroad. To interested governments, America's obstinate
refusal to allow war debts owing to her to be treated as an integral
component in the network of inter-governmental claims arising
from the war provided a continuing source of frustration. But if
one factor was more important than any other in the shaping of
foreign attitudes it was the growth of American direct investment
abroad. It is possible that this growth was no more rapid during the
1920s than at other times before or since, but certainly the form it
took was uniquely awesome to the other developed countries of the
west.l2 For it involved the expansion or take-over of firms prominent
in industries whose products were the very symbols of twentieth
century progress. The chemical industry, the telecommunications
industry, the electrical, oil, aluminium, office equipment, and
above all the automotive industry, all attested in the most visible
way to the supremacy of American mass-production techniques
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and managerial skills. In Europe popular works such as the
evocatively titled America Comes of Age, America's Secret, The
Economic Impact ofAmerica, and America Conquers Britain encouraged
resistance to, as well as emulation of, 'the colossus of the
West'.13 The victory of Herbert Hoover in the presidential election
of November 1928 and the start of Congressional debate on tariffraising
early the following year added new intensity to European
apprehensions. 14 Already expectations had grown that America
would be forced to concentrate upon foreign markets for manufactured
goods in view of the imminent 'saturation' of her own
domestic market,.15 With the former commerce secretary in the
White House a more ominous prospect arose; by embarking upon a
co-ordinated economic offensive on the one hand, while raising to
prohibitive heights her already unprecedented tariffs on the other,
America might make it impossible for Europe to cover both her import
bill and war-debt obligations except by selling control of ever
larger portions of her own industrial base.16
Among European observers influenced by America's gigantism
during the 1920s were men as diverse in political outlook as Adolph
Hitler, Leon Trotsky, and Sir Oswald Mosley, at this time on the
British left,17 Others closer to the centre of European opinion,
however, appeared scarcely less impressed before the close of the
decade. In Germany, Stresemann, for instance, asserted before the
Reichstag in June 1929 that the central issue of foreign affairs was
no longer Germany's isolation within Europe but 'one of Europe as
a whole in fee to the power of the United States'.1g The industrialist
Signor Pirelli spoke for a large section of Italian opinion when he
expressed a similar views. 19 But nowhere was concern more evident
than in France, where feelings were exacerbated by the approaching
deadline for ratifying the Mellon-Berenger war debt agreement..
Franco-American relations, never good since Woodrow Wilson'ss
attempt to defend his fourteen points in Paris in 1919, had been
strained throughout the following years by the unresolved issue of
war debts. Relations were worsened in 1927 when France, having
conceded most-favoured-nation treatment to Germany, refused to
accord the same treatment to American goods so long as the United .
States continued to impose high duties on luxury goods, and, incidentally,
persisted in prohibiting alcoholic beverages. Retaliation
was threatened and eventually carried out, followed by French
counter-measures.20 The necessity to take the decision, postponed
since 1925, to ratify or repudiate the war debt agreement just when
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the American tariff seemed about to be raised even higher, thus led
the former Radical premier Edouard Herriot, the executive of the
Socialist party, the five hundred presidents of the semi-official
chambers of commerce, and numerous other political and business
leaders to speak with one voice against America's allegedly intolerable
claims on Europe.21 Almost without exception,
moreover, each expression of frustration was accompanied by
hopes for a common European response. Only by working together,
it was asserted, could Europe find markets for her own goods
and create the basis for mass-production techniques which, as
America had shown, were vital to the prosperity and independence
of the continent.
British opinion, though muffled by the caution of a relatively
much larger mercantile community, was by no means uninfluenced
by these developments. Ardent imperialists such as Leopold
Amery, Colonial Secretary in the Conservative government of
Stanley Baldwin, and Sir Hugo Hirst, chairman of General Electric,
who feared that America's economic expansion would envelop
the Dominions as well as Britain herself, were only the most
outspoken in their concern.22 In some measure the trade unionist
Ernest Bevin, the governor of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman,
and even Baldwin himself shared their apprehension.23 The
second Labour government, which took office in June 1929, also
showed signs of concern. But so far from turning towards Britain's
European neighbours, Ramsay MacDonald indicated Labour's
reaction by attacking Baldwin during the election campaign for his
'lover-like attachment to France' and confirming his personal
determination to establish a special relationship with America.
Almost immediately upon its formation, the Labour government
was confronted with a number of parliamentary questions, some
inviting it to make representations to the United States against prohibitive
tariff increases, others suggesting that Britain join with
continental states in common defence against American protectionism.24
As a dedicated proponent of free trade, William
Graham, President of the Board of Trade, was particularly hostile
to the suggestion of discriminatory trade practices.25 The
maintenance of harmonious Anglo-American trade relations was
important enough in itself. But even more important was the need
to discourage discrimination abroad, since under free trade Britain
depended for fair treatment in foreign markets solely upon general
acceptance of the most-favoured-nation clause in its unconditional
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form. Even the previous Conservative government had jealously
defended the clause at international conferences, and the present
government was by comparison far more enthusiastic for free
trade.
Commerce, of course, was not the only issue at stake. Commonwealth
relations were intimately involved, since collaboration
with Europe would probably require at least acquiescence in restrictions
damaging to Dominions' trade. Yet the Labour government,
no less than its predecessors, accepted Britain's existing world commitments,
including the maintenance and development of imperial
links. Moreover, whereas a gr.owing number of Conservatives regarded
American economic expansion as a threat to the empire and
accepted the need for an exclusive empire economic bloc, the
Labour government looked to the friendship and co-operation of
an ever more powerful United States as a vital component in a
peaceful, fundamentally unchanged world order maintained under
the aegis of the League of Nations. Indeed, conversations had
already begun with American officials on a projected naval agreement,
and MacDonald, the Prime Minister, was preparing to continue
them personally in Washington.26 The government thus had
no hesitation in disassociating itself from parliamentary suggestions
for a European economic bloc, particularly as they seemed inspired
chiefly by France, the country most closely associated with
the discredited policy of 'old alliances' and continental antagonism
towards America. Graham's request was accordingly granted and
only when the Foreign Office advised against giving offence to
Briand was Graham restrained from openly deprecating talk of
European federation.27 In the meantime Briand indicated to Britain's
ambassador in Paris, Lord Tyrrell, his strong desire to
discuss with Arthur Henderson, the Foreign Secretary, his plans for
a 'United States of Europe' in advance of the Tenth Assembly.28
Henderson, it appears, offered no response.
On 5 September Briand spoke before the Assembly, affirming
with pride his readiness to be associated with the idea of a unified
Europe, however utopian it seemed. Graham, who addressed the
Assembly later the same day, discouraged resort to grandiose
plans. 'Far be it from me...to throw cold water upon any plan
which is designed to bring European nations more closely
together', Graham insisted. But, he warned, the practical difficulties
must not be underestimated, and discrimination against
extra-European nations, whether by tariff preferences or limited in-
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dustrial agreements, must be abjured at all costs. In his words,
'such a policy might, from the economic standpoint, generate that
friction which would manufacture war between the nations -
war
which it is our express purpose in this League to make certain will
never recur.' Thereupon Graham presented a 'concrete proposal': a
two-year tariff truce, to provide a breathing-space for the negotiation
of progressive tariff reductions.29 The Belgian and Swiss
delegates, while sharing Graham's hope for reductions in world
trade barriers, emphasized the need to surmount the present impasse
by endorsing the League economic subcommittee's proposal
for excepting 'plurilateral conventions' from the operation of
most-favoured-nation agreements. The Australian delegate on the
other hand evoked a sympathetic echo from representatives of
other extra-European primary producing countries when he denounced
the assumption, implicit in Graham's remarks, that free
trade was the inseparable economic concomitant of the League's
political objectives.3~ All the same, the Assembly deliberations remained
friendly if earnest when, on 9 September, Briand arranged
a luncheon for the heads of European delegations.
