.V4 Document) Economic motives, however, will probably drive them to it sooner or later. The whole world is so closely bound by economic lies that economic national ism must be disastrous; the great development of productive capacity demands wide markets; and the appalling conditions under which many millions are now forced to live necessitate the proper exploitation of world resources. The first steps toward an economic union have already been taken, under stress of war, bv England and France, just as they were taken in the last war. It is of the utmost importance that there should be no retreat at the time of peacemaking from this economic alliance, which we may hope is but a beginning. 4. Constitutions, Institutions and Powers 29. Kenneth Wheare: 'What Federal Government is' 194! I mhu U/mí Federal Government is, i;e|>. 17-1B. 23-38. Kenneth Clinton Wheare i(1907-79, subsequent!)-Sir Kenneth Wheare) was an Australian ■■■ came a Felfov of University College, Oxford 0939-44), Dean of University College It}, Gladstone Professor af Government und I'ublie Administration nt the University 1944 \7)and Vkc-Chancellor oftbc University »fOxford (1964-66). HewroiC m constitutional and legal matters, iWaJmg Federal Government,1'-most of ernte when be was a Fellow of University College during the Second World War. i, .n .(/ University College with Beveridge when be became a member of the Federal Heieareb Institute's Constitutional Research Committee, together with Coodbarf tied a Draft < onitilMlion for its first Conference, and a-rote What Federal Government Untitnte. This excerpt comprises a large part of bis Federal Tract, which was «It designed :•> ex plam federal government to Hritisb readers who bad little under- I tts rationale and structure. i nlci il (iovcrnment is a thing of which most people in the United Kingdom of II Hi mm and Northern Ireland have had no direct, personal experience, and » lind ii hard, therefore, to understand what it is. (...) tt i ustomed to a form of government one of the leading character is-i h Im d i- ih.it one single legislature, the King-in-Parliamcnt at Wcsunins-tuthority to make laws for the whole ol the United Kingdom on all haiiocvcr; and these laws duly made prevail over rules made by any bod\ m the Kingdom mu\ are accepted by the courts as valid law and i iv I'lu rcsuh is that people in this country may doubt whether acts of .im) laws, hut they cannot doubt that they are good law. In a n ii n otherwise, There, ins possible to doubt not only whether the acts itiirc in the federation are good laws but also whether they are good oi - court io declare acts which are almost universally b.nl law ami no law at all. This intentional uberal "i. < 'ii In- will ol the elected representatives of xhe people as •islaturc, appears to us to be a strange device. Why do ment London Oxford 1 Iniversil) Press! 1946. KŔ Dot* omenu people adopt such a form of government, and why do they continue lu put up with it? (. . .) What Federal Government is What then is federalism? Its essence consists, I think, in this: that in a federal system, the functions of government arc divided in such a way that the relationship between the legislature which has authority over the whole territory and those legislatures which have authority over parts of the territory is not the relationship of superior to subordinates as is the relation of the Parliament at Westminster to the Parliament at Stormont, but is the relationship of co-ordinate partners in the governmental process. In a federal government there is a division of governmental functions between one authority, usually called the federal government, which has power to regulate certain matters for the whole territory, and a collection of authorities, usually called state governments, which have power to regulate certain «uher matters lor the component parts of the territory. (. . .) Wbiii Federal Government is for II this is what federal government is, what is it lor? Why is it adopted? Why are people not satislied with devolution? A short answer to these questions mav be given in this way. If all thai people want is the power to regulate local affairs locally as a general rule, and if they are prepared at the same time to leave to a national parliament not only the power to regulate national affairs but also a power to regulate local affairs coo if it thinks fit, that is, a potential supremacy over all matters whatsoever in the territory, then a system of devolution wij| do. (. ..} It is only when a group of Territorial communities are prepared to cooperate with each other for the regulation of certain matters but lor those matters only, and when they are determined at the same time to remain separate and supreme, each in its own territory, for the regulation of other matters, that federal government is appropriate, federalism provides for this desire for cooperation in some tilings coupled with a determination to be separate in others, h was because the American colonies had this attitude to each other that ihev formed the federation of the United States of America, enumerating in their constitution the matters which they handed over to the federal congress for regulation - foreign commerce, inter-state commerce, coinage, naturalisation, post office, copyright, defence, and so on. (.. .) What Federal Government is like I have attempted to explain what federal government is and what it is for. It may next be asked: What is it like? Is the governmental machinery in a lederation arranged in any special way? Are there any essential, distinguishing marks in the institutions of a federal government? There arc, and rwo or three of them maybe mentioned. ľirsí ol all, since federal government involves .1 division ol Functions and since the states forming the federation arc anxious thai this division should be explicit mid guaranteed