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1 Joe u mc n is
regiment Crosses ,i frontier. When force is overwhelming ii can conquer without bloodshed. Germany acquired Czechoslovakia in this way and Russia made the Baltic States hex vassals. Long years may pass in European history that witness iio events .is brutal or cynical .-is these. In these static periods the balance of power is so delicate thai no ambition* State will risk i move. Jiui even in these uneventful periods forces are at play; when they are equal and opposite we flatter ourselves by calling the negative result a condition of peace. We can hope for nothing better, so long as power is owned by a number ví Sovereign Stales, each seeking its own advantage.
The only radical cure is manifestly to transfer power from these competing Sovereign units to a collective whole that includes them all. Each must surrender the primary prerogative of sovereignly, the right to make war, and with it the ownership of power and of the took thai serve lor war. They must agree, that is to say, to form a I-ederatiori, and to transfer to it this prerogative of sovereignty. Henceforward the whole responsibility for defence will fall on it, and the com ponent States are relieved ol this burden.
5. Lionel Robbins: The Cause of International Conflict
End 1939
From The Economic Causei of War, London (Jonathan Cape) 19J9. i>. 99-109; reprinted New Ytirk (Fciiig.) 1V6S; published in Italian as Le cause eomomiche delta gue-ra. Turin (Einaudt) 1944, pp. 93-105.
K
Lione.' Charles Rabbin, (IS9S-I9H-Í, tiler Lord Robbins) teas Professor of Economies in ihc University of London, at the London School of Economic*, from 1929 ro 196! ■ He way Director ofl.be Economic Section of she Offices of the War Cabinet {19*1—ÍV,, President of thľ Royal Economic Society (fífíf-SS) and Chairman of the financial Times {I9ňf—70). Among the books thai established him as one of the leading liberal economists if bis time were two which laid the economic foundations for much subsequent federálni thought! Economic Planning anil International Order' (1937) end The Economic Caus" of War (19)9), each of them based on d Series of lectures delivered, at the invitation of Professor Rappard. at the Institut Umienitaire de Hautet Etudes Internationales of Geneva. The preface "/'The Economic Causes of War is dared 16 September I9S9 and. after rebutting, in the first part of the book, the Marxist theory ihat var n caused by capitalism, and then identifying "independent national sovereignties as the root cause of international conflict. Robbini wen! on to propose "a genuine federation ichicb takes over from the state! ofwhich II >• composed, those powers which engender conflict'''' and to make an eloquent appeal for a mied Stater of Lumpe in whkh "the German Geist can give ir> re.«, not its worst, to Europe '" Thus Robbitn already bad the conviction and the intellectual instruments - bich enabled htm t<> make the key contribution to the economic thinking of Federal Union and its
I   <>!' at
'   (sei p  IS below) I     ;■   ■ • below t p ic». fp.51 bi .-.■
1. Federal Union 1939-41
45
Research Institute dming the following few months.' 7V»« extract summarises his critique of national sovereignty as the generator of economic conflicts which lead to war and his proposal f or a European federation.0
{, ..) The ultimate condition giving rise to those clashes of national economic interest which lead to international war is the existence of independent national sovereignties. Not capitalism, but the anarchic political organization of the world is the root disease of our civilization.
Against this, however, it might be argued that such conflicts ate not necessary.
S See Economic Aspects of federation, published lirsi in Chaniug-Fearce (ed.), federal Union, and reprinted as Federal Tracts >W 2 and in Ransctnc (ed. I. Studies in federal Planning; ami die Interim Report on Economic Aspects of lbe federal Constitution it» ľUltl. First Annual Repot? 1939-40, which was drafted by Robbins and agreed by the members of the FUR] Economic Committee (fur its membership, $ec p. 31). The Olhet excerpts Iroin Robbins' writings are number 15, p. 63; 38, p. 113; 41- p. 123; 42, p. 125; 45. p. 135; 55. p. 150.