Briand, now employing the phrase 'un lien de solidarite qui
permette un contact permanent entre les pays d'Europe', attempted
to anticipate possible objections to European federation.31 As one
of his professional advisers had warned, any appearance of
organizing Europe against American economic expansion must be
avoided since, however popular in Europe at the moment, it would
arouse American or 'Anglo-Saxon' hostility; and equally important,
European institutions, when required at all, must not be given
the appearance of rivals to the League of Nations.32 The second
danger Briand dismissed by telling his audience that he had chosen
Geneva to introduce his proposal precisely in order that it would
develop within the atmosphere of the League; Article 21 of the
Covenant envisaged regional ententes, and Europe was in essence a
'region'. As to the suggestion current in certain quarters of uniting
Europe against the United States, Briand continued, he would
rather abandon his proposal altogether than allow it to take this
form. In fact, he understood that America favoured his proposal,
since it would open a new era of prosperity in Europe, to the profit
of everyone. Co-operation in the economic sphere was Europe's
most pressing need, Briand concluded, but methods of procedure
were for the European states to decide upon together. Stresemann,
as he had done in the Assembly that morning, welcomed Briand's
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initiative and joined in the call for economic co-operation, while
reiterating his own concern to avoid any measure damaging to the
League. Henderson, speaking next, thanked Briand for the opportunity
to discuss the European 'problem', then expanded upon
Stresemann's last remarks and added a warning about a second
'danger', of appearing to organize Europe against another power,
be it the United States or the Soviet Union. However, delegates
from Austria, Yugoslavia and Belgium indicated greater enthusiasm,
and eventually all present joined in inviting Briand to
.
prepare a memorandum outlining his proposals for the consideration
of their governments and-to collate their views in a report to
the Eleventh League Assembly a year hence. Presently Graham's
tariff truce proposal, jointly introduced by Britain, France, and
Belgium, was adopted by the Assembly. For the time being at least
it seemed that a common basis might be found for reconciling
British and European approaches to trade reforms.
As Graham recognized, Briand's initiative reflected in some
measure the concern in Europe with American economic 'penetration'
; that and the more distant but never forgotten threat posed by
the USSR, which had just embarked upon its five-year plan. At the
same time, however, neither the Labour government nor its
Whitehall advisers took Briand's initiative seriously. In part their
scepticism derived from the very frequency with which such proposals
had been mooted since the war, and the absence of practical
results. But partly, too, it derived from ignorance of the forces and
organizations working for European unity.33 For the 'European'
movement, though including prominent figures from literary,
scientific, legal and political circles, was formed pre-eminently
from the continent's business elite.34 Yet the Foreign Office, due to
the enduring strength of laissez-faire attitudes, had no commercial
or economic section; and Henderson, like his predecessors, directed
the Office on the assumption that foreign policy and economic affairs
were things apart. Thus the Comité franco-allemand d'information
et de documentation, instituted in 1926 by the Luxembourg
steel-maker Emile Mayrisch and comprising many of the leading
figures in French and German banking and heavy industry, was apparently
unknown to the Foreign Office.35 Of the Union douaniere
européenne, which numbered among its active members Jacques
Seydoux, the recently retired director of commercial and political
affairs at the Quai d'Orsay, as well as several former French
premiers, and was linked to almost equally impressive bodies in
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other major European capitals, the Foreign Office knew only the
barest details.36 Nor did the Office pay serious attention to the activities
of the Pan-Europa Society, the most prominent of the
'European' organizations, whose leading French official was Louis
Loucheur, the industrialist, sometime cabinet minister, and
Briand's closest political associate.37 Even in 1930 the Office
library possessed none of the publications of Count CoudenhoveKalergi,
founder of the Pan-Europa Society.38°
For the same reasons, the Office remained scarcely aware of Britain's
crucial influence upon further European co-operation.
Politically, Britain was the obvious counter-weight within a European
association including the two rival powers Germany and
France. But hardly less important, Britain, as the world's greatest
trading nation and Europe's largest import market, possessed enormous
influence over the economic policies of the continental states.
In particular, Briand's initiative, which looked to the subordination
of political differences and the reduction of national
sovereignty for the sake of more pressing economic needs, was virtually
bound to collapse if Britain indicated her opposition. This
was almost certain to be the case, so long as the Labour government
condemned regional trade preferences and international industrial
agreements, the basic tools that Briand had to hand, as
contrary to free trade principles. Nevertheless, to the extent that
they took notice of Briand's initiative at all, most members of the
Foreign Office, like their political masters, regarded it merely as a
more subtle manifestation of the French desire for permanent
hegemony on the continent, viewed his emphasis upon economic
affairs as little more than an attempt to exploit anti-American sentiment,
and assumed that Britain could comfortably remain safely
outside in any dispute that resulted.39
Typical of the Foreign Office attitude towards 'European' activity
was that expressed in 1926 by the Under-Secretary Sir (later
Lord) William Tyrrell, towards the founder of the Pan-Europa
Society: 'I know Coudenhove: he is a thoroughly impractical
theorist'.4~ In March 1928 Jacques Seydoux, just retired from the
Quai d'Orsay, published a lengthy article in The Times pleading for
closer British involvement in European affairs.41 According to
Seydoux, Britain's post-war pre-occupation with the balance of
power had led her to fear France and hasten German recovery
heedless of the fact that French predominance on the continent was
in any case strictly temporary. France on the other hand was coming
to terms with Germany, particularly in the economic sphere.
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The recent commercial treaty was, in his words, 'a phenomenon of
unusual importance, since it means that Franco-German trade relations
dominate the whole French economic system'. Agreements
were already in force linking the French and German steel, steel
pipe, and potash industries, and similar agreements were also being
devised for the chemical, electrical, and other industries. Reparation
deliveries in kind, formerly looked upon with disfavour by
both countries, were now mutually encouraged. Seydoux concluded,
'France and Germany cannot do without Great Britain; but
Great Britain needs them both. The peace of Europe and of the
world demands that any Franco-German entente on the economic
plane should have as its corollary a still closer entente between
France and Britain.' Despite Seydoux's impressive reputation as an
international analyst, however, Tyrrell briefly dismissed his plea
with the comment, 'M. Seydoux is chasing a mirage of long standing,
viz. that economics in the case of France and Germany will
overcome race antagonism.'42
Yet on becoming Ambassador in Paris, Tyrrell soon found cause
to alter his attitude. On 3 October 1929 Stresemann died, and
within the same month Briand's government fell. Nevertheless,
Tyrrell reported, Edouard Daladier, who had engineered the
government's downfall, shared Briand's enthusiasm for close cooperation
with Britain, disarmament, and European federation.43
In the new year Tyrrell received reliable information that the
French government had been instrumental in reconciling Poland to
a trade agreement with Germany.44 The Foreign Office, however,
was still sceptical of significant developments when Tyrrell
reported an intriguing conversation with Daniel Serruys, the chief
French negotiator of the commercial treaty with Germany, who
though now retired from the Ministry of Commerce was a member
of the French delegation to the forthcoming tariff truce
conference.45
According to Serruys, Louis Loucheur, now Minister of Commerce,
was 'working on a Franco-German economic agreement to
the exclusion of England', a development he 'deplored' because in
his opinion British co-operation was vital to European recovery
and the making of a true 'United States of Europe'. Tyrrell,
suspicious that Serruys' motive might be merely to frighten Britain
into a more forthcoming attitude at the approaching conference,
knew of no current Franco-German economic negotiations of any
significance. 'On the other hand,' he wrote to the Permanent
Under-Secretary, Sir Robert Vansittart, 'the Germans here seem
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to be hand in glove with the French at the moment, and the intimacy
of their relations constantly surprises me and would probably
very considerably startle people in London.' Moreover, it
seemed logical to him that France, as the weaker party in negotiations
with Germany, would earnestly wish Britain to play a more
active role in the economic side of European affairs.