and thai they should nor surrender more power« than they know, I. Inderal Union 1939-41 87 il is essential for a federal government that there be a written constitution embodying the division of powers, and binding all governmental authorities throughout the federation. From it all state and federal authorities derive their powers and any actions they perform contrary to it are invalid. It must be the supreme law of the land. (...) In the second place, if the division of powers is to be guaranteed and ii the constitution embodying the division is to be binding upon federal and state governments alike, it follows that the power of amending that part of the constitution which embodies the division of powers must not be conferred cither upon the federal government acting alone or upon the state governments acting alone. It is preferable, though not essential to federalism, that the power should be exercised by the federal and state authorities acting in co-operation, as is done in the United States, for example, where amendments may be carried by a two-thuds majority, in both houses of Congress, together with a simple majority in the legislatures of three-quarters ol the States. In Australia and in Switzerland the people arc associated in the amending process through a referendum. (...) Again, if there must be a division of powers and if this division must be ibed in a constitution and if this inscribed division must be guaranteed, it follows i hat in any case of dispute between federal and state governments as to th< csteni ol the powers allocated to them under the constitution, some body Othci than the federal and state governments must be authorised to adjudicate Upon those disputes. It is not accidental, therefore, that there exists in the United States, Australia and Canada a body of this kind. The United States has its Supreme Court; Australia has a High Court together with, for some cases, the [utlicifll Committee of the Privy Council; and Canada has the Judicial Committee ul the Privy Council. Switzerland has no institution performing this function LOmplciel) and is 10 this extent imperfectly federal. (. . .) I m.IK. it the governmental authorities in a federation are to be really coordinate with each other in actual practice as well as in law, it is essential that »• should be available to each of chem, under its own unfettered control. In km id resources sufficient for the performance of the functions assigned to it i [he constitution. It is no good allotting functions to the federal or to siate i m« s and devising legal safeguards so that each should be limited strictly to ......lance of iis respective lunctions, unless at the same time adequate ismu has been made so that each authority can afford to do its job without M,p ill rig to the other for financial assistance. {. ..) I manual subordination makes an end of federalism in fact, no matter how .1 tonus may be preserved. . . i r modifications upon the completely delimited and co-ordinate division of . lui.i.ieiisn. of federalism may he essential if good government or dct isivc government shall be achieved in a given community. It may be roupol states in devising a system ol government for themselves to ii t federalism m some matters and a modified federalism or no federal-ill m uthci matters federalism is not an au\ in itself. (.. . .) Ii hat iituall) been hard to establish a te.lcr.il government. The forces of ii ,uul individualism which make federal Urn necessarj make any super- 70 •s Documents State government ai .ill almost impossible. And when .1 federation has with difficulty come to cxisr, it is only with difficulty that it continues to exist. Its operation requires great skül and tact. Its success depends upon an enormous patience and an enormous capacity lor compromise among the statesmen who work it. Swift and decisive government is impossible. Deep dividing issues mtisr be avoided. Changes can come about only at the pace of the slowest. Federal government is conservative government. Federal government is above all legalistic. It is created and regulated by a legal document; it is safeguarded by a court ol law. Compromise, conservatism, and legalism-these arc at once the virtues and the vices of federal government. It is wise to recall them when one proposes to set up a new lederal government in the world. Those who do propose such a federal government, however, may feel inclined to say to me at this point: The difficulties you have been Talking about seem to us to be much less urgent and more remote. Our greatest difficulties come not from those who prefer a unitary government lor Europe to a federal government for Ľuropc, but from those who do not believe thai any torm or government', strictly so called, for Kurope is possible or desirable. The real obstacle tor us is the supporter of the sovereign, independent state and not the supporter of the unitary state. That is true. It is also true that they must expect, when they overcome the objections of those who believe in the sovereign, independent state, to meet thereafter the objections ol those who, used to the simple certainties of unitary government, declare that they do not believe in federalism. Ii has seemed wise therelorc to recall thai federalism is a form of government which is not always appropriate or always easy to work. It is fair 10 recall ai the same time that federal government is at least government; it is order, not anarchy, it is peace, not war. 30. William Beveridge: Form of Federal Authority 1 May 1940 From Peace by Federations, Federal Tracts No. I, London, Federal Union, 1940. tip, 18-20; reprinted in World Order Paper), First Series. London, Royal Institute of In-ternationa] Affairs, September I94Q, pp. 80-82. til this excerpi, ftu'eridge1 expounds in simple terms the form of federal institutions which Whct the two Houses and 53