i> flie l%H edition of The Economic Causes of War contains an interesting new preface in which Robbins evaluates his theory in the light of subsequent experience. Although the origins ol East-Wen tension are "ideological rather than economic" (19ť>S edition, ľ 5), the Marxian theories of the economic causes ol war remain relevant because many arc sul] influenced by them; moreover, "the powers of independent sovereign states to pursue economic and financial policies inimical to the prosperity of others are an im-pmt.ini l.mor lending to international disunity and hence to situations which may be exploited by power politics actuated hy non-economic motives" {196S edition, p. 6). Kobbim then goes on to explain the evolution of his own thinking about the proposal I"? ■ United States of Europe: "The essay here reproduced ends with a section (con-laincd m tins excerpt - cd.) written in the first weeks of war, pleading passionately for the creation ol .« United States of Europe within which German creativeness and energy might lervc die common weal rather than periodically disrupting it- '' alsu contains 9 loot not c referring to plans lor a wider Atlantic Union put forward by Mr. Clarence Si i en and others, in which I express »udial appreciation of the idea but considerable scepticism concerning its practicability. At that time, I did not conceive the possibility o| in isolationist United Stales allowing itself once more to he involved in the interne-quarrels ol Europe, A greai deal has happened since then ... :hc United States \$ today (he active leader and defender of the civilisation uí ílu- Yv't-si. Such gigantic i hang« <il circumstance could not run alien the perspective of thought regarding the possibilities ol the future, In ill« years immediately following tlie end oi the war, despairing »I the stability and political reliability ol some ol the states of Western I mope and revolted by the anti-Americanism Current among influential continental politician« and thinkers whose ven existence had been saved by American intervention, I abandoned my carlici position and argued against british entry inu?a purely European l umí. telling m» hopes on a laigei structure developing gradually from the North Allimx Alliance. In ibis I now think 1 «as wrong .. in my failure to realise the -•til of the in aii-in. in these circumstances, "".» United western Europe i u i . ■ ould be played in it bv Great Britain ... So [ arn back in a frame of nund m which the peroration ol this essay t% not something I wish to repudiate. But... nphniiie ihai I continue tu regard the more limited association .»•■ ■•. . . pre-luumin        lo a more p                 larger union later un        (I96R edition, pp    ■
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II the different sovereign suites would abstain from the practices of restriction-ism, si their Citizens would banish from their hearts the desire tor sectional advantage, these things* need not happen. Rightly interpreted, the long-run interests of the inhabitants of the different national areas are not in disharmony. Whatever the prospects of momentary advantage Irom rcstrietionist manipulation and aggression, in tlie modern world at least, the long-run interests of all who are not sadistic maniacs lie above all in the preservation or peace.
Such was the belief of the Cobdenite liberals, in spiie of the jeers of the uneducated, probably the most disinterested body of men who ever influenced the policy of a great nation. But, in spite of its nobility, it was grounded in error. It is true thai, rightly interpreted, the long-run interests of the majority of the human race are not in conflict. It is true that, for humane men, the disaster of war is an evil o! the first order of magnitude. But it is not true that, in the absence of the rule ol law, there is .my security against its occurrence. 'I1ic Cobdenite liberals would have never dreamt of urging that, within national areas, the long-run interests of the majority in peaceful co-operation could be regarded as secured without a framework ot law and coercion. Such a view would have been the view, not of liberals, but or philosophical anarchists. What just Í fie at ion had they, therefore, for assuming that, in the relations between the inhabitants of different national areas, a superior harmony might be expected? If they did not expect the mere demonstration of long-run interest, unsupported by law, to secure an absence of anti-social behaviour within the nation, why should they have expected that it would do so between nations, where the play of irrational prejudice and the Lick of understanding and sympathy were so much more likely co be prevalent? Surely ihe truth is that, if the different national governments are free to do anything, there is a strong probability thai, with the best will in the world on the part ol the majority, from time to time, error or sinister Interest will result in policies leading 10 disharmony.
We can nee this very plainly ii we turn for a moment from the relations of geographical groups to the relations of groups of producers. It is possible to argue that, rightly interpreted, the interests ol different groups of producers are not in long-period disharmony, If one group alone restricts output, it is quite possible that it may gain; but ii al! groups play ihe same game, then most at least will be the poorer. Nevertheless, knowledge of such long-period harmonics docs not justify us in believing that, if groups of producers are given by statute a position of uncontrolled monopolistic privilege, the prospect of short-period gain will not tempt them very often to abuse it. It is true that governments have sometimes acted on this assumption and that ihe 'experts' they have consulted have done nothing to warn them of its dangers. But experience shows that it is unwarranted. If groups of producers are given positions of monopolistic privilege, a state of affairs is created in which the emergence of policies tending to disharmony can be regarded as almost inevitable.