At Vansittart's suggestion, Tyrrell therefore approached Serruys
again to request clarification of French views.46 In response to Tyrrell's
blunt questioning, Serruys described the frustration that Britain's
dogmatic advocacy of free trade was causing in official
circles in Paris, and the conviction there that only a programme of
'industrial rationalization' based upon trusts and cartels, combined
with trade preferences, could end the 'balkanization' of Europe
and enable Europe to compete on the same footing with America.
The uncommon frankness of Serruys' remarks deserves quotation:
As he had now been asked to come into the open, he would say that the manner
in which' we had consistently advocated this theory and thought we could teach it
to the French, as at one time our financiers like Bradbury thought they could
teach the French their methods of finance, created the most deplorable impression.
If anythmg had turned responsible French opinion against the tariff truce it
was the clumsy interventions of [Sir Arthur] Salter... and what he called the Free
Trade épouvantails who were constantly paraded by British delegations at
Geneva. In Serruys' opinion neither the British theory nor the French theory
could carry the day at the moment. What ought to be done was to talk in a free
and friendly manner. Perhaps the French had been wrong in talking too much in
the past to the Germans. But it was so difficult to talk with British officials.
Many of them did not seem able to understand the continental theory or talk the
continental language.
Pressed further, Serruys referred to Loucheur's efforts, adding that
Alexis Leger, director of the political and commercial section of the
Quai d'Orsay and Briand's chef de cabinet, was also actively involved
in efforts to secure permanent arrangements for FrancoGerman
collaboration while their mutual relations remained in
good health.
Serruys said that Loucheur and Leger and under their influence Briand -
and
this was what he wanted to tell me the other day - were definitely out for the
federalisation of Europe on the economic basis of the organisation of production,
rationalisation etc., and that as our attitude seemed to them so hopeless
they were ready with Germany to organise Europe without us. Their ideas were
still nebulous and they did not realise the difficulties and dangers, but they
thought they could organise Europe behind some kind of tariff barrier which
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would be erected to our disadvantage and still more to that of the United
States... Loucheur and Co. seemed to think that such a scheme would appeal to
the European agricultural countries, such as Hungary, just as much as to the industrial
countries hke Germany and France, since they would each receive ad-
vantages.
Once more Serruys stressed his own hopes for British co-operation,
and urged that Graham speak frankly with M. Flandin, the new
Minister of Commerce, when they met in a few days time at the
tariff truce conference in Geneva. The direction of French policy,
along his own or Loucheur's lines, Serruys concluded, depended
chiefly upon Britain's own readiness to adopt a friendly, helpful attitude
towards French aspirations.
Tyrrell was interested to note that the most-favoured-nation
principle, one of the main topics that Serruys had suggested for
conversation, had recently been raised for debate in the French
Chamber of Deputies. He was also impressed to find much of Serruys'
account corroborated by Léger himself.47 The French government,
Léger advised, could not contemplate support for Graham's
idea of an unqualified tariff truce, which in any case had practically
no support elsewhere in Europe. On the other hand, Flandin had
no wish to act independently of Britain and, while hoping to present
the conference with constructive alternatives, looked for the
closest co-operation with Graham. But, Tyrrell concluded his
report of the meeting, 'my informants, and particularly the
member of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, have both insisted on
the fact that the French government is definitely decided to
organise Europe economically, and my feeling is that they have
already received considerable encouragement from other countries
including certainly Germany.'
The tariff truce conference, which convened on 17 February
1930, was attended by delegations from every European League
member-state but only three from overseas states, and almost immediately
bore out Serruys' prediction that a moratorium on tariff
building undertaken solely by the European states was unacceptable.
Indeed, it was Serruys himself who took the lead in rejecting
the idea, expressing himself with such brutal directness that briefly
the conference appeared in danger of collapse.48 However, Flandin's
arrival was delayed by a governmental crisis in Paris, and
when at last he reached Geneva Graham coolly avoided discussion
of limited 'European' arrangements.49 During committee pro-
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ceedings, delegates from Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Hungary spoke in favour of mutual preferences between the
agricultural and industrial countries of Europe. More cautiously,
delegates from France, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland
indicated readiness to modify most-favoured-nation commitments
to enable the establishment of 'plurilateral
conventions'.5~ As the Board of Trade subsequently reported to the
Foreign Office, 'such conceptions cannot be said to have received
encouragement at the conference, rather the reverse.'51 That this
was so, the Board might have added, was due in large measure to
the vigorous opposition put up by the British delegation.
In the event, the conference marked a practical defeat for
Graham's free trade efforts without opening the way for an alternative
approach. A loose, ineffective formula governing future
tariff increases was patched together, while measures for agreed
reductions were left for consideration at a second session scheduled
for the autumn. Graham, under strong attack from Tory imperial
protectionists, who accused him of signing away Britain's freedom
of action, defended the 'valuable' work of the conference.52 Speaking
to the press on his departure from Geneva, Flandin, however,
deprecated talk of tariff reductions and reaffirmed France's commitment
to Telargissement du march~ europeen des echanges'.53
At almost the same moment the United States Senate ended seven
months of debate by passing the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill.54
The Foreign Office by this time had received evaluations of Tyrrell's
reports from the ambassadors in Berlin and Rome. Sir Horace
Rumbold was confident that Stresemann's policy of reconciliation
with France would continue, especially now that Germany was suffering
severely from the world slump. Indeed, Rumbold wrote,
'German Ministers... have told me time after time recently that the
immediate task before Germany is to set her own house in order.
She asks herself which of her neighbours can best contribute to that
end, and the answer is France, so far as Europe is concerned. 155 But
although Germany, with her 'natural predilection for all kinds of
combines', would undoubtedly be attracted towards some kind of
'economic federation of Europe', Tyrrell, it seemed to him, quite
underestimated the political differences still separating Germany
from France. At all events, Rumbold concluded, the foremost consideration
in German policy was to avoid any action likely to annoy
the United States or Britain.56 According to Sir Ronald Graham in
Rome, Italy regarded France as 'definitely hostile to Italian
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development', a view which made Briand's plans unlikely to succeed
for the moment.57 In fact, Italy, lacking plans of her own, was
casting about for new support and possibly would make approaches
to Germany or even eventually Russia. But it largely
depended upon Britain's attitude and policy. Italy's preference, 'I
have no doubt at all', Graham wrote, was full British participation
in European affairs as a counterweight to France. The Italians were
doubtful of Britain's willingness, however, and anticipated that she
would 'pretend that she does not belong to Europe, but can concentrate
on the Empire and the United States'. Both evaluations thus
were negative. Yet, scarcely less significant, the principal reason in
both cases was ascribed to assumptions as to Britain's own policy.