In exactly the same way, il geographical group- have uncontrolled powers ol restriction and exclusion, if there is no Framework o! law limiting the actions of independent sovereign siaies, then a state ol affairs exists in which ihe abuse ot these powers is probable. There exists a state "t affairs in which the del us ions ol
I   FaU-r.il Union 1939-41
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restrictionism and the sinister influence of the pressure groups have maximum scope and effectiveness a stale of affairs in which the deep-seated non-rational impulses of nationalism have the maximum opportunity to become entangled in the support of economic policies which ultimately lead to war. However true it mav be that, in the long run, such policies can be shown to lead 10 impoverishment and international conflict, there is no reason to suppose thai, in the absence of the restraims of a rule of law, the majority ol the citizens will be sufficiently alert or sufficiently long sighted to prevent their emergence. A world organization which depends upon the continual dominance in every sovereign state of the principles of Cobdenite liberalism, is an organization which is bound not infrequently to be disorganized. The dominance in one important state or group ol states of different principles is liable to endanger the whole system. A system of sovereign geographical groups is no less likely to be provocative of clashes of interest than a system of 'sovereign' groups of producers.
All this becomes very clear if we take a hypothetical example, which, but for ihe foresight of a small group ol men and the courage and consistency of their successors, might easily have become an example in actual history.
Under the constitution of the United States of America, the governments ol the different states arc prohibited Irom imposing protective tariffs on imports or exports. They arc prohibited from limiting migration or tlte movement or capital. All these matters are the prerogative of the federal government.
Lei us suppose that things had been different. Suppose that the Constitutional I ongrcss ha.! broken down and there had eventually arisen, in thai great area, instead of one federation, forty eight independent sovereign states.
I lues any man of experience doubt lor a moment that there would have arisen
also, in America as in Europe, a network of restriction on interstate economic
relations? Trade would have been limited. The interests in various slates would
have protested against the 'flood of cheap imports'; even under the present con
ititution   there   are   formidable   barriers   in   the   shape of   spurious   veterinary
ulaiions and such-like measures not guarded against by the founders ol the
. (institution. Migration would have been hampered. II prospěni v in one pari was
itci than in another, there would have been protests against the 'flood ol
immigrant labour'; in the recent depression, unconstitutional limitations ol this
ion have actually been attempted by various states. Relations ol debtors and
: !.»rs would have been endangered. Ii the states ot the middle wcjsi were
tjed, n"i only would there be isolated failures to keep faith with eastern
■lure w.ml.l .lis.» be imposed the paralysing apparatus ol exchange
control and partial repudiation with which European practice Ins made us lain
ilin    And ihe result of  ill this would be interstate Conflict.   The different
rnments would feel it incumbent on ihcm to maintain national power by
ilium i s tmi mandu vres. The inhabitants ol the poorci states would covci ihe
privilege* ol i In richct states, There would be talk ol the necessity for IM
Where dcbi wai   r« pudiated, ihe cause ol the investors might become  i
■ i»l dip!.....a t n  Iru non, n 1% easy to imagine an expeditionary force from
York invading, lei us say, Kansas to proicci the interests ol the bond hnldi
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In short, we should be confronted with the whole dreary spectacle of power politics with its manoeuvres, ÍK devotions, its mass sentiment, and its background or sinister' interest, with which the history of unhappy Uurope has made us so depressing!)' familiar. And tlie pacifists would say that it was due it) lack o( virtue. The biologists would s*y it was an aspect of the inevitable struggle for existence. The psychologists would say it was a manifestation of the death instinct which it wiHifd lake a thousand years research to learn to sublimate. The Marxians would say it was all due to the capitalist system. And certain among the historians would hint thai it was the result ol dark subtle forces of which only they understood ihe mystery.
Hot in fact, it would be due to the existence ol independent sovereign states. No doubt it would he possible to investigate further the catastrophe which had brought it about that this, rather than federation, had been the line oi evolution. If Hamilton had not lived or if Lincoln had faltered. .- or if the economic interests of dissenting states had succeeded in securing the rejection of the proposals of the Constitutional Congress-any of these things might have caused the path ol history to be different. But in the sense in which cause may be said to be a condition in the absence ol which subsequent events could not have happened, the existence or independent sovereign states ought be justly regarded as the lund.initnl.il cause ot conflict. And since we know thai it was deliberately to avoid such a state of chaos that Hamilton and his friends devised the existing constitution, we may well regard their motives as the cause of its freedom from this kind of embarrassment. In the sense which is significant for political action, it is the chaos of independent sovereignties which is the ultimate condition ol international conflict. It is not only because the independent states have the power to declare war, that war is sometimes declared, it is also because they have the power to adopt policies involving clashes of national interest of which war seem:- the only solution.
The United Stales ôf Europe
If this iji so, then the remedy is plain. Independent sovereignty must be limited. As citizens of the various national states, wc may hope to diminish the danger of conflict by opposing policies which lend to evoke it. But this is not enough. The apparatus ol modem war is so formidable, the cost of its maintenance so onerous, the dangers of actual conflict arc so great, that we cannot afford to rely on spontaneous goodwill as our only safeguard against catastrophe. There must beau international framework ol law and order, supported by solid sane tions which prevent the emergence of those policies which arc eventually responsible for conflict. We do not need a unitary world state; such an organization would be neither practicable nor desirable, bin we do need a federal organization; not a mere confederation of sovereign slates as was the League of Nations, but a genuine Icdcration which takes ovci horn the states of which it is composed, those powers which engender conflict. The founders of the League ol Nations were nghi in thai ihey recognized the need uf a su pernatí tnul authority: their error was thai ihey did m>i go far enough   Thcj tin! not realize that the
I. Federal Union 1939-41
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effective functioning of a supernational authority is incompatible with independent national sovereignty. Bui to-day we know this. The history of the League of Nations is one long demonstration o| the truth of the proposition long ago sei forth by Hamilton and Madison, that there is no safety in confederations. Wc know to-day that unless wc destroy the sovereign state, ihe sovereign state will destroy us.'
Now. of course, it is quite Utopian to hope lor ihe formation in our time of a federation ol world dimensions. There is not sufficient feeling of a common citizenship. There is as yet no sufficiently generalized culture. In present conditions, even the electoral problems of such a body would present insurmountable difficulties. The formation ol a world system, the political consummation of the unity of ihe human race, may well be regarded as the divine event towards which all that is good in the heritage of ihe diverse civilizations of the world, invites us to strive. But, whatever we may hope for in the distant future of the planet, ii must be clear that, ai ihe present stage of human development, any attempt at so comprehensive an organization would be necessarily doomed to disaster.
Butii is not Utopian to hope for the construction of more limited federations-for the merging of independent sovereignties in areas where there exists the consciousness or a common civilization and a need for greater unity. In particular it is not Utopian to hope for the formation of a structure of this kind in that part of the world now most menaced by the contradictions ol its present political organization - among the warring sovereignties of Europe. So far is it from being Utopian that, for those with eyes to See, ii is ihe most urgent practical necessity of ihe age.
Tor it is surely plain that ihe present political organization of Europe has completely outlived its usefulness and is now nothing but a menace to the very existence ol the civilization it has helped to bring forth. When the sovereign states ol modern F.uropc emerged from the feudalism ol the middle ages, their functions were liberalizing and creative. They eliminated the mass <il local restrictions which were strangling economic development. They pacified the warring barons and princes <md established uniformity of law over areas given over lo particularism. But, at ihe present time, n is, not their unifying, bul their separatist tendencies which have become dominant. They restrict the activities of ifí economic life which, in its spontaneous development, spreads far beyond their borders. They are uneconomic umis for the administration of what positive functions ihey discharge: and the burden of maintaining the apparatus ol defence which is necessary to secure then independence, threatens mere and more i<> absorb all the energies ol their inhabitants. The existence •>! restrictions to trade .nid movement between the different states ol Europe to-daj is as absurd as the existence ol similar restrictions between different provinces ai earlier periods. It» an intelligent outsider unacquainted with ihe background <>i our history, the maintenance ol vasi armies In the states ol liuropc km defence against en h oihei
I it.....tilu original «m ii>" i fullci < lahm ,•„.■. ■>! thcu argument* w« my Etv.....
'fanning ami/niematianal Ordi      tlup»   iv, % and xi   The genera                   »I Mi
■ I..                                        thoiild alio hi cumuli«
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musí be hardly less ridiculous than would be the maintenance or armies for the separate Jelence of the towns or departments within these stares. The system has rcachec breaking point: and, with the development of modern military techniques- Íl lias no longer survival value. As gunpowder rendered obsolete the feudal system, so the aeroplane renders obsolete the system ol the independent sovereignties of Europe. A more comprehensive type of organization is inevitable. Will it come by mutual agreement or by Caesarian conquest? That is the unsolved question. I'Or either there must be empire or federation; on a lone view, there is no alternative.