Meanwhile, evidence of French efforts to secure German support
for European federation continued to mount. In February a
Franco-German chamber of commerce was established in Paris.58
In March the French Comite d'ftudes pour l'Union douaniere
européenne canvassed support from various European chambers of
commerce.59 Towards the end of April Rumbold described
preparations for a Pan-Europa conference in Berlin, commenting,
'I was struck by the strength and composition of the French delegation',
whose speakers included former premier Painleve as well as
Loucheur and Serruys.60 Rapprochement, Rumbold noted the
following week, was being sought in other ways as well: 'the French
Embassy in Berlin continues as before to make a parade of cordial
relations, not only with literary and artistic, but with political and
official circles here.'61 Ronald Campbell, counsellor at the Paris
embassy, offered further evidence in a letter to Vansittart on
6 May:
The Franco-German rapprochement to which we have lately been drawing your
attention, is proceedmg apace and is much closer in effect than appears on the
surface. It is manifested not only in the official dealings between the two countries,
but is now passing into the social domain. I was told, for instance, the
other day that Fouqui~res, the Chef du Protocole, recently called on Hoesch to
convey to him a message from the St. Cloud Country Club to the effect that it
would now welcome the staff of the German Embassy on its membership list.62
The British government took no notice of these developments.
Since the autumn mounting pressure to alleviate unemployment
had forced other issues into the background, and in the time remaining
for foreign affairs ministers had been preoccupied with the
London naval conference and subsequent negotiations, which stret-
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ched into the spring. Tyrrell repeatedly appealed for a sympathetic
attitude towards Briand's forthcoming memorandum on federation,
in view of his unique contribution to European peace.63 But
his appeals received scant notice: the only aspect of Briand's objective
that seriously interested the Foreign Office and more especially
Lord Robert Cecil, Henderson's special adviser on League affairs,
and Philip Noel-Baker and Hugh Dalton, his parliamentary
assistants, was its ostensible anti-American appearance. Early in
May Briand expressed hopes of discussing the memorandum with
Henderson when the Foreign Secretary passed through Paris on his
way to Geneva for a League council meeting. The Office cautioned
against discussions before French intentions were clearer, and the
subject was passed over quickly when they met at the Quai d'Orsay
on 9 May.64 Briand assured Henderson that his memorandum, now
in proof form, conformed to League principles and safeguarded
the sovereign rights of prospective participating states. Henderson
promised to examine it 'with the utmost consideration'. But he was
prepared to make only one observation at present, 'and that was to
remind M. Briand that he had originally expressed to him the hope
that there would be nothing in the scheme which would give it even
the semblance of being directed against the United States of
America'. Briand replied, 'there was nothing of that kind and that
this consideration had been very much in his mind throughout'.
The appearance of Briand's 'Memorandum on the Organization
of a System for European Federal Union' coincided auspiciously
with the formal transfer of reparations administration from the
reparations commission to the Bank for International Settlements,
as well as the order for removal of the last French troops from the
Rhineland.65 By a stroke of luck, it also appeared just as the second
Pan-Europa Conference convened in Berlin, which provided an excellent
forum for its introduction into public debate, a task performed
by Loucheur with assistance from Barthelemy and Serruys,
two of the other principal speakers.66 Yet the document itself,
which betrayed signs of hasty rewriting, was repetitive and imprecise.
In the first place, the memorandum called for an 'initial
and symbolic pact', pledging member-states to the principle of
union and collaboration in the formulation of a common policy.
The economic importance of federation was subsequently outlined.
Divisions within Europe, to which the peace settlement had added
over 20,000 kilometres of trade barriers, were blamed for stifling
industrial development and employment opportunities. They were
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'the source of both political and social instability', and 'the most
serious obstacle to the development and efficiency of all political
and judicial institutions on which the foundations of any universal
organisation of peace tend to be based'. Within the general principles
laid down in the initial pact, therefore, members were advised
to adopt as 'the objective which they intended to define as their
economic policy: the establishment of a common market which
shall raise to the maximum the standard of human well-being in all
the territories of the European commonwealth'. This, the memorandum
stressed, presented no threat to extra-European states
since, unlike previous European customs union schemes, reduced
internal tariffs would not be complemented by a higher external
tariff wall. Hence, the assertion was made, the programme of action
would conform to the recent recommendation of the League
working party on the application of the most-favoured-nation principle
to regional associations. That said, however, Briand now
reversed his priorities as stated before the Tenth Assembly, and
called for 'general subordination of the economic problem to the
political problem'. Progress towards 'economic union' was 'strictly
governed by the question of security': economic union could not
precede 'political union'. Just as negotiations for collective
regional (Locarno) security agreements had been undertaken within
the framework of the League, the memorandum advised, so now
European union must be underpinned by the extension of a network
of arbitration and security agreements covering the whole
continent.
A. W. A. Leeper, the Foreign Office official who took responsibility
for drafting Britain's reply, and one of the few in the Office
to take Briand's efforts seriously, found this subordination of
economic co-operation perplexing.67 Perhaps it simply denoted a
retreat to the traditional French policy of demanding security
before disarmament. Perhaps in promoting the plan Briand had
merely been posturing for the sake of his French electorate or, in
the expectation of its rejection, to score a moral victory over Italy,
Germany, and other powers. This was possible, Leeper suggested,
yet it would be quite out of character for Briand to act this way.
'Almost alone among French politicians he has in recent years consistently
shown himself a good European, the friend of peace and
of the improvement of international relations.' Moreover, as a trap
for Germany or Italy it was far too 'barefaced' to succeed. A 'far
more positive and practical' purpose could thus be assumed.
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After all, the organization of the European economy as a counterweight
to non-European and especially American competition had
always been the mainspring of 'European' activity, and it was
patently obvious that only the economic attractions were likely to
unite Germany and Italy with France. Probably, then, Briand was
acting out of 'deference' to the United States and Britain and to
Germany's fears of arousing their hostility, and intended to
establish a formal framework within which economic arrangements
could be developed when political conditions permitted. This, too,
was the view of Orme Sargent, head of the Office's central department
:
I have little doubt that when M. Bnand first approached this subject last
September the idea he had in mind was an economic federation. When, however,
he came to work out his ideas he realised that such a federation would obviously
have the appearance of being a measure of defence against American competition
(and indirectly against the possibility of British Imperial Free Trade). When,
on top of this, the Secretary of State warned M. Bnand that His Majesty's
Government would not consider any scheme aimed against America, he must, I
think, have hurriedly recast his memorandum so as to get the political aspect of
his proposal in the foreground.
Sargent, to judge by the records of the Quai d'Orsay, may well
have been right. For, if too fragmentary to support firm
judgements, they do suggest that the memorandum underwent
repeated redrafting in an effort to forestall foreign objections.68 At
any rate, Leeper assumed the best, and prepared a reply which
combined caution with sympathy.69 He had no illusions about the
difficulties a European union would create for Britain: to remain
both 'in and out' would probably prove impossible, and to go 'in'
would mean a definite break with the Commonwealth. But such a
prospect was too far distant to govern present policy, especially
when the French plan failed to go beyond generalities, and Britain
could only sympathize with Briand's stated aim of realizing in
Europe the programme laid down by the 1927 world economic conference.
More importantly, Briand himself deserved support as 'an
old and valued friend of this country'. Since either Germany or Italy,
'who are far more directly concerned', would reject the plan, or
it would be carried forward by the self-interest of the continental
countries regardless of Britain's attitude, Britain could now safely
avoid obloquy by a general expression of sympathy for Briand's
efforts.
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The sympathy which Leeper and fellow officials showed towards
Briand, however, was as nothing compared to the zeal with which
Henderson's political advisers responded to the spectre of
regionalism. To Noel-Baker and Cecil, Briand's scheme threatened
to weaken the League of Nations by diverting the attention of its
most active members, and eventually to become a dangerous rival
to its This in itself was serious enough, but ultimately more
ominous was the destructive centrifugal force that would be
unleashed; by adding strength to 'the Pan-American movement
[and] the Asiatic feeling which already exists', it would inevitably
drive the component parts of the British Empire into the separate
geographical blocs that resulted. This view found identical expression
in a memorandum by the League of Nations Union, of which
Cecil was joint president.71 It also formed the core of an appraisal
by Sir Arthur Salter, the British expert at the head of the League
economic section, which was forwarded to Noel-Baker.72 With the
division of the world into a few large blocs, 'European, panAmerican,
British Empire (with perhaps a Russian Asiatic to
follow)', Salter wrote, 'we should have, more remotely but
ultimately on a larger scale, the same kind of danger which comes
from &dquo;alliances&dquo; endangering the League's overriding authority.'
Henderson, thoroughly impressed by Salter's arguments, called for
revision of Leeper's draft reply along appropriate lines, a task
undertaken by another official, Charles Howard Smith.73 The
resulting document, though prefaced with professions of sympathy
for Briand's pacific motives and the idea of European economic cooperation,
affirmed that Britain would co-operate only so long as
European affairs were considered by and in the context of the
League of Nations.
Henderson, whose interest in international economics was
negligible, evidently believed that the revised reply constrained
Briand's plan without confounding it altogether. If so, his reliance
upon Salter's advice was unfortunate. To French officials, whose
exasperation with Salter's doctrinaire commitment to free trade
was already known, the British claim that the international coal
negotiations and the 'striking example' of the tariff truce negotiations
demonstrated the League's effectiveness in matters of special
European interest could not have been better calculated to annoy.
For by the time the reply was received the former negotiations had
broken down,74 while the tariff truce negotiations stood no chance
of success so long as the most-favoured-nation principle, insisted
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upon by Britain, made extra-European co-operation essential.
Since, as the Foreign Office recognized, the success of the plan
depended upon its potential economic benefits, it should not have
been surprising that the British reply was generally deemed hostile
on the continent. The Board of Trade was indeed hostile. Only a
few months earlier a departmental memorandum surveying British
commercial policy had reiterated the supreme importance of ensuring
that the most-favoured-nation clause was 'drawn as tightly as
possible and leave as little opening as possible for evasion'.75 Certain
limited exceptions were acknowledged. But the 'so-called
United States of Europe' plan inspired by France, 'that is to say not
of a Customs Union but of a body of States giving each other
special Customs preferences as against the rest of the world, is one
which we should strenuously resist as cutting at the root of our
most-favoured-nation policy, and not as being a minor derogation
from it.' The cabinet was less hostile than merely uninterested. On
28 May a small cabinet committee was formed to consider Britain's
response to Briand's memorandum. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Philip Snowden, whose dedication to free trade was
equalled only by his hostility towards France, made only one contribution
: to warn against encouraging any hope of British cooperation
outside the strictly economic field. And the Dominions
Secretary, J. H. Thomas, whose own hopes had come to rest with
protectionist agreements with the Commonwealth, merely underlined
the dangers to imperial unity that co-operation with Briand
presented.76 The committee met only once, on 14 July, a day before
the deadline Briand had set for replies,with neither Thomas nor
Snowden present. On 16 July the Cabinet gave perfunctory approval
to the Foreign Office's revised draft, which was thereupon
handed to the French ambassador.77 Significantly, it was a day
late.
Britain's long silence before replying did what her earlier influence
on Briand's memorandum had not already accomplished.
In conversation with Noel-Baker at Geneva on 12 May, M. Procop6,
the Finnish Foreign Minister, had expressed enthusiasm for
European union.78 As he had already told the French, an aggressive
stance vis-d-vis Russia or the United States must be avoided and, to
succeed, British participation was vital. But he was sufficiently
hopeful of the prospects that he had encouraged formation of a
movement at home for the promotion of European co-operation.
The following week M. Dieckhoff of the German embassy
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cautiously enquired about British intentions.79 Upon the appearance
of Briand's memorandum, preliminary reactions in European
capitals revealed an uncomfortable ambivalence, a Foreign
Office survey noted.g~ The economic side of the plan had wide appeal,
though Italy and Hungary strongly opposed any freezing of
the status quo, and Czechoslavakia and Poland feared that further
Franco-German rapprochement would be made at their expense.
The Germans, while suspicious of French political motives, were
reluctant to jeopardize the economic opportunities and reawaken
old animosities. 'Opinion in most countries realises', the survey
concluded, 'that the attitude of His Majesty's Government will be
decisive.'
In strict confidence, Baron Ramel, the Swedish Foreign Minister,
informed British Minister Sir Hugh Kennard on 17 June that his
government had proposed to Norway, Denmark, and Finland a
common reply, 'so worded as to discourage any positive action,
while expressing polite appreciation of the admirable sentiments
which inspire the proposals.' 'Baron Ramel then told me emphatically',
Kennard reported, 'that an important factor in the
determination of this attitude was the belief that His Majesty's
Government were not inclined to accept the proposals, and he asked
me if I could enlighten him on this point. '81 But Kennard was
unable to comment. On 30 June Vansittart acknowledged that,
having been questioned by 'nearly every foreign representative in
London', Britain's continuing silence was leading them to interpret
this as a negative attitude.
Cecil, writing to Prime Minister MacDonald from Geneva on 18
August, reaffirmed that 'all over the Continent it is admitted that
Briand's proposals have no chance unless we support them'.82 At
the meeting of European delegates on the eve of the Eleventh
League Assembly, however, Britain's deeply cautious attitude set
the tone. Briand, whose one aim now was to ensure approval of the
principle of European federation, in the hope that substantive
measures would thereafter become possible, found his claim that
the replies to his memorandum already demonstrated approval
sharply challenged by Henderson.83 Henderson indeed made clear
that he preferred the matter to be passed on to the League assembly
without prior comment. Discouraged and annoyed, Briand
threatened to abandon his project altogether before agreeing reluctantly
to put a unanimous but anodyne resolution, that mentioned
neither European union nor federation nor even 'un lien de
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solidarite', before the assembly. The next morning the Greek Prime
Minister, M. Venizelos, approached Cecil to appeal for British acceptance
of greater European autonomy in the elaboration of
Briand's plan.g4 A few days later M. Massigli of the French Foreign
Ministry made a last minute attempt to keep the plan from being
absorbed by the League organization,85 whose British SecretaryGeneral,
Sir Eric Drummond, was commonly understood to be a
strong opponent of regionalism.86 All the European delegations
were telling him, Massigli asserted, 'Agree with the English and
nothing else matters to us, we will do what you like.' He hoped that
Henderson would agree to present a joint resolution at the close of
the Assembly, recommending creation of a European committee
under the auspices of the League, but leaving appointments to the
participants themselves and providing it with a clear mandate for
action. Cecil, whose own dislike of Briand's efforts had just been
revealed in an interview published in the Paris press,87 offered no
encouragement: Henderson, he replied, would 'strongly prefer' appointments
to be made by the League.
Briand's brief resolution was soon approved by the Assembly,
and Briand himself was elected by acclaim Chairman of the League
Committee of Enquiry for European Union.88 The assembly itself,
however, was riven by dispute over regional economic arrangements.
M. Madgearu, the Romanian Foreign Minister, led on
behalf of the eastern and southern European agrarian countries in
pressing for relaxation of the most-favoured-nation principle to
make room for intra-European preferential arrangements. 89 Unless
they could find markets among neighbouring countries for their
relatively small cereal surpluses at remunerative prices, Madgearu
insisted, Europe's agrarian countries would have no choice but to
intensify their autarkic defences. The British delegation, supported
by the Australians, South Africans and Canadians, resisted with
equal determination this attack on 'the root principles of the
League'.~ As Flandin stated on 27 September, 'all our discussions
have shown that there were two equally determined camps facing
one another on this issue of the most-favoured-nation clause'.91 A
few days later the final plenary session culminated with Flandin'ss
bitter recriminations against the doctrinaire and hypocritical attitude
taken by 'certain' countries, which was paralysing action.92
By an over-rigid systematization of issues, he complained, they
vainly sought tariff reductions, heedless of the fact that other countries
could not contemplate such action without the assurance of
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alternative sources of revenue and stable markets; and while
upholding the most-favoured-nation clause in its most unconditional
form, they maintained their own preferential arrangements
or simply closed their doors to foreign goods. 'The nations', Flandin
warned, 'have not forsworn the sword as an arbiter of international
justice merely in order to replace militarist by economic imperialism,
which is no less dangerous to the peace of the world.'
Briand's committee, dormant until the new year, initiated plans
for alleviating Europe's now acute economic crisis at its first working
session in January 1931.93 Soon afterwards Howard Smith
commented, 'We rather disliked the whole thing, but in spite of
that it has not been possible to kill it.'94 For all practical purposes,
however, Britain had killed it. All the evidence available to the
Foreign Office had confirmed that, whatever else might be needed
to sustain the European movement's existence, Britain's active cooperation
was vital. For if, politically, Britain's participation was
probably required to remove fears of French or German
predominance, economically, Britain's role was decisive; practical
measures for halting the collapse of trade were undoubtedly required
to induce broader-based co-operation within Europe, and
Britain, Europe's greatest import market, whose very trade deficit
was a source of enormous influence abroad, was capable of
discouraging all hope of such measures.95 But so far from cooperating,
Britain had exerted her influence, first to emasculate
Briand's proposal, then to discourage other countries from supporting
it by her own prolonged, silent delay. By the time Britain's reply
was received the moment for action had passed. The trend
towards autarky had begun, Hitler and the radical right were making
great strides towards power in Germany, and Briand himself
was coming under attack at home for encouraging German revisionism
with his utopian scheme.96 For the first time in modern
history, European unity had received the formal support of a major
European country and the sympathetic interest of many others, and
Britain had said 'No'. In the name of internationalism, Britain had
turned in isolation from the continent of which it was virtually a
part, impelled by the very forces drawing that continent together.
Not for another fifteen years, after a second great European war
had been fought, would a comparable opportunity again arise.
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Notes
1. The Morning Post, 12 July 1929; The Daily Herald, 12 July 1929; The
Economist, 20 July 1929, 107-8. Briand was also Prime Minister of a short-lived
government at the time of his address to the assembly.
2. League of Nations, Official Journal 1929, Records of the Tenth Ordinary
Session of the Assembly, Plenary Minutes, 52. Briand's memorandum and the
replies from the European states are collected in League of Nations 'Documents
Relating to the Organisation of a System of European Federal Union', 15 September
1930, A.46.1930. VII.
3. Of the growing body of specialist literature, see in particular Walter Lipgens,
'EuropAische Einigungsidée,1923-1930 und Briand Europaplan im Urteil der
deutschen Akten', Historische Zeitschrift, 203 (1966), 46-89, 316-63; Fernand
L'Huillier, Dialogues Franco-allemands, 1925-1933 (Strasbourg 1971); Jean Freymond,
Le IIIe Reich et la réorganisation économique de l'Europe, 1940-1942
(Leiden 1974), part I; Jacques Banety, 'Idée européenne et relations francoallemandes',
Bulletin de la faculté des lettres de Strasbourg (March 1968), 571-84
and 'Industries allemands et industriels français à l'époque de la République de
Weimar', Revue Allemagne, Vol. IV, No. 2 (April-June 1974).
4. Frank Arnold Haight, A History of French Commercial Polrcies (New York
1941), 138.
5. 'The Increased Danger to British Export Trade with France of German
Deliveries in Kind', memorandum by J. R. Cahill, 4 February 1929, Pubhc Record
Office (hereafter PRO), T.160/209, F7800/4.
6. League of Nations, 'The World Economic Conference, Geneva, May 1927.
Final Report', CEI44, 22-34.
7. League of Nations, 'Report of the Economic Consultative Committee on its
first Session, 14-19 May 1928', C.217.M.73.1928.II, 7.
8. Statement by Sir Walter Layton in 'The Economic Conference: Prospects of
Practical Results', Internatronal Affairs, Vol. VI, no. 6 (November 1927), 361.
9. The World Economic Conference and its aftermath are well summarized in
League of Nations Economic, Financial and Transit Department, Commercial
Policy in the Inter-War Period: International Proposals and National Policies
(Geneva 1942), 38-49.
10. League of Nations, Official Journal 1929, 'Work of the Economic Committee
during its Twenty-Eighth Session, 8-12 April 1929', 1228-9. However, largely
owing to British obstruction, the report of the working party was not formally
adopted. See League of Nations Economic, Financial and Transit Department,
Commercial Policy in the Inter-War Period, 47-50.
11. League of Nations, 'Report of the Economic Consultative Committee on the
period May 1928 to May 1929', C.130.M.45.1929.II, 8-9.
12. Mira Wilkins, The Maturing ofMultinational Enterprize: American Business
Abroad from 1914 to 1970 (Cambridge Mass. 1974), Chapter 7; Robert L.
Heilbroner, 'None of Your Business', The New York Review of Books, Vol. XXII,
no. 4 (20 March 1975), 6.
13. The degree of interest in this phenomenon is indicated by the massive
'Selected Bibliography on the International Position of the United States', Interna-
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tional Affairs, Vol. X, no. 1 (January 1931), 103-99; and ibid, Vol. X, no. 2 (March
1931), 230-41.
14. New Statesman, 10 November 1928, 146; The Times, 4 March 1929; John B.
C. Kershaw, 'The American Presidential Election and the Future of British and
European Trade', The Financial Review of Reviews, January-March 1929, 50-61; S.
K. Ratcliffe, 'President Hoover and Europe', The Contemporary Review, Vol.
CXXXVI, no. 764 (August 1929), 145.
15. See, for example, statements by William Graham and Sir Robert Horne in the
House of Commons, July 1927. Hansard, Fifth Series, Vol. 209, cols. 802, 913;
statement by Australian Prime Minister Stanley Bruce, The Times, 3 July 1929.
16. The prospect of an imminent 'economic offensive' was seriously entertained
within British governing circles by inter alia Sir Arthur Balfour, Sir Philip CunliffeLister
(later Lord Swmton), and it appears Sir Austen Chamberlain. See memorandum
by Wellesley, 19 February 1929, and appended minutes, PRO FO371/13510,
A1397/12/45.
17. Leon Trotsky, Europe and America: Two Speeches on Imperialism (New
York 1971), Adolph Hitler, Hitler's Secret Book (New York 1961), 103, 108; Sir
Oswald Mosley, My Life (London 1968), 185-6, 194-209. American developments
profoundly influenced other radicals active on the British left; see, for instance,
H. N. Brailsford, John A. Hobson, A. Creech Jones, and E. F. Wise, The Living
Wage (London 1926); H. N. Brailsford, 'American Bankers as Europe's Real
Rulers', New Leader, 11January 1929, 6.
18. The Economist, 29 June 1929, 1439.
19. See Joseph Marion Jones Jr., Tariff Retaliation: Repercussions of the
Hawley-Smoot Bill (Philadelphia 1934), ch. 3 and passim.
20. US State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, Vol. I,
988-93; Jones, Tariff Retaliation, 159-63; The Economist, 2 February 1929, 221.
21. The Economist, 20 April 1929, 848; ibid., 8 June 1929, 1279; Ibid., 22 June
1929, 1393; Ibid., 13 July 1929, 64; European Finance, 26 July 1929, 79-80; The
Statist, 27 July 1929, 132; Andre Siegfried, 'European Reactions to American Tariff
Proposals', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8, no. 1 (October 1929), 13-19.
22. Amery's apprehension received clear expression in Leopold S. Amery, The
Empire in the new Era. Speeches Delivered during an Empire Tour. 1927-1928 (London
1928); Hirst's in his contribution to Barker, America's Secret, 1 and passim.
Hirst's efforts to save General Electric from American take-over earned him the censure
of the City, but received the compliment of emulation by Marconi International
Marine, Imperial Airways, Fairey Aviation, and Rolls Royce, among others. See
The Times, 7, 12, 13 March 1929; European Finance, 15 March 1929, 173, 177: The
Manchester Guardian Commercial, 21 March 1929, 342; New Leader, 12 April
1929, 10; The Economist, 15 June 1929, 1350-1; The Daily Telegraph, 22 June 1929.
The impact of American economic expansion on the empire received sober examination
in 'Europe at the Cross-Roads', The Round Table, Vol. MCMXXVI, no. 63
(June 1926), 476-501. Less restrained was the warning issued by Thomas Greenwood
that Russia and the United States 'aim both, consciously or unconsciously, at the
disruption of the British Empire — the former with a subversive propaganda, the
latter with financial imperialism'. See his 'Whither British Foreign Policy?', The
Empire Review, Vol. 1, no. 344 (September 1929), 192.
23. Bevin's outlook is revealed in Alan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest
Bevin, Vol. 1, Trade Union Leader, 1881-1940 (London 1960), 362; Report of
distribution.
 1980 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized
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42
Evidence (London 1931), I., Q.555. A glimpse of Norman's and Baldwin's outlook
is provided in Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary, ed. Keith Middlemas, 2 vols. (London
1969), I. 177. It is noteworthy that Baldwin chaired the cabinet meeting in 1928
which authorized investigation of the dangers to 'vital national interests' from
American capital control of British enterprise. See Cabinet conclusions, 13 March
1928, PRO CAB 23/57: 14(28)5.
24. Hansard, Fifth Series, Vol. 229, cols. 225-6 and 476-7; Ibid., Vol. 230, col.
1055.
25. Graham memorandum, 15 July 1929, PRO, CAB 24/205: CP209(29).
26. Even MacDonald betrayed ambivalent feelings towards American power, as
indicated by the fact that the first issue to which he directed the new Economic Advisory
Council was the threat to British security posed by American direct investment
in British industry. See conclusions, 17 February 1930, PRO, CAB 58/2:
EAC/1st Mtg.
27. Minutes by Craigie, Lindsay, Wellesley, Henderson, 12 July 1929, PRO,
FO 371/13537: A4956/139/45: conclusions, 23 July 1929, PRO CAB 23/61:
29(29)25.
28. Tyrrell letter to Henderson, 29 July 1929, PRO, FO 800/284.
29. League of Nations, Official Journal 1929, Records of the Tenth Ordinary
Session of the Assembly, Plenary Minutes, 79-81.
30. Ibid., 48; League of Nations, Official Journal 1929, Records of the Tenth Ordinary
Session of the Assembly. Minutes of the Second Committee, 20, 22, 25-7,
32-3.
31. 'Resume de l'échange de vues qui a eu lieu à l'issue du déjeuner offert le 9
septembre par M. Briand aux réprésentants des Etats européens à la SDN'; France,
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, carton 1253, no. 1.
32. 'Note pour M. Massigli', 2 September 1929, ibid.
33. The state of Foreign Office intelligence is indicated by the background paper
prepared in the Office library for the Foreign Secretary, 'Proposals for securing
economic and political unity in Europe', 24 July 1929, PRO, FO 371/14134,
W7294/6739/98.
34. Compare Freymond, XIII; Sir Alfred Mond, Industry and Politics (London
1927) 276.
35. Jean Schlumberger, and Robert Meyer, Emile Mayrisch. Précurseur de la
construction de l'Europe (Lausanne 1967); Jacques de Launay, Emile Mayrisch et la
politique du patronat (Bruxelles 1965).
36. Cf. L'Europe de Demam. Official organ of the French section of the Union.
L'Union scandinave, an organization dedicated to the creation of a 'United States of
European nations within the framework of the League of Nations', boasted an
equally impressive French 'committee of co-operation'. Its committee of honour
was presided over by Gaston Doumergue, President of the Republic, and included
MM. Barthou, Bouisson, Briand, Cailloux, Paul Doumer, Herriot, Leygues, Marsal,
and Painlevé; its management committee included Leon Jouhaux, Theo
Laurent, Henri Lichtenberger, de Peyerimhoff, Albert Thomas, Joseph Barthélémy,
Yvon Delbos, Flandin, Renaudel, Rollin, and Loucheur.
37. Monnosuke Kajima, Jacques de Launay, Vittorio Pons, and Arnold Zurcher,
Coudenhove-Kalergi. Le Pionnier de l'Europe Unie (Lausanne 1971); Richard
Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers the World (London 1953), 148-9.
distribution.
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43
38. Minute by A. W. A. Leeper, 8 May 1930, PRO, FO 371/14366,
C3439/230/18.
39. E. H. Carr, then a member of the central department, repeatedly dismissed
Briand's talk of European unity as 'hot air', 'clap-trap', and 'eye-wash'. See Carr
minutes, 9 January 1930, PRO, F0371/14365; C230/230/18; 2 April 1930; PRO,
FO371/14365 C2356/230/18.
40. Tyrrell minute, 2 October 1926, PRO, FO371/11246; C10417/10417/62.
41. The Times, 15 March 1928.
42. Tyrrell minute, 21 March 1928, PRO, FO371/12900, C2116/652/18.
43. Tyrrell letter to Henderson, 30 October 1929, PRO, FO800/284.
44. Tyrrell despatch to Henderson, no. 3, 8 January 1930, PRO, FO371/14365;
C230/230/18.
45. Tyrrell letter to Vansittart, 28 January 1930, PRO, F0371/14365;
C1002/230/18. Serruys, an authority on Byzantine history, had negotiated the
Franco-German commercial treaty of 1927, and participated actively in discussion
on the future of the most-favoured-nation principle as member and latterly chairman
of the League economic committee. Resigning from public service in 1928, he
had joined the investment bankers Lazard Frères and Citroen.
46. Vansittart letter to Tyrrell, 3 February 1930, PRO, F0371/14365:
C2116/653/18: Tyrrell letter to Vansittart, 11February 1930, PRO, F0371/14365:
C1234/230/18.
47. Tyrrell despatch to Henderson, no. 26, 13 Feburary 1930, PRO,
FO371/14951: W.1602/17/98.
48. The Times, 1 March 1930.
49. Sargent letter to Tyrrell, 26 February 1930, PRO, F0371/14365:
C1234/230/18.
50. League of Nations, 'Proceedings of the Preliminary Conference with a view
to Concerted Economic Action, 17 February-24 March 1930', C.222M.109.II., 90,
94, 103, 107, 110, 113, 114, 151, 156, 294.
51. Fountain letter to Foreign Office, 30 April 1930, PRO, FO371/14365:
C3359/230/18.
52. The Times, 26 March 1930.
53. Tyrrell despatch to Henderson, no. 319, 25 March 1930, PRO, FO371/14952:
W3103/17/98.
54. The Times, 25 March 1930.
55. Rumbold despatch to Henderson, no. 254, 3 April 1930, PRO, F0371/14365:
C2694/230/18. See also Rumbold despatch to Henderson, I1 October 1929, PRO,
FO371/13630: C7801/299/18; Rumbold letter to Sargent, 28 February 1930, PRO,
FO371/14365: C1753/230/18; Rumbold despatch to Henderson, no. 190, 14 March
1930, PRO, FO371/14365: C2545/230/18.
56. Rumbold letter to Sargent, 13 February 1930, PRO, FO371/14365:
C1358/230/18.
57. Graham despatch to Henderson, no. 187, 14 March 1930, PRO,
FO371/14365: C2355/230/18.
58. European Finance, 28 February 1930, 136.
59. Rumbold despatch to Henderson, no. 214, 24 March 1930, PRO,
FO371/14365: C2356/230/18.
60. Rumbold despatch to Henderson, no. 333, 29 April 1930, PRO,
FO371/14366, C3438/230/18.
distribution.
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44
61. United Kingdom, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Second
series, Vol. 1, no. 303, Rumbold despatch to Henderson, no. 347, 2 May 1930.
62. Campbell letter to Vansittart, 6 May 1930, F0371/14366: C3561/230/18.
63. See, for instance, Tyrrell letter to Henderson, 28 March 1930, PRO, FO
800/281; Tyrrell despatch to Henderson, no. 411, 11 April 1930, PRO, FO
371/14365: C2841/230/18.
64. Howard Smith memorandum, 6 May 1930, PRO, F0371/14980:
W5193/451/98; 'Discussion between Mr. Henderson and M. Briand at the Quai
d'Orsay on May 9th, 1930', minute dated 10 May 1930, PRO, F0371/14980:
W4922/451/98.
65. A. W. Cordier, European Union and the League of Nations (Geneva 1931), 5.
66. De Margene to Briand, nos. 444-9, 19 May 1930, France, Ministère des Affaires
Etrangères, carton 1253, no. 2. On the previous day, Serruys had spoken to
the Mayrisch committee in Heidelberg on the implications of Briand's proposals for
France and Germany, L'Huillier, 98.
67. Leeper minute, 21 May 1930, and Sargent minute, 25 May 1930, PRO,
F0371/14980: W5111/451/98.
68. Compare Fouques-Duparc letter, 14 April 1930, and 'Note', undated but probably
drafted about the end of April 1930, France, Ministère des Affaires
Etrangères, carton 1253, no. 1.
69. Leeper memorandum, 30 May 1930, PRO, FO371/14981: W5585/451/98.
70. Noel-Baker minute, 26 May 1930, Cecil minute to Henderson, PRO,
F0371/14981: W5336/451/98.
71. Memorandum from League of Nations Union, 23 May 1930, and League of
Nations Union memorandum to Henderson, 20 June 1930, PRO, F0800/281.
72. Salter letter to Noel-Baker, 22 May 1930, PRO, FO371/14982:
W5805/451/98.
73. Howard Smith minute, 5 June 1930, PRO, F0371/14982: W5805/451/98.
74. 'Disappointments at the I.L.O.', The Industrial Review, July 1930, 15-16.
75. Board of Trade memorandum, 5 April 1930, PRO, BT11/234.
76. Grigg letter and treasury memorandum to Selby, 11July 1930, and Thomas
letter to MacDonald, 10 July 1930, PRO, FO371/14983, W7203/451/98.
77. Conclusions, 16 July 1930, CAB23/64 PRO: 41 (30) 8; Vansittart memorandum
to de Fleuriau, 16 July 1930, PRO, F0371/14983: W7204/451/98.
78. Noel-Baker minute, 13 May 1930, PRO, FO371/14980: W5079/451/98.
79. Norton minute, 19 May 1930, PRO, FO371/14980: W5192/451/98.
80. Mallet minute, 10 June 1930, PRO, FO371/14982: W5919/451/98.
81. Kennard despatch to Henderson no. 174, 17 June 1930. Minute by Vansittart,
30 June, 1930, PRO, FO371/14982: W6386/451/98.
82. British Library, Cecil MSS, 51, 081, Cecil letter to MacDonald, 18 August
1930.
83. 'Conférence tenue à Genève sur l'Organisation d'un Régime d'Union
Fédérale Européenne', 8 September 1930, France, Ministère des Affaires
Etrangères, carton 1254, no. 4. Cadogan telegram to Foreign Office, no. 45LN, 9
September 1930, PRO, FO371/14984: W9214/451/98.
84. British Library, Cecil MSS, 51, 081, Cecil minute to Henderson, 9 September
1930.
85. British Library, Cecil MSS, 51, 081, Cecil letter to Henderson, 11September
1930.
distribution.
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45
86. Coudenhove-Kalergi, op. cit., 114. According to Dalton, however, by
September 1930 Drummond was prepared to leave Briand's plan in European hands
since 'he thinks it is bound to come to nothing, and doesn't want the discredit to fall
on the League.' British Library of Political and Economic Science, Dalton MSS, entry
of 7/9-1/10/30 in diary of 28/8/29-27/3/31. See also Ralph T. White,
'Regionalism Vs Universalism in the League of Nations. A Study of "PanEuropeanism"
and the League Secretariat between 1925 and 1930, based on
material in the League Archives at Geneva', Annales d'Etudes Internationales, 1
(1970), 88-114.
87. P. J. V. Rolo, Britain and the Briand Plan: The Common Market that never
was (Keele 1972).
88. League of Nations, Official Journal 1930, Records of the Eleventh Ordinary
Session of the Assembly. Plenary Minutes, 37-9.
89. League of Nations, Official Journal 1930, Records of the Eleventh Ordinary
Session of the Assembly. Minutes of the Second Committee, 23.
90. Ibid., 54-5, also 87, 88.
91. Ibid., 83.
92. League of Nations, Official Journal 1930, Records of the Eleventh Ordinary
Session of the Assembly. Plenary Minutes, 183-6.
93. League of Nations, note by the Secretary-General, "Resolutions Adopted at
the 2nd Session of the Commission (January 16th-21st, 1931)", 22 January 1931,
C.114.M.41.1931.VILC.E.U.E.12.
94. Howard Smith minute, 13 February 1931, PRO, FO371/15694: W1649/7/98.
95. This was clearly acknowledged by Dr. Peter Munch, Danish Foreign Minister
and delegate to the assembly. See Peter Munch, La Politique de Danemark dans la
SdN (Geneva 1931), 42. On Britain's importance in European trade see, Heinrich
Liepmann, TariffLevels and the Economic Unity of Europe, translated by H. Stenning
(London 1938).
96. Tyrrell despatch to Henderson, no. 784, PRO, FO371/14366: C5529/230/18;
Campbell despatch to Henderson, no. 930, 13 August 1930, PRO, FO 371/14366:
C6393/230/18.
Robert W. D. Boyce
is a lecturer in the Department of International
History at the London School of Economics.
He is completing a study of British
foreign economic policy formulation and
management during the world crisis,
1929-39.
distribution.
 1980 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized
by Tom Bossman on November 14, 2007http://ehq.sagepub.comDownloaded from