But to create such a federation will not be easy. We have a common culture, lint we have no common language. We have a common history. But it is riven bv fratricidal quarrels: No one who has realized the nature of the interests involved in the perpetuation of the present powers of the independent sovereign states can be blind to the strength ol the opposition to any attempt to eliminate our disunity. The federation ol the thirteen secession states of the new world was almost wrecked by local particularism, even though they were united by a common tongue, common habits and the memory ol recent action against a common enemy. How much harder must it be for the warring states of Europe, with none of these aids, to establish a basis of unity- It will not be easy to make the new Europe.
Nevertheless, of all the tasks which present themselves to our generation, it is that which is most worth while attempting. The age in which we live is an age in which men have worshipped many idols and followed many false visions. It has-.seen nationalism run mad and collectivism turn oppressor. The ideals of the romantic rebellion nave proved dead sea fruit in our hands. But the great ideals of liberty, justice and mutual tolerance and the heritage of art and learning which is their spiritual outcome, have not been found wanting. The more ihey have become endangered, the more important we have discovered them to be. But it is lust these things which are in peril from the disunity of Europe. The political structure amid which they have developed has developed stresses and strains which threaten to overwhelm them; if they arc to be preserved, a constructive effort is necessary. Not merely because war is terrible, not merely because it impoverishes, but because it threatens all that is most valuable in the cultural heritage ol Europe, wc must devise institutions which banish it from our mid«. It is because the civilization of Socrates and Spinoza, of Shakespeare and Beethoven, ol Michelangelo ami Rembrandt, of Newton and Pascal, is at stake thjt wc must build a new Europe.
And now that the war has come and our hopes of peaceful developments lie Mattered, this necessity is all the greater if the end is not to be chaos. We arc fighting < icrmans. If European civilization is not to perish, we must destroy the tyranny which rules over them. No one with any sense ol history and art will deny the existence <>l .1 real German problem m Europe — the incapacity lor government, the tcndenc) to brutality and sadism, the fascination with the tir.iih motive, the moral clumsiness, the deep sense ol spiritual insecurity, which i] 1 1 nid again, sun.* the use <-i Prussia, have been .1 menace to the peace and liberties ol f uropc   Bui [01 »II that, (Icrmans arc I uropcans   I hey arc part ol om
I. ľedcial Union 1939-41
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civilization; and Europe can never be completely healthy till Germany is healthy too. Somehow or other we must create a framework in which the German Geist can give its best, not its worst, to Europe. A draconian peace will do nothing. The Nazis must be extirpated: but wc have neither the strength nor the will to keep Germans in subjection for ever. What more appropriate outcome of our present agonies, therefore, what more fitting consecration of the blood which is being shed, than a peace in which this great people, purged of its devils, shall be coerced into free and equal citizenship of the United States of Europe?
6. William Curry: The Fundamentals of World Order     End 1939 From The Case for Federal Union, Harmondsworth (Penguin) 1939, p. 105.
William Burnley Curry (1900-62) was " Scholar of Trinity College. Cambridge, where he audita physics, then spent Im working life as 1 schoolmaster. He taught at Graham School, Holt, at Bed/lies School and at Oak Lane County Day School. Philadelphia, inhere he became headmaster at the age of 29; and he was headmaster of the progressive coeducational Darlington School I9JI-Í7. He was very active in the early day* of Federal Union, becom-mg a member 0/its National Council in February 1940 and later Vice-Chairman. He wrote most "fllic Case lor Federal Union m August 1939 as a popular -work designed to propagate the federal idea, and revised if hastily after the outbreak of war tn September. Published that autumn as a Penguin Special, by April I94C over iOO.OCO copies of it had been sold. Starting with an attack on nationalism and national sovereignty, he went on to stress the need for a world-wide federation based on liberal values. He was influenced by Clarence Stmt's proposal for a union of the liberal democracies, though the outbreak of war caused htm Id propose that Germany he offered membership.' He shoail in this excerpt how the progress of Science and technology has outstripped the xooihPs political structure, based on national 1 ■ l.|:,;'"''
The progress of science and invention has changed the character of war and has
made the world already one community. All war is now civil war, and its de-
uctiveness is such that if it continues ú will destroy society altogether.
I Infortunatcly, science and invention have sped ahead of our moral and political
ideas, which áre still rooted m a past that science has made obsolete. The political
organisation of the world, as regards the relationships between States, is still one
1  arch). and wc cling obstinately to the ideas and institutions that express this
unarchy. Anarchy ^ the condition out of which the likelihood and the possibility
var ai isc, and oui task is u> substitute order and government for the anarchy
wi  1 ndun ai present.
.      .          ,         Uihcr cwerpu fran    The 1           r Federal Union are number 2-1
■ ľ.'